Foreign Interference

Date: June 4, 2021

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Fully releasable (ATIP)? Yes

Branch/Agency: NSCB/PS

Proposed Response:

If Pressed on a Foreign Agent Registry

Background

Foreign interference is understood as hostile activity undertaken by foreign states that is purposely covert, malign, clandestine and deceptive. It can include threats, harassment and intimidation. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interest and values.

On May 31, 2021, the Alliance Canada Hong Kong (ACHK) published a report titled, “In Plain Sight: Beijing’s Unrestricted Network of Foreign Influence in Canada.” This report examines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) foreign influence and interference operations occurring in Canada and provides recommendations on how to address these operations. Seven aspects of the CCP’s foreign influence operations are covered in the report: political influence, elite capture, surveillance and intimidation, information and narrative discursion warfare, academic influence & vulnerability of intellectual property, national security, and the United Front Work Department. Of note, the report recommends the Government of Canada consider creating a foreign influence transparency scheme to create a public registry of individuals, organizations, and representatives who are actively acting on behalf of foreign states and their affiliates in Canada.

On April 28, 2021, a Global News article citing a recent European Union (EU) report on disinformation, notes that Russian and Chinese media are systematically seeking to raise fears in Western COVID-19 vaccines, and sow distrust and divisions in the West. According to the article, in late 2020 and early 2021, the two countries’ state media outlets amplified fake news online in multiple languages, highlighting safety concerns, unfounded links to deaths and promoted Russian and Chinese vaccines as safer and superior options. “Both Chinese official channels and pro-Kremlin media have amplified content on alleged side-effects of the Western vaccines, misrepresenting and sensationalizing international media reports and associating deaths to the Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine in Norway, Spain and elsewhere,” the EU report said.

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. The scope of potential foreign interference activities can be broad, encompassing a range of techniques that are familiar to intelligence agencies. These include: human intelligence operations, the use of state-sponsored or foreign influenced media, and the use of sophisticated cyber tools.

Several reports have highlighted the threat of foreign interference in Canada. For example, the 2020 CSIS Public Report, released on April 12, 2021, states that In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, espionage and foreign interference threats continue to persist and, in some areas, are increasing. Canada’s advanced and competitive economy, and its close economic and strategic partnership with the United States, makes it an ongoing target of hostile foreign state activities. Foreign governments also continue to use their state resources and their relationships with private entities to conduct clandestine, deceptive, or threatening foreign interference activities in Canada. In many cases, these clandestine influence operations are meant to support foreign political agendas or to deceptively influence Government of Canada policies, officials, or democratic processes.

Further, the 2020 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined foreign interference activities, including the targeting of Canadian institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP (2020) report states that foreign interference continues to be a significant threat to the security of Canada. Foreign states use direct and indirect contact to influence democratic and electoral institutions and processes by manipulating ethnocultural communities, persons in positions of authority or influence, and the media. Those activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. Though the effects of espionage and foreign interference are not as readily apparent as those of terrorism, they are the most significant long-term threats to Canada's sovereignty and prosperity.

The Minister of Public Safety’s open letter to all Members of Parliament, outlining the threat of foreign interference, and what the Government is doing to address it, was sent on December 18, 2020 in response to the motion introduced in the House of Commons by Mr. Michael Chong (Wellington—Halton Hills) that was passed on November 18, 2020. The motion reads: That, given that (i) the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, is threatening Canada’s national interest and our values, including Canadians of Chinese origin within Canada’s borders, (ii) it is essential that Canada have a strong and principled foreign policy backed by action in concert with its allies, the House call upon the government to: (a) make a decision on Huawei’s involvement in Canada’s 5G network within 30 days of the adoption of this motion; and (b) develop a robust plan, as Australia has done, to combat China’s growing foreign operations here in Canada and its increasing intimidation of Canadians living in Canada, and table it within 30 days of the adoption of this motion.

Threats to Democracy

Canada has observed state-sponsored information manipulation employed by certain regimes aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. These states are manipulating information, including employing disinformation, to sow doubt about the origins of the virus and the means required to counter it; discredit democratic responses to COVID-19 while casting their own as superior; and erode confidence in values of democracy and human rights.

It is important to note that disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices including information on the COVID-19 pandemic. State-sponsored disinformation campaigns are an example of foreign interference.

In an effort to counter foreign interference against the 2019 Federal Election, the Government created the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, composed of officials from CSE, CSIS, RCMP and GAC. As members of the SITE Task Force, CSIS was involved in efforts to raise awareness and assess foreign interference threats against the 2019 federal elections, and the RCMP provided law enforcement expertise. The SITE Task Force remains after the 2019 Federal Election, as threats to democratic institutions, such as foreign interference and disinformation, have not abated.

