Parliamentary Committee Notes: Minister Anandasangaree’s appearance before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (SECD)
Mandate and Priorities of the Minister of Public Safety

Overview Note

Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (SECD)
Mandate and Priorities of the Minister of Public Safety

General Information

• Date: Monday, October 20, 2025
• Time: 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.
• Location: Room W110, 1 Wellington St

Context

Your appearance before SECD on Monday, October 20 represents an opportunity to address Committee members with respect to the breadth, scope and importance of the work undertaken across the Public Safety Portfolio in support of your mandate.

As Minister of Public Safety, your mandate has a critical role in supporting two Government's missions, including: protecting Canadian sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe by securing our borders and reinforcing law enforcement; and, establishing a new security relationship with the U.S. and strengthening our collaboration with allies around the world.

You have already made progress on initiatives tied to core Government commitments and missions; such as:

• introducing comprehensive legislation to further the implementation of Canada's Border Plan (Bill C-2 and Bill C-12) and to strengthen our cyber resilience (Bill C-8);
• supporting a successful G7 Leaders' Summit with the publication of leaders' statements on countering migrant smuggling and transnational repression;
• engaging proactively with US counterparts to counter inconsistent narratives about our shared border; and,
• launching the individual owners phase of the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program.

Your proposed opening remarks reinforce the central elements of your mandate, as well as the work currently underway to support the Government's priorities and overall agenda. Your briefing package also includes key messages related to the missions outlined in the Prime Minister's May 2025 Mandate Letter to the Ministry.

Officials

You will appear for the first hour with the following officials, they will remain for the second hour.

• Tricia Geddes, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada
• Mark Flynn, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
• Erin O'Gorman, President, Canada Border Services Agency
• Anne Kelly, Commissioner, Correctional Service Canada
• Joanne Blanchard, Chairperson, Parole Board of Canada
• Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Opening Remarks

At the onset of the meeting, the Chair will invite you to deliver opening remarks, to last approximately 5 minutes. Questions from Committee members will ensue.

Rounds of Questions

Four minutes will be allocated to members in no pre-determined order, where the Chair will choose based on hands raised in the room.

Opening Remarks

Speaking Notes For The Honourable Gary Anandasangaree
Minister of Public Safety

Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (SECD)

October 20, 2025 - Ottawa, Ontario

Good evening.

Thank you, Honourable Senators, for inviting me here.

It's an honour to work with all of you on the many important issues that fall within my mandate.

As the Minister of Public Safety, my priority is to ensure that each and every Canadian remains safe and secure. This is a responsibility that I do not take lightly.

Since my appointment, I have been focused on enhancing our country's border security, tackling organized crime, strengthening our cyber security, getting guns off our streets, and ensuring our communities remain safe for everyone across the country.

Under our $1.3 billion border plan, we have enhanced security at our ports of entry and between them, increased surveillance via drones, towers, helicopters and other resources to allow 24/7 surveillance.

As a result of these measures, there has been a 99 per cent reduction in illegal south bound movement from Canada to the US since June 2024.

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has also increased its removals of inadmissible people from Canada – the most in a decade. This shows our plan is working and, over the next two years, the CBSA will further increase removals by 25 percent.

We are also seeing positive results from our National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft. In 2024, CBSA also intercepted 2,277 vehicles stolen in railyards and ports. In 2025, auto thefts continue to decline nationally, with a 19 per cent decrease reported in the first half of this year.

Bill C-12 will enable us to further build on this progress. It includes provisions that would strengthen the government's ability to combat transnational organized crime, illegal fentanyl, and money laundering.

To further protect our borders and national security, Canada must maintain its close relationships with like-minded allies. In September, I met with my five-eyes counterpart in the United Kingdom and, next month, I will welcome our G7 partners to an interior ministers meeting in Ottawa, where I will emphasize the importance of multilateral cooperation.

We also continue to work with all our partners to better protect our cybersecurity and critical infrastructure. Under the 2025 National Cyber Security Strategy, we aim to build national cyber resilience with all of Canadian society.

Bill C-8 will help to further promote and increase cyber security across four major sectors: finance, telecommunications, energy and transportation. This legislation will protect Canadians, businesses and the cyber systems they depend on well into the future.

Mr. Chair, with our investments, our Government's comprehensive plan is getting guns off our streets and resources into our neighborhoods to fight crime and prevent violence.

In recent years, there has been a concerning rise in hate in Canada. The Canada Community Security Program helps communities at risk of hate-motivated crimes to enhance the security of their gathering spaces, such as synagogues, mosques and churches. Since 2007, the Government of Canada has invested over $40 million in more than 950 projects that help to protect these communities.

The Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program is another important piece in our government's comprehensive approach to combat crime and gun violence. To date, the business buy-back program has removed over 12,000 firearms from our communities, with over $22 million in compensation.

Once again, Mr. Chair, I appreciate this invitation and I would be happy to address any questions about these or other initiatives under my mandate.

Thank you.

Mandate and Priorities

QP Notes

Q1 – How is your Portfolio aligning its work with the government's Missions

• The Portfolio is focused on keeping Canadians safe, protecting our sovereignty, and forging new security relationships globally.
• We are well-equipped to champion effective national coordination that will strengthen unity and improve safety, economic and security outcomes for Canadians.
• I am proud of the work we have accomplished over the last several months.
• Phase Two of the Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program.
• Bills C-2, C-8 and C-12
• Myself and Portfolio officials have been meeting with Five Eye's counterparts and international partners on border security and other national security issues.
• I look forward to Canada hosting the G7 Interior Ministers' Meeting in November.

Q2 – Canadians do not feel safe in their communities. How can we trust that the Government's actions will reverse this

• We are working on modernizing and stabilizing our law enforcement agencies.
• We are ushering in new and comprehensive criminal justice reforms.
• These measures will strengthen bail and sentencing, combat crime, enhance investigative capacity, and protect children and other vulnerable Canadians.
• Bill C-9 (Combatting Hate Act) introduced by my colleague, the Honourable Sean Fraser, is an important step forward to combat and address hate propaganda and hate crimes.

Q3 – How does the Public Safety Portfolio actually contribute to a stronger economy

• Ensuring the safety of the public helps the economy by creating environments that foster economic activity, attracting investment, ensuring consumer and business confidence, and enabling stable communities where people feel safe to work, shop, and live.
• A strong, independent and resilient economy needs to be free from unmitigated national security threats.
• Investments in the Portfolio prevent economic losses from crime and disasters, reduce poverty, and contribute to overall productivity and well-being.

Q4 – What are you doing to protect and strengthen Canada's sovereignty

• We are investing in what matters most to ensure Canada is equipped to face any challenges that may come at home or abroad.
• We have made an investment of $1.3 billion to support more personnel, new technology and equipment, and enhanced coordination to strengthen border security.
• As a next step, we are working with our colleagues in Parliament to ensure Bill C-12 becomes law.
• Enacting this Bill will help combat transnational organized crime, stop the flow of illegal fentanyl, crack down on money laundering, dismantle criminal networks, and improve the integrity of our immigration system.

Q5 – Can you share how your department is reducing spending on government operations and what steps are being taken to ensure that cost savings don't compromise public safety

• Our goal is to build the strongest economy in the G7.
• I have conducted a review and identified ambitious savings proposals to spend less on the day-to-day running of the Portfolio and invest in modernizing technology and processes to improve efficiencies.
• This review focused on returning to core responsibilities, ensuring value for money, and improve service delivery for Canadians.
• I look forward to Cabinet discussions and Budget 2025 to start delivering on these savings.

If pressed on operational impacts

• It remains vitally important that all Canadians are safe in their communities. These efforts start at our border.
• In support of the investments announced in Canada's Border Plan, reduction targets were adjusted from 15% to 2% for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

Departmental Overview – Key Issues – October 2025

Key Messages

• Government measures are working to reduce crime and ensure that Canadians feel safe in their communities.
• The Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) is actively working to ensure timely removal of individuals with criminality, organiszed crime, or security concerns.
• Since day one, this government has been acting decisively to keep our communities safe

Community Safety

Crime is down, and communities are safer.

• Police-reported major assaults: 197 incidents per 100,000
• Crime rates decreased in 2024:
  • Overall Crime Severity Index (CSI): -4%
  • Violent CSI: -1%; Non-violent CSI: -6%
  • Overall crime rate: -4%; Violent crime rate: -1%
  • Youth CSI: - 4%; youth crime rate: - 3%

Getting guns off our streets keeps them out of the wrong hands.

• Prohibited makes and models: over 2,500
• Seized firearms at the Border: 930 firearms – 90% from the U.S.
• Non-restricted makes and models: over 19,000 (over 127,000 variations remain available for hunting and sport shooting in Canada).

Auto theft is down — our national plan is working.

• Auto Theft: dropped 19.1% nationwide in early 2025
• CBSA intercepted over 2,200 stolen vehicles in 2024 and detained 1,155 more in 2025 (as of Sept. 23).

Removals

CBSA has doubled removals since 2021 — protecting Canadians and strengthening border security.

CBSA personnel dedicated to immigration investigations and removals: 550

Current Fiscal Year:

• Number of removals: 11,354
• Removals for criminality, organized crime, or security concerns: 578
• Closed criminal immigration warrants: 254

Last Fiscal Year:

• Number of removals: 18,048
• Removals for criminality, organized crime, or security concerns: 905
• Closed criminal immigration warrants: 542

1,000 New officers

CBSA will expand its presence at key ports of entry and crack down on organized crime, smuggling, fraud, and terrorism.

• Distribution of new personnel: 80% armed officers, 20% operations officers
• CBSA College has capacity: 250 in the first year, and 300 in the second year
• Average Student Border Services Officers hired per year: 700

We're boosting federal policing to fight online fraud, child exploitation, money laundering, and organized crime across Canada.

• Budget 2025: investment of $1.8 billion over four years to increase federal policing capacity
• Distribution of new personnel: 75% police officers, 25% civilian officers
• Training: expanding online training to increase enrolment

Firearms

QP Notes

Q1 – Could you walk the committee through the main types of firearms commonly used in Canada, including how they function and how they are classified under current federal regulations

• There are a variety of firearms that are commonly used in Canada, including rifles, shotguns and handguns. With respect to how firearms function, there are a number of different types of actions, including bolt-action, pump- action and semi-automatic.
• In Canada, the possession, acquisition, storage, and transportation of firearms are governed by both the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act.
• The Criminal Code and its regulations provide the legal framework for the classification of firearms in Canada. Firearms fall into one of the following categories:
  • Non-restricted, which typically includes most rifles and shotguns commonly used for hunting and sport shooting.
  • Restricted, which includes most handguns and certain semi-automatic firearms. Legitimate uses for these types of firearms are limited to approved shooting ranges and collection purposes; and
  • Prohibited, which include fully automatic firearms, short-barreled handguns, or unlawfully manufactured or modified firearms. Outside of rare exceptions, these firearms have no lawful civilian applications in Canada.
• Firearms are classified by physical characteristics or by make or model and can be prescribed in the Criminal Code Regulations through Governor-in-Council authorities.
• The Firearms Act and its regulations establish rules and requirements for the lawful possession, use, transport and storage of firearms, which is based on firearm classification.
• A person must meet all the necessary conditions set out in the Firearms Act – including possessing a valid Possession & Acquisition Licence (PAL), and a registration certificate in the case of restricted or prohibited firearms – in order to lawfully possess and acquire firearms in Canada.

