Parliamentary Committee Notes: National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg
Responsive only – National security questions and answers
Note: PHAC’s Questions and Answers related to the release of NML documents are under a separate cover.
Q1: Was there evidence of foreign interference? (CSIS lead)
A1: It is well known that the Thousand Talents Plan (TTP) is one way that the People’s Republic of China seeks to incentivize academics to participate in activities that exploit advancements in Canadian technologies to improve their military and intelligence capabilities and their economic competitiveness, at the expense of Canada’s national interests.
When reading the publicly released documents it is clear that there were elements of TTP involvement.
The TTP seeks to exploit the collaborative, transparent, and open nature of Canada’s private sector, universities and colleges using scholarships, sponsored trips and visiting professorships to recruit individuals to advance PRC objectives.
The Government of Canada has taken significant steps to protect our country, our institutions and our intellectual property from all foreign state actors, their proxies and non-traditional intelligence collectors, that pose a risk to our country’s national security.
In a world marked by economic competition and confrontation, some states seek to advance their strategic political, economic and military objectives by exploiting investment and trade with Canada. Foreign states seek to acquire access or control over sensitive technologies, data, and critical infrastructure to advance their own military and intelligence capabilities, deprive Canada of access to economic gains, employ economic coercion against Canada, and support other intelligence operations against Canadians and Canadian interests. Canadian academic institutions are world leaders in various economic, technological and research sectors that are of interest to foreign military and intelligence actors.
In our 2021 and 2022 Public Report, we reported that the PRC relies on various means to gather intelligence, including non-traditional collectors of intelligence – individuals without formal intelligence training who have relevant subject matter expertise (i.e. scientists, business people) – and other non-transparent means to facilitate intangible technology transfer and further contribute to the development and competitiveness of the PRC’s science and technology sector.
Q2: What is the Government of Canada doing to protect Canadian institutions from foreign interference? (PS lead – previously approved response on foreign interference and research security)
A2: Canadian research is at the forefront of discovery, and today’s work is driving solutions to humanity’s most pressing challenges. While Canadian-led research is defined by its excellence and collaborative nature, its openness can make it a target for foreign influence, increasing the potential risks for research and development efforts to be misappropriated to the detriment of national security.
The Government of Canada takes research security very seriously, as today’s research will build tomorrow’s economy. That is why on January 16, 2024, the Government of Canada introduced a series of measures to safeguard Canada’s world-class research, which include:
- Implementing the new Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern;
- launching Canada’s new Research Security Centre as announced in Budget 2022, and;
- supporting post-secondary institutions with a total investment of close to $50 million through the Research Support Fund.
The Government of Canada remains committed to combatting foreign interference by protecting our citizens and communities, safeguarding our democratic institutions, and promoting economic security all while ensuring transparency and respect for the rule of law.
While the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have mandates to address and investigate threats in order to reduce them through criminal prosecution or other means, they are not our only tools. The Government of Canada also:
- Conducts robust national security reviews of foreign investments that may threaten Canada’s national security;
- Engages with private companies, researchers and the health sector to inform them of the threats and to help them better understand how to protect their work;
- Helps critical infrastructure operators defend critical cyber security systems that Canadians rely on;
- Provides mechanisms for the public to report threats through CSIS and RCMP websites and national security threat phone lines;
- Engages with communities at risk in Canada to help them better protect themselves against foreign threats;
- Coordinates and shares information with Five Eyes, and other allies, such as G7 and NATO on foreign interference and other threats; and,
- Adopts a holistic approach to protecting Canada’s democratic institutions and practices from interference, as exemplified by the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy, which includes initiatives such as the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, and classified threat briefings to key political party personnel with the required security clearance
At the same time, we recognize that the threat of foreign interference is not static, and we must continue to develop our toolkit to confront this evolving threat. That is why the Government of Canada continues to make investments to bolster its ability to counter foreign interference, including:
- Budget 2023 proposed $13.5 million over five years to Public Safety Canada to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office, as well as $48.9 million over three years to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation by foreign actors, to increase its investigative capacity, and to more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted.
- In March 2023, the Government also re-affirmed the allocation of $10 million over five years to the Protecting Democracy Unit, housed at the Privy Council Office. The Protecting Democracy Unit coordinates, develops, and implements Canadian government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and protect Canada’s democratic institutions and processes, including against foreign interference, in close cooperation with the NCFIC and in coordination with other government partners. The Protecting Democracy Unit is also responsible for coordinating the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy.
- These investments build on Budget 2022, where the Government committed $13.4 million to renew and expand the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism over the next five years, to address foreign threats to democracy.
- Public and stakeholder consultations to guide the creation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.
- On November 24, 2023, the Government of Canada also launched public consultations on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act and the Canada Evidence Act. The purpose of these consultations was to gather feedback from Canadians about potential amendments to further bolster Canada’s counter-foreign interference toolkit.
The Government of Canada takes the issue of foreign interference seriously. We take a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to strategically countering foreign interference.
Q3. Is the the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) investigating these two individuals? (RCMP lead – previously used lines from 2023)
The RCMP investigation into this matter is ongoing. The RCMP has no further comment at this time. National Security criminal investigations are often complex, multijurisdictional, and resource intensive and can take several years to complete.
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