Parliamentary Committee Notes: Minister Anandasangaree and Secretary of State Sahota’s appearance before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)
Canada-United States Border Management Study

Appearance before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU) - Canada-United States Border Management Study – October 23, 2025

General Information

Date: Thursday, October 23, 2025
Time: 11:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Location: TBC

Context

You have been invited to appear at SECU for one hour on the Committee's study on Canada-United States Border Management, subsequent to the adoption of the following motion:

That the committee undertake a study, according to Standing Order 108(2), on Canada-United States border management;

that the study includes a minimum of five meetings;

that the committee invites the Minister of Public Safety, Secretary of State (Combatting Crime), the Fentanyl Czar, the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the President of the Canada Border Services Agency, the President of the Customs and Immigration Union, the President of the National Police Federation and other witnesses as the Committee deems appropriate to appear before it;

That the study begin with a two-hour in-camera briefing by relevant officials from Public Safety Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canada Border Services Agency; and,

that the committee reports its recommendations to the House.

Officials

You will be appearing for the first hour with the following officials:

• Tricia Geddes, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada
• Mike Duheme, Commissioner, RCMP
• Erin O'Gorman, President, CBSA
• Kevin Brosseau, Canada's Fentanyl Czar

The following officials have been invited by the Committee to remain for the second hour:

• Mike Duheme, Commissioner, RCMP
• Erin O'Gorman, President, CBSA
• Kevin Brosseau, Canada's Fentanyl Czar

Opening Remarks

At the beginning of the meeting, the Chair will invite you and the Secretary of State to each deliver opening remarks to last approximately 5 minutes each.

Rounds of Questions

Questions from Committee members will follow with the rounds of questions to be as follows:

First Round of Questions:

• Conservative Party, six minutes.
• Liberal Party, six minutes.
• Bloc Québécois, six minutes.

Second and Subsequent Rounds of Questions:

• Conservative Party, five minutes.
• Liberal Party, five minutes.
• Bloc Québécois, two and a half minutes.
• Conservative Party, five minutes.
• Liberal Party, five minutes.

Speaking Notes for The Honourable Gary Anandasangaree

Minister of Public Safety

Opening Remarks

Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (Canada-United States Border Management)

October 23, 2025
Ottawa, Ontario

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I am pleased to be here today to speak about how we are managing the Canada-United States Border.

Canada shares the longest non-militarized land border in the world with the United States.

In many ways, the border defines the relationship between our two countries.

And I think all of us here can agree that over our history our relationship has brought real benefits.

Last year, nearly $3.6 billion worth of trade and about 400,000 people crossed the Canada-U.S. border – every single day.

It also brings challenges.

We are constantly having to balance the movement of legitimate trade and travel with measures to keep our border secure.

Both countries are dealing with irregular migration, human smuggling, and illegal drug and firearms trafficking.

All these are compounded by the involvement of transnational organized criminal groups.

So, to counter these threats, we have a long history of working closely with the United States, each and every day.

I recently met with my U.S. counterpart, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem, U.S Attorney General, Pam Bondi and Tom Homan, the U.S Border Czar on border security.

Public Safety Canada, CBSA and RCMP also have regular, daily interactions with their counterparts in the U.S.

This week, the Fentanyl Czar, the RCMP Commissioner and President of the CBSA, travelled to Washington to meet with the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Terrance Cole, and with the Commissioner of the U.S Customs and Border Protection, Rodney Scott.

These discussions build on the already strong intelligence and information-sharing work we do with the U.S., and underscore the importance of this collaboration.

But there is always more that we can do. That is why the Government of Canada is taking a number of steps to improve the security of our borders.

It starts with our Border Plan, which is already delivering results.

We have increased the resources along the border and are investing in new technologies to improve surveillance and detection.

Southbound irregular migration between Canada and the United States has dropped 99% since last year.

Together with the U.S., we launched a North American Joint Strike Force to target transnational organized crime, precursor chemicals, and illegal substances, including fentanyl.

Here at home, we established a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to strengthen collaboration among agencies and advance investigations into the illicit cross-border movement of fentanyl. Those efforts also reinforce our work with our American counterparts.

We are also training and deploying new border detector dog teams who can sniff out fentanyl.

While less than 1% of illegal fentanyl seized in the U.S. is linked to Canada, we know how important it is get this drug off of our streets, whether in Canada or the U.S.

A safe and secure flow of goods and people across the Canada–United States border is critical to North America's economy.

That is why we continue to look for ways to make it easier and faster to cross the border without compromising the integrity of our immigration system.

Under the Border Plan, we have strengthened visa screening and integrity measures.

It also provides over $55 million to CBSA to increase the Agency's removals capacity.

We are seeing results.

The Agency removed over 18,000 inadmissible people in 2024-25 – the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before.

Finally, Mr. Chair, as committee members know, our government has introduced Bill Bill C-12, the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act.

This bill supports efforts to secure our border by tackling organized crime and money laundering, and enhancing the integrity and fairness of our immigration system.

This bill provides the authorities needed to take decisive action and protect Canadians.

Measures in the Bill also advance shared Canada–U.S. priorities, such as disrupting the cross-border flow of illicit drugs, strengthening law enforcement cooperation, and improving information sharing.

Given the importance of Bill C-12 to protecting our borders, I urge members of this committee to support its swift passage.

Thank you.

Speaking Notes for The Honourable Ruby Sahota

Secretary of State (Combatting Crime)

Opening Remarks

Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (Canada-United States Border Management)

October 23, 2025
Ottawa, Ontario

Good morning/afternoon.

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me to speak here today.

I am happy to be able to be here with the Minister of Public Safety to talk about the measures we are taking to ensure border security.

My mandate as Secretary of State for Combatting Crime includes working to keep Canadians and their communities safe from serious organized crime, including its role in driving the opioid crisis, gun crime, and auto thefts.

Given my remit, I will focus my remarks today on telling the committee a bit more about the progress we have made in specific areas, thanks to multiple initiatives implemented since 2018, including Border Plan-related measures announced in December 2024.

Given that border management includes tackling issues such as human smuggling and illegal drug trafficking, border management is of paramount importance to my work.

Indeed, we know that transnational organized crime groups are involved in all of these activities.

And their ability to adapt and take advantage of vulnerabilities mean that we need to be ever vigilant and up to date in the tools that we use to stop them.

The government's $1.3 billion Border Plan has helped to put in place many new tools that will help keep communities on both sides of the border safe.

This includes:

• enhancing trilateral coordination with Mexican and U.S. counterparts, international partners and law enforcement agencies;
• designating seven transnational criminal organizations as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code;
• launching a Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership between Canada's major banks and law enforcement;
• deploying new helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers;
• increasing usage of artificial intelligence and adding imaging tools that will further help detect illegal drugs before they enter Canada;
• deploying new canine teams to intercept illegal drugs to augment the existing 80 detector dog teams located at various ports of entry across Canada;
• deploying new chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry;
• accelerating regulatory processes to ban precursor chemicals and expanding lab capacity for synthetic drug analysis so that border and law enforcement can take swift action to prevent their illegal importation and use in drug production, while strengthening federal oversight and monitoring of emerging drug trends.

And we are already seeing results.

Thanks to the hard work of border services officers, the Canada Border Services Agency seized over 50,000 kg of prohibited drugs, cannabis, narcotics and chemicals, and more than 900 firearms last year.

More specifically, the CBSA interdicted over 34,000 kg of illegal drugs, including nearly 5 kg of seized fentanyl in 2024.

I want to highlight that 81% of fentanyl that is seized in Canada comes from the United States.

I also want to take a moment to highlight some of the positive results achieved in tackling vehicle thefts since the launch of the National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft in May 2024.

Motor vehicle theft saw a significant decline in 2024, with police-reported incidents dropping by 17 per cent.

Auto thefts have continued to decline nationally in 2025, with a 19 per cent decrease reported in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period last year, according to the latest trend report from Équité Association.

The CBSA intercepted 2,277 stolen vehicles in railyards and ports in 2024, an increase of over 25% compared to the previous year.

And they have intercepted 1,252 since the beginning of 2025.

These positive outcomes can indeed be attributed in part to the initiatives highlighted in the National Action Plan and carried in a collaborative manner within the PS portfolio, with key government departments and across jurisdictions, including with provincial and international law enforcement partners.

Before concluding, I would like to take a moment to thank the dedicated officers of the CBSA and the RCMP. Their work helps make our border one of the safest in the world.

I would also like to call on Parliamentarians from all parties to support Bill C-12, the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act, which will build on the progress we've already made and give law enforcement even more tools to help strengthen our borders.

Thank you.

Key Messages - Detecting, Disrupting, and Dismantling the Fentanyl Trade

Enforcement related data

Since Nov 2024, at the national level^{Footnote 1}, there have been:

• 2,120 fentanyl-related arrests/charges
• 12,097 fentanyl and analogues seizures. Between May 1 – June 30, there were seizures of, on average, 286 lbs/month compared to an average of 60 lbs/month in April, July and August. Most recently in September there were 160 lbs of fentanyl seizures.
• 1,488 drug related raids.
• In September, there were 1,346 fentanyl -related seizures and 260 arrests.
• Fentanyl/Synthetic Opioid-related financial intelligence disclosures to law have increased, especially in April, July and September.
• Precursor seizures have remained stable, with the exception of a spike in the first half of May.

Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) Seizures

• In fiscal year 2024 to 2025, CBSA seized 6,378 g of fentanyl. In the first quarter of 2025 to 2026 CBSA has seized 566 g.
• The U.S, is by far, the main source of fentanyl coming into Canada: 82% (541.93g) in 2024; 100% (118.54g) so far in 2025.^{Footnote 2 Footnote 3}

Fentanyl Seizures by U.S. Customs and Border Protection^{Footnote 4}

• At the Northern Border, fentanyl seizures were: 14.1 kg in FY2022, 2.5 kg in FY2023, 43.0 kg in FY2024, and 76.9 kg so far in FY2025.
• At the Southwest Border, fentanyl seizures were 14,104 kg in FY2022, 26,718 kg in FY2023, 21,148 kg in FY2024, and 10,945 kg so far in FY2025.

Disrupting Domestic Production/Targeting Smuggling

• In December 2024 and January 2025, the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime (CIROC), composed of federal, provincial, and municipal law enforcement agencies, undertook a national enforcement sprint, seizing 101.8 lbs of fentanyl and 15,765 pills made from fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, among other items.
• From Feb 12, 2025, to Mar 13, 2025, CBSA conducted Operation Blizzard, a cross-country surge operation to intercept fentanyl and other illegal drugs leaving Canada in postal, air cargo and marine containers. CBSA conducted approximately 691,000 examinations which resulted in over 2,600 seizures of suspected narcotics and precursors, including 116 fentanyl seizures (just under 4 lbs)^{Footnote 5} The United States was the country of destination or origin for over 85% of all seizures made during the Operation.^{Footnote 3}
• Since 2021, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detected and/or dismantled 58 clandestine labs.^{Footnote 6}
• As per the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) dashboard, from November 1, 2024 to September 30, 2025 total seizure was $28.07M.

Fentanyl/Opioid Deaths

• There has been a 21% decrease in the number of opioid-related deaths compared to the previous 12 months.
• Of all apparent opioid toxicity deaths so far in 2025 (Jan to Mar), 63% involved fentanyl and 51% involved fentanyl analogues.^{Footnote 7}  

Fentanyl/Opioid Emergency Department Visit and Hospitalizations

• Between January 2016 and March 2025, there have been 203,577 reported emergency department visits due to opioid-related poisoning. In the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), 5,370 such visits were reported.^{Footnote 8}
• In the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), 35% of opioid-related emergency department visits involved fentanyl or its analogues. This represents a 75% increase since 2018, when national surveillance began but appears to have stabilized in recent years.^{Footnote 8}
• Since January of 2016, there have been 49,445 opioid-related poisoning hospitalizations reported. Of these, 1,218 hospitalizations occurred between January and March 2025.^{Footnote 7}
• In the first quarter of 2025 (January to March), 27 % of opioid-related poisoning hospitalizations involved fentanyl and its analogues. This marks a 69% increase since 2018, when national surveillance began but appears to have stabilized in recent years.^{Footnote 7}

Supervised Consumption Sites

• Since 2017, the number of supervised consumption sites (SCS) in Canada has increased from 2 to a peak of 40, with 32 currently in operation. As of May 2025, SCS have^{Footnote 9}:
  • Been visited more than 5.3 million times
  • Responded to over 65,000 overdoses
  • Made over 624,000 referrals to health and social services

Strengthening Canada's Border Security

Actions Taken to Date (September 2025)

Securing the Border

• 24/7 surveillance of the border with boots-on-the-ground (up to 10,000 frontline personnel) and through new technology and intelligence capabilities (3 Black Hawk helicopters, 60 Tactical Mission Drones, 40 operational drones from CAF, counter- drone technologies, and mobile surveillance towers).
• Committed to hire 1,000 new Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) personnel and 1,000 new Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) personnel to fight drug trafficking and other serious crimes.
• New tools in place to address illegal migration – more visa fraud investigations, more resources identifying high-risk individuals, and partial re-imposition of visa requirements on Mexico. Illegal crossings from Canada to the U.S. are down 99% in August 2025 from peak levels in June 2024. Northbound apprehensions now outnumber southbound.
• New capabilities are being deployed to detect and identify illegal synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals - imaging and trace detection tools, regional satellite laboratories, handheld chemical analyzers (Raman) and detector dog teams. More equipment still to come.
• More resources dedicated to removing foreign nationals inadmissible to Canada – in 2024-25, 18,041 removals were enforced, the most in over a decade.
• CBSA international operations has increased support by adding temporary resources to handle additional interceptions in the pre-departure space.

