Parliamentary Committee Notes: Minister Anandasangaree’s appearance before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)
Mandate and Priorities of the Minister of Public Safety

Overview Note

General information

Date: Thursday, October 9, 2025
Time: 12:00 p.m. to 1:15 p.m.
Location: Room 225-A, West Block, 111 Wellington St.

Context

On September 25, 2025, the following motion was adopted unanimously by SECU:

That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee invite the Minister of Public Safety to appear before the committee for a minimum of two hours, before Friday, October 10, 2025, to answer questions regarding his mandate and priorities.

Your appearance before SECU on Thursday, October 9, 2025 represents an opportunity to address Committee members with respect to the breadth, scope and importance of the work undertaken across the Public Safety Portfolio in support of your mandate.

In keeping with the volatility and complexity of the public safety and global security landscape, sophisticated threats and unpredictability have increasingly become the new norm. Through its provision of direct and critical service delivery, the Public Safety Portfolio is on the front-line in protecting Canadians, communities, businesses, the economy and democratic institutions. Many areas under its purview including border management, national security, and immigration enforcement are exclusively federal responsibility.

As Minister of Public Safety, your mandate has a critical role in supporting two Government's missions, including: protecting Canadian sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe by securing our borders and reinforcing law enforcement; and, establishing a new security relationship with the U.S. and strengthening our collaboration with allies around the world.

You have already made progress on initiatives tied to core Government commitments and missions; such as: introducing comprehensive legislation to further the implementation of Canada's Border Plan (Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act) and to strengthen our cyber resilience (Bill C-8, an Act Respecting Cyber Security); supporting a successful G7 Leaders' Summit with the publication of leaders' statements on countering migrant smuggling and transnational repression; engaging proactively with US counterparts to counter inconsistent narratives about our shared border; and, publicly launching the individual owners phase of the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program.

Your proposed opening remarks reinforce the central elements of your mandate, as well as the work currently underway to support the Government's priorities and overall agenda. Your briefing package also includes key messages related to the missions outlined in the Prime Minister's May 2025 Mandate Letter to the Ministry.

Officials

You will appear for the one hour and 15 minutes with the following officials:

• Tricia Geddes, Deputy Minister, Public Safety Canada
• Michael Duheme, Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
• Erin O'Gorman, President, Canada Boarder Services Agency (CBSA)
• Anne Kelly, Commissioner, Correctional Service of Canada (CSC)
• Joanne Blanchard, Chairperson, Parole Board of Canada (PBC)
• Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)

Opening remarks

At the onset of the meeting, the Chair will invite you to deliver opening remarks, to last approximately 5 minutes. Questions from Committee members will ensue.

Rounds of questions

First round of questions:

• Conservative Party, six minutes..
• Liberal Party, six minutes..
• Bloc Québécois, six minutes..

Second and subsequent rounds of questions:

• Conservative Party, five minutes..
• Liberal Party, five minutes..
• Bloc Québécois, two and a half minutes..
• Conservative Party, five minutes..
• Liberal Party, five minutes..

Speaking Notes for The Honourable Gary Anandasangaree - Minister of Public Safety

Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)

October 9, 2025 - Ottawa, Ontario

Good morning,

Thank you Mr. Chair and committee members for inviting me here today.

As the Minister of Public Safety, I am focused on ensuring the safety and security of our country and all Canadians.

I have been clear that enhancing our border security and tackling cross-border crime are among my top priorities. Yesterday, I introduced important legislation, Bill C-12, that will help tackle these two challenges.

This is the latest step we have taken in in making our border stronger and more secure, while ensuring the efficient flow of legitimate travel and trade that is crucial to our economy.

Backed by an investment of $1.3 billion, Canada's Border Plan delivers concrete actions to further strengthen border security, disrupt the illegal fentanyl trade, improve operational coordination, expand information sharing, and minimize unnecessary border volumes.

We have enhanced security at Ports of Entry and between them, increased surveillance via drones, towers, helicopters and other resources to allow for 24/7 surveillance.

Under our Border Plan, there has been a 99% reduction in illegal southbound movement from Canada to the U.S.,since June 2024. This demonstrates real success in deterring illegal cross-border movement.

Further, the Canadian Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) has increased its removals of inadmissible people from Canada – the most in a decade.

In 2024, the CBSA also intercepted 2,277 vehicles stolen in railyards and ports. Between January and the end of May this year. the it intercepted an additional 666 stolen vehicles.

These are just some of the positive results from our National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft.In 2025, auto thefts continued to decline nationally, with a 19% decrease reported in the first half of the year.

This progress comes through collaboration with our federal, provincial, territorial, Indigenous and law enforcement partners, as well as police of jurisdiction.

For example, the appointment of a Fentanyl Czar, as well as the creation of a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell, has resulted in better coordination on disrupting the fentanyl trade.

In September, I met with my Five Eyes counterparts in the United Kingdom to discuss pressing border and national security issues and next month I will welcome our G7 partners to an Interior Ministers' Meeting in Ottawa to continue the conversation on these important themes.

With the increasing sophistication and borderless nature of transnational organized crime, cybercrime, migrant smuggling and illegal synthetic drugs, the G7 meetingwill provide Canada with an opportunity to showcase our efforts and signal the importance of multilateral collaboration.

Everyone, regardless of their identity, deserves to feel safe in Canada. But we have all seen a concerning rise in hate in Canada.

This past summer, along with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Commissioner, I met with community representatives across Canada. They told me they are concerned for their safety and they expect tangible action from all levels of government and law enforcement.

I want to highlight one success story, the Canada Community Security Program.

Since 2007, the Government of Canada has invested over $40 million in more than 950 projects to help communities at risk of hate-motivated crimes further enhance the security of their gathering spaces, such as synagogues and mosques.
You cannot be serious about crime unless you are serious about guns.

The Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program is another important piece of our Government's comprehensive approach to combat gun violence.

It is working. So far, the business buyback program as removed over 12,000 firearms from our communities, with over $22 million in compensation.

We are now implementing the program for individuals, beginning with a pilot in Cape Breton. Later this fall, we will move ahead with the program nation-wide. This will help us to get even more guns off our streets and protect Canadians.

Mr. Chair, as the Minister of Public Safety, my top priority will always be to ensure that each and every Canadian remains safe and secure – no matter where they live.

I know this is a priority you all share and I look forward to continuing our work together.

Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Firearms

Q1 – Could you walk the committee through the main types of firearms commonly used in Canada, including how they function and how they are classified under current federal regulations

• There are a variety of firearms that are commonly used in Canada, including rifles, shotguns and handguns. With respect to how firearms function, there are a number of different types of actions, including bolt-action, pump- action and semi-automatic.
• In Canada, the possession, acquisition, storage, and transportation of firearms are governed by both the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act.
• The Criminal Code and its regulations provide the legal framework for the classification of firearms in Canada. Firearms fall into one of the following categories:
  • Non-restricted, which typically includes most rifles and shotguns commonly used for hunting and sport shooting.
  • Restricted, which includes most handguns and certain semi-automatic firearms. Legitimate uses for these types of firearms are limited to approved shooting ranges and collection purposes; and.
  • Prohibited, which include fully automatic firearms, short-barreled handguns, or unlawfully manufactured or modified firearms. Outside of rare exceptions, these firearms have no lawful civilian applications in Canada.
• Firearms are classified by physical characteristics or by make or model and can be prescribed in the Criminal Code Regulations through Governor-in-Council authorities.
• The Firearms Act and its regulations establish rules and requirements for the lawful possession, use, transport and storage of firearms, which is based on firearm classification.
• A person must meet all the necessary conditions set out in the Firearms Act – including possessing a valid Possession & Acquisition Licence (PAL), and a registration certificate in the case of restricted or prohibited firearms – in order to lawfully possess and acquire firearms in Canada.

Q2 – Can you explain the difference between a restricted and non-restricted firearm under Canadian law

• Non-restricted firearms are firearms that do not meet the definition of "restricted" or "prohibited firearms" set out in the Criminal Code or regulations. Non-restricted firearms are typically rifles and shotguns and do not need to be registered.
• Restricted firearms include handguns that are not prohibited, semi-automatic rifles and shotguns with a barrel length under 18.5", firearms that can be fired when reduced to a length of less than 660 mm and firearms prescribed as restricted in the Criminal Code Regulations. These firearms are typically used for target or sport shooting.
• All licence holders must successfully complete the Canadian Firearms Safety Course (CFSC) to be eligible to hold a licence.
• Possession of restricted firearms additionally requires successful completion of the Canadian Restricted Firearms Safety Course (CRFSC), registration of all such firearms, and special authorization to transport these firearms within and outside of Canada, except when transporting to and from an approved range is required.

Q3 – Which models are currently banned under the buyback program, and why were they selected

• Over 2,500 makes and models of firearms were re-classified as prohibited by the Governor in Council through Order in Council as part of the 2020, 2024 and 2025 prohibitions. They can no longer be legally used, sold, imported, transferred, or transported except as provided in the Amnesty Orders that accompanied each Order in Council or as authorized under appropriate business licence under the Firearms Act.
• Firearms prohibited in 2020 and subsequent prohibitions in 2024, and 2025 possess basic technical characteristics, namely semi-automatic action with sustained rapid-fire capability (tactical or military design with large capacity magazine), that make them unsuitable for civilian use and a serious threat to public safety, given the degree to which they can increase the severity of mass shootings.

Q4 – In light of recent comments suggesting that municipal police services may lack the resources to enforce the federal firearms buyback program, could you share your assessment of their current capacity and how the government plans to support enforcement at the local level

• The Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program is a voluntary program for firearms owners. It provides an option for individual firearm owners and businesses to seek compensation and dispose of their prohibited firearms before the end of the amnesty period.
• The Program for individuals relies on the expertise of police of jurisdiction to safely and securely collect firearms from members of the public. This work cannot, and will not, compromise the crucial work that front-line police undertake to keep our communities safe every day. The Government is providing funding to support police of jurisdiction in collecting firearms using police on overtime, off duty and alternative operational resources.
• To minimize the burden on police, [REDACTED]. A Web Portal/Case Management System has also been developed to make sure the process runs smoothly.
• My officials are having productive meetings with police and municipal officials on the Program. It is very clear that the role of police in the Program would not impact frontline policing, and there is allocated money to reimburse them for their participation in the program.

Bail Reform

Q5 – As the government prepares to introduce bail reform legislation this fall, can you explain how the proposed changes will address concerns about repeat violent offenders being released into communities

• While the specifics of bail reform fall under the Minister of Justice, I fully support legislative changes that enhance public safety by targeting repeat and high-risk offenders. My officials are working closely with their justice colleagues to advance on these commitments.
• I would emphasize, however, that delivering on this commitment will aim to strengthen responses at both the bail and sentencing stages, addressing concerns raised by provinces, stakeholders, and the public about violent reoffending, organized crime, and auto theft.
• The goal is to improve community safety and restore confidence in the justice system.

Q6 – Do you believe public safety should be the primary consideration in bail decisions, and if so, how does the current federal framework reflect that priority

• Public safety is a top priority, and while bail decisions are governed by the Criminal Code under the Minister of Justice, my department is focused on supporting complementary measures.
• This includes funding and programs that enhance enforcement, prevent crime, and reduce reoffending.
• Legislative changes are one part of a broader strategy to strengthen the bail system and support communities through targeted interventions and crime prevention efforts.

Q7 – How is your department working with provincial governments to address concerns about repeat offenders and bail enforcement ? Are you working with provinces like Ontario, which have called for ankle monitors, mandatory detention for certain crimes, and a "three-strikes" rule

• Bail reform is a shared responsibility, and we're working closely with provinces and territories to improve public safety outcomes.
• For example, through the Gun and Gang Violence Action Fund, we're providing $390.6M over five years to support enforcement, prevention, and intervention initiatives. In Ontario, a portion of the funds are being used for Intensive Firearm Bail Support Teams.
• We also invest in community-led programs through the Building Safer Communities Fund and the National Crime Prevention Strategy. Improving data sharing with provinces remains a key priority to assess the impact of reforms and monitor trends.
• Efforts by both the federal government and the provinces and territories that contribute to this goal are critical and welcomed, including initiatives which enhance enforcement and supervision as well as broader supports that address mental health, addiction, and underlying causes of criminality.

Q8 – Do you support mandatory passport surrender for non-citizens and non–permanent residents as a bail condition, as proposed in Bill C-242

• I think the Bill raises important issues that should be met with serious consideration but is it critical to remember that any bail conditions should be tied to effectively managing risk of the accused and keeping our communities safe. I also understand that there is currently the authority in place already for the courts to impose conditions which limit flight risk.
• However, I can assure this Committee that delivering public safety results though evidence-based policy will always guide our positions, and we are prepared to support any initiative which furthers this goal.

If pressed

With respect to support for Bill C-242 specifically, it is currently in the process of being reviewed and analyzed by the Government so that we may fully understand its policy, operational and legal impacts. Accordingly, our position on the Bill remains under consideration at this time.

Bill C-2 – the Strong Borders Act and Bill C-8 – an Act Respecting Cyber Security

Q9 – Both Bill C-2 and Bill C-8 expand government access to private data without requiring a warrant. How does the government justify this erosion of privacy protections

• Canada's privacy protections remain robust, and both Bill C-2 and Bill C-8 operate within that framework.
• Bill C-2 allows law enforcement and Canadian Security Intelligence Service to request basic service information, such as whether a subscriber exists, from electronic service providers without a warrant. No personal data is accessed without judicial authorization.
• In emergencies, limited data like transmission or location may be retrieved without a warrant, but only under strict legal conditions. These provisions build on existing Criminal Code powers and align Canada with G7 and Five Eyes partners, establishing one of the most privacy-protective standards internationally.
• Bill C-8 does not authorize warrantless access to Canadians' personal data. It explicitly prohibits interception of private communications and focuses solely on securing Canada's telecommunications infrastructure.
• Any data collected under Part 2, such as technical information about cyber incidents, is defined through stakeholder consultation and protected under the Privacy Act. Oversight by National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) ensures accountability. Ultimately, both bills aim to modernize Canada’s security tools while safeguarding privacy and protecting Canadians from cyber threats and criminal activity.

Q10 – Why is the government centralizing power in ministers through legislation like C-2 and C-8, without robust checks and balances

• Both bills include strong oversight mechanisms.
• Under C-2, Ministerial Orders require consultation with the Minister of Industry and affected service providers, who may seek judicial review. Independent review bodies like NSIRA and NSICOP also have authority to examine activities.
• Bill C-8 includes safeguards such as reasonableness standards, consultation requirements, and transparency through public reporting. Powers under the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act rest with Cabinet, not individual ministers, and are scoped to protect infrastructure, not to enable surveillance.

Q11 – Industry and civil society have raised concerns about both bills. How has the government engaged with stakeholders to address these issues? Was the Privacy Commissioner consulted

• Extensive consultations have taken place on both bills. Public Safety has held briefings and bilateral meetings with civil society, industry, academia, provinces, and law enforcement regarding Bill C-2.
• For Bill C-8, consultations began when it was first introduced as Bill C-26, and included the Privacy Commissioner. Feedback from stakeholders led to key amendments, such as clearer privacy protections, reporting requirements, and due diligence provisions. All of which remain in the current version of the bill.

Q12 – Part 1 of this Bill C-8 confers extraordinary powers, such as 'terminating services to anyone'. How can the government ensure they aren't cutting off essential services for Canadians

• The powers in Bill C-8 are designed to protect Canada's telecommunications system from severe threats, such as large-scale cyberattacks.
• Any order must be reasonable, proportionate to the threat, and based on specified criteria. Impacted parties are consulted in advance and can make representations.
• The Minister of Industry must also be consulted. Orders are public by default, with confidential orders subject to oversight by NSIRA and NSICOP. These safeguards ensure powers are used responsibly and only in exceptional circumstances.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Procurement of Helicopters

Q13 – Could you explain why the RCMP selected Black Hawk helicopters for border operations, what specific capabilities they offer compared to other platforms, and how they support the RCMP's operational objectives

• The RCMP selected Black Hawk helicopters based on their ability to meet specific operational needs for border enforcement. These aircraft offer long-range coverage, high payload capacity, and rapid deployment capabilities, including fast-roping and rappelling for tactical operations.
• At the time of charter, they were the only platform available through Public Services and Procurement Canada's standing offer that met all requirements for patrolling remote areas between ports of entry.

Q14 – Can you clarify why the RCMP chose to lease rather than purchase these helicopters, and why the fleet is limited to only three aircraft despite the scale of border surveillance needs

• Leasing through an existing Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) standing offer allowed the RCMP to quickly address urgent border security needs while maintaining flexibility and cost-efficiency.
• The fleet size reflects staffing capacity and operational priorities, with the three Black Hawks deployed to high-risk areas identified through intelligence. The RCMP also uses other aircraft, including covert surveillance and its own rotary and fixed-wing platforms.
• Planning is underway for a competitive long-term lease, with the goal of purchasing helicopters once capital funding becomes available.

Border Issues

Q15 – Can you explain the recent Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) IT systems outages that resulted in delays for travelers and commercial processing

• First I want to be clear that these outages were not the result of a cyberattack. They started following unforeseen technical problems during routine systems maintenance on Sunday, September 28.
• During the outages, CBSA personnel and partners from airport authorities and bridge and tunnel operators acted quickly to manually process travellers, traffic and shipments, while ensuring safety and security.
• While the initial outages were resolved within 48 hours, the impacts on kiosks at airports and on commercial processing at some ports of entry continued as the CBSA worked to address the backlogs that were created.
• CBSA officials are working closely with Shared Services Canada, who provides secure IT infrastructure services, to reduce the risk of future outages and strengthen its contingency plans based on the experience gained from these recent outages.

