Structured Intervention Unit Implementation Advisory Panel 2023 to 2024 Annual Report

Third Annual Report (2023 to 2024) of the Structured Intervention Units Implementation Advisory Panel

July 15, 2024

Executive Summary

This is the third annual report from the Structured Intervention Unit Implementation Advisory Panel (SIU-IAP) and it comes to the same conclusions as the other six empirically based reports (two annual and four feature reports) released by the Panel. Structured Intervention Units (SIUs) are not addressing the problems they were designed to address. We now have four full years of data on the operation of the SIUs. They are not working as intended, and as will be demonstrated in this report, they are also not improving. The problems are fundamental, not peripheral.

Some of the key problems – consistently identified across our empirical work – remain:

• Indigenous and Black prisoners are over-represented in SIUs, as are people with identified mental health issues.
• SIU stays tend to be long – with roughly 40% staying over one month – and this has changed little over time. Indeed, for most years, the rate of long stays in SIUs is not dramatically different from the rate of long stays in Administrative Segregation.
• Black and Indigenous prisoners continue to stay longer in SIUs than others.^{Footnote 1}
• Minimum hours out of cell, a key feature of the SIUs which is supposed to differentiate SIU practices from the practice of Administrative Segregation (and solitary confinement), are largely not being achieved. Correctional Service of Canada’s (CSC) attempts to shift the responsibility onto the prisoner for refusing to accept offers to leave their cell is insufficient because a) refusing to leave one’s cell does not account for the failure to achieve the minimum hours out, and b) we have no clear picture of what is being offered (and why it might have been refused).

In this third annual report we continue to find the above trends, along with seeing that:

• There has been an increased use of SIUs and rates of long stays that mirror what was seen under the old Administrative Segregation regime.
• There have been no meaningful, sustained improvements over time in achieving the minimum hours out of cell. Prisoners refusing to leave their cell does not explain the failure to achieve minimum standards.
• When prisoners do not receive their minimum hours out of cell, they typically experience one of the key negative features of the practice of solitary confinement – less than two hours out of cell.
• Dramatic regional variation persists.
• Prisoners with mental health issues are over-represented in SIUs. They also experience more multiple stays in SIUs, often in different SIUs in different regions.
• Very little correctional programming is being provided.
• CSC’s performance measures are problematic, providing little understanding of issues and obscuring the problems.

Since 2020, there have been ten independent empirical reports (six produced by this panel) describing the operation of CSC’s SIUs. All are publicly available.^{Footnote 2} These reports are based almost exclusively on data from CSC, and all have identified serious problems in the operation of SIUs, along with a failure to achieve minimum expectations. The Parliamentary Committee that is required to be established to examine the SIUs at the start of the fifth year of the SIU regime needs to address these problems as these problems have, for the most part, been repeatedly highlighted in the ten publicly available reports since 2020.

Introduction

On October 16, 2018, the Hon. Ralph Goodale (then federal Minister of Public Safety) tabled Bill C-83: An Act to Amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) and another Act. Bill C-83 would eliminate disciplinary segregation and replace the use of Administrative Segregation with Structured Intervention Units (SIUs). SIUs were to be a new model of correctional intervention for prisoners who could not safely stay in the mainstream prison population. According to the Minister’s Statement to the Senate in May 2019, “(i)nmates in an SIU will receive structured interventions, enhanced mental health care, and programming tailored to address their specific needs. The goal is to treat the underlying causes of high-risk behaviour, reduce the number of violent incidents in penitentiaries, and improve correctional outcomes such as rehabilitation.” Indeed, the launching of SIUs on November 30, 2019, was intended to mark an historic “transformation of the federal correctional system”.^{Footnote 3}

Bill C-83 and its amendments to theCCRA were the federal government’s response to court rulings in British Columbia and Ontariothat Administrative Segregation was essentially solitary confinement.^{Footnote 4} As such, Administrative Segregation violated at least two sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – Section 7 (the right to liberty) and Section 12 (the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment), and it threatened to violate other Sections, such as Section 15, which guarantees “equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination, including on the basis of race, ethnic origin or mental or physical disability”.^{Footnote 5}  Moreover, the practice of Administrative Segregation was seen to violate Mandela Rule 44, which defines solitary confinement as “the confinement of prisoners for 22 hours or more per day without meaningful human contact; prolonged solitary confinement occurs if such confinement exceeds 15 consecutive days”.^{Footnote 6}

According to section 34.1 of the amended CCRA, SIUs were to be a last resort and used “only if… there is no reasonable alternative…”. Prolonged confinement was to be avoided and prisoners were to be offered a minimum of four hours out-of-cell per day, two hours of which were to involve “meaningful human contact”. Independent external oversight of Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) decision-making regarding SIUs was established through the legislated creation of Independent External Decision Makers (IEDMs). The IEDMs were charged with reviewing SIU cases and making recommendations related to the conditions and duration of confinement, with binding powers to order that a prisoner’s period in the SIU should end.

A second, non-statutory oversight body was established to monitor SIU implementation. The Structured Intervention Unit Implementation Advisory Panel (SIU-IAP) was created in mid-2019 and mandated to advise the Minister of Public Safety and make recommendations to the Commissioner of Corrections regarding the implementation and operation of SIUs. The original Panel had a one-year mandate that ended without being able to access CSC data on the operation of the SIUs. The data were eventually made available to two independent researchers in late September 2020 and the first report on the implementation of SIUs was released by these researchers in October 2020. The current Panel was created in April 2021 and given a two-year term, which was subsequently extended to December 31, 2024.^{Footnote 7} The Panel’s final report will coincide with the mandated 5-year review of Bill C-83. Over the past four years, the Panel has publicly released six empirically-based reports – two annual and four feature reports. Panel members have visited all SIU sites (including male and female units) in every region of the country. These site visits have included meetings with administrative, operational, and professional staff, including health care practitioners and Indigenous Elders, as well as interviews with SIU prisoners. Despite the fact that some shared misgivings about the creation of SIUs, most of the operational staff whom Panel members spoke with voiced a commitment to trying to “make things work”. The Panel also has held several meetings with senior CSC officials, including the Commissioner, and various stakeholders with interest and knowledge of SIUs, such as the John Howard Society of Canada, the Office of the Correctional Investigator, and British Columbia Prisoners’ Legal Services.

It is noteworthy that the Minister has not yet appointed a Panel member with lived experience as a prisoner. While the Panel’s Terms of Reference do not specifically require such an appointment, it was discussed and agreed to as an important part of re-constituting the Panel in the Spring of 2021. As requested, the Panel Chair referred several potential appointees to the Minister for consideration. More than three years later, no appointment has been made.^{Footnote 8}

Over four years of SIU operations, there is little evidence that SIUs have led to transformational change in federal corrections. Instead, despite considerable effort to implement the Bill C-83 changes, evidence suggests that SIU use mirrors many of the problems identified by the courts as problematic under the former Administrative Segregation regime and may, in fact, be having a negative effect on other CSC institutional operations. A recent site visit to an SIU raised such concerns with a common theme emerging from the staff interviews that SIUs “drain resources” from other areas of the prison, impacting services to the mainstream population and exacting a mental and physical toll on CSC staff (including managers). As one example, the staff noted that to accommodate the SIUs, the caseload ratio of prisoners to institutional parole officers within the general population has increased. Other challenges included being able to access prisoners due to limits on movement between units and increased inter-regional transfers which appear to be done in an effort to reduce prisoner time spent in SIUs. Staff at one site maintained that the SIU was absorbing a disproportionate amount of attention and resources and that therapeutic units were being “decimated”. As they put it, the most vulnerable prisoners – those being maintained outside the SIU – were suffering due to the disproportionate allocation of resources to the SIU (see Appendix 2 for details on the site visit). Panel members have heard similar concerns raised during visits to other sites over the past three years. As noted later in this report (see footnote 27), additional resources in the form of $448 million were allocated to CSC, some of which were to be dedicated to additional staffing.

Both empirical (using CSC’s own data) and anecdotal evidence (testimonies of staff and prisoners) indicate that, contrary to the aspirations for SIUs as outlined in the Minister’s statement on Bill C-83, SIU prisoners are not receiving “structured interventions” or enhanced mental health care^{Footnote 9} or programming tailored to address their specific needs. Evidence indicates that SIUs are not complying with the intent or actual content of the amended CCRA (i.e., used as a last resort, four hours out of cell, two of which include meaningful contact, confinement in an SIU to end as soon as possible). Instead, SIUs are looking increasingly like the Administrative Segregation they were meant to replace.

