Parliamentary Committee Notes: Minister Anandasangaree's Appearance Before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)
Main Estimates 2026-2027

May 28, 2026

Table of contents

Overview

Overview Note

General Information

Date: Thursday, May 28, 2026
Time: 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Location: Room 415, Wellington Building, 197 Sparks Street

Context

Following tabling on February 26, 2026, the 2026-2027 Main Estimates were referred to SECU for study – who in turn have invited you to appear. Senior officials from the following departments will be joining you at the table:

  • Tricia Geddes, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada
  • Bryan Larkin, Senior Deputy Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  • Erin O'Gorman, President, Canada Border Services Agency
  • Talal Dakalbab, Commissioner, Correctional Service Canada
  • Nicole Giles, Deputy Director, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service
  • Joanne Blanchard, Chairperson, Parole Board of Canada

SECU members will likely approach this appearance as a broad discussion on your mandate and priorities.

The Conservative Party of Canada (CPC) will likely focus questions on the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program, such as its costs and uptake, and they will likely also raise ongoing concerns related to community safety, including extortion. You can also expect questions, similar to those raised during previous appearances, about national security concerns linked to trade relationships with China and India.

The Bloc Québécois (BQ) is expected to seek an update on CBSA and RCMP recruitment efforts to date, including how initial recruits have been allocated across operations. The BQ may also raise questions about planned Comprehensive Expenditure Review reductions, particularly those affecting Correctional Service Canada, including impacts on libraries and the CEGEP agreement.

Sequence of the meeting

At the beginning of the meeting, you will be invited to deliver approximately five minutes of opening remarks on Main Estimates and their relevance to operations across the Public Safety portfolio. You are invited to appear from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.

Officials, including Chief Financial Officers, will remain for the second hour of the meeting (4:30 p.m.–5:30 p.m.) to respond to questions from committee members.

Opening Remarks

Speaking Notes for The Honourable Gary Anandasangaree
Minister of Public Safety

May 28, 2026
Ottawa, Ontario

Thank you for having me here today to speak about the 2026–27 Main Estimates for Public Safety portfolios.

I would like to acknowledge that we are meeting on the traditional and unceded territory of the Algonquin Anishnaabeg People.

The Main Estimates reflect our Government's priorities to keep communities safe, combat modern national security threats and foreign interference, strengthen our borders, and assert our economic sovereignty.

We are focused on building stronger, safer communities that are free from violence. That is why this past March, I announced our renewal of the Building Safer Communities Fund. With more than $150 million in funding, we are building on our strong partnerships with municipalities and Indigenous communities.

We're supporting the vital work of local community organizations that work day in and day out to provide young people with the opportunities they need to leave a life of crime behind. And the results are clear: young people have the tools they need to succeed, and our communities are better for it. But this is only one part of the our action to cut down on gun violence.

We continue to fortify our strategic global partnerships, while ensuring federal policing and public safety institutions remain effective, accountable, and financially responsible in a challenging and evolving environment.

On a portfolio-wide basis, the total authorities sought in the Main Estimates will result in funding approvals of $16.7 billion for the Public Safety Portfolio for the 2026–27 fiscal year.

Allow me to point out some highlights.

For Public Safety Canada, a total of 2.2 billion is sought in these estimates, which includes a funding increase for the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program of $38.2 million, along with a $37.8-million increase for the First Nations and Inuit Policing Facilities Program.

These programs are fundamental to reconciliation and to improving the safety of Indigenous communities.

Our Government is continuing to invest in culturally responsive, community-led policing services that are designed and governed in partnership with First Nations and Inuit communities.

Funding supports both self-administered police services and tripartite agreements, with a focus on officer recruitment and retention, training, equipment, and community trust.

We have a responsibility to focus resources on core public safety outcomes.

That's why we are ensuring that spending is targeted where it delivers the greatest impact—particularly in frontline services and high-risk areas.

Canada Border Services Agency estimates include funding to deliver on our Government's commitment to hire 1,000 new CBSA officers, reinforce Canada's borders, enhance border integrity, and support the Land Border Crossing Project.

Similarly, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police funding will expand the RCMP's federal policing workforce by 1,000 new, dedicated personnel. The total funding sought is $6.3 billion, of which $263.9 million will support additional capacity for the Federal Mandate and $173.3 million will support contract policing programs.

For the Correctional Service of Canada, total funding sought is $4 billion, representing a $138-million increase, mainly tied to operating expenditures and compensation due to collective agreement increases.

For the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the total funding sought is $1 billion, which is an increase of $32.7 million over the previous year.

These are all directed at improving the safety of communities across the country, at our borders, and in lockstep with our global allies.

Again, portfolio-wide, these funding increases are offset by Comprehensive Expenditure Review measures to refocus and streamline costs, ensuring responsible, efficient allocation of taxpayer funds.

I look forward to continuing to work jointly with the United States and domestic partners to ensure border security and integrity while building our strategic and economic autonomy.

We will continue to improve our ability to detect and respond to national security threats, as well as law enforcement's capacity to fight crime and protect our communities.

I'm proud to strive to fulfil these duties and to work alongside all of you to keep Canadians safe. Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Key messages placemats

Public Safety Canada (PS)

Public Safety Canada Priorities

We're moving swiftly on the key legislation that keeps Canadians safe.

  • Bill C-8 will improve our resilience to cyber threats in four sectors: finance, telecommunications, energy and transportation.
  • Bill C-22 will tackle organized crime, terrorism and foreign interference by providing law enforcement with tools to lawfully access basic information and data.

The Government is investing in the North, including growing its presence in Northern communities.

  • As Canada increases Arctic investment, the national security community is advancing in step, scaling up recruitment across the North and Arctic regions.
  • The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) are building on their partnerships with Indigenous communities to bolster their security, resilience, and prosperity.

Getting guns off our streets keeps them out of the wrong hands.

  • The $248.6M Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program is set to remove roughly 152,000 prohibited firearms from circulation.
  • As of May 10, more than 126,000 prohibited firearms have been declared or claimed.

Public Safety is advancing toward its targeted savings of up to 15% over three years.

  • Public Safety is reducing its workforce by 375 positions.
  • To achieve this, 649 employees received letters indicating that their positions are affected.
    • Reductions have already been achieved through voluntary departures, including those incentivized into early retirement.
  • Critical services and supports to communities will be maintained.

With partners, we are ensuring FIFA World Cup games hosted in Canada are safe for all participants.

  • In April, the Government of Canada committed up to $145 million to support enhanced security operations related to hosting the FIFA World Cup 2026 in Toronto and Vancouver.
  • This investment builds on up to $220M already committed to Canadian host cities and up to $100M in Budget 2025 for federal partners.
  • Overall coordination, planning, and provision of security rests with the FIFA governing bodies and the Local Police of Jurisdiction.

Canada is taking action to address cybersecurity fears surrounding Chinese EVs.

  • All vehicles on Canadian roads must meet Canada's strict regulatory standards.
  • Strong safeguards are already in place, and we're rolling out additional measures to further mitigate these risks.

We have strengthened Canada's ability to detect, disrupt, and prevent extortion across Canada.

  • Multiple bills are before Parliament that provide additional tools in addressing these issues.
  • Budget 2025 announced $1.7 billion to strengthen RCMP investigative capacity.
  • We are uniting all levels of government and community leaders to safeguard local businesses and protect residents.

We're moving fast to implement the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act.

  • There are three key pieces needed for the Act to come into force:
    • Appointment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner (Anton Boegman nominated);
    • Regulations; and
    • Secure IT solution to support the Registry.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

General Overview
Budget 2025 Highlights
  • The RCMP received approximately $2.1 Billion
  • $1.8B over 4 years to hire 1000 RCMP personnel and enhance the Cadet Recruitment Allowance
  • $183.9M over 6 years: Air Fleet Modernization (to support Contract Policing Phase 1 of the RCMP's 15-year Air Fleet Renewal and Modernization Strategy)
Fast FactsFootnote 1
  • 19,067 RCMP Officers
  • 11,333 Public Service Employees
  • 2,384 Civilian Members
  • Over 700 detachments across Canada
  • 12,000 Active On-Road Vehicles, 1,700 Off-Road Vehicles, 334 Marine Vessels, 30 Aircrafts
Federal Policing
  • Federal Policing enforces federal laws, secures the borders, conducts international policing activities, ensures the safety of major events, state officials, dignitaries and foreign missions
  • Prevents, detects and investigates serious and organized crime, financial crime, cybercrime, and criminal activity related to national security
National Specialized Services
  • Provides critical frontline operational support services to RCMP, Canadian law enforcement partners, and select foreign organizations
  • Includes the Canadian Firearms Program, the Canadian Police College, the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, Forensic Science and Identification Services, Specialized Operations and Intelligence and Technical Operations
Indigenous, Provincial, Territorial and Municipal Policing
  • General administration of justice, preservation of the peace, community policing and the prevention of crime
  • Provides policing services to eight provinces (excluding Quebec and Ontario), three territories
  • Police service for approximately 550 Indigenous communities
Recruitment
Hiring 1000 Additional Personnel
  • The RCMP is adding 1,000 personnel, including 350 Regular Members in year one, to boost capacity against organized crime, cybercrime, financial crime, and national security threats
  • Recruitment will focus on specialized skills and experienced officers, with phased onboarding aligned to training and security clearance capacity
  • Recruitment is a top priority for the RCMP and work is underway to address recommendations of the Auditor General and Management Advisory Board
  • National Recruitment Strategy (2026–2030) published in March to modernize and expand hiring
  • First Nations, Inuit and Métis Recruitment Strategy and Action Plan developed to strengthen culturally appropriate recruitment for all categories of employees
  • Increasing diverse representation among cadets, including Indigenous Peoples, bilingual candidates, and other under-represented groups, is central to the RCMP's mission
  • To reduce the time it takes for applicants to get to Depot, security screening has been moved up and each candidate is personally supported in the process to enhance their experience and address issues early
  • Work to reduce the application process continues:
    • 43% of applicants loaded to Depot were processed in less than a year
    • Target: reduce processing time to 6 months by 2028–29
  • Cadet Recruitment Allowance increased from $525/week to $1,000/week (starting April 1, 2026) that will be more competitive with other police agencies and help to retain cadets throughout their training
  • Planning to increase the number of cadets being trained each year
  • Project Red Serge - streamlining recruitment in BC/Yukon to allow all applications from BC /Yukon to be processed right from the division
Operational successes
Securing the Border
  • Acquired and deployed new Black Hawk helicopters, tactical remotely piloted aircraft systems, drones, counter-drone surveillance systems (both mobile and fixed - vehicles, radar/cameras, detection capabilities), and mobile surveillance systems (trailers, radars, thermal high-performance cameras) to improve border surveillance
  • As part of the Border Integrity Operations Centres (BIOCs), upgraded two existing Operations Communications Centres to ensure command and control of border operations across Canada, including monitoring stations servers and additional operator personnel to provide 24/7 coverage
Combating Transnational Organized
Crime and Illicit Financing
  • Participating in new Joint Operational Intelligence Cell that brings together key domestic agencies and law enforcement partners to improve information sharing and coordination in targeting transnational organized crime
  • Established a North American Joint Strike Force with Integrated Synthetic Enforcement Teams in Canada and increased footprint in the U.S. and Mexico
  • Conducted targeted, effective and counter- fentanyl enforcement actions among federal agencies (e.g., the CBSA, police partners). For example, the RCMP collaborated with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to advance Operation Giant Slalom, which targeted an international drug trafficking organization allegedly led by Canadian Ryan Wedding. This resulted in the seizure of significant quantities of illegal substances.
  • Launched a money laundering intelligence partnership (IMLIP) with the major banks to increase information sharing on money laundering and organized crime

Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA)

CBSA Priorities
1,000 New CBSA Officers
  • Budget 2025 allocated $669 million over five years and $198.3 million ongoing to bolster CBSA operations.
  • As of May 8, 2026, over 100 new CBSA officers were hired, of the 1,000. This includes 76 Border Services Officers (including the first 3 fentanyl detector dog teams), 21 Trade Officers, 3 Recourse Officers, 4 Chemists and 2 Detection Technology Engineers.
  • 200 will be in training at the college in Rigaud by July 2026.
  • Over 400 new officers are expected to be in place by the end of this fiscal year. CBSA is on track to reach the 1,000 new officers target by the end of fiscal year 2028-2029.
Removals
  • The CBSA removed over 23,000 inadmissible persons in 2025, the highest ever in the history of the Agency, thanks to $55.5 million in additional funding under the Border Plan.
  • Removing approx. 440 inadmissible persons each week, including those involved in extortion.
  • Over 550 CBSA personnel are focussed on immigration investigations and removals. CBSA also has a tip line – the Border Watch Line – for the public to report violation of immigration law.
Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER)
  • CBSA's budget was reduced by two percent, or approx. $52 million.
  • CBSA is reducing its workforce by 348 employees (18 executives and 330 non-executives), only in national headquarters.
  • To achieve this, approx. 700 employees reporting to national headquarters received letters indicating that their positions are affected.
  • These workforce adjustments will have no impact to CBSA frontline operations.
CBSA Specific Issues
  • Since the major outage last fall, the CBSA and Shared Services Canada produced a report and are implementing an action plan.
  • During an outage, the CBSA ensures an adequate number of primary inspection lines are open, while maintaining normal operations, and collaborates with trade partners and stakeholders to facilitate the flow of commercial goods.
  • Safety and security standards are upheld at all times.