Q16 – What percentage of containerized cargo entering Canada is currently screened to detect contraband or security threats, and what technologies are used to support that screening

The CBSA screens 100% of containerized marine cargo entering Canada using a combination of risk assessment and tools and technologies. This includes targeting, Large-Scale Imaging, portal radiation detection, and destuff examination.

Q17 – You recently received a letter from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative urging you to restore and expand customs clearance capacity across the Hwy H2O corridor. The letter highlights the withdrawal of CBSA services from the Port of Valleyfield and the lack of clearance options at other strategic ports including Hamilton, Windsor, Québec City, Picton, Port Colborne, and Goderich. What concrete steps are you taking to restore and expand customs clearance capacity at Valleyfield and these other Hwy H2O corridor ports to ensure Canada's competitiveness and supply chain resilience

• I want to highlight CBSA's role not only in national security and public safety but in the economic security of Canada. CBSA's work at ports is not only to stop contraband from coming in but to make sure legitimate goods flows quickly.
• Our government is focused on trade diversification, which is evident by the work that the Prime Minister is leading with countries around the world. Making sure that our supply chains are fluid and that we have the right port infrastructure is a joint effort that involves my Transport, ISED, Trade and other colleagues. I can assure you that we are working together to make sure that we have the right infrastructure in the right places, to support fluidity while also protecting the safety of Canadians.

If Pressed on sending CBSA officers/designate the port of Valleyfield

We will do what is right for the Canadian economy and this will be done in consultation with my Cabinet colleagues.

Q18 – The Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for Combatting Crime publicly announced that the Irish hip-hop group Kneecap was banned from entering Canada. But there was no official notice, no confirmation from CBSA or Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the group claims to have received valid travel authorizations. Did the Parliamentary Secretary mislead Canadians, and if not, who made the decision, on what grounds, and why was it communicated in such a vague and unofficial manner

• Any foreign national wishing to travel to Canada must seek a Canadian travel document, such as a visa or Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA). The granting of such document is the responsibility of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).
• IRCC officers, in consultation with Canada Border Services officers, review applications for eligibility and admissibility. Serious inadmissibility includes grounds related to national security, serious and organized crime and human rights violations. Inadmissible foreign nationals will not be granted a travel document and can have an existing travel document revoked.
• The travel document status of a person cannot be disclosed here for privacy reasons. I would refer you to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship for more information.

Q19 – Recent reports reveal that nearly 600 foreign nationals ordered deported from Canada—including hundreds convicted of serious crimes—are missing and unaccounted for. Many have been evading removal for years. In 2023, your government shut down the CBSA's 'Wanted' webpage, eliminating a key public tool for locating high-risk individuals. How do you explain this enforcement failure, and what steps are you taking to ensure deportation orders are executed transparently, consistently, and in a way that protects public safety

• Since 2021, the CBSA doubled the number of removals from 7,530 yearly to 18,048 last fiscal.
• When an inadmissible foreign national does not comply with removal requirements, the CBSA issues an arrest warrant and works relentlessly with police to track people down.
• More than 550 CBSA personnel are dedicated to immigration investigations and removals. They are focused on cases that pose a risk to security and public safety. CBSA also has a tip line for the public to share information about the whereabouts of those who are trying to evade the law.
• Last year, CBSA closed 542 immigration warrants involving criminals and 254 so far this year. They also removed 905 individuals inadmissible for criminality, organized criminality and security.
• CBSA officers are going to continue doing their job to remove people who have served sentences for crimes from this country.

Q20 – A recent report revealed that Gulfam Hussain, a foreign national convicted of a criminal offence and ordered deported in 2017, remains in Canada eight years later. How is it possible that someone deemed inadmissible on criminal grounds has not been removed, and what steps are you taking to ensure that deportation orders are enforced in a timely and effective manner to protect public safety? Given his criminal history, how was Mr. Hussain able to enter in Canada in the first place? Does this not point to a broader failure in Canada's screening and admissibility processes, and do you have any plans to strengthen these mechanisms to prevent similar cases in the future

• Although I cannot comment on individual cases, I can tell you that the CBSA and IRCC have measures in place to prevent bad actors from entering our country and they are constantly working to improve these measures.
• When the CBSA becomes aware of individuals who don't comply with our country's immigration laws, they investigate and take action.
• Last year, the CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible individuals—the highest number in a decade—including 905 individuals with serious inadmissibility.
• The Border Plan provides funding for the CBSA to increase removals to 20,000 a year.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Allegations of corruption at the RCMP and the CBSA made at SECU on October 7, 2025

Q23 – A witness made serious allegations of corruption at the RCMP and the CBSA. What will you do about these serious allegations? Have you discussed this with the Commissioner of the RCMP and the President of the CBSA

I take any allegation of corruption and misconduct within my portfolio very seriously. Canadians can be assured that the CBSA also takes allegations seriously and addresses them accordingly, including working with partners on concerns involving potential corruption.

October 8, 2025 news conference held by former official to reveal findings from an investigation into allegations of corruption and covert influence in PEI

Q24 – How do you respond to the allegations of corruption and covert influence in PEI

• Foreign Interference is a threat to Canada's sovereignty, to the security of its institutions and its people and we take these threats seriously. Foreign interference can manifest in many ways as states use new tactics to spread influence and achieve their strategic objectives, including through targeting other jurisdictions in Canada beyond the federal level.
• When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is informed of any allegations of foreign interference, including covert foreign influences, it uses the full mandate of the CSIS Act to investigate, advise, and respond to the threat, alongside law enforcement, to keep Canadians safe. In addition, the Royal Canadian Mounted Policy (RCMP) can investigate and respond to allegations of foreign interference, including political interference by a foreign government.
• We are always working to improve our approach to counter foreign interference and have taken decisive actions to bolster our posture. For example, the Countering Foreign Interference Act:
  • provided CSIS with new legal authorities to share threat information with a wider set of Canadian partners than the federal government.
  • implemented new offences that cover foreign interference and malign foreign influence, even when those actions target provincial and municipal governments; and.
  • established a secure administrative review proceeding that provides greater flexibility to the Government to protect intelligence during an administrative proceeding.
• Since the passage of the Countering Foreign Interference Act, federal departments have been working to educate partners and stakeholders across government (including subnational governments and police of jurisdiction) on the new laws and how and when they apply. In addition, the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator (NCFIC) has worked with federal law enforcement and national security partners to deliver workshops to civil society groups and key interlocutors across Canada, including in Atlantic Canada, on how to build resilience to the threat and how to report foreign interference to responsible authorities.
• We continue to urge organizations or members of the public who bring allegations of foreign interference forward to continue to report these to the RCMP or CSIS.

Q25 – Why has the government not yet appointed a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner or implemented the foreign agent registry mandated by Bill C-70

• We know political interference and influence can be particularly challenging to address given it does not always manifest itself in traditional lobbying activities. That is why we brought forward the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) – to shine a light on those areas where influence activities would otherwise be undertaken in darkness.
• Bringing the FITAA into force is a significant undertaking and officials continue to work to ensure its full and timely implementation. We are learning some similar efforts undertaken by Canada's allies which have taken more than two years to implement.
• The appointment of an independent commissioner is a top priority that requires a rigorous selection process to ensure credibility and impartiality. Other major components of the regime are under development include regulations, setting up the Commissioner's Office, building an enforcement system with financial penalties and possible criminal charges for serious violations; and developing a secure, user-friendly online platform for registration and public access.
• The regime will be launched in the shortest possible timeframe while still being sure to get it right. Canadians looking to report foreign interference can utilize the RCMP, CSIS, CSE and CBSA phonelines and online reporting mechanisms that are monitored for anyone who would like to report a threat to national security.
• We appreciate any time allegations of foreign interference are brought forward and encourage all those who wish to report such activities to do so to the responsible federal authorities.

Security Screenings Assessments

Q26 – Why do immigration requests from specific countries take so long to be assessed? Is the government doing these assessments based on gender, race and ethnicity as the US does right now

• CSIS does not screen based on race and ethnicity, but rather on a variety of other risk-based factors.
• The immigration security screening process has several steps, and is a collaborative effort between IRCC, CBSA, and CSIS. IRCC and CBSA refer certain applications to CSIS for security screening assessments.
• Each of these files is reviewed and analysed against the information and intelligence available, and CSIS provides a security screening assessment.
• IRCC is the decision maker on immigration files, under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).
• There has been a 156% increase in immigration and citizenship security screening requests sent to CSIS between 2022 (343,700) and 2024 (538,200).
• The majority of files are processed expediently, while others require additional verifications based on valid reasons in the interest of national security and safety of Canada and Canadians.

Contributing to Canada's Missions: Keeping Canadians Safe, Protecting our Sovereignty, and Establishing New Economic and Security Relationships Worldwide

Issue Note – Mandate and Priorities of the Minister of Public Safety

SECU Appearance: Mandate and Priorities – Strategic Policy and Priorities Division – October 9, 2025

Key messages

• In the face of rising uncertainty both domestically and abroad, it is an honour to contribute to our government's core missions of keeping Canadians safe, protecting our sovereignty and establishing new economic and security relationships worldwide.
• We have opportunity to redefine Canada's approach to national and economic security. By strengthening and renewing ties with diverse international partners, Canadians and Canadian businesses will see direct benefits that reinforce the country's safety, sovereignty, and long-term prosperity.
• The Public Safety Portfolio is well-equipped to champion effective national coordination that will strengthen unity and improve safety, economic and security outcomes for Canadians.
• I am proud of the work we have accomplished over the last several months – ushering in Phase Two of the Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program, seeing Bills C-2 and C-8 move through the Parliamentary process, contributing to the National Security Strategy, and fostering meaningful relationships on the world stage.
• I recently met in London with my Five Eye's counterparts on border security and other national security issues and I am looking forward to Canada hosting the G7 Interior Ministers' Meeting in November, which will identify concrete joint actions to address common threats and challenges.

If pressed

Q1 – Canadians do not feel safe in their communities. How can we trust that the Government's actions will reverse this

• Our Government is working tirelessly to uphold and improve community safety across Canada.
• In addition to the work already underway to modernize and stabilize our law enforcement agencies, we are ushering in new and comprehensive criminal justice reforms.
• These measures will help build safer communities through legislation and strategic investments to strengthen bail and sentencing, combat crime, enhance investigative capacity, and protect children and other vulnerable Canadians.

Q2 – How does the Public Safety Portfolio actually contribute to a stronger economy

• In this period of economic and global uncertainty, there is a strong case to be made the investments being prioritized in Public Safety will have significant and long-lasting impacts to make our communities and institutions, safer and more resilient.
• Ensuring the safety of the public helps the economy by creating environments that foster economic activity, attract investment, ensures consumer and business confidence, and enables stable communities where people feel safe to work, shop, and live.
• The investments being made across the Public Safety Portfolio contribute to the prevention of economic losses from crime and disasters, reduce poverty, and contribute to overall productivity and well-being.
• Recent geopolitical shifts require, a re-examination of how we view our national security and sovereignty. Adversaries are likely to position themselves to benefit from Canada-U.S. tensions. While trade diversification is critical, it brings its own risks as other trade partners could be exposed to nefarious actors.
• Achieving economic growth and prosperity will require that the Government identify national security risks to the economy that could jeopardize these efforts and ultimately harm Canada's sovereignty. A strong, independent and resilient economy needs to be free from unmitigated national security threats.

Q3 – Why is the government of Canada only prioritizing the diversification of relationships now

• Canada is confronting a convergence of serious challenges. In an increasingly volatile and fragmented world, rising geopolitical risks are testing our sovereignty. The global trading system—long a cornerstone of Canada's prosperity—is undergoing its most profound transformation in over forty years.
• Canada must reimagine its international, commercial, and security relationships.

Q4 – What are you doing to protect and strengthen Canada's sovereignty

• The Government is protecting Canadians and their sovereign rights by ensuring it invests in what matters most to ensure Canada is equipped to face any challenges that may come at home or abroad.
• To keep communities safe across Canada, the Government has committed to hire 1,000 more RCMP personnel. We have also made an investment of $1.3 billion to support more personnel, new technology and equipment, and enhanced coordination. Through the deployment of scanners, drones and helicopters, additional personnel, and K-9 teams, the Government is strengthening our interdiction of all contraband including illegal guns and drugs across the border.
• As a next step in the Border Plan, the Government of Canada introduced Bill C-2 in June 2025, the Strong Borders Act, which proposes to update existing laws to bolster our response to national and economic security threats and continue to provide a fair, transparent, and well-managed immigration system.

Background

Issue

• On May 21, 2025, Prime Minister Carney instructed the Ministry to contribute to the Government's seven overarching missions.
• The Public Safety (PS) Portfolio contributes directly to two missions:
  1. protecting Canadian sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe by securing our borders and reinforcing law enforcement;
  2. establishing a new security relationship with the U.S. and strengthening our collaboration with allies around the world.

Information to support key messages

• To support the Government's missions, the PS Portfolio has established an Action Plan with five key objectives to guide its forward-looking priorities. These objectives include: enhancing Canada's national security capabilities; securing Canada's borders; reducing gun violence across the country; ensuring Canadians feel safe in their communities; and, reinforcing economic and security relationships worldwide.
• To address the evolving security landscape, build our national security sovereignty, and further establish ourselves as a valuable security-intelligence partner, Canada must develop and enhance our legislative authorities and operational capacity to account for 21st century threats and a changing world order. Bill C-8 is making its way through the parliamentary process, aimed at strengthening regulations for critical infrastructure sectors.
• Maintaining a strong and secure border is key to ensuring Canada's sovereignty and keeping Canadians safe. PS will continue to build on the progress being made to ensure that our border security, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies have the tools, resources, and authorities needed to address border security threats. Bill C-2 is also before Parliament, fully implement the legislative components of Canada's Border Plan.
• The PS Portfolio has a mandate to ensure that Canadians feel safe in their communities. Gun crime, among other community safety concerns, have left citizens feeling less safe in their homes. Progress is being made to reduce gun violence, as for example, the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program launched a pilot project for individuals last week.
• Safer communities also require the support of a modern federal police force, equipped to respond to rapidly evolving threats. The PS Portfolio will strive to strengthen the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to protect Canadians, keep communities safe and fight crime. The Speech from the Throne committed to hiring 1,000 RCMP personnel to keep communities safe.
• Canada has a rare opportunity to redefine its approach to national and economic security. Recent international engagement, such as in Washington, Mexico, and the United Kingdom has been fruitful and has proved effective for us to align our efforts with strategic partners, to discuss areas for improvement, and to chart a path forward together.
• Lastly, through new and renewed relationships with international partners, Canadians and Canadian businesses will benefit directly and these opportunities will contribute to Canada's safety, sovereignty, and prosperity.
• Under the leadership of the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of Canada, both you and the Secretary for State (Combatting Crime) will actively promote effective crime prevention and anti-hate initiatives to modernize the criminal justice system.

Spending less on government operations

SECU Appearance: Mandate and Priorities Portfolio Affairs and Communications Branch – September 29, 2025

Key messages

• The Prime Minister has made clear that our government must act with urgency and determination to build the strongest economy in the G7. It is imperative that we contribute to this mission and reign in the increasing cost of government operations and the federal public service.
• In recent months, I have conducted a review and identified ambitious savings proposals to spend less on the day-to-day running of the Public Safety Portfolio and invest in modernizing technology and processes to improve efficiencies.
• This review focused on returning to core responsibilities, ensuring value for money, and improve service delivery for Canadians.
• I look forward to Cabinet discussions and Budget 2025 to start delivering on these savings.

If pressed

Q1 – Operational impacts

• It remains vitally important that all Canadians are safe in their communities. These efforts start at our border.
• Strategic investments are needed in personnel, infrastructure, technology and equipment to help address human trafficking and human smuggling, and the smuggling of firearms, fentanyl, stolen vehicles and other illegal contraband across our border.
• In support of the investments announced in Canada's Border Plan, reduction targets were adjusted from 15% to 2% for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

Strengthening Border Security (PS)

Question Period Note – PACB – October 7, 2025

Key messages

• Strengthening our border is a priority for our Government, and an important area of Canada-U.S. cooperation.
• We have made significant progress in recent months in making our border stronger and more secure, while ensuring an efficient flow of legitimate travel and trade.
• Backed by an investment of $1.3 billion, Canada's Border Plan strengthens border security and our immigration system, and accelerates the fight against fentanyl and illegal drugs. With these investments, we are ensuring enhanced border surveillance through new and existing technology and the mobilization of law enforcement resources. Deployment of new detection technology has enhanced the ability to interdict when needed, further protecting the border.
• Other important actions include establishing a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to support law enforcement investigations, establishing the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to help tackle financial crimes, listing transnational criminal organizations as terrorist entities, and directing Canada's intelligence agencies to target cross-border criminal activities.
• Not only have we launched and delivered on key components of our Border Plan since December 2024, but we have also introduced legislation in Parliament that further strengthen our border posture and give important tools to our law and border enforcement agencies to tackle cross-border crime.
• Most recently, we introduced the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act, a new piece of legislation that reinforces our commitment to the security of our borders and the integrity of our immigration system. This new Bill will advance key legislative commitments made in Canada's Border Plan. Given the urgent need for these changes, I hope that I can count on the support of Parliament for its swift passage.
• These efforts are vital for maintaining border security and meaningful results have been achieved through collaboration between federal, provincial, territorial, Indigenous and law enforcement partners. We will continue to take action to keep Canadians and our communities safe.