The ten independent empirical reports produced since 2020 are based almost exclusively on data from CSC. In addition, CSC has produced a report on SIU Performance Results and has made it available to the SIU-IAP. CSC’s own description of its performance is important in that it provides careful readers with a description that, in very serious ways, fails – perhaps purposefully – to give an adequate picture of what is actually going on in the SIUs. At the same time, however, what can be gleaned from the data is consistent with what all other empirical reports have found: that there are serious problems with SIU operations. The Parliamentary Committee that is required to be established to examine the SIUs at the start of the fifth year of operations needs to address these problems. They have, for the most part, been repeatedly highlighted in the ten reports released to the public since 2020.

This is the SIU-IAP’s third annual report, and the conclusion remains the same. SIUs are not addressing the problems they were designed to address. We now have four full years of data on the operation of the SIUs. They are not working as intended. As will be demonstrated in this report, they are also not improving. And the problems are fundamental, not peripheral.

Some of the key problems – consistently identified across our empirical work^{Footnote 10} – remain:

• Indigenous and Black prisoners are over-represented in SIUs, as are people with identified mental health issues.
• SIU stays tend to be long – with roughly 40% staying over one month – and this has changed little over time. Indeed, for most years, the rate of long stays in SIUs is not dramatically different from the rate of long stays in Administrative Segregation.
• Black and Indigenous prisoners continue to stay longer in SIUs than others.
• Four hours per day out of cell (including two hours of meaningful human interaction) – key features of the SIUs which are supposed to differentiate SIU practices from the practice of Administrative Segregation (and solitary confinement) – are largely not being achieved for substantial numbers of prisoners. CSC’s attempts to shift the onus onto the prisoner for refusing to accept offers to leave their cell is insufficient because a) refusing to leave one’s cell does not begin to account for the Service’s failure to achieve the minimum hours out of cell, and b) we have no clear picture of what is being offered (and refused).

In this third annual report we will focus on a limited number of issues:

• Are the findings from independent reports (including from this panel) consistent with CSC’s own assessment of its performance?
• Who is being transferred into an SIU? What does an analysis of the use of SIUs tell us about important issues such as the treatment of Indigenous, Black and other racialized prisoners, and those with mental health concerns?
• Are improvements being made in limiting the use of the SIUs?
• Are prisoners in the SIUs receiving the treatment (e.g., time out of cell, short stays) that is required by the legislation?
• What does a careful examination of the SIUs, and the placement of prisoners in SIUs, as well as the movement of prisoners across Canada, tell us about CSC’s ability to comply with its obligation to treat offenders in a fair, humane and reasonable fashion?

CSC’s view about what is important: SIU Performance Results reported in the “Performance Direct” National Results

We thought that a good place to start would be to examine, in detail, how CSC describes its own performance. For this purpose, we will discuss a document in its “Performance Direct” collection described as “SIU Performance Results.” This document was updated as of April 7, 2024, and therefore covers four full fiscal years of operation of the SIUs, from FY 2020-2021 to FY 2023-2024.^{Footnote 11} This document is not, as far as we know, publicly available in a similar format, though there is not, as far as we can see, any protected information that could not be public. More detail about the operation of SIUs can be found on that internal website.^{Footnote 12}

The internal CSC performance report is an easy-to-read document that presents data on eleven measures which, presumably, CSC sees as an adequate overview of the operation of the SIU. We have concerns about many of the measures and have provided further discussion about our concerns later in this report (see section on CSC’s Performance Indicators). For illustrative purposes, we have highlighted two examples of a problem that pervades many of the indicators.

• The percentage of days offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units were “offered” time out of their cell - The report explains that “(t)he indicator represents the total number of days offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units were offered time out of their cell per the total number of days offenders were available to be out of their cell (based on four hours out of cell per day). The data is constrained to days where offenders were present in the Structured Intervention Unit for a minimum of four hours, with offers and accepted offers limited to those that occurred between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm.” Without an assessment of what was offered, this is rather meaningless. Offering a prisoner the opportunity to do something that is less attractive than sitting alone in one’s own cell doesn’t mean much. Hence high rates (85%-96%) are rather meaningless. In addition, pooling days across all prisoners isn’t very helpful. For example, the data for 2023-2024 show that there were 4,196 person days when prisoners were not offered time out of cell. It makes a difference whether these “days without offers” were concentrated among certain prisoners (e.g., long stay prisoners vs. short stay prisoners). Essentially, then, this measure tells us very little. In any case, how meaningful is a count of the number of days a prisoner was offered time out of cell, versus a count of the amount of time a prisoner was actually unlocked from their cell?
• Percentage of days offenders housed in SIUs were out of their cell - The report’s full description of this indicator is that it “represents the total number of days offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units were out of their cell per the total number of days offenders were available to be out of their cell (based on four hours out of cell per day). The data is constrained to days where offenders were present in the Structured Intervention Unit for a minimum of four hours, with offers and accepted offers limited to those that occurred between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm.” This measure has the same problem as the previous measure since not receiving time out of cell may or may not be evenly distributed across types of SIU prisoners (e.g., long vs short stays). More generally, the success in getting prisoners to leave their cells is low (23.3% to 38.4% in the past four years). Given that we don’t know what it is that was offered, or why prisoners are refusing to leave their cell, and the fact that the reported percentage is pooled across all days available for all prisoners, this measure gives little useful information.

Who is in SIUs?

There are many ways of describing who Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) places in SIUs. Our main data, since October 2020, have been the data on the “person-stays” – the characteristics and experiences of each person who is admitted into an SIU, where each stay is described independently.^{Footnote 13} However, we also have a census, or count, of all prisoners in CSC penitentiaries which was conducted, by CSC, on March 24, 2024 which we use to describe the population.

Women in the SIUs

On the “census day”, March 24, 2024, there were only seven women in SIUs (roughly half the proportion that we see for men). That is, on this day, 1.9% of all male prisoners were in SIUs (or Restricted Movement Cells)^{Footnote 14} compared to about half that proportion (0.9%) of women (in SIUs). As we have seen each time we look at the data by institution, most of the women (four of the seven in this case) were in Edmonton. Two of the other four women’s institutions had no women in their SIUs. In addition, most women who are imprisoned in an SIU tend to spend relatively short periods of time there. Four of the seven women had been in the SIU for four days or less on “census day” and none had been there for more than 27 days. In contrast, three male prisoners had been in an SIU for more than 450 days on the “census day”, one for 596 days and counting. 68% of the men had been in an SIU for 28 or more days – longer than any of the women in SIUs.

Turning to “person stays” in SIUs, we see similar patterns. Of all admissions into SIUs during the four-year period of our study, roughly 97% involve men and the numbers of both men and women prisoners being admitted into SIUs increased substantially in 2023 (compared to 2022). Women saw the largest number of admissions across all four years in 2023 with 83 of them, compared to 28 the year before (see Appendix Table 1). Men also saw an increase in admissions from 1,396 in 2022 up to 2,057 in 2023 (see Appendix Table 1). And, looking across all four years, if a woman was admitted into an SIU, they tended to be placed in the Edmonton SIU, though recently the numbers have grown somewhat in Quebec (see Appendix Table 2).

On an ordinary day, prisoners in SIUs have been there before

As noted above, one way to get a snapshot of what an SIU looks like is to carefully examine the population in the SIUs on a CSC selected “census” day. We have, therefore, looked in some detail at all prisoners who were in the SIU on March 24, 2024. The picture of these prisoners is interesting. Looking at the numbers, it breaks down as follows:

• 244 – The number of prisoners in SIUs that day (about 1.8% of the CSC institutional population).
• 177 – The number of prisoners in SIUs for whom this was not their first visit (72%). In other words, 72% of the prisoners in the SIU on that day had been in an SIU at least twice.
• 71 – The number of prisoners who started their second and/or subsequent SIU stay within four or fewer days after the previous stay had ended. This is 40% of the multiple-stay prisoners (71/177= 40%). Some prisoners had more than one pair of SIU stays separated by four or fewer days. The data do not tell us why the prisoner was returned to an SIU so quickly. In other words, we do not have evidence that CSC knew, when these prisoners were released from the SIU, that they would return very soon. Given that CSC considers a transfer out of the SIU to be successful if there is no readmission within 120 days, it would seem that there are a lot of “SIU transfer out” failures.
• 144 – The number of prisoners with two or more stays in SIUs, who had stays in two or more different SIUs. This constitutes 81% of prisoners who had more than one stay in an SIU (144/177=81%).

As highlighted in all of our reports, there is substantial regional and institutional variation in almost all aspects of SIUs. Indeed, the capacities of SIUs vary across institutions as does the usage over time. We looked at counts on five census days chosen at random between January 2023 and March 2024. Donnacona, for example, has an SIU capacity of 48 and, across five different census count dates, had as few as 24 prisoners and as many as 44. Millhaven has a similar SIU capacity (50 prisoners) and its one-day count on these five days varied from 26 to 47. Finally, Edmonton has a rated capacity of 48 SIU prisoners, but had a range, across these five dates of 10 to 23 SIU prisoners. This amount of variation would suggest that the workload for people rostered to work in SIUs will be very different across time, as would be the experience of SIU prisoners.