Hot Issues - Anticipated Questions

Committee Notes - Immigration and Border Management

Q1 - Regarding individuals linked to the Iranian regime entering Canada, what screening measures and protocols are in place to protect Canada
Before entering Canada
  • Foreign nationals must apply for a visa before travelling to Canada.
  • Visa applications are assessed by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) and during the assessment process, individuals are subject to screening by IRCC.
  • If inadmissibility concerns are identified, the file is referred for comprehensive security screening to the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
  • For those that may be inadmissible, the CBSA provides a non-favourable admissibility recommendation to IRCC who makes the final decision on issuance of a visa.
  • CBSA conducts risk assessments before arrivals to identify individuals who are high risk and works with officers overseas to ensure that inadmissible individuals do not board planes bound for Canada.
  • When a foreign national arrives at a port of entry, officers conduct an admissibility assessment based on all relevant information available.
  • If the individual is determined inadmissible, they may:
    • Withdraw their application to enter Canada;
    • Be reported inadmissible and issued a removal order either by a delegated CBSA official for certain types of allegations; or,
    • Have their case referred for an admissibility hearing before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) for more serious and complex allegations.
Foreign nationals in Canada who may be inadmissible
  • If the CBSA becomes aware of a foreign national in Canada who may be inadmissible, an investigation is conducted.
  • If concerns are well-founded, the CBSA will report the individual inadmissible.
  • Depending on the inadmissibility allegation, the CBSA may have the authority to issue removal orders, while more serious or complex allegations will be referred to the IRB for an admissibility hearing.
  • If the IRB determines an individual inadmissible, a removal order is issued.
  • The CBSA works to remove the inadmissible individual as soon as possible, once all legal avenues which may stay removal have been exhausted, and any impediments to removal such as obtaining travel documents have been resolved.
  • As part of designation of the Iranian regime:
    • Over 17,800 visa applications reviewed by IRCC;
    • 239 visas cancelled by IRCC;
    • 176 investigations launched by the CBSA;
    • CBSA has identified 34 individuals who are believed to be senior officials of the regime and sent these cases to the IRB for hearing and decision;
    • 8 individuals left Canada.
  • Since the June 19, 2024 listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the CBSA identified 37 suspected members.
    • 7 left Canada before facing an admissibility hearing;
    • 23 are being prepared for an IRB hearing;
    • 7 are with the IRB for a hearing.
Q2 - Why is the government failing to deport non-citizens convicted of serious crimes
  • Over 23,000 inadmissible persons removed in 2025, including more than 1,100 persons (approx. 5%) with serious inadmissibilities such as members of designated regimes, those guilty of war crimes, serious criminality, national security risks and terrorism.
  • The Border Plan provided new funding to support CBSA in increasing capacity to reach 20,000 removals for fiscal years 2025-26 and 2026-27.
  • The CBSA exceeded their 2025-26 target by completing over 22,000 removals; the highest in the past 5 years.
  • Approximately 440 inadmissible persons removed from Canada each week.
Q3 - Why are judges able to issue lighter sentences that effectively allow these individuals to avoid deportation
  • Criminal proceedings take precedence over immigration matters and removal cannot take place until the person has completed serving their sentence.
  • Steps in the removal process can be conducted concurrently to a person serving their sentence, ensuring the removal can take place once a criminal sentence has been completed.
  • After a foreign national has exhausted or waived all legal avenues of recourse which may stay removal, and any impediments to removal (such as obtaining travel documents) have been resolved, the CBSA will finalize removal arrangements at the earliest opportunity.
  • The Supreme Court of Canada has been clear: Collateral immigration consequences, such as the potential for deportation, are relevant factors that judges can consider when determining a sentence.
  • The court emphasized that judges should not impose lenient sentences solely to avoid deportation but can consider these consequences as part of an individualized and just sentence.
If asked if making a claim for refugee protection will allow someone with criminality to remain in Canada:
  • Making a refugee claim does not exempt those with serious inadmissibilities from being subject to immigration enforcement.
  • Under Immigration legislation, a person is ineligible to make a claim if they have been inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious criminality or organized criminality.
  • As of May 4, number of individuals inadmissible for serious inadmissibility:
    • 1,700 are in the 'Removals in Progress' inventory;
    • 970 are in the 'Wanted' inventory, totalling 2,670 actionable cases;
    • 3,148 are in the 'Removal not possible' inventory, which includes individuals that cannot currently be removed. These include, but are not limited to, pending Federal Court appeals, criminal charges, or Pre-Removal Risk Assessments, and sentences of imprisonment.
Table 1: Removal Inventories
Removal Inventories Priority 1
Serious Inadmissibility
Removal Not Possible 3,148
Wanted 970
Removal In Progress 1,700
Total 5,818

Committee Notes - Bill C-22

Q4 - Does a "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard for subscriber-information orders align with Spencer and Charter privacy protections
  • Our Government is committed to address serious and organized crime.
  • This includes providing law enforcement agencies and domestic intelligence with new tools to facilitate domestic and transnational sharing of information and data to advance investigations in a digital and globalized world where crimes transcend national borders.
  • In R v Spencer (2014), the Supreme Court of Canada held that internet users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity when linked to anonymous online activity.
  • Accordingly, the court held that police need some type of legal authority (e.g., legislative authority or prior judicial authorization) to obtain subscriber information in certain contexts.
  • Because no specific tool exists to obtain subscriber information, police have had to use the only tool available - the general production order based on the reasonable grounds to believe standard.
  • These amendments are proposing the creation of a new production order that is specific to subscriber information. It is carefully designed to balance the privacy interests of impacted persons engaged by the disclosure of subscriber information, while addressing the need to ensure that law enforcement agencies have appropriate tools to fulfill their mandates.
  • Police will only be able to use this new tool to obtain subscriber information, as defined, on the conditions that they have satisfied a judge that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed that the person has possession or control of the information, and that the information will assist in the investigation of the offence.
  • The new production order for subscriber information would not be the first or the only production order to be issued on a reasonable suspicion standard. The Criminal Code currently contains different other production orders and warrants for specific types of data that are obtained on a reasonable suspicion standard. For example, police can obtain a production order for transmission data (section 487.016), which can provide a person's calling history, on that standard.
  • The Bill would establish the most privacy-protective legal standard for accessing subscriber information among Canada's core and like-minded international partners.
  • For example:
    • Practices vary widely across countries, but none of Canada's Five Eyes partners require judicial authorization to obtain subscriber information.
    • In countries with inquisitorial systems, such as France and Spain, prosecuting authorities can issue production orders themselves without judicial oversight.
    • Other democracies like Germany and Finland also allow law enforcement agencies to access subscriber information without prior judicial authorization.
Q5 - What oversight applies to ministerial orders, and why wasn't judicial review required
  • A review by a federal court judge was not included because Ministerial Orders (MOs) do not authorize access to information. To ensure robust oversight, the Intelligence Commissioner, who is required to be a former superior court judge, must review and pre-approve MOs before they are issued by the Minister of Public Safety to ESPs.
  • The Commissioner - who is independent and a quasi-judicial oversight body - will provide an essential layer of accountability and transparency by ensuring that the Minister's decision to issue an MO is reasonable.
  • The Commissioner must also provide a copy of their decision to the National Security Intelligence Review Agency, which, at their discretion, and according to their mandate, will be able to review the usage of the MO scheme.
  • Additionally, to enhance transparency and strengthen accountability, the Minister of Public Safety must publish an annual report on the activities taken under the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA) during the previous calendar year, including on the issuance of MOs.
  • We are confident that this proposal brings the right balance between supporting effective investigations and privacy rights.
Q6 - Why doesn't Bill C-22 set out essential parameters and definitions now. so parliamentarians can meaningfully assess and debate the Bill
  • The government is not asking Parliament to simply "trust us". Bill C-22 left certain technical and operational details, to be addressed through regulations so they can be developed collaboratively, and with the benefit of expert and stakeholder input through the transparent regulatory process.
  • A regulatory approach requires that consultation take place and allows requirements to be tailored to real world operational realities and updated as technologies evolve without waiting to reopen the Act.
  • It should also be noted that all regulations made under Bill  C-22 would be subject to review by the Standing Joint Committee for the Scrutiny of Regulations (SJCSR), which ensure they remain within the authority granted by Parliament, respect constitutional and legal norms, and are properly drafted and applied.
  • The SJCSR provides strong assurance that regulations cannot incrementally expand the scope of the legislation beyond what Parliament intended.
  • The law would also be subject to a comprehensive parliamentary review after three years, ensuring that Parliament retains the ability to reassess the powers granted, the effectiveness of safeguards, and practical impacts over time.
Q7 - Will tech companies add "backdoors" to their systems potentially creating serious vulnerabilities
  • The Government of Canada does not support, nor does SAAIA require, the creation of what we consider a "backdoor" or the weakening of electronic protections.
  • In fact, subsections 5(5) and 7(5) provide explicit safeguards that would ensure the Government cannot force ESPs to comply with regulatory requirements or MOs that would create systemic vulnerabilities or prevent them from being rectified.
  • This means that, if an ESP were to assess that they cannot comply with a requirement without introducing a systemic vulnerability into their electronic protections, which includes encryption, they would not have to abide by it.
  • A similar protection was implemented in Australia.
  • Moreover, both in the making of the regulations and the issuance of Ministerial Orders, the Government of Canada will be required by law to consult the impacted ESP and take into account the potential impact on cybersecurity and privacy protections.
Q8 - Why is the federal government not compensating all the ESPs that it is forcing this legislation on
  • There are two provisions in Bill C-22 that relate to costs.
  • As I noted during my appearance at SECU on the Bill, in the case of costs incurrent by an ESP related to a specific Ministerial Order – meaning a unique situation requiring a targeted solution - the Minister of Public Safety may provide compensation in an amount that they consider appropriate.
  • Second, separate from federal compensation is the potential to create a standardized fee scheme for law enforcement and CSIS to pay ESPs for operational services that is nationally set.
  • I am of the view corporate Canada has a responsibility to play in Canadians safety and security. Establishing and maintaining the necessary mechanisms to provide information to law enforcement and CSIS in their lawful investigations should not come at a cost to the federal purse.

