National Security
The national security threat landscape is increasingly complex and diverse, and presents significant challenges to Canada’s security, economic prosperity, and social cohesion. In this evolving landscape, provinces and territories, private sector entities, academia, non-governmental organizations, and individuals, are important stakeholders. Outreach and engagement are key in building resilience to modern threats in the physical and digital world. Transparency and accountability mechanisms are also key to maintaining public trust. The preservation of national security is a multi-faceted endeavor that requires cooperation across a diverse range of initiatives and programs. Public Safety Canada functions as a centralized hub for coordinating work in counter-terrorism, critical infrastructure, cyber security and transportation security.
Relevant Platform Commitments
- Work with G7, NATO, and likeminded partners to develop and expand collective responses to arbitrary detention, economic coercion, cyber threats, foreign interference in democratic processes, and egregious violations of human rights, including through the use of sanctions, support for international institutions, and coordinated action to reinforce the rules of international trade.
- Expand collaboration and information sharing with Canadian partners and across all levels of government with respect to addressing security risks in foreign research and investment partnerships.
- Increase resources available to our national security agencies to counter foreign interference and to the RCMP to protect Canadians from unacceptable surveillance, harassment, and intimidation by foreign actors.
- Implement domestic measures to protect Canadians and work closely with friends, allies, and partners to respond to illegal and unacceptable behaviour by authoritarian states, including China, Russia, and Iran.
- Expand the office of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to keep Canadians safe as climate change increasingly impacts our domestic and global contexts.
Further Information
Hostile Activities by State Actors
Hostile activities by state actors (HASA) include any efforts by a foreign state, or its proxies, to undermine Canada’s national interest and values. They involve actions that often fall short of overt, direct military aggression, yet are deceptive, threatening, corrupt, covert or illegal in nature. Foreign states engage in hostile activities to advance their strategic interests, including to seek: geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, domestic stability, and military advantages. HASA threats have been exacerbated as a result of the global environment shaped by COVID-19, which has provided foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to advance their objectives. HASA has reached levels not seen since the Cold War, and currently poses one of the greatest strategic threats to Canada’s national security as it targets the integrity of our political system, democratic institutions, social cohesion, academic freedom, economy and long-term prosperity.
Economic-Based Threats to National Security
Increased global trade together with rapid technological innovation have provided Canada with expanded opportunities for economic growth and increased prosperity. Canadians have taken their place on the cutting edge of important emerging fields of technology, which have become key drivers of economic growth and development. While this has brought new opportunities for Canada, it has also given rise to new and potentially serious national security vulnerabilities. As a result, certain hostile actors have sought to exploit key segments of Canada’s economy to advance their own strategic military, intelligence, security and economic interests. Activities include but are not necessarily limited to:
- foreign investments in sectors and industries important to Canada’s national security;
- the export of goods, technology, and know-how important to Canada’s national security; and
- partnerships between academic and research institutes and entities controlled by, or connected to, hostile foreign actors for the development of sensitive technologies and intellectual property (IP).
Research Security
Canada’s national security community continues to grapple with the threat posed by espionage and theft of cutting-edge research, trade secrets, and intellectual property that has national security and economic significance. PS is involved in a number of initiatives to strengthen the security posture of Canada’s research institutions. Since 2016, PS has been raising awareness of research security threats through direct engagement with frontline researchers and the academic community through the Safeguarding Science initiative that offers workshops, tools, and resources.
Critical Infrastructure
Canada’s critical infrastructure (CI) faces many national security threats, including HASA, terrorism, violent extremism, organized criminals, climate change and infectious disease. Foreign actors, with the support of state-level resources, are developing advanced capabilities to target CI, increasingly leveraging cyber systems to conduct espionage, steal IP, and disrupt operations. There are growing security concerns related to the global nature of supply chains on which CI depends for products and services from computer hardware to antibiotics. Globalized supply chains are difficult to assess and protect, leaving them vulnerable to accidental and intentional disruption.
Terrorism and Violent Extremism
Non-state actors, including religiously (RMVE), politically, and ideologically motivated violent extremists (IMVE), remain a key threat to Canada’s national security. While the threat manifests predominantly online, violent extremist narratives inspire real world violence. Attacks carried out by violent extremists in Canada have most often employed low-sophistication tactics to cause mass casualty events. Violent extremists have also been able to leverage technology to radicalize others, operate dispersed and sometimes transnational networks, and circumvent traditional systems and tools (e.g., through the use of crypto or virtual currencies, and encrypted messaging apps) to further their objectives in ways that directly or indirectly undermine Canada’s economic, institutional, and national security. In particular, Canada has seen an increase in the number of attacks carried out by IMVE actors in recent years. IMVE actors fueled on disinformation, cut at our social fabric, destabilize and undermine our cohesion and confidence in our democratic institutions and processes. At the same time, RMVE remains a persistent threat and an equal priority for investigative agencies.