The over-representation of Black and Indigenous prisoners in SIUs

As indicated elsewhere in this report, Indigenous prisoners are over-represented in CSC institutions. While representing approximately 5% of Canada’s population, including a significant percentage that are minors and would not be placed in federal custody, Indigenous people, in 2021/2, constituted 32.7% of the federal prisoner population.^{Footnote 15} Black people are estimated to account for 4.3%^{Footnote 16} of the Canadian population in 2021, and 9%^{Footnote 17} of the federal custodial population in 2021-2022.

The over-representation of both of these groups is more obvious in SIUs where, on March 24, 2024, 44.2% of prisoners housed in SIUs or Restricted Movement (RM) cells were Indigenous and 16.3% were Black, while in the general population of CSC penitentiaries, on this same day, 32.9% were Indigenous and 9.4% were Black (see Appendix Table 3). Black prisoners continue to stay longer in SIUs/RMs than others (see Appendix Table 4). On this census day in March 2024, of the 41 Black prisoners in SIUs, 39% (N=16) had been in over 60 days compared to 31.6% of white prisoners and 26.1% of the Indigenous and other prisoners (see Appendix Table 4).

Our findings indicate that relative to the general population, the prisoners who were in SIUs/RMs on March 24, 2024 tended to be young, with 35.1% being under 30, compared to 20.4% of the general penitentiary population being that young (see Appendix Table 5). Of Indigenous and Black prisoners in SIUs/RMs, 42.3% and 31.7% (respectively) were under the age of 30 while only 23.7% of white prisoners in the SIU/RM on March 24, 2024 were that young (see Appendix Table 6A). For Indigenous and white prisoners, the age distribution in SIUs/RMs on the census date was considerably younger than those in the general population where 25.3% of Indigenous prisoners were under age 30 and 13.4% of white prisoners were under age 30 (see Appendix Table 6B). Black prisoners in the general population, however, tended to be younger than others with 29.3% being under the age of 30 (see Appendix Table 6B).

This points to the need for CSC, both in its general population and especially in SIUs, to take into consideration the age-based needs of these cohorts. More generally, since it is widely accepted that given the presence of systemic racism and its strong negative relationship to the social determinants of health, Canadian citizens who self-identify as members of ethnically vulnerable communities should be provided supports and access to treatment which takes into consideration the many systemic travails with which they must contend. CSC may not be responsible for the systemic racism that contributes to the vulnerabilities of Black and Indigenous Canadians but it nonetheless must do all that is necessary to assist Black and Indigenous individuals once they are in its care and custody.

Indigenous prisoner interviews:

Interviews with Indigenous prisoners suggested that some may prefer to stay in a SIU for as long as possible for their own protection and safety. In some instances, these prisoners told us they were prepared to threaten or physically assault staff to force placement in the SIU. This behaviour may be an indicator of CSC’s inability to implement gang interventions and disassociation strategies that can provide meaningful alternatives to SIUs being the placement of choice for those seeking protection. Non-Indigenous prisoners have shared similar sentiments, but the over-representation of Indigenous men and women inside SIUs makes these issues particularly acute.

As is true for some non-Indigenous prisoners, the Panel has also heard that there may be an expectation among some Indigenous prisoners that placement in a SIU will give them more access to health services, programs and time out of cell. But the quality of those opportunities may not, with the exception of time with Elders, reflect a comprehensive Indigenous focus compatible with the over-representation of Indigenous prisoners. In interviews with Elders and Indigenous Liaison Officers (ILOs), Panel members were told of many gaps and barriers in the delivery of services to Indigenous men and women transferred to an SIU. Until such time as CSC recognizes this as a reality, and adjusts its operating environment and policies, the timely release of Indigenous prisoners will continue to be delayed, thus contributing to the over-representation of Indigenous prisoners in both the general population and in SIUs.

CSC has undertaken to incorporate Gladue^{Footnote 18}principles into its decision making and has instituted the creation of Indigenous Social Histories, but it is not clear the extent to which they are used in developing correctional plans or tailoring programs to reflect an Indigenous SIU prisoner’s individual needs. It is important for CSC to determine if those social histories are respected and reflected in the work of SIU Parole Officers, Correctional Program Officers, Social Program Officers, and the newly created Behavioural Skills Coaches. SIUs must develop a broad range of Indigenous-centric programs and interventions. Absent this effort, the problems demonstrated in this Report concerning time-out-of-cells, length of stay, and meaningful human contact will continue. Unfortunately, recent site visits continued to find a lack of adequate Indigenous representation among staff^{Footnote 19}, especially vis-à-vis the overrepresentation of Indigenous prisoners in both the SIU and mainstream populations (see Appendix 2).

SIU Elders play an integral role in providing cultural and spiritual training to Indigenous prisoners. While CSC states that Elders are a key element in Indigenous programming for SIU prisoners, there are still a number of historic and continuing problems with Elders’ services throughout institutions including those with SIUs. The June 2022 Audit of Elder Services^{Footnote 20} and discussions with SIU Elders reveal several common themes to the Panel: In many SIUs, there are an insufficient number of Elders to meaningfully work with prisoners; they are over-worked and burning out; it takes too long for Elders to be recruited by CSC; and they are burdened with administrative duties at the cost of working with prisoners.

Mental health and the SIU

Given that we already have information about the mental health status of prisoners in SIUs, we asked for comparable data on all prisoners on the census date (March 24, 2024) broken down by whether they were in an SIU or not.^{Footnote 21} On this date, SIU prisoners had a considerably higher likelihood of being described by CSC as having “some” or “considerable or higher” mental health needs in comparison with the prisoners in the general population (see Table 1).

Functioning of SIUs

Most of our attention in this and previous reports is on “person stays” in Structured Intervention Units (SIU). We look at these by year of admission to the SIU.^{Footnote 23} We examined admissions into SIUs starting January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2023.^{Footnote 24} In the first year of operation (2020), there were 2,152 admissions into SIUs and in the following year (2021), that declined to 1,393. Since then, admissions have increased up to 1,424 in 2022 and 2,140 in 2023. The most recent increase in admissions during 2023 was noted across all regions (data not shown) and was noted in a recent site visit where managers said that the SIU population had increased significantly and continues to command a lot of attention (see Appendix 2 for site visit details).

When looking at the number of different people admitted into SIUs, overall, we see that 2,979 different prisoners have experienced one or more SIU stays between January 1, 2020 and December 31, 2023 (see Table 2). In the first year of operation, 1,267 prisoners were sent to an SIU for the first time. In 2021, 523 prisoners were sent to an SIU for the first time. This declined further in 2022 down to 467 prisoners being admitted, for the first time, into an SIU. Most recently however, 722 prisoners were sent to an SIU for the first time.

These data are easy to misinterpret. As noted, we have the year in which the first SIU stay occurred. If a person first went into the SIU in 2020 and then visited SIUs in each of the subsequent years, they would appear only in the 2020 year. Hence the increase in 2023 reflects an increase in new “recruits”. This number (722) does not include all those who had been in the SIU in one or more of the earlier years.

Length of stays

After the first year of operation, there has been no appreciable change in the length of SIU stays. Around 20% stay longer than two months and this has not meaningfully changed over time (see Appendix Table 7). Furthermore, regional variation in length of stay continues to exist. For example, in 2023 roughly 30% of stays in the Atlantic and Pacific regions were for over two months while only 10.9% of stays were that long in Quebec (see Appendix Table 8). As seen in the census data, Black and Indigenous prisoners continue to stay longer in SIUs than others. In 2023, 26% of Black prisoners and 22% of Indigenous prisoners stayed in SIUs for over two months while only 16% of white prisoners stayed that long (see Appendix Table 9).

Finally, comparing the use of SIUs to the former use of Administration Segregation reveals that the use of isolating conditions of confinement has gone “back to the future” with rates of long stays (over 120 days) returning to what they were in the two years before SIUs were up and running (see Table 3).

The Panel finds this table to be very disturbing. The SIU regime was meant to be different from the former Administrative Segregation. However, data indicate 2023, in terms of long stays, looks very much like the last full year of the use of Administrative Segregation.

Time out of cell: Achieving the minimum four hours out of cell

There is a legitimate question about how the “days available” for a prisoner to be out of the cell should be counted. First of all, when a person enters the SIU one day – e.g. at 3:00 pm – and is released the next day at 2:00 pm, one could ask whether they should be seen as having zero, one, or two days for the purpose of assessing time out of cell. There is no perfect way to solve this problem, but for the most part, questions like this are most relevant for short stays in the SIU.