Committee Notes - Community safety

Q9 - Extortion has reached record levels, putting communities and residents at risk. What actions are being taken
  • Protecting Canada and Canadians from the threat created by organized crime groups, including extortion, remains a top priority for our government and we are fully committed to aggressively disrupting and dismantling these groups nationwide.
  • As part of this effort, we co-hosted summits on combatting extortion in Surrey, British Columbia and the Peel Region, bringing together federal, provincial and municipal leaders and law enforcement to strengthen coordination and advance integrated action.
  • Building on this momentum, the Government is taking concrete steps to better equip police of jurisdiction to counter organized crime and extortion, including:
  • Surging FINTRAC resources and strengthening the collection and sharing of financial intelligence to provide law enforcement with more timely and actionable intelligence to identify networks, support investigations, and hold perpetrators accountable.
  • Investing $4 million each over four years in British Columbia and Ontario under Canada's Border Plan to establish Regional Integrated Drug Enforcement Teams, targeting organized and cross border criminal networks at the core of their business.
  • Providing funding in British Columbia to support victims and strengthen community based prevention initiatives, while also supporting the Peel Region extortion task force to enhance coordinated enforcement and victim assistance.
  • The RCMP is supporting police of local jurisdiction through its national role by coordinating a seamless response to extortion, sharing intelligence, and providing specialized tools and expertise through its National Coordination and Support Team.
  • These efforts will be supported by the commitment to hire 1,000 additional RCMP personnel to increase federal policing capacity across Canada, including to combat organized crime, financial crimes contributing to extortion and community safety concerns.
  • The Canada Border Services Agency is contributing by enforcing immigration authorities to remove foreign nationals deemed inadmissible to Canada, helping disrupt criminal activity linked to extortion.
  • From a legislative standpoint, Bills C-12, C-22, and C-14 strengthen Canada's framework to aggressively deter organized crime and target extortionists by tightening border and immigration controls, modernizing investigative authorities, and toughening bail and sentencing for serious extortion offences.
  • In addition, Bill C-29, the Financial Crimes Agency Act, was introduced in Parliament on April 27 to establish a new Financial Crimes Agency to be Canada's lead enforcement agency against serious and complex financial crimes and help ensure criminals are held to account.
Q10 - What is the government doing to properly fund Indigenous policing, given the growing safety risks caused by longstanding underinvestment
  • The Government of Canada works with First Nations and Inuit communities, and with provinces and territories, to advance a vision of Indigenous policing and community safety that is rooted in dignity, cultural awareness, and self-determination.
Budget 2024 Investments
  • Budget 2024 committed $267.5 million over five years, and $92.5 million per year ongoing, for the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program; and $200 million over five years, to repair, renovate and replace policing facilities in First Nations and Inuit communities. This is in addition to Budget 2021 investments of $540.3 million over five years, and $126.8 million per year ongoing.
  • These investments are helping to stabilize the funding for First Nations and Inuit policing, which is cost-shared based on a 52% federal – 48% provincial/territorial ratio.
2025-2026 Program Spending
  • In fiscal year 2025-26, we again worked actively with provinces and territories to align required cost sharing and effectively deliver both the Frist Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP) and the First Nations and Inuit Policing Facilities Program (FNIPFP).
  • FNIPP - Leveraging Budget 2024 investments, these efforts delivered an unprecedented level of federal support - approximately $392M – in 2025-26, resulting in the full allocation of the available annual program budget.
  • FNIPFP - while delayed provincial cost sharing commitments resulted in $50M of Budget 2024 investments for the Nunavik Police Service not being spent as anticipated in 2025-26, Public Safety Canada nevertheless delivered $21.4M of cost-shared federal spending last fiscal year – a figure that represents more than 67% of the available non-Budget 2024 program budget.
  • We are working with the Province of Quebec to commence planned infrastructure projects for the Nunavik Police Service as soon as possible in fiscal year 2026-27. Any FNIPFP funding that was not spent as planned in 2025-26 will be proposed for a forward reprofile to a future fiscal year.
PBO Report
  • We have taken note of the reports published by the Parliamentary Budget Officer in November 2025 and February 2026. Public Safety Canada is now using these findings to guide its financial planning, in collaboration with provincial partners.
Q11 - Will the government commit today to repeal Bills C-5 and C-75 to restore meaningful jail time for serious offenders and put an end to the catch and release system
  • Repealing former Bill C-75 would undo several significant changes to the Criminal Code, beyond the bail provisions. These include restricting preliminary inquiries to offences punishably by a maximum of 14 years imprisonment (previously available for all indictable offences) and strengthening protections for victims of intimate partner violence (e.g., reverse onus for those charged with IPV who have a prior IPV conviction, higher maximum penalties where the offender has a prior IPV conviction), among others.
  • Through Bill C-14, the Bail and Sentencing Reform Act, and Bill C-16, the Protecting Victims Act, the Government is taking concrete steps to strengthen accountability, reinforce public safety, and ensure the justice system better protects victims and communities.
    • These two bills propose a recalibration of some of the reforms that were enacted by the former Bill C-5.
    • Specifically, Bill C-14 would clarify that the principle of restraint – that has been mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada as required under the Charter and was codified in former Bill C-75. It would do so by clarifying that the principle of restraint does not mandate release and direct police and courts on its application (e.g., by directing courts not to give primary consideration to release where a reverse onus applies).
    • Bill C-14 would also re-enact the restriction on conditional sentence orders (CSOs) for sexual assault where the Crown proceeds by indictment that was repealed by former Bill C-5 and introduce new restrictions for all child sexual offences.
    • Bill C-16 would strengthen mandatory minimum penalties (MMPs) in the Criminal Code by ensuring that MMPs previously struck down by courts, but that remain on the books, would once again become operative and would be protected against future Charter challenges. This would restore clarity and consistency in sentencing and ensure that serious offences are met with penalties that reflect their gravity.
Q12 - What actions is the Government of Canada taking to combat hate and better protect communities
  • The Government of Canada is taking concrete action to combat all forms of hate to better protect communities and keep them safe.
  • In 2024, the Government of Canada launched Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate, investing $273.6 million over six years. The Strategy supports community outreach and law enforcement reform, tackles the rise in hate crimes, enhances community security, counters radicalization, and increases support for victims.
  • With funding from the Strategy, Public Safety Canada, is advancing prevention and community protection efforts through the Community Resilience Fund (CRF) and the Canada Community Security Program (CCSP).
  • As well, funding was provided to Public Safety Canada to enhance access to training on hate crimes to provincial and municipal police forces with the goal of ensuring that law enforcement officers are equipped to handle hate crimes effectively and sensitively.
  • To further enhance efforts to protect communities, the Spring Economic Update 2026 proposes $75 million over five years for the CCSP. This will provide additional funding for security measures and will foster safer, more inclusive communities. This is in addition to the $10 million announced in March 2026 to support Jewish communities in addressing urgent security needs.
  • The Government of Canada is also advancing legislative measures to combat hate:
    • Bill C-9, the Combatting Hate Act, aims to address hate crimes, intimidation, obstruction, the display of certain hate or terrorism symbols, and the definition of hatred to clarify what constitutes a hate crime or hate speech.
    • Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, in March 2026, would strengthen the Criminal Code and provide law enforcement and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) with the tools needed to disrupt crime, investigate serious threats, and protect communities.
  • The Royal Canadian Mounted Police continues to collaborate with police services across Canada to share best practices and develop new tools to respond to hate crimes.

Committee Notes - Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program

Q13 - How many firearms will be removed through the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program
  • Program uptake has been steady. As of May 10, over 126,000 firearms have been declared or claimed under the Program by businesses and individuals. Of these, over 12,000 have already been disposed of – during the initial phase of the Program for Businesses and a pilot of the Program for individuals.
  • The program's total funding envelope is $742.5 million, this includes fixed costs such as Program design and Web Portal design, development and maintenance. It also includes costs that will depend on Program uptake, including compensation for businesses and individuals – for which we have up to $248.6M set aside. This amount is forecast to support the collection of approximately 152,000 ASFs in total; however, actual numbers of firearms collected under the Program will vary based on participation rates and will be reported once the program is completed. Any surplus funding will be returned to the fiscal framework.
  • The Program for individuals launched nation-wide with a declaration period from January 19 to March 31, 2026. The second phase of the Program businesses opened on April 23, 2026. Collection activities for businesses and individuals is now underway and will run until fall 2026, concluding prior to the end of the Amnesty Period, after which point the final number of firearms collected and disposed of under the Program will be reported.
Q14 - How were compensation amounts for prohibited firearms determined
  • Compensation amounts were determined following in-depth research including consultation with the Canadian Sporting Arms and Ammunition Association (CSAAA), reviewing of manufacturer prices, Canadian dealer, retailer prices, foreign retailer prices, pricing guidebooks and auction listings. Wherever possible, manufacturer prices and Canadian retail prices were given priority.
Q15 - How will the government address gaps in jurisdictions where local law enforcement is not participating
  • The Program for individuals launched nation-wide with a declaration period from January 19 to March 31, 2026. The second phase of the Program businesses opened on April 23, 2026. Collection activities for businesses and individuals is now underway and will run until fall 2026, after which point the final number of firearms collected and disposed of under the Program will be reported.
  • Participation of the provincial and territorial governments or local police is not a requirement to collect firearms in this Program. Firearms will be collected by the RCMP, private sector mobile collection units, or participating local police, depending on the jurisdiction.
  • While some police services choose not to directly participate in the administration of the collection for compensation of assault-style firearms, this does not impact the role of all law policing agencies to enforce the law on possession of prohibited firearms

Committee Notes - National Security

Q16 - With regard to China and India, how is the government protecting Canada's national security while pursuing its broader goal of strengthening Canada's economic security
  • While the government is seeking to diversify trade and bring in additional investments including from non-traditional partners, economic security guardrails continue to be important.
  • For example, within the federal government responsibility, a national security review process has been put in place for major projects under the Building Canada Act.
  • The government's investments in domestic capacity and autonomy are all part of that overall approach.
  • Guardrails include foreign investment screening under the Investment Canada Act.
  • In addition, the government is also sponsoring cyber security legislation which is currently being studied by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.
  • Further work is ongoing on protecting critical infrastructure and what additional economic security measures may be required.
  • The Government relies on a number of tools to mitigate risks in specific sectors, such as transport, natural resources, and finance and telecommunications.
Q17 - What is the Public Safety Portfolio doing to support the Arctic region and respond to the threats and risks facing Canada's Arctic Sovereignty
  • The Public Safety Portfolio is actively engaged in the region, in collaboration with Territorial partners and Indigenous communities, to address threats to the public and economic security of Canadians and businesses in the Arctic.
  • The Canadian Security Intelligence Services' (CSIS) has meaningful relationships in Canada's Arctic with Territorial governments, Inuit organizations, local leaders, and the private sector, providing valuable intelligence.
  • Recruitment in the North and Arctic Regions remains a key focus across my Portfolio and I am committed to growing our presence in our Northern communities, putting boots on the ground where needed to further Canada's collective approach to secure our communities and borders from serious domestic and foreign threats.
  • The planned recruitment of 1,000 new Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers and 1,000 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) personnel will bolster national security, border integrity, and public safety, while reflecting Canada's cultural, demographic, and geographic diversity, including in the Arctic.
  • As the Government of Canada steps up its investments in the Arctic, the national security community will be stepping up as well. And not only on economic security.
  • This means the RCMP, CBSA and CSIS will be building on their partnerships with Indigenous communities to bolster their security, resilience, and prosperity in the face of increasing threats, with an emphasis on community safety.
  • The Public Safety (PS) Portfolio is also working with other federal departments, key partners and other orders of government to mitigate risks to northern communities, including the importation of illegal substances via regional airports and mail.
Q18 - The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act received Royal Assent in June 2024, but its core provisions are not in force. Why
  • There are three key pieces needed for the Act to come into force:
    • Appointment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner (Anton Boegman nominated);
    • Development of regulations which set out the detailed requirements for registration, exemptions and compliance; and
    • development of a secure IT solution to support the Registry.
  • Work is ongoing to hire the staff needed to run the Office, set up the Commissioner's website and secure office space.
  • Similar efforts to implement comparable Acts in allied countries have taken over two years.