If passed by Parliament, the Strong Borders Act will:

• Provide new authorities to cancel, change, or suspend immigration documents (e.g., visas, electronic travel authorizations, work and study permits), and cancel, suspend, or stop accepting new applications when it is determined to be in the public interest.
• Create new ineligibilities to protect the integrity of the asylum system by discouraging those crossing the border irregularly from the U.S. and by others seeking to claim refugee protection to extend their temporary stay in Canada.
• Provide authority for the Canadian Coast Guard to conduct security patrols and share intelligence for security purposes.
• Obligate owners and operators of premises where goods destined for export are reported, loaded, unloaded, or stored, to provide CBSA Officers with access for the examination of containers selected for inspection prior to export.
• Provide the RCMP with a greater ability to share information on registered sex offenders intending to travel outside of Canada, including to the United States. This is in addition to the development of the previously announced publicly accessible High Risk Child Sex Offender Database, expected to be operational by December 31, 2025.

Combatting transnational organized crime and fentanyl

• Canada is not a significant source of illegal fentanyl entering the U.S. Less than 1% of fentanyl seized in the U.S. comes from Canada.
• Between January 2022 and August 2025, only 136 pounds of fentanyl were seized within the area of the U.S. Northern Border, while over 72,379 lbs were seized at the U.S. Southwest Border; totaling more than 532 times as much.
• Canada's Fentanyl Czar is leading multi-agency coordination to tackle the production and trafficking of illegal fentanyl.
• Prime Ministerial Directive issued requiring enhanced efforts on intelligence production and sharing, and inter-agency cooperation.
• New Joint Operational Intelligence Cell now bringing together security agencies and law enforcement partners to target transnational organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking and to improve border security.
• Seven cartels listed as terrorist entities; property of those groups can now be frozen. Listing is an important tool that will support criminal investigations and strengthen law enforcement's ability to prevent and disrupt the activities of these criminal networks.
• North American Joint Strike Force launched with U.S. partners to target transnational organized crime, precursor chemicals, and illegal substances, including fentanyl.
• Three new Regional Integrated Drug Enforcement Teams (RIDETs) being created to bring together seconded law and border enforcement resources from multiple agencies and jurisdictions to combat organized drug crime in areas most impacted.
• Precursor Chemical Risk Management Unit now established to provide greater oversight and surveillance of precursor chemicals and distribution channels, and new Canadian Drug Analysis Centre being established to expand laboratory drug testing capabilities and provide more forensic information and services to law enforcement.
• Targeted law and border enforcement operations focusing on fentanyl and other drugs have intensified – see p. 2 for highlights of recent operations and results.

If passed by Parliament, the Strong Borders Act will:

• Strengthen Canada's ability to control precursor chemicals.
• Allow police to search and seize contraband, including fentanyl, from Canada Post mail with a general warrant.
• Facilitate law enforcement's ability to lawfully access basic information and data that is necessary in the early stages of criminal investigations.
• Ensure that electronic service providers have the capabilities in place to support criminal and intelligence investigations by requiring them to fulfil lawfully authorized requests.

Disrupting illicit financing

• Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership is now in operation to increase targeted information sharing between law enforcement and Canada's financial sector.
• Public, searchable registry now in place to crack down on criminal abuse of corporate structures.
• Trade Transparency Unit now established for data-sharing with the U.S. to expose and shut down trade-based money laundering.

If passed by Parliament, the Strong Borders Act will:

• Strengthen anti-money laundering supervision, compliance, and enforcement, including through increased civil and criminal penalties.
• Address prevalent types of money laundering with new restrictions on large cash transactions and third-party cash deposits.
• Require businesses regulated for anti-money laundering purposes to enroll with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).
• Clarify public to private information sharing provisions to help better detect and deter money laundering.

Results achieved

Monthly irregular crossings from Canada to the U.S. down ↓99% since peak in June 2024

Number of individual southbound apprehensions

Based on Government commitments, on a one time basis US Immigration and Customs Enforcement have transferred 4 persons who were authorized to travel to Canada and subsequently were intercepted entering the US illegally. Work continues to transfer up to 22 people.

Image 1: Description

This line graph illustrates the monthly number of individual southbound apprehensions recorded between June 2024 and August 2025. The vertical axis (y-axis) shows the number of apprehensions, ranging from 0 to 4,000. The horizontal axis (x-axis) represents each month in the one-year period, starting with June 2024 with 3437 and falling significantly until August 2025, where 36 arrests were recorded.

CBSA fentanyl seizures at the Canada-U.S. border remain low

Image 2: Description

The bar graph below illustrates the quantity of fentanyl seized by CBSA, by quarter, from the second quarter of the last fiscal year 2024-2025 to the first quarter of the current fiscal year, 2025-2026.

During the second quarter, 9.32 pounds of fentanyl were seized. During the third quarter, 0.34 pounds were seized. During the fourth quarter, 3.94 pounds were seized. And during the first quarter of fiscal year 2025-2026, 1.24 pounds were seized.

U.S. CBP (Customs and Border Patrol) fentanyl seizures at northern border area remain low

Seizures in the northern border area are 0.03% of total U.S. CBP fentanyl seized in the month of August.

Image 3: Description

This line graph shows the number of pounds of fentanyl seized by United States Customs and Border Protection over an 12-month period, from July 2024 to August 2025. The vertical axis (y-axis) represents the quantity of fentanyl seized, measured in pounds, from 0 to 3,000. The horizontal axis (x-axis) displays the months in chronological order, beginning with July 2024 and ending with August 2025.

Two lines are used to distinguish between seizures at different border regions:

1. The orange line represents fentanyl seizures at the southern border area
2. The red line represents fentanyl seizures at the northern border area

At the start of the reporting period in July 2024, seizures at the southern border were significantly higher than those at the northern border. Specifically, 2,732 pounds of fentanyl were seized at the southern border, compared to 16.49 pounds at the northern border.

Over the following months, the quantity of fentanyl seized at the southern border declined steadily. This downward trend continued into the spring of 2025 and into the summer, despite a slight rise. In August 2025, 679 pounds were seized.

In contrast, fentanyl seizures at the northern border remained relatively low and stable throughout the period. While there were minor fluctuations, the overall trend was flat. By August 2025, the amount seized at the northern border was 2.25 pounds.

Targeted Enforcement Results

CIROC-led enforcement sprint

In December 2024 and January 2025, the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime (CIROC), composed of federal, provincial, and municipal law enforcement agencies, undertook a national enforcement sprint, seizing 101.8 lbs of fentanyl and 15,765 pills made from fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, among other items.

Operation Blizzard

In February and March 2025, CBSA conducted Operation Blizzard, a cross-country surge operation to intercept fentanyl and other illegal drugs in postal, air cargo and marine containers. In total, the CBSA executed over 2,600 seizures of suspected illegal substances and precursors across the country, including 3.8 lbs of fentanyl and 131.7 lbs of other substances, such as methamphetamine, cocaine and heroin. 67.5% of all seizures made were of illegal narcotics coming to Canada from the United States, while 17.5% were of illegal substances going to the United States.

Other notable seizures and enforcement results

• In July 2025, CBSA officers seized 434.31 lbs of cocaine at the Blue Water Bridge port of entry in Point Edward, Ontario. The drugs, discovered in seven bags inside a commercial truck arriving from the United States, have an estimated street value of $24.6 million.
• Between January 1 and July 10, 2025, the CBSA seized a total of 2566.1 lbs of cocaine originating from the United States, alongside 1133.1 lbs from other countries combined.
• In August 2025, CBSA and the RCMP arrested Tolga Yilmaz. He was involved in smuggling 44 individuals into Canada via a cube truck near Stanstead Quebec on August 3, bypassing official border entry points. Yilmaz faces charges under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Customs Act.
• In August 2025, the RCMP and CBSA arrested two individuals in Valleyfield Quebec who were attempting to smuggle 11 foreign nationals. They were charged under the IRPA and the Customs Act. Authorities are continuing investigations to determine connections to other recent human smuggling incidents.
• In August 2025, the CBSA, in collaboration with the Sûreté du Québec, executed a search warrant at a residence in St-Anicet, Quebec, as part of an investigation into cross border weapons smuggling. The investigation began in May 2025, after CBSA intercepted prohibited firearm parts in a postal package at the Montreal Mail Centre. Authorities seized 180 long guns, 1 handgun, 7 silencers, 35 high-capacity magazines, 4 prohibited weapons, thousands of rounds of ammunition, CAD $169,000 and USD $30,000 in cash, 11 electronic devices, and multiple firearm receiver assemblies.
• On August 21, 2025, CBSA officers seized 12 firearms and 12 magazines from a U.S. resident entering Canada on a boat at St. Catharine's Ontario. The individual has been charged under the Customs Act and Criminal Code charges have been laid.
• In August 2025, CBSA seized a total of 768 lbs of suspected cocaine at the Blue Water Bridge at Point Edward, Ontario. Two separate commercial trucks arriving from the U.S. were intercepted on consecutive days. The drivers, Gurjeet Singh and Abdikadir Egal, were arrested and charged with drug importation and trafficking. The estimated street value of the drugs is $43.7 million. These seizures are part of broader efforts to strengthen border security, with CBSA reporting over 3,080 lbs of cocaine have been seized from the U.S. so far in 2025. Investigations are ongoing.
• On September 2, 2025, CBSA announced that officers seized 19 firearms and 19 illegal magazines, from a U.S. resident at a land port of entry in Southern Ontario.

Key Statistics on Core Border Issues

Detecting and Disrupting the Fentanyl (and other drugs) Trade

Canada is not a source of fentanyl to the U.S.:

• Canada is not a corridor for fentanyl into the U.S.—the data proves it.
• According to U.S. data, between January 2022 and August 2025, seizures attributed to the "Northern Border region" accounted for 0.1% (136 lbs) of total U.S. fentanyl seizures.
• This is compared to 73,000 lbs attributed to the Southern Border, more than 500 times Northern Border amount.
• Canada is taking decisive, coordinated action—deploying artificial intelligence, new technologies such as detectors, cutting-edge labs and more K-9 units, and frontline enforcement to disrupt synthetic drug trafficking at the source.

Introducing Significant New Tools for Law Enforcement

More people and equipment at the border are showing results:

• Canada is equipping law and border enforcement with the tools, tech, and personnel they need to protect our borders—24/7, coast to coast to coast.
• The numbers speak for themselves: illegal crossings have plummeted (down 99%), removals are at a decade high, and enforcement is ramping up.
• New equipment includes: 3 Black Hawk helicopters, 60 Tactical Mission Drones, 40 operational drones from CAF, counter-drone technologies, and mobile surveillance towers to enhance surveillance of the border.
• In 2024-25, 18,041 removals were enforced, the most in over a decade. Aiming for even more this year (20,000).

Enhancing Operational Coordination

We are coordinated domestically and with the U.S. like never before:

• Canada and the U.S. are working shoulder to shoulder—sharing intelligence, coordinating enforcement, and securing the border together.
• We have created a North American Joint Strike Force, to disrupt organized crime and illegal border activity.
• We have launched a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell (JOIC) to crack down on transnational crime, money laundering, and drug trafficking.
• We are creating a secure forum for intelligence and operational information sharing between federal, provincial and territorial partners.
• Three new Regional Drug Enforcement Teams are being set up to unite law and border agencies in hotspots hit hardest by organized drug crime.

Increasing Information Sharing

We are breaking down silos with better information sharing:

• Canada is sharing intelligence faster and smarter to stop transnational crime in its tracks.
• Prime Ministerial Directive mandates stronger intelligence sharing and tighter inter-agency coordination on transnational criminal organizations.
• We launched a new anti-money laundering intelligence partnership between law enforcement and the financial sector.
• We have set up a Trade Transparency Unit with the U.S. to expose and shut down trade-based money laundering through smarter data sharing.
• Bill C-12 would give the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) wider authority to share information on sex offenders planning to travel abroad.

Hiring of 1,000 Canada Border Services Agency and Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers

QP Notes

Q1 - The Government has committed to hiring 1,000 new Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers. Can you outline your plans for delivering on this commitment, including how recruitment, training, and deployment will be phased in

• As per the Prime Minister's announcement on October 16, the RCMP would receive $1.8B over 4 years to hire 1,000 RCMP personnel, through Budget 2025 – which is subject to Parliamentary appropriations.
• This amount would also include funds to raise the Cadet Recruitment Allowance to $1,000/week and dedicate 150 new RCMP personnel to tackle financial crimes.
• The RCMP has mobilized to be ready to implement this important investment on an accelerated basis.

Q2 - The Government has announced the hiring of 1,000 new Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers. What is your plan to meet this target, and how will these new officers be integrated into frontline operations over the coming months and years

• The government is committed to onboarding 1,000 new CBSA officers.
• This will enhance CBSA's integrated operations team to address threats across all ports of entry. Behind every border services officer at a port of entry, are the officers supporting them with intelligence, targeting, investigations and international operations.
• There will be 1,000 CBSA officers deployed at ports of entry, internationally and at specialized sites where targeting, intelligence and criminal investigations take place.
• Approximately 80% (800) will be recruited as border services officers, trained by the CBSA College and deployed across the country at ports of entry.
• The other approximately 20% (200) will include national targeting centre officers, inland enforcement officers (including detention and removals officers), criminal investigators, and intelligence officers who will be recruited from several different areas with different training.
• They will be hired from within the border services officer ranks, other security and law enforcement agencies or experienced headquarters staff who return to these operational roles.
• Border enforcement extends beyond the physical border. For example,
  • Enhanced targeting and intelligence supports our officers in seizing illegal guns, drugs, and stolen cars at ports of entry.
  • Inland enforcement officers deal with immigration investigations, detentions and removals from within Canada.
  • International officers prevent people who are inadmissible from coming to Canada in the first place. All of which are part of border operations.
• These resources will not go towards internal services in Ottawa. Rather, they will bring needed reinforcements on the ground, across the country and internationally.

