Responses to parliamentary committees and external audits
Public Safety Canada's 2023 to 2024 Departmental Results Report

Government Response to the Third Report of the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship entitled: "A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship"

Summary:

On May 16, 2023, the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship released their third report entitled "A Threat to Canadian Sovereignty: National Security Dimensions of the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship". The Committee's work on this report followed from the release of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavour by the People's Republic of China (PRC) after their unlawful detention and during a period of public allegations of foreign interference by the PRC in Canada's 2019 and 2021 elections. This report focuses on the foreign interference threat as well as the international dimension of the threat posed by the PRC, most notably against international institutions and the rules-based international order.

Recommendations:

The Committee provided 34 recommendations which were broadly broken into two major themes, foreign interference and international threats, which included (but are not limited to) the following themes:

• Electoral interference;
• Malign influence and espionage in the academic sector;
• The targeting and repression of certain individuals and communities;
• Interference with Canadian institutions;
• Influence in Canadian diaspora media;
• Cyber threats and protection of critical infrastructure;
• Organized crime;
• The COVID-19 Pandemic;
• Influence in multilateral institutions;
• Arbitrary detention of Canadians abroad; and
• Arctic sovereignty.

Response Hyperlink/Summary:

The Government provided its response to CACN's recommendations on September 18, 2023.

Corrective Actions:

The Government Response to the report addressed each of the 34 recommendations individually, and has also outlined both existing and planned efforts to protect Canadians and our allies from the threat posed by the PRC. The recommendations covered issues that cut across the mandates of more than 20 different departments and agencies across the Government of Canada including (but not limited to) Public Safety Canada, Global Affairs Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Communications Security Establishment, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Heritage Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Department of National Defence, Health Canada, Public Health Agency of Canada, and Finance Canada.

The Government acknowledged all 34 recommendations and agreed with 17 of the recommendations and took note of the other 17. In all cases the Government highlighted work that is already ongoing to address the concerns raised by the Committee, however, the Government took note of recommendations where current Government efforts are not in line with the recommendations made by the Committee. Highlighted in the Government Response are the public consultations that were launched on a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, a Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator within Public Safety Canada to combat foreign interference, and the establishment of the Research Security Centre at Public Safety Canada to provide outreach and advice to academic institutions, among other key initiatives.

Government Response to the Fourth report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship entitled: "The Chinese Communist Party's Overseas Police Service Stations"

Summary:

On November 29, 2023, the Special Committee on the Canada-People's Republic of China Relationship (CACN) tabled its fourth report entitled "The Chinese Communist Party's Overseas Police Service Stations" (OPSS). Following reports by a non-governmental organisation that OPSS in Canada monitor Chinese diaspora communities and play a role in coercing individuals to return to the People's Republic of China (PRC) to face criminal proceedings, CACN undertook a study of the matter. Over two meetings, the Special Committee heard from then Minister of Public Safety, the Honourable Marco Mendicino, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), David Vigneault, the then Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Brenda Lucki, government officials, academics, as well as representatives of non-governmental organisations, including Safeguard Defenders. The report summarises these testimonies and focuses on what is the purpose of OPSS, what is being done to address the issue, and what additional tools could help.

Recommendations:

The Committee provided an interim report and does not contain recommendations for the Government of Canada at this time.

Response Hyperlink/Summary:

The Government provided its response to the CACN report on April 8, 2024.

Corrective Actions:

Since CACN commenced its study of the OPSS in October 2022, several new Government initiatives were introduced that speak directly to the Committee's findings. This has included the RCMP actively investigating reports nationally of criminal activity in relation to the OPSS; the announcement in March 2023, of the creation of a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator within Public Safety Canada; public consultations in 2023 on legislative amendments to counter foreign interference in Canada; the passing of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, on June 20, 2024, to bolster Canada's ability to detect, disrupt and counter foreign interference threats to all people in Canada, including members of diaspora communities, through legislative amendments to the CSIS Act, the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, as well as the introduction of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), to create a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry for Canada, overseen by an independent Commissioner, to promote transparency from people who advocate on behalf of a foreign principal and accountability from those who would do so in non-transparent ways.