Q2 – Can you explain the difference between a restricted and non-restricted firearm under Canadian law

• Non-restricted firearms are firearms that do not meet the definition of "restricted" or "prohibited firearms" set out in the Criminal Code or regulations. Non-restricted firearms are typically rifles and shotguns and do not need to be registered.
• Restricted firearms include handguns that are not prohibited, semi-automatic rifles and shotguns with a barrel length under 18.5", firearms that can be fired when reduced to a length of less than 660 mm and firearms prescribed as restricted in the Criminal Code Regulations. These firearms are typically used for target or sport shooting.
• All licence holders must successfully complete the Canadian Firearms Safety Course (CFSC) to be eligible to hold a licence.
• Possession of restricted firearms additionally requires successful completion of the Canadian Restricted Firearms Safety Course (CRFSC), registration of all such firearms, and special authorization to transport these firearms within and outside of Canada, except when transporting to and from an approved range is required.

Q3 – Which models are currently banned under the buyback program, and why were they selected

• Over 2,500 makes and models of firearms were re-classified as prohibited by the Governor in Council through Order in Council as part of the 2020, 2024 and 2025 prohibitions. They can no longer be legally used, sold, imported, transferred, or transported except as provided in the Amnesty Orders that accompanied each Order in Council or as authorized under appropriate business license under the Firearms Act.
• Firearms prohibited in 2020 and subsequent prohibitions in 2024, and 2025 possess basic technical characteristics, namely semi-automatic action with sustained rapid-fire capability (tactical or military design with large capacity magazine), that make them unsuitable for civilian use and a serious threat to public safety, given the degree to which they can increase the severity of mass shootings.

Q4 – In light of recent comments suggesting that municipal police services may lack the resources to enforce the federal firearms buyback program, could you share your assessment of their current capacity and how the government plans to support enforcement at the local level

• The Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program is a voluntary program for firearms owners. It provides an option for individual firearm owners and businesses to seek compensation and dispose of their prohibited firearms before the end of the amnesty period.
• The Program for individuals relies on the expertise of police of jurisdiction to safely and securely collect firearms from members of the public. This work cannot, and will not, compromise the crucial work that front-line police undertake to keep our communities safe every day. The Government is providing funding to support police of jurisdiction in collecting firearms using police on overtime, off duty and alternative operational resources.
• To minimize the burden on police, the department has also retained the services of a private contractor to pick up firearms from police detachments and destroy them. A Web Portal/Case Management System has also been developed to make sure the process runs smoothly.
• My officials are having productive meetings with police and municipal officials on the Program. It is very clear that the role of police in the Program would not impact frontline policing, and there is allocated money to reimburse them for their participation in the program.

Q5 – Your predecessor Dominic LeBlanc's appearance before this committee on October 23, 2023, he committed that the federal government would appoint Chief Firearms Officers (CFO) in jurisdictions that had not done so themselves, and that in provinces with their own CFOs—such as Alberta and Saskatchewan—your department would work to ensure federal firearms legislation is respected and enforced. Can you provide the committee with a status update on this commitment? Have federal CFOs been appointed in any additional jurisdictions since that commitment was made What mechanisms are in place to ensure that provincially appointed CFOs are enforcing federal firearms laws consistently

• There are currently seven provincially appointed Chief Firearms Officers (CFOs), including in Saskatchewan and Alberta. All other jurisdictions have federally appointed CFOs, including in the territories.
• All CFO positions, whether federally or provincially appointed, are occupied.:
• Nunavut and Manitoba are served by the same CFO (resident in Manitoba)
• Yukon and BC are served by the same CFO (resident in BC)
• Northwest Territories is served by a CFO who resides in Alberta
• The issue of CFO representation, particularly in the North, has been the subject of significant study and engagement, including with territorial officials.
• When this issue was discussed in the Senate in December 2023, the RCMP's Canadian Firearms Program advised that a review of the firearms regulatory service delivery model in each of the territories was already underway.
• This review spanned a ten-month period from May 2023 to March 2024. The RCMP consulted widely to seek perspectives of community members on firearms regulatory services with a view to identifying opportunities for improvement. The RCMP produced a Final Report, containing a number of findings and recommendations to enhance regulatory services in the North, including a dedicated northern Chief Firearms Officer who resides in one of the territories.
• While a resident CFO has not yet been appointed in the territories, the CFP has already taken a number of steps to respond to the findings.
• This includes providing licencing application assistance sessions and delivering female and youth-focused Canadian Firearms Safety Courses.
• Steps are also underway to enhance representation. More information will soon be available.
• With respect to ensuring consistent application of firearms legislation and regulations across all jurisdictions, the CFP leads an annual CFO partners meeting, which includes participation from all Federal and Provincial CFO partners to discuss firearms priorities, issues, and initiatives. In addition, the CFP leads monthly operational level meetings with federal and provincial CFO partners to support the development of operational policies, workflows, and best practices, all to ensure consistency between CFO jurisdictions.

Q6 – Bill C-21 provides a narrow exemption from the handgun freeze for athletes and coaches involved in Olympic and Paralympic disciplines. However, this has sparked significant controversy. Could you provide the committee with clarity on your department's position regarding the current implementation of the Olympic exemption? How many athletes have qualified and through which governing bodies? Are you considering expanding the exemption to include other competitive disciplines like International Practical Shooting Confederation or International Defensive Pistol Association? What safeguards are in place to prevent abuse of the exemption, and how do you respond to concerns that broadening it could undermine the handgun freeze

• The handgun freeze includes a limited exemption for athletes and coaches involved in Olympic and Paralympic shooting disciplines.
• Since 2022, 57 transfers have been made under this exemption, with eligibility confirmed by four recognized governing bodies: the Shooting Federation of Canada, Alberta Federation of Shooting Sports, British Columbia Target Shooting Association, and Saskatchewan Target Shooting Association.
• To qualify under the exemption, individuals must provide a letter to a Chief Firearms Officer (CFO) from a recognized governing body attesting that they are actively training, competing, or coaching in a handgun discipline listed on the programme of the International Olympic or Paralympic Committee.
• Safeguards are in place to prevent misuse, including oversight by CFOs.
• If there is concern about the validity of supporting documentation, the Canadian Firearms Program may contact the supporting governing body for additional information.
• There are no plans to expand the exemption. The exemption remains tightly focused on supporting our athletes training for the Olympics or Paralympics while limiting handgun proliferation.
• The transfer of handguns to individuals was restricted to cap the domestic market and help keep Canadian communities safe from handguns.
• In 2023, half of firearm-related violent crime (49%) in Canada involved the presence of a handgun. Evidence from industrialized countries around the world shows that where there are more guns, there are more gun deaths, injuries, and crimes.
• In 2020, there were approximately 1.1 million registered handguns in Canada, with 1 million registered to individuals. This represents a 74% increase since 2010.

Q7 – Bill C-21 introduced significant changes to firearms regulation, including a national handgun freeze and new licensing requirements. Could you update the committee on how these changes are affecting the training and certification of firearms safety instructors and the licensing and operational readiness of armed security personnel, such as those employed by Brinks or working in high-security sectors? What steps is your department taking to ensure these essential services are not disrupted by the new regulatory framework

• The handgun freeze includes exemptions for individuals who require restricted firearms for lawful professional purposes, including armed personnel in the cash-in-transit sector.
• The cash-in-transit workforce requires employees to hold a Restricted Possession and Acquisition Licence (RPAL) and an Authorization to Carry (ATC), issued by Chief Firearms Officers (CFOs). These requirements remain unchanged under the current framework.
• Employers remain responsible for ensuring their personnel meet all training and proficiency requirements, including completion of the Canadian Firearms Safety Course and the Canadian Restricted Firearms Safety Course.
• Discussions about operational impacts of the handgun freeze were the subject of engagement with industry and labour representatives, including on the availability of certified instructors and training sessions.
• CFOs have the authority to designate firearms safety instructors, including in-house trainers, provided they meet national standards. This authority allows jurisdictions to respond to local training needs and workforce pressures.
• Continued analysis and updating of materials related to the Canadian Restricted Firearms Safety Course (course and exam materials) is underway. New course material expected to be published by spring 2026.
• Public Safety Canada continues to work with the Canadian Firearms Program (CFP) and CFOs to monitor impacts and support essential services while maintaining public safety.

Q8 – Given that a significant proportion of crime guns in Canada are traced back to the United States, what specific measures is your department taking to stem the flow of these prohibited firearms across the border, and how effective have these measures been to date

• With the Border Plan, we are bolstering our frontline and ensuring that officers have the tools and technology they need to continue to interdict illicit drugs and illegal firearms.
• Over the last five years, over 3,000 firearms from the U.S. have been seized at our border. In 2024 alone, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) seized more than 930 firearms – 90% of which came from the U.S.
• The CBSA works with domestic and U.S. law enforcement partners in a joint effort to investigate, prevent criminal activity, seize guns and protect our communities.
• The Government of Canada works closely with domestic and international, and Indigenous partners to gather and share information to detect and investigate organized crime groups and networks involved in migrant smuggling.

Hiring of 1,000 CBSA and RCMP officers

QP Notes

Q1 – The Government has committed to hiring 1,000 new Royal Canadian Mounted Police officers. Can you outline your plans for delivering on this commitment, including how recruitment, training, and deployment will be phased in

• As per the Prime Minister's announcement on October 16, the RCMP would receive $1.8B over 4 years to hire 1,000 RCMP personnel, through Budget 2025 – which is subject to Parliamentary appropriations.
• This amount would also include funds to raise the Cadet Recruitment Allowance to $1,000/week and dedicate 150 new RCMP personnel to tackle financial crimes.
• The RCMP has mobilized to be ready to implement this important investment on an accelerated basis.

Q2 – The Government has announced the hiring of 1,000 new Canada Border Services Agency officers. What is your plan to meet this target, and how will these new officers be integrated into frontline operations over the coming months and years

• The government is committed to onboarding 1,000 new CBSA officers.
• This will enhance CBSA's integrated operations team to address threats across all ports of entry. Behind every border services officer at a port of entry, are the officers supporting them with intelligence, targeting, investigations and international operations.
• There will be 1,000 CBSA officers deployed at ports of entry, internationally and at specialized sites where targeting, intelligence and criminal investigations take place.
• Approximately 80% (800) will be recruited as border services officers, trained by the CBSA College and deployed across the country at ports of entry.
• The other approximately 20% (200) will include national targeting centre officers, inland enforcement officers (including detention and removals officers), criminal investigators, and intelligence officers who will be recruited from several different areas with different training.
• They will be hired from within the border services officer ranks, other security and law enforcement agencies or experienced headquarters staff who return to these operational roles.
• Border enforcement extends beyond the physical border. For example,
  • Enhanced targeting and intelligence supports our officers in seizing illegal guns, drugs, and stolen cars at ports of entry.
  • Inland enforcement officers deal with immigration investigations, detentions and removals from within Canada.
  • International officers prevent people who are inadmissible from coming to Canada in the first place. All of which are part of border operations.
• These resources will not go towards internal services in Ottawa. Rather, they will bring needed reinforcements on the ground, across the country and internationally.