If pressed

Q1 – Surveillance on the Border

• Canada's Border Plan includes several measures that have enhanced surveillance of the Canada–U.S. border.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has deployed an Aerial Intelligence Task Force, equipped with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers to enhance continuous monitoring and rapid response capabilities regarding border incidents. These technologies directly support front-line RCMP officers in securing the border. They are further reinforced by RCMP Border Integrity Operations Centres (BIOCs), responsible for monitoring surveillance equipment between the ports of entry.
• Personnel representing Federal, Provincial, Territorial, and Indigenous partners work together to protect the border. In addition, the RCMP has mobilized and increased resources along the Canada-U.S. border, augmenting its capacity to patrol, detect, respond to, and investigate threats.
• Together, these measures strengthen our sovereignty and security, while facilitating the legal flow of people and goods across the border.

Q2 – Expanding CBSA to Patrol Between Ports of Entry

• In Canada, border security and integrity is a shared responsibility between the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the RCMP. Currently the CBSA has the mandate to enforce border legislation and various other acts at Ports of Entries (POEs). Enforcement between POEs is performed by the RCMP as part of its federal policing mandate. This mirrors the division of labour between our counterparts in the U.S. (U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Border Patrol).
• When apprehensions are made by the RCMP between POEs, apprehended individuals are brought to a CBSA Port of Entry for processing. The CBSA closely coordinates with RCMP for border enforcement.
• The CBSA plays a critical role in protecting our borders and ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. It enforces over 100 acts, regulations, and international agreements on behalf of other federal departments, agencies, provinces, and territories.
• Public Safety is constantly reviewing the mandate, authorities, and resources needed to ensure a safe, secure and efficient border and has taken note of various stakeholders' recommendations on the expansion of CBSA's mandate and is analyzing these recommendations.

Q3 – Improving Operational Coordination

• Canada–U.S. border collaboration remains robust and highly institutionalized, underpinned by decades of trust and shared strategic interests. Operational programs such as preclearance, Shiprider, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Border Security Task Forces (BEST – U.S.-led) exemplify the depth of coordination between agencies.
• Day-to-day interactions are marked by intelligence sharing, joint training, and integrated technologies that support both security and the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel.
• Nonetheless, emerging challenges are prompting both countries to reassess and modernize their approach. Irregular migration, evolving cyber threats, and aging infrastructure are placing new demands on border operations.
• At the same time, there are opportunities to enhance collaboration through digital innovation, expanded trusted traveler programs, and strengthening joint patrols.
• Enhancing operational coordination is a primary objective of Canada's Border Plan. As a key part of these efforts, Canada has established a North American Joint Strike Force in collaboration with U.S. partners.
• The Joint Strike Force aims to target transnational organized crime involvement in the illegal drug trade and combat the trafficking of illegal substances and precursor chemicals. The Joint Strike Force consists of domestic, international, and technical operations.
• The designation of seven cartels as terrorist entities enables key players from Canada's financial services sector and law enforcement to further improve intelligence collection and coordination, strengthening efforts against transnational organized crime.
• We are also setting up regional information-sharing hubs that will bring together key Federal, Provincial, local, and Indigenous law enforcement to support operational coordination, with a focus on high-risk drug trafficking areas.

Q4 – Increasing Information Sharing

• Canada's Border Plan includes significant measures to enhance information sharing.
• The plan improves real-time intelligence sharing between Canadian and U.S. officials, including: the RCMP, the CBSA, Public Safety Canada, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Health Canada, and provincial and territorial partners. This has been realized through the creation of the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell (JOIC), with a focus on facilitating the expedient and effective flow of intelligence for use by law enforcement operations in Canada and abroad.
• Increasing information sharing broadly allows for better targeting and stronger actions against illegal border activities. This includes monitoring illegal migration trends and hot spots to respond swiftly and effectively.
• The designation of cartels as terrorist entities enables new partnerships involving key players from Canada's financial services sector (e.g., banks), such as the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) and law enforcement agencies. These partnerships improve intelligence collection and coordination, bolstering efforts against sophisticated money laundering schemes and transnational organized crime.
• Similarly, the new Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership (IMLIP) will further support the permissible sharing of money laundering and organized crime intelligence between law enforcement and Canada's big banks.
• By strengthening the exchange of information, the Government enhances our border security and safeguards our nation's safety, prosperity, and integrity.
• Additionally, continued partnerships with Indigenous communities, provincial, territorial and municipal law enforcement remain critical to disrupting cross-border criminality.

Q5 – New Tools for Law Enforcement

• To bolster law enforcement capabilities, Canada has introduced an Aerial Intelligence Task Force, equipped with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers and supported by counter-drone technology.
• The addition of Black Hawk helicopters greatly increases the RCMP's detection and response capabilities, offering rapid deployment and providing coverage when and where needed in between ports of entry, pursuant to Canadian laws and regulations, and in line with the RCMP's mandate.
• Drones are part of a coordinated approach to border security, working alongside other technologies and personnel to address potential illegal activity along the border.
• Additionally, artificial intelligence and imaging tools are deployed to detect illegal drugs, particularly fentanyl, before they enter Canada. The CBSA is also training and deploying new canine teams and chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry.
• Canada is also in the process of setting up regional information-sharing hubs that will bring together key Federal, Provincial, local, and Indigenous law enforcement.
• The Government is committed to ensuring that law enforcement has the tools they need to keep our borders safe and secure.

Q6 – Border Legislation

• A strong Canada means strong borders. Our Government made a commitment to keep Canada secure, and to work with our American partners to strengthen our shared border.
• That is why, on October 8, we introduced the Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act, a new bill that advances critical elements of Bill C-2, while leaving time for further study of the more complex pieces.
• If passed, the new bill will keep Canadians safe by ensuring border and law enforcement have the right tools to keep our borders secure, stop the flow of illegal fentanyl, and crack down on money laundering, while enhancing the integrity and fairness of our immigration system.
• This proposed legislation builds on the priorities set out in Canada's $1.3 billion Border Plan, announced in December 2024.
• This includes changes that would facilitate information sharing; disrupt the illicit flows of fentanyl, other drugs, and precursor chemicals; bolster migration security; and strengthen law enforcement operations.
• Canadians support a strong border and giving law enforcement the tools needed to keep it secure. The proposed legislation will complement a new economic and security relationship with the United States while protecting Canadian sovereignty.

Q7 – Cannabis Trafficking

• Since the Cannabis Act came into effect in 2018, Canada created a strict legal framework to controlling the production, distribution, sale and possession of cannabis. A key goal of legalization was to eliminate the illicit cannabis market and cut off profits to organized crime groups.
• Since legalization, the illegal cannabis market has reduced significantly, and the influence of organized crime groups has decreased.
• This reflects our government's commitment to combat crimes and dismantle organized crime.
• The CBSA works to prevent cross-border trafficking and works with international partners and local law enforcement agencies to disrupt criminal supply chains.
• Recent initiatives, like the Strong Borders Act, strengthen this effort by expanding law enforcement powers, improving intelligence-sharing, and providing new tools to the RCMP and CBSA to combat transnational organized crime.

Q8 – Public Safety's Role in Border Management

• Public Safety Canada plays a central and strategic role in border management, focusing on policy leadership, coordination, and resource allocation to ensure both national security and the smooth flow of legitimate trade and travel.
• Public Safety Canada provides federal policy leadership on border-related issues by working closely with Portfolio agencies such as the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
• Through this collaboration, it ensures coherence across departments on critical matters including customs and immigration enforcement, cross-border crime prevention, cross-border law enforcement programs, emergency border arrangements, the preclearance program, and policies related to irregular migration and asylum.

Q9 – Border Security Funding Breakdown

• The Fall Economic Statement of December 2024 allocated $1.3 billion for the Border Plan. This amount is allocated across several federal agencies to strengthen capabilities, enforcement and intelligence.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police received $667.5 million for aerial surveillance, counter-drone technology, and intelligence expansion, as well as additional personnel.
• The Canada Border Services Agency received $355.4 million to enhance screening, deploy detection tools, and expand export inspections.
• The Communications Security Establishment received $180 million to bolster cyber and intelligence capabilities, while Health Canada receives $77.7 million for drug profiling and lab support.
• Public Safety Canada received $20 million for policy coordination, including through the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell (JOIC) and other initiatives.
• Expected outcomes from the $1.3 billion border security investment include more effective interdiction of fentanyl and precursor chemicals, enhanced surveillance capabilities at ports of entry and along the border, accelerated and more accurate screening of goods and travellers, increased capacity to remove inadmissible individuals, and strengthened intelligence sharing with both domestic agencies and international partners to support coordinated enforcement and threat mitigation.

Q10 – Measurable Results achieved through Canada's Border Plan

• The Government of Canada has been resolute in its commitment to doing whatever it takes to keep our border secure, because a strong border is essential to our economy, national security, and the safety of our communities. The Government continues to advance efforts under the Border Plan to address the flow of illegal fentanyl, other illegal drugs, and precursor chemicals; deter organized crime and illegal migration; and increase information sharing and operational coordination with partners.
• Meaningful results have been achieved through collaboration between federal, provincial, territorial, Indigenous and law enforcement partners, as well as police of jurisdiction.
• For example, since June 2024, there has been a dramatic reduction of 99% in illegal southbound movement from Canada to the United States (U.S.). This is thanks to more and better enforcement and intelligence-sharing at the border between Canada and the U.S, and also due to integrity measures taken upstream by our colleagues at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. This demonstrates that our efforts have been successful in deterring illegal cross-border movement.
• Canada has invested in enhanced security at Ports of Entry and between them with increased surveillance via drones, towers, helicopters and deployed additional resources to allow for 24/7 surveillance.
• Operational coordination has improved with the appointment of a Fentanyl Czar to lead coordination on disrupting the fentanyl trade, and the creation of the Joint Operational Intelligence Cell mandated to turn actionable intelligence into law enforcement operations. The designation of seven transnational criminal organizations as terrorist organizations under the Criminal Code has also given law enforcement new tools against them, such as the freezing of their Canadian assets.
• On the drugs front, Fentanyl seizures from Canada to the U.S. continue to be minimal, and constitute well below 1% of all Fentanyl seize by the U.S at its borders. Between January 2022 and August 2025, only 136 pounds of fentanyl were seized within the area of the U.S. Northern Border, while over 73,000 pounds were seized at the U.S. Southwest Border; totaling more than 500 times as much.
• Meanwhile, the CBSA has seized 1,424 Kg of Cocaine so far in 2025, most of it coming from the U.S. at the land border.
• Information-sharing gaps between the various key players (including the U.S.) are being addressed via the creation of a Canada-U.S. Strike Force for joint intelligence mapping and assessments, and the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information-sharing between law enforcement and the financial sector.
• These results demonstrate that the Border Plan is delivering tangible progress in securing Canada's borders and disrupting illegal activity. Through strategic investments, enhanced coordination, and strengthened partnerships, the federal government is making measurable strides in protecting communities and upholding the integrity of Canada's immigration and public safety systems.

Q11 – Legislative Gaps closed by Border Legislation

• The Strengthening Canada's Immigration System and Borders Act is designed to close several operational and legislative gaps that have limited Canada's ability to respond effectively to evolving threats. These include gaps in border enforcement, such as limited authority for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to inspect exports and access private facilities, and weaknesses in the asylum system that allow delayed or irregular claims to proceed.
• As a modernization of Canada's security and immigration systems, the new bill aligns with international partners, particularly the United States, while reaffirming Canada's commitment to privacy, transparency, and public trust.

Q12 – Respecting Indigenous Communities Interests in Canada-U.S. Border Management

• Indigenous communities on both sides of the Canada-U.S. Border are key partners in ensuring a safe, secure and efficient experience crossing the border. Many communities, such as the Akwesasne Mohawk Community directly straddle the border and interact daily with Canadian and U.S. border enforcement.
• Indigenous communities have been directly involved in the development and implementation of Canada's Border Plan, for example, by participating in Table Top Exercises organized with all provinces and territories in January 2025.
• Public Safety also provides funding to Indigenous law enforcement, including for border enforcement activities, through the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP).
• The Minister of Public Safety is also a convenor of the Jay Treaty Border Alliance (JTBA) Collaborative Initiative High Table, which works to facilitate Indigenous Border mobility and brings together governments, First Nations, and U.S. Federally Recognized Tribes.
• Public Safety Canada supports efforts led by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada in expanding border mobility rights for Canadian and U.S. Indigenous communities, in furtherance of United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act Action Plan Measure 52 (UNDA APM 52).

Background

Issue

Backed by an investment of $1.3 billion, Canada's Border Plan is bolstering border security, strengthening our immigration system, and contributing to ensuring Canada's future prosperity.

Canada's Border Plan

• The Government of Canada announced a significant investment of $1.3 billion to enhance border security and strengthen the immigration system. This plan, unveiled in December 2024, focuses on five key pillars:
  • Detecting and Disrupting the Fentanyl Trade: Enhanced support for law enforcement agencies, including new Artificial Intelligence and imaging tools, additional dog detection teams, and new chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry.
  • Introducing Significant New Tools for Law Enforcement: Deployment of an Aerial Intelligence Task Force with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers, along with counter-drone technology.
  • Enhancing Operational Coordination: Increased information sharing and collaboration between Canadian and U.S. officials, along with the creation of regional enforcement hubs and a North American Joint Strike Force, will enhance the targeting and disruption of organized crime and illegal border activities.
  • Increasing Information Sharing: Enhanced information and intelligence sharing with Federal, Provincial, and Territorial authorities, the U.S., and international partners to better identify, monitor, and intercept high-risk individuals and goods moving between countries.
  • Minimizing Unnecessary Border Volumes: Implementation of changes to end "flagpoling," amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for greater control over immigration documents, new restrictions on non-cooperative countries, and maintenance of the Safe Third Country Agreement to strengthen immigration and asylum systems while collaborating with the U.S. to protect border integrity and combat illegal activities.
• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was provided over $355 million through the Border Plan over a six-year period. So far, as part of this investment:
  • The Agency currently has 36 new officers being trained at the CBSA College who will be deployed to ports of entry by the end of 2025, increasing the Agency's examination capacity, with more officers to be hired over the six-year period.
  • The CBSA has spent over $1 million to create Special Investigation and Examination for Greater Enforcement (SIEGE) capacity. This included Operation Blizzard, a month-long, cross-country operation to intercept fentanyl and other illegal drugs at the border, resulting in over 2,600 seizures of narcotics and precursors. The Agency will continue to allocate funding for these targeted operations in the weeks and months ahead.
  • The CBSA has spent $6.25 million for Large Scale Imaging (X-ray) systems and committed another $31 million for a range of other equipment. The CBSA is also in the process of procuring new detection technology tools that will enhance our ability to detect and identify illegal synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals at the border. These investments include imaging and trace detection tools, regional satellite laboratories, and handheld chemical analyzers, with an additional $24 million of equipment planned for delivery in 2026, and more in the following years.
  • The CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible people last fiscal year – the most in a decade. The Border Plan provides funding for the CBSA to increase the rate at which it removes inadmissible people from Canada, to complete 20,000 removals for each of the next two fiscal years. To reach this target, the CBSA has hired approximately 30 additional frontline personnel, allowing for an increase in the number of interviews with inadmissible foreign nationals facing removal from Canada. The Agency is taking steps toward meeting its commitment to completing 20,000 removals by March 31, 2026, and maintaining that cadence the following fiscal year. More information and statistics on removals are available online: CBSA removals program statistics.
• This comprehensive plan aims to bolster security, improve the efficiency of the immigration system, and ensure the safety and prosperity of Canadians.
• The Government of Canada appointed Kevin Brosseau, former Deputy Commissioner of the RCMP and former Deputy National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, as Commissioner of Canada's Fight Against Fentanyl (informally known as the Fentanyl Czar).

Migrant Smuggling (RCMP)

Question Period Note – RCMP – September 9, 2025

Key messages

• Migrant smuggling networks are sophisticated, highly lucrative, transnational, organized crime groups that pose a threat to public safety.
• The Government of Canada works closely with domestic and international, and Indigenous partners to gather and share information to detect and investigate organized crime groups and networks involved in migrant smuggling.
• Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy is a whole-of-Government approach that combines domestic and international capabilities to protect the integrity of Canada's borders.
• Through this Strategy, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) detects and prevents migrant smuggling, and has saved hundreds of lives.
• In addition, Canada's Border Plan combines existing efforts and capabilities with new initiatives and investments to enhance investigative and surveillance capacity and border enforcement.

If pressed

Q1 – What specific measures are the RCMP taking to identify and dismantle organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling operations in Canada

• The RCMP is dedicated to addressing migrant smuggling at the Canadian border and abroad, including through Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy.
• The RCMP uses technology, intelligence and other tools to prevent, detect, investigate and disrupt organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling.

Q2 – How does the RCMP collaborate with international law enforcement partners to prevent migrant smuggling before individuals reach Canadian borders

• The RCMP works closely with the U.S. and other international law enforcement partners to investigate transnational human smuggling networks that facilitate the movement of people.
• This includes close collaboration with U.S. law enforcement through the Cross-Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee and the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, also known as Shiprider.
• Under Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy, the RCMP works with law enforcement partners domestic and abroad to increase their capacity to disrupt and dismantle migrant smuggling criminal organizations.

Q3 – What is the RCMP's mandate for southbound migration

• The RCMP is responsible for ensuring border security between official Ports of Entry.
• The RCMP continues to respond to the border through a combination of patrol resources, technology and partnerships with agencies in Canada and the U.S.

Background

Issue

RCMP efforts to address migrant smuggling across the Canada-U.S. border.