The Government of Canada’s security and intelligence community is combatting these threats within their respective mandates. CSIS is working closely with other government partners, inside and outside the security and intelligence community, to address clandestine, deceptive or threatening interference activities that can pose significant harm to our democratic institutions and processes. For example, CSIS has longstanding investigations into foreign interference threat activities targeting democratic processes and institutions across Canada. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multi-faceted mandate that allows it to investigate, and prevent foreign interference drawing upon various legislation.

Information manipulation, in particular disinformation, has been a subject of international collaboration in the context of COVID-19. Canada has discussed the threat and possible responses across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. For example, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism has enabled real-time information and assessment sharing, as well as the coordination of strategies to counter COVID-19 related disinformation. The Minister of Public Safety represents Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial, an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration and information sharing on various national security issues, including foreign interference. These discussions often include the sharing of respective approaches to shared issues, and the coordination of a cohesive Five Eyes responses.

Threats to Communities

The People’s Republic of China and other foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. These states may use a combination of their intelligence and security services as well as trusted agents to assist them in foreign interference activity on Canadian soil.

While states may attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals in order to pursue fighting corruption or to bring criminals to justice, these tactics can also be used as cover for silencing dissent, pressuring political opponents and instilling a general fear of state power no matter where a person is located.

When foreign states target members of Canadian communities, these individuals, for various reasons, may not have the means to protect themselves or do not know they can report these activities to Canadian authorities. The fear of state-backed or state-linked retribution targeting both them and their loved ones, in Canada and abroad, can force individuals to submit to foreign interference.

These activities constitute a threat to Canada’s sovereignty and to the safety of Canadians. When CSIS is informed of allegations of foreign interference, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe from harm and intimidation. Furthermore, criminal activity that is reported to law enforcement and that involves a national security nexus is investigated by the RCMP.

Threats to the Economy and Research Sector

We know that certain governments and their proxies are prepared to use illicit means to obtain goods and technology to advance their interests. These proxies could include state-owned enterprises, academic institutions/institutes, trade organizations or other entities that are not considered part of the state itself but may still serve its interests.

Direct engagement between Canadian universities, federal laboratories and security institutions on the risks posed by foreign interference has been ongoing since 2016 through the Safeguarding Science initiative led by Public Safety Canada, in partnership with 10 other federal departments. This initiative aims to raise awareness within Canada’s research communities of the risks of proliferation; dual-use technology; research security; and cybersecurity. The initiative informs participants about tools to help recognize and mitigate the risks Canadian institutions are facing, including those posed to their research and development. From January to June 2021, Safeguarding Science presentations have been delivered to 272 participants in universities and federal labs across the country, with plans to hold additional workshops at Canadian universities on an ongoing basis.

Public Safety Canada has also published the first edition of the Research Security Information Update. These updates aim to disseminate open source information relating to research security that includes, but is not limited to, key developments, case studies, tips and guides on mitigating threats within research institutions, or any security related topic of relevance to the research.

In addition, Public Safety Canada has established a Federal, Provincial and Territorial Community of Practice on Economic-based Threats to National Security to bring together key officials at the working level from across these jurisdictions to discuss national security threats that arise through economic activities. This includes, for example, threats arising from foreign direct investment, trade and exports, and the transfer or acquisition of Canadian intellectual property, knowledge, rights and licenses.

The COVID-19 pandemic has provided foreign threat actors with unique opportunities to advance their objectives, to the detriment of Canada’s national interest. The impacts of economic-based national security threats including the theft of intellectual property, and threats to Canada's supply chain are ongoing national security concerns. To protect sectors critical to Canada’s COVID-19 response, CSIS has launched an outreach operation aimed at sensitizing these sectors from the threat they could face from foreign interference and espionage. These sectors include the biopharmaceutical industry, healthcare, supply chains, and research and development. For example, last summer, CSIS delivered a presentation on espionage and foreign interference threats to BIOTech Canada, an industry association representing Canada’s biopharma sector.  

On March 24, 2021 the Ministers of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Public Safety, and Health released a statement asking that  members of the Government of Canada - Universities Working Group develop specific risk guidelines to integrate national security considerations into the evaluation and funding of research partnerships. Work to develop these guidelines is underway, and is due to be submitted for consideration by June 25, 2021. This statement follows one released on September 14, 2020 encouraging all members of the research community to take extra precautions to protect the security of COVID-19-related research, intellectual property and knowledge development. These statements reinforce the point that it is critical that research undertaken in Canada, by Canadians, with Canadian funding is safeguarded to protect both the integrity of our research ecosystem and long-term economic competitiveness and prosperity.