Removal of Foreign Nationals convicted of serious crimes

QP Notes

Q1 – Recent reports reveal that nearly 600 foreign nationals ordered deported from Canada—including hundreds convicted of serious crimes—are missing and unaccounted for. Many have been evading removal for years. In 2023, your government shut down the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) 'Wanted' webpage, eliminating a key public tool for locating high-risk individuals. How do you explain this enforcement failure, and what steps are you taking to ensure deportation orders are executed transparently, consistently, and in a way that protects public safety

• Since 2021, the CBSA doubled the number of removals from 7,530 yearly to 18,048 last fiscal.
• When an inadmissible foreign national does not comply with removal requirements, the CBSA issues an arrest warrant and works relentlessly with police to track people down.
• More than 550 CBSA personnel are dedicated to immigration investigations and removals. They are focused on cases that pose a risk to security and public safety. CBSA also has a tip line for the public to share information about the whereabouts of those who are trying to evade the law.
• Last year, CBSA closed 542 immigration warrants involving criminals and 254 so far this year. They also removed 905 individuals inadmissible for criminality, organized criminality and security.
• Of the 599 cases flagged, CBSA knows the whereabouts of 100 people. These 100 are comprised of cases of people that are presently serving a criminal sentence, have already been removed or have had their warrants closed as they have either been apprehended and started reporting to the CBSA.
• CBSA officers are going to continue doing their job to remove people who have served sentences for crimes from this country.

Bail Reform

QP Notes

Q1 – With the expected tabling later this week of bail reform legislation, can you explain how these measures will address concerns about repeat violent offenders being released into communities

• While the specifics of bail reform fall under the Minister of Justice, I fully support legislative changes that enhance public safety by targeting repeat and high-risk offenders. My officials are working closely with their justice colleagues to advance on these commitments.
• As announced by the Prime Minister last week, this new bill will include the following amendments to the Criminal Code:
  • Introducing reverse-onus bail for major crimes.
  • Allowing consecutive sentencing so multiple crimes mean longer time behind bars.
  • Imposing harsher penalties for organised retail theft.
  • Restricting conditional sentences for a number of sexual offences.
• I would emphasize, however, that these measures aim to strengthen responses at both the bail and sentencing stages, addressing concerns raised by provinces, stakeholders, and the public about violent reoffending, organized crime, and auto theft.
• The goal is to improve community safety and restore confidence in the justice system.

Q2 – Do you believe public safety should be the primary consideration in bail decisions, and if so, how does the current federal framework reflect that priority

• Public safety is a top priority, and while bail decisions are governed by the Criminal Code under the Minister of Justice, my department is focused on supporting complementary measures.
• This includes funding and programs that enhance enforcement, prevent crime, and reduce reoffending.
• Legislative changes are one part of a broader strategy to strengthen the bail system and support communities through targeted interventions and crime prevention efforts.

Q3 – How is your department working with provincial governments to address concerns about repeat offenders and bail enforcement? Are you working with provinces like Ontario, which have called for ankle monitors, mandatory detention for certain crimes, and a "three-strikes" rule

• Bail reform is a shared responsibility, and we're working closely with provinces and territories to improve public safety outcomes.
• For example, through the Gun and Gang Violence Action Fund, we're providing $390.6M over five years to support enforcement, prevention, and intervention initiatives. In Ontario, a portion of the funds are being used for Intensive Firearm Bail Support Teams.
• We also invest in community-led programs through the Building Safer Communities Fund and the National Crime Prevention Strategy. Improving data sharing with provinces remains a key priority to assess the impact of reforms and monitor trends.
• Efforts by both the federal government and the provinces and territories that contribute to this goal are critical and welcomed, including initiatives which enhance enforcement and supervision as well as broader supports that address mental health, addiction, and underlying causes of criminality.

Q4 – While bail reform is one measure to address crime, what actions is the department taking to address its root causes and reduce recidivism

• To truly make communities safer, we must make major investments to build affordable housing, support those struggling with mental health and addictions, and reinforce programs for at-risk youth.
• This work is being undertaken in partnership with provinces, territories, municipalities, and local law enforcement, because to be effective, our solutions must reflect the realities of the communities we serve.

Q5 – Do you support mandatory passport surrender for non-citizens and non–permanent residents as a bail condition, as proposed in Bill C-242

• I think the Bill raises important issues that should be met with serious consideration but is it critical to remember that any bail conditions should be tied to effectively managing risk of the accused and keeping our communities safe. I also understand that there is currently the authority in place already for the courts to impose conditions which limit flight risk.
• However, I can assure this Committee that delivering public safety results though evidence-based policy will always guide our positions, and we are prepared to support any initiative which furthers this goal.

If pressed

With respect to support for Bill C-242 specifically, it is currently in the process of being reviewed and analyzed by the Government so that we may fully understand its policy, operational and legal impacts. Accordingly, our position on the Bill remains under consideration at this time.

Bill C-70 Implementation

QP Notes

Q1 – Why has the government not yet appointed a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner or implemented the foreign agent registry mandated by Bill C-70

• We know political interference and influence can be particularly challenging to address given it does not always manifest itself in traditional lobbying activities. That is why we brought forward the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) – to shine a light on those areas where influence activities would otherwise be undertaken in darkness.
• Bringing the FITAA into force is a significant undertaking and officials continue to work to ensure its full and timely implementation. We are learning some similar efforts undertaken by Canada's allies which have taken more than two years to implement.
• The appointment of an independent commissioner is a top priority that requires a rigorous selection process to ensure credibility and impartiality. Other major components of the regime are under development include regulations, setting up the Commissioner's Office, building an enforcement system with financial penalties and possible criminal charges for serious violations; and developing a secure, user-friendly online platform for registration and public access.
• The regime will be launched in the shortest possible timeframe while still being sure to get it right. Canadians looking to report foreign interference can utilize the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) phonelines and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security.
• We appreciate any time allegations of foreign interference are brought forward and encourage all those who wish to report such activities to do so to the responsible federal authorities.

Q2 – Bill C-70 aims to counter foreign interference and transnational repression, but concerns have been raised about potential unintended impacts on diaspora communities, particularly regarding civic engagement and freedom of expression. Could you update the committee on how your department is engaging with diaspora communities to address these concerns and ensure the legislation is implemented in a way that protects their rights while achieving its national security objectives

Foreign Influence Transparency Registry Implementation

• The Registry is not a Foreign Agent Registry. It focuses on openness and transparency in public affairs, not stigmatization of specific groups or individuals.
• Freedom of expression and civic engagement are not restricted. Canadians are free to speak out and participate in democratic processes.
• The Registry simply requires transparency when someone acts on behalf of a foreign government to influence political or governmental decisions.
• Diaspora communities have been consulted and largely support the initiative as a way to shed light on foreign interference, which can disproportionately affect them. They continue to be engaged during the regulatory development to ensure fair and inclusive implementation.

Engagement on FI and NS laws, incl. C-70 (general)

• Engagement with Canadians, including diaspora communities, is at the heart of Public Safety Canada's approach to countering foreign interference.
• For example, on Bill C-70 we held broad consultations before and during the legislative process, including nearly 1,000 online responses and meeting with hundreds of stakeholders, including community groups, advocacy organizations, and faith-based leaders. In these sessions we discussed the potential impact any proposed legislation would have on freedom of expression in Canada and how the legislation could ensure it is consistent with Charter-protected rights.
• With regard to ongoing engagement, Public Safety Canada, in collaboration with our security and intelligence partners, has been delivering cross-country engagement sessions with community members vulnerable to transnational repression and foreign interference, providing them with practical tools and knowledge to better protect themselves against threats. These engagements provide space for meaningful dialogue on how we can ensure Canada's national security laws and policies can be implemented in a way that upholds Charter rights and protects communities.

Q3 – Minister, this committee will soon begin a study on Russian disinformation and its impacts on Canadian society. In light of this, could you outline how countering foreign disinformation—particularly Kremlin-backed influence operations—fits within your department's current mandate and priorities? What steps is Public Safety Canada taking to detect, disrupt, and build resilience against these threats, and how are you coordinating with other federal agencies and civil society to ensure a comprehensive response

• Public Safety Canada works closely with the Canadian security and intelligence community and portfolio agencies to coordinate domestic and international responses to foreign information manipulation and interference operations that present a risk to our national security, including Russian disinformation and influence.
• We coordinate with federal agencies by chairing key policy and operational tables, ensuring that a wide range of tools and authorities are considered in determining and delivering appropriate responses.
• The department also supports other interdepartmental efforts to respond to instances of foreign information manipulation and interference. For example, the Deputy Ministers' Committee on Intelligence Action addresses actionable intelligence reports and coordinates operational responses to protect Canada's democratic processes and institutions.
• Housed at Public Safety, Canada's National Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator has, and will continue to engage with at-risk Canadian communities, academia, civil society partners, as well as other levels of government in Canada to raise awareness of these issues while at the same time increasing the Government of Canada's understanding of Canadian perspectives and challenges, which informs our collective actions in this space.
• Public Safety Canada is actively working with partners, including Privy Council Office (PCO) Democratic Institutions to develop new and innovative policy solutions to counter foreign information manipulation and interference.

Q4 – Bill C-70 significantly expands the federal response to foreign interference. Can you confirm whether the RCMP has received the necessary resources to implement the new authorities and responsibilities under this legislation? Specifically, what additional funding and personnel have been allocated to support foreign interference investigations? As the RCMP enhanced its capacity to engage with communities and respond to transnational repression? Are further investments anticipated to ensure sustained enforcement and operational readiness

• The RCMP responds to all threats, including those involving foreign actor interference. Foreign actor interference is a complex and dynamic threat environment that necessitates a whole-of-government approach. The RCMP will continue to work with its domestic and international partners to assess, adapt and build capacity to counter this evolving threat.
• The RCMP received funding announced in Budget 2023 to "protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation, increase its investigative capacity, and more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted." This funding was used to onboard 46.3 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) to tackle foreign interference. More recently, on October 16, 2025, the Prime Minister announced that the Government will invest $1.8 billion over four years in Budget 2025 to increase federal policing capacity.
• In addition, the RCMP is conducting outreach and engagement with the diaspora and ethnocultural communities targeted by state-backed harassment and intimidation campaigns and activities. The RCMP also provides guidance and support resources for officers and investigators conducting engagement and outreach activities with police of jurisdiction and diaspora communities who are experiencing state-backed harassment and intimidation, as well as the private sector.

Q5 – How do you respond to the allegations of corruption and covert influence in Prince Edward Island (PEI)

• When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is informed of any allegations of foreign interference, including covert foreign influences, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise, and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe. In addition, the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP) can investigate and respond to allegations of foreign interference, including political interference by a foreign government.
• We are always working to improve our approach to counter foreign interference and have taken decisive actions to bolster our posture. For example, the Countering Foreign Interference Act:
  • provided CSIS with new legal authorities to share threat information with a wider set of Canadian partners than the federal government;
  • implemented new offences that cover foreign interference and malign foreign influence, even when those actions target provincial and municipal governments; and,
  • established a secure administrative review proceeding that provides greater flexibility to the Government to protect intelligence during an administrative proceeding.
• Since the passage of the Countering Foreign Interference Act, federal departments have been working to educate partners and stakeholders across government (including subnational governments and police of jurisdiction) on the new laws and how and when they apply. In addition, the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC) has worked with federal law enforcement and national security partners to deliver workshops to civil society groups and key interlocutors across Canada, including in Atlantic Canada, on how to build resilience to the threat and how to report foreign interference to responsible authorities.
• We continue to urge organizations or members of the public who bring allegations of foreign interference forward to continue to report these to the RCMP or CSIS.