For this report, we have focused largely on a measure that CSC uses which might be considered a count of “days available” to be out of cell. This was a measure created by CSC and implemented starting on October 31, 2021, and counts only the days where the prisoner was in SIU for at least four hours and could have been given time out of cell.^{Footnote 26} Unfortunately, this measure is only available after this date so we can only explore these trends for 2022 and 2023.^{Footnote 27}

For those with fewer days available (i.e. 15 or fewer days available), there appears to be a slight improvement over the two years, from 62.9% not receiving their minimum of four hours out cell in the vast majority (over 76%) of their days in 2022, down to “only” 56.9% not receiving their four hours in 2023 (see Appendix Table 10). For those with more days available (i.e. 16+ days available), there has been no change over the two years: slightly over half (54%) are not receiving their minimum four hours out cell in the vast majority of their days (76%+ of their days) (see Appendix Table 10).

Examining those with more days available (16+ days) who did not receive their minimum of four hours out of cell on the majority of their days in 2023 (N=689) reveals that 44.9% of them refused to leave their cell – or chose not to avail themselves to whatever CSC was offering – in 20% or fewer of their days (see Appendix Table 11). Indeed, the vast majority (80%) refused to leave their cell in half or fewer of their days (see Appendix Table 11). Since not getting time out of cell was often not because they refused to leave their cell, it is a mystery why they ended up not receiving their minimum four hours out of cell in over 76% their days. Moreover, examining the average time out of cell that they received shows that they did not come close to receiving four hours out of cell (see Appendix Table 12). Most (94.5%) experienced the practice of what the courts considered to be solitary confinement (on average two hours or less out of cell).

One could obviously study who exactly did not receive their time out of cell. Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), if they were concerned about knowing why prisoners are not getting their time out of cell would do careful analyses of the data that are available. From our perspective, however, it is clear that there are hundreds of relatively long-stay SIU prisoners who do not receive their minimum time out of cell, and this cannot be explained by suggesting that prisoners did not avail themselves of offers that were made.

It is worth noting that there were (as pointed out in previous reports) large regional differences on whether people received their time out of cell. In 2023 in the Atlantic and Pacific regions, 70% or more of those who had more than 15 days available to be out of cell did not receive their minimum four hours out in 76% or more of their days (see Appendix Table 13). In the Prairies only 22.4% did not receive their minimum hours that much of their time.

Time out of cell: Achieving the minimum two hours of meaningful human contact

We next examine two hours of meaningful human contact and see no improvements over the two years for which we have data (using the new measure of “days available”). In 2022, of those who had up to 15 days available, 59.3% did not receive their minimum two hours of meaningful human contact in over half their days and in 2023, 55.1% did not receive their minimum hours in over half their days (see Appendix Table 14). In 2022, for those with more days available (i.e. 16+ days), 44.7% did not receive their minimum hours in over half their days, and in 2023, this rose to 48.7% (see Appendix Table 14).

Looking at the 621 prisoners who, in 2023, had 16 or more days available to be out of cell but did not receive their minimum two hours of meaningful human contact again reveals that refusals to leave their cell does not explain why they’re not receiving their minimum hours of meaningful human contact. Although these prisoners did not receive their minimum hours on over half their days, about half of them refused to leave their cell in 35% or fewer of their days (see Appendix Table 15). Moreover, they did not come close to receiving their full two hours. About 53% of them received, on average, up to half an hour out of their cell and another 45% received over half an hour up to one hour out of cell (see Appendix Table 16).

Our point with these data is simple: CSC is not delivering what the Bill C-83 amendments to the CCRA were meant to deliver, and, we would have expected that by now, these shortcomings would have been addressed. In our analyses, we found that regional variation, once again, accounted for some of the variability. In 2023 in the Pacific region, about 69% of the prisoners with over 15 days available to be out of cell did not receive their two hours of meaningful human contact at least half the time (see Appendix Table 17). In contrast, in the Prairies, only about 25% missed receiving their two hours of meaningful human contact on most days.

As we did in some previous reports, we looked at length of stay along with the four and two hours out of cell (for meaningful human contact) and characterized each of the stays in SIUs according to how these legislated expectations were delivered. Overall, there are no signs of improvement in achieving the minimum hours out of cell (see Table 4). Around a quarter of the SIU stays in both 2023 and 2024 involved prisoners who did not receive either their two or four hours out of cell most of the time during a long stay in the SIU.

Notes: “Long stay” = 16+ days available to be out of cell; “Not receiving 4hrs” = did not receive 4hrs out of cell in 76% or more of their days; “Not receiving 2hrs” = did not receive 2hrs of meaningful human contact in 51% or more of their days.

Correctional Programming

CSC explains Structured Intervention Units (SIU) on their website^{Footnote 28} as follows:

SIUs are meant to:

• be proactive and constructive (such as essential health services and mental health support)
• provide targeted interventions (such as culturally appropriate programming for Indigenous and ethnocultural offenders) to help with their individual rehabilitation needs
• provide transition and safe reintegration back into a mainstream inmate population

A typical day:

• work with a parole officer and engage with health care staff
• participate in correctional programs and interventions
• participate in counselling sessions with an Indigenous Elder, Spiritual Advisor, or Chaplain ^{Footnote 29}

Further, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) states that:

32 (1) The purpose of a structured intervention unit is to

(a) provide an appropriate living environment for an inmate who cannot be maintained in the mainstream inmate population for security or other reasons; and

(b) provide the inmate with an opportunity for meaningful human contact and an opportunity to participate in programs and to have access to services that respond to the inmate’s specific needs and the risks posed by the inmate.

Given these descriptions, and the fact that CSC was given substantial and permanent extra funding for staffing and mental health care^{Footnote 30}, we thought we should examine the use of correctional programming (see Appendix Table 18). In 2023, it appears that of those who had 15 or fewer days available for programming, the majority (77.8%) received none. For those who had 16 to 30 days available for programming, 43.5% received no programming while 27.6% received up to two hours of programming. This means that the majority of those who stayed up to one month in an SIU (71.1%) receive two hours or less of programming during the entire month.

For the longer-stay prisoners (i.e. those who had 31 to 60 days available for correctional programming), the vast majority (93%) received a total of ten hours or less of correctional programming during these 31 to 60 days. Finally, for those who stayed 61 days or more, 72.9% received ten hours or less of correctional programming. This means that the best-case scenario for the majority of the group who had 61 or more days available to receive programming (the 72.9 % who received 10 hours or less programming) turns out to be about 1.25 hours per week.

While we are unable to calculate what the right amount of programming for each prisoner might be, we think it is fair to say that this seems low.^{Footnote 31}

One could argue that programming in the SIU is most relevant for those who are in an SIU for a long period of time. Hence, we will focus primarily on those who had over a month of available time for programing. While 2021 and 2022 might have shown some marginal improvements from 2020 in terms of providing more hours of programming, whatever gains were made, were lost in 2023 (see Table 5). We have no insights into this decline and in CSC’s performance indicator report no data were provided on the number of accepted offers of interventions after Fiscal Year 2021-2022 (see our more general concerns about this Performance Indicator in the section on CSC’s Performance Indicators).

As with all other outcomes examined, we again see significant regional variation in CSC’s success in delivering correctional programming. For those who had 31 or more days available for programming in 2023, 43.4% received no correctional programming in Quebec, whereas only 7.9% received no programming in the Atlantic region (see Appendix Table 19).

Treatment by Travel: The Experience of Multiple Stays in SIUs

In recent years, we have noticed a tendency for CSC to move SIU prisoners around the country more than we would have thought was necessary or desirable. We obviously are looking only at SIU prisoners and do not know if transfers to different penitentiaries (often in other regions) is a standard practice of CSC. But we do know that the movement of prisoners across SIUs and regions is fairly dramatic, and family members have told us the transfer of their loved ones far away from their support systems have had significant negative consequences.

When we are looking at movement of SIU prisoners, we look at individual people rather than person stays in SIUs. Hence, for each person, we counted the number of times they were admitted into an SIU starting from January 1, 2020, up until March 31, 2024.^{Footnote 32} Between January 2020 and March 2024, there were 3,116 people admitted into SIUs, of which half went in more than once (see Appendix Table 20).

Men were more likely than women to have multiple SIU stays with 30.4% of the men experiencing three or more stays compared to only 20% of women (see Appendix Table 21). Black prisoners also experience more stays than others, with 35.1% of them experiencing three or more SIU stays, compared to 30% of Whites, and 28.5% of Indigenous and other racialized people experiencing that many stays (see Appendix Table 22). People with mental health issues were also more likely to have multiple stays. Only 22.3% of those with no mental health issues experienced three or more SIU stays while 40.3% of those with “some”^{Footnote 33} mental health issues experienced that many stays, and 52.4% of those with “considerable”^{Footnote 34} mental health issues experienced three or more stay (see Appendix Table 23).