Removal of Foreign Nationals Convicted of Serious Crimes

QP Notes

Q1 – Recent reports reveal that nearly 600 foreign nationals ordered deported from Canada—including hundreds convicted of serious crimes—are missing and unaccounted for. Many have been evading removal for years. In 2023, your government shut down the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) 'Wanted' webpage, eliminating a key public tool for locating high-risk individuals. How do you explain this enforcement failure, and what steps are you taking to ensure deportation orders are executed transparently, consistently, and in a way that protects public safety

• Since 2021, the CBSA doubled the number of removals from 7,530 yearly to 18,048 last fiscal.
• When an inadmissible foreign national does not comply with removal requirements, the CBSA issues an arrest warrant and works relentlessly with police to track people down.
• More than 550 CBSA personnel are dedicated to immigration investigations and removals. They are focused on cases that pose a risk to security and public safety. CBSA also has a tip line for the public to share information about the whereabouts of those who are trying to evade the law.
• Last year, CBSA closed 542 immigration warrants involving criminals and 254 so far this year. They also removed 905 individuals inadmissible for criminality, organized criminality and security.
• Of the 599 cases flagged, CBSA knows the whereabouts of 100 people. These 100 are comprised of cases of people that are presently serving a criminal sentence, have already been removed or have had their warrants closed as they have either been apprehended and started reporting to the CBSA.
• CBSA officers are going to continue doing their job to remove people who have served sentences for crimes from this country.

Firearms Smuggling

QP Notes

Q1 – Given that a significant proportion of crime guns in Canada are traced back to the United States, what specific measures is your department taking to stem the flow of these prohibited firearms across the border, and how effective have these measures been to date

• With the Border Plan, we are bolstering our frontline and ensuring that officers have the tools and technology they need to continue to interdict illicit drugs and illegal firearms.
• Over the last five years, over 3,000 firearms from the U.S. have been seized at our border. In 2024 alone, the Canada Border Services Agency seized more than 930 firearms – 90% of which came from the U.S.
• The CBSA works with domestic and U.S. law enforcement partners in a joint effort to investigate, prevent criminal activity, seize guns and protect our communities.

Access to Data and Information: Bills C-2 and C-8

QP notes

Q1 - Both Bill C-2 and Bill C-8 expand government access to private data without requiring a warrant. How does the government justify this erosion of privacy protections

• Canada's privacy protections remain robust, and both Bill C-2 and Bill C-8 operate within that framework.
• Bill C-2 allows law enforcement and Canadian Security Intelligence Service to request basic service information, such as whether a subscriber exists, from electronic service providers without a warrant. No personal data is accessed without judicial authorization.
• In emergencies, limited data like transmission or location may be retrieved without a warrant, but only under strict legal conditions. These provisions build on existing Criminal Code powers and align Canada with G7 and Five Eyes partners, establishing one of the most privacy-protective standards internationally.
• Bill C-8 does not authorize warrantless access to Canadians' personal data. It explicitly prohibits interception of private communications and focuses solely on securing Canada's telecommunications infrastructure.
• Any data collected under Bill C-8, such as technical information about cyber incidents, is defined through stakeholder consultation and protected under the Privacy Act. Oversight by National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)and National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) ensures accountability.
• Ultimately, both bills aim to modernize Canada's security tools while safeguarding privacy and protecting Canadians from cyber threats and criminal activity.

Q2 - Why is the government centralizing power in ministers through legislation like C-2 and C-8, without robust checks and balances

• Both bills include strong oversight mechanisms.
• Under C-2, Ministerial Orders require consultation with the Minister of Industry and affected service providers, who may seek judicial review. Independent review bodies like NSIRA and NSICOP also have authority to examine activities.
• Bill C-8 includes safeguards such as reasonableness standards, consultation requirements, and transparency through public reporting. Powers under the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act rest with Cabinet, not individual ministers, and are scoped to protect infrastructure, not to enable surveillance.

Q3 - Industry and civil society have raised concerns about both bills. How has the government engaged with stakeholders to address these issues? Was the Privacy Commissioner consulted

• Extensive consultations have taken place on both bills. Public Safety has held briefings and bilateral meetings with civil society, industry, academia, provinces, and law enforcement regarding Bill C-2.
• For Bill C-8, consultations began when it was first introduced as Bill C-26 and included the Privacy Commissioner. Feedback from stakeholders led to key amendments, such as clearer privacy protections, reporting requirements, and due diligence provisions, all of which remain in the current version of the bill.

Q4 - Part 1 of Bill C-8 confers extraordinary powers, such as 'terminating services to anyone'. How can the government ensure they aren't cutting off essential services for Canadians

• The powers in Bill C-8 are designed to protect Canada's telecommunications system from severe threats, such as large-scale cyberattacks.
• Any order must be reasonable, proportionate to the threat, and based on specified criteria. Impacted parties are consulted in advance and can make representations.
• The Minister of Industry must also be consulted. Orders are public by default, with confidential orders subject to oversight by NSIRA and NSICOP. These safeguards ensure powers are used responsibly and only in exceptional circumstances.

Q5 - In light of the recent NSIRA report indicating that Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) failed to disclose the use of a novel and intrusive surveillance technology to both the Federal Court and Public Safety officials, how do you intend to ensure that intelligence agencies operate with greater transparency and accountability, especially as Bill C-2 proposes expanding warrantless powers

• The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is subject to rigorous national security review: the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians have broad access to CSIS information, are free from any government intervention in the review process, and are deeply engaged with the Government's national security community. The existence of this review, including its findings and recommendations is evidence of the system's efficacy.
• My department will be working with CSIS to review and update accountability processes to take into account NSIRA reviews and the evolving national security environment.
• Bill C-2 is aimed at ensuring that Canada's law enforcement and intelligence investigators have the necessary tools to detect, deter and respond to today's technology-enabled threats to Canada and Canadians while protecting Charter rights and freedoms. CSIS's future use of Bill C-2, like all their activities, are also subject to review by NSIRA and NSICOP.

Canada's Border Plan

QP notes

Q1 – As we approach one year since the announcement of Canada's Border Plan, what results are you seeing from these investments

• The Government is advancing efforts under the Border Plan to address the flow of illegal fentanyl, tackle organized crime and illegal migration, and increase information sharing and operational coordination with partners.
• Meaningful results have been achieved. For example, since June 2024, there has been a dramatic reduction of 99% in illegal southbound movement from Canada to the United States (U.S.). This is thanks to more and better enforcement and intelligence-sharing at the border between Canada and the U.S, and also due to integrity measures taken upstream by our colleagues at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
• Canada has invested in enhanced security at Ports of Entry (POE) and between them with increased surveillance via new drones, towers, and helicopters, and deployed additional resources that together now allow for 24/7 surveillance.
• Operational coordination has improved with the appointment of a Fentanyl Czar to lead coordination on disrupting the fentanyl trade, and the creation of the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell bringing together key agencies to turn actionable intelligence into law enforcement operations.
• The designation of seven transnational criminal organizations as terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code has also given law enforcement new tools against them, such as the freezing of their Canadian assets.
• Fentanyl seizures from Canada to the U.S. continue to be minimal, and constitute well below 1% of all fentanyl seized by the U.S at its borders. Between January 2022 and August 2025, only 136 pounds of fentanyl were seized within the area of the U.S. Northern Border, while over 73,000 pounds were seized at the U.S. Southwest Border, more than 500 times as much.
• Information-sharing gaps between the various key players (including the U.S.) are being addressed via the creation of a Canada-U.S. Strike Force for joint intelligence mapping and assessments, and the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information-sharing between law enforcement and the financial sector.
• These examples of results demonstrate that the Border Plan is delivering tangible progress in securing Canada's borders and disrupting illegal activity, and more results will come as these investments continue to roll out over the next few years.

Q2 – How has the Border Plan improved border surveillance

• Canada's Border Plan includes several measures that have enhanced surveillance of the Canada–U.S. border.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has deployed an Aerial Intelligence Task Force, equipped with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers. They are further reinforced by RCMP Border Integrity Operations Centres (BIOCs), responsible for monitoring surveillance equipment between the ports of entry.
• As part of the Aerial Intelligence Task Force, the RCMP are flying three Black Hawk helicopters daily to enhance continuous monitoring and rapid response capabilities regarding border incidents.
• Additionally, artificial intelligence and imaging tools are deployed to detect illegal drugs, particularly fentanyl, before they enter Canada. The Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) is also training and deploying new canine teams and chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry.

Q3 – Could you explain why the RCMP selected Black Hawk helicopters for border operations, what specific capabilities they offer compared to other platforms, and how they support the RCMP's operational objectives

• The RCMP selected Black Hawk helicopters based on their ability to meet specific operational needs for border enforcement. These aircraft offer long-range coverage, high payload capacity, and rapid deployment capabilities, including fast-roping and rappelling for tactical operations.
• At the time of charter, they were the only platform available through Public Services and Procurement Canada's standing offer that met all requirements for patrolling remote areas between ports of entry.

Q4 – Can you clarify why the RCMP chose to lease rather than purchase these helicopters, and why the fleet is limited to only three aircraft despite the scale of border surveillance needs

• Leasing through an existing Public Service and Procurement Canada standing offer allowed the RCMP to quickly address urgent border security needs while maintaining flexibility and cost-efficiency.
• The fleet size reflects staffing capacity and operational priorities, with the three Black Hawks deployed to high-risk areas identified through intelligence. The RCMP also uses other aircraft, including covert surveillance and its own rotary and fixed-wing platforms.
• Planning is underway for a competitive long-term lease, with the goal of purchasing helicopters once capital funding becomes available.

Q5 – How have Border Plan investments improved operational coordination and cooperation between domestic agencies and with the United States

• Canada–U.S. border collaboration remains robust and highly institutionalized, underpinned by decades of trust and shared strategic interests. Operational programs such as preclearance, Shiprider, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Border Security Task Forces (BEST – U.S.-led) exemplify the depth of coordination between agencies.
• A key example of how the Border Plan aims to improve operational coordination with U.S. partners is the establishment a North American Joint Strike Force, which aims to target transnational organized crime involvement in the illegal drug trade and combat the trafficking of illegal substances and precursor chemicals. The Joint Strike Force provides for joint mapping and targeted efforts between the two countries to tackle these threats.
• On the domestic front, the designation of seven cartels as terrorist entities has enabled key players from Canada's financial services sector and law enforcement to further improve intelligence collection and coordination, strengthening efforts against transnational organized crime.
• We are also setting up regional information-sharing hubs that will bring together key Federal, Provincial, local, and Indigenous law enforcement to support operational coordination, with a focus on high-risk drug trafficking areas.

Q6 – Why not expand CBSA's mandate to patrol the border between ports of entry, rather than have two agencies responsible for border surveillance

• Currently the CBSA has the mandate to enforce border legislation and various other acts at Ports of Entry (POEs). Enforcement between POEs is performed by the RCMP as part of its federal policing mandate. This mirrors the division of labour between our counterparts in the U.S. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Border Patrol).
• When apprehensions are made by the RCMP between POEs, apprehended individuals are brought to a CBSA Port of Entry for processing. The CBSA closely coordinates with RCMP for border enforcement.
• The CBSA plays a critical role in protecting our borders and ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. It enforces over 100 acts, regulations, and international agreements on behalf of other federal departments, agencies, provinces, and territories.
• Public Safety is constantly reviewing the mandate, authorities, and resources needed to ensure a safe, secure and efficient border and has taken note of various stakeholders' recommendations on the expansion of CBSA's mandate and is analyzing these recommendations.

Bill C-12, Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act

QP Notes

Q1 – What is the difference between Bill C-2 and Bill C-12

• Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, and Bill C-12, the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act, both advance the Government of Canada's commitment to keeping our borders secure and communities safe. They both build on the the priorities set out in Canada's $1.3 billion Border Plan and share the same overarching objectives to combat transnational organized crime, disrupt fentanyl trafficking and illicit financing, and enhance coordination across border and law enforcement agencies.
• Bill C-2 focuses on modernizing enforcement tools to target organized crime and money laundering, including provisions to improve law enforcement access to basic subscriber information, restrict large cash transactions and third-party deposits, and stop illicit drugs such as fentanyl from travelling through the mail.
• Bill C-12 includes initiatives to secure the border—such as improving the immigration system, increasing information-sharing on sex offender travel, and expanding the Canadian Coast Guard's mandate to include security—and reinforces measures to combat transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, and money laundering.
• The introduction of Bill C-12 allows for the timely consideration of key measures by Parliament, while providing space for continued consultation on the broader reforms proposed in Bill C-2.

Q2 – Did you introduce a new Border Bill because you got it wrong the first time

• The introduction of Bill C-12 reinforces our Government's commitment to equipping law enforcement agencies with the right tools to keep our borders secure. It draws on the elements of Bill C-2 to combat transnational organized crime, stop the flow of illegal fentanyl, crack down on money laundering, dismantle criminal networks, and improve the integrity of our immigration system.
• Bill C-12 allows for the timely consideration of key border measures by Parliament, while providing space for continued consultation on the broader reforms proposed in Bill C-2, such as lawful access to data and measures to stop the trafficking of fentanyl by mail.
• We have listened to Canadians and to Parliamentarians, and I am confident that both want meaningful conversations on these issues.

Q3 – What legislative gaps are you closing with the measures included in Bill C-12

• Canada's Border Plan always contemplated the need for legislative changes to close some key gaps and provide new legislative tools to secure our borders and enhance the integrity of our immigration system.
• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act advances key legislative commitments made in the Border Plan and is designed to close several operational and legislative gaps that have limited Canada's ability to respond effectively to evolving threats.
• These include gaps in border enforcement, such as limited authority for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to inspect exports and access private facilities, limited ability for the Canadian Coast Guard to support border and law enforcement with maritime surveillance, and weaknesses in the asylum system that allow delayed or irregular claims to proceed.
• This new bill is intended to advance pressing elements of Bill C-2, while leaving time for further study of the more complex pieces contained in the original bill.

Detecting and Disrupting the Illegal Fentanyl Trade

QP Notes

Q1 – What concrete steps is the Government taking to detect and disrupt the illegal fentanyl trade at our border—and how are you working with U.S. counterparts to ensure these efforts are effective

• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act will give law enforcement the right tools to fight the illegal drug trade and organized crime, tackle money laundering, and keep our borders secure.
• It builds on Border Plan investments in detection and imaging tools, intelligence sharing capacity, and a Joint Strike Force with the U.S.
• We will invest in 1,000 new RCMP officers, 1,000 new border officers, and prosecution to fight drug trafficking and other crimes, and put drug traffickers behind bars.
• We will continue to support enforcement as part of a federal drug policy that protects the health and safety of all Canadians.