Access to Data and Information: Bills C-2 and C-8

QP Notes

Q1 – Both Bill C-2 and Bill C-8 expand government access to private data without requiring a warrant. How does the government justify this erosion of privacy protections

• Canada's privacy protections remain robust, and both Bill C-2 and Bill C-8 operate within that framework.
• Bill C-2 allows law enforcement and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to request basic service information, such as whether a subscriber exists, from electronic service providers without a warrant. No personal data is accessed without judicial authorization.
• In emergencies, limited data like transmission or location may be retrieved without a warrant, but only under strict legal conditions. These provisions build on existing Criminal Code powers and align Canada with G7 and Five Eyes partners, establishing one of the most privacy-protective standards internationally.
• Bill C-8 does not authorize warrantless access to Canadians' personal data. It explicitly prohibits interception of private communications and focuses solely on securing Canada's telecommunications infrastructure.
• Any data collected under Bill C-8, such as technical information about cyber incidents, is defined through stakeholder consultation and protected under the Privacy Act. Oversight by National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) ensures accountability.
• Ultimately, both bills aim to modernize Canada's security tools while safeguarding privacy and protecting Canadians from cyber threats and criminal activity.

Q2 – Why is the government centralizing power in ministers through legislation like C-2 and C-8, without robust checks and balances

• Both bills include strong oversight mechanisms.
• Under C-2, Ministerial Orders require consultation with the Minister of Industry and affected service providers, who may seek judicial review. Independent review bodies like NSIRA and NSICOP also have authority to examine activities.
• Bill C-8 includes safeguards such as reasonableness standards, consultation requirements, and transparency through public reporting. Powers under the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act rest with Cabinet, not individual ministers, and are scoped to protect infrastructure, not to enable surveillance.

Q3 – Industry and civil society have raised concerns about both bills. How has the government engaged with stakeholders to address these issues? Was the Privacy Commissioner and the Intelligence Commissioner consulted

• Extensive consultations have taken place on both bills. Public Safety has held briefings and bilateral meetings with civil society, industry, academia, provinces, and law enforcement regarding Bill C-2.
• For Bill C-8, consultations began when it was first introduced as Bill C-26, and included the Privacy Commissioner and the Intelligence Commissioner. Feedback from stakeholders led to key amendments, such as clearer privacy protections, reporting requirements, and due diligence provisions, all of which remain in the current version of the bill.

Q4 – Part 1 of Bill C-8 confers extraordinary powers, such as 'terminating services to anyone'. How can the government ensure they aren't cutting off essential services for Canadians

• The powers in Bill C-8 are designed to protect Canada's telecommunications system from severe threats, such as large-scale cyberattacks.
• Any order must be reasonable, proportionate to the threat, and based on specified criteria. Impacted parties are consulted in advance and can make representations.
• The Minister of Industry must also be consulted. Orders are public by default, with confidential orders subject to oversight by NSIRA and NSICOP. These safeguards ensure powers are used responsibly and only in exceptional circumstances.

Q5 – In light of the recent NSIRA report indicating that CSIS failed to disclose the use of a novel and intrusive surveillance technology to both the Federal Court and Public Safety officials, how do you intend to ensure that intelligence agencies operate with greater transparency and accountability, especially as Bill C-2 proposes expanding warrantless powers

• The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is subject to rigorous national security review: the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians have broad access to CSIS information, are free from any government intervention in the review process, and are deeply engaged with the Government's national security community. The existence of this review, including its findings and recommendations is evidence of the system's efficacy.
• My department will be working with CSIS to review and update accountability processes to take into account NSIRA reviews and the evolving national security environment.Bill C-2 is aimed at ensuring that Canada's law enforcement and intelligence investigators have the necessary tools to detect, deter and respond to today's technology-enabled threats to Canada and Canadians while protecting Charter rights and freedoms. CSIS's future use of Bill C-2, like all their activities, are also subject to review by NSIRA and NSICOP.

Russian Disinformation

QP Notes

Q1 – Minister, this committee will soon begin a study on Russian disinformation and its impacts on Canadian society. In light of this, could you outline how countering foreign disinformation—particularly Kremlin-backed influence operations—fits within your department's current mandate and priorities? What steps is Public Safety Canada taking to detect, disrupt, and build resilience against these threats, and how are you coordinating with other federal agencies and civil society to ensure a comprehensive response

• Public Safety Canada works closely with the Canadian security and intelligence community and portfolio agencies to coordinate domestic and international responses to foreign information manipulation and interference operations that present a risk to our national security, including Russian disinformation and influence.
• We coordinate with federal agencies by chairing key policy and operational tables, ensuring that a wide range of tools and authorities are considered in determining and delivering appropriate responses.
• The department also supports other interdepartmental efforts to respond to instances of foreign information manipulation and interference. For example, the Deputy Ministers' Committee on Intelligence Action addresses actionable intelligence reports and coordinates operational responses to protect Canada's democratic processes and institutions.
• Housed at Public Safety, Canada's National Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator has, and will continue to engage with at-risk Canadian communities, academia, civil society partners, as well as other levels of government in Canada to raise awareness of these issues while at the same time increasing the Government of Canada's understanding of Canadian perspectives and challenges, which informs our collective actions in this space.
• Public Safety Canada is actively working with partners, including Privy Council Office (PCO) Democratic Institutions to develop new and innovative policy solutions to counter foreign information manipulation and interference.

Detecting and Disrupting the Illegal Fentanyl Trade

QP Notes

Q1 – What concrete steps is the Government taking to detect and disrupt the illegal fentanyl trade at our border—and how are you working with U.S. counterparts to ensure these efforts are effective

• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act will give law enforcement the right tools to fight the illegal drug trade and organized crime, tackle money laundering, and keep our borders secure.
• It builds on Border Plan investments in detection and imaging tools, intelligence sharing capacity, and a Joint Strike Force with the U.S.
• We will invest in 1,000 new RCMP officers, 1,000 new border officers, and prosecution to fight drug trafficking and other crimes, and put drug traffickers behind bars.
• We will continue to support enforcement as part of a federal drug policy that protects the health and safety of all Canadians.

Q2 – Organized crime and fentanyl trafficking rely heavily on money laundering to fund their operations. What steps is your government taking to detect, disrupt, and prosecute money laundering schemes linked to fentanyl? Moreover, how are you ensuring these financial tools are aligned and coordinated with our U.S. counterparts

• This government is taking decisive action to identify and disrupt money laundering networks, particularly those linked to organized crime and the illicit drug trade.
• The Government has:
  • Led the development of the G7 Financial Crime Call to Action to tackle financial crime.
  • Created new Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec;
  • Launched the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to help law enforcement and Canada's big banks share more information; and
  • Invested in modernizing the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)'s intelligence and compliance tools to mitigate money laundering threats.
• It will also:
  • Provide $29.9 million to the Canada Border Services Agency to combat trade-based financial crime; and
  • Increase penalties for non-compliance.
• These measures confront the threat of money laundering, promote financial integrity and protect Canadians.

Q3 – Minister, Canada is subject to international scrutiny under the Financial Action Task Force, which has raised concerns about gaps in our anti-money laundering regime. Can you explain how the government is addressing these vulnerabilities? Is the Government of Canada implementing the FATF's recently issued specific guidance on detecting and combating money laundering tied to fentanyl and synthetic opioids

• Since 2018, the Government has invested nearly $470 million to strengthen data resources, financial intelligence and information sharing to support anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing (AML/ATF) investigations in Canada.
• In 2021, FATF recognized Canada's AML/ATF regime's improved compliance with FATF standards.
• In 2022, Canada co-led a FATF report on money laundering linked to illegal synthetic opioids to raise international awareness about the illegal opioid trade and related global financial flows. The report outlines risk indicators to help operational authorities identify potential trafficking of illicit opioids.
• The Government continues to work closely with the FATF as part of its ongoing mutual evaluation (2024-2026) to further strengthen Canada's AML/ATF regime.

Q4 – Organized drug crime groups operate across borders and adapt quickly to enforcement efforts. Given this transnational threat, how is Canada working with international partners—through bilateral agreements and multilateral forums—to strengthen our collective ability to detect and disrupt the financial networks that enable the global fentanyl trade

• Law and border enforcement officials work directly with international counterparts every day to keep our border secure and Canadians safe from drug threats.
• Our work through the Canada-U.S. Opioids Action Plan and the North American Drug Dialogue helps us to share information, learn about best practices, and coordinate drug policies.
• We work through the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs to make sure fentanyl precursors are controlled in all countries.
• This engagement is helping the Government to tackle this global threat, and we will continue to support it.

Q5 – What is the Government doing to ensure that Canadian police services have the operational capacity, intelligence tools, and investigative resources they need to effectively target and dismantle organized crime networks involved in fentanyl trafficking

• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) Federal Policing program detects, investigates, and disrupts significant criminal threats to public safety, including the illegal fentanyl market.
• Intelligence and investigative efforts target all aspects of the drug trade. This includes transnational organized crime groups involved in production and trafficking of illegal substances, including fentanyl.
• The RCMP operates Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and Response teams in specific regions that target organized crime groups involved in the production of illegal substances, including fentanyl. They provide specialized support to local law enforcement in detecting and dismantling clandestine drug production sites.
• We will hire 1,000 new RCMP personnel to further support these efforts and we will continue to work with law enforcement to fight illegal fentanyl and the organized crime groups behind it.

Q6 – What measures are being taken to strengthen Canada's border enforcement capabilities to detect and intercept fentanyl and related precursors, and how is the Government ensuring that frontline agencies like CBSA are equipped to respond to the evolving tactics of organized drug traffickers

• The CBSA works closely with the RCMP and police of jurisdiction to support criminal investigations and prosecutions.
• Through Canada's Border Plan, CBSA is bolstering the frontline and ensuring officers have the tools and technology required to continue to interdict illegal drugs and firearms.
• In February and March, CBSA's Operation Blizzard made over 2,600 seizures of suspected narcotics and precursors, most of which were coming to Canada from the U.S.
• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act will further strengthen our border security through changes to strengthen CBSA's ability to detect and seize drugs, weapons, and stolen cars, before they leave Canada.
• We are in the process of hiring 1,000 new CBSA personnel and will continue to explore every tool available to keep our border strong and illegal drugs and precursors from crossing it.

Bill C-12, Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act

QP Notes

Q1 – What is the difference between Bill C-2 and Bill C-12

• Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, and Bill C-12, the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act, both advance the Government of Canada's commitment to keeping our borders secure and communities safe. They both build on the the priorities set out in Canada's $1.3 billion Border Plan and share the same overarching objectives to combat transnational organized crime, disrupt fentanyl trafficking and illicit financing, and enhance coordination across border and law enforcement agencies.
• Bill C-2 focuses on modernizing enforcement tools to target organized crime and money laundering, including provisions to improve law enforcement access to basic subscriber information, restrict large cash transactions and third-party deposits, and stop illicit drugs such as fentanyl from travelling through the mail.
• Bill C-12 includes initiatives to secure the border—such as improving the immigration system, increasing information-sharing on sex offender travel, and expanding the Canadian Coast Guard's mandate to include security—and reinforces measures to combat transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, and money laundering.
• The introduction of Bill C-12 allows for the timely consideration of key measures by Parliament, while providing space for continued consultation on the broader reforms proposed in Bill C-2.