On another measure around changes in mental health, one sees the same pattern (see Appendix Table 24). Of those CSC has identified as having “low needs and not getting worse”, only 23.7% experienced three or more SIU stays. Of those CSC has identified as having “high needs, but not getting worse”, 39.5% experienced three or more SIU stays, and of those CSC has identified as having various mental health needs and getting worse, 48.8% experienced three or more SIU stays.^{Footnote 35}

Given the strong and persistent relationship between multiple SIU stays and mental health needs, we next examine only those who experienced more than one SIU stay (N=1,560). Those with more than one SIU stay (N=1,560) are an interesting group in part because they not only were in SIUs for more than one stay, but they also visited different SIUs in a number of regions.

In particular, people with considerable mental health needs, and those whose mental health is identified as deteriorating were most likely to stay in different SIUs in different regions. Of those with multiple SIU stays, 54% of those with considerable mental health needs spent time in different SIUs in different regions while only 36% of those with no mental health needs experienced such cross-country movement (see Appendix Table 25). Similarly, of those with multiple SIU stays, 58% of those with various mental health needs (and getting worse) were sent to different SIUs in different regions while 36% of those with low/some needs (who were not getting worse) experienced such relocation (see Appendix Table 26). We know of no data suggesting that those with considerable mental health needs or deteriorating mental health are especially likely to benefit from considerable relocation and its likely disruption of treatment and therapeutic relationships.

Finally, in the context of CSC’s tendency to move prisoners across institutions and regions, we will return to a set of findings we outlined much earlier in the report which focuses on people in SIUs on the March 2024 census day. We have already pointed out that many of the SIU prisoners in March 2024 had a fair amount of experience with SIUs. In looking at this group of 244 people, we should keep in mind that instability was almost certainly part of their lives before they entered a CSC facility and stabilizing their lives might well be a reasonable way of increasing the likelihood that they would live stable peaceful lives when they are released (as most of them will be).

The 244 people in SIUs on March 24, 2024 had quite varied experiences with SIUs. As we have already pointed out, 67 people had only one SIU stay and 177 (72%) had two or more SIU stays. Of the 177 prisoners with more than one SIU stay, two had been in SIUs 17 times. What is, perhaps, more remarkable is that the vast majority (81%) of SIU prisoners on March 24, 2024 with more than one SIU stay had been in two or more different SIUs (144 of the 177 or 81%), and 41 (23%) had been in four or more different SIUs (see Appendix Table 27). Furthermore, most had been in SIUs in more than one region. In fact, with the exception of those who had “only” experienced two SIU stays, the vast majority (127 or 72%) had experienced SIUs in two or more regions (see Appendix Table 28).

It would appear that CSC’s implicit policy is that the second and subsequent stay in an SIU should take place in different SIUs. To be specific on this, there were 21 prisoners in SIUs on March 24, 2024 who had been in SIUs on 11 to 17 separate occasions. Of those 21 prisoners who had 11 or more SIU placements, 18 of them (86%) had been in four or more different SIUs. In fact, two had visited nine different SIUs.

CSC’s Performance Indicators

As we have already noted, in the internal performance report shared with the Structured Intervention Unit Implementation Advisory Panel (SIU IAP), CSC has identified eleven performance indicators (or measures) which, we assume, are designed to be used to determine how successful CSC is at implementing this new model of confinement. What follows is CSC’s description of each indicator and our analysis of it.

1. Rate of transfers of prisoners to SIUs. CSC describes the indicator as “the number of offender transfers to Structured Intervention Units per 1,000 offenders in federal custody”. It is broken down by Indigenous/Not Indigenous, Men/Women, and Region. Essentially it suggests that the number of transfers first went down and then returned to its 2020-2021 level. Rates were higher for Indigenous prisoners and men and varied across regions.

The problem in looking solely at the number of transfers is that a transfer to an SIU for a few days (e.g., four or five) counts the same as a transfer resulting in an SIU stay of hundreds of days. Hence, they are of limited usefulness.

2. Rate of transfers out of SIUs. Since this is so dependent on performance indicator 1 above, it is hard to see much added value in this measure. It is noteworthy that CSC chose to present this measure rather than present something that might have given a better indication of the change in use of the SIUs. They might, for example, have given the average population size of the SIUs for each year.

3. Median number of days spent in SIUs. Although CSC, to its credit, does provide a more useful breakdown of the length of each SIU stay (using 12 ranges of length of stay) in the performance report the featured measure – the median – is not very useful. The median is the score representing the point where half of the scores are higher, and half are lower. Hence, the median can be lowered by increasing the number of very short stays without changing, at all, the number of long stays. Or relatively long stays can be made much longer without having any impact on the median. Days spent in the SIU is very important, but highlighting the median is a way of ensuring that crucial data are not showcased. The problems associated with using this measure were raised by the Panel in a meeting with CSC senior officials and a detailed critique was presented in our second annual report. Despite assurances the problems would be addressed, the practice continues. It is hard to accept that featuring this inadequate measure is an oversight on the part of CSC. 

Here, again, is the problem. As far as we can tell, what is being described is the length of stays that finished during each fiscal year. For the four relevant fiscal years, CSC reported the median number of days in the SIU as follows:

Referring to this same page of the CSC website, with a bit more navigation on the page, one can see that the decline in the median after Fiscal Year 2021-2022 is in large part because of a substantial increase in stays of 20 days or less (from 648 in Fiscal year 2021-2022 to 1,767 in Fiscal Year 2023-2024). At the same time, the number of very long SIU stays (61+ days) was higher than it has ever been in Fiscal Year 2023-2024 (n = 470). Adding short stays hardly qualifies as a success when the number of long stays is higher than every other year. Furthermore, the median does not tell the reader anything about the number (or relative frequency) of the very long stays. It is hard not to conclude that this is intentional. CSC, in its comments about this section, focused on the usefulness of the median as compared to the mean, but did not address our approach to describing length of stay. We have generally used categories of length of stay so that readers can see the actual number of various lengths of stays (e.g., long, short, etc.).

4. Percentage of successful transfers out of SIUs. CSC describes this indicator as “the total number of successful offender transfers out of Structured Intervention Units per the total number of transfers out of Structured Intervention Units. The transfer is considered successful if there is no readmission to a Structured Intervention Unit within 120 days of the original release decision”. This is an interesting measure when applied to an SIU because it implies that if a person returns to any SIU in Canada within four months of being released from a specific SIU, that the SIU that the prisoner was released from was unsuccessful. It would seem to make the SIU responsible rather than the subsequent CSC institution that transferred the person back to an SIU. Hence it is not clear that it tells us much – or anything at all – about the SIU model.

5. Number of subsequent transfers to SIUs within the past 12 months. CSC describes this indicator as “the total number of offenders who were transferred to a Structured Intervention Unit more than once within the past 12 months.” Once again, this measure is more closely aligned to CSC as a whole than to the SIUs. Performance measures 4 and 5 underline the fact that the operation of the SIUs cannot be separated from the operation of the institutions as a whole.

Note: Performance Indicators 6 and 7 were used as illustrations earlier in this report but are repeated here for readers’ convenience.

6. The percentage of days offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units were offered time out of their cell. CSC describes this indicator as “the total number of days offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units were offered time out of their cell per the total number of days offenders were available to be out of their cell (based on four hours out of cell per day). The data is constrained to days where offenders were present in the Structured Intervention Unit for a minimum of four hours, with offers and accepted offers limited to those that occurred between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm.”

Without an assessment of what was offered, this measure is meaningless. Offering a prisoner the opportunity to do something that is less attractive than sitting alone in one’s own cell doesn’t mean much. Hence high rates (85% to 96%) are meaningless. In addition, pooling days across all prisoners isn’t very helpful. For example, the data for 2023-2024 show that there were 4,196 person days when prisoners were not offered time out cell. It makes a difference whether these days without offers were concentrated among certain prisoners (e.g., long stay prisoners vs. short stay prisoners). Essentially, then, this measure tells us very little.

7. Percentage of days offenders housed in SIUs were out of their cell. CSC describes this indicator as “the total number of days offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units were out of their cell per the total number of days offenders were available to be out of their cell (based on four hours out of cell per day). The data is constrained to days where offenders were present in the Structured Intervention Unit for a minimum of four hours, with offers and accepted offers limited to those that occurred between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm”.

This measure has the same problem as performance indicator 6 since refusals by prisoners may or may not be evenly distributed across types of SIU prisoners (e.g., long vs. short stays). More generally, the success in getting prisoners out of their cells is low (23.3% to 38.4% in the past four years). However, given that we don’t know what was offered, or why they are refusing to leave their cell, and the fact that this is pooled across all days available for all prisoners, this gives little useful information.

8. Percentage of days with interaction time offered to offenders housed in SIUs.

9. Percentage of days where interaction time was availed by offenders housed in SIUs.

Measures 8 and 9 are essentially the same as 6 and 7, except that they relate to interaction time outside of the cell (where a minimum of two hours per day is the goal). Once again, the data show that people generally are recorded as having been offered interaction time, but only in half of the (total) person-days did prisoners avail themselves of whatever it was that they were offered.