Information to Support Key messages

• Migrant smuggling, also referred to as human smuggling, is the facilitation of the illegal entry of individuals into a country where they are neither citizens nor permanent residents. This crime typically occurs with the consent of the individual who is being smuggled: the smuggler provides services such as fraudulent travel documents, transportation and accommodation in exchange for payment.
• Transnational serious and organized crime groups engaged in migrant smuggling exploit vulnerable individuals for financial gain. Profits generated by migrant smuggling networks are frequently used to fund other forms of illicit activity, including drug trafficking, firearms smuggling, and corruption.

RCMP Efforts to Combat Migrant Smuggling

• The RCMP is responsible for border security between official ports of entry (POE) along the Canada-U.S. border, across all domains (air, land, marine and Arctic). The goal is to prevent illegal activity that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Canada.
• The RCMP collaborates with Canadian law enforcement and Indigenous partners to further Canada's collective approach to secure the borders from serious criminal threats.
• The RCMP is leveraging investments from Canada's Border Plan to deploy a new Aerial Intelligence Task Force composed of helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers to further strengthen surveillance between POE.

Canada's Migrant Smuggling Prevention Strategy

• Established in 2010, the Strategy aims to identify and disrupt mass migrant arrivals by Sea. The Strategy assists source and transit countries in taking preventative action to stop the operations before departing for Canada and to dismantle transnational organized criminal networks targeting Canada.
• The Strategy, coordinated by Global Affairs Canada, combines efforts from law enforcement, intelligence, border management and enforcement, voluntary return assistance, anti-crime capacity-building and diplomatic engagement.

G7 Action Plan to Prevent and Counter the Smuggling of Migrants

• At the 2024 G7 Interior and Security Ministers' meeting, Canada and its G7 partners committed to implementing the G7 Action Plan to Prevent and Counter the Smuggling of Migrants.
• The G7 Action Plan outlines measures to enhance law enforcement capacity and coordination against migrant smuggling groups, to foster greater collaboration with the private sector and countries of origin and transit, and to raise awareness.

Removals (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – October 7, 2025

Key messages

• Removing those who are not admissible to Canada is critical, especially those who pose threats to the safety of Canadians.
• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) removed over 18,000 inadmissible people last fiscal year—the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before.
• The Border Plan provided $55.5M to support immigration and asylum processing and to increase CBSA's capacity to reach 20,000 removals for fiscal years 2025-26 and 2026-27. From April 1st to September 29th, 2025, the CBSA enforced 11, 354 removals of which 578 were for criminality and national security reasons.
• All individuals facing removal from Canada have access to due process before the law. The CBSA only actions a removal once all avenues of recourse have been exhausted.

If Pressed – 600 foreign nationals to be deported

• CBSA arrests, detains and removes foreign nationals who should not be in the country and who pose a security threat to the public.
• Since 2021, the CBSA doubled the number of removals from 7,530 yearly to 18,048 last fiscal.
• When an inadmissible foreign national does not comply and tries to evade, the CBSA immediately notifies police forces across the country with an arrest warrant.
• CBSA works side-by-side with local police to locate and arrest those with warrants.
• Over 550 CBSA personnel are dedicated to immigration investigations and removals. They are focused on cases that pose a risk to security and public safety.
• CBSA also has a tip line for the public to share information about the whereabouts of those who are trying to evade the law.
• Last year, CBSA closed 542 immigration warrants involving criminals and 254 so far this year. They also removed 905 individuals inadmissible for criminality, organized criminality and security.
• Of the 599 cases flagged, CBSA knows the whereabouts of 100 people. These 100 are comprised of cases of people that are presently serving a criminal sentence, have already been removed or have had their warrants closed as they have either been apprehended and started reporting to the CBSA.

Background

Issue

Enforcing removal of people who do not have the right to stay in Canada.

Information to support key messages

• The process for determining inadmissibility begins with the issuance of a 44 report that outlines the inadmissibility and referral of the report to an authorized decision-maker. Depending on the inadmissibility ground and status of the individual, a Minister's Delegate may issue a removal order or the case may be referred to the Immigration Division at the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) for an admissibility hearing.
• The removal of foreign nationals that are found inadmissible as per the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) is an integral part of the CBSA's security mandate. Individuals may be inadmissible for a variety of reasons including security; criminality; organized crime, international human rights violation, non-compliance with the IRPA, etc. If found inadmissible, a removal order will be issued. Persons subject to a removal order may have various redress options either through the (IRB) or Federal Court. Once those have been resolved, the Agency is mandated to enforce as quickly as possible.
• The CBSA prioritizes removals based on a risk management regime that assigns the highest priority to cases involving security, organized crime, crimes against humanity, and criminality. These are followed by failed refugee claimants as second tier, and all other inadmissible persons as the lowest priority.
• All individuals who are subject to enforcement action and ordered to be removed from Canada have access to due process before the law. They may seek redress through various processes at the IRB (appeals), the Federal Court of Canada (judicial review) and if eligible, at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (pre-removal risk assessment if they feel they may be subject to persecution in their country of origin, and humanitarian and compassionate applications for permanent residence). Please note that there are legislated factors that allow or deny access to some of these processes.
• The CBSA's removal efforts may be hindered and delayed by impediments such as uncooperative foreign nationals who do not provide necessary information or documentation to allow for their removal, or foreign governments that refuse the return of their nationals, or fail to promptly issue timely travel documents. The CBSA works closely with foreign governments, Canadian officials abroad, and other departments to resolve these challenges, and participates in international forums to identify joint strategies and best practices to achieve timely removals of inadmissible persons.
• The CBSA has an inventory of high-risk individuals, including those with serious criminality, whose whereabouts are unknown and Canada-wide immigration warrants have been issued for their arrest. A Wanted by the website was launched in 2011 and remained active until 2023, during which a total of 159 individuals were featured on the webpage. Until 2014, some of these individuals were located and arrested as a result of tips received from the public.
• It was used as a last resort by CBSA officers who were searching for an individual who had an active immigration warrant for their removal, and who fell into a category of serious inadmissibility. The web page was removed in 2023 because investigative tools and methods had evolved, making it no longer necessary for operations.
• The Fall Economic Statement (FES) provided $55.5 million over three years to the CBSA to support front-end immigration and asylum processing activities, and achieve a 25% increase in the number of removals enforced. This includes reducing inventory backlogs, increasing removal capacity and addressing the anticipated increase in associated removals litigation. The funding will primarily be used to secure regional staff and ensure the program has necessary resources to achieve 20,000 removals in FY2025-26 and FY2026-27.
• In response to the significant increase in individuals making asylum claims in Canada, the CBSA aligned its resources to enforce removal orders in a more efficient and timely manner. A Removals Action Plan has also been developed to further enhance program delivery and address outstanding issues, including prioritizing cases to overcome impediments to removal, leveraging existing resources more efficiently, and engaging priority countries to expedite removal processes.
• (CBSA)Officers are trying to locate almost 600 foreign nationals wanted for removal who have criminal records 431 of whom have been found inadmissible on serious criminality grounds, pursuant to the IRPA. This generally includes indictable offences that may range in severity to non-violent crimes such as fraud over $5000 to more serious offences, such as assault causing bodily harm.
• Figures from the CBSA show that 1,635 foreign nationals guilty of committing crimes in Canada are currently facing deportation, but 599 of them have failed to attend deportation proceedings and have been placed on the agency's "wanted" removal inventory.
• Of those 599, 315 have been evading deportation for more than three years. Another 46, according to CBSA figures obtained by The Globe and Mail, have been evading the authorities for more than two years.
• Of the foreign nationals due to be deported, 401 are serving a prison sentence and must leave the country after they get out of custody.
• At the time, the border services agency used a "Wanted by the CBSA" webpage including photographs of individuals wanted for removal who were convicted of more serious offences to help gain leads from the public. The webpage, set up in 2011, had featured 159 profiles of wanted individuals before it was taken down in 2023.

Immigration Detention (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 18, 2025

Key messages

• The Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) priority continues to be to remove inadmissible individuals from Canada as soon as possible, with a focus on individuals who are inadmissible for serious criminality and national security.
• Over 98% of individuals requiring CBSA supervision are enrolled in an alternative to detention and less than 2% are detained.
• The Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) of Canada reviews detention decisions made by the CBSA and determines if it detention should be maintained or not.
• The CBSA is upgrading its existing immigration holding centres to safely house high-risk detainees and has begun operating a designated immigrant station in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec, which can house up to 25 adult males who present a significant risk to public safety.

If Pressed – Use of Provincial Correctional Facilities

• As of September 15, the CBSA has no immigration detainees in a provincial correctional facility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).
• The Government has taken the necessary steps to ensure that the CBSA can securely manage individuals who would have previously been detained in provincial correctional facilities.
• This includes investments in federal infrastructure, such as the immigration holding centres, and the establishment of the designated immigration station for high-risk detainees in Sainte-Anne-Des-Plaines, Quebec.

Background

Issue

Immigration Detention

Information to support key messages

Canada's Immigration Detention Program is governed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and its regulations.

Immigration detention is based on the principle that detention shall be used only as a measure of last resort, in limited circumstances.

Over the last eight years, the CBSA has reduced the use of detention by increasing alternatives to detention, such as in-person and remote reporting, Community Case Management and Supervision, and Electronic Monitoring. However, in certain cases, detention is deemed necessary when there are reasonable grounds to believe the person is inadmissible to Canada and is:

• a danger to the public;
• unlikely to appear (flight risk) for immigration processes;
• unable to satisfy the officer of their identity (foreign nationals only);
• upon entry, to complete an immigration examination; or,
• has been designated as part of an irregular arrival by the Minister of Public Safety (16 years of age or older only).

CBSA officers may also detain foreign nationals and permanent residents at a port of entry where there are reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is inadmissible due to security grounds, human rights violations or criminality.

A CBSA officer's decision to detain a person under the IRPA is subject to a review by the Immigration and Refugee Board, an independent quasi-judicial tribunal. Detainees must appear before the Immigration and Refugee Board within the first 48 hours of being detained. At a detention review, the Board may release the person or identify conditions for release or determine that detention should continue. If the Immigration and Refugee Board determines that detention should be continued, the individual must appear in the next seven days and every 30 days thereafter. The Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board always provides reasons for its decisions, and its decisions are subject to judicial review with leave from the Federal Court.

As of September 15, there were 13,503 people on alternatives to detention and 163 people detained under the IRPA including:

• 2 people in the designated immigrant station in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines;
• 44 people in the Laval IHC;
• 56 people in the Toronto IHC;
• 60 people in the British Columbia IHC; and,
• one person in other facilities (including those of other law enforcement agencies, such as RCMP detachments and local or provincial police cells).

Formerly, the CBSA's immigration holding centres were designed to hold detainees of low and medium risk, while higher-risk individuals were housed in provincial correctional facilities. Following the termination of the agreements with the provinces, the CBSA secured funding through Budget 2024 to retrofit two of its facilities – in Laval, Quebec and Toronto, Ontario – to accommodate some of the higher-risk detainee population. The CBSA began the retrofit projects at its Laval and Toronto IHCs in March 2025, and both projects are scheduled to be completed in late fall 2025. The work includes the interior construction of higher-risk living units, the expansion of administrative space, and other requirements necessary for the operationalization of an all-risk facility.

Upon completion, the Toronto IHC will have capacity for 29 high-risk detainees, the Laval IHC will have capacity for 24 high-risk detainees, and the British Columbia IHC will continue to provide two rooms for high-risk detainees. For individuals who require a higher degree of supervision and control, the CBSA may place them in the designated immigrant station located in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec, which has a capacity of 25 detainees.

Updated policies, procedures, and training are being implemented, and increased tools and staffing complements are being introduced, to ensure immigration holding centre and Designated Immigrant Station staff are adequately prepared and resourced. These measures will ensure that the CBSA is able to continue to detain all individuals subject to enforcement measures under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, for whom release on an alternative to detention is not an option. The CBSA continues to work with partners to maintain community safety, and to ensure all immigration detainees are treated in a dignified and compassionate manner.

Refugee claims – Lacolle (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 2, 2025.

Key messages

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has plans in place to maintain a secure border in the event of an increased number of refugee claimants from the United States.
• In processing individuals claiming asylum, CBSA officers determine whether the person is admissible into Canada. They also assess whether they meet an exception to the Safe Third Country Agreement – and if they do not, they are returned to the U.S.
• As of mid-May, the CBSA had processed approximately 13,500 asylum applications in Canada, which is 50% less than last year.

If pressed

Q1 – Safe Third Country Agreement and Removals

• From January to May, 2025, approximately 1440 asylum claimants were removed to the U.S. for their ineligibility under the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).
• The CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible people in fiscal year 2024-25—the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before. The Border Plan provided $55.5M to support immigration and asylum processing and to increase CBSA's capacity to reach 20,000 removals for the next two years.

Background

Issue

Increases of number of asylum claims at the border crossing in Lacolle, Quebec.

Information to support key messages

• The CBSA's role at ports of entry is to assess the admissibility of persons coming to Canada. All persons seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and may be subject to a more in-depth examination. Admissibility of travellers is decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the information made available at the time of entry.
• Having obtained a temporary resident visa (visitor visa) or having been previously authorized to enter Canada does not guarantee the right to enter Canada. On arrival at a Canadian port of entry, all travelers must demonstrate that they meet the requirements to enter. Foreign nationals seeking to visit, study, or work in Canada must establish that they hold a valid visa (if required) and that they are admissible to enter Canada and will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay.
• When a traveler makes a refugee claim upon arrival in Canada, the CBSA is obligated to process them in accordance with the law. This means determining whether or not the claim is eligible. If eligible, the person's file will be referred to the Immigration Refugee Board for consideration and the person will be authorized to enter Canada to pursue their claim for protection. If ineligible, they may be removed from Canada.
• Canada reserves refugee protection for individuals who are forced to flee their countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution. For example, refugees may face a danger of torture, death, or cruel and unusual treatment/punishment if they return to their home country. Foreign nationals who misrepresent their circumstances to claim asylum when there is no real risk of persecution are abusing Canada's refugee system and delaying the processing of genuine refugees in need of protection. When the CBSA becomes aware of situations where there are possible violations of the IRPA, including fraudulent refugee claims, we investigate and take appropriate action.

Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) Assessment and Revenue Management System (CARM) – Release Prior to Payment Program (RPP)

Question Period Note – CBSA – June 16, 2025

Key messages

• Each year, the Canadian Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) manages $40 billion in duties and taxes.
• Previously, the CBSA's inability to claim against an importer's debt resulted in significant annual losses to revenue.
• To address this liability, the CBSA's CARM Client Portal now requires importers to post financial security in order to have their goods released prior to payment.
• This change is targeted to reduce debt write-off by $13 million annually.

Background

Issue

Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) Assessment and Revenue Management System (CARM) and the Release Prior to Payment Program (RPP)

Information to support key messages

• On October 21, 2024, Legislative and regulatory amendments came into effect making CARM the official system for managing the $40 B in duties and taxes collected by the CBSA. CARM provides businesses with an account view of their importing history, allows them to make payments, establish a financial security agreement and submit digital forms. It improves compliance with trade rules, protects Government of Canada revenue and simplifies the import process by replacing paper based processes.
• Transitional measures were put in place to support trade chain partners as they adjust to CARM and, more specifically, changes to the regulations relating to financial security.
• Guiding the process, Accounting for Imported Goods and Payment of Duties Regulations (SOR/86-1062) have been in place for years; compliance with the regulations had been satisfied by allowing the importer to use the financial security of a customs broker. While this model facilitated the movement of goods it impeded the CBSA from collecting on debts owing to the crown. The inability to claim against a customs brokers financial security to pay an importers bad debt resulted in annual debt write offs.
• Following the deployment of the CARM system on October 21 2024, a transition period was introduced to give commercial importers additional time to post their financial security electronically while continuing to benefit from the Release Prior to Payment Program (RPP). This transition period ended at 3 am EDT on May 20, 2025. The change in liability is targeted to reduce debt write off by $13M annually. The changes also align with legislative changes planned to come into force in January 2026 that will provide greater clarity between the role of the importer and the customs broker.
• In order to support the continued flow of commercial shipments at the border after the transition period ends, the CBSA will allow goods to move in bond to an inland sufferance warehouse providing the transporting carrier is bonded. If an importer does not have RPP upon arrival of their goods, they may choose to either post the financial security required in order to benefit from RPP or submit a Commercial Accounting Declaration at a CBSA office and pay the applicable amounts owing. Importers may choose to pay the applicable amounts owing using a credit card, up to a maximum of $5,000.00, or a debit card or a cheque. The security deposit option may be suitable for businesses whom import infrequently, seasonally and/or have low amounts of duties and taxes payable. This deposit can be paid with a credit card.
• Awareness sessions and outreach across a broad range of stakeholders including small, medium and large size importers, customs brokers and transportation companies proved to be effective in raising awareness and mitigating the risk of border delays. Border Wait Times for processing commercial shipments remains within service standards and as of May 2025, over 157,000 businesses have registered in the CARM Client Portal. Importers who have posted financial security to obtain Release Prior to Payment represent over 97% of the volume.
• Most recently, the CBSA is using CARM to implement surtax and remission orders in a timely and targeted manner in response to U.S. trade actions and other global developments. Through automated tariff coding updates and centralized importer account management, CARM allows for immediate application of new fiscal measures without the delays previously caused by manual processing and dispersed systems.
• The cost of the CARM system was $438.4 million – within an overall budget of $526M. Deloitte has been contracted in the design, development and implementation of CARM, and is now supporting the systems ongoing operation. Deloitte receives $22M annually to manage the CARM service.