Q2 – Did you introduce a new Border Bill because you got it wrong the first time

• The introduction of Bill C-12 reinforces our Government's commitment to equipping law enforcement agencies with the right tools to keep our borders secure. It draws on the elements of Bill C-2 to combat transnational organized crime, stop the flow of illegal fentanyl, crack down on money laundering, dismantle criminal networks, and improve the integrity of our immigration system.
• Bill C-12 allows for the timely consideration of key border measures by Parliament, while providing space for continued consultation on the broader reforms proposed in Bill C-2, such as lawful access to data and measures to stop the trafficking of fentanyl by mail.
• We have listened to Canadians and to Parliamentarians, and I am confident that both want meaningful conversations on these issues.

Q3 – What legislative gaps are you closing with the measures included in Bill C-12

• Canada's Border Plan always contemplated the need for legislative changes to close some key gaps and provide new legislative tools to secure our borders and enhance the integrity of our immigration system.
• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act advances key legislative commitments made in the Border Plan and is designed to close several operational and legislative gaps that have limited Canada's ability to respond effectively to evolving threats.
• These include gaps in border enforcement, such as limited authority for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to inspect exports and access private facilities, limited ability for the Canadian Coast Guard to support border and law enforcement with maritime surveillance, and weaknesses in the asylum system that allow delayed or irregular claims to proceed.
• This new bill is intended to advance pressing elements of Bill C-2, while leaving time for further study of the more complex pieces contained in the original bill.

Canada's Border Plan

QP Notes

Q1 – As we approach one year since the announcement of Canada's Border Plan, what results are you seeing from these investments

• The Government is advancing efforts under the Border Plan to address the flow of illegal fentanyl, tackle organized crime and illegal migration, and increase information sharing and operational coordination with partners.
• Meaningful results have been achieved. For example, since June 2024, there has been a dramatic reduction of 99% in illegal southbound movement from Canada to the United States (U.S.). This is thanks to more and better enforcement and intelligence-sharing at the border between Canada and the U.S, and also due to integrity measures taken upstream by our colleagues at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
• Canada has invested in enhanced security at Ports of Entry (POE) and between them with increased surveillance via new drones, towers, and helicopters, and deployed additional resources that together now allow for 24/7 surveillance.
• Operational coordination has improved with the appointment of a Fentanyl Czar to lead coordination on disrupting the fentanyl trade, and the creation of the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell bringing together key agencies to turn actionable intelligence into law enforcement operations.
• The designation of seven transnational criminal organizations as terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code has also given law enforcement new tools against them, such as the freezing of their Canadian assets.
• Fentanyl seizures from Canada to the U.S. continue to be minimal, and constitute well below 1% of all fentanyl seized by the U.S at its borders. Between January 2022 and August 2025, only 136 pounds of fentanyl were seized within the area of the U.S. Northern Border, while over 73,000 pounds were seized at the U.S. Southwest Border, more than 500 times as much.
• Information-sharing gaps between the various key players (including the U.S.) are being addressed via the creation of a Canada-U.S. Strike Force for joint intelligence mapping and assessments, and the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information-sharing between law enforcement and the financial sector.
• These examples of results demonstrate that the Border Plan is delivering tangible progress in securing Canada's borders and disrupting illegal activity, and more results will come as these investments continue to roll out over the next few years.

Q2 – How has the Border Plan improved border surveillance

• Canada's Border Plan includes several measures that have enhanced surveillance of the Canada–U.S. border.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has deployed an Aerial Intelligence Task Force, equipped with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers. They are further reinforced by RCMP Border Integrity Operations Centres (BIOCs), responsible for monitoring surveillance equipment between the ports of entry.
• As part of the Aerial Intelligence Task Force, the RCMP are flying three Black Hawk helicopters daily to enhance continuous monitoring and rapid response capabilities regarding border incidents.
• Additionally, artificial intelligence and imaging tools are deployed to detect illegal drugs, particularly fentanyl, before they enter Canada. The Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) is also training and deploying new canine teams and chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry.

Q3 – Could you explain why the RCMP selected Black Hawk helicopters for border operations, what specific capabilities they offer compared to other platforms, and how they support the RCMP's operational objectives

• The RCMP selected Black Hawk helicopters based on their ability to meet specific operational needs for border enforcement. These aircraft offer long-range coverage, high payload capacity, and rapid deployment capabilities, including fast-roping and rappelling for tactical operations.
• At the time of charter, they were the only platform available through Public Services and Procurement Canada's standing offer that met all requirements for patrolling remote areas between ports of entry.

Q4 – Can you clarify why the RCMP chose to lease rather than purchase these helicopters, and why the fleet is limited to only three aircraft despite the scale of border surveillance needs

• Leasing through an existing Public Service and Procurement Canada standing offer allowed the RCMP to quickly address urgent border security needs while maintaining flexibility and cost-efficiency.
• The fleet size reflects staffing capacity and operational priorities, with the three Black Hawks deployed to high-risk areas identified through intelligence. The RCMP also uses other aircraft, including covert surveillance and its own rotary and fixed-wing platforms.
• Planning is underway for a competitive long-term lease, with the goal of purchasing helicopters once capital funding becomes available.

Q5 – How have Border Plan investments improved operational coordination and cooperation between domestic agencies and with the United States

• Canada–U.S. border collaboration remains robust and highly institutionalized, underpinned by decades of trust and shared strategic interests. Operational programs such as preclearance, Shiprider, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Border Security Task Forces (BEST – U.S.-led) exemplify the depth of coordination between agencies.
• A key example of how the Border Plan aims to improve operational coordination with U.S. partners is the establishment a North American Joint Strike Force, which aims to target transnational organized crime involvement in the illegal drug trade and combat the trafficking of illegal substances and precursor chemicals. The Joint Strike Force provides for joint mapping and targeted efforts between the two countries to tackle these threats.
• On the domestic front, the designation of seven cartels as terrorist entities has enabled key players from Canada's financial services sector and law enforcement to further improve intelligence collection and coordination, strengthening efforts against transnational organized crime.
• We are also setting up regional information-sharing hubs that will bring together key Federal, Provincial, local, and Indigenous law enforcement to support operational coordination, with a focus on high-risk drug trafficking areas.

Q6 – Why not expand CBSA's mandate to patrol the border between ports of entry, rather than have two agencies responsible for border surveillance

• Currently the CBSA has the mandate to enforce border legislation and various other acts at Ports of Entry (POEs). Enforcement between POEs is performed by the RCMP as part of its federal policing mandate. This mirrors the division of labour between our counterparts in the U.S. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Border Patrol).
• When apprehensions are made by the RCMP between POEs, apprehended individuals are brought to a CBSA Port of Entry for processing. The CBSA closely coordinates with RCMP for border enforcement.
• The CBSA plays a critical role in protecting our borders and ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. It enforces over 100 acts, regulations, and international agreements on behalf of other federal departments, agencies, provinces, and territories.
• Public Safety is constantly reviewing the mandate, authorities, and resources needed to ensure a safe, secure and efficient border and has taken note of various stakeholders' recommendations on the expansion of CBSA's mandate and is analyzing these recommendations.

Border Management

QP Notes

Q1 – As of February 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) removed the non-binary 'X' gender option from the NEXUS application system, requiring applicants to select only 'male' or 'female'. What steps is the Government of Canada taking to support affected travellers and to engage with U.S. authorities on ensuring inclusive and respectful treatment of all Canadians at the border

• Despite the recent changes by the U.S. administration to the NEXUS application form, Canada continues to recognize and support gender diversity and inclusion.
• NEXUS is a voluntary program. Membership is not required for travel to the US. Canadian citizens can continue to travel on Canadian passports indicating "gender X."
• This change doesn't impact NEXUS cards with a "gender X" issued prior to the U.S. change – they remain valid.

Q2 – While CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM) is intended to modernize customs and revenue management, many Canadian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME) have faced onboarding challenges. What is the Government doing to ensure these businesses can continue cross-border operations smoothly, especially in the context of ongoing Canada–U.S. trade tensions

• Recognizing this is a significant change for industry, the Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) implemented a range of transition measures to give businesses time to adapt and ensure goods continue to move efficiently.
• Since CARM's launch, CBSA officials have actively engaged with industry, adjusting transition measures as needed, including expedited release for perishable and certain essential goods.
• To support businesses, the CBSA has extended certain transition measures until December 31, 2025, enhanced its CARM helpdesk capacity to handle onboarding enquiries, including a dedicated customs brokers line, and delivered 54 webinars since May 20 to help businesses onboard and use the system.

Q3 – How is the CBSA ensuring that small and seasonal importers are not disadvantaged by the new requirements under CARM

• I understand that the transition to CARM and the requirement to post financial security may be more challenging for small and seasonal importers.
• CBSA officials are working with these businesses to overcome these challenges and increasing their outreach to spread awareness of the new requirements, such as reaching out through U.S. trade networks to US-based companies who import into Canada and may be less aware. Small business enrollments are increasing daily as a result.
• Following the extended 210-day transition period, the CBSA continues to provide temporary measures allowing the continued use of brokers' financial security until at least December 31, 2025, contingency options for time-sensitive and certain essential goods, increased outreach to small importers, and dedicated help-desk services to assist with CARM registration and onboarding.
• Small businesses continue to have the option to pay duties and taxes upon entry into Canada.

Q4 – How does CARM impact Canada's responsiveness to U.S. trade actions and global developments

• CARM enables the CBSA to implement surtax and remission orders quickly and accurately through automated tariff coding and centralized account management.
• This allows Canada to respond to U.S. trade measures and other global shifts without the delays previously caused by manual systems.

Q5 – The Canada Border Services Agency recently announced coordinated changes with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to reduce service hours at 35 land ports of entry. What steps is the Government taking to ensure these changes do not negatively affect border communities, local economies, and the movement of goods and people in affected regions

• Canada and the United States have one of the closest and most extensive relationships in the world, including our shared border.
• Better alignment of service hours at ports of entry will enhance security at the border and allow the redeployment of border services officers where they are most needed.
• The Canada Border Services Agency will continue to work closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection counterparts and other enforcement partners, to keep the border open to legitimate trade and travel while protecting our communities from illegal activities.

If Pressed

• Almost all of these ports of entry are processing an average of two or less cars or commercial trucks per hour during the hours that will no longer be in operation, and;
• Travellers have an alternative border crossing option within a 100 km radius.

Q6 – Can you explain the recent CBSA IT systems outages that resulted in delays for travellers and commercial processing

• First, I want to be clear that these outages were not the result of a cyberattack. They started following unforeseen technical problems during routine systems maintenance on September 28.
• During the outages, CBSA personnel and partners from airport authorities and bridge and tunnel operators acted quickly to manually process travellers, traffic and shipments, while ensuring safety and security.
• While the initial outages were resolved within 48 hours, the impacts on kiosks at airports and on commercial processing at some ports of entry continued as the CBSA worked to address the backlogs that were created.
• CBSA officials are working closely with Shared Services Canada, who provides secure IT infrastructure services, to reduce the risk of future outages and strengthen its contingency plans based on the experience gained from these recent outages.