10. Percentage of accepted offers of interventions in SIUs. CSC describes this indicator as “the total number of accepted offers of intervention by offenders housed in Structured Intervention Units, per the total number of interventions offered in Structured Intervention Units. Interventions include correctional programs, social programs, educational programs, and vocational programs. The data is constrained to days where offenders were present in the Structured Intervention Unit for a minimum of four hours, with offers and accepted offers limited to those that occurred between 7:00 am and 10:00 pm”. No data were provided on this measure after Fiscal Year 2021-2022.

Once again, this is pooled across prisoners making it difficult to discern, for the period when the data were available, whether the roughly one-third of offers that were accepted reflects most prisoners accepting only about a third of the time, or that about one-third accepted almost all the time and the other two-thirds almost never accepted the offer, or something in between. In addition, without knowing what the appropriateness was of the intervention or program that was offered, it is hard to assess what the refusals mean.

11. Median number of days from decision to transfer an offender out of the SIU to the actual transfer out. CSC describes the indicator as “the median duration (in days) between the decision date to transfer an offender out of a Structured Intervention Unit to the date of actual transfer out”. We have noted this problem in each of our previous annual reports. The IEDMs, in their most recent report^{Footnote 36}, also discuss this problem. While most prisoners ordered out of the SIU get out quickly, being ordered out of the SIU doesn’t always necessarily translate to actually getting out. Hence pooling across regions, the median is zero, which is completely meaningless since the median does not even give a hint as to the scope of the problem (beyond the fact that “most” get out quickly). Performance measure 2 (above) tells us that thousands of people are transferred out of SIUs during this period. When we looked carefully at this measure - again using data that CSC does provide - we find that there are hundreds of prisoners who were detained in an SIU many weeks after they were (legally) ordered out of the SIU. Using the median number of days between being ordered out and being released is statistically honest, but simultaneously obscures the problem. What is clear is that using either the median (CSC’s choice) or the mean (nobody’s choice) does not describe the problem. We have presented the detailed data in Tables 6 and 7.

The detailed data – first as numbers (Table 7), and then as percentages (Table 8) – are reported below. They demonstrate that there were, during the four years of operation of the SIUs, hundreds of prisoners who are transferred out of the SIU 20 or more days after they were ordered out. To be more specific, Table 7 shows that, pooled across four years, 68% of those ordered out of the SIU got out immediately. Hence the median delay is zero days. But 622 prisoners, or 12.1% of all prisoners ordered out during the four years spent at least 31 extra days in SIUs.

Table 7 also shows that, across the four years, there were 7.6% of SIU prisoners who spent 51 or more days in an SIU after they had been ordered to be released. But in terms of people, this 7.6% constituted 390 person stays in SIU. Said differently, in 390 instances, prisoners who were ordered out of the SIU spent an additional 51 or more days remaining in the isolating conditions of confinement in an SIU.

Notes: a) eight cases missing data. b) Data appear to include each full fiscal year. c) CSC says that “(t)he indicator represents the median duration (in days) between the decision date to transfer an offender out of a Structured Intervention Unit to the date of actual transfer out”. d) Although the explanation says “median” CSC also provides “details” with the number of days broken down into the following categories: 0, 1 to 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 100 and >100. e) The choice to collapse into the categories in the next table below was ours. For ease in access to the full descriptive data, we have used CSC’s full range of times in the table above, but have collapsed it, to make the table a bit easier to read in the next (percentage) table.

The argument might be made, of course, that moving people out of the SIU is difficult because one has to find a safe place to move them to. But the regional variation presented in Table 8 challenges that conclusion. In the Prairies, at least 93% - and, in 2023-2024, 100% - of the prisoners ordered out of SIUs were released within ten days. Other regions were much less successful in following the law.

We have gone into these findings in detail for two independent reasons. First of all, it seems unreasonable that in each of the four (full) years of operation, there have been 8.9% or more of the prisoners who have been ordered out of the SIU through a legal process who are detained in the SIU 31 or more days (after being ordered out). The argument that they might not have availed themselves of the opportunity to leave SIUs reveals more about their assessments of what life in the mainstream population would be like, than it absolves CSC of responsibility to embrace at least the spirit of the law. If being alone most of the time is deemed to be an undesirable state (as implied by the legislation and as one might conclude from the empirical work on isolating conditions of confinement), then why prisoners want to experience more isolating confinement than they have to must to be questioned. Second, the performance measure that CSC wants us to focus on – the median number of days in the SIU after being ordered out – obscures the issue.

We have one additional concern about the performance measures. They are meant to measure CSC performance in achieving the purpose of the Bill C-83 amendments, and not the individual performance of CSC employees. Members of CSC staff may indeed work very hard to meet their responsibilities and help the CSC achieve its purpose. That is to their credit. The problem, of course, is that they are being asked to implement a flawed policy.

Conclusion

This is the third annual report released from the Structured Intervention Unit Implementation Advisory Panel (SIU-IAP). The findings presented here mirror the findings from our two previous annual reports (2021-2022 and 2022-2023), the four feature reports this Panel has produced over the last three years, and the previous four reports produced by independent researchers: SIUs are not operating as the law intended. Specifically,

• Many SIU stays are long;
• Indigenous and Black prisoners, as well as prisoners with mental health issues, are over-represented in SIUs;
• Prisoners with mental health needs experience more SIU placements and they are especially likely, in their multiple SIU stays, to be placed in different SIUs in different regions;
• A core feature of the legislation – a minimum of four hours out of cell, two hours of which are to involve meaningful human contact – is not being achieved for the majority of prisoners with long (16+ days) SIU stays; and
• There appears to be little in the way of correctional programming occurring in SIUs.

Furthermore, we see no meaningful or consistent improvements in operations over four years. We repeat what we said in our second annual report (2022-2023): the SIU regime is not working as intended. We therefore restate our three clear conclusions that flowed directly from our findings from the second annual report since we see no evidence that the conclusions made in that report are incorrect. Indeed, we have accumulated additional evidence in support of these conclusions.^{Footnote 37}

Conclusion 1: Unfulfilled Promises

The operation of the Structured Intervention Units is not sufficiently consistent with the goals of the Bill C-83 legislative amendments (42nd Parliament, 1st session). The implicit promises made when Parliament changed the law in 2019 are not being fulfilled.

This is important for a simple reason. The SIU regime, as we and others have pointed out, was instituted to address the successful Charter challenges against Administrative Segregation, the predecessor to the SIU model. The operation of the SIUs is therefore vulnerable to the same Charter challenges.

Details of the inconsistency between the intent of the legislation and current practice are contained throughout this report. One can point to the length of the stays in the SIUs, the absence of timely independent review (and CSC’s failure to reasonably respond to the outcomes of these reviews), and the inability to achieve the minimum time out of cell, with or without meaningful human activity, as obvious problems.

The response by CSC that prisoners do not avail themselves of opportunities to leave the SIU is not sufficient. The experience of isolating conditions of confinement has been demonstrated to be harmful. To attribute the failure to provide minimum time out of cell to prisoners, many with identified mental health concerns, who decline the opportunities offered by CSC is akin to suggesting that CSC bears no responsibility for preventing self-harm if a prisoner chooses to hurt themselves.

Notwithstanding the problems we have identified with the SIU scheme in our analyses, it is worth remembering that many prisoners we have interviewed prefer isolation in an SIU to the alternative, which is being placed in the mainstream penitentiary population. They often refer to their personal safety needs as they explain their preference. We see this as an indication more of the inadequacy of CSC’s administration of the rest of the penitentiary than a finding of adequacy of the SIUs. Said differently, when long stays in isolating conditions of confinement are preferable to an alternative, what does this say about the alternative?

Conclusion 2 – The Operation of the SIUs is not Improving

In this report, we present four years of data on many outcome variables. The operation of the SIUs is not improving in any material way. This Panel acknowledges that the implementation of the SIU regime was never expected to be easy. However, the lack of evidence of meaningful improvement despite both internal and external identification of deficiencies, is deeply troubling. From this perspective, it is difficult to find anything that supports a prediction that things will suddenly get better or that CSC simply “needs more time” to get the SIUs running in an adequate fashion.

One approach that CSC takes when responding to difficult prisoners is particularly disturbing. This is the practice whereby difficult SIU prisoners are moved from one SIU to another SIU, often in different regions. This practice suggests that CSC, as a national organization, does not take a cohesive national approach to the safe management of prisoners with complex and challenging needs.

In the context of unexplained variation in the operation of the SIUs, the special needs of Black and Indigenous prisoners, as well as those with mental health problems, must be addressed.