Q2 – Organized crime and fentanyl trafficking rely heavily on money laundering to fund their operations. What steps is your government taking to detect, disrupt, and prosecute money laundering schemes linked to fentanyl? Moreover, how are you ensuring these financial tools are aligned and coordinated with our U.S. counterparts

• This government is taking decisive action to identify and disrupt money laundering networks, particularly those linked to organized crime and the illicit drug trade.
• The Government has:
  • Led the development of the G7 Financial Crime Call to Action to tackle financial crime.
  • Created new Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec;
  • Launched the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to help law enforcement and Canada's big banks share more information; and
  • Invested in modernizing the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)'s intelligence and compliance tools to mitigate money laundering threats.
• It will also:
• Provide $29.9 million to the Canada Border Services Agency to combat trade-based financial crime; and
• Increase penalties for non-compliance.
• These measures confront the threat of money laundering, promote financial integrity and protect Canadians.

Q3 – Minister, Canada is subject to international scrutiny under the Financial Action Task Force, which has raised concerns about gaps in our anti-money laundering regime. Can you explain how the government is addressing these vulnerabilities? Is the Government of Canada implementing the FATF's recently issued specific guidance on detecting and combating money laundering tied to fentanyl and synthetic opioids

• Since 2018, the Government has invested nearly $470 million to strengthen data resources, financial intelligence and information sharing to support anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing (AML/ATF) investigations in Canada.
• In 2021, FATF recognized Canada's AML/ATF regime's improved compliance with FATF standards.
• In 2022, Canada co-led a FATF report on money laundering linked to illegal synthetic opioids to raise international awareness about the illegal opioid trade and related global financial flows. The report outlines risk indicators to help operational authorities identify potential trafficking of illicit opioids.
• The Government continues to work closely with the FATF as part of its ongoing mutual evaluation (2024-2026) to further strengthen Canada's AML/ATF regime.

Q4 – Organized drug crime groups operate across borders and adapt quickly to enforcement efforts. Given this transnational threat, how is Canada working with international partners—through bilateral agreements and multilateral forums—to strengthen our collective ability to detect and disrupt the financial networks that enable the global fentanyl trade

• Law and border enforcement officials work directly with international counterparts every day to keep our border secure and Canadians safe from drug threats.
• Our work through the Canada-U.S. Opioids Action Plan and the North American Drug Dialogue helps us to share information, learn about best practices, and coordinate drug policies.
• We work through the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs to make sure fentanyl precursors are controlled in all countries.
• This engagement is helping the Government to tackle this global threat, and we will continue to support it.

Q5 – What is the Government doing to ensure that Canadian police services have the operational capacity, intelligence tools, and investigative resources they need to effectively target and dismantle organized crime networks involved in fentanyl trafficking

• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) Federal Policing program detects, investigates, and disrupts significant criminal threats to public safety, including the illegal fentanyl market.
• Intelligence and investigative efforts target all aspects of the drug trade. This includes transnational organized crime groups involved in production and trafficking of illegal substances, including fentanyl.
• The RCMP operates Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and Response teams in specific regions that target organized crime groups involved in the production of illegal substances, including fentanyl. They provide specialized support to local law enforcement in detecting and dismantling clandestine drug production sites.
• We will hire 1,000 new RCMP personnel to further support these efforts and we will continue to work with law enforcement to fight illegal fentanyl and the organized crime groups behind it.

Q6 – What measures are being taken to strengthen Canada's border enforcement capabilities to detect and intercept fentanyl and related precursors, and how is the Government ensuring that frontline agencies like CBSA are equipped to respond to the evolving tactics of organized drug traffickers

• The CBSA works closely with the RCMP and police of jurisdiction to support criminal investigations and prosecutions.
• Through Canada's Border Plan, CBSA is bolstering the frontline and ensuring officers have the tools and technology required to continue to interdict illegal drugs and firearms.
• In February and March, CBSA's Operation Blizzard made over 2,600 seizures of suspected narcotics and precursors, most of which were coming to Canada from the U.S.
• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act will further strengthen our border security through changes to strengthen CBSA's ability to detect and seize drugs, weapons, and stolen cars, before they leave Canada.
• We are in the process of hiring 1,000 new CBSA personnel and will continue to explore every tool available to keep our border strong and illegal drugs and precursors from crossing it.

Border Management

QP Notes

Q1 – As of February 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) removed the non-binary 'X' gender option from the NEXUS application system, requiring applicants to select only 'male' or 'female'. What steps is the Government of Canada taking to support affected travellers and to engage with U.S. authorities on ensuring inclusive and respectful treatment of all Canadians at the border

• Despite the recent changes by the U.S. administration to the NEXUS application form, Canada continues to recognize and support gender diversity and inclusion.
• NEXUS is a voluntary program. Membership is not required for travel to the US. Canadian citizens can continue to travel on Canadian passports indicating "gender X."
• This change doesn't impact NEXUS cards with a "gender X" issued prior to the U.S. change – they remain valid.

Q2 – While CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM) is intended to modernize customs and revenue management, many Canadian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) have faced onboarding challenges. What is the Government doing to ensure these businesses can continue cross-border operations smoothly, especially in the context of ongoing Canada–U.S. trade tensions

• Recognizing this is a significant change for industry, the Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) implemented a range of transition measures to give businesses time to adapt and ensure goods continue to move efficiently.
• Since CARM's launch, CBSA officials have actively engaged with industry, adjusting transition measures as needed, including expedited release for perishable and certain essential goods.
• To support businesses, the CBSA has extended certain transition measures until December 31, 2025, enhanced its CARM helpdesk capacity to handle onboarding enquiries, including a dedicated customs brokers line, and delivered 54 webinars since May 20 to help businesses onboard and use the system.

Q3 – How is the CBSA ensuring that small and seasonal importers are not disadvantaged by the new requirements under CARM

• I understand that the transition to CARM and the requirement to post financial security may be more challenging for small and seasonal importers.
• CBSA officials are working with these businesses to overcome these challenges and increasing their outreach to spread awareness of the new requirements, such as reaching out through U.S. trade networks to US-based companies who import into Canada and may be less aware. Small business enrollments are increasing daily as a result.
• Following the extended 210-day transition period, the CBSA continues to provide temporary measures allowing the continued use of brokers' financial security until at least December 31, 2025, contingency options for time-sensitive and certain essential goods, increased outreach to small importers, and dedicated help-desk services to assist with CARM registration and onboarding.
• Small businesses continue to have the option to pay duties and taxes upon entry into Canada.

Q4 – How does CARM impact Canada's responsiveness to U.S. trade actions and global developments

• CARM enables the CBSA to implement surtax and remission orders quickly and accurately through automated tariff coding and centralized account management.
• This allows Canada to respond to U.S. trade measures and other global shifts without the delays previously caused by manual systems.

Q5 – The Canada Border Services Agency recently announced coordinated changes with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to reduce service hours at 35 land ports of entry. What steps is the Government taking to ensure these changes do not negatively affect border communities, local economies, and the movement of goods and people in affected regions

• Canada and the United States have one of the closest and most extensive relationships in the world, including our shared border.
• Better alignment of service hours at ports of entry will enhance security at the border and allow the redeployment of border services officers where they are most needed.
• The Canada Border Services Agency will continue to work closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection counterparts and other enforcement partners, to keep the border open to legitimate trade and travel while protecting our communities from illegal activities.

If Pressed :

• Almost all of these ports of entry are processing an average of two or less cars or commercial trucks per hour during the hours that will no longer be in operation, and;
• Travellers have an alternative border crossing option within a 100 km radius.

Q6 – Can you explain the recent CBSA IT systems outages that resulted in delays for travellers and commercial processing

• First, I want to be clear that these outages were not the result of a cyberattack. They started following unforeseen technical problems during routine systems maintenance on September 28.
• During the outages, CBSA personnel and partners from airport authorities and bridge and tunnel operators acted quickly to manually process travellers, traffic and shipments, while ensuring safety and security.
• While the initial outages were resolved within 48 hours, the impacts on kiosks at airports and on commercial processing at some ports of entry continued as the CBSA worked to address the backlogs that were created.
• CBSA officials are working closely with Shared Services Canada, who provides secure IT infrastructure services, to reduce the risk of future outages and strengthen its contingency plans based on the experience gained from these recent outages.

Q7 – What percentage of containerized cargo entering Canada is currently screened to detect contraband or security threats, and what technologies are used to support that screening

The CBSA screens 100% of containerized marine cargo entering Canada using a combination of risk assessment and tools and technologies. This includes targeting, Large-Scale Imaging, portal radiation detection, and destuff examination.

Q8 – You recently received a letter from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative urging you to restore and expand customs clearance capacity. The letter highlights the withdrawal of CBSA services from the Port of Valleyfield and the lack of clearance options at other strategic ports including Hamilton, Windsor, Québec City, Picton, Port Colborne, and Goderich. What concrete steps are you taking to restore and expand customs clearance capacity at Valleyfield and these other corridor ports to ensure Canada's competitiveness and supply chain resilience

• I want to highlight CBSA's role not only in national security and public safety but in the economic security of Canada. CBSA's work at ports is not only to stop contraband from coming in but to make sure legitimate goods flow quickly across the border.
• Our government is focused on trade diversification, which is evident by the work that the Prime Minister is leading with countries around the world. Making sure that our supply chains are fluid and that we have the right port infrastructure is a joint effort that involves my Transport, ISED, Trade and other colleagues.
• I can assure you that we are working together to make sure that we have the right infrastructure in the right places, to support fluidity while also protecting the safety of Canadians.

If pressed on sending CBSA officers/designate the port of Valleyfield:

We will do what is right for the Canadian economy and this will be done in consultation with my Cabinet colleagues.

Q9 – How are you respecting indigenous rights and interests in the management of the Canada-U.S. border

• Indigenous communities on both sides of the Canada-U.S. Border are key partners in ensuring a safe, secure and efficient experience crossing the border. Many communities, such as the Akwesasne Mohawk Community directly straddle the border and interact daily with Canadian and U.S. border enforcement.
• Indigenous communities have been directly involved in the development and implementation of Canada's Border Plan, for example, by participating in Table Top Exercises organized with all provinces and territories in January 2025.
• Public Safety also provides funding to Indigenous law enforcement, including for border enforcement activities, through the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP).
• We are also a convenor of the Jay Treaty Border Alliance (JTBA) Collaborative Initiative High Table, which works to facilitate Indigenous Border mobility and brings together governments, First Nations, and U.S. Federally Recognized Tribes.
• Public Safety Canada is also working with IRCC to examine border mobility rights for Canadian and U.S. Indigenous communities, in furtherance of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act Action Plan Measure 52 (UNDA APM 52).

Border Enforcement

QP Notes

Q1 – Given the alarming rise in human smuggling cases along the Canada–U.S. border, can you elaborate on the Government's current strategy to disrupt organized migrant smuggling networks

• The Government of Canada works closely with domestic and international, and Indigenous partners to gather and share information to detect and investigate organized crime groups and networks involved in migrant smuggling.
• Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy is a whole-of-Government approach that combines domestic and international capabilities to protect the integrity of Canada's borders.
• Through this Strategy, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detects and prevents migrant smuggling, and has saved hundreds of lives.
• In addition, Canada's Border Plan combines existing efforts and capabilities with new initiatives and investments to enhance investigative and surveillance capacity and border enforcement.

Q2 – What specific measures are the RCMP taking to identify and dismantle organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling operations in Canada

• The RCMP is dedicated to addressing migrant smuggling at the Canadian border and abroad, including through Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy.
• The RCMP uses technology, intelligence and other tools to prevent, detect, investigate and disrupt organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling.

Q3 – How does the RCMP collaborate with international law enforcement partners to prevent migrant smuggling before individuals reach Canadian borders

• The RCMP works closely with the U.S. and other international law enforcement partners to investigate transnational human smuggling networks that facilitate the movement of people.
• This includes close collaboration with U.S. law enforcement through the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee and the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, also known as Shiprider.
• Under Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, the RCMP works with law enforcement partners domestic and abroad to increase their capacity to disrupt and dismantle migrant smuggling criminal organizations.

Q4 – What is the RCMP's mandate for southbound migration

• The RCMP is responsible for ensuring border security between official Ports of Entry.
• The RCMP continues to respond to the border through a combination of patrol resources, technology and partnerships with agencies in Canada and the U.S.

Q5 – With the significant increase in refugee entries at the Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle border crossing from the United States, what concrete steps is the Government taking to manage this trend and ensure the integrity and capacity of Canada's border and asylum systems

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has plans in place to maintain a secure border in the event of an increased number of refugee claimants from the United States.
• In processing individuals claiming asylum, CBSA officers determine whether the person is admissible into Canada. They also assess whether they meet an exception to the Safe Third Country Agreement – and if they do not, they are returned to the U.S.
• As of mid-May, the CBSA had processed approximately 13,500 asylum applications in Canada, which is 50% less than last year.

If pressed on Safe Third Country Agreement and Removals

• From January to May, 2025, approximately 1440 asylum claimants were removed to the U.S. for their ineligibility under the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).
• The CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible people in fiscal year 2024-25—the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before. The Border Plan provided $55.5M to support immigration and asylum processing and to increase CBSA's capacity to reach 20,000 removals for the next two years.