Q7 – What percentage of containerized cargo entering Canada is currently screened to detect contraband or security threats, and what technologies are used to support that screening

The CBSA screens 100% of containerized marine cargo entering Canada using a combination of risk assessment and tools and technologies. This includes targeting, Large-Scale Imaging, portal radiation detection, and destuff examination.

Q8 – You recently received a letter from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative urging you to restore and expand customs clearance capacity. The letter highlights the withdrawal of CBSA services from the Port of Valleyfield and the lack of clearance options at other strategic ports including Hamilton, Windsor, Québec City, Picton, Port Colborne, and Goderich. What concrete steps are you taking to restore and expand customs clearance capacity at Valleyfield and these other corridor ports to ensure Canada's competitiveness and supply chain resilience

• I want to highlight CBSA's role not only in national security and public safety but in the economic security of Canada. CBSA's work at ports is not only to stop contraband from coming in but to make sure legitimate goods flow quickly across the border.
• Our government is focused on trade diversification, which is evident by the work that the Prime Minister is leading with countries around the world. Making sure that our supply chains are fluid and that we have the right port infrastructure is a joint effort that involves my Transport, ISED, Trade and other colleagues.
• I can assure you that we are working together to make sure that we have the right infrastructure in the right places, to support fluidity while also protecting the safety of Canadians.

If pressed on sending CBSA officers/designate the port of Valleyfield

We will do what is right for the Canadian economy and this will be done in consultation with my Cabinet colleagues.

Q9 – How are you respecting indigenous rights and interests in the management of the Canada-U.S. border

• Indigenous communities on both sides of the Canada-U.S. Border are key partners in ensuring a safe, secure and efficient experience crossing the border. Many communities, such as the Akwesasne Mohawk Community directly straddle the border and interact daily with Canadian and U.S. border enforcement.
• Indigenous communities have been directly involved in the development and implementation of Canada's Border Plan, for example, by participating in Table Top Exercises organized with all provinces and territories in January 2025.
• Public Safety also provides funding to Indigenous law enforcement, including for border enforcement activities, through the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP).
• We are also a convenor of the Jay Treaty Border Alliance (JTBA) Collaborative Initiative High Table, which works to facilitate Indigenous Border mobility and brings together governments, First Nations, and U.S. Federally Recognized Tribes.
• Public Safety Canada is also working with IRCC to examine border mobility rights for Canadian and U.S. Indigenous communities, in furtherance of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act Action Plan Measure 52 (UNDA APM 52).

Border Enforcement

QP Notes

Q1 – Given the alarming rise in human smuggling cases along the Canada–U.S. border, can you elaborate on the Government's current strategy to disrupt organized migrant smuggling networks

• The Government of Canada works closely with domestic and international, and Indigenous partners to gather and share information to detect and investigate organized crime groups and networks involved in migrant smuggling.
• Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy is a whole-of-Government approach that combines domestic and international capabilities to protect the integrity of Canada's borders.
• Through this Strategy, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detects and prevents migrant smuggling, and has saved hundreds of lives.
• In addition, Canada's Border Plan combines existing efforts and capabilities with new initiatives and investments to enhance investigative and surveillance capacity and border enforcement.

Q2 – What specific measures are the RCMP taking to identify and dismantle organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling operations in Canada

• The RCMP is dedicated to addressing migrant smuggling at the Canadian border and abroad, including through Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy.
• The RCMP uses technology, intelligence and other tools to prevent, detect, investigate and disrupt organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling.

Q3 – How does the RCMP collaborate with international law enforcement partners to prevent migrant smuggling before individuals reach Canadian borders

• The RCMP works closely with the U.S. and other international law enforcement partners to investigate transnational human smuggling networks that facilitate the movement of people.
• This includes close collaboration with U.S. law enforcement through the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee and the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, also known as Shiprider.
• Under Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, the RCMP works with law enforcement partners domestic and abroad to increase their capacity to disrupt and dismantle migrant smuggling criminal organizations.

Q4 – What is the RCMP's mandate for southbound migration

• The RCMP is responsible for ensuring border security between official Ports of Entry.
• The RCMP continues to respond to the border through a combination of patrol resources, technology and partnerships with agencies in Canada and the U.S.

Q5 – With the significant increase in refugee entries at the Saint-Bernard-de-Lacolle border crossing from the United States, what concrete steps is the Government taking to manage this trend and ensure the integrity and capacity of Canada's border and asylum systems

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has plans in place to maintain a secure border in the event of an increased number of refugee claimants from the United States.
• In processing individuals claiming asylum, CBSA officers determine whether the person is admissible into Canada. They also assess whether they meet an exception to the Safe Third Country Agreement – and if they do not, they are returned to the U.S.
• As of mid-May, the CBSA had processed approximately 13,500 asylum applications in Canada, which is 50% less than last year.

If pressed on Safe Third Country Agreement and Removals

• From January to May, 2025, approximately 1440 asylum claimants were removed to the U.S. for their ineligibility under the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).
• The CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible people in fiscal year 2024-25—the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before. The Border Plan provided $55.5M to support immigration and asylum processing and to increase CBSA's capacity to reach 20,000 removals for the next two years.

Q6 – How is the government ensuring that immigration detentions are truly a 'last resort', limited in duration, subject to meaningful oversight, and accompanied by adequate mental-health and legal supports

• The CBSA's priority continues to be to remove inadmissible individuals from Canada as soon as possible, with a focus on individuals who are inadmissible for serious criminality and national security. In order for an individual to be lawfully detained, there must be a direct link between the detention and an enforcement action, such as removal from Canada.
• Over 98% of individuals requiring CBSA supervision are enrolled in an alternative to detention and less than 2% are detained.
• The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada reviews detention decisions made by the CBSA and determines if detention should be maintained.
• The CBSA is upgrading its existing immigration holding centres to safely house high-risk detainees and has begun operating a designated immigrant station in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec, which can house up to 25 adult males who present a significant risk to public safety.

If pressed on conditions, human rights and oversight

• The constitutionality of our immigration detention system has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada. Decisions to detain are subject to review by both the Immigration and Refugee Board and the Federal Court of Canada.
• The CBSA ensures safe, secure and compassionate detention conditions with improved access to mental health services as provided by its National Immigration Detention Standards.
• For transparency, the CBSA provides open access to its holding facilities to non-government organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to provide support to detainees, and the Canadian Red Cross independently monitors conditions of detention and the treatment of detainees on behalf of the CBSA by conducting site visits and generating a yearly report, which is available on the CBSA external website.

If pressed on use of Provincial Correctional Facilities

• As of September 15, 2025, the CBSA no longer has agreements with any provincial governments to hold immigration detainees in a provincial correctional facility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)
• The Government has taken the necessary steps to ensure that the CBSA can securely manage individuals who would have previously been detained in provincial correctional facilities.
• This includes investments in federal infrastructure, such as the immigration holding centres, and the establishment of the designated immigration station for high-risk detainees in Sainte-Anne-Des-Plaines, Quebec.

Q7 – The Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for Combatting Crime publicly announced that the Irish hip-hop group Kneecap was banned from entering Canada. But there was no official notice, no confirmation from CBSA or IRCC, and the group claims to have received valid travel authorizations. Did the Parliamentary Secretary mislead Canadians, and if not, who made the decision, on what grounds, and why was it communicated in such a vague and unofficial manner

• Any foreign national wishing to travel to Canada must seek a Canadian travel document, such as a visa or Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA). The granting of such document is the responsibility of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).
• IRCC officers, in consultation with Canada Border Services officers, review applications for eligibility and admissibility. Serious inadmissibility includes grounds related to national security, serious and organized crime and human rights violations. Inadmissible foreign nationals will not be granted a travel document and can have an existing travel document revoked.
• The travel document status of a person cannot be disclosed here for privacy reasons. I would refer you to IRCC for more information.

Q8 – A recent report revealed that Gulfam Hussain, a foreign national convicted of a criminal offence and ordered deported in 2017, remains in Canada eight years later. How is it possible that someone deemed inadmissible on criminal grounds has not been removed, and what steps are you taking to ensure that deportation orders are enforced in a timely and effective manner to protect public safety? Given his criminal history, how was Mr. Hussain able to enter in Canada in the first place? Does this not point to a broader failure in Canada's screening and admissibility processes, and do you have any plans to strengthen these mechanisms to prevent similar cases in the future

• Although I cannot comment on individual cases, I can tell you that the CBSA and IRCC have measures in place to prevent bad actors from entering our country and they are constantly working to improve these measures.
• When the CBSA becomes aware of individuals who don't comply with our country's immigration laws, they investigate and take action.
• Last year, the CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible individuals—the highest number in a decade—including 905 individuals with serious inadmissibility.
• The Border Plan provides funding for the CBSA to increase removals to 20,000 a year.

Q9 – We've learned that at least $170,000 was spent on the repatriation of Canadians who had travelled abroad to join ISIS, including business class flights, luxury hotel accommodations and room service. While these costs were reportedly incurred by Global Affairs Canada, can you confirm whether Public Safety Canada or any of its portfolio agencies also incurred expenses related to these repatriations? And as Minister of Public Safety, do you believe these costs are justified, and should there be a mechanism for reimbursement from the individuals concerned

• Around the world, like-minded countries have taken steps to repatriate their respective citizens from northeastern Syria. The safety and security of Canadians, both at home and abroad, is the government's utmost priority.
• As such, Canada took extraordinary steps to repatriate 6 Canadian women and 13 children identified in the Bring Our Loved Ones Home litigation.
• The full cost of repatriation operations from northeast Syria cannot be disclosed as we have a responsibility to protect the confidentiality of operations carried out with the support of international partners, including the United States.
• This Government remains steadfast in its commitment in the fight against Daesh and global terrorism while vigorously defending human rights both domestically and abroad. I want to reiterate that it is a serious criminal offence for anyone to leave Canada to knowingly support a terrorist group and those who engage in these activities will face the full force of Canadian law and I remain committed to taking every possible step to ensure the safety and security of Canadians.
• Due to security considerations and provisions of the Privacy Act, I cannot provide any further details or comments on Canada's consular operations in Syria.

Q10 – Given that some of the repatriated individuals now face terrorism-related charges or are subject to peace bonds, what assurances can you provide that your department conducted thorough national security risk assessments prior to their return? What specific measures have been implemented to monitor their activities, assess ongoing risks, and ensure sustained coordination with the RCMP and intelligence agencies to protect Canadian communities

• Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is the Government's lead on this issue given that the majority of the cases are consular in nature. GAC provides guidance for the provision of urgent or extraordinary assistance to detained Canadian extremist travelers and any related children.
• Public Safety Canada, CSIS, RCMP, and CBSA, continue to be part of interdepartmental discussions and, as per their mandates, provide advice and conduct investigations on possible threats to Canadian national security.
• Individual Canadian extremist travelers are assessed, and subsequent investigations are conducted on a case-by-case basis. However, I cannot discuss the precise nature of our investigations.

If pressed on RCMP activities related to Canadian Extremist Travelers

• The safety and security of our citizens is of the utmost importance to the RCMP; they take any threat to the safety and security of Canadians seriously. As such, the management of the risk posed by extremist travelers returning to Canada is a priority for the RCMP.
• However, I can say that the RCMP conducts criminal investigations to the fullest extent that they are able, with a view to ensuring public safety and with a view to supporting criminal charges and prosecutions of Canadian extremist travelers and returnees.
• The RCMP continues to work with domestic and international partners to investigate and disrupt individuals who either seek to travel abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities, or who have returned to Canada after engaging in such activities abroad.