OAG Audit– Professional Services Contract – GC Strategies (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 2, 2025

Key messages

• The Canada Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) has implemented a Procurement Improvement Plan to strengthen its practices and make sure that all procurement follows contracting rules and represents value for Canadians.
• In response to the Audit of ArriveCAN, the CBSA has implemented seven of the eight applicable recommendations, and the final recommendation is in the process of being implemented.
• Several audits and reviews have covered procurement at the CBSA. These have resulted in a number of recommendations which the CBSA has either already implemented or are planning to address.

If pressed

Q1 – Botler AI allegations

• The CBSA's administrative investigation is continuing.
• Information relating to administrative investigations are confidential in nature and subject to the Privacy Act.

Background

Issue

The Office the Auditor General (OAG) tabled their Audit of Professional Services Contracts – GC Strategies Inc on Tuesday, June 10, 2025.

Information to support key messages

• On 17 September 2024, the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (OGGO) passed a motion, Request to the Auditor General of Canada to Conduct a Performance Audit. The text of the motion is as follows:.
• "That, in light of new reports that GC Strategies and other companies incorporated by the cofounders have received millions of dollars in government contracts, including a number of sole-sourced contracts, the committee request the Auditor General of Canada to conduct a performance audit, on a priority basis, of all payments to GC Strategies, and other companies incorporated by the cofounders and all contracts with the Government of Canada, including all departments, agencies and Crown corporations, including all subcontracts which GC Strategies and the before mentioned have been awarded under those contracts and that the committee report this request and these findings to the House."
• The objective of the audit was to determine whether the contracts awarded and the payments made to GC Strategies and other companies incorporated by its cofounders aligned with applicable policy instruments and whether value for money for these contracts was obtained. The CBSA's four contracts with GC Strategies Incorporated, while referenced in the report, were scoped out of this engagement, as they were examined as part of the Office of the Auditor General's Audit of ArriveCAN.
• The Audit of ArriveCAN concluded that it was not managed with due regard to value for money. Deficiencies in contracting and procurement, documentation, and management of deliverables made it impossible to determine the actual cost of the application. In response to this and other audits and reviews on the topic of procurement, the CBSA has made management excellence an Agency priority and has added specific measures and expectations in performance agreements to drive accountability. It has strengthened its oversight and quality assurance over contracting processes, conducted reviews of contracts where discrepancies were found and further investigated potential issues through collaborative work between the procurement and the professional standards teams. With respect to the Audit of ArriveCAN, the CBSA has implemented seven of the eight applicable recommendations, and the final recommendation is in the process of being implemented.
• On Monday June 9, the Government of Canada confirmed that GC Strategies Inc. will be unable to be awarded Federal government contracts for a period of 7 years.

NEXUS – responding to US changes (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 2, 2025

Key messages

• Despite the recent changes by the U.S. administration to the NEXUS application form, Canada continues to recognize and support gender diversity and inclusion.
• NEXUS is a voluntary program. Membership is not required for travel to the US. Canadian citizens can continue to travel on Canadian passports indicating "gender X.".
• This change doesn't impact NEXUS cards with a "gender X" issued prior to the U.S. change – they remain valid.

Background

Issue

As of February 2025, U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has implemented changes to the online NEXUS application system such that when a person applies for a NEXUS card, there is no longer an option to select an identifier other than "male" or "female".

Information to support key messages

• NEXUS is a binational, Canada-United States program for pre-approved, low-risk travellers entering Canada or the United States at designated air, land and marine ports of entry.
• The program is jointly operated by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), United States Customs and Border Protection.
• The quick processing of known travellers allows border officers to concentrate their efforts on processing unknown or higher-risk travellers and goods.
• On January 20, 2025, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 14168, "Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government", under which only the male and female sexes are to be recognized.
• The NEXUS program currently has over 1.8 million members, with the majority of members being Canadian.
• NEXUS cards allow members to:
  • use self-serve NEXUS kiosks or eGates when entering Canada at nine major international airports
  • use dedicated vehicle lanes at 20 designated land border crossings.
  • use U.S. Global Entry kiosks for entry into the U.S.
  • receive expedited clearance through (Canadian Air Transport Security Authority) security screening lines at major and select mid-sized airports in Canada.
  • receive expedited clearance through the U.S. Transportation Security Administration Pre-Check lines at over 200 participating U.S. airports.
  • clear the border by boat using the Telephone Reporting Centre and pre-register your arrival at 426 designated sites.

Remote Area Border Crossing Program

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 2, 2025

Key messages

• To ensure safe and efficient border services for Canadians, including those living and working in remote locations, the Canada Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) is reviewing its Remote Area Border Crossing Program.
• While no new permits will be issued during this review, existing permit holders can continue to use their permits to cross the border into Canada at designated areas.
• Permit applications can still be submitted and they will be considered once the review has been completed.

Background

Issue

The status of the Remote Area Border Crossing Program.

Information to support key messages

• The Remote Area Border Crossing (RABC) program has been operating since 1991 and is a program designed to simplify border crossing into Canada for communities, wilderness tourists and remote cottagers along the border, and is only accessible to Canadian and U.S. citizens and permanent residents.
• The program services a geographical area that is very complex and otherwise would not be accessible to travellers, due to the limited number of designated reporting sites and Ports of Entry.
• Once the permit is issued, the traveller then can enter Canada anywhere within the prescribed geographic region.
• On September 25, 2024, the CBSA suspended the processing of applications for the RABC permit program. Applications are still being accepted by the CBSA and existing permit holders can continue to use their permits. However, the CBSA will only process new applications once the review of the program has been completed.
• This pause in processing applications was necessary to allow the CBSA to do an administrative review and update of internal procedures.
• The Remote Area Border Crossing RABC Program is not suspended and existing permit holders may continue to use their permits to cross the Canada-U.S. border in the following remote areas:
  1. from Pigeon River through to and including Lake of the Woods;
  2. the Canadian shore of Lake Superior;
  3. Cockburn Island;
  4. Sault Ste. Marie (upper lock system); and,
  5. Northwest Angle Area.
• RABC permits are typically valid for a period of one year, but permits issued after September 1, 2023 have been extended and will remain valid until December 31, 2025. RABC membership totaled approximately 9,140 members in 2023-24.
• Travellers wishing to enter Canada who do not hold a valid RABC permit must present themselves at an open port of entry. At select locations, they may also take advantage of telephone reporting by calling the CBSA Telephone Reporting Centre: 1-888-226-7277 or 905-679-2073. Travellers should consult the Directory of CBSA Offices and Services for information on the nearest ports of entry.

Preclearance (PS)

Question Period Note – PACB – October 1, 2025

Key messages

• Canada and the U.S. have a successful and long-standing history of preclearance operations. Preclearance benefits both our countries by facilitating cross-border movement of people and goods while improving border security and efficiency.
• The Government of Canada knows that preclearance is a program that Canadians value and want to see continue and grow. Given the security and economic benefits, the program provides to both countries, I am convinced that our American colleagues see it the same way.
• Canada and the United States continue to actively collaborate towards bringing preclearance to more locations in Canada and the United States, such as Billy Bishop Toronto City airport and Cannon Corners, New York.

If pressed

Q1 – Preclearance Benefits

• Preclearance exemplifies Canadian and U.S. binational cooperation to deliver a border security program that has large scale benefits for our citizens, governments, and economies.
• Preclearance assists governments in pushing the border out so they can intercept threats before they enter their country. Travellers clear U.S. immigration and inspections in Canada so when they arrive in the U.S. they can exit quickly as a domestic traveler or to catch a connecting flight.
• Under the program, airlines can fly directly to airports and / or terminals usually limited to the U.S. domestic carriers, like Aspen Colorado and Reagan National airport in Washington D.C., which provides direct economic benefits.
• Canadian airports also compete with U.S. international airports as in-transit hubs to final U.S. destinations. Airlines realize route savings, providing a competitive advantage.

Q2 – U.S. Ambassador's Remarks about Preclearance

• Preclearance is an excellent example of Canada - U.S. cooperation at work; to secure our shared border and, at the same time, to facilitate trade and travel.
• The Preclearance program allows the U.S. to intercept inadmissible goods and travellers, as well as potential threats, before they enter the enter U.S. Pushing the border 'out' in this way has been beneficial to the U.S. for decades, but is particularly aligned to the current Administration's objectives.
• I will not speculate about what was meant, or what motivated the Ambassador's initial comment about 'taking a look at Preclearance', but we have received no formal indication from the current Administration that they are looking at pulling out of the program.

Q3 – Canadian Preclearance in the United States

• Once operational at sites such as Cannon Corners, New York, Canadian officers will be able to examine travellers and goods to decide whether they are admissible into Canada. This includes screening for dangerous goods such as firearms and drugs and looking out for stolen vehicles before they leave the U.S.
• While officers will be able to conduct most types of immigration processing at this site, claims for refugee protection cannot be processed at preclearance. Travellers seeking refugee protection in Canada will need to use a port of entry in Canada.

Background

Issue

• On January 25,2025, during an address to the Global Business Forum in Banff, Alberta, U.S. Ambassador Pete Hoekstra said that the United States "may need to reassess airport preclearance", and that "we're not sure we can make the numbers work anymore". The statement was made in the context of declining Canadian travel to the United States. Later on, during the engagement, when pressed, the Ambassador walked-back his comments and said "nobody said we're ending preclearance, don't put words in my mouth."
• These comments are at odds with the close collaboration and investment Canada and the United States continue to devote to expanding preclearance in Canada and in the United States.

Information to support key messages

• Canada and the U.S. plan to expand preclearance to 2 sites in Vancouver (rail and cruise); Billy Bishop airport in Toronto; Victoria B.C.; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Cannon Corners, New York.
• Preclearance makes it possible to intercept threats before they enter the U.S. or Canada; airlines can market flights directly from Canada to non-international U.S. airports; and Canadian airports can compete as in-transit hubs for travel to the U.S.
• Although year-over-year volumes have declined since February 2025, preclearance will still service over 15.5M passengers travelling from or through Canada during the 12-month period ending September 30, 2025.

Expansion of marine cargo facilities (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 11, 2025

Key messages

• I want to thank Canada Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) employees who work 24/7 across the country to protect public safety, facilitate trade and support our economy.
• CBSA presence at ports helps to disrupt transnational organized crime, intercepting contraband like opioids, illegal guns and stolen vehicles.
• The CBSA regularly assesses the allocation of its resources to respond to evolving trends.
• The CBSA is committed to working with stakeholders to examine options and consider proposals for the expansion of services.

Background

Issue

The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative is calling for greater resources for customs clearance at Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway Ports to facilitate global trade. This message has been endorsed and echoed by the Coalition of Marine Stakeholders.

Information to support key messages

Goods being imported into Canada, including those imported via marine containers, must be reported to the CBSA and may be subject to examination before release. Examination of high-risk marine cargo is completed at the vessel's first point of arrival and may include dockside inspections, and full offload examinations conducted at Marine Container Examination Facilities. Dedicated Marine Container Examination Facilities are in place at Canada's five major marine ports: Halifax, NS; Saint John, NB; Montreal, QC; Vancouver, BC; and, Prince Rupert, BC. These locations deploy state-of-the-art tools such as monitored radiation screening portals, non-intrusive large scale imaging, secure examination spaces, and trained CBSA personnel, to support the examination of imported goods to ensure any requirements from program legislation are met, with a view to protect the health, safety, and security of Canadians.

In a joint letter to Federal Officials including the Minister of Public Safety, The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative has expressed support for a renewed mandate and investments in the CBSA for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Region. The Coalition of Marine Stakeholders has also sent a joint open letter to Federal Officials, including the Minister of Public Safety, in support of the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Cities Initiative to ensure the CBSA is equipped with resources to secure Canadian borders while also facilitating trade.

Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) Report (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 2, 2025

Key messages

• We thank the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) for their important work.
• The Canadian Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) takes its privacy responsibilities very seriously and has taken action to address the findings of the report.
• The CBSA is committed to respecting the privacy of all travelers to Canada.

Background

Issue

• The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) tabled its annual report on Thursday, June 5.
• The CBSA is mentioned in the Top institutions by number of complaints accepted.

Information to support key messages

• All complaints received by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) are taken seriously and are handled in a professional and impartial manner. The CBSA's Privacy Code of Principles provides information and guidelines for CBSA employees on the procedures that protect the personal information managed in our offices. CBSA employees are held to a high standard and are expected to adhere to these guidelines, in order to preserve public trust and confidence in the integrity of the organization. Where a privacy breach is suspected, the CBSA has procedures in place to help contain the spread of information.
• In 2024-2025, the OPC accepted 1,279 complaints related to the public sector Privacy Act. Of these, the CBSA received 107 complaints.
• In 2023-2024, the OPC accepted a total of 1,113 Privacy Act complaints. Of these, the CBSA received 103 complaints.

OPC Investigation – TV show

An OPC investigation determined that a personal search carried out by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) was disclosed in real time to employees of a TV production company without the individual's consent. The OPC concluded that the personal information collected by the CBSA during the search itself related directly to the CBSA's operating programs and activities, and that the collection was therefore consistent with the Privacy Act. However, the OPC also found that the CBSA did not obtain the valid consent of the complainant to disclose their personal information to the production company in connection with the search. The OPC also raised concerns regarding the problematic nature of the disclosure in this case. Given the privacy implications surrounding personal searches at the border, the real-time disclosure of the complainant's personal search represented a serious invasion of privacy. The CBSA accepted the OPC's recommendations to enhance protections and controls around personal searches and has agreed to implement them.

CBSA Primary Inspection Kiosk (PIK) Outage

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 25, 2025

Key messages

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) experienced a system outage creating kiosk connectivity issues at airports.
• They worked with partners to restore the service as soon as possible.
• During outages, travelers are re-directed to the primary inspection lines for manual processing. Safety and security standards are upheld at all times, with border services officers working to verify travelers' identities, receive their declarations, and conduct any additional screening warranted by each traveler's individual circumstances.
• The CBSA works closely with airport management to expedite traveler processing, minimize delays, and complete verifications as required.
• We thank all travelers and stakeholders for their cooperation and apologize for any inconvenience.

Background

Issue

• On the morning of September 28, 2025, some airports observed PIK (Primary Inspection Kiosk outages with a full system outage at 4pm EST.
• On the morning of September 29, at 2am EST, Primary Inspection Kiosks and all portals were returned to operations.
• The outage was related to unforeseen technical issues from planned maintenance work.

Information to support statements made in the Key messages

• Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIK) is a large-scale IT system that was introduced by the CBSA in late 2013 in partnership with airport authorities across Canada to enhance security, reduce wait times for travelers at Canada's busiest international airports
• Kiosks are available at the following locations:
  • Vancouver International Airport (YVR)
  • Calgary International Airport (YYC)
  • Edmonton International Airport (YEG)
  • Winnipeg Richardson International Airport (YWG)
  • Toronto Pearson International Airport (YYZ) (Terminal 1 and 3)
  • Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (YTZ)
  • Ottawa International Airport (YOW)
  • Montreal-Trudeau International Airport (YUL)
  • Québec City Jean Lesage International Airport (YQB)
  • Halifax Stanfield International Airport (YHZ)
• The CBSA, in collaboration with airport authorities, began introducing next generation Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) in March 2017 and throughout 2019.
• Upon arrival, travelers use a next-generation PIK to verify their travel documents, confirm their identity and complete an on-screen declaration. Those looking to save more time at the kiosk can prepare their declaration in advance using the CBSA Advance Declaration and scan their quick response (QR) code at a kiosk upon arrival.

CBSA Hours of Operation

Question Period Note – CBSA – October 1, 2025

Key messages

• Canada and the United States have one of the closest and most extensive relationships in the world, including our shared border.
• Better alignment of service hours at ports of entry will enhance security at the border and allow the redeployment of border services officers where they are most needed.
• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) will continue to work closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection counterparts and other enforcement partners, to keep the border open to legitimate trade and travel while protecting our communities from illegal activities.

If pressed

• Almost all of these ports of entry are processing an average of two or less cars or commercial trucks per hour during the hours that will no longer be in operation, and;
• Travellers have an alternative border crossing option within a 100 km radius.

Background

Issue

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is collaborating with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to adjust service hours at 35 land ports of entry (POE) across Canada on January 6, 2025.

Information to support key messages

Historically, there have been a small number of Canada-US border crossings with misaligned operational hours. While managing the impacts of the pandemic in 2020, the CBSA and United States Customs and Border Protection (US CBP) reduced the number of sites with misaligned hours.

At the time of this decision, a public commitment was made by the former Minister of Public Safety that COVID restrictions were temporary and that services would be restored to pre-pandemic levels.

Although the CBSA returned to pre-pandemic hours in March 2023, the US CBP did not return to their pre-pandemic hours for all sites that were impacted by a temporary reduction of service.

Misaligned hours of operation present a number of challenges, both for the CBSA and US CBP (including: managing inadmissible travellers, traffic management, security accessibility risks and gate management).

On November 18, 2024 the CBSA along with the US CBP announced changes in hours of operation at multiple land border ports of entry. These changes came into effect on January 6, 2025 at all affected sites. The CBSA intends to adjust the hours of service at 35 land border ports of entry to better align service hours with those at adjacent US sites.

Better alignment of service hours between Canadian and US ports of entry enhances the overall security of the border and allows both countries to return inadmissible travellers and goods to the other country, which is more difficult when one side of the border is closed while the other remains open.

These changes were made based on an analysis of operational pressures, peak periods, and services required at these ports of entry. Data indicated that almost all of these ports of entry process an average of two or less cars or commercial trucks per hour during the hours that are no longer in operation, and have an alternative border crossing option within a 100 km radius. The changes mainly consist of reductions in service hours of 3 to 5 hours per day in the traveller and the commercial streams. Additionally 9 locations that currently operate 24 hours will see their hours reduced by 12 hours in 8 POE's and by 8 hours in the ninth.