Q6 – How is the government ensuring that immigration detentions are truly a 'last resort', limited in duration, subject to meaningful oversight, and accompanied by adequate mental-health and legal supports

• The CBSA's priority continues to be to remove inadmissible individuals from Canada as soon as possible, with a focus on individuals who are inadmissible for serious criminality and national security. In order for an individual to be lawfully detained, there must be a direct link between the detention and an enforcement action, such as removal from Canada.
• Over 98% of individuals requiring CBSA supervision are enrolled in an alternative to detention and less than 2% are detained.
• The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada reviews detention decisions made by the CBSA and determines if detention should be maintained.
• The CBSA is upgrading its existing immigration holding centres to safely house high-risk detainees and has begun operating a designated immigrant station in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec, which can house up to 25 adult males who present a significant risk to public safety.

If pressed on conditions, human rights and oversight

• The constitutionality of our immigration detention system has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. Decisions to detain are subject to review by both the Immigration and Refugee Board and the Federal Court of Canada.
• The CBSA ensures safe, secure and compassionate detention conditions with improved access to mental health services as provided by its National Immigration Detention Standards.
• For transparency, the CBSA provides open access to its holding facilities to non-government organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to provide support to detainees, and the Canadian Red Cross independently monitors conditions of detention and the treatment of detainees on behalf of the CBSA by conducting site visits and generating a yearly report, which is available on the CBSA external website.

If pressed on use of Provincial Correctional Facilities

• As of September 15, 2025, the CBSA no longer has agreements with any provincial governments to hold immigration detainees in a provincial correctional facility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)
• The Government has taken the necessary steps to ensure that the CBSA can securely manage individuals who would have previously been detained in provincial correctional facilities.
• This includes investments in federal infrastructure, such as the immigration holding centres, and the establishment of the designated immigration station for high-risk detainees in Sainte-Anne-Des-Plaines, Quebec.

Q7 – The Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for Combatting Crime publicly announced that the Irish hip-hop group Kneecap was banned from entering Canada. But there was no official notice, no confirmation from CBSA or IRCC, and the group claims to have received valid travel authorizations. Did the Parliamentary Secretary mislead Canadians, and if not, who made the decision, on what grounds, and why was it communicated in such a vague and unofficial manner

• Any foreign national wishing to travel to Canada must seek a Canadian travel document, such as a visa or Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA). The granting of such document is the responsibility of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).
• IRCC officers, in consultation with Canada Border Services officers, review applications for eligibility and admissibility. Serious inadmissibility includes grounds related to national security, serious and organized crime and human rights violations. Inadmissible foreign nationals will not be granted a travel document and can have an existing travel document revoked.
• The travel document status of a person cannot be disclosed here for privacy reasons. I would refer you to IRCC for more information.

Q8 – A recent report revealed that Gulfam Hussain, a foreign national convicted of a criminal offence and ordered deported in 2017, remains in Canada eight years later. How is it possible that someone deemed inadmissible on criminal grounds has not been removed, and what steps are you taking to ensure that deportation orders are enforced in a timely and effective manner to protect public safety? Given his criminal history, how was Mr. Hussain able to enter in Canada in the first place? Does this not point to a broader failure in Canada's screening and admissibility processes, and do you have any plans to strengthen these mechanisms to prevent similar cases in the future

• Although I cannot comment on individual cases, I can tell you that the CBSA and IRCC have measures in place to prevent bad actors from entering our country and they are constantly working to improve these measures.
• When the CBSA becomes aware of individuals who don't comply with our country's immigration laws, they investigate and take action.
• Last year, the CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible individuals—the highest number in a decade—including 905 individuals with serious inadmissibility.
• The Border Plan provides funding for the CBSA to increase removals to 20,000 a year.

Q9 – We've learned that at least $170,000 was spent on the repatriation of Canadians who had travelled abroad to join ISIS, including business class flights, luxury hotel accommodations and room service. While these costs were reportedly incurred by Global Affairs Canada, can you confirm whether Public Safety Canada or any of its portfolio agencies also incurred expenses related to these repatriations? And as Minister of Public Safety, do you believe these costs are justified, and should there be a mechanism for reimbursement from the individuals concerned

• Around the world, like-minded countries have taken steps to repatriate their respective citizens from northeastern Syria. The safety and security of Canadians, both at home and abroad, is the government's utmost priority.
• As such, Canada took extraordinary steps to repatriate 6 Canadian women and 13 children identified in the Bring Our Loved Ones Home litigation.
• The full cost of repatriation operations from northeast Syria cannot be disclosed as we have a responsibility to protect the confidentiality of operations carried out with the support of international partners, including the United States.
• This Government remains steadfast in its commitment in the fight against Daesh and global terrorism while vigorously defending human rights both domestically and abroad. I want to reiterate that it is a serious criminal offence for anyone to leave Canada to knowingly support a terrorist group and those who engage in these activities will face the full force of Canadian law and I remain committed to taking every possible step to ensure the safety and security of Canadians.
• Due to security considerations and provisions of the Privacy Act, I cannot provide any further details or comments on Canada's consular operations in Syria.

Q10 – Given that some of the repatriated individuals now face terrorism-related charges or are subject to peace bonds, what assurances can you provide that your department conducted thorough national security risk assessments prior to their return? What specific measures have been implemented to monitor their activities, assess ongoing risks, and ensure sustained coordination with the RCMP and intelligence agencies to protect Canadian communities

• Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is the Government's lead on this issue given that the majority of the cases are consular in nature. GAC provides guidance for the provision of urgent or extraordinary assistance to detained Canadian extremist travelers and any related children.
• Public Safety Canada, CSIS, RCMP, and CBSA, continue to be part of interdepartmental discussions and, as per their mandates, provide advice and conduct investigations on possible threats to Canadian national security.
• Individual Canadian extremist travelers are assessed, and subsequent investigations are conducted on a case-by-case basis. However, I cannot discuss the precise nature of our investigations.

If pressed on RCMP activities related to Canadian Extremist Travelers:

• The safety and security of our citizens is of the utmost importance to the RCMP; they take any threat to the safety and security of Canadians seriously. As such, the management of the risk posed by extremist travelers returning to Canada is a priority for the RCMP.
• However, I can say that the RCMP conducts criminal investigations to the fullest extent that they are able, with a view to ensuring public safety and with a view to supporting criminal charges and prosecutions of Canadian extremist travelers and returnees.
• The RCMP continues to work with domestic and international partners to investigate and disrupt individuals who either seek to travel abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities, or who have returned to Canada after engaging in such activities abroad.

Q11 – A witness made serious allegations of corruption at the RCMP and the CBSA. What will you do about these serious allegations? Have you discussed this with the Commissioner of the RCMP and the President of the CBSA

I take any allegation of corruption and misconduct within my portfolio very seriously. Canadians can be assured that the CBSA also takes allegations seriously and addresses them accordingly, including working with partners on concerns involving potential corruption.

The Government of Canada's Border Plan - significant investments to strengthen border security and our immigration system

Backgrounder

Canada is investing $1.3 billion to bolster security at the border and strengthen the immigration system, all while keeping Canadians safe. This includes $667.5M for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), $355.4M for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), $180M over 6 years for the Communications Security Establishment, $77.7M for Health Canada, and $20M over five years for Public Safety Canada.

Detecting and disrupting the fentanyl trade

• Adding new and expanded detection capacity to better detect illegal drugs and other threats such as guns and gun parts at border entries, which will also contribute to cutting cargo container processing time.
• Creating a new Canadian Drug Profiling Centre to support 2,000 investigations a year and expand capacity at regional labs. CBSA will deploy new chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry.
• Deploying new canine teams to intercept illegal drugs.
• Accelerating the regulatory process for banning precursor chemicals so that border and law enforcement can take swift action to prevent their illegal importation and use.
• Launching a new Chemical Precursor Risk Management Unit to increase oversight over precursor chemicals and monitor emerging illegal drug trends, enhance monitoring and surveillance, and enable timely law enforcement action.
• Expanding powers to strengthen law enforcement to act against illegal drugs and precursors under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Introducing Significant New Tools for Law Enforcement

• Investing in new crewed and non-crewed (drones) air-based intelligence and surveillance platforms to support live operational response and monitoring of border events and patterns. This will be complimented by mobile surveillance towers, supporting artificial intelligence (AI) tools and counter-drone technology intended to provide more comprehensive surveillance between ports of entry (POE).
• Develop a better picture of illegal drug supply chains by expanding capacity for intelligence collection by the RCMP and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), to target transnational organized crime and fentanyl trafficking more effectively.
• Bring in a legislative requirement to expressly obligate port owners and operators to provide CBSA, free of charge, with the space and facilities it needs to conduct export inspections, just as they do for imports.
• Punish serious criminal non-compliance of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act by: increasing limits for all criminal fines by 10 times and all undefined prison terms to up to 1 year; and introducing a new offence for the provision of false information to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).
• Strengthen the anti-money laundering/anti-terrorist financing framework, advance the global fight on financial crime, and support a positive upcoming Mutual Evaluation of Canada by the Financial Action Task Force by: requiring reporting entities, not already registered, to enroll with FINTRAC; enabling FINTRAC disclosures to the Office of the Commission of Canada Elections to detect and deter illicit financing and foreign interference in Canadian elections; and making technical amendments.

Improving Operational Coordination

• Creating regional hubs to coordinate national, regional, and local law enforcement activities against organized crime and illegal drugs.
• Propose to the United States the creation of a new North American Joint Strike Force to target transnational organized crime, including operational surges, dedicated synthetic drug units, expanded Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units, Binational Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and new technical operations capacity and infrastructure.

Expanding Information Sharing

• Enhancing and expanding information and intelligence sharing arrangements between federal, provincial, territorial and Indigenous authorities to manage the border, with a focus on fentanyl, human smuggling and organized crime.
• Enhancing vetting with the United States of all ETA (Electronic Travel Authorization) applicants to screen for high-risk individuals.
• Improving disclosure to the United States through the Sex Offender Information Registration Act and the High-Risk Child Sex Offender Database Act to ensure border officials have access to information on high-risk individuals who are attempting to travel.

Minimizing unnecessary border volumes

Steps taken to date:

• Introduced an Additional Protocol to the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) to extend the application of the STCA to the entire Canada-U.S. land border, including internal waterways. The number of asylum claims from people crossing illegally has dropped from an average of 165 per day in March 2023 to 12 per day since then.
• Cancelled the visitor-to-worker public policy, which has been used by nefarious actors to mislead and mistreat foreign nationals.
• Implemented a partial visa requirement for Mexican nationals in February 2024 to reduce the high number of asylum claims, most of which were refused, withdrawn or abandoned. This change has significantly reduced claims from Mexican citizens at airports across the country.

Put in place measures to manage the volume of temporary resident arrivals and uphold the integrity of our immigration system, including:

• reforming the International Student Program by ending post-graduation work permit 'flagpoling',
• introducing new measures to address fraud in Canada's Temporary Foreign Worker Program,
• tightening eligibility requirements for temporary foreign workers, post-graduation work permits, and spouses of international students work permits

Continue to heighten screening and enhanced tools to detect fraud and reduce the number of non-genuine visitors to Canada, while re-examining and taking action on visas already in circulation when fraud is suspected.

Proposed measures:

• Improve the rate of removals of inadmissible people from Canada, and reduce existing immigration enforcement inventories.
• Introduce new legislation to strengthen authorities to:
  • cancel, change or suspend immigration documents, including visas, or
  • cancel or suspend applications in our inventory, or
  • pause the acceptance of new applications.
• This would be done for groups of immigration documents or applications when determined to be in the public interest, or on an individual case-by-case basis.
• These authorities would be used when warranted to prevent people outside of Canada who may pose a risk from entering the country, in turn leading to a decrease in irregular southbound migration.
• We will also impose new costs and restrictions on recalcitrant countries that do not rapidly facilitate the return of their citizens in the event of fraudulent entry or removal order.
• We will put an to end to the practice of 'flagpoling', which happens when a temporary resident leaves Canada and immediately returns to a port of entry to get immigration services. This practice uses significant resources at the border, distracts border officers from enforcement activities and slows cross-border traffic.
• As this change takes effect, temporary residents would need to apply for all necessary immigration services online, removing the option to apply at a port of entry. To reduce border congestion and allow officers to focus on security, we will stop processing most immigration applications at ports of entry from flagpolers.

Initiatives outlined in the 2024 Fall Economic Statement (FES)

Protecting the Integrity of Canada's Visa System

In FES 2024, the government proposes to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to secure and extend legislative authorities to cancel, suspend, or vary immigration documents for reasons deemed in the public interest.

Strengthening Information Disclosures from Sex Offender Registries

In FES 2024, the government proposes to amend the Sex Offender Information Registration Act to enhance the ability of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to share information collected under the Act with domestic and international partners.

Cracking Down on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

In FES 2024, the government proposes to amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) to strengthen Canada's anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing (AML/ATF) framework by introducing universal enrollment for reporting entities, permitting disclosures to the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, as well as making technical amendments.

Stronger Penalties for Financial Crimes

In FES 2024, the government proposes to amend the PCMLTFA, with small, targeted and consequential amendments to regulations under the PCMLTFA, to strengthen AML/ATF penalties and support compliance with PCMLTFA requirements.

Amendments to the Customs Act

In FES 2024, the government proposes to amend the Customs Act to compel carriers and sufferance warehouse operators to grant access to Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers to examine goods destined for export, as well as obligate owners and operators to provide adequate facilities for these officers to carry out the CBSA's mandate.

Asylum Integrity and Processing

In FES 2024, the government proposes to introduce legislative amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that would uphold the integrity and fairness of the asylum system, including by streamlining the intake, processing, and adjudication of claims.

Border Plan Funding Breakdown

Border Plan Backgrounder

Canada is investing $1.3 billion to bolster security at the border and strengthen the immigration system, all while keeping Canadians safe. This includes $667.5M for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), $355.4M for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), $180M over 6 years for the Communications Security Establishment, $77.7M for Health Canada, and $20M over five years for Public Safety Canada.