Conclusion 3 – Reform of the SIUs Must be Carried Out Within the Context of CSC’s Overall Operations

We have reluctantly concluded that the operation of the SIUs cannot be “fixed” just by tinkering with the legislation. A complete operational review of CSC is required. SIUs must be understood within the context of broader CSC institutional operations. Changes to SIUs necessarily affect the whole institution and vice versa. There is little point in fixing the SIUs if the result is simply that the problems are shifted to other and less visible parts of CSC’s institutions (e.g., the so-called ‘hidden cells’). Every indication is that the problems with the SIUs reflect larger organizational problems.

We have, for example, been told that there are many prisoners who prefer to stay in SIUs because of fears about violence in the general population. This problem cannot be fixed by looking at SIUs in isolation. Nor can it be fixed by continuing the practice of frequently moving prisoners – most notably those with mental health challenges – to other SIUs, often in other regions.

Similarly, mental health issues cannot be examined in isolation from the rest of CSC’s operations. Once again, we can see the intersectionality of problems. As noted in this report, those with multiple SIU stays are especially likely to have mental health needs. And those with considerable mental health needs are especially vulnerable to being sent to multiple SIUs in different regions. It would appear to us that the examination of the treatment of those with mental health issues needs to be expanded and carried out in the broader context of CSC institutional operation and capacity. A policy or practice that implicitly endorses “Treatment by Travel” (moving “difficult” prisoners to another institution or region) should not be tolerated.

Work on the reform of the SIUs – by CSC and Public Safety Canada – must be carried out in a systematic fashion that will inform the “five-year review” of the SIU legislation. The review is already overdue (see Bill C-83, Clause 40.1).^{Footnote 38} It is incumbent on Parliament to respect the legislation it passed and call upon the appropriate committee to initiate the mandated review - Canadians deserve assurance that prisoners are treated humanely and in accordance with the law.

The Corrections and Conditional Release Act states that

[Section 3] The purpose of the federal correctional system is to contribute to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by

(a) carrying out sentences imposed by courts through the safe and humane custody and supervision of offenders; and

(b) assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law-abiding citizens through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and in the community.

3.1 The protection of society is the paramount consideration for the Service in the corrections process.

Stated bluntly, the protection of society is not being given paramount consideration when a stay in an SIU in a CSC institution is transformed into what is internationally considered to be solitary confinement. Given the broadly acknowledged negative impacts of solitary confinement, protection of society is not being served by undermining prisoners’ mental health before they are released into the community. And it should be remembered that most prisoners will be released back into the community. As we have already seen (see Appendix Table 20) there were 3,116 different people who have been in an SIU one or times between January 2020 to March 2024. 80% (N=2,481) of those people have fixed sentences meaning that they will almost certainly return to Canadian communities. 2,155 (87%) of  those with fixed sentences will be released within 10 years, 1,017 (47%) of whom will be released within four years or less.

One does not need to focus solely on the value of treating prisoners fairly and consistent with correctional law and other guarantees (e.g., the Charter of Rights and Freedoms) to realize that it is in the interest of “the protection of society” – the “paramount consideration for the [Correctional] Service” – to ensure that prisoners receive the programs and supports they require and are treated in a manner that is most likely to result in low rates of reoffending.

The urgent need for change has been clear since October 2020 when the first set of findings on the operation of the SIUs was released. These findings have been consistent across what are now including this report) 11 separate empirical reports on SIU operations.

Recommendations

The following three recommendations were originally made in our second annual report (2022-2023). They address the need to ensure that any further change in CSC operations is evidence-based and consistent with the central mission of CSC, which is the rehabilitation of prisoners and their reintegration into Canadian society.^{Footnote 39}

We are comfortable repeating these recommendations^{Footnote 40} in part because the findings that we have been presented in our third annual report (2023-2024) are entirely consistent with the previous six empirical reports we have released over the last three years. Quite independent of the required 5-year Parliamentary review – we believe that Canada has a positive obligation to do what is necessary to ensure that prisoners are treated in a manner consistent with Canadian law and international standards.

1.CSC must be directed immediately to examine the relationship of the operation of the SIUs to its overall operations. CSC staff have frequently suggested that the SIU model has had negative impacts on core correctional operations and have also suggested that SIUs are responsible for an erosion of the conditions of confinement for general population prisoners. An examination of these issues must start immediately. Additionally, the narrow focus of the SIUs and their oversight must be broadened beyond the location (the treatment of prisoners in places identified as Structured Intervention Units) to encompass the practice (solitary confinement) which can occur anywhere in an institution. The operation of the SIUs cannot be separated from the operation of CSC institutions more generally. In response to this recommendation, CSC committed to conducting a review and producing a report by December 31, 2024. At the request of the Panel, Public Safety Canada asked CSC to provide the report by September 30, 2024. To date, the SIU-IAP has not been asked to provide any input in the scope of the review or an outline of the review’s terms of reference.

2. CSC must be directed immediately to develop and implement a plan to reduce the high number of Black prisoners, Indigenous prisoners, and prisoners with mental health issues who are being transferred into SIUs, as well as reducing their lengths of stay in the SIUs. Monitoring systems need to be put in place to ensure that these, and analogous groups, are not disadvantaged by CSC when they are under special restrictions in SIUs or elsewhere. More generally, it is important that procedures be put in place to monitor the treatment of different groups (e.g., Black people and Indigenous people) in the SIUs and elsewhere in the CSC system. Procedures need to be designed in order to determine whether the treatment of these groups is different from that of other groups in Canada’s penitentiaries. The actions taken must also prevent the prolonged isolation of these prisoners in any other forms of restrictive custody. In response to this recommendation, the Minister asked CSC to provide an action plan within 90 days and report on progress every 120 days. The Panel has requested that the action plan and subsequent progress reports be shared. To date, the Panel has not received the plan or any progress reports.^{Footnote 41}

3. Procedures need to be developed to ensure that decisions made by CSC employees concerning important matters related to SIUs and other forms of restricted movement will be reviewed quickly by a person who is truly independent of CSC. This would start with the initial decision to place a prisoner in an SIU.At the moment, for example, a decision concerning placing and keeping someone in an SIU need not be reviewed by an external person until the prisoner has been in the SIU for approximately 90 days. Reviews prior to that time are made by CSC employees responsible to CSC alone and whose job and job prospects relate primarily to CSC.

The decision to place a prisoner in an SIU is an important one that can have lasting impacts not only on the prisoner’s mental health but also on their subsequent treatment in CSC penitentiaries (e.g., classification, institutional placement, etc.). Details of how these independent reviews can take place efficiently and effectively need to be developed. What is abundantly clear is that there is a need.

There were no specific commitments made to address this recommendation in last year’s response.

Each of these recommendations is grounded in the urgent need to align the operation of the SIU Model with the legislative goals of Bill C-83, the Corrections and Conditional Release Act more generally, and with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

References

• United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 2015.
• Bill C-83: An Act to Amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) and another act.

Appendix 1: Tables

Appendix 2: Site Visit Trip Report

Recently, two members of the Structured Intervention Unit Implementation Advisory Panel (SIU-IAP) spent two days at an SIU institution and met with various staff members (in their separate occupational groups) including Institutional Managers, Mental Health Staff, an Elder and Indigenous Liaison Officers (ILO), Parole Officers, SIU Staff and prisoners. At the end of the visit, the two Panel members agreed that, in assessing the implementation of the SIUs, the IAP may have failed to adequately consider the impact of operationalizing the SIUs on Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) staff members. The health and wellbeing of CSC staff is critical to the health and wellbeing of prisoners. In each meeting, the toll that the implementation of the SIU has taken / is taking on staff was abundantly evident and clearly articulated by staff. As one staff member put it, the SIU has become “a monster” that consumes a disproportionate amount of resources – money, time, and energy.

Common themes

1. SIU from an operational standpoint

Consensus seemed to be that operations were not where they wanted to be but moving in that direction. The SIU population has increased significantly over the past two years and, according to the managers, continues to command a lot of attention. Most SIU prisoners are not receiving the required time out of cells. There continues to be some resistance to, and negative perceptions of, SIUs among correctional staff and the need for a “culture shift” remains.

Managers expressed some frustration at being directed by IEDMs to take actions, such as implement core mainstream programming in SIUs, when this contradicts policy and programming goals. Also, it is difficult for staff to find time to read reports of SIU performance and it is discouraging (disincentivizing?) when the “tone” of reports suggest they are not working hard enough. On the positive side, a couple of positions had recently been filled.

A Panel member met with an SIU prisoner who had been transferred from a mainstream population in another institution. This individual explained that he was continuing to work with a community representative supporting Black prisoners and has found this to be extremely positive for him and his future plans of obtaining a Day Parole release. The continuation of his release planning has given him the incentive to stay positive in the SIU and he believes that he soon will be transferring back to a medium security institution.

2. Staff resources

SIUs are sorely lacking in dedicated resources for Indigenous prisoners and mental health support for those in need of it. As a result, staff are trying to fill these gaps by pulling resources from the mainstream population. Psychologists, whose expertise is in mental health, are relegated to conducting policy mandated risk assessments rather than utilizing their full skillset, such as overseeing complex cases and diagnostic clarifications.