Additionally, Global Affairs Canada, through the Rapid Response Mechanism's use of Open Source Intelligence methodologies, has undertaken work to map the online footprint of the PRC OPSS as part of ongoing efforts to share best practices, lessons learned, and threat information among G7 and partner countries about transnational repression.

Government Response to the Fifth Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence entitled: "The Cyber Defence of Canada"

Summary:

In June 2023, the Standing Committee on National Defence tabled its report entitled "The Cyber Defence of Canada". This report emphasizes the growing importance of cyber security in an increasingly interconnected world. With the digital age transforming daily activities and the COVID-19 pandemic accelerating the use of online platforms, the report highlights Canada's heightened vulnerability to cyber threats. These threats range from cybercrimes and espionage to state-sponsored disinformation campaigns, particularly from authoritarian regimes like China, Russia, and Iran, which aim to undermine trust and cohesion in democratic societies.

The report underscores the multifaceted nature of cyber security, involving national security, foreign policy, technology, governance, and finance, and emphasizes that cyber security requires whole-of-society collaboration between the public and private sectors. It discusses the complexities of detecting, attributing, and responding to cyberattacks, given the involvement of various state and non-state actors with different motives and tools. Furthermore, cyberspace has become a new domain for military operations, with countries developing offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. The report stresses the need for Canada to enhance its cyber security strategies, initiatives, legislation, and international cooperation to better protect its systems, networks, and critical infrastructure from both domestic and foreign cyber threats.

Recommendations:

The Committee provided thirty-seven recommendations in its report, which fell into several larger categories including (but not limited to):

• Establishing an ongoing multistakeholder platform for collaboration and engagement on cyber security issues;
• Investing in cyber security for government network infrastructure and conducting comprehensive assessments to harden systems and third-party networks storing sensitive government data;
• Working with Five Eyes partners to adopt a consistent Cyber Security Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) to ensure Canadian defence companies are not disadvantaged by differing security standards;
• Creating incentives, such as tax credits, to encourage companies to adopt cyber security measures;
• Expediting the renewal of Canada's National Cyber Security Strategy and establishing an ongoing review process to keep pace with evolving cyber threats;
• Formalizing ongoing dialogue with critical infrastructure owners and operators, including municipalities and private sector operators, to discuss potential threats and best practices;
• Ensuring that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has the necessary legislative tools to keep pace with technological advancements and evolving cyber security threats.

Response Hyperlink/Summary:

The Government provided its response to the Standing Committee on National Defence's recommendations.

Corrective Actions:

The Government Response to the report addressed each of the thirty-seven recommendations individually: it supported twenty-two of the recommendations, took note of seven of the recommendations, agreed with three of the recommendations, and agreed to further examine five of the recommendations. The Government Response also outlined both the existing and planned efforts to strengthen Canada's cyber security undertaken by numerous Departments and Agencies, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS); the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); Global Affairs Canada (GAC); Industry, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED); Public Safety Canada (PS); Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC); the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP); Shared Services Canada (SSC); and, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (TBS).

The Government of Canada has undertaken several corrective actions in response to the recommendations from the Standing Committee on National Defence's Fifth Report on "The Cyber Defence of Canada". One significant action is the establishment of a multistakeholder platform for collaboration and engagement on cyber security issues. This initiative, modeled after the United Kingdom's Industry 100, aims to create a space where industry and cyber officials can exchange information and best practices, thereby enhancing information sharing and preventing future cyberattacks. The CCCS within the CSE has been hosting bi-weekly joint threat briefs and sector-specific workshops to address cyber security concerns.

Additionally, the Government has increased funding to the CCCS to improve coordination between federal and provincial cyber security systems, addressing incidents more effectively. This funding supports initiatives like sector-specific briefings and analyst exchange programs with key stakeholders, which are crucial for enhancing cyber security capabilities across different sectors. The CCCS's efforts include hosting workshops and roundtables to facilitate collaboration and information sharing among IT security professionals, senior executives, and other stakeholders.