[Redacted]

Briefing Deck: Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act

Purpose of the Act

The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act proposes a suite of measures intended to protect Canadian sovereignty and keep Canadians safe. These measures will:

• Strengthen border and immigration security with new measures to combat illegal migration, the illegal fentanyl trade, transnational organized crime, money laundering and terrorist financing
• Contribute to a sovereign and secure Canada by delivering on core elements of a new economic and security relationship with the U.S.
• Modernize laws to address national and economic security threats and respond to evolving challenges

Key Themes

The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act addresses two key themes:

• Securing the border through amendments to the Customs Act, the Oceans Act andthe Sex Offender Information Registration Act. Also strengthens immigration and asylum systems through amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act (DCIA).
• Combating transnational organized crime, fentanyl and illicit financing through amendments to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Cannabis Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA), and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act provides more tools to combat money laundering and other financial crimes, and address some of the most prevalent forms of money laundering.

Theme 1: Securing the border

Amending the Customs Act (Canada Border Services Agency)

To compel transporters and warehouse operators to provide access to their premises to allow for export inspections by CBSA officers and require owners and operators of certain ports of entry/exit to provide facilities for export inspections, just as they currently do for imports.

Amending the Oceans Act (Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO))

To add security-related activities and enable the Canadian Coast Guard to conduct to security patrols and share information with security, defence, and intelligence partners.

Amending the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (Public Safety)

To enhance the ability of law enforcement agencies to share information collected under the Act with domestic and international partners. This includes amendments to the legal threshold to disclose information collected under the Act and maintained in the National Sex Offenders Registry (NSOR).

Amending both the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC))

• To secure and extend legislative authorities to cancel, suspend, or vary immigration documents, and cancel or suspend processing of new applications (en masse) for reasons determined to be in the public interest.
• To allow IRCC to disclose immigration information for the purpose of cooperation with federal partners.
• To uphold the integrity and fairness of the asylum system, including by streamlining the intake, processing, and adjudication of claims.
• To improve and expand information sharing within the Government of Canada and with provincial or territorial partners under written information-sharing agreements.
• To create new ineligibility measures, to make certain claims ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration Refugee Board (in collaboration with CBSA).

Theme 2: Combatting transnational organized crime, fentanyl, and illicit financing

Clarifying authority around law enforcement exemptions to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act (PS)

To clarify exemptions that allow for the use of certain investigative tools to combat illegal drug production and trafficking.

Amending the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Health Canada)

To amend the pathway that allows precursor chemicals that can be used to produce illicit drugs to be rapidly controlled by the Minister of Health, allow law and border enforcement to take swift action to prevent their illegal importation and use, and ensure strict federal oversight over any legitimate use of these chemicals.

Amending the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA)

To strengthen the administrative monetary penalty framework, enhance anti-money laundering supervision and compliance, punish serious criminal non-compliance, and advance the global fight against financial crime.

Amending the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act and the PCMLTFA

To enhance supervisory collaboration and support high standards of regulatory compliance by adding the Director of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) to the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC) and enabling FINTRAC to exchange supervisory information on federally-regulated financial institutions with FISC.

Conclusion

This proposed legislation will complement ongoing measures under Canada's Border Plan to enhance border security, strengthen the integrity of our immigration system, and contribute to Canada's continued prosperity, while still ensuring appropriate safeguards to protect Canadians' privacy and Charter rights.

Further information about the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act can be found on the Government of Canada website

Annex A: Legislative Proposals Summary – Lead Departments and Legislative Proposal

Theme 1: Securing the border

• CBSA: Amending the Customs Act
• DFO: Amending the Oceans Act
• Public Safety Canada: Amending the Sex Offender Information Registration Act
• IRCC
  • Protecting the Integrity of Canada's Visa System
  • Improve Asylum Integrity and Processing
  • Create new ineligibilities in the IRPA to manage surges in asylum claims
  • Strengthening information sharing
  • Introducing changes to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act

Theme 2: Combatting transnational organized crime, fentanyl, and illicit financing

• Health Canada: Create a new accelerated scheduling pathway for precursor chemicals
• Public Safety Canada : Clarifying authority around law enforcement exemptions to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act
• Finance
  • Strengthening anti-money laundering penalties
  • Adding FINTRAC to the membership of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee (FISC)
  • Cracking down on money laundering and terrorist financing

Overview of Lawful Access Measures in Bill C-2 and how they support border security

Many crimes, including those that undermine border security, leave a digital footprint.

The globalization of information and communications technology and gaps between legal systems allow criminals and national security threat actors to hide their tracks by using foreign information and communication service providers or local service providers whose records are stored in foreign countries, to shelter their digital footprint beyond the reach of local law enforcement or national security agencies.

Part 14 of the Strong Borders Act (Bill C-2) would respond to these challenges by amending the Criminal Code and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to:

• provide law enforcement new tools to lawfully obtain information needed to investigate crime;
• modernize Canada's legal framework (e.g., search warrant and provisions governing warrantless seizures in exigent circumstances) to keep pace with modern digital challenges, including to explicitly deal with the search of computer systems and data stored on or accessible from those systems;
• enhance international cooperation in criminal matters by creating two new mechanisms to facilitate access to crucial evidence and support modern border enforcement and the investigation of serious cross-border crimes:
  • first, a new mechanism in the Criminal Code to authorize Canadian law enforcement to request subscriber information or transmission data from a foreign telecommunications service provider and;
  • second, a new mechanism in the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to permit the enforcement of a foreign decision, compelling the production of subscriber information and/or transmission data in the possession or control of an individual or an entity located in Canada submitted by one of Canada's mutual legal assistance partners.

These amendments would strengthen timely access to data and information essential to preventing, investigating and prosecuting criminal offences, including those that undermine border security, as well as investigating threats to Canada's security.

Enhancing law enforcement's capacity to investigate crime here at home would also increase agencies' ability to work closely with international partners, including U.S. law enforcement and security agencies, in securing the border and effectively addressing serious global crime issues of shared priority, including transnational organized crime, child sexual exploitation and abuse, and online fraud.

These proposed changes would respond to evolving case law, including Supreme Court of Canada decisions, and are designed to uphold the privacy interests and Charter rights of people in Canada.

Tools to obtain information

Bill C-2 proposes three principal changes in this area.

Information demand

Clause 158 of the Bill would enact section 487.0121 of the Criminal Code and provide law enforcement an "information demand" power. This power would enable law enforcement to obtain, without judicial approval, information about the existence of records from a person who provides a service to the public. A person who provides a service to the public can include a communications service provider (e.g., Bell Canada), a hotel, or a car rental agency. This information would help identify the service provider in possession or control of information that law enforcement may then later seek judicial authorization to obtain.

The Bill defines the information that law enforcement can seek (a closed list) and includes whether the person provides a service to a particular subscriber, client, account or identifier, whether they have records related to those services, the dates over which services were provided, and the municipality in which the services were provided.

To make this demand, the officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect a crime has been or will be committed and that the information sought will assist in the investigation of the crime.

Information available under this new tool (e.g., a yes/no answer to the existence of records) is basic information about the nature of the services provided and would not reveal the nature of the services provided, and therefore engages a lower expectation of privacy than information sought through the subscriber information production order which would attract a higher expectation of privacy. That said, in situations where confirming services provided to a specific client could disclose information that is privileged or otherwise protected by law from disclosure, or be unreasonable in the circumstances, the service provider could object to providing the information, following the process set out in the proposed information demand. In such cases, they do not have to provide any information until the court makes a final decision. The court would consider the reasonableness of the request and whether the information sought is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure by law. This feature of the provision ensures that the new demand cannot be used to obtain privileged information, such as from lawyers' or doctors' offices.

The purpose of this new tool is to help law enforcement identify the service provider in possession of information relevant to a crime investigation. Law enforcement would use the information obtained through this tool to parse out leads and apply to the court for a warrant or production order.

Subscriber Information

Clause 159 of Bill C-2 would enact section 487.0142 of the Criminal Code and provide law enforcement the ability to apply to the court to obtain subscriber information from a person who provides a service to the public. A court would need to be satisfied that the police have reasonable grounds to suspect a crime has been or will be committed, that the service provider possesses or controls the information sought, and that it will assist in the investigation of the crime.

Bill C-2 defines "subscriber information" to include the contact information a person gives to a service provider to set up a subscription service, such as their name, pseudonym, billing address, telephone number, or email address. This new tool responds to the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v Spencer (2014) by establishing a lawful authority to obtain subscriber information.

Information available under this new tool engages a higher expectation of privacy than the information sought under an information demand. The Bill further allows the service provider receiving the order to object to providing the information. In such cases, they do not have to provide any information until the court makes a final decision. The court would consider the reasonableness of the request and whether the information sought is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure by law.

Passive Receipt of Information by Law Enforcement/Public Information

Clause 164 of Bill C-2 would amend section 478.0195 of the Criminal Code to clarify that law enforcement does not need specific authorization (warrant, production order, or information demand) to receive information – including an IP address - that a person provides voluntarily (e.g., by a victim) or under compulsion of law (e.g. mandatory reporting of Child sexual and exploitation abuse on the internet), and to receive, obtain and act on any publicly available information. Police must continue to obtain a court order (e.g., production order or warrant) if they wish to use the information they receive to obtain further information in a manner that engages a reasonable expectation of privacy. This proposal clarifies the law following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v Bykovets (2024), which dealt with police requests for IP addresses (transmission data under the Criminal Code) in the context of an ongoing police investigation.

Modernizing the Criminal Code search warrant

In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a search warrant (section 487) must specifically authorize law enforcement to search a computer because of the potentially vast amounts of information stored on such devices (R v Vu). Section 487 was drafted with the search of physical spaces (e.g., a home or a car) in mind, and does not clearly translate to the search of digital devices. The proposed amendments to section 487 would explicitly authorize to search digital devices and add conditions that the court may impose for the examination of data. In so doing, it would codify case law, including Vu.

Warrantless searches in exigent circumstances

The common law authority of police to act in exigent circumstances has always existed. Further, since 1997, the Criminal Code has explicitly provided a warrantless authority for police officers to act in emergency situations, without first obtaining a warrant, if the conditions exist for obtaining that warrant and only if obtaining one would be impracticable for the police. Exigent circumstances justify police action to prevent serious injury or death, or to respond to an immediate danger of the loss, removal, disappearance, or destruction of evidence.

Bill C-2 would clarify in the Criminal Code, the ability of law enforcement to seize specific data and information, including subscriber information, without a warrant in exigent circumstances. The courts would have the ability to review the lawfulness of police action in exigent circumstances.

International Cooperation

Clause 160 of Bill C-2 would enact section 487.0181 of the Criminal Code, allowing a justice or judge to authorize a peace officer or public officer to make a request to a foreign telecommunication service to produce transmission data or subscriber information in its possession or control for the purposes of investigating an offence in Canada. The court must be satisfied that the police officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed, that the foreign telecommunication service provider possesses or controls the information sought, and that the information will assist in the investigation of the crime. This amounts to the same safeguards as production orders for domestic service.

The court authorization would allow Canadian law enforcement to seek this data from the foreign entities. However, the court authorization would not compel the foreign entity to provide the data. It would provide a basis for sharing the information if the domestic law of the other country requires such a basis for sharing the requested information.

Clause 183 would amend the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) by adding a tool for international cooperation permitting the domestic judicial enforcement of a foreign decision from Canada's mutual legal assistance partners, compelling the production of transmission data and/or subscriber information in the possession or control of entities or individuals located in Canada. This new mechanism is modelled on existing tools in the MLACMA relating to data production; it contains the following protections and safeguards that align with other MLACMA provisions:

• On receipt of the foreign request, the Minister of Justice, as the Central Authority under MLACMA, must determine whether to authorize the making of an application before Canadian courts to have the foreign decision enforced. Among the Ministerial considerations are whether the foreign request meets the requirements of any applicable treaty and whether it is complying with Canadian law.
• If the Minister authorizes the request, an application would be made to a Canadian court seeking to enforce the foreign decision. The Court would determine whether the Canadian legal threshold of reasonable suspicion is met.
• If the legal test is met, the foreign decision becomes enforceable in Canada.
• Once the Canadian entity or individual produce the data, it would either be sent directly to the foreign Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) partner, subject to the discretion of the Canadian court, or the matter would return to the Canadian court to assess whether a sending order should be made in respect of the produced data. If a sending hearing proceeds, the Court may, in its discretion, hear from parties who oppose the sending application and/or seek conditions on the sending of the data abroad.
• Appeals of courts decisions under this provision are possible only on questions of law.

The main difference between this new section and other MLACMA data access provisions is that it involves the judicial enforcement of foreign decisions, rather than issuing a separate Canadian production order. This streamlines the process while retaining the checks and balances underlying the MLACMA process.

Consolidated List of Safeguards in place for Bill C-2

Part 1 – Customs Act

• Examination powers are restricted to regulatory functions, such as verifying compliance with export control requirement. They are not for use in criminal investigations.
• Border control measures will be executed at specified locations and only when the Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) has established that goods are destined for export.
• The proposed measures mirror existing obligations for imported goods, extending them to exports.
• Courts have upheld similar border control authorities as compliant with Section 8 of the Charter, affirming that such search or seizure mechanisms are reasonable.

Part 2 – Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Temporary accelerated scheduling pathway)

• A substance will only be added to Schedule V when there are reasonable grounds to believe it poses a significant risk to public health or safety and is being imported into or distributed within Canada without a legitimate purpose.
• While regulatory controls are strengthened, legitimate use of these chemicals will continue to be permitted. These uses will be subject to licensing requirements and oversight.
• The proposed amendments maintain the discretion of trial judges to impose appropriate sentences for applicable offences under the framework.

Part 3 – Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Cannabis Act (Exempting members of law enforcement)

Part 4 – Canada Post Corporation Act

• The amendment does not create any new or independent authority, or lessen the current requirements of lawful authorities provided under federal statutes, to search, seize, detain, or retain mail but rather allows government officials to rely on these existing authorities, such as search warrant powers under the Criminal Code and their requirement of judicial authorization on 'reasonable grounds to believe'.
• The police would still be required to obtain a warrant from a judge under the Criminal Code to lawfully search and seize mail and they would be required to report mail seizures to the court and seek detention orders under the Criminal Code to retain mail as evidence.
• Opening letters would be permitted only if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that certain legal requirements have not been complied with or the letter contains non-mailable matter.