Terrorist Listings
Another tool that Canada has to combat the threat of terrorism is the Criminal Code list of terrorist entities. Listing terrorist entities, be it groups or individuals, helps to ensure that Canada’s financial system cannot be used to facilitate terrorist activities by freezing an entity’s property. The fact of being listed establishes an entity as a “terrorist group” as defined under the Criminal Code. Certain offences related to terrorist financing, terrorist-related travel and terrorist recruitment may apply. This strengthens law enforcement’s ability to take action against domestic members and supporters of terrorist entities. A listing can further support the removal of the entity’s presence on social media and online platforms, and can support the decision to render an entity’s members inadmissible to Canada. There are currently 75 groups and 2 individuals on the Criminal Code list.
Canadian Extremist Travellers (CETs)
CETs are individuals suspected of travelling abroad to engage in extremist activity. This includes, but is not limited to: the participation in armed combat, financing, radicalizing, recruiting and media production. Offences specifically related to leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purpose of committing certain terrorism offences are enacted in the Criminal Code.
Responding to the threat posed by CETs engages the mandates of multiple departments and agencies, including PS, Global Affairs Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). When the Government learns that a CET is seeking to return, key departments and agencies work together to assess risks, develop options and manage the return. The whole-of-government approach enables the collective identification of measures needed to manage the threat posed by these individuals.
In the event of a return of a CET, the first objective is arrest and prosecution, should there be sufficient evidence. If there is insufficient evidence for a charge, the RCMP and its law enforcement and security and intelligence partners will continue their investigation, while other tools are leveraged to manage and mitigate the threat. These tools include the use of terrorism peace bonds, using the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA) to prevent travel and, in certain circumstances, the use of CSIS threat reduction measures to reduce the threat posed by an individual.
Passenger Protect Office
The Passenger Protect Office (PPO) administers Public Safety’s statutory obligations under the Secure Air Travel Act (SATA), the Canadian Passport Order (CPO), and the Prevention of Terrorist Travel Act (PTTA). Subject to SATA, the Passenger Protect Program (PPP) aims to enhance transportation security by mitigating the risks presented by individuals suspected of posing a threat to aviation security or of travelling by air travel for the purpose of engaging in terrorist activities. Pursuant to the CPO, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness may refuse, revoke or cancel an individual’s passport if the decision is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state.
National Security Reviews
The enactment of the National Security Act, 2017 marked the launch of a new national security review framework. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), and Intelligence Commissioner provide independent, fact-based, external review and oversight of Canada’s security and intelligence activities. PS’ role in supporting review is twofold: it coordinates work with the review bodies for any issues in which PS is under review, as well as advising the Minister on his decisions and interactions with review bodies regarding portfolio agency programs. PS’ role is complementary to a review unit at the Privy Council Office, which is responsible for ensuring central coordination of the security and intelligence community’s support to review.
National Security Act, 2017 (Bill C-59) Review
The National Security Act, 2017 enhanced Canada’s national security framework by modernizing its S&I laws and equipping its national security agencies with the tools they need to address new and emerging threats. A comprehensive review is mandated to begin in June 2022, the fourth year after the Bill’s coming into force. As a result, PS and the broader S&I community will review how its various provisions have been implemented since June 2019. The review will include an assessment of how the legislation has affected the operations of CSIS, the RCMP and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) that relate to national security, information sharing, and the interaction of those organizations with NSIRA, the Intelligence Commissioner and NSICOP.
Stakeholder Perspectives
In today’s threat environment, stakeholders are strong partners with the federal government and play a key role in supporting Canada’s national security interests. This includes, for example: companies from small start-ups working on innovative new technologies, to large corporations that own and operate critical infrastructure; universities that house cutting-edge research and data; financial institutions that freeze the assets of organizations and individuals on Canada’s terrorist entities list; and, air carriers that work with the Government of Canada to prevent individuals deemed a threat to air travel from boarding a plane. Provinces and territories are also important partners given complementary jurisdiction in a number of areas, with a key area of focus being the need to improve information sharing. Furthermore, Public Safety Canada regularly cooperates and shares information with international partners, and particularly Five Eyes allies, on a number of national security files, including hostile activities by state actors, terrorist listings, and economic-based threats to national security. Overall, Public Safety Canada continues to work closely with stakeholders, both inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to look for new and innovative ways to enhance the measures in place to address the range of today’s threats.
Public Safety Canada’s relationships with stakeholders is generally positive. The work carried out by the Department reflects the Canadian security and intelligence community’s commitment to public policy and program development that reflects the perspectives and needs of stakeholders most impacted by our work. For example, private sector stakeholders – including owners of critical infrastructure, financial institutions, air carriers, and industry associations – can be counted on to offer important insights to the federal government on how policy and programs are being implemented on the ground, where improvements can be made, and any impacts on key industries in the Canadian economy. To that end, private sector stakeholders generally welcome open, regular dialogue with the federal government, including guidance on key future policies and programs being contemplated by the Government of Canada. With respect to safeguarding sensitive research in the academic sector, universities are keen to continue building on an established relationship that is open, transparent, and facilitates the exchange of information in a way that advances both national security while respecting academic freedom. The academic community appreciates the opportunity to provide input that will shape public policy proposals before they have been finalized. Finally, provinces and territories are also interested in more frequent, ongoing interactions with the federal government on national security issues, though they often have varying degrees of capacity given uneven resources. That said, provinces and territories are generally supportive of greater collaboration with the federal government in ways that complement our respective tools and approaches given constitutional divisions of authority.
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