Q11 – A witness made serious allegations of corruption at the RCMP and the CBSA. What will you do about these serious allegations? Have you discussed this with the Commissioner of the RCMP and the President of the CBSA

I take any allegation of corruption and misconduct within my portfolio very seriously. Canadians can be assured that the CBSA also takes allegations seriously and addresses them accordingly, including working with partners on concerns involving potential corruption.

First Nations Policing

QP Notes

Q1 – Many of your predecessors have committed to co-develop legislation that recognizes First Nations policing as an essential service. Can you update the committee on the status of that legislative work and the timeline for its introduction

• I acknowledge and appreciate the extensive work that was undertaken over the past years with First Nations, police services and provincial and territorial partners in the co-development of federal legislation to recognize First Nations police services as essential services.
• This body of work is now informing and guiding ongoing program reform efforts. I am focused on ensuring our programs, such as the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP) and the First Nations and Inuit Police Facilities Program (FNIPFP), are responsive, sustainable, and aligned with the communities they serve.

Q2 – Indigenous police services continue to face challenges related to underfunding, outdated infrastructure, and recruitment. What steps is your department taking to ensure these services are adequately resourced and supported to meet the public safety needs of Indigenous communities

• My officials and I continue to work with provincial and territorial partners on our shared priority to better support both the operations and the infrastructure needs of the 36 First Nations and Inuit police services across Canada. These efforts are being supported by Budget 2024's additional investment of $250 million over five years and $92.5 million ongoing in the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program, and an additional $200 million in policing facilities over five years.
• In 2024-2025 alone, our Government invested $334M in cost-shared federal funding under the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP).

Q3 – The Auditor General's 2024 report found that Public Safety Canada did not work in partnership with Indigenous communities to provide equitable access to culturally appropriate policing services. It also highlighted that millions in allocated funds went unspent and that RCMP detachments often failed to meet the terms of community agreements. Can you update the committee on how your department is responding to these findings, and what concrete steps are being taken to improve funding allocation, community engagement, and service delivery under the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program

• I fully accept the Auditor General's findings, and I have taken concrete steps to strengthen the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP) based on the recommendations.
• This includes the following concrete steps:
  • Approval of modernized Terms and Conditions for the Program, which will give Indigenous partners more flexibility and reduce administrative burden for them.
  • Adopting a new federal-provincial-territorial governance structures to improve how funding decisions are made. Multi-year funding proposals are now being collected from all provinces and territories to support more equitable and transparent allocations, while a new national tracker helps align program demand with available resources.
  • Updating the 1996 First Nations Policing Policy and developing a revised results-based measurement framework that reflect the diversity of Indigenous policing needs.
  • Introducing a mandatory cultural competency training roadmap for departmental staff.
  • With input from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Indigenous organizations, approving new guidelines for Community Tripartite Agreement to improve accountability and service delivery.
• Together, these measures are creating a stronger, more responsive program that supports culturally appropriate and sustainable policing in First Nations and Inuit communities. They are also addressing past issues of unspent funds and uneven access by ensuring that allocations reflect real community needs and that funding is distributed in a timely and predictable way.

Systemic Racism

QP Notes

Q1 – In light of recent border legislation—Bills C-2 and C-12—and the government's broader border modernization plan, how is your department ensuring that these initiatives do not result in unfair scrutiny or disproportionate impacts on racialized Canadians at ports of entry and within immigration enforcement? Was a Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) analysis conducted as part of the development of these legislative and policy initiatives, and if so, what were the key findings regarding impacts on racialized and marginalized communities

• My officials and those of partner Departments and agencies conducted a Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) for Bills C-2 and C-12, as well as the Border Plan.
• There is no evidence that suggests disproportionate impacts on racialized Canadians at the border or inland.
• Some initiatives, such as amendments to the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), may have indirect impacts on specific groups, such as male offenders from racialized communities. These potential effects were carefully considered during policy development.
• In October 2024, the Public Complaints and Review Commission Act (PCRC Act) received Royal Assent, which closes a longstanding gap by subjecting the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to independent external review for the first time.
• The PCRC will report annually on disaggregated race-based data about complainants and will be empowered to conduct specified activity reviews of CBSA and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) policies, practices, and procedures.
• These reviews will help uncover systemic issues and support the development of evidence-based recommendations for reform.

Q2 – In addition to legislative reforms like Bills C-2 and C-12, the government's border modernization plan includes enhanced enforcement and surveillance capabilities. What steps is your department taking to ensure that these measures do not lead to disproportionate scrutiny or enforcement actions against racialized Canadians, and how are equity and anti-racism principles being integrated into border operations and oversight

• First, I want to make it clear that Bill C-2 and C-12 amendments aim to improve efficiency and strengthen fairness in Canada's asylum system.
• These measures apply only to foreign nationals, as Canadian citizens are not subject to enforcement under immigration legislation.
• The law will continue to be consistently and fairly applied, in full respect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which protects everyone in Canada.
• Officers at the CBSA are trained and guided to ensure that enforcement actions are carried out equitably and with respect for human rights

Q3 – Minister, in 2022, your predecessor Minister Mendicino issued mandate letters to the heads of CSC, CSIS, CBSA, and the RCMP directing them to combat systemic racism, misogyny, and unconscious bias, and to build cultures of inclusion and respect. Can you update the committee on the progress made in implementing these directives across the agencies

CSC Response

• As part of our efforts to build a respectful, inclusive workplace for all, CSC has taken many meaningful steps. CSC has an Anti-racism, Diversity and Inclusion Directorate that works to address systemic issues and gaps, promote and measure impact, and raise awareness about anti-racism, diversity and inclusion.
• We also established a dedicated Culture Team which is developing a strategic approach to evolving our culture, which is focused on identifying meaningful actions that respond to employee feedback. This includes expanding on successful wellness initiatives that meet our employees' unique needs, and partnering with other agencies to learn best practices. CSC is also reviewing its code of conduct for opportunities to further reinforce ethical behavior in the workplace.

CSIS Response

• CSIS values diversity and is committed to ensuring that its workforce is representative of the citizens it serves and the diverse communities it seeks to protect.
• In 2024, CSIS advanced implementation of its Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Strategy and the associated three-year action plan. Overall, 100% of the 45 commitments have been adopted or have progressed, and 41% are completed.
• In support of creating an inclusive workplace free of bias and systemic barriers, CSIS undertook an in-depth review of its hiring, recruiting, and promotion processes and policies using gender-based analysis plus (GBA Plus). Recommendations stemming from this review are under review and will inform tool and policy revisions to ensure systemic bias is avoided, and inclusive language and principles are meaningfully integrated throughout the talent acquisition and career progression processes.
• The organization also expanded mandatory DEI training requirements for all employees, including a learning path specifically tailored to CSIS executives. Furthermore, employee networks serve to unite employees and amplify their unique perspectives across CSIS.
• Employee networks are very active and include the Black Women's Network; the Black, Indigenous and Persons of Colour (BIPOC) Network; the CSIS Women's Network; the Pride Network; the Women in IT Plus (WiT+) Network; the Indigenous Network; the Jewish Network; the Latin American Network, and the Young Professionals Network.

RCMP Response

• These are important issues that transcend any mandate letter, and they continue to be a priority.
• In 2024, the RCMP created the Anti-Racism, Equity, Diversity and Inclusion Secretariat as the centre of expertise for addressing systemic racism, equity, diversity and inclusion. This Secretariat has developed a Race-Based Data Collection framework to address systemic racism and ensure better outcomes for Indigenous, Black and other racialized communities in Canada. In early 2024, the Data Collection framework was launched in four pilot sites, including: Burnaby, British Columbia; Thompson, Manitoba; Whitehorse, Yukon; and Wood Buffalo, Alberta.
• The RCMP has also implemented the Diverse and Inclusive Pre-Cadet Experience (DICE), the Diversity Retention and Employee Advancement Model (DREAM) and the Anti-Racism Strategy:
• Launched in 2023, DICE is a three-week program at the RCMP Training Academy (Depot) that focuses on removing systemic barriers that impact racialized and underrepresented persons aspiring to join the RCMP. There have been six DICE troops to date.
• DREAM is designed to support the retention and advancement of employees from underrepresented groups, with a specific focus on Indigenous, racialized and diverse employees. There have been four DREAM workshops to date.
• Additionally, the RCMP launched the organization's Anti-Racism Strategy in March 2025, to identify and address systemic barriers in organizational policies, programs, and procedures that disproportionately impact Indigenous, Black and other racialized employees.

Q4 – The mandate letters also emphasized the need for increased oversight and accountability within CSC, CSIS, CBSA, and the RCMP to address systemic discrimination. What mechanisms have been put in place to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of these reforms, and how are you ensuring transparency with the public and affected communities

CSC Response

• To ensure that our employees have safe spaces and avenues for identifying and reporting racism and discrimination within the organization, we are reviewing our employee complaint resolution processes to ensure that all allegations are appropriately dealt with in a sensitive manner by qualified and trained professionals.
• This will build upon other recent initiatives, including the launch of an Ombuds Office for Workplace Well-Being to offer an impartial, independent and confidential approach to prevent and resolve workplace issues. CSC also has diversity champions at the executive level to provide leadership and guidance to employment equity working groups as well as employee networks, which allows employees to help us better identify and address barriers for equity-deserving employees.

CSIS Response

In addition to its DEI Strategy and three-year action plan, CSIS has produced an annual report addressing misconduct and wrongdoing to ensure transparency, to hold the organization to account, and to clearly demonstrate that inappropriate behaviours are being and will continue to be addressed. The first Addressing misconduct and wrongdoing at CSIS report was published in early 2025, and includes complete statistics for both 2023 and 2024. In December 2023, CSIS committed to an independent CSIS Ombuds office, with the aim of better supporting all CSIS employees, augmenting existing mechanisms, and helping build a strong culture of trust and respect with CSIS employees at all levels. CSIS officially launched the Ombuds office on July 7, 2025.

RCMP Response

• These are important issues that transcend any mandate letter, and they continue to be a priority.
• With the creation of the Anti-Racism, Equity, Diversity and Inclusion Secretariat in 2024, the RCMP now has a centre of expertise for addressing systemic racism, equity, diversity and inclusion. The Secretariat has developed a Race-Based Data Collection framework to address systemic racism and ensure better outcomes for Indigenous, Black and other racialized communities in Canada. In early 2024, the Data Collection framework was launched in four pilot sites, including: Burnaby, British Columbia; Thompson, Manitoba; Whitehorse, Yukon; and Wood Buffalo, Alberta. Collection of data under the framework will allow the RCMP to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts.
• Mechanisms are also built into the RCMP's anti-racism programs to help the organization monitor and evaluate effectiveness and ensure transparency. For example,
• The Diverse and Inclusive Pre-Cadet Experience (DICE) program offers ongoing mentorship following the three week training experience at Depot. There are protocols in place to track the number of DICE graduates who apply to the Regular Member application process. 20 DICE graduates are now serving as police officers across Canada.
• For the Race-Based Data Collection framework, internal governance committees have been established to provide oversight, assess progress, and address implementation challenges. The RCMP has also committed to reporting back to the public on key takeaways and lessons learned from the pilots currently operating in Burnaby, British Columbia; Thompson, Manitoba; Whitehorse, Yukon; and Wood Buffalo, Alberta.
• The RCMP's Anti-Racism Strategy is built on four pillars: representation, education and awareness, mental health, and consequential accountability. The RCMP is working to strengthen accountability measures by embedding an anti-racism lens into the internal complaint process and incorporating anti-racism objectives in performance management assessments.