Part 5 – Oceans Act

• Existing legal frameworks will remain in place, however, the new powers to collect, analyze, and disclose information and intelligence are necessary to support coast guard services.
• Said powers can only be used in support of the Minister's responsibility for coast guard duties, which include matters related to the safe movement of ships in Canadian waters and marine pollution response, and not for other, broader or inconsistent purposes.
• There is currently no intention to arm Coast Guard officers or for them to perform functions as peace officers.

Part 6 – Information Sharing (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship)

• Information disclosure will be limited within the Department for the purposes of the exercise of the Minister's powers or performance of their duties and functions.
• Written arrangements or agreements between the Department and federal, provincial, and territorial partners will be in place prior to the disclosure of personal information which will be limited to the identity of the individual, their immigration or citizenship status in Canada, and the contents and status of their documents.
• It will also be prohibited for a provincial government or receiving party to disclosure personal information that it receives to a foreign entity unless the Minister provides written consent.
• The draft authorities were amended while in the Senate as part of Bill S-6 to directly address and reflect recommendations from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner with regard to information sharing agreements and arrangements.
• Additionally, the draft authorities to disclose personal information in C-2 have also been determined by the Department of Justice by way of the Charter Statement to be in compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Part 7 – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (In-Canada Asylum System)

• IRPA protects against removal to situations of risk during the period when a foreign national is not eligible for a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) by providing safeguards against removal, such as a request to defer removal, and Ministerial exemption from PRRA bar for humanitarian and compassionate considerations.
• Foreign nationals subject to the PRRA can also seek leave and judicial review of decisions made under IRPA and can seek a stay of removal.
• If country conditions change suddenly, there is a Ministerial exemption to PRRA bar as per section 112 (2.1) of the IRPA.

Part 8 – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Certain Measures in Respect of Applications and Documents)

Cancellation, Suspension, and Variance of Immigration Documents

• The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship cannot exercise these powers unilaterally - the decision to use the authorities to protect the public interest rests with the Governor in Council.
• The Governor in Council must be of the opinion that it is in the public's interest to decide to cancel, suspend, or vary immigration documents. The order will be temporary in nature and can be repealed or amended if circumstances change.
• The order would also have no immediate impact on the legal status of individuals already in Canada.

Statutory Obligations of Persons Subject to a Public Interest Order and of Foreign Nationals Outside Canada

• Statutory powers would require that information be provided for regulatory or administrative purposes, and not for the purpose of a criminal investigation.
• Subject to a public order, an individual's response to an officer's questions, request for evidence and documents, and attendance for examination must be specifically tied to the purpose of determining whether an individual is actually captured in the scope of the order.
• For foreign nationals outside of Canada, the statutory obligations are to ensure that they continue to meet the requirements of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), and if they are found non-compliant, they would be unable to lawfully enter Canada. Their non-compliance would not result in any penal consequences.
• In addition, any incriminating evidence obtained from the exercise of the new statutory powers may not be used in another proceeding against individuals as it would violate the principle against self-incrimination.

Part 9 – Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Ineligibility)

• While an immigration removal has the potential to engage the rights of life, liberty, and security of the person (Section 7) under the Charter in certain circumstances, the proposed ineligibility provisions would not result in the immediate removal of foreign nationals and would not impact the ability of foreign nationals to access an evaluation of the risk they could face upon removal.
• Courts have consistently held that neither the Charter nor the Refugee Convention require a particular form of refugee determination process. Therefore, as those with ineligible claims are given access to a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) prior to removal from Canada, the proposed ineligibility provisions would likely be found compliant with Canada's international refugee law obligations and of the Charter.
• Foreign nationals whose claims are found ineligible for referral to the Refugee Protection Division pursuant to the proposed ineligibility provisions would, prior to their removal from Canada, have access to a pre-removal risk assessment conducted by an Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) officer trained to make such assessments. Subject to certain exceptions, for example, those found inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or international rights, a pre-removal risk assessment would provide an assessment of whether a claimant could face a risk of persecution, a danger of torture, a risk to their life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if removed from Canada, which are the same risks assessed by the Refugee Protection Division. A pre-removal risk assessment must be conducted in a procedurally fair manner, and could result in the person obtaining protected person status that would enable them to remain in Canada.

Part 10 – Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (Various Measures)

Information Sharing – Commissioner of Canada Elections

• The proposed disclosure obligations will not extend Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC's) mandate.
• Disclosure will only be authorized to an appropriate police force or other agencies where FINTRAC has already developed reasonable grounds to suspect that the information would be relevant to an investigation.
• Disclosure to the Commissioner of Canada Elections will be allowed given that information related to money laundering, terrorist financing, sanction evasion, or threats to national security can reveal information relevant to election-related offences or violations.

Enrollment

Enrolment would enhance FINTRAC's ability to exercise its compliance role, by ensuring they have up to date information on entities that are subject to obligations under the PCMLTFA.

Administrative Monetary Penalties and Compliance Orders

• The process leading to the imposition of a monetary penalty would be administrative in nature, encouraging compliance rather than punishment.
• Penalties would be fixed, or would be determined by taking into account the purpose of the penalty, the harm done by the violation, the ability of the person or entity to pay the amount, or other criteria prescribed by regulation.

Offence – False or misleading statements

Requiring that persons and entities provide complete, accurate, and non-misleading information to FINTRAC helps ensure the effectiveness of the various requirements to provide information and helps protect against the possibility of fraud and collusion.

Part 11 – Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (Cash Transactions)

• The proposed restriction on third-party cash deposits is aimed at countering the known problem of criminals circumventing the know-your-client requirement of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA) by receiving cash from anonymous sources into a bank account.
• The proposed restriction on large cash transaction is aimed at the known problem of criminals purchasing goods and services to launder proceeds of crime and/or evade taxation.
• The behaviour caught by the offences are directly related to the objectives of combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
• The restriction on large cash transactions will not have a significant impact given as large cash deposits can still be made to deposit-taking institutions enabling convenient and secure cash alternatives, such as cheque, debit card, credit card, wire transfer, e-transfer, etc.

Part 12 - Legislation Related to Financial Institutions (Supervisory Committee)

• Making FINTRAC a member of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee would enhance coordination among federal agencies with financial sector responsibilities and support high standards of regulatory compliance by federally regulated financial institutions.
• Information shared with the committee would be limited to compliance information that relates directly to the supervision of these institutions, mitigating the risk to the financial system posed by money laundering and terrorist financing, by helping ensure that other regulatory bodies are made aware of information that relates to their mandate and can take appropriate action.

Part 13 - Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA)

The Collection of Identifying Information

• Registered sex offenders generally have diminished privacy right for their identifying information and recording and photographing are relatively non-intrusive means of collecting information.
• The proposed amendments will clarify that the existing provision which permits the recording of observable characteristics to help identify the sex offender would permit the collection of physical characteristics that may not be easily observable.

Obligation to Report Changes in Vehicle Information

• Sex offenders are already required to provide vehicle information; the new specified information does not reveal highly sensitive information about individuals. They are already obligated to report changes to other types of personal information within the same timeframe.
• The proposed amendments strike a reasonable balance between privacy and the objectives of SOIRA by ensuring police and law enforcement agencies have accurate and up-to-date information.

CBSA's Consultation of SOIRA Information

SOIRA already permits CBSA officials to collect and receive information about sex offenders in certain circumstances. The proposed amendments will now allow officials to consult information collected under SOIRA for limited purposes such as carrying out their lawful duties and to examine individuals and imported goods to prevent the importation of contraband.

CBSA's Disclosure of Certain Information

• Information that may be disclosed is limited to biographical and travel-related information which is not highly sensitive in nature.
• CBSA may only disclose the specific types of information to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of administering and enforcing SOIRA

Enhanced Information-Sharing under SOIRA

• The relevant disclosure threshold is 'reasonable ground to believe' that the information will assist in the prevention and/or investigation of a sex crime.
• The purpose of the disclosure is tailored to the stated objective of SOIRA to help law enforcement prevent and investigate crimes.

Part 14 – Timely Access to Data and Information

Information demand

• The information sought would be limited to basic information about the nature of services provided, and would not reveal the contents of any communications, or any other details in relation to the services provided.
• The information demand would require "reasonable suspicion," which is a recognized threshold for certain searches in the criminal context.
• The information provided would be used primarily in obtaining further search warrants or production orders, which would be subject to the applicable thresholds set out in legislation.
• The person who receives the demand would be able to challenge the demand in front of a judge, who would be able to revoke or vary the demand.
• Is consistent with recent Supreme Court of Canada rulings.

Request for information

• The information sought would be basic information about the nature of services provided, and would not reveal the contents of any communications, or any other details in relation to the services provided.
• The information provided would be used primarily in obtaining further search warrants or production orders, which would be subject to the applicable thresholds set out in legislation.

Production order – Subscriber Information

• The information sought, subscriber information and transmission data, does not by itself constitute sensitive information, since it is limited to information that identifies clients and services, and does not include the contents of communications.
• These orders would generally be sought at early stages of an investigation to generate leads, prior to the point at which officers are able to establish the "reasonable grounds to believe" threshold used for general production orders.
• The order would not be directed at the person who is under investigation for the offence for which evidence is being sought, and so would not require someone to incriminate themselves.
• The judge would have discretion as to whether to issue an order, and if they choose to issue an order, the judge would have discretion as to what information is specified in it.

Voluntary or compelled provision of information, and publicly available information

This provision merely clarifies that the production order, warrant and information demand powers are not meant to displace the existing ability of police to receive information that is voluntarily provided to them by people lawfully in possession of it

Publicly available information

This provision merely clarifies that the production order, warrant and information demand powers are not meant to displace the existing ability of police to receive, obtain and act upon information that is available to the public.

Offence – information demand

Potential inconsistencies with the principles of fundamental justice were not identified in review of the relevant provisions.

Request to foreign entity

• The information sought, subscriber information and transmission data, does not by itself constitute sensitive information.
• The "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard is a recognized threshold for searches in the criminal context.
• These orders would generally be sought at early stages of an investigation to generate leads, prior to the point at which officers are able to establish the "reasonable grounds to believe" threshold used for general production orders.
• The judge would have discretion as to whether to issue an order, and if they choose to issue an order, the judge would have discretion as to what information is specified in it.

Exigent circumstances

• The power of police, in exigent circumstances, to conduct searches that would otherwise require a warrant has long been recognized by common law, and found reasonable under the Charter.
• The amendments would clarify that this power applies to the specific situations of transmission data recorders and subscriber information seizures, which engage similar privacy interests to those already authorized under exigent circumstances.

Tracking device – similar things

• The additional authorization would, as with the existing tracking warrant power, have to be authorized by a judge on the basis of reasonable suspicion, which is a threshold recognized in caselaw for obtaining tracking data.
• The nature of the data being obtained, and the privacy interests at stake, are the same as those for the initial tracking warrant.

Transmission data – means of telecommunication

• The additional authorization would, as with the initial warrant, have to be authorized by a judge on the basis of reasonable suspicion.
• The availability of this additional power is made necessary by the fact that a person may use multiple means of telecommunication at different times, making it impractical to seek a new warrant each time a new means of telecommunication is discovered.
• The nature of the data being obtained, and the privacy interests at stake, are the same as those for the initial transmission data warrant.

Examination of computer data

• Examination of computer data would be judicially authorized, in advance, on a "reasonable grounds to believe" standard, which is the default standard for authorizing searches in a criminal context.
• The judge would be able to impose conditions, including for example that the examination be limited to a specified class of computer data, and that the extraction of such data be performed by someone who is not otherwise involved in the investigation. This can limit the extent to which the investigators may be inadvertently exposed to data that is outside the scope of the warrant.
• Police would also have to provide a copy of the warrant to the owner or person in possession of the computer system, or the person under investigation whose data is being sought. This helps ensure an effective opportunity for these persons to challenge the warrant.

Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act

The amendments would preserve, for these foreign demands, the requirement in domestic law of prior judicial authorization, and the applicable threshold of reasonable suspicion for police to obtain this information.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act – Information Demands and Information Orders

• The information sought would be limited to basic information about services provided, and would not reveal the contents of any communications, or any other details in relation to the services provided.
• The information provided would be used primarily as part of applications to obtain further warrants or production orders, pursuant to existing powers set out in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act.
• The information demand power would only be available for the purpose of CSIS's security intelligence and foreign intelligence mandates, and a judge would only be able to issue an information order where satisfied that the information would assist CSIS in performing its duties under those mandates.
• The recipient of a demand would be able to challenge it in front of a judge, and would not be obliged to comply until a final decision is made.

Part 15 – Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA)

Non-disclosure of information regarding Ministerial Orders

• The provisions would place limits on communication about the technical capabilities of External Service Providers (ESPs), which are commercial entities.
• The restrictions would be narrowly focused on the existence and contents of orders, exemptions and systemic vulnerabilities, all linked to the objective of protecting sensitive information.

Inspection and production powers

• The powers would be available for the regulatory purpose of verifying compliance and preventing non-compliance with the Act.
• Further, information gathered in this context would generally relate to technical capabilities of ESPs, which would not attract a heightened privacy interest.
• In addition, the powers would not be available for the purpose of advancing a penal investigation.
• It is important to note that SAAIA, on its own, will not create new authorities, such as surveillance powers, for law enforcement and CSIS. But rather, it ensures that ESPs are able to give effect to legal requests from law enforcement and CSIS.
• The proposed powers are similar to regulatory inspection powers that have been upheld in other contexts.
• SAAIA includes explicit prohibition against requirements that would create systematic vulnerabilities, addressing the concern of creating 'backdoors' in encryption.
• SAAIA does not prescribe specific technology, process or measure and merely seeks to ensure a lawful request can be met by ESPs.