Additional questions added May 27, 2026

Committee Notes - Ebola

Q19 - What measures are in place to prevent the importation of Ebola into Canada, and how is your portfolio ensuring a more timely response than seen with COVID-19 to protect the health and safety of Canadians
  • The Government of Canada has announced decisive action to reduce the risk of the virus entering and spreading within Canada by introducing temporary border measures, including travel restrictions for residents of high-risk countries and new screening and quarantine rules for anyone who has recently been in these countries. The Canada Border Services Agency will support the proposed measures through denial of boarding for those no longer authorized to travel to Canada and through additional screening measures for any passengers with a nexus to the affected region.
  • At the border, specific screening questions have been added to Primary Inspection Kiosks at Canadian international airports and the Agency continues to work closely with the Public Health Agency of Canada on passenger screening and referrals.

Committee Notes - FIFA

Q20 - With the upcoming FIFA World Cup expected to bring significant influx of international visitors, what measures are being taken to help contain the spread of infectious diseases and protect Canadians
  • My Department continues its close collaboration with U.S. officials to ensure a common approach to managing all aspects of the tournament including with regard to Ebola.
  • FIFA North America is and remains cooperative, ensuring that measures such as team isolation (such as for the Democratic Republic of the Congo team in Belgium), are enforced prior to teams arriving in North America.

Committee Notes - MOU between Public Safety and China

Q21 - Why did the RCMP choose to enter into a memorandum of understanding on public safety with China? Please provide full details on its contents and objectives
  • The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) recently signed between the RCMP and the Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China is a renewed public safety MOU, originally signed in 2010. It is a symbol of renewed cooperation on combatting crime as policing partners, including transnational serious and organized crime, financial and economic crime, trafficking, cybercrime and child exploitation.
  • The agreement outlines specific forms of mutual collaboration, including the exchange of information, investigative assistance, sharing best practices specific to technical expertise and training, and coordinating with other domestic law enforcement agencies, where necessary.
  • MOUs are nonbinding and do not supersede existing law enforcement arrangements, including information sharing on a case-by-case basis, domestic legislative frameworks, and/or international conventions.
If pressed on when the MOU provisions will be made public:
  • The contents of the MOU are subject to mutual confidentiality provisions and cannot be disclosed without the partner's consent, which is typical for international law enforcement agreements.

Portfolio Hot Issues & QA

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Committee Notes - Recruitment

Q1 - Given existing recruitment challenges, how will the RCMP recruit an additional 1,000 federal policing personnel
  • The addition of 1,000 new RCMP personnel is a significant workforce expansion. This investment will focus on tackling financial crimes and increase investigative capacity to address the most serious criminal threats, including organized crime, cybercrime and national security.
  • New personnel will be recruited through targeted strategies focused on the specialized skill sets required for federal policing. The approach will also include attracting experienced officers.
  • A phased implementation plan is underway that aligns recruitment, training, and security clearance capacity to support timely onboarding of new personnel.
  • In the first year, 350 Regular Members will be added nationally who will be focused on countering organized crime and national security threats.
If pressed on how this affects front line in provinces and territories:
  • This will not affect the RCMP's ongoing recruitment efforts and its commitment to hire and train more officers to meet the needs of the organization.
  • The goal is to get more Regular Members trained and to the front line as quickly as possible. 
Q2 - The RCMP's recruitment rate, vacancies and workforce planning were identified as issues in the Auditor General's report. What are you doing to address the gaps identified
  • The RCMP accepts the finding and recommendations of the Auditor General and work is well underway to address the issues identified.
  • The RCMP published a National Recruitment Strategy in March 2026, supported by a clear action plan to deliver its commitments.
  • In 2026-27, the RCMP plans to train more troops with a target of graduating a total of 1,600 cadets.
  • The RCMP has already reduced the time it takes for applicants to move through its system and will continue to do so. By 2028-2029, the RCMP will reduce average applicant processing times to six months.
  • The RCMP is closely tracking its progress including applicant processing times, the number of applicants sent for training at Depot, the number of cadets that graduate from Depot, and the deployment of new cadets to RCMP divisions and regions.
  • The RCMP is developing a data-driven workforce model to identify requirements by division, function, and specialization, and account for attrition. Such an evidence-based approach will be used to identify actions necessary to address shortages in existing capacity and facilitate planning.

Committee Notes - India

Q3 - What actions has the RCMP taken in response to allegations involving agents of the Government of India with ties to criminal networks in Canada
  • The RCMP takes all allegations of intimidation, harassment, or targeting of individuals in Canada seriously.
  • Any involvement of a foreign government—directly or through criminal proxies—in targeting individuals or communities in Canada is unacceptable.
  • The RCMP continues to work with domestic and international partners to detect, deter and disrupt any form of foreign actor interference in Canada.

Committee Notes - Firearms

Q4 - Minister, why is the government moving forward with the buyback of assault-style firearms
  • The Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program addresses a public safety priority set by the Government of Canada and led by Public Safety Canada.
  • The RCMP is committed to supporting Public Safety Canada in the operationalization of this initiative.
If pressed:
  • This includes contributing to the safe collection of prohibited firearms in participating RCMP contract policing jurisdictions, facilitating collection activities in other jurisdictions when requested and where possible, and supporting post-amnesty compliance.

Committee Notes - Emerging Issues

Q5 - Is the RCMP concerned about foreign interference in the context of secessionism movements in Canada
  • National security is a core responsibility of the RCMP and it is actively involved in investigating all allegations of foreign interference.
  • The RCMP takes any instance of foreign interference seriously, regardless of its origin—including any attempt to interfere in Canada's democratic processes.
  • With respect to protecting Canada's democratic institutions from foreign interference, the RCMP is an essential part of a broader GoC effort to ensure that every tool at our disposal is being used.
Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA)

Committee Notes – CBSA

Q1 - What is the CBSA doing to remove Iranian regime members
  • The CBSA is investigating Iranians who are in Canada and who were senior officials of the regime, and bringing them before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) to make a case against them.
  • As part of designation of the Iranian regime:
    • Over 17, 800 visa applications from Iranians were reviewed by IRCC for potential inadmissibility;
    • 239 visas cancelled by IRCC;
    • 176 investigations launched opened by the CBSA;
    • As a result of these investigations, the CBSA has identified 34 individuals who are believed to be senior officials of the regime and sent these cases to the IRB for hearing and decision;
    • 8 individuals left Canada.
  • The Administrative Deferral of Removal for removals to Iran does not apply to persons found inadmissible as senior officials in the Iranian regime.
  • Removal can proceed because these officials are inadmissible on the ground of human or international rights violations.
  • The CBSA's Border Watch Line is available for organizations and the public to submit tips on suspected regime members.
  • Approx. 450 tips were received by the CBSA Since the original designation of the Iranian regime in November 2022.
Q2 - What is the CBSA doing to stop IRGC from coming to Canada
  • The CBSA works diligently to prevent all inadmissible persons from travelling to or entering Canada, and pursues appropriate immigration enforcement against inadmissible persons when they are encountered.
  • IRCC is responsible for making decisions on visas and immigration applications.
  • To support decision making, CBSA provides security screening recommendations to IRCC on a referral basis in relation to cases involving admissibility concerns based on security, international human rights violations or organized criminality grounds.
  • Members of the IRGC are prevented from travelling to Canada in the first place.
  • CBSA is responsible for making determinations of inadmissibility of persons seeking to enter Canada at ports of entry, and conducts immigration investigations against permanent residents and foreign nationals in Canada who may be inadmissible.
  • As the IRGC is an organization which has engaged in terrorism, and is a listed terrorist entity under the Criminal Code, the CBSA pursues allegations of inadmissibility against their members.
  • Cases are reviewed and assessed on a case-by-case basis, in accordance to a number of factors when determining whether a person is inadmissible as a member of an organization.
Q3 - How many members of the IRGC has CBSA removed
  • On June 19, 2024, the Minister of Public Safety listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code.
  • Military service in Iran is mandatory (conscription); for some, service in the IRGC was compulsory.
  • The CBSA is investigating Iranians who are in Canada and who may have been members of the IRGC.
  • Where the CBSA suspects someone was a member of the IRGC, they prepare a case and present it to the IRB, the decision maker.
  • Since the listing of the IRGC, the CBSA has identified 37 suspected members of the IRGC:
    • 7 left Canada before facing an admissibility hearing;
    • 23 are being prepared for an IRB hearing;
    • 7 are with the IRB for a hearing.
Q4 - What is the CBSA's role in tackling extortion
  • The CBSA works with law enforcement partners through joint task forces across the country such as:
    • the BC Extortion Task Force in BC's Lower Mainland;
    • Alberta Law Enforcement Response Team in Edmonton and Calgary; and,
    • with Peel police in Ontario.
  • Police notify the CBSA when they identify an individuals who may be in violation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA); the CBSA then conducts investigations that can lead to immigration enforcement action, including removal from Canada.
  • As of May 7, 2026, 446 immigration investigations were opened by the CBSA, 118 removal orders have been issued for various inadmissibility grounds, and 55 people have been removed.
  • These cases come to the Agency's attention through many sources, including collaboration with extortion task forces, tips from partner agencies and the public, and CBSA's own investigative work.
Q5 - As a result of the OAG Audit of Reforms to the International Student Program, what actions will be taken by the CBSA to track the departure of international students when their study permits expire
  • IRCC is responsible for ongoing oversight and compliance monitoring of the International Student Program and maintains in contact with designated learning institutions. These institutions are required to report non-compliant students to IRCC twice a year.
  • As per the audit's recommendation, IRCC will provide CBSA with a list of individuals with expired student permits, who have not applied for or received an extension, or applied for or transitioned to permanent residence, or otherwise maintained valid immigration status.
Q6 - What does the CBSA assess when a claimant arrives to makes a claim
  • The CBSA assesses identity, admissibility and eligibility of the asylum claimant.
  • Officers verify identity, review biometrics and criminality checks and conduct an in-person interview.
  • Officers must be satisfied the individual is not inadmissible on grounds such as national security, serious or organized criminality and human or international rights violations.
  • Officers also determine whether the claim is eligible for referral to the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).
  • The CBSA does not assess the merits of the claimant's fear of persecution.
  • The IRB is solely responsible for determining the merits of asylum claims, including credibility.
  • This separation of roles is established in legislation.
Q7 - Does the CBSA do any other security checks asylum claimants
  • The CBSA is responsible for security screening asylum claimants.
  • A comprehensive security screening is conducted for all adult claimants, in partnership with intelligence partners.
  • Screening assesses inadmissibility on grounds such as national security, human or international rights violations and serious or organized criminality.
Q8 - Is the Assessment and Revenue Management system (CARM) imposing a burden on industry
  • No, but CARM did introduce a number of changes for the business community (including small business) such as the need to create an account with the CBSA and the need to post financial security.
  • These changes have largely been adopted with over 250, 000 companies using CARM and over 99 % of the goods being released into Canada having financial security.
  • These changes are important to secure debt to the Crown.
  • For small business, who traditionally have relied on the services of a customs brokers to import goods, the requirement to sign up for a CARM account and obtain financial security has had an impact on business.
  • The CARM help desk continues to support businesses set up their accounts and businesses with 1 to 10 imports a year have adopted the requirement for financial security.
  • The introduction of CARM did not negatively impact imports to Canada as demonstrated by volumes of imports and that CARM collected $41.7 billion in duties and taxes in fiscal year 2024-2025, almost $2 billion more than in previous years.
  • CARM has greater than 99% systems availability since December 2024, demonstrating the importance of having business systems in place to manage today's volumes of trade.
Q9 - What has CBSA done about the systems outages
  • We recognize the impacts felt by travellers and trade chain partners when IT systems are down.
  • A joint report by the CBSA and SSC has identified key causes and measures to better prevent and mitigate outages.
  • CBSA has been engaging air travel and commercial and trade stakeholders to keep them updated on progress.
  • During an outage, the CBSA ensures an adequate number of primary inspection lines are open, while maintaining normal operations.
  • The CBSA collaborates with trade partners and stakeholders to facilitate the flow of commercial goods.
Q 10 - How does the CBSA collect VIN data? What issues has the Agency identified
  • The CBSA collects VIN data at the border as part of its export declaration process.
  • VINs are self-reported by exporters at the border.
  • Internal verifications have shown some VINs are reused or fabricated to clone or mask stolen vehicles.
Q11 - Why does the CBSA have an arrangement with CARFAX and Équité Association
  • Under the National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft, the CBSA moved forward with establishing an information sharing process with CARFAX and Équité, a Canadian not for profit.
  • They work directly with law enforcement to recover stolen vehicles and provide expert testimony, ensuring data is used for recovery.
  • The majority of car dealerships were already paying for and using comprehensive vehicle reports in their daily operations before the Agency began sharing information. VIN information did not increase those fees.
Q12 - Why can't you make the VIN data public for all to access on the web
  • VIN data is customs information and the Customs Act has rules on how information can be shared.
  • VIN data cannot be made accessible to the public on the web because it is not fully verified, and releasing it could be harmful to the public. For example, it could result in the loss of insurance coverage, difficulty in registering a vehicle, or facilitate VIN fraud by bad actors.
  • The CBSA only shares this data with specific groups like CARFAX Canada and Équité Association. This helps stop car theft while still keeping Canadians' personal information safe.
Q13 - What is the CBSA doing about the importing of goods produced with Forced Labour
  • Importers are responsible for ensuring that the goods they are importing into Canada are not directly or indirectly produced by forced labour.
  • The Government of Canada expects companies to take every step possible to ensure that their supply chains conform to Canadian law.
  • With respect to the allegations of forced labour, as outlined in CBSA Memorandum D9-1-6, goods manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour are prohibited from entering Canada under tariff item 9897 of the Customs Tariff.
Q14 - What can you tell me about CBSA's duty to accommodate BSOs who can no longer carry firearms
  • The CBSA has a duty to accommodate employees who can no longer be fully armed.
  • At the same time, they also have a duty to spend taxpayer money wisely and ensure employees meet the requirements of the job.
  • I know that the CBSA is committed to working with employees requiring accommodations.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Committee Notes - Iran and IRGC