Combatting Hate

QP Notes

Q1 – Canadians from a wide range of backgrounds—including Indigenous, racialized, 2SLGBTQI+ and religious communities—have experienced a troubling rise in hate-motivated violence and threats in recent years. What is your government doing to ensure that these communities are adequately protected

• The Government of Canada is taking decisive actions to combat all forms of hate to better protect communities and keep them safe.
• This includes implementing Canada's first Action Plan on Combatting Hate, to help prevent and respond to hate crimes and support victims.
• Public Safety (PS) Canada is investing in hate crimes training for police, preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, and assisting vulnerable communities to protect their gathering spaces.
• Public Safety is also working with partners across the country to identify actions to help address the public safety threat of antisemitism.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) continues to collaborate with police services across Canada to share best practices and develop new tools to respond to hate crimes.
• The Government introduced the Combatting Hate Act on September 19, 2025, which proposes to amend the Criminal code to better protect access to religious and cultural places and to clearly denounce hate-motivated crime.

Q2 – If pressed – Islamophobia

• Public Safety is working with the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service), as well as with the Special Representative on Combatting Islamophobia, to combat violent rhetoric and keep communities safe.
• We're also working with communities to build safer spaces and increase community safety.
• The Government introduced the Combatting Hate Act on September 19, 2025, which proposes to amend the Criminal code to better protect access to religious and cultural places and to clearly denounce hate-motivated crime, including directed towards the Muslim community.

Q3 – If pressed – Antisemitism

• Public Safety is working with the RCMP and CSIS, as well as with the Office of the Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism, to combat violent rhetoric and keep communities safe.
• Recognizing the urgent need to address the public safety threat of antisemitism, the government convened a National Forum, bringing together multiple partners to commit to coordinated action.
• We're also working with communities to build safer spaces and increase community safety.
• The Government introduced the Combatting Hate Act on September 19, 2025, which proposes to amend the Criminal code to better protect access to religious and cultural places and to clearly denounce hate-motivated crime, including directed towards the Jewish community.

Q4 – If pressed – incidents targeting Christian communities

• Public Safety is working with the RCMP and CSIS to combat violent rhetoric and keep communities safe.
• We're also working with communities to build safer spaces and increase community safety.
• The Government introduced the Combatting Hate Act on September 19, 2025, which proposes to amend the Criminal code to better protect access to religious and cultural places and to clearly denounce hate-motivated crime, including directed towards the Christian community.

Q5 – If pressed – Canada Community Security Program (CCSP)

• The Canada Community Security Program helps communities at risk of hate-motivated crime by funding security upgrades, assessments, training, and security personnel to help protect their gathering spaces.
• The program takes applications year-round.
• We continue to work closely with vulnerable communities to share information about the program and its flexibilities so that people can gather in safety. This includes working with local security networks who understand the specific needs of their communities.

Q6 – If pressed – Rights of 2SLGBTQI+ persons

• I want to reassure Canadians, especially those in the 2SLGBTQI+ community, that our government takes any threat of violence very seriously.
• Again this year, the government provided funding to support the security needs of Pride festivals this season. This funding, provided by Women and Gender Equality Canada, helped offset rising security and insurance costs for events across the country, amid high levels of 2SLGBTQI+ hate.
• Women and Gender Equality Canada (WAGE) is also supporting projects to combat hate against 2SLGBTQI+ communities.
• The Government introduced the Combatting Hate Act on September 19, 2025, which proposes to amend the Criminal code to better protect access to religious and cultural places and to clearly denounce hate-motivated crime, including directed towards the 2SLGBTQI+ community.

Q7 – If pressed – RCMP efforts to Combat Hate

• The RCMP is committed to investigating all hate reported incidents in the communities it polices.
• The RCMP also plays an important leadership role, bringing together police, community advocates, academics and subject matter experts to exchange best practices and develop tools to help respond to hate crimes.
• The RCMP has partnered with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation to co-chair the Hate Crimes Task Force, which is developing practical, front-line tools and solutions rooted in prevention, investigation and victim support.
• Additionally the RCMP leads bi-weekly calls with Canadian police leaders, as well as a national Community of Practice to share information, trends, and best practices related to hate crimes.
• With additional funding announced under Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate, the RCMP will do more to respond to hate crimes in our communities, including developing specialized training and education for police across Canada.

Q8 – If pressed – CSIS efforts to Combat Hate

• CSIS works to protect Canada and Canadians from threats, including extremist violence rooted in hateful ideologies.
• CSIS investigates ideologically motivated threats like white nationalism, misogyny, as well as anti-2SLGBTQI+ and anti-authority violence, and engages with communities to build awareness and resilience.
• CSIS has also remained heavily engaged with community groups and organizations in Canada. These outreach efforts are meant to support communities' ability to better understand and build awareness and resilience to these threats, equipping them with tools and strategies.
• CSIS' efforts will help reduce risks to extremist violence and support safer communities across Canada.

Q9 – If pressed – Combatting Hate Act

• On September 19, 2025, the Government of Canada introduced the Combatting Hate Act which proposes to amend the Criminal Code to better protect access to religious, cultural and other specified places, and to more clearly denounce hate-motivated crime.
• The legislation would amend the Criminal Code to make it a crime to intimidate or obstruct access to places of worship, as well as schools, community centres and other places primarily used by an identifiable group.
• The bill would also make it a crime to willfully promote hatred against an identifiable group by displaying specific symbols of terrorism and hate, including the Nazi Hakenkreuz (the Nazi swastika), the Nazi double Sig-Rune (SS bolts), and symbols that so nearly resembles them.
• The bill would also make hate-motivated crime a specific offence, ensuring such conduct is more clearly denounced and that offenders are held accountable.
• The bill would also make it easier for law enforcement to act quickly to counter hate crime and protect communities by removing the requirement to obtain the Attorney General's consent – streamlining the process to lay hate propaganda charges.
• The bill would also bring clarity around when conduct constitutes a hate crime by codifying a definition of "hatred".

Corrections

QP Notes

Q1 – Minister, report after report has raised concerns about the implementation of Structured Intervention Units. What do you propose to do about their operations, and will you commit to starting the long overdue 5 year review into the former C-83

Structured Intervention Units

• Structured Intervention Units (SIUs) are part of an ongoing, historic transformation of the federal correctional system that aim to promote greater rehabilitation of offenders while maintaining the safety and security of institutions.
• To improve the operation of SIUs, Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has promulgated updated policies and will continue to implement further improvements to the operation of SIUs by the end of the year.
• These include new performance indicators and enhanced accountability for the collection and reporting of data.
• CSC will also explore improvements to correctional interventions to ensure they meet offenders' needs.
• With these actions, in addition to ongoing efforts to address recommendations from internal and external oversight bodies, CSC aims to strengthen the oversight and operation of SIUs.

Examples of Actions Taken

• CSC has introduced an enhanced staffing model for the SIUs, which provides additional intervention options for inmates with specific needs and enables more accurate data collection.
• CSC is working with external organizations to implement innovative approaches to increase access to interventions and identify additional options for time out of cell and interactions with others.
• An example includes the Dad HERO program, being offered at most SIU locations by the Canadian Families and Corrections Network.
• CSC has gathered best practices from all sites and shared feedback with all regions to assess if these practices could be implemented in other sites, while considering their local realities.
• CSC has developed a new internal performance indicator that explores the impact of SIUs on offender behaviour in the mainstream inmate population.

Q2 – Minister, offenders who need mental health services should receive it in a rehabilitative environment. Prisons are not conducive to this. What steps will you take to improve offenders' ability to receive sufficient mental health supports

Mental Health

• Mental health services are delivered to offenders across a continuum of care, from their admission to their return to community.
• Approximately 95% of inmates with an identified mental health need receive treatment, and 94% of inmates have an identified physician or nurse practitioner.
• CSC has also taken additional action to strengthen mental health services for offenders, including implementing a Patient Advocacy Service.

Transfer to Community Hospitals

• Health Care may be provided at community hospitals for inmates whose needs exceed the level of care provided at CSC institutions.
• For example, CSC currently has a partnership with the Institut Philippe-Pinel de Montréal and is continuing to engage with additional provincial psychiatric hospitals to supplement existing capacity.
• It is important to note that CSC cannot compel external hospitals to enter into partnerships.
• Last year, CSC contacted 11 external hospitals and all but 1 declined entering into a partnership for the provision of external beds at that time.

Q3 – Minister, we've seen the troubling reports of Indigenous overrepresentation in our judicial system, specifically for Indigenous women. What steps will you take as Minister to address this

Overrepresentation

• We are taking action to address the overrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples by enhancing cultural supports, streamlining release processes, implementing targeted reintegration and employment initiatives, and establishing leadership roles focused on Indigenous corrections.
• We recognize there is more work to be done and will continue to collaborate with our partners to support Indigenous offenders' rehabilitation and successful reintegration.
• This includes ongoing work to develop a culturally responsive, Indigenous-informed security classification process.
• We continue to provide ongoing funding to support Indigenous offender reintegration through the Community Reintegration Fund, which enhances access to culturally responsive services, urban transition and home community reintegration supports, and Section 84 release planning to address this issue.

Section 81 and 84

• In terms of the total number of Indigenous offenders transferred to Section 81 and CSC Healing Lodge facilities, we have seen continued, annual, increases dating back to 2022-2023.
• In 2024-2025, 467 Indigenous offenders had an established Section 84 release plan prior to their first release.

Q4 – Minister, we've read many tragic reports of bullying in CSC institutions. What steps are you taking to ensure that employees and inmates are safe from violence and intimidation

Culture

• CSC is committed to a workplace that is healthy, inclusive, and characterized by trust.
• A dedicated Culture Team has been established to develop a strategic approach to evolving its culture.
• Additionally, CSC is reviewing its code of conduct to ensure appropriate sanctions for harassment, bullying and violence, and examining ways to improve formal and informal conflict resolution.
• The renewed Mental Health Strategy on Workplace Wellness and Employee Well-Being will ensure CSC can respond effectively to psychological health and safety issues.
• CSC is also reviewing its National Training Standards to ensure all employees have the knowledge and tools they need to contribute to a safe workplace.
• For offenders, CSC has increased awareness through educational information to prevent these situations from occurring and ensuring offenders know how to come forward if they believe they are being victimized.

Q5 – I recently reached out to CSC about the case of [Redacted]. Will someone be held accountable for this behaviour

• I want to acknowledge the impact this situation has had on [Redacted], including [Redacted] the incidents and the subsequent investigation.
• CSC initiated a formal investigation which was conducted by an independent third-party firm. While the investigation did not find evidence of malicious intent or deliberate harm on the part of the individuals involved, the final report confirmed that the incident met the definition of workplace violence and harassment.
• CSC fully acknowledges the impact of these actions and is committed to learning from this experience and implementing meaningful changes to support a healthier and respectful workplace across the organization.
• Already, concrete remedial and preventative actions have been taken in response to the investigation's findings.
• This includes monitoring National Training Standards courses, the introduction of a Civility Charter in the Atlantic Region, and the launch of the Learning Culture initiative.