These changes allow the Agency to use our resources efficiently by deploying officers at busier ports of entry and adjusting our resources to meet the needs of border communities and minimize the impacts on them.

Canada Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) Personnel

Question Period Note – CBSA – October 2, 2025

Key messages

• Every day, approximately 8,500 Canada Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) frontline personnel play a crucial role protecting our communities.
• The Border Plan allocated significant funding for new technology, new border services officers, intelligence analysts, specialized chemists and detector dog teams.
• The Prime Minister also announced upcoming investments to hire 1000 additional CBSA personnel.
• The focus of CBSA's hiring will be to improve capacity in areas such as intelligence, flexible response, and enforcement to address existing and emerging border vulnerabilities.

If pressed

Q1 – Student Border Services Officers

• Approximately 5% of the frontline CBSA personnel are student border services officers.
• Student border services officers are not armed. They work at international airports, mail processing centres and cruise ship operations.
• Students provide additional capacity so officers can focus on border security priorities, and facilitate recruitment for the CBSA.

Background

Issue

Current personnel levels and commitment to hire 1000 new CBSA personnel.

Information to support key messages

• More than 8,500 frontline personnel include both employees and middle managers in the FB classification and Student Border Services Officers (SBSO) that actively serve on the frontline.
• Agency growth outside of the frontline workforce since 2015, directly or indirectly, supports the frontlines in areas of work such as enforcement, trade, policy, information and technology and other enabling program areas.
• The number of Border Services Officer graduates from the Canada Border Services College has continuously increased year over year since 2016, with the exception of 2020 due to the College temporarily having to shut down (and moved to online learning for a short period) because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
• The CBSA College continues to undertake the necessary planning, recruitment, and training of sufficient new recruits into the College each year to maintain workforce requirements.
• The Agency has made investments to increase the number of officers who support Asylum processing and intelligence activities across Canada. This is consistent with investments made by the Government to address pressures in the immigration system.
• Through its renewal efforts and commitment to sustainability, the CBSA continues to implement technology aimed at making the border experience more efficient, streamlining processing to reallocate critical resources to interdiction and enforcement activities. This includes initiatives like the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management project and Travelers Modernization project.
• Student Border Services Officers (SBSO) who are unarmed can perform certain duties of the Border Services Officer.
• SBSOs must complete a 5 weeks training program that consists of 8 days of theoretical (in class) followed by 8 days of Control and Defensive Tactics (CDT) for a total of 16 days of training.
• Most SBSOs work at international airports (processing travellers, while the remaining SBSO's work at international mail processing centers and at the National Telephone Reporting Center. Beginning this year, SBSOs will now be deployed to the Vancouver and Victoria Cruise Ship Operations on the West Coast.
• The CBSA has hired on average around 700 SBSOs each year from 2020 to 2025 to complement operations at busy ports of entry across the country.

Combatting Organized Crime (PS)

Question Period Note – Crime Prevention Branch – September 2025

Key messages

• The Government of Canada remains firmly committed to protecting Canadians from organized crime and combatting transnational organized crime groups through coordinated action with a range of domestic and international partners.
• As part of this commitment, the Government introduced Bill C-2 in June 2025, which included measures that will expand Canada's law enforcement toolkit to combat transnational organized crime, fentanyl trafficking, and money laundering.
• In addition, the Government's $1.3 billion Border Plan is enhancing our ability to prevent organized criminal activity at our borders, such as drug and firearms trafficking, and human smuggling. This includes significant investments in detection capacity, border surveillance capacity and border personnel.
• To further disrupt the financial underpinnings of organized crime, the Government established the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership (IMLIP) and the Joint Organized Crime Intelligence Centre (JOIC) to tackle the operational and financial dimensions of criminal networks, including those linked to fentanyl production and trafficking.
• We are also combatting specific areas of organized crime through targeted strategies, including the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy, the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, and the National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft.
• These efforts are producing results. Since 2018, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and local law enforcement have identified and dismantled close to 50 clandestine drug labs and super labs. In late March 2025, RCMP dismantled multiple illicit fentanyl labs across BC, seizing precursor chemicals and arresting two suspects.
• The Government of Canada will continue to take action to prevent crime, strengthen law enforcement, hold those responsible to account, including by disrupting and dismantling transnational organized crime groups.

If pressed

Q1 – Money Laundering

• The Government of Canada is committed to a comprehensive and coordinated approach to combatting money laundering.
• To strengthen Canada's ability to combat financial crimes and money laundering, the Government has:
  • Created new Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec to undertake complex money laundering investigations;
  • Launched the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information sharing between law enforcement and Canada's financial sector;
  • Invested in modernizing the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)'s intelligence and compliance tools to enhance capacity to respond to money laundering threats;
  • Announced that it would provide $29.9 million to the Canada Border Services Agency to combat financial crime.
  • Introduced legislative changes to give powers to law enforcement to freeze and seize virtual assets with suspected links to crime, improve inter-agency information sharing, and establish new criminal offences targeting illicit financial activities;
  • Proposed, under the Strong Borders Act, increased penalties for non-compliance under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act as well as new restrictions on large cash transactions and third party cash deposits; and
• In May 2025, Canada joined our G7 counterparts in agreeing to a G7 Financial Crime Call to Action to spur further concrete progress in tackling financial crime, including money laundering.

Q2 – Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

• Canada is currently undergoing a mutual evaluation by the FATF. Its evaluation report will be published in Summer/Fall 2026.The Government of Canada takes the challenges identified by the FATF's 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report of Canada seriously.
• Since 2018, the government has invested nearly $470 million to strengthen data resources, financial intelligence, information sharing, and investigative capacity to support anti-money laundering (AML) and anti-terrorist financing (ATF) investigations in Canada.
• In Canada's most recent follow-up report (October 2021), the FATF recognized improvements to Canada's AML/ATF Regime and elevated Canada's international standing in compliance with the FATF standards.
• The Government of Canada continues to monitor key trends that are expected to shape Canada's AML/ATF landscape and consistently implements enhancements to its AML/ATF regime.

Q3 – Drug Trafficking

• The Strong Borders Act will give law enforcement the right tools to fight the illegal drug trade and organized crime, crack down on money laundering, and keep our borders secure.
• This bill builds on investments made in Canada's $1.3 billion Border Plan.
• We are prioritizing border surveillance capacity, detection technology tools and border and law enforcement personnel; we appointed a Fentanyl Czar to accelerate our work to fight fentanyl; established a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to target organized crime groups that traffic fentanyl; and listed seven cartels as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• These new measures reinforce those implemented through the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy, which balances public health and safety, including countering drug crime.
• The Canadian Boarder Service Agency (CBSA) and RCMP are actively working with domestic and international partners to disrupt organized criminal groups producing and trafficking illegal drugs, including fentanyl.

Q4 – Extortion

• Protecting Canada and Canadians from the threat created by organized crime groups, including extortion, is a top priority for our government and we remain fully committed to aggressively disrupting and dismantling these illegal activities across the country
• The RCMP, serving as the national police force and the provincial and municipal police service for many regions, is tasked with preventing, detecting, and investigating serious and organized crime, as well as national security threats.
• For example, online extortion, including instances of sextortion, may impact children as well as adults. The RCMP's National Child Exploitation Crime Centre works to address online child sexual exploitation, including sextortion offences, in Canada and internationally.
• $41.6 million over five years was allocated to Public Safety in 2022 to assist in better protecting children through the National Strategy for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation on the Internet. Ongoing investments to combat online child sexual exploitation total more than $27 million per year.
• The Government of Canada supports the RCMP's coordinated efforts through its National Coordination and Support Team (NCST) and in partnership with Police of Jurisdiction (POJ) across Canada —to combat organized crime in all its forms, including the growing threats of extortion and online child sexual exploitation, and encourages individuals to report incidents to their local POJ.

Q5 – Preventing Gang Involvement

• Public Safety renewed the Initiative to Take Action against Gun and Gang Violence in 2023, which provides $390.6 million over five years to provinces and territories.
• Through the ITAAGGV, the RCMP is receiving $8.3 million ongoing to produce intelligence products, promote outreach and stakeholder engagement, and build capacity to intercept illegal firearms in Canada. Starting in 2018, the CBSA received $92.9 million over seven years to engage in cross-border law enforcement activities, with $7.5 million ongoing.
• The Government is support Public Safety's efforts in the area of enhancing federal leadership with increased cooperation with the provinces and territories, stakeholder engagement and data/research development.
• Public Safety launched the Building Safer Communities Fund in 2022 providing $250 million directly to municipalities and Indigenous communities to bolster gang-prevention programing and counter the social conditions that lead to criminality. As of September 2025, 87 contribution agreements have been signed (including the one with the Province of Québec as per M-30 legislation).
• This initiative will aim to positively engage young people with their families, their schools, and their communities to prevent gang involvement. Intervention programs will aim to help young adults, adults, and families who are impacted by gang involvement.

Background

Threat Environment

• The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) estimates that 4000+ Organized Crime Groups (OCG) operate in Canada, of which 668 (17%) were assessed in 2024. Of these, 7 OCGs are considered as national high-level threats and 128 are medium-level
• OCGs have become increasingly sophisticated, more agile and more diversified. They are expanding their networks with criminal actors abroad and are collaborating with hostile state actors to engage in transnational repression, foreign interference and money laundering/terrorist financing; they are also leveraging cyber capabilities to evade law enforcement.

Government of Canada strategies and initiatives to combatting organized crime

• In June 2025, the Government introduced Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, which would provide law enforcement with expanded tools and authorities to combat transnational organized crime, illegal fentanyl trafficking, and money laundering. Key provisions include enhanced port security, stronger penalties for financial crimes, improved inter-agency information sharing, and new powers to disrupt illicit drug and financing networks.
• In December 2024, the Government of Canada announced a $1.3 billion Border Plan to curtail migrant and drug smuggling, particularly at the Canada-U.S. border. The Plan includes the deployment of new detection capabilities, investments in border surveillance equipment and federal border personnel, refocusing existing personnel on high-priority threats like migrant and drug smuggling.
• Measures to address illegal drug production and trafficking build on those implemented through the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy, Canada's evidence-based approach to substance use that balances public health and safety priorities. To this end, Canada engages with both domestic and international partners, including through forums such as the Canada-U.S. Opioids Action Plan, the North American Drug Dialogue and the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
• Since 2016, the federal government has invested more than $1.4 billion to address gun violence and keep guns out of the hands of gangs and criminals. This includes $840.1 million over 10 years (2018-2019 to 2027-2028) through the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV), $250 million through the Building Safer Communities Fund and $312 million over five years through the Enhancing Canada's Firearm Control Framework.
• The objectives of the ITAAGGV are further supported by legislative measures to strengthen Canada's firearms regime. For example, firearms trafficking and illegal manufacturing now has a maximum penalty of 14 years and all privately manufactured firearms are automatically classified as prohibited.
• In May 2024, the Government of Canada released its National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft, setting out a detailed approach to disrupt and dismantle the OCGs involved. The plan includes an investment of $9.1 million over three years (FY 2024-2025 to FY 2026-2027 for Ontario and Quebec and $3.5 million over the same period to support INTERPOL in combatting transnational organized vehicle crime).
• The National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, supported by $10.28 million annually, brings together federal efforts to counter human trafficking through a victim-centered, survivor-informed and gender-responsive lens. As part of this strategy, PS invests in a national public awareness campaign, and community-based empowerment projects, among other initiatives. Further and complementary to the Strategy, Public Safety Canada provides $2.5 million annually to operate the Canadian Human Trafficking Hotline.

Detecting and Disrupting the Fentanyl Trade (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – September 2025

Key messages

• Protecting Canadians from the harms associated with the illegal drug trade is a top priority for our government.
• The Strong Borders Act will give law enforcement the right tools to fight the illegal drug trade and organized crime, tackle money laundering, and keep our borders secure.
• It builds on Border Plan investments in detection and imaging tools, intelligence sharing capacity, and a Joint Strike Force with the U.S.
• We will invest in 1,000 new Royal Canada Mounted Police (RCMP) officers, 1,000 new border officers, and prosecution to fight drug trafficking and other crimes, and put drug traffickers behind bars.
• We will continue to support enforcement as part of a federal drug policy that protects the health and safety of all Canadians.

If pressed

Q1 – Listing transnational criminal organizations in Canada as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code

• The Government of Canada is committed to protecting the safety and security of people in Canada and Canadians abroad, and stopping the transnational criminal organizations behind the fentanyl crisis and other harmful criminal activity.
• Transnational organized crime groups meeting the Criminal Code's threshold are listed as terrorist entities through a rigorous process based on evidence, intelligence and law.
• These organizations take hostages, attack civilian and critical infrastructure, actively disrupt the functions of local governments and law enforcement, and generate terror among civilian populations. They also play a leading role in the production and distribution of fentanyl throughout our country.
• We are committed to holding terrorist groups accountable for their actions and to exploring all options to respond to the threat they pose to Canada's national security and public safety.

Q2 – Money Laundering

• The Government of Canada remains vigilant in countering financial crimes, including money laundering.
• The Government has:
  • Led the development of the G7 Financial Crime Call to Action to tackle financial crime.
  • Created new Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec;
  • Launched the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to help law enforcement and Canada's big banks share more information; and
  • Invested in modernizing the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)'s intelligence and compliance tools to mitigate money laundering threats.
• It will also:
  • Provide $29.9 million to the Canada Border Services Agency to combat trade-based financial crime; and
  • Increase penalties for non-compliance and introduce new restrictions on large cash transactions.
• These measures confront the threat of money laundering, promote financial integrity and protect Canadians.

Q3 – Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

• Canada remains committed to tackling financial crime, money laundering and terrorist financing.
• Since 2018, the Government has invested nearly $470 million to strengthen data resources, financial intelligence and information sharing to support anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing (AML/ATF) investigations in Canada.
• In 2021, FATF recognized Canada's AML/ATF regime's improved compliance with FATF standards.
• In 2022, Canada co-led a FATF report on money laundering linked to illegal synthetic opioids to raise international awareness about the illegal opioid trade and related global financial flows. The report outlines risk indicators to help operational authorities identify potential trafficking of illicit opioids.
• The Government continues to work closely with the FATF as part of its ongoing mutual evaluation (2024-2026) to further strengthen Canada's AML/ATF regime.

Q4 – International Engagement

• The Government of Canada understands that organized drug crime groups do not respect borders and that to combat the illegal drug trade we must work with our international partners, in bilateral and multilateral forums.
• Law and border enforcement officials work directly with international counterparts every day to keep our border secure and Canadians safe from drug threats.
• Our work through the Canada-U.S. Opioids Action Plan and the North American Drug Dialogue helps us to share information, learn about best practices, and coordinate drug policies.
• We work through the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs to make sure fentanyl precursors are controlled in all countries.
• This engagement is helping the Government to tackle this global threat, and we will continue to support it.

Q5 – Law enforcement (Policing)

• The Government of Canada is committed to supporting law enforcement in its efforts to address organized drug crime and keep Canadian communities safe.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) Federal Policing program detects, investigates, and disrupts significant criminal threats to public safety, including the illegal fentanyl market.
• Intelligence and investigative efforts target all aspects of the drug trade. This includes transnational organized crime groups involved in production and trafficking of illegal substances, including fentanyl.
• The RCMP operates Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and Response teams in specific regions that target organized crime groups involved in the production of illegal substances, including fentanyl. They provide specialized support to local law enforcement in detecting and dismantling clandestine drug production sites.
• We will continue to work with law enforcement to fight illegal fentanyl and the organized crime groups behind it.

Q6 – Law enforcement (Border)

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) remains vigilant in the interdiction of illegal drugs, including fentanyl and its precursors, to ensure these harmful substances remain off the streets and out of our communities.
• The CBSA works closely with the RCMP and police of jurisdiction to support criminal investigations and prosecutions.
• Through Canada's Border Plan, CBSA is bolstering the frontline and ensuring officers have the tools and technology required to continue to interdict illegal drugs and firearms.
• In February and March, CBSA's Operation Blizzard made over 2,600 seizures of suspected narcotics and precursors, most of which were coming to Canada from the U.S.
• The Strong Borders Act will further strengthen our border security through changes to strengthen CBSA's ability to detect and seize drugs, weapons, and stolen cars, before they leave Canada.
• The CBSA will continue to prioritize the identification and interdiction of fentanyl and other harmful substances, to help keep Canadian communities safe.

Background

Issue

• The opioid overdose crisis is a public health and safety emergency of significant concern.
• Canada works with domestic and international partners to combat the illegal fentanyl and precursor chemical trade; this includes legislative changes and investments to detect and disrupt illicit supply chains.

Federal responses

• Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, aims to ensure law enforcement has the right tools to keep our borders secure, combat transnational organized crime, stop the flow of illegal drugs and precursors, and crack down on money laundering. Key measures include:
  • A new accelerated scheduling pathway for precursor chemicals;
  • Allowing police to search the mail with a general warrant; and,
  • Improvements to the anti-money laundering regime.
• Canada's Border Plan invests $1.3 billion to bolster border security, including by creating:
  • A Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to build intelligence-sharing capacity;
  • An Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information sharing between law enforcement and Canada's financial sector;
  • A North American Joint Strike Force with the U.S. to target transnational organized drug crime groups; and
  • A Chemical Precursor Risk Management Unit and Canadian Drug Analysis Centre to provide greater insight into precursor chemicals and distribution channels.
• Canada appointed a Fentanyl Czar and listed seven organized crime groups as terrorist organizations to provide law enforcement with additional tools to fight drug crime.
• The Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy is the federal government's comprehensive drug policy that invests in prevention and education, evidence, substance use services and supports (treatment, harm reduction and recovery), and substance controls.