Q1- How has the threat environment changed since the conflict in Iran
  • CSIS continues to assess that Iranian threat-related activities directed at Canada and its allies are likely to continue in 2026.
  • At present, CSIS is not aware of any threat-related incidents in Canada directly linked to the Iran conflict. The National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL) remains at a MEDIUM level (an attack is a realistic possibility in Canada in the next six months).
  • We continue to monitor the threat environment with heightened vigilance.
  • CSIS works closely with IRCC and CBSA to support the integrity of Canada's borders and immigration systems, including by providing security screening assessments and advice to inform immigration decisions made by IRCC.

Committee Notes - Jewish and Iranian Communities

Q2 - What has been the impact on Jewish and Iranian Communities
  • CSIS has observed an increase in violent extremist rhetoric inspired by the conflict in the Middle East, including in Canada.
  • CSIS understands that Canadians are concerned for their safety and security given the increase in anti-Semitism, Islamophobia and hate crimes.
  • CSIS is working vigilantly to identify and counter potential threats.
  • CSIS also works with local communities, and will continue to provide as much information as possible on the threat and the actions we are taking.
  • Over the last year, CSIS has worked to counter the actions of Iranian intelligence services and their proxies who have targeted individuals they perceive as threats to their regime.
  • ITAC continues to not recommend an increase to the NTTL, which remains at a MEDIUM level (an attack is a realistic possibility in Canada in the next six months), at this time. As the situation evolves, the NTTL will continue to be evaluated.
  • Violent extremist threat activities directed by Iran or its proxies are being monitored closely and directly inform Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level (NTTL), a tool used by government and law enforcement agencies to mitigate risks and vulnerabilities of terrorism.

Committee Notes - Canada-US Relations

Q3 - How has Canada's security partnership with the US changed
  • Canada values its partnership with the United States, and we believe that it is in the strategic interest of both countries to continue our strong national security cooperation.
  • We have a number of shared interests that will continue to persist, such as counter-terrorism, and combatting espionage and foreign interference.
  • Canada has strong intelligence relationships with numerous U.S. agencies that are long-standing and resilient. While we are always alive to the geopolitical environment, we will continue to collaborate and share intelligence, where appropriate, through our very comprehensive intelligence-sharing framework.
  • The interconnectedness of our national security communities allows us to better protect North American security.

Committee Notes - Arctic

Q4 - What is CSIS doing to ensure the safety and security of Canada's Arctic
  • Foreign interest in Canada's Arctic continues to grow due to the economic and strategic opportunities it presents, including:
    • the opening up of new trade routes,
    • the rich critical mineral resources present,
    • and opportunities to conduct valuable scientific research.
  • Foreign states, such as Russia and the PRC, also have a significant intelligence interest in our Arctic and those who influence or develop its economic or strategic potential. This includes access to the region's natural resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals.
  • CSIS protects Canadian national security interests in the region and enhances Canada's resilience against various threats. Our mandate in the Arctic includes:
    • Investigating activities in the Arctic/North that are suspected to be threats to Canada's security;
    • Advising the Government and stakeholders and rights-holders in the region on these threats;
    • Engaging with rights-holders and organizations, the private sector, and the public, among others to help build their resiliency to threats; and
    • Collecting intelligence on regional activities and threats and taking mitigative action as appropriate.
  • CSIS continues to work with key partners in Canada, including territorial governments, Indigenous governments and organizations, industry, and communities.
  • CSIS engages regularly with Indigenous and Arctic rights holders to learn from their insights and help build resilience to threats.

Committee Notes - Foreign Interference

Q5- Have you observed new threats in terms of espionage activities or foreign interference or transnational repression from foreign actors such as India and China
  • CSIS continues to take all allegations of foreign interference and transnational repression seriously. CSIS remains vigilant against all foreign interference and espionage threats, regardless of where they originate from.
  • Canada's recent engagements with these countries provides CSIS with the opportunity to work toward constructive resolutions of issues bilaterally, in a way that can assure better security outcomes for Canadians.

Committee Notes - Security Clearances

Q6 - What does CSIS do in relation to security screenings
  • CSIS has two roles as it relates to security screening:
    • Providing advice to IRCC regarding immigration and citizenship applications. CBSA and IRCC can refer applications to CSIS for comprehensive security screening on immigration applications. CSIS reviews all in Canada asylum applications and all citizenship applications.
    • Providing advice to Deputy Heads of other government departments to allow them to make decisions on security clearances for government officials.
  • CSIS's government security screening program provides security assessments to requesting federal departments that are sponsoring the clearance of an employee or an individual with a need to receive classified information.
    • For members of provincial governments, the Privy Council Office is generally the sponsoring department, and the one that ultimately grants the clearance.
    • CSIS supports the Government of Canada's national security engagement with provincial and territorial governments.

Committee Notes - Alberta Sovereignty Movement

Q7- Is CSIS monitoring the Alberta Sovereignty Movement
  • CSIS does not investigate lawful protest, advocacy and dissent.
  • CSIS investigates where a foreign state might seek to use covert or obfuscated means to divide Canadians, amplify narratives that reflect the positions of a foreign state which may be detrimental to Canada, or otherwise deceptively interfere in domestic political processes.
Correctional Service Canada (CSC)

Committee Notes

Q1 – Why are convicted terrorists and high-risk offenders being released into our community on statutory release
  • In the last year, our government introduced multiple bills to combat crimes and keep our communities safe.
  • The Parole Board of Canada (PBC) imposes conditions when an offender is released on Statutory release.
  • In certain cases, the PBC may impose a condition requiring an offender to reside in a Community-Based Residential Facility, which is the most restrictive form of release.
  • For offenders in the community, any risk is managed through strict monitoring and supervision strategies.
  • We take our mandate to protect the safety of our communities very seriously and when the risk of an offender is increased or there is a change in an offender's behaviour or compliance with their conditions, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) takes immediate action, which can include suspending their release and returning them to custody.
Q2 – What programming is provided to radicalized offenders to prevent them from reoffending
  • Radicalization is not a new phenomenon in federal corrections; rather, CSC has a long history of successfully managing offenders who have been radicalized.
  • Extensive case management plans are developed to manage radicalized offenders, including detailed correctional plans that are customized for each offender's risk and needs.
  • Programming works to target violence and the influence of antisocial associates, which are common to radicalized offenders.
  • In addition, CSC reviews interventions used in other jurisdictions to ensure that current and best practices are applied.
  • CSC does, and will, continue to share information with both domestic and international partners, including within the law enforcement and national security community, to keep Canadians safe.
Q3 – Incidents, like the recent one at Springhill Institution, are deeply concerning. What is CSC doing to better protect its staff from increasing violence
  • Incidents of staff assault are taken very seriously by CSC. Specific to Springhill Institution, reviews are underway, and we will continue working closely with partners, to ensure accountability and strengthen prevention, where possible.
  • We recognize the threat posed by contraband, including drugs and weapons, entering institutions by drones.
  • The Spring Economic Update outlines targeted investments to strengthen CSC's ability to detect and disrupt drone activity and enhance security technology in our institutions, which is an important step to protecting staff and maintaining safe operations.
  • Supporting CSC employees goes beyond responding to incidents. It means investing in safer workplaces, modern tools, and strong mental health supports.
  • Together, we remain committed to ensuring CSC staff have the tools and resources they need.
Q4 – At a time of increased violence and threats in our prisons, why is CSC cutting front-line staff, including mobile patrol units
  • With new, innovative technologies being introduced, CSC is committed to reviewing its deployment standards to ensure they reflect today's operational realities.
  • Continuing to add layers of security technologies to its operations leads to better responses to potential threats, including drones.
  • Correctional Officer posts, including Mobile Patrol posts, remain an important component of security.
  • However, with improvements in contraband detection technology, as well as direct supervision by staff, CSC will continue to support the effective response to threats, using a layered approach to security.
  • This includes the announcement in the Spring Economic Update which outlines targeted investments to strengthen CSC's ability to detect and disrupt drone activity and enhance security technology in our institutions, which is an important step to protecting staff and maintaining safe operations.
Q5 – Why is Darren Ray in a minimum-security unit without any fences at a time when Durham police say he is too much of a risk to be allowed in the community
  • While I cannot comment on specific offenders, CSC contributes to the safety of institutions and the public by ensuring that all inmates are placed in institutions that match their security classification level.
  • Inmates are classified based on the necessary degree of supervision and control within the penitentiary, escape risk, and risk to public safety in the event of an escape.
  • All transfers to lower levels of security occur only after CSC has duly considered an inmate's risk and how best to manage it.
  • In recent years, CSC has strengthened its assessment for those seeking a transfer to a minimum institution.
  • An inmate can be returned to a higher security level at any point if deemed necessary to ensure the safety of the public or the institution.
Parole Board Canada (PBC)