Government Response to the Tenth Report of the Standing Committee On Access To Information, Privacy and Ethics entitled "Foreign Interference And The Threats to the Integrity of Democratic Institutions, Intellectual Property and the Canadian State"

Summary:

On October 24, 2023, the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI) presented its report entitled "Foreign Interference And The Threats To The Integrity Of Democratic Institutions, Intellectual Property And The Canadian State". This report was undertaken by ETHI with the goal of examining the impact of allegations of foreign interference (FI) in Canada and on Canadian communities. Chapter 1 addresses foreign interference and related issues including the disclosure of national security intelligence and the rise of xenophobia. Chapter 2 provides a overview of FI targets and tactics used by key actors, specifically the People's Republic of China and Russia. Chapter 3 outlines the Committee's recommendations to improve Canada's response to FI and enhance Canadian's confidence in our democratic institutions.

Recommendations:

The Committee provided 22 recommendations in its report to address FI and the threats to the integrity of democratic institutions, intellectual property and the Canadian State. The Committee recommends that the Government of Canada:

• improve the declassification system for historical records, as recommended in its report on the state of the access to information system published in June 2023, and establish and implement clearer classification guidelines for national security records;
• amend the Access to Information Act to clarify that the access to information system is based on a culture of openness and transparency, and that it implement the other recommendations of the Committee in its report on the state of the access to information system published in June 2023;
• direct increased and regular sharing of relevant information to the public by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in order to increase national security literacy;
• strengthen rules and penalties governing illicit disclosure of national security intelligence;
• ensure that any legislative mechanisms developed to counter foreign interference take into account how they might affect individuals and communities already victimized or targeted by foreign interference in Canada, and that it include these communities in developing measures to counter the impacts of interference on them;
• review and update Canada's national security policy, and that the new policy outlines the rules allowing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to directly warn federal Members of Parliament of threats related to foreign interference;
• make full use of existing legislation, such as the Security of Information Act and other relevant Acts as enforcement resources and tools;
• update its national security policy to include a policy on the threats caused by the use of artificial intelligence by foreign actors;
• invest in Canada's strategic digital literacy and capabilities and those of its national security agencies to improve the ability to detect and counter foreign interference activities conducted with artificial intelligence;
• ensure that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service provide more training and information to Canadian parliamentarians and public servants on the threats posed by foreign interference in Canada, the various tactics used by foreign actors and the means to counter them;
• establish a foreign interference awareness program for use by academic and research institutions;
• in collaboration with national security agencies, establish rigorous mechanisms to ensure that any contractual arrangements between Canada and foreign suppliers do not create high risk to national security;
• work with minority-language communities affected by foreign interference activities in Canada to provide them reliable information on the Canadian democratic process, including information on government policies and programs that may affect them, in the language they understand best, and that the government engage with local and ethnic medias to provide that information;
• include in the Criminal Code criminal penalties that cover all foreign interference operations, including harassment and intimidation by a foreign state, and that it provide appropriate sanctions;
• clarify the purpose of the provisions of the Security of Information Act to counter foreign interference operations and its related sanctions, and that it implement a policy enabling Canadians to better understand how the Security of Information Act protects Canada from foreign interference;
• hold online platforms accountable for publishing false or misleading information and that it develop policies to support the media ecosystem in communities and linguistic minority communities not represented by mainstream media to ensure that vulnerable communities are not revictimized;
• in collaboration with national security agencies, explore the possibility of imposing targeted sanctions against Canadian companies that are exporting or selling technology to countries that use it to engage in foreign interference operations;
• establish a foreign influence registry as soon as possible;
• amend the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act to require that each annual report tabled before each House of Parliament include a yearly review of foreign interference threats in Canada, such as harassment and intimidation of certain Canadian communities by foreign states;
• create a Cabinet committee on national security;
• strengthen reporting mechanisms for victims of harassment or intimidation by foreign entities, to ensure better coordination of the government response to such incidents and appropriate actions on individual complaints; and
• consult communities affected by foreign interference activities in Canada in any inquiry into foreign interference.