Platform commitments

• The 2025 Liberal Party of Canada platform commits to addressing the illegal drug trade by:
  • Ending drug trafficking in our communities, including by recruiting and training 1,000 more RCMP personnel;
  • Cracking down on drugs, including by hiring 1,000 new CBSA officers and standing up additional border scanners, drones and new detector dog teams;
  • Investing in the Public Prosecution Service of Canada to prosecute more drug trafficking and organized crime offences;
  • Amending the Canada Post Corporation Act to allow police to search the mail with a general warrant; and
  • Updating the Canadian Coast Guard mandate to include countering criminal activity like drug trafficking.

Combatting Hate (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – September 2025

Key messages

• The Government of Canada is taking concrete action to combat all forms of hate to better protect communities and keep them safe.
• This includes implementing Canada's first Action Plan on Combatting Hate, to help prevent and respond to hate crimes and support victims.
• Public Safety Canada is investing in hate crimes training for police, preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, and assisting vulnerable communities to protect their gathering spaces.
• Public Safety is also working with partners across the country to identify actions to help address the public safety threat of antisemitism.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) continues to collaborate with police services across Canada to share best practices and develop new tools to respond to hate crimes.
• Hate crime is unacceptable and our government will continue to take concrete action to ensure all Canadians can feel safe to be who they are without the threat of violence.

If pressed

Q1 – Islamophobia

• Canadians deserve to live, work, and practice their faith without fear of being attacked. Islamophobia, and all forms of hate, are completely unacceptable.
• We respect the right of Canadians to freedom of expression and to engage in peaceful protest activities, but violence and hate speech of any kind will not be tolerated.
• Public Safety is working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), as well as with the Special Representative on Combatting Islamophobia, to combat violent rhetoric and keep communities safe.
• We're also working with communities to build safer spaces and increase community safety.
• The Government of Canada stands firmly against Islamophobia and all forms of hate.

Q2 – Antisemitism

• Canadians deserve to live, work, and practice their faith without fear of being attacked. Antisemitism, and all forms of hate, are completely unacceptable.
• We respect the right of Canadians to freedom of expression and to engage in peaceful protest activities, but violence and hate speech of any kind will not be tolerated.
• Public Safety is working with the RCMP and CSIS, as well as with the Office of the Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Antisemitism, to combat violent rhetoric and keep communities safe.
• We're also working with communities to build safer spaces and increase community safety.
• The Government of Canada stands firmly against antisemitism and all forms of hate.

Q3 – Rights of 2SLGBTQI+ persons

• All people in Canada deserve to feel safe to express themselves and their identities freely and without threats of violence. I want to reassure Canadians, especially those in the 2SLGBTQI+ community, that our government takes any threat of violence very seriously.
• Again this year, the government provided funding to support the security needs of Pride festivals this season. This funding, provided by Women and Gender Equality Canada, helped offset rising security and insurance costs for events across the country, amid high levels of 2SLGBTQI+ hate.
• WAGE is also supporting projects to combat hate against 2SLGBTQI+ communities.
• These measures will keep all Canadians safer from hate-motivated violence.

Q4 – Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence

• The Government of Canada is committed to preventing terrorism and violent extremism in all of its forms.
• The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence leads the federal government's efforts to prevent and counter all forms of radicalization to violence, both online and offline.
• Through the Community Resilience Fund, the Canada Centre financially supports grassroots prevention efforts, advancing research to better understand radicalization to violence in Canada.
• Canada is working with partners to improve safety and security. This will protect the vibrancy and diversity of Canada's population.

Q5 – Canada Community Security Program (CCSP)

• There is no place for hate in this country. All Canadians deserve to be safe where they work, live, and worship.
• The Canada Community Security Program helps communities at risk of hate-motivated crime by funding security upgrades, assessments, training, and security personnel to help protect their gathering spaces.
• The program takes applications year-round.
• We continue to work closely with vulnerable communities to share information about the program and its flexibilities so that people can gather in safety. This includes working with local security networks who understand the specific needs of their communities.
• Canada is working with partners to improve safety and security. Canadians should feel safe no matter who they are or how they worship.

Q6 – RCMP efforts to Combat Hate

• The Government of Canada condemns hate crimes of all forms.
• The RCMP is committed to investigating all hate reported incidents in the communities it polices.
• The RCMP also plays an important leadership role, bringing together police, community advocates, academics and subject matter experts to exchange best practices and develop tools to help respond to hate crimes.
• The RCMP has partnered with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation to co-chair the Hate Crimes Task Force, which is developing practical, front-line tools and solutions rooted in prevention, investigation and victim support.
• Additionally the RCMP leads bi-weekly calls with Canadian police leaders, as well as a national Community of Practice to share information, trends, and best practices related to hate crimes.
• With additional funding announced under Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate, the RCMP will do more to respond to hate crimes in our communities, including developing specialized training and education for police across Canada.
• These actions will better protect Canadians.

Q7 – CSIS efforts to Combat Hate

• CSIS works to protect Canada and Canadians from threats, including extremist violence rooted in hateful ideologies.
• CSIS investigates ideologically motivated threats like white nationalism, misogyny, as well as anti-2SLGBTQI+ and anti-authority violence, and engages with communities to build awareness and resilience.
• CSIS has also remained heavily engaged with community groups and organizations in Canada. These outreach efforts are meant to support communities' ability to better understand and build awareness and resilience to these threats, equipping them with tools and strategies.
• CSIS' efforts will help reduce risks to extremist violence and support safer communities across Canada.

Q8 – National Forum on Combatting Antisemitism

• Hate-motivated crimes targeting Jewish communities remain among the most reported in Canada.
• Recognizing the urgent need to address the public safety threat of antisemitism, the government convened a National Forum, bringing together multiple partners to commit to coordinated action.
• The Government of Canada will continue to work with partners to combat antisemitism and protect communities.

Background

Issue

• In Canada, the number of police-reported hate crimes has more than doubled since 2018.
• However, that trend may be tapering off. Police-reported hate crimes only minimally increased in 2024, and the most recent data indicate an 11% decline in hate crimes reported to police in the first quarter of 2025 compared to 2024.
• Preliminary results indicate that 870 hate crimes were reported to police between January and March of 2025 (Q1 2025). These results are lower than the numbers in the first quarter of 2024 (980). This number (870) is less than one fifth of what was reported for the full 12 months in 2024 (4,882).
• Similar to last year, hate crimes targeting a race or ethnicity (50%) made up the largest proportion of the hate crimes reported during Q1 2025, followed by those targeting a religion (18%) and those targeting a sexual orientation (10%).
• These crimes are driven by a complex interplay of factors, including global and domestic events, social polarization, online disinformation, economic inequality, and feelings of exclusion.

Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate (CAPCH)

• To confront hate in all its forms, the Government launched Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate on September 24, 2024, investing $273.6 million over six years, starting in 2024-25, with $29.3 million ongoing. This includes:
• $32 million over six years, starting in 2024-25, and $11 million ongoing, to enhance the Security Infrastructure Program (SIP) – now referred to as the Canada Community Security Program;
• $19.5 million over three years, starting in 2024-25, allocated to Public Safety's Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence to increase financial support for frontline prevention programs through the Community Resilience Fund, strengthen Canada's commitments to the Christchurch Call to Action, and increase understanding of radicalization to violence in Canada through a new open-source data analytics capability;
• $20.2 million over six years, starting in 2024-25, and $3.2 million ongoing, to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Police College to enhance their anti-hate work with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation and policing partners through the Hate Crimes Task Force;
• $26.8 million over four years, starting in 2024-25, to Public Safety Canada to support police colleges to increase training on handling hate crimes.

Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre)

• The Canada Centre, housed in Public Safety Canada, leads the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence.
• As outlined in the National Strategy, the Canada Centre's activities complement national security and criminal justice efforts by supporting programs that divert individuals at risk of radicalization away from pathways to terrorism and violent extremism or help individuals involved leave violent extremism behind.
• The Canada Centre's Community Resilience Fund (CRF), supports research initiatives, early prevention efforts, and interventions programs that strengthen local, frontline capacity to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.
  • Specialized intervention programs are often led by health or social service professionals who address the needs and vulnerabilities of individuals in order to build protective factors and divert them from pathways towards violent extremism. These programs engage fields such as social work, mental health, employment, housing, policing, probation and parole, education, and child welfare services.
  • Since its launch in 2017, the CRF has provided more than $85.4 million in funding to 81 projects.

Canada Community Security Program (CCSP)

• The CCSP provides time-limited funding to enhance security infrastructure for private, not-for-profit organizations at risk of hate-motivated crimes, including places of worship, private provincially and territorially recognized educational institutions, shelters for victims of gender-based violence, community centers, and privately run, not for profit, community-based facilities such as daycares and office spaces.
• Although the program has not been actively involved in supporting security costs at community cultural events, it is an eligible cost of the program on an exceptional basis.
• In advance of the High Holidays, Public Safety launched a social media campaign to remind Canadians about the CCSP, and proactively reached out to Jewish stakeholders and organizations.
• In 2025-26, CCSP has $20.5M in funding, a significant increase from funding of $5.8M in 2022-23. Starting in 2026-27, funding will stabilize at $15.7M per year.

Hate Crimes Task Force and collaboration with Chiefs of Police

• Since Spring 2022, the Hate Crimes Task Force co-chaired by the RCMP and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, has served as a network of experts dedicated to enhancing police response to hate-motivated crimes in Canada by exchanging best practices, supporting investigations, and sharing knowledge on complex issues.
• In response to the ongoing increase in reported hate crimes in Canada, the RCMP and the CRRF is currently working to evolve this effort in a way that allows for a more dynamic response to emerging trends and the needs identified by the public safety community.
• The RCMP also engages with police leaders from across the country on a bi-weekly basis to exchange information and best practices on hate crimes to help improve the overall policing response in Canada.

The National Forum on Combating Antisemitism

• To help address the growing public safety threat posed by antisemitism, on March 6, 2025, the Government of Canada held a National Forum on Combatting Antisemitism in Ottawa, co-chaired by the Ministers of Public Safety and the Minister of Justice.
• At the Forum, broad themes emerged during the discussions including: enhanced law enforcement and prosecution; legislative reform; education and awareness; government coordination and leadership; protecting the public; consistent messaging and definitions; community support and engagement.
• At the Forum, the Government of Canada also announced several commitments to combatting hate and supporting communities at risk of hate-motivated crimes.
• Following the Forum, Public Safety Canada has actively worked with partners across the country to develop National Commitments which are expected to be released this fall.
• As well, the Community Resilience Fund provided $7M in funding to four projects that supported local partnerships, youth programs in schools and communities, and evidence-based digital tools to counter harmful online narratives.

First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNPP) (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – September 2025

Key messages

• On behalf of all Canadians, the Government of Canada offers our deepest condolences to the families and communities of those who died during interactions with police across Inuit Nunangat.
• In Nunavik, we understand that Québec's independent police oversight agency is currently pursuing multiple investigations into these cases.
• The Government of Canada is committed to working collaboratively with provinces and territories, and First Nations and Inuit communities, to support community safety solutions that are tailored to their needs and realities.

Background

Policing in Inuit Nunangat

Inuit Nunangat is the homeland of the Inuit in Canada, and consists of four northern regions.

• Nunavik, in Northern Quebec, is served by the Nunavik Police Service (NPS), which was established in 1995 in accordance with the spirit of the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement and pursuant to sections 369 and 370 of the Act Respecting Northern Villages and the Kativik Regional Government. 90% of NPS officers are white. The NPS is funded through Public Safety Canada's First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP).
• Nunavut does not have legislation to enable the establishment of an Inuit police service. As such, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is the only police of jurisdiction, through its V Division. On May 17, 2023, Public Safety Canada, the RCMP and the Government of Nunavut signed a Framework Agreement enabling the territory to access FNIPP funding. In the immediate term, this will enable the addition of 15 FNIPP-supported RCMP officers, who will arrive as Community Tripartite Agreements are signed with specific communities, with 8 officers arriving in 2024-25, and the remaining 7 in fiscal year 2025-26.
• In Inuvialuit, the RCMP is the police of jurisdiction, mostly through its Northwest Territories (G) Division. A Framework Agreement signed with the Government of the Northwest Territories enables the provision of FNIPP-funded enhanced policing services by the RCMP in the communities of Inuvik, Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk.
• The RCMP, through its B Division, is the police of jurisdiction in Nunatsiavut. A Framework Agreement signed with the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador enables the provision of FNIPP-funded enhanced policing services by the RCMP in the communities of Nain, Hopedale, Makkovik and Rigolet.

Police shootings in Nunavik

There have been 3 police officer-involved fatalities for the NPS since November 2024.

• On November 4th, 2024, Joshua Papigatuk was shot and killed, and his twin brother Garnet was seriously injured, after officers from the NPS responded to a call about someone allegedly attempting to drive drunk in Salluit. According to police reports, officers first used a stun gun and pepper spray to subdue the two men. An officer then opened fire and hit one of the brothers, and when the second man continued to fight, the same officer shot him too.
• On May 6th, 2025, members of the NPS had planned to arrest Mark Annanack, who was inside a tent in Kangiqsualujjuaq. The police said he resisted when officers tried to arrest him, emerging from the tent with a knife. Officers used pepper spray and a stun gun, but the situation escalated and an officer opened fire. Mr. Annanack was later declared dead at a regional health centre.
• On July 17th, 2025, officers of the NPS were called to a residence in Inukjuak after receiving a complaint of forcible confinement. Police entered the home and were confronted with a person who was armed with a knife. There was a confrontation, and officers discharged their service weapons, striking the individual, who was later pronounced dead at the community health centre. The NPS did not release the name, age or gender of the person killed.
• As the NPS is under the jurisdiction of the Government of Quebec, the province's police watchdog — the Bureau des enquêtes indépendantes — has opened investigations into all shootings. Conclusions are forthcoming.

First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP)

The FNIPP is a contribution program that provides funding to support the provision of policing services to First Nation and Inuit communities across Canada. FNIPP agreements are cost-shared between the federal government (52%) and the Provincial/Territorial government (48%). The FFNIPP supports roughly 450 First Nations and Inuit communities, or approximately 65% of all Indigenous communities in Canada.

National Action Plan for Combatting Auto theft (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – September 2025

Key messages

• Our government has taken decisive actions to combat auto theft, including the launch of the National Action Plan, building on the successes of the February 2024 National Summit.
• Through collaborative efforts with provincial, territorial, municipal and industry partners, we continue to see positive results:
  • According to Équité Association's First Half of 2025: Auto Theft Trend Report, theft of private passenger vehicles has decreased by 19.1% country-wide compared to the same period in 2024.
  • The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) intercepted 2,277 stolen vehicles at its marine and intermodal ports in 2024, with significant interceptions in Quebec and Ontario. In addition, 1,155 vehicles have been detained thus far in 2025 (as of September 23, 2025).
  • Integration with the International Criminal Police Organisation's (INTERPOL) Stolen Motor Vehicle Database has resulted in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) receiving thousands of notifications and international collaboration requests.
• We know that criminal networks are quick to adapt, and that is why the Government will continue to work actively with all our partners to ensure a comprehensive and agile response to this evolving criminal trend.

If pressed

Q1 – Intelligence or information sharing

• By improving the exchange of information and intelligence between customs officials and police forces, we are making it easier to identify and retrieve stolen vehicles.
• We're deploying cutting-edge data analytics and technologies, including artificial intelligence, to track and target stolen vehicles. This disrupts the flow of stolen vehicles from Canada and strikes a blow against organized crime.
• Leveraging financial intelligence from the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), we're bolstering investigations related to auto theft. This powerful tool is helping us uncover the financial networks behind these crimes.

Q2 – Intervention

• We are implementing advanced security features in vehicles to make them harder to steal. This includes technologies like immobilizers, tracking systems, and improved locking mechanisms.
• We are also enhancing methods to quickly locate and recover stolen vehicles. This involves using GPS tracking, collaboration with law enforcement, and public awareness campaigns to report stolen vehicles promptly.
• We are strengthening border controls and inspections to prevent stolen vehicles from being exported. This includes deploying detection technologies at marine ports and intermodal facilities to intercept stolen vehicles before they leave the country.

Q3 – Legislation, regulations, and governance

• We have introduced stricter penalties for auto theft, particularly when it is linked to organized crime. This means harsher sentences and fines for those convicted, sending a strong message that auto theft will not be tolerated.
• New regulations are being implemented to enhance vehicle security standards. This includes mandating advanced anti-theft technologies in new vehicles, making them harder to steal.
• Robust governance structures have been established to oversee the implementation of the action plan. This ensures that all initiatives are executed effectively and that there is accountability at every level.
• We're strengthening legal frameworks to facilitate better cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders. This includes creating new laws and policies that support collaborative efforts to combat auto theft.

Background

Issue

• According to the Insurance Bureau of Canada, an estimated 90,000 cars (or one car every six minutes) are stolen in Canada each year. This results in approximately $1.5 billion in annual costs to Canadian insurance policyholders and taxpayers. 
• On May 20, 2024, the Government of Canada released a National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft focused on disrupting, dismantling, and prosecuting the organized crime groups involved.