Committee Notes

Q1 - Why does the Parole Board keep releasing violent criminals into the community
  • The safety of the public is always the paramount consideration in all Parole Board of Canada decisions.
  • The vast majority of offenders do not reoffend violently while on conditional release.
  • In fact, over the last five years, 99.7% of federal day parole and 99.3% of federal full parole supervision periods were completed without violent reoffending. This success rate is among the highest in the world.
  • Conditional release helps offenders reintegrate into the community gradually and safely, under supervision. It also helps them access community resources.
  • Under the law, all offenders, including those serving a life sentence, are eligible for different types of conditional release during their sentence, such as Escorted/Unescorted Temporary Absences, Day and Full Parole.
  • Offenders on conditional release are supervised in the community by CSC and must follow strict conditions.
  • If an offender violates their parole conditions or poses an increased risk to the community, they may be returned to prison. In addition, if an offender fails to comply with the conditions on their unescorted temporary absence (UTA), the UTA and any future UTAs that were authorized may be cancelled.
Q2 - There have been recent instances of offenders on parole committing murder. How do you defend this? Isn't this proof the system is broken and needs to be fixed
  • First, I want to extend my deepest sympathies to the family and friends of the victims of such tragic incidents.
  • Violent offences by individuals on conditional release are always shocking, but thankfully also extremely rare.
  • In fact, over the last five years, 99.7% of federal day parole and 99.3% of federal full parole supervision periods were completed without violent reoffending.
  • That said, parole decision-making is based on an empirically supported framework. However, assessing and predicting human behaviour is both complex and difficult.
  • Parole reviews involve a thorough risk assessment conducted by independent Parole Board of Canada Board members, who receive extensive training.
  • The safety of the public is always the paramount consideration in all Parole Board of Canada decisions, as evidenced by the Board's outcomes.
  • In making its decisions, by law, the Parole Board is required to make the least restrictive determination.
  • In the rare event where an offender has re-offended violently in the community, the PBC Chairperson and CSC Commissioner may convene an independent Board of Investigation to thoroughly review and analyze all the facts around the incident and make recommendations.
Q3 - Victims have told us they feel their voices are not being heard in the parole process. How do you respond to this
  • The Government recognizes the important role that victims play in the conditional release process and is committed to respecting their rights.
  • During fiscal year 2024-25, the PBC had over 24,000 contacts with victims and supported the participation of over 1,000 victims and their support persons in attending hearings.
  • Parole Board members are legally required to consider all relevant and available information, including victim statements, when making their conditional release decisions.
  • Victims may attend parole board hearings and present a victim statement for consideration by Board members. They can also request that special conditions be placed on an offender's conditional release.
  • The Parole Board will impose any conditions on the offender's release that are considered reasonable and necessary to protect the victim.
Q4 - If an offender is considered "a high risk to public safety" and denied day parole, how can the Board authorize an Unescorted Temporary Absence
  • Unlike parole, an Unescorted Temporary Absence (UTA) is granted for a specified purpose. For example, for medical purposes, family contact, or personal development (such as to complete a treatment program only offered outside of the institution).
  • When deciding whether to authorize a UTA, the PBC considers all relevant available information to determine whether the criteria under the law are met.
  • This includes consideration of the limited duration of the UTA, as well as the structured plan for the offender while on the UTA, including any conditions of release. It also includes static risk assessments which do not take into account changes the offender may have made during their sentence.
  • A UTA does not guarantee future absences or parole, and the Board may cancel it at any time if conditions change, a breach occurs, or new information arises.
  • In all cases, public safety is the paramount consideration in decision-making.

Portfolio Overview and Anticipated Questions per Organization

Public Safety Canada (PS)
Table 2: PS Organizational Estimates (in dollars)
Budgetary Voted 2024-2025 2025-2026 2026-27
Expenditures Main Estimates Estimates to Date Main Estimates
1 – Operating expenditures 266,253,175 346,711,518 357,802,956 265,778,295
5 – Grants and contributions 1,046,877,971 1,787,484,190 1,822,728,626 1,958,506,033
Total VotedFootnote * 1,313,131,146 2,134,195,708 2,180,531,582 2,224,284,328
Total StatutoryFootnote * 27,686,447 28,792,986 30,266,073 28,559,700
Total BudgetaryFootnote * 1,340,817,593 2,162,988,694 2,210,797,655 2,252,844,028

Anticipated Questions

Q1 - What funding is requested through the Main Estimates
  • The 2026-27 Main Estimates total authorities for Public Safety Canada (PS) is $2,252.8M.
    • $265.8M in Vote 1 – Operating expenditures
    • $1,958.5M in Vote 5 – Grants and contributions, and
    • $28.6M in Statutory authorities.
Q2 - How have Public Safety's total authorities changed between 2025–26 and 2026–27
  • Overall, the Department of Public Safety's total authorities for 2026-27 have a net increase of $89.9M or 4.2% from the previous year's total Main Estimates.
    • Vote 1 authorities decreased from $346.7M to $265.8M (23.3% decrease)
    • Vote 5 authorities increased from $1,787.5M to $1,958.5M (9.6% increase)
    • Statutory authorities decreased from $28.8M to $28.6M (0.8% decrease)
Q3 - What are the main factors driving the increase in the Public Safety's authorities for 2026–27
  • The main factors contributing to the changes in funding levels include:
    • An increase of $490.9M in Vote 5 authorities for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements program (DFAA)
    • An increase of $38.2M in Vote 5 authorities for the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program
    • An increase of $37.8M in Vote 5 authorities for the First Nations and Inuit Policing Facilities Program
  • These increases are offset by the following decreases:
    • A decrease of $308.9M for the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program ($59.9M in Vote 1 and $249.0M in Vote 5). A reprofile of funding from 2025-26 of $203.2M has been approved and will be reflected in the 2026-27 Supplementary Estimates A.
    • A decrease of $57.1M due to expiry for the Canada's 2025 G7 Presidency ($4.3M in Vote 1 and $52.8M in Vote 5)
    • A decrease of $54.4M due to expiry of the Building Safer Communities Fund ($1.9M in Vote 1 and $52.5M in Vote 5). The renewal for this program will be reflected in the 2026-27 Supplementary Estimates A.
Q4 - How is the Comprehensive Expenditures Review (CER), announced in Budget 2025, reflected in the 2026–27 Main Estimates
  • Measures announced under the Comprehensive Expenditure Review are reflected in these Main Estimates and represent a $15.3M reduction in funding (Vote 1 and statutory authorities), enabling the Department to meet its 2026–27 target.
Q5 - What is the most significant item in these Main Estimates and what are the intended uses of the funding requested
  • The most significant item is $1.1 billion dollars for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) contribution program. This amount represents a $490.9M increase in contributions funding for the DFAA program from the previous year.
  • Public Safety regularly consults with provinces and territories (P&Ts) to ensure funding levels meet disbursement requirements under the DFAA legislation and aligns funding levels accordingly.
  • The majority of the main estimates funding ($1.0 billion) is the result of a reprofile of funds from 2024-25 to 2026-27, as final payments for the following Orders in Council (OiC) were delayed to 2026-27:
    • $410M – 2013 Alberta Flood (OiC 162)
    • $159M – 2017 British Columbia Interface Fire (OiC 211)
    • $60M – 2018 British Columbia Interface Fire (OiC 219)
Q6 - What is the current status of funding for the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program, and how will it support program implementation
  • The program received $148.8M in Main Estimates
    • $55.2M in Vote 1 – Operating expenditures, and
    • $93.6M in Vote 5 – Grants and contributions
  • A request for a reprofile of funding of $203.2M has been approved and will be reflected in the 2026–27 Supplementary Estimates A.
  • At that time, total authorities for the Assault-Styles Firearms Compensation Program will increase to $352.0M.
  • This funding will allow the program to:
    • Fully deliver the businesses phase, and
    • Support completion of the individuals phase, including the collection and safe destruction of individually-owned assault-style firearms.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
Table 3: RCMP Organizational Estimates (in dollars)
Budgetary Voted 2024-2025 2025-2026 2026-27
Expenditures Main Estimates Estimates to Date Main Estimates
1 – Operating expenditures 3,769,187,217 3,815,441,410 3,939,830,522 3,866,940,232
5 – Capital expenditures 358,463,364 452,365,865 453,391,534 451,267,333
10 – Grants and contributions 20,622,124 26,176,685 67,660,284 26,676,685
15 – Payments in respect of disability and health benefits for members of the RCMP 947,245,331 1,060,656,391 1,129,325,344 1,159,839,174
Total VotedFootnote * 5,095,518,036 5,354,640,351 5,590,207,684 5,506,723,424
Total StatutoryFootnote * 648,853,855 721,777,327 728,915,781 779,997,567
Total BudgetaryFootnote * 5,744,371,891 6,076,417,678 6,319,123,465 6,286,720,991

Anticipated Questions

Q1 - Given that $238.8M (or $263.9M with Employee Benefits Plan) in RCMP's Main Estimates authorities is funding to expand support and capacity within the Federal Policing mandate, can the Minister explain what specific outcomes and operational enhancements are expected from this investment
  • This funding, over four years, will expand the RCMP's federal policing workforce by 1,000 new, dedicated personnel. This will include 350 additional Regular Members in the first year of funding.
  • This investment will focus on tackling financial crimes and increase investigative capacity to address the most serious criminal threats, including organized crime, cybercrime and national security.
  • The approach will support targeted recruitment and training focused on the specialized skills required for federal policing.
  • This investment will also increase the Cadet Recruitment Allowance from $525/week to $1,000/week. This change helps offset the real costs faced by applicants during the recruitment and training process and makes the path to joining the RCMP more accessible and competitive.
Q2 - Minister, the 2026–27 Main Estimates include an incremental $36.2 million for the RCMP to enhance the integrity of Canada's borders. Could you elaborate on how this funding will be allocated, what specific gaps it is intended to address, and what measurable outcomes Canadians should expect as a result
  • The 2024 Fall Economic Statement announced Canada's new Border Plan, backed by an investment of $1.3 billion. Of this amount, the RCMP received $643.7 million ($667.5 million including Shared Services Canada (SSC) and Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) costs) over six years, starting in fiscal year 2024-25, and $82.4 million ($86 million including SSC and PSPC costs) ongoing to increase border enforcement capacity.
  • The RCMP is allocating the $643.7 million towards three main lines of effort:
    • Deploying a new Aerial Intelligence Task Force;
    • Increasing Investigative Capacity; and
    • Establishing a North American Joint Strike Force.
  • Investments from Canada's Border Plan build on the RCMP's existing measures to increase capacity to patrol, detect, and respond to serious criminal threats including fentanyl production and illegal migration.
  • For example, this funding has enabled the RCMP to:
    • Deploy a multi-capability Aerial Intelligence Task Force, integrating helicopters, drones, mobile surveillance systems, and counter-drone technology, to deliver continuous monitoring between ports of entry and accelerate response times to border incidents;
    • Establish a money laundering intelligence partnership to increase information sharing on money laundering and organized crime, bringing together law enforcement and the Domestic Systemically Important Banks;
    • Stand up a North American Joint Strike Force to combat illegal substances and related organized crime activity, and establishing four regional Integrated Synthetic Enforcement Teams in strategic locations across Canada to conduct illicit drug investigations; and
    • Participate in two national fentanyl sprints to date led by the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime, which resulted in significant seizures of illegal substances and over 8,000 arrests and charges.
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
Table 4: CBSA Comparison of Main Estimates 2025-26 to 2026-27 (in millions of dollars)
Vote Main Estimates 2025-26 Main Estimates 2026-27 Variance Change (%)
1 – Operating expenditures 2,538.4 2,494.8 (43.6) -1.8%
5 – Capital Expenditures 173.4 236.8 63.4 26.8%
Total VotedFootnote * 2,711.8 2,731.5 19.8 0.7%
Total StatutoryFootnote * 281.2 338.3 57.1 16.9%
Total Budgetary ExpendituresFootnote * 2,993.0 3,069.9 76.9 2.6%

Anticipated Questions

Q1 - How much funding will the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) receive in the 2026–27 Main Estimates

The CBSA is seeking $3.07 billion in 2026–27, which represents an increase of $76.9 million, or 2.6 percent, compared to last year's Main Estimates.

  • The increase to the CBSA 2026-27 Main Estimates is related to:
    • Capital investment for infrastructure projects, including Land Border Crossings and Marine Container Examination Facilities. The aim is to strengthen enforcement capacity, modernise facilities, and support the secure flow of people and goods.
    • Additional funding to deliver on the commitment to hire 1,000 new CBSA Officers.
  • These funding increases are partially offset by Comprehensive Expenditure Review reductions to back office functions.
Q2 - What funding is being provided to hire 1,000 new Officers, and how will it be implemented

Budget 2025 provides $669 million over five years and $198.3 million ongoing to Strengthen Canada's Borders.