Offences and Administrative Monetary Penalties (AMPs)

• The offences are regulatory in nature, and are not punishable by imprisonment.
• While a person could be liable for the actions of an employee, agent or mandatary, they are able to raise as a defence that they exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence

Part 16 - Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (Collect and use of personal information)

The collection and use of information by businesses and professionals regulated for anti-money laundering purposes would be subject to safeguards that align with the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act. These include ensuring that the purpose of the collection and use is consistent with detecting or deterring money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion, and that obtaining the individual's knowledge or consent would compromise that purpose.

Preclearance

Speaking Points

• Preclearance exemplifies Canadian and U.S. binational cooperation to deliver a border security program that has large scale benefits for our citizens, governments, and economies.
• Government border agencies deliver on security and regulatory responsibilities all while respecting host country laws.
• There are approximately 400 U.S. officers posted to Canada. They and their families live, work, and go to school as members of their local communities.
• Public Safety Canada is responsible for the Preclearance program which is delivered in close partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transport Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency, Global Affairs Canada and Justice Canada.
• Eight of Canada's largest airports offer Preclearance services, so the vast majority of air travellers to U.S. from Canada are precleared and arrive in the U.S. as domestic travellers.
• U.S. Preclearance operations in Canada are larger than the rest of the world combined. Globally, 3 out of 5 travellers precleared to enter the U.S. depart from Toronto Pearson, Vancouver and Montreal Trudeau airports.
• Interest in expanding Preclearance in Canada persists, including amongst rail and marine facilities and carriers. The Canadian Border Service Agency CBSA leads the work to establish Canadian preclearance in the U.S.

Preclearance Benefits

• Preclearance assists governments in pushing the border out so they can intercept threats before they enter their country.
• Travellers clear U.S. screenings and inspections in Canada so when they arrive in the U.S. they can exit quickly or catch a connecting flight.
• Airlines can fly directly to airports and / or terminals usually limited to the U.S. domestic carriers, like Aspen Colorado and Reagan National airport in Washington D.C.
• Canadian airports can compete with U.S. international airports as in-transit hubs to final U.S. destinations.
• Airlines realize route savings, providing a competitive advantage.
• The most recent Preclearance treaty brings security and economic benefits of Preclearance to other modes of transportation

Statistics

Passenger volumes have steadily increased since the marked downturn in travel from 2020-2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently, a marked downturn in travel volumes has been observed this calendar year, inline with a similar reduction in travel from Canada to the U.S. overall. Between January 1 to August 31, 2025, over 570,000 fewer travellers were precleared in Canada as compared to the same period in 2024.

Background

Canada-United States preclearance involves United States (U.S). officers carrying out their duties to determine admissibility of travellers and goods to the U.S. while physically stationed in Canada, and vice versa. Preclearance is currently ongoing at airports in: Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax.

Evolution of Preclearance

Preclearance has existed in Canada since 1952, and has evolved substantially over time. More recently, in 2011, Canada and the U.S. issued a joint declaration, Beyond the Border (BTB), which called for further cooperation towards economic prosperity and border security. Within BTB was a joint intent to expand the previous preclearance treaty. From this the Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine and Air Preclearance (LRMA) was negotiated and entered into force in August, 2019, along with Canada's Preclearance Act, 2016 (PCA).

Preclearance Legal Framework

The LRMA permits preclearance at land, rail, and marine locations, in addition to preclearance at airports which was already in place. It also extended the application of preclearance to commercial goods in addition to travellers. The LRMA also authorizes U.S. and Canadian preclearance officers (PCOs) to be armed to the same extent, and in the same operating environments, as are the officers of the domestic border agency. In Canada, U.S. officers are generally permitted to be armed whenever on duty except when working at airports where the authority is limited to specific locations and circumstances.

The LRMA also contains a protections and accountabilities framework for PCOs. Very broadly, amongst other things, the framework establishes that if an offence is committed by a PCO while on duty, prosecution is subject to the criminal jurisdiction of their home country.

The Preclearance Act, 2016 is the legislation that implements Canada's obligations under the LRMA between Canada and the U.S. There are also Preclearance in Canada Regulations (SOR /2019-183) and Preclearance in the U.S. Regulations (SOR/2024-283), which provide operational rules for preclearance activities in Canada and the U.S.

Governance & Operations

Public Safety is the lead Government of Canada department for preclearance. Transport Canada (TC), the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Global Affairs Canada and the Department of Justice play significant roles in the delivery and management of the preclearance program.

The main governance mechanism for the Preclearance program is an ADM-level Canada-U.S. Preclearance Consultative Group (PCG), which is responsible for monitoring the performance of the Preclearance treaty and for resolving any serious issues. TC and PS ADMs are the co-chairs, along with counterpart Assistant Secretaries from U.S. DHS and U.S. Department of State. Other government departments participate in meetings of the PCG, notably the CBSA and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations

Shiprider Fact Sheet

• Integrated Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO, commonly known as Shiprider) is the deployment of a patrol vessel jointly crewed with designated officers from the United States and Canada for law enforcement or related purposes in shared waterways.
• First instituted as a pilot program in 2005 to address maritime border security concerns along the United States and Canadian international boundary, Shiprider remains a unique law enforcement arrangement globally that reduces the ability for individuals and transnational criminal organizations to exploit the international border. This includes the prevention, detection, suppression, investigation, and prosecution of criminal offences or violations of law related to border enforcement including, but not limited to, the illicit drug trade, migrant smuggling, trafficking of firearms, the smuggling of counterfeit goods and money, and terrorism. Shiprider is to be intelligence-driven, based on joint Canada-United States threat/risk assessments and coordinated with existing cooperative cross-border policing programs and activities.
• ICMLEO is enacted by a 2009 treaty – Framework Agreement on ICMLEO between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America. To regularize the treaty in 2012, Canada further put into force the Integrated Cross-border Law Enforcement Operations Act.
• Article 5 of the Framework Agreement designates the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), or their designate/delegate, as the Central Authorities responsible for the ICMLEO program.
• The Central Authorities have authority to appoint law enforcement officers from federal, state, provincial, local, First Nations and tribal law enforcement agencies as designated ICMLEO officers upon successful completion of initial Shiprider training.
• Initial Shiprider training is a 10-day course jointly designed and delivered by the USCG and RCMP. This is conducted at the USCG's Maritime Law Enforcement Academy onsite at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centre (FLETC) in Charleston, South Carolina.
• To maintain currency of designation, officers must attend regional refresher training every two years, held in locations across the border where these operations take place. Canadian officers are also required to attend an annual Title 19 refresher.
• Designated ICMLEO officers are authorized to do ICMLEO across the international maritime border on shared waterways and, in urgent and exceptional circumstances, continue those activities on adjacent land.
• To conduct cross-border operations, all on a patrol vessel must be ICMLEO trained and designated, no exceptions.
• The Criminal Code of Canada includes designated ICMLEO officers in the definition of "peace officer" for US officers operating in Canada. When operating in the United States, Canadian officers are designated as "Customs Officers (excepted)" under Title 19, United States Code. The lead officer of a joint crew is based on the country in which the patrol vessel is physically located at a given time, i.e. host country direction.
• Designated officers are located at USCG stations and RCMP detachments across the shared waterways of the Canada-United States border coast to coast. The RCMP also has dedicated full-time Shiprider units deployed in Kingston and Windsor, ON and Surrey and Victoria, BC.
• Extended partners who take part in Shiprider with designated ICMLEO officers include but are not limited to: Ontario Provincial Police, Windsor Police Service, Toronto Police Service, Walpole Island First Nations Police Service, Niagara Regional Police Service and Brockville Police Service.
• Shiprider includes an air capability where officers of the USCG, RCMP and partner agencies are trained and designated to perform cross-border law enforcement aerial patrols (when ICMLEO is occurring on the water). All air training is conducted on location for units in Canada and the US.
• Bi-national management of the Shiprider program, policy and training is coordinated through RCMP Federal Policing Criminal Operations – Border Integrity and the USCG Liaison to the RCMP, both based at RCMP National Headquarters in Ottawa, ON.

Backgrounder: Indigenous Border Mobility

Public Safety and its portfolio partners support interdepartmental efforts to advance Indigenous Border Mobility Issues, including the Indigenous Border Mobility Initiative and the Jay Treaty Border Alliance Collaboration Initiative.

Indigenous Border Mobility Initiative

• The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (UNDA) Action Plan – specifically Shared Priority 52 – commits the Government of Canada to pursue legislative amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and related regulatory and policy revisions, to respond to complex border-crossing and migration challenges faced by Indigenous peoples whose communities span the Canada–U.S. border.
• In response to Shared Priority 52, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) in close collaboration with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), have been advancing the Indigenous Border Mobility (IBX) initiative as a way of exploring options to amend Canada's right-of-entry provision for Indigenous peoples.
• Policy options are currently being developed by IRCC and CBSA following thorough consultations with Indigenous partners via various bilateral mechanisms, including regional roundtable discussions that occurred across five provinces and one territory between 2023 and 2024.
• While options are still being developed, key principles would involve unfettered mobility for members of all Canadian and U.S. and Indigenous communities and rights to work and access education.
• The initiative will continue to be advanced through a whole-of-government approach, with consultations involving Crown–Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC), Indigenous Services Canada (ISC), Global Affairs Canada (GAC), Justice Canada, and the Public Safety portfolio.
• PS and its portfolio partners are generally supportive of this proposal, provided that public safety considerations (e.g., fidelity of documents and other safeguards are in place to mitigate security risks) remain a key consideration.

Jay Treaty Border Alliance

• The Jay Treaty Border Alliance (JTBA) is a coalition of members from First Nations communities and American federally recognized tribes located along the Canada-U.S. border.
• In April 2022, the Government of Canada and the JTBA established the Jay Treaty Border Alliance – Collaboration Initiative (JTBA-CI). The JTBA-CI provides an opportunity for the JTBA and the Government of Canada to discuss Indigenous border crossing issues related to the mobility of Indigenous Peoples and their goods.
• The JTBA advocates for full implementation of Jay Treaty border crossing rights (right to freely travel and trade between Canada and the U.S.) by the U.S. and Canadian governments as well as respect for inherent sovereignty, political status, and cultural and economic rights of Indigenous Peoples living along the border.
• The JTBA-CI High Table is co-convened by the Minister of Public Safety and Regional Ontario Chief Abraham Benedict of the Chiefs of Ontario, with participation of the Ministers of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, and Crown-Indigenous Relations, along with JTBA leadership. High Table meetings have focused on the broad scope of border mobility challenges faced by First Nations and U.S. tribal communities.
• The High Table provides political-level leadership and direction to the Governance Table (Vice-President/Assistant Deputy Minister/-level), and is supported by five technical tables, in which the Public Safety portfolio actively participates:
  • Border Crossing Experience Technical Table;
  • Entry of Goods Technical Table;
  • Identification and Travel Documents Technical Table;
  • Right of Entry Technical Table; and,
  • Safety and Security Technical Table.

Recent Firearms Policy Measures

Royal Assent of Bill C-71 on June 21, 2019, with practical targeted measures implemented in 2021 and 2022

• Background checks expanded to cover lifetime of a firearms licence applicant (2021)
• Licence verification and business record-keeping requirements for sale of non-restricted firearms (2022)

Prohibition of Assault-Style Firearms (ASF)

• May 2020: over 1,500 makes and models, and their variants, now encompasses around 2,000
• December 2024: 324 makes and models, and their variants
• March 2025: 179 makes and models, and their variants

National handgun freeze, October 2022 (regulations)

Royal Assent of Bill C-21 on December 15, 2023, with the following measures immediately in force.

• National handgun freeze codified in Firearms Act, restricting the transfer of handguns to individuals with limited exemptions for:
  • individuals with an Authorization to Carry (ATC) (e.g., for lawful profession or occupation)
  • those training, competing or coaching in a handgun shooting discipline recognized by the Olympic or Paralympic Committee
• Newly designed ASFs prohibited, specifically:
  • A firearm designed and manufactured on or after Royal Assent that is not a handgun, and that discharges centre-fire ammunition in a semi-automatic manner, and was originally designed with a detachable cartridge magazine
• Red Flag laws, allowing anyone to apply to a court for an emergency prohibition order to temporarily remove firearms access when there is a risk of harm to self or others (up to 30 days)
• Increased maximum penalties for trafficking and smuggling, from 10 to 14 years
• Enhanced information sharing and investigative authorities for law enforcement
• Measures to address ghost guns, including licence requirements for certain firearm parts, range of firearms offences now include firearm parts, any unlawfully manufactured firearm is prohibited, and new offences for the possession and distribution of computer data for use in illegal manufacturing

Bill C-21 Regulations

• July 2024 - Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) regulations amended to allow removal at Port of Entry for straightforward criminal offences (e.g., carrying concealed weapon, unauthorized possession of firearm)
• September 2024 - New Licence Requirements for import and transfer of ammunition, cartridge magazines and specific firearm parts (i.e., handgun slide, firearm barrel)
• September 2024 - Offences related to Firearms parts
• October 2024 - Centralization of decision-making for Protection of Life Authorizations to Carry, from Chief Firearms Officers to Commissioner of Firearms
• March 2025 - Temporary Licence Suspension regime ("Yellow Flag" Laws)
• April 2025 – Mandatory Licence Refusal and Revocation Authorities in force
  • Licence must be refused if someone is convicted of an offence involving violence against a family member or intimate partner
  • Licence must be revoked if a Chief Firearms Officer suspects a licence holder may have engaged in domestic violence or stalking
• Outstanding – Mandatory Licence Refusal and Revocation if subject to Protection Order Proposed Regulations to define Protection Order published in Canada Gazette 1, March 2025

Red Flag Laws Awareness Campaign

• New Public Legal Education on Red Flag laws published on Public Safety web site, Summer 2023
• Red Flag Awareness Contribution Program to mobilize knowledge and increase access
  • call for proposals complete; funding proposals assessed and to be announced

Outstanding – Pre-Verification of Firearms Classification

Proposed Technical Assessment [Firearms Reference Table "FRT")] Regulations, pre-published in Canada Gazette 1, December 2024, to require firearms importers and manufacturers to share technical information on makes and models with RCMP prior to shipment or manufacture to enable assessment of classification, as required