Moreover, the government launched the Safeguarding Your Research portal in September 2020 to support Canada’s research community. The portal provides information, best practices and tools to help researchers identify and mitigate potential security risks to their work.

Finally, in the current economic environment shaped by COVID-19, the Government of Canada is applying increased scrutiny to all foreign direct investments, controlling or non-controlling, into Canadian businesses that are vital to public health and the security of supply of critical goods and services to Canadians or to the Government of Canada. Further, at this time the Government of Canada will also subject all foreign investments by state owned enterprises, or private investors assessed as being closely tied to or subject to direction from foreign governments, to enhanced scrutiny under the national security provisions of the Investment Canada Act (ICA). Public Safety Canada coordinates the National Security Review process under the ICA, which utilizes a robust interdepartmental approach involving 18 departments and agencies to identify foreign investments that could be injurious to our national security. CSIS is a prescribed investigative body under the national security provisions of the ICA and conducts investigative efforts related to national security concerns arising from foreign investment. CSIS works with partners to provide advice in support of this process. The RCMP also participates in the national security review of foreign investment process under the ICA, to offer a law enforcement perspective, and to assess if there are potential criminal linkages to certain foreign investment proposals. If the Government determines that an investment meets the threshold, then it may decide to: 1) allow it subject to the imposition of mitigation measures to address residual risk; or 2) order the investment blocked (if it hasn’t been implemented yet) or a divestiture to undo the investment (if it has been implemented). As reported in the 2018-19 ICA Annual Report, for the four fiscal years 2015-16 to 2018-19 the Governor in Council issued eight 25.4 final orders: six blocking or ordering the foreign investor to divest of its investment and two imposing conditions that protect national security while allowing those investments to proceed.

United Front Work Department

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Chinese Communist Party is used by the PRC to stifle criticism, infiltrate foreign political parties, diaspora communities, universities and multinational corporations. The UFWD’s importance to the Chinese Communist Party has grown in recent years under President Xi, as 40,000 new staff have been added.

Foreign Agent Registry

Foreign governments and entities regularly seek to influence Government of Canada policies, officials or democratic processes in lawful and transparent ways in Canada, including through routine diplomatic engagement. However, some foreign states engage in acts of foreign interference to advance foreign political interests and influence federal officials and decision-makers. As part of these efforts, they may employ individuals, some of whom may be high profile, to act on their behalf without disclosing ties to the foreign state.

Both the United States and Australia have foreign agent registries that require those acting on behalf of a foreign state to register their activities. The United Kingdom has also announced plans to introduce a similar regime.

Australia – Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act (FITS)

FITS was enacted in December 2018. It is intended to increase transparency of foreign influence on Australia’s government and politics. The scheme is administered by the Attorney General’s Office.

FITS establishes registration obligations for individuals and entities that undertake certain activities on behalf of foreign principals. These include activities for the purpose of "political or governmental influence". That term is broadly defined in the Act and includes any influence over matters such as federal elections or votes, or the decision making processes of Government of Australia. Communications to the public or financial support for the purpose of influencing governmental decision making processes are also registrable activities under FITS. The registry is not intended to restrict or criminalize lawful activities that may benefit foreign principals (governments, entities or individuals). Of note, former cabinet ministers have a lifetime obligation to register any activity they undertake on behalf of a foreign principal unless an exemption applies.

An individual acting on behalf of a foreign principal can be penalized for failing to register or update information with the AGO, misleading or lying to authorities, or destroying relevant records. Penalties for violations under the FITS range from fines to prison terms of six months to five years. 

United States - Foreign Agent Registry Act (FARA)

FARA was enacted in 1938 and requires certain individuals acting on behalf of foreign principals (governments, entities or individuals) who are engaged in political activities or other activities under the statute to register as a “foreign agent” with the Department of Justice. The Act also requires foreign agents to make periodic public disclosures of their relationships with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and disbursements in support of those activities.

The central purpose of FARA is to promote transparency regarding foreign influence in the United States by ensuring the government and the public know the source of certain information from foreign agents intended to influence American public opinion, policy and decision-making.

The penalty for willful violation of FARA is maximum of five years in prison and/or a fine of up to $250,000. There are also civil enforcement provisions that empower the United States Attorney General to seek an injunction requiring registration under FARA. Since 2016, FARA violations have resulted in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counter-intelligence investigations, some of which have led to criminal charges and/or immigration proceedings against foreign agents and foreign principals.

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