  • In 2026–27, CBSA will receive $77 million through the Main Estimates to support this initiative.
  • This funding will support two areas:
    • Recruitment, training and deployment of 1,000 new CBSA officers, as well as an increased stipend for all Border Services Officer Trainees.
    • Investment in infrastructure, including renovations to the CBSA College, two new container examination facilities, and upgrades to IT systems.
Q3 - What are CBSA's savings under the Government of Canada's Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER) included in the 2026–27 Main Estimates
  • CBSA's 2026–27 Main Estimates include $44.1 million in savings, plus $7.9 million in Employee Benefit Plan adjustments, for a total of $52 million under the Comprehensive Expenditure Review.
  • CBSA's savings will focus on reducing administrative overhead, streamlining internal business processes, and making use of data to manage the workforce more efficiently.
  • The CBSA is on track to deliver on the saving proposals while at the same time advancing Canada's strategy to strengthen CBSA's front line capacity, through the hiring of 1,000 new officers.
  • The Agency's CER savings initiatives will not impact frontline border operations.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
Table 5: CSIS Organizational Estimates (in dollars)
Budgetary Voted 2024-2025 2025-2026 2026-27
Expenditures Main Estimates Estimates to Date Main Estimates
1 – Program expenditures 748,322,493 907,947,462 918,324,834 930,948,484
Total VotedFootnote * 748,322,493 907,947,462 918,324,834 930,948,484
Total StatutoryFootnote * 64,694,921 72,192,509 74,047,502 81,907,699
Total BudgetaryFootnote * 813,017,414 980,139,971 992,372,336 1,012,856,183

Anticipated Questions

Q1 - How does CSIS protect Canada's sovereignty, especially given the current geopolitical context
  • CSIS is mandated to investigate threats to the security of Canada. CSIS reports to and advises the Government of Canada, and in specific circumstances, to take measures to reduce these threats.
  • Under the Act, CSIS is authorized to investigate as espionage, and sabotage, foreign interference, terrorism and violent extremism, and subversion.
    • CSIS does not investigate lawful advocacy, protest, or dissent.
  • CSIS prioritizes its resources to address threats to the security of Canada.
  • As part of its functions, CSIS:
    • Collect intelligence relating to the security of Canada and Canadian national interests;
    • Provides advice and disseminates intelligence to Government of Canada partners to increase understanding of threats to Canada and to help inform decision making;
    • Takes actions to reduce threats to the security of Canada;
    • Works closely with Canadian entities and national security partners so they are aware of the threat environment and have the information they need to build resiliency to threats.
Q2 - Does CSIS have the tools it needs to perform its duties and functions, and ensure the safety and security of Canada and all Canadians
  • CSIS operates in a world where the threat landscape is always evolving. The tools CSIS uses must also evolve and adapt, both in their scope and scale, to reflect the complexity of the current domestic and global national security environment.
    • CSIS therefore takes a rigorous approach to prioritizing its resources, tools, and efforts to best effect.
  • The government also continuously evaluates CSIS's capabilities and posture to ensure that we take any measures needed to keep our national security toolkit up to date, and best-placed to keep Canadians safe, secure, and prosperous.
Q3 - Without a breakdown of CSIS's expenditures, how can we be sure the funding is being applied effectively
  • Given the sensitivity of its operations, CSIS limits the publicly available details on its financial expenditures. However, CSIS will continue to use its annual reports and other disclosures to inform Canadians and the Government of Canada on its plans, priorities and progress.
  • CSIS is also subject to robust review and oversight, including from National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), the Intelligence Commissioner, Privacy Commissioner and others to satisfy legislative and reporting obligations, including on financial matters.
  • Furthermore, CSIS has robust internal and external audit and evaluation mechanisms that fully examine the organization's expenditures, among other activities
  • While breakdowns of CSIS's expenditures are classified, I can share some of the ways this funding supports CSIS in delivering its mandated functions:
    • CSIS prepares intelligence reports, assessments and advice for the government to inform decision-making, to protect Canada's investments, industries and Canadians' interests.
    • CSIS engages with communities, the private sector, and other partners to help raise awareness and build resiliency against threats.
    • CSIS also takes measures to reduce threats if there are reasonable grounds to believe the security of Canada and Canadians is at risk.
    • CSIS provides security assessments on individuals who require access to classified information or sensitive sites within the Government of Canada, and
    • conducts foreign intelligence collection within Canada at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence.
Q4 - How does CSIS's budget align with the government's NATO-related spending
  • CSIS's full annual budget counts toward Canada's core defence contributions, given the central role CSIS plays in the defence of Canada, both through NATO and other efforts. This aligns Canada's approach to defence spending with that of our allies.
  • CSIS's efforts to protect national security and provide an intelligence advantage contributed to Canada meeting the 2025-26 target of spending 2% of GDP on defence, and are part of collective work towards 5% by 2035.
Q5 - What kind of impacts can Canadians expect once CSIS's funding has been implemented
  • The threat environment is constantly evolving, increasing in volume, velocity and variety of threats. Advances in technology have increased the sophistication of threat actors.
  • This funding will help CSIS ensure it has the capability to respond to a multitude of threats, including foreign interference, violent extremism, and espionage.
  • Canadians can expect to be more informed, continue to have access to tools and support societal resiliency in the face of such threats, and be assured that CSIS is steadfast in its efforts to keep Canada and Canadians safe.
Correctional Service of Canada (CSC)
Table 6: CSC Organizational Estimates (in dollars)
Budgetary Voted 2024-2025 2025-2026 2026-27
Expenditures Main Estimates Estimates to Date Main Estimates
1 – Operating expenditures, grants and contributions 3,084,547,130 3,227,384,720 3,367,812,903 3,296,446,429
5 – Capital expenditures 246,251,581 337,357,217 337,357,217 382,568,067
10 – CORCAN revolving fund N/A 1 1 N/A
Total VotedFootnote * 3,330,798,711 3,564,741,938 3,705,170,121 3,679,014,496
Total StatutoryFootnote * 269,728,706 297,787,547 312,582,379 321,559,689
Total BudgetaryFootnote * 3,600,517,417 3.862.529.485 4.107,752,500 4,000,574,185

Explanation of Significant Changes

  • The net increase of $138.0 million compared to Main Estimates 2025 to 2026 is primarily attributable to additional funding for collective agreement ratification and capital investment to support our infrastructure requirements.

Anticipated Questions

Q1 - Increase in Funding for the Main Estimates 2026-2027
  • The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has sought increased funding under the Main Estimates 2026-2027 to sustain its operations.
  • This funding will be used to address CSC's key operating pressures, due to increasing security risks, evolving offender profiles, aging infrastructure, and the need to adapt to emerging technologies and environmental challenges.
Q2 - Why is CSC seeking additional funding for investments in correctional facilities
  • $45.2M of the increase in funding is dedicated to investments in correctional facilities.
  • These investments will support CSC in continuing to meet its mandate of safe and secure custody of offenders and the safety and security of the public, victims, staff and offenders in institutions as well as in the community.
  • Many CSC institutions were designed decades ago, which can pose certain challenges and risks.
  • Aging infrastructure affects not only the offenders who live in these facilities, but creates challenging working conditions for our employees, including from a health, rehabilitation, and safety perspective.
  • Through targeted investments that seek to make upgrades and repairs to some aging facilities, we will promote a healthier environment conducive to offender rehabilitation as well as longer-term well-being of our employees.
Q3 - What is the funding for collective agreements for
  • Contained within the Main Estimates 2026-27 is a request of $143.4M for funding to cover an increase in compensation for ratification of collective agreement.
  • This increase is mainly due to the Correctional Officer collective agreement signed in February 2025.
  • CSC employees work tirelessly across the country to supervise offenders in our institutions and our communities. Their work is unique and has certain inherent challenges.
  • In recognition of this, CSC reached an agreement with its labour partners to increase wage enhancements for thousands of employees.
  • The funding being requested through the Main Estimates recognizes CSC employees' significant contributions to maintaining public safety and will ensure that posts continue to be occupied by the most qualified personnel.
Q4 - What about the risks posed by drones? Are there investments there
  • The Main Estimates 2026-27 will also allow us to address key operating pressures and priorities.
  • This includes continuing to invest in innovative technologies to ensure that we have the best possible response to the threat posed by drones and contraband.
  • The Spring Economic Update outlines targeted investments of $60.4M over three years and $2.3M ongoing for Correctional facilities and immigration holding centres to strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt drone activity and enhance security technologies in our institutions.
  • In addition, CSC is expanding its pilot related to the operation of jamming technologies to mitigate the impact of drones, the result of which will inform further utilization at select institutions in the future.
  • CSC also continues to introduce full body scanners at institutions across the country, with a plan to have them at all institutions by the end of the 2029-2030 fiscal year.
  • With improvements in contraband detection technology, as well as direct supervision by staff, CSC will continue to support the effective response to threats, using a layered approach to security.
Parole Board of Canada (PBC)
Table 7: PBC Organizational Estimates (in dollars)
Budgetary Voted 2024-2025 2025-2026 2026-27
Expenditures Main Estimates Estimates to Date Main Estimates
1 – Program expenditures 68,497,369 64,336,572 64,336,572 63,077,947
Total VotedFootnote * 68,497,369 64,336,572 64,336,572 63,077,947
Total StatutoryFootnote * 8,432,461 8,111,091 8,111,091 8,493,331
Total BudgetaryFootnote * 76,929,830 72,447,663 72,447,663 71,571,278

Anticipated Questions

  • The total funding sought by the Parole Board of Canada (PBC) in the Main Estimates for 2026-27 is $71.6M, representing a $0.9M or 1.2% decrease over the previous year. This decrease can mainly be explained by:
    • The Refocusing of Government Spending announced under the Budget 2023 (a reduction of $0.8M).
    • The implementation of the partially approved amount of the Comprehensive Expenditure Review (CER) announced under the Budget 2025 (a reduction of $1.2M).
  • Offset by:
    • Funding received for employee compensation and various other small items (an increase of $1.1M).
  • The Parole Board will allocate 79% of its resources to its core program delivery, broken down as followed:
    • 57% for conditional release and related support.
    • 7% for conditional release openness and accountability.
    • 15% for record suspension/pardons and expungement decisions, and clemency recommendations.
    • And 21% of its resources will be allocated to internal services.
  • Overall, the PBC plans on spending:
    • $63.1M (88%) in operating expenditures, net of revenue.
    • $8.5M (12%) for employee benefit plans.
  • Spending is based on the plan that there will be 510 full-time equivalents (FTEs), including Board members (Governor in council appointees).

Background

2026-27 Main Estimates - Overview Explanation Note

Public Safety Portfolio

  • Ratification by Parliament of these Main Estimates will result in funding approvals of $16.7B for the Public Safety Portfolio for fiscal year 2026-27. On a portfolio-wide basis, total authorities sought in the 2026-27 Main Estimates will result in a net increase of $0.6B or 3.5% over the 2025-26 Main Estimates.
Table 8: Main Estimates Variance – 2025-26 to 2026-27 (in millions of dollars)
Organizations Main Estimates 2025-26 Main Estimates 2025-26 $ Variance Change %
PS 2,163.0 2,252.8 89.9 4.2%
CBSA 2,993.0 3,069.9 76.9 2.6%
CSIS 980.1 1,012.9 32.7 3.3%
CSC 3,862.5 4,000.6 138.0 3.6%
PBC 72.4 71.6 (0.9) -1.2%
OCI 8.1 7.7 (0.4) -4.7%
RCMP 6,076.4 6,286.7 210.3 3.5%
ERC 6.8 6.8 0.1 0.9%
CRCC 16.9 29.2 12.4 73.3%
Total – PortfolioFootnote * 16,179.2 16,738.2 559.0 3.5%

Summary of Highlights

The most material items affecting funding levels for Public Safety Portfolio organizations in the 2026-27 Main Estimates are listed below:

  • $490.9M for the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements program (DFAA) (PS);
  • $263.9M to support and increase capacity for RCMP Federal Policing Programs (RCMP);
  • $173.3M for the Contract Policing Program (RCMP);
  • $166.2M related to compensation for the funded portion of Collective Agreement increases (CSC); and
  • $122.6M related to class action lawsuits (CSC).

These increases are offset by the following decreases:

  • $335.2M for the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program (PS, RCMP);
  • $279.3M for one time funding for the Presidency of the 2025 G7 Summit in Canada (RCMP, PS); and
  • $198.2M on a cash basis, related to the Comprehensive Expenditure Review announced in Budget 2025 (PS, CBSA, CSC, RCMP, CSIS, OCI, PBC).