SIU numbers have increased (comparable to pre-SIU levels) due in part, if not large part, to “unjustified” cases and cases where, for whatever personal reasons, they refuse to leave the SIU. This has led to increased land transfers, “SIU hoppers” and “fake mediums”, and frustrated CSC staff who see the demand for documenting and report writing increasing with no commensurate benefit. They feel like they are box-ticking. Staff see prisoners who could benefit from longer-term SIU stays being required to leave and “unjustified” cases getting admitted. On the positive side, reportedly the proportion of mental health cases is low, largely due to the concerted efforts of the Mental Health Unit staff to maintain their clients in the therapeutic units. These same staff members, however, see the erosion of resources to the transition units and mainstream population clients – due to the SIU.

Mental Health Staff acknowledged that there was a general perception that mental health problems were higher in the SIUs, and they reported being “bombarded” daily with requests from the SIU. Staff maintained that the SIU was absorbing a disproportionate amount of attention and resources and that therapeutic units were being “decimated”. As they put it, the most vulnerable clients – those being maintained outside the SIU were suffering due to the disproportionate allocation of resources to the SIU.

It is not surprising that there is turnover among staff and that recruitment and retention of new staff is difficult. The environment is a recipe for burnout – demands exceeding resources coupled with staff’s diminishing sense of control over the environment. It is difficult to see how staff are to replenish their reservoir of resiliency over the short-term let alone the long-term. It was particularly concerning to listen to the junior parole officers and wonder about the short- and longer-term impacts of their “baptism by fire” into CSC. Stressed staff operating within a stressful work environment cannot be good for prisoners. Some staff members also remarked on how comments by external observers could be discouraging and seem disrespecting of their efforts. It was suggested that if the “tone” of reports invited listening, they might be better able to hear the concerns and suggestions.

Four of the five inmates interviewed during this institutional visit were reporting symptoms of mental health problems. One stated that he had become quite depressed and tried to hang himself when he was transferred from the Regional Treatment Centre. He has been in every SIU in the country and has been transferred 16 times. He has been, reportedly, waiting almost a month to see a physician for a back injury which continues to cause him obvious distress both physically and mentally. Apparently, the physician’s prescription order was denied by “pharmacy” and he is not receiving the required medication to manage his pain. He maintains that he is unable to continue with his job in the unit (which provided him a level of stability and pride) due to the injury. Despite his willingness to participate in programming and other interventions, his pain is preventing him from doing so and he spends most of his time in his cell.

This prisoner reported feeling “hopeless” and not knowing what to do. He said that “neglect was the most powerful tool to drive you crazy”. He indicated this was in relation to his medical issues and also to the neglect from some staff. He said that if you are in the SIU, “it can’t get any worse”.  As a Dangerous Offender, he feels that “he will die in prison” and never be “free again” and that he is “beyond hopelessness and doesn’t care about life anymore”.

3. Rules, Regulation, Documentation

What would become a common and resounding theme for the day was that the many rules, regulations, and relentless documentation associated with the SIUs was placing enormous constraints on professionals’ ability to practice effectively (e.g., maintain continuity of care) and ethically (e.g., being required to “invade” clients’ space and privacy unnecessarily). The common theme was that SIUs “drain resources” – from other areas of the prison, such as the mainstream population – and exact a mental and physical toll on CSC staff (including managers). For example, to accommodate the SIUs, the caseload ratio of prisoners to institutional parole officers has increased. Other challenges include being able to access clients due to limits on movement between units, and the increased paperwork due to “unjustified” and voluntary SIU cases and increased inter-regional transfers (an effort to reduce prisoner time spent in SIU).

The Parole Officer (PO) to prisoner ratio in the SIU on the day of the visit was 1:6. The POs reported that the increased number of reports, especially Correctional Plan Updates (CPUs), that they are required to complete on a monthly basis provided less time for formal or informal interventions. As of July 2023, Policy Bulletin #698 requires that an SIU-CPU be completed within five working days of a decision to transfer and within every 30 calendar days thereafter until the prisoner is physically transferred out of the SIU.^{Footnote 43} Apparently, each SIU prisoner has multiple CPUs and the POs clearly are concerned that the quantity of reports is unsustainable and operating at odds with sustaining quality of reports. It was widely acknowledged that the pressure to get prisoners out of SIUs was to the detriment of those prisoners who could benefit from longer stays in SIU.

The POs claimed that their days are consumed with writing reports - CPUs, SIU Case Conference Reviews (SICCR), Assessments for Decision (A4Ds) - attending interdisciplinary hearings and, as time permits, meeting with clients. They explained that the SIU numbers have been creeping up, in part due to “recycled offenders”. For those who are perceived as being in the SIU “voluntarily”, or for someone who may possibly become a long-term SIU case, pressure mounts to make them medium and get them transferred out. These cases are known as “fake mediums” or “SIU mediums” and are particularly frustrating for POs (and other staff) who see their recommendations on these case often being overridden. One PO asserted that POs are no longer “driving the case; Region is driving the case”.The POs no longer feel respected by management and feel case management is being controlled from the top down. They recounted a case where a medium was transferred and returned the same day. There was the feeling that sometimes even security is compromised in an attempt to “check those boxes.” POs seem to be getting mixed messages regarding transfers. Most of the time it feels like it is only about the numbers, other times, when absolutely all interventions have failed, they are being told that being in an SIU is not a valid reason for transfer. Staff refer to these transfers as, “SIU hoppers” and “fake mediums” and frustrated CSC staff who see the demand for documenting and report writing increasing with no commensurate benefit (i.e., check boxes) as they don’t see these increased transfers as being helpful for staff or inmates. Staff indicated that the numbers are not reduced because as they are transferring out of their institution, other SIU institutions are transferring an equivalent number to them. They believe the “rush” to transfer is harming some prisoners who could benefit from longer-term SIU stays. Staff also expressed a concern that pushing people out does little more than create SIU space for questionable, or what they termed as “unjustified” cases being admitted. Most staff agree that the abolition of Administrative Segregation was needed but most also agree that the SIUs are not producing expected results and are negatively impacting the mainstream population.

One such “SIU hopper” was interviewed. This individual describes himself as being “institutionalized”. In total, he has spent only a few months in the community in the past 20 years; almost all of his incarceration time has been spent in Administrative Segregation and SIUs. He said he has been in every SIU in Canada and to the Special Handling Unit (SHU) four times. He has recently been approved for an inter-regional transfer and says that he “will not” leave his current institution and “will not” integrate into the proposed institution. He claims that, if anything is forced upon him, he will go on high suicide watch. He stated that he has lots of razors and will not only self-injure but will assault any staff that comes near him. He said he doesn’t know where to turn, and “is at the end of his rope”. He said he is not eating and the “kitchen continues to provide him meals containing fish when his fish allergy is well documented”. He said he needs something useful to do and should be trained in job skills for his eventual release to the street. He previously was employed in an institutional CORCAN shop and enjoyed that work. He does meet with the SIU mental health nurse and SIU Correctional Program Officer but doesn’t feel that the IEDMs really can understand institutional life and what prisoners experience.

4. Indigenous Representative

The most obvious take-away from the meeting with Indigenous leaders (Elder and ILO) was that there continues to be a lack of adequate Indigenous representation among staff, especially vis-à-vis the overrepresentation of Indigenous prisoners in both the SIU and mainstream populations. There has been no Indigenous Correctional Program Officer for over a year. There is a dedicated

SIU Elder and another for the mainstream population. The SIU Elder is not comfortable doing sweats alone and hopes that an SIU-dedicated Elder’s helper will be staffed soon to assist with the sweats. Currently, the Elder does provide some other ceremony. The dedicated space in the SIU is insufficient to conduct interviews, counselling, etc.

One Indigenous prisoner stated that he is willing to work with the Indigenous team and someday would like to participate in the Pathways program. He grew up in the foster care system when he was 12 and feels that he would benefit from counselling regarding his childhood trauma. He stated that there are not enough staff/interventions for Indigenous inmates.

Another Indigenous inmate who was in the SIU was experiencing extreme sadness over, in his words, “letting his family down”. He talked about losing family members while incarcerated and would like to regain his medium and be returned closer to his home region where he feels he would have access to an Elder who understands the unique issues of his community and could better help with issues related to his childhood, most notably, as a residential school survivor, and later as a group home resident. He stated that while in the mainstream population, he was working with the Elder as a helper. At this point, he feels that “they will never let him out of the SIU”. He expressed feeling “hopeless and doesn’t know what to do”. He is working with some with the ILO but feels he isn’t getting the full benefit of counselling from the Elder, ILO or other Indigenous staff due to the differences between his tribe and theirs.

Date modified:

2024-10-04