Response Hyperlink/Summary:

The Government provided its response to the tent report of ETHI's recommendations on February 16, 2024.

Corrective Actions:

The Government Response (GR) to the report addressed each of the 22 recommendations individually.

Since ETHI commenced its study, several new government initiatives were introduced or have progressed that speak directly to the Committee's recommendations. The Government agreed with 12 of the 22 recommendation in the Report, underscoring the many instances in which Canada is already implementing the recommendations in some form and committing to bolstering these efforts. For instance, the committee highlighted suggestions to amend the Security of Information Act, to establish a foreign influence registry, and increase information sharing capabilities between CSIS and the public.  These were addressed in Bill C-70, An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference which received royal assent on June 20, 2024. The Government of Canada also established the National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister

The Government committed to further examine an additional 3 recommendations. One such recommendation is that the Government of Canada work with minority-language communities affected by FI activities in Canada to provide them reliable information on the Canadian democratic process, including information on government policies and programs that may affect them, in the language they understand best. Current materials are available in a wide variety of languages, but the possibility of translating additional resources about Canada's democratic institutions into other languages spoken in Canada will be explored.

The Government took note of the remaining 7 recommendations. For example, the Committee recommended that the Government of Canada amend the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (NSICOP) to require that each annual report include a yearly review of FI threats in Canada. The GR indicated the importance of maintaining NSICOP's independence, but highlighted that there is an opportunity for Parliament to consider this recommendation further as part of a potential review of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Government Response to the Tenth Report of the Standing Committee on the Status of Women (FEWO) entitled "Act Now: Preventing Human Trafficking of Women, Girls and Gender Diverse People in Canada"

Summary:

On February 29, 2024, the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women (FEWO) tabled its report, entitled: "Act Now: Preventing Human Trafficking of Women, Girls and Gender Diverse People in Canada". This report and the study preceding it were undertaken by FEWO to examine human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Canada, focusing on the experiences of women, girls and gender-diverse people.

Recommendations:

The FEWO report makes 22 recommendations to the Government of Canada, with the goals of improving support to victims and survivors of human trafficking in Canada, as well as addressing human trafficking currently occurring, and preventing further instances of human trafficking in Canada. Recommendations included: potential legislative changes; the improvement of data collection and sharing across jurisdictions; expanded education, training and awareness efforts; to further protect migrant workers; a continued federal national strategy to combat human trafficking that is intersectional; to implement a 'Red Dress Alert' for missing Indigenous women, girls and Two-Spirit people; and, fully implement all Calls for Justice from the Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.

Response Hyperlink/Summary:

The Government provided its response to FEWO's recommendations on August 21, 2024.

Corrective Actions:

The Government Response to the FEWO report outlines ongoing federal work in response to all 22 recommendations, as well as future efforts to strengthen Canada's approach to address human trafficking, particularly under the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking. 

Public Safety Canada is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking in partnership with the Canada Border Services Agency; Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada; Public Services and Procurement Canada; and, Women and Gender Equality Canada. Many other federal departments and agencies contribute to Canada's efforts to address this crime through existing mandates. This includes: Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada; Employment and Social Development Canada; Global Affairs Canada; Indigenous Services Canada; Department of Justice Canada; Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Statistics Canada; Public Prosecution Service of Canada; among others.

Though the recommendations are directed at the Government of Canada, engagement and collaboration with provinces, territories and stakeholders, civil society organizations, private sector and international partners, and others as noted by the Committee, remains central.

Response to audits conducted by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (including audits conducted by the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development)

The Office of the Auditor General of Canada tabled 2 performance audits in Parliament in 2023-24

Response to audits conducted by the Public Service Commission of Canada or the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages

There were no audits in 2023–24 requiring a response.