Supplementary material

Media Scan Cheat Sheet

Importation of Ebola into Canada

  • The Government has announced border measures, including travel restrictions and new screening and quarantine rules.
  • CBSA will support these measures through denial of boarding and additional screening measures for passengers with nexus to the affected region.
  • Specific screening questions have been added to inspection kiosks at Canadian international airports.

Ebola and the upcoming FIFA World Cup

  • We are working in close collaboration with U.S. counterparts on all aspects of the tournament, including with regard to Ebola.
  • FIFA North America is ensuring that measures such team isolation are enforced prior to arrival in North America.

FIFA security

  • Host cities are primarily responsible for safety and security for the tournament.
  • The Government is providing financial support to Toronto and Vancouver for enhanced security operations.
  • The Government Operations Centre will maintain an enhanced situational awareness and is prepared to coordinate a federal response.

Organized Crime and Pearson Airport (From Transport Canada)

  • The Government continues to work closely with airport authorities, CATSA, police of jurisdiction, and other partners to address risks and strengthen security measures.
  • Transport Canada is currently examining additional measures to ensure the highest standards are in place to protect passengers, workers and airport operations.

Alberta referendum and foreign interference

  • Protecting Canada's democracy from foreign interference is a shared responsibility across federal institutions, provincial governments, and independent oversight bodies.
  • RCMP has informed the Alberta government that there is no evidence the province's separatist movement has been subject to foreign interference.

Firearms Compensation Program

  • The Government has banned more than 2,500 makes and models of assault-style firearms since May 2020.
  • The program gives eligible owners and businesses a clear option to dispose of firearms and receive fair compensation.
  • The nation-wide declaration period was open to eligible firearms owners across the country, including those residing in Alberta and Saskatchewan.
  • Individuals who live in Alberta or Saskatchewan should consult their provincial government for laws or regulations put in place that may impede or limit their participation in the program.

See separate document for facts and statistics on firearms.

Combatting Hate (Acts of antisemitism in Montreal, attacks on Islamic Center of San Diego)

  • Hate does not have a place in our society. The Government stands with Jewish and Muslim communities across Canada.
  • Canadians deserve to feel safe at home and in their communities. That's why the Government is advancing new initiatives and investing in our institutions to strengthen public safety, including hiring 1,000 additional RCMP officers to protect Canadians.

Lawful Access (Bill C-22) Amendments

See separate document for latest information.

Extortion

  • Law enforcement are making arrests and laying charges for extortion and related violence across Canada.
  • In British Columbia, the Extortion Task Force has contributed to a decline in extortion-related activity.
  • As of May 7, 2026, the CBSA has opened 446 immigration investigations, issued 118 removal orders for various inadmissibility grounds, and removed 55 individuals from Canada.
  • Several transnational criminal organizations, including the Bishnoi Gang, are now listed as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code, which strengthens the RCMP's ability to prevent and disrupt terrorist activities.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

  • Members of the IRGC are prevented from travelling to Canada.
  • As the IRGC is an organization which has engaged in terrorism, and is a listed terrorist entity under the Criminal Code, the CBSA pursues allegations of inadmissibility against their members.
  • Cases are reviewed and assessed on a case-by-case basis, when determining whether a person is inadmissible as a member of an organization.
  • Since the listing of the IRGC, the CBSA has identified 37 suspected members of the IRGC.

Bill C-22: Key Messages for SECU Appearance

  • Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA) responds to the recommendation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians to modernize Canada's lawful access framework.
  • It establishes a framework for making general requirements, through regulations, and specific requirements, through orders, for lawful access capabilities that will consider privacy and cybersecurity and ensure there is no substantial risk to cybersecurity.
  • Access to information through these capabilities would continue to be governed by the Criminal Code and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and privacy legislation and frameworks would continue to apply.
Table 9: Key Messages
Hot Issue Key Messages
Scope of "electronic service provider"
  • The technologies that carry and store communications are continually evolving.
  • A circumscribed definition today is out-of-date tomorrow. For example, just in the past year artificial intelligence communications have taken on a new relevance to investigations.
Meaning and application of systemic vulnerability / Risks / Salt Typhoon
  • The Act is drafted to empower electronic service providers to say "no" to doing something that would make their systems systemically vulnerable. It's important they are empowered in this way, as they know their systems best.
  • This does not mean that cybersecurity risks that do not meet this threshold will be ignored. The bill requires the government to take them into account as part of the regulatory or order making process. These processes are subject to public and Intelligence Commissioner scrutiny respectively.
Backdoors/
Encryption
  • The government agrees that encryption should not be compromised. This is reflected in the bill through the prohibitions on systemic vulnerabilities. This is another way of saying "no backdoors."
  • The Minister has also announced his interest in making it specifically clear through an amendment that end-to-end encryption will never be compromised.
Metadata retention
  • Metadata is a key component to initiating an investigation, because it is tied to the first sign of a crime: it's the number of the threatening caller or the IP address of the hacker.
  • There are important trade-offs in the decision of how long to retain metadata, including cost and privacy.
  • The legislation recognize this and requires that these trade-offs be considered when making regulations or orders, which will be subject to input from business and experts through the regulation making or ministerial order processes.
New functionalities (turning on microphones, etc.)
  • The bill is for a distinct purpose set out in section 3 – enabling the exercise of authorities to access information, such as warrants.
  • Requiring collection of new information would be beyond this scope.
Ministerial Order Confidentiality
  • Confidentiality of ministerial orders ensures that the capabilities of police and intelligence are protected.
  • To offset for the lack of public scrutiny, the Intelligence Commissioner plays a role in reviewing and approving these orders. He plays a similar role for orders that cannot be made public.
  • The Intelligence Commissioner and the Minister will report annually on implementation of SAAIA.
Lack of judicial oversight / Comparison to Criminal Code authorities
  • Criminal Code tools, such as preservation orders, are designed for when there is an investigation into an offence and an impact on a specific individual's privacy without their knowledge.
  • SAAIA is designed to support the ability for Criminal Code tools, and other investigatory authorities to work. They require different considerations, given their impacts (e.g., cost, feasibility, privacy) and have different processes as a result of their more general role.
  • It should also be noted that the Intelligence Commissioner must be a former judge of a superior court, so he brings this expertise in the context of a quasi-judicial review that can take into account all the factors in the statute, including privacy.
CLOUD Act
  • Negotiations for a bilateral data access agreement relating to the CLOUD Act remain outstanding. The nature and status of negotiations are confidential matters. As such, we cannot provide further information at this time.
  • Any negotiation outcome would have to conform to the Charter with respect to enabling invasions of privacy.

Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program (ASFCP) - Envelope details by activity

  • The program's funding envelope of $742.SM includes projected costs of approximately:
    • $21.8M for Program design
    • $28.7M for the design, development and maintenance of the Program's Web Portal and Case Management System.
    • $248.6M in compensation for businesses and individuals
    • $132.2M to the RCMP, for collection activities, validation of collected ASFs, and other supporting activities.
    • $149M for collection and destruction activities. This includes funding to participating local police (provincial and municipal) as well as contracts for mobile collection units and destruction services.
    • $162.2M for program delivery and support, including payments, ESDC contact centre, client services and other activities supporting program implementation and ramp-down
  • Note that the exact amounts by category are subject to change based on operational needs as the Program evolves but the overall envelope will remain the same.

CBSA Facts and Figures

  • Budget 3,069M (2026-27)
  • 17,000 employees
  • 8,500 front line
  • 1,200 POEs / 36 countries
  • 117 land-border, 61 are 24/7
  • 13 airports, 10 are 24/7
  • 27 rail sites
  • 3 Ports Hali, Montréal, Van
  • 36 IT consultants as of Aug 15,2025 compared to 250 in June 2023
  • 44% VP/RDG from frontline (8of18)
  • 35.7% Executives from frontline
  • 66% VPs RDGs women (12of18)

In 2025:

  • 82.3M Travellers
  • 30.7M releasees of goods
  • 149M courier shipments
  • Commercial by the numbers:
    • Highway: 5M trucks
    • Air: 3.8M shipments
    • Marine: 2M containers
    • Rail: 1.8M cars
  • Over 52K seizures including over:
    • 830 firearms
    • 17k weapons seized
    • 90 child porn. seizures
    • 31k illegal drugs seizures:
      • Cocaine: 4.7k kilos
      • Heroin: 128 kilos
      • Fentanyl: 2.8 kilos
      • Methamph.: 2.3k kilos
      • Other opioids: 1k kilos
      • Other drugs, narcotics and chemicals: 28k kilos
      • cannabis 46.6k kilos
      • tobacco 803k kilos
  • Recent large seizure: $1.7M of cocaine at Pearson

Stolen Vehicles:

  • 2024: 2,277
  • 2025: 1,590

Currency Seizures:

  • 2025: over 38M
    • Suspected POC 3.8M
  • 2024: over 33M
    • Suspected POC 5.4M
  • 2023: over 25M
    • Suspected POC 3.6M
  • 2022: over 14M
    • Suspected POC 1.4M

1000 Officers:

  • 76 BSO grads so far
  • 21 Trade Officers
  • 4 Chem 2 Engineers
  • By July: 140 hired, 200 at Rigaud on track for 1,000 by end 28/29
  • Av. annual attrition(5yrs) 364
  • College throughput 720
  • Starting salary FB03 $86,900
  • New stipend from $125 to $525

Border Plan:

  • Large Scale Imaging
    • FY25/26: 6
    • FY26/27: 8
    • FY27/28: 5
  • Dog teams: 6 (3 fentanyl)

FES Time-limited/not part of 1000:

  • Removals backlog: 30
  • Trade/steel: 14

Removals:

  • 2025 over 22,000
  • 2024 over 17,000
  • 2023 over 15,000
    • Inventories (as of Jan 29, avail online)
    • No action required ~482K
    • removal not possible ~27k
    • Wanted ~33k
    • Removal in progress ~30k

Examples of inadmissibility types:

  • Security grounds
  • Human/Intern'l rights violation
  • Criminality
  • Organized crime
  • Misrepresentation
  • Non-compliance

Extortion:

  • Over 450 open investigations
  • Over 60 removed

Iranian Regime Members

  • Nov 2022 designated Iran regime from Nov 15, 2019 onwards
  • Sept 2024 amended start date of designation to June 23, 2003.
    • 177 CBSA investigations opened
    • 35 reported inadmissible
    • 27 sent to IRB
    • 3 deportation orders
    • 1 removed

IRGC

Since June 2024 listing:

  • 38 suspected, of which
  • 8 left before admissibility hearing
  • 27 cases being prepped for IRB
  • 10 ongoing hearings at IRB

Security Screening (April 1):

  • Temp resident applications: 60,318
  • Perm resident applications: 27,454
  • Asylum claims: 88,430
  • Total: 176,202
  • Last fiscal year CBSA closed over 100K files, 1% were non-favourable.

Detention Capacity:

  • Laval, SADP, Surrey, Toronto
  • 292 Low-Med risk
  • 105 High Risk (incl. 25 @ SADP)
  • Total: 397
  • Before retrofit we had 406 but no high risk capacity

Grievances:

  • Total in inventory: 8498
    • Total grievors: 4033
  • Breakdown by type:
    • Col.Agreement 5435
    • Policy/Nat'l Joint Counc. 1982
    • Behavioral 1081
    • Harassment 193
    • Discrimination 460
    • Discipline 428
  • Oldest grievance dates to year 2000:
    • 6 people have 50+ grievances
    • 16 people have 25+ grievances
    • 21 people have 20+ grievances
    • 266 people have 5+ grievances

PSI:

Investigations by year:

  • 2021-22: 47, 77% founded
  • 2022-23: 78, 72% founded
  • 2023-24: 83, 83% founded
  • 2024-25: 69, 75% founded

NICE:

  • Total notices of occurrence: 347
  • 100+ recs. implemented

Detector Dog Program:

  • 81 teams post border plan
  • Current female ratio: 34%
  • 42 policy grievances, all open
  • 2 scheduled for FPSLREB in June
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