National Action Plan on Auto Theft

• The National Action Plan builds on the Government of Canada's recent actions to combat auto theft, which are already making a difference.
• The National Action Plan is informed by continued collaboration with our partners following the February 8, 2024, National Summit on Combatting Auto Theft. The Government of Canada continues to work with these crucial partners to coordinate our actions and ensure the plan remains current and flexible.
• Auto theft is a complex problem that requires manufacturers, insurance companies, shippers, law enforcement agencies and governments to work together on solutions. Each partner has a role play in reducing auto thefts. Recognizing the significant impact this issue is having on the lives of Canadians, and as highlighted in the most recent update to the National Action Plan, the Government has advanced a number of initiatives that fall within federal authority during the past few months.
  • Legislation, regulations, and governance: Changes, including amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-69) to institute tougher penalties for auto theft with ties to violence, organized crime and money laundering, new offences targeting the possession and distribution of devices that facilitate auto theft, a new aggravating factor applicable at sentencing where there is evidence that an offender involved a person under the age of 18 in the commission of an offence, as well as changes to the Radiocommunication Act providing the authorities to the minister to regulate devices used to steal cars, as committed in Budget 2024. These amendments have now become law.
  • As well, the Government launched a consultation to gather information relating to the use of wireless devices in auto theft. In addition, Transport Canada committed to reviewing and modernizing the Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations related to theft prevention to ensure they consider technological advancements to deter and prevent auto theft.
  • Intelligence/information sharing: Enhancements between municipal, provincial, federal and international police and customs officials in support of criminal investigations, charges, and prosecutions, building on joint efforts that are already under way.
  • Intervention: Improvements to allow more shipping containers to be examined, through increased capacity at the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), local police of jurisdiction (POJ) and INTERPOL, as well as the integration of new targeting tools. Transport Canada committed to working with Public Safety partners to identify high-risk port facilities and conduct targeted security assessments to revise and validate security plans for high-risk container facilities, as necessary. Also, prevention measures and programs targeting at-risk youth with an aim of diverting them from future involvement in criminal and anti-social activities.

Government Measures to Reduce Gun Violence (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – September, 2025

Key messages

• Our Government will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach to keep Canadians and Canadian communities safe.
• This work will build on significant measures now in place to strengthen the firearms regime, combat illicit firearms and gang activity, and address risks posed by firearms in gender-based and intimate partner violence.
• These measures complement significant investments to enhance law enforcement capacity in Canada and at the border, and to support community prevention and intervention programs.
• Everyone in Canada deserves to be safe in their homes and in their communities. Our Government will continue to play a leadership role and work with provinces, territories, municipalities, and Indigenous communities in taking action to reduce gun and gang violence.

If pressed

Q1 – Firearm Laws

• Significant enhancements have been made to Canada's firearms laws.
• New licence requirements are in effect, maximum penalties for firearms trafficking and smuggling have been increased, and a suite of new harm reduction tools are in place.
• Work will continue to ensure Canada's firearms regime is responsible and effective, supporting the safe use of firearms by law-abiding firearms owners and protecting Canadian communities against the devasting impact of firearms violence.

Q2 – Law enforcement

• Effective enforcement and operational cooperation are critical to combatting firearms violence, and significant investments have been made to enhance law enforcement and border security.
• This includes funding to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to increase capacity to trace crime guns and enhance anti-smuggling activities, and funding for Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) to strengthen border controls to prevent firearms smuggling into Canada.
• We will also continue to strengthen cooperation with United States partners, including through the Cross Border Firearms Task Force.

Q3 – Gang violence

• A multi-pronged approach is vital to address gang-based violence, including activities in the areas of prevention, intervention, suppression and enforcement.
• To support communities, $390.6 million is channeled directly to the provinces and territories through the Gun and Gang Violence Action Fund and $10 million is allocated to the Youth Gang Prevention Fund.
• In 2022, Public Safety (PS) launched the Building Safer Communities Fund to provide $250 million directly to municipalities and Indigenous communities to bolster gang-prevention programming and counter the social conditions that lead to criminality.

Background

Issue

• Canada saw a slight decrease in firearm-related homicides from 2023 to 2024, however there has been an increase in firearm-related violent crimes over a ten year period (2013-2023).
• The Government of Canada has launched several initiatives to strengthen the firearms regime and combat gun violence.

Firearms Investments

• The government has invested over $1.4 billion since 2016 in measures to reduce gun violence.
• In 2018, $356.1 million over five years was allocated for the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence. In 2023, the initiative was renewed for an additional five years through 2028. The majority of funds are allocated to provinces and territories (P/T) under the Gun and Gang Violence Action Fund (GGVAF) to combat gun and gang violence in communities across Canada., Funding was also provided to the RCMP and CBSA for law enforcement-based activities.
• Launched in March 2022, the $250 million Building Safer Communities Fund seeks to counter social conditions that may lead to criminality by bolstering gang prevention programming through direct funding to municipalities and Indigenous communities. The program sunsets in March 2026. As of September 2025, 87 contribution agreements have been signed (including one with the Province of Québec as per M-30 legislation).
• In 2021, an investment of $312 million over five years, starting in 2021–22, and $41.4 million ongoing was made to enhance Canada's firearm control framework across PS, CBSA and RCMP Canadian Firearms Program (CFP) to strengthen services to support the lawful acquisition, ownership and use of firearms by enhancing services to Canadians and law enforcement; to increase capacity to trace crime guns and target firearms smuggling and trafficking; and enhance firearms policy capacity and promote awareness of firearms programs.
• Building on Budget 2021 investments, the Government invested an additional $3.4 million over five years, starting in 2022-23, and $1.5 million ongoing to support the implementation of former Bill C-21, including a red flag awareness campaign.
• In 2024, as part of the Government Response to the Mass Casualty Commission's Final Report, the Government announced an investment of $22.5 million over five years and $3.3 million ongoing, starting 2024-25 to PS to increase public awareness, enhance firearms data collection and strengthen firearms regulations. Additionally, in 2024, an investment of $7.4 million over five years, starting in 2024-25 to the RCMP to modernize the CFP's telephone and case management systems.

Cross-Border Smuggling

• Departments and Agencies within Canada and the United States co-operate on smuggling investigations, share information, and identify opportunities to detect and disrupt firearms trafficking through the Cross-Border Firearms Task Force (strategic), Cross-Border Law Enforcement, North American Joint Strike Force, and the Northern Border Firearms Task Force (tactical).
• The Government of Canada has also invested in multiple tools and technologies to detect firearms smuggling across the Canada-U.S. border.

Implementation of Former Bill C-21

• Former Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms), received Royal Assent on December 15, 2023.
• The Bill enshrined in legislation the national freeze on handguns, which took effect via regulation in October 2022. The vast majority of individuals can no longer buy, sell, or import handguns into Canada.
• Maximum penalties for gun trafficking have increased from 10 to 14 years, and new authorities to combat firearms smuggling and related offences have been created.
• The Bill also introduced measures to address the growing threat of illegally manufactured firearms or "ghost guns", with new computer data offences targeting illegal manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing) and trafficking of "ghost guns", new licence requirements for certain firearms parts, and illegally made firearms now classified as prohibited.
• The Bill also introduced new "red flag" laws, which allow anyone to apply to a court for an order to remove access to firearms for up to 30 days when a person may be a danger to themself or others.
• The Bill also introduced mandatory licence revocation and refusal measures. An individual is ineligible to hold a licence if they have been convicted of an offence involving violence against their intimate partner or any member of their family or are subject to a protection order. And a licence will be revoked if the holder is subject to a protection order and must be revoked if a Chief Firearms Officer suspects the licence holder may have engaged in domestic violence or stalking.
• All measures introduced in former Bill C-21 are in force and implemented, except for mandatory refusals and revocations for protection orders. For the new licence revocation and ineligibility provisions to be fully operative, the term protection order must be defined in regulation.

Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – October 2, 2025

Key messages

• We know that too many Canadians have been affected by acts of gun violence in communities across our country. That is why our government is taking action through its comprehensive approach to address firearms violence and combat crime.
• Since 2020, the Government has prohibited over 2,500 makes and models of assault-style firearms, including those used in Canada's mass shootings. These firearms are not suitable for hunting or sport shooting and exceed safe civilian use.
• The Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program (ASFCP) provides owners with a way to dispose of dangerous firearms and be eligible to receive compensation.
• The Program for individuals is moving forward with a pilot in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia that is now underway. It will then open to all eligible firearms owners later this fall with a nation-wide declaration period. Collection will begin in early 2026.
• [REDACTED]
• It is very clear that the role of police in the Program would not impact frontline policing, and there is allocated money to reimburse them for their participation in the program.
• [REDACTED]

If pressed

Q1 – When will this program be in full operation? Will it cover all the guns that have been prohibited?

• The Program for businesses has already run successfully for firearms prohibited in May 2020. The Program will reopen for businesses in the coming weeks to receive claims for firearms prohibited in December 2024 and March 2025, and to continue accepting claims for those prohibited in May 2020.
• The Program for individuals is moving forward with a small-scale pilot in Nova Scotia, in partnership with the Cape Breton Police Service, for firearms prohibited in May 2020, December 2024 and March 2020. The Program will then open to all eligible firearms owners with a nationwide declaration period later in fall 2025, followed by a collection and compensation period in 2026.

Q2 – How many guns have been collected under this program?

The Program has already run successfully to intake firearms prohibited in May 2020 from businesses. Over 12,000 firearms and 14,000 parts and components have been collected and destroyed, with approximately $22 million (M) in compensation for businesses.

Q3 – How much is this program going to cost?

• We are committed to this program being as cost-effective and efficient as possible, while promoting public safety by removing these dangerous firearms from communities. A total amount of $248.6 million has been allocated for compensation to individuals and businesses. The total funding of $742 million includes all amounts allocated since 2020, which is when the first ban was introduced. It covers compensation, as well as funding for collection, the IT system, the call centre, and other operational costs. The total costs will be available at the conclusion of this program.

Q4 – The Liberal platform "Canada Strong" released on April 19 2025 was to "Continue to implement an efficient gun buyback program for assault-style firearm." What efficiencies are involved, and how will you save money?

We remain committed to this program being as cost-effective and efficient as possible. The goal remains to promote public safety by safely and securely removing assault-style firearms from our communities.

Q5 – How can you launch a national program when Alberta and Saskatchewan oppose it?

As we move ahead with the program for individuals across Canada, we have maintained a dialogue with both provinces to determine a path forward for them to participate so their impacted gun owners can receive fair compensation while coming into compliance with the law. [REDACTED]

Q6 – Will delivering this program have an impact on frontline policing?

• The program relies on the expertise of police of jurisdiction to safely and securely collect firearms from members of the public. This work cannot, and will not, compromise the crucial work that front-line police undertake to keep our communities safe every day. That is why funding is being provided to support police of jurisdiction in collecting firearms using police on overtime, off duty and alternative operational resources – [REDACTED]. Discussions are ongoing to finalize contribution agreements with police services across the country.
• A Web Portal/Case Management System has also been developed to make sure the process runs smoothly. Departmental officials stand ready to provide support for police as contribution agreements are signed and the program advances.

Background

Issue

• The Government committed to providing fair compensation to businesses and individual firearms owners legally required to dispose of prohibited assault-style firearms.
• The previous Government prohibited over 2,500 makes and models of ASFs through three prohibitions (in 2020, 2024 and 2025). These prohibited firearms have semi-automatic action with sustained rapid-fire capability, which are not appropriate for hunting or sporting and exceed safe civilian use.
• There are more than 19,000 estimated non-restricted makes and models, meaning that over 127,000 variations of firearms remain available for hunting and sport shooting in Canada.

Amnesty Orders

• Three Amnesty Orders under the Criminal Code are in force to protect lawful ASF owners and businesses from criminal liability and allow them time to come into compliance with the prohibitions. The amnesties also provide a temporary exception for Indigenous Peoples' exercising their traditional hunting right, as recognized under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, as well as those who use firearms for sustenance hunting. The May 2020 and December 2024 amnesty orders expire on October 30, 2025, and the March 2025 amnesty order expires on March 1, 2026. The Minister has indicated that the Amnesty Orders will be officially updated to have a synchronized end date in October 2026 in short order.
• During the amnesty period, including during the run of the Program, owners may choose to dispose of their affected ASFs as set out in Amnesty Order (e.g., turning them in to police or having them deactivated for no compensation, or exporting them).

Program Pilot for Individuals

• The Government is moving forward with the implementation of the ASFCP for individual firearms owners, starting with a small-scale pilot in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia that is now underway.
• The pilot, conducted in collaboration with the Cape Breton Regional Police, is expected to run for approximately six weeks to test program elements while collecting up to 200 prohibited firearms.

Program national launch

• Following the pilot, firearm owners across Canada will be invited to declare their prohibited firearms the program's online portal – a required step to participate in the program and seek compensation.
• In early 2026, firearms owners whose declarations have been approved will have to finalize their claims and book collection appointments with local police of jurisdiction to turn in those firearms. One their firearms have been validated, they will receive payment within 45 business days.
• The Program will reopen for businesses in fall 2025 to receive claims for firearms prohibited in December 2024 and March 2025, and to continue accepting claims for those prohibited in May 2020.

Collaboration with Police Services

• Funding is being provided, via contribution agreements between Public Safety and relevant provincial governments and police services, to support police of jurisdiction in collecting firearms using police on overtime, off duty and alternative operational resources. Discussions are ongoing to finalize contribution agreements with police services across the country.
• [REDACTED]

Firearms from the US (CBSA)

Question Period Note – CBSA – September 2, 2025

Key messages

• With the Border Plan, we are bolstering our frontline and ensuring that officers have the tools and technology they need to continue to interdict illicit drugs and illegal firearms.
• Over the last five years, over 3,000 firearms from the U.S. have been seized at our border. In 2024 alone, the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) seized more than 930 firearms – 90% of which came from the U.S.
• The CBSA works with domestic and U.S. law enforcement partners in a joint effort to investigate, prevent criminal activity, seize guns and protect our communities.

Background

Issue

The flow of prohibited firearms coming from the United States.

Information to support key messages

• As part of its mandate, the CBSA controls the movement of firearms, weapons and other devices to ensure compliance with existing laws, regulations and orders, including the Customs Act, the Firearms Act and the Criminal Code.
• The CBSA actively participates in firearm-related criminal investigations with a border nexus, including joint investigations alongside domestic and international law enforcement partners, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other Canadian police agencies, provincial and territorial governments, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Homeland Security Investigations, and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in a joint effort prevent and prohibit those who engage in criminal activity from entering Canada. The Agency regularly shares relevant information on border and national security issues with its national and international law enforcement partners as well as other government departments in Canada, to ensure the health, safety, and security of Canadians.
• Border security and integrity is a shared mandate between the CBSA and the RCMP in Canada. The CBSA is responsible for enforcing the law at designated ports of entry in Canada and the RCMP is responsible for enforcing Canadian legislation between ports of entry. The CBSA is also working with federal government partners, provincial, territorial and Indigenous communities, as well as local law enforcement agencies to ensure a coordinated approach to border security.
• In March 2023, the CBSA signed an information sharing Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives that enables efficient and direct information sharing between both organizations including information relating to the origins of seized firearms. The CBSA has a policy to trace 100% of firearms seized at the border. Where serial numbers have been removed, altered or obliterated, efforts are made to restore the serial number with partner assistance. In 2024, the U.S. was the main source of firearms seized by the CBSA, with approximately 90% of all successful traces leading back to U.S. purchasers or retailers.
• On April 29, 2024, the Agency appointed an Executive Director for Combatting Firearms Smuggling to bolster our considerable efforts and recent successes. The Executive Director, located in the CBSA's Greater Toronto Area Region, helps coordinate and lead our Agency-wide efforts against illegal firearms smuggling and to create more direct linkages between headquarters, frontline operations, and domestic and international partners. The Executive Director for Combatting Firearms Smuggling is working closely with U.S. partners to improve information sharing aimed at building greater intelligence and investigative leads around persons and organized crime groups attempting to exploit our shared border.
• The CBSA screens all goods entering Canada, including international mail shipments, to make sure they are properly declared and meet import requirements. The CBSA processes international mail at three processing centres in Vancouver, Toronto or Montreal, in addition to goods arriving by courier. The CBSA prioritizes investigating cases where a cross-border interception suggests smuggling or other criminal intent such as the unauthorized manufacturing of guns in Canada. As smugglers are increasingly using more sophisticated concealment methods in smuggling attempts, the CBSA employs a number of tools and tradecraft to stem the flow of illegal and prohibited materials into Canada. Guided by intelligence, our officers are also assisted by contraband detection tools such as handheld devices, small scale and large-scale X-ray machines, and detector dogs. Their specialized training, expertise and knowledge, in detecting contraband and prohibited or restricted goods, allows them to always be on the lookout for dangerous goods.
• The CBSA continues ongoing review and analysis of seizures of firearms, prohibited weapons and devices occurring in/or destined to Canada to help identify trends and indicators to assist with targeting. Intelligence personnel focus their efforts on priority files based on a number of indicators, and facilitate referrals to the Criminal Investigations Division where appropriate. This work also includes a focus on education and compliance with respect to importers/consignees in the postal and courier areas. The CBSA also has different teams that work together and play specific roles in the detection and interception of firearms and contraband:
  • The Intelligence and Investigations Program teams play a key role in identifying border risks. Intelligence activities are conducted to identify, entities of interest to the CBSA in connection with organized crime, human smuggling and immigration, fraud, terrorism and other violations of the Customs Act and Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
  • The targeting program team identifies individuals and goods bound for Canada that may pose a threat to the safety and security of the country by using a number of automated pre-arrival information sources.
  • The National Firearms Intelligence Desk team, was created in 2021 to maintain a real-time picture of illicit gun threats in Canada and their movement across our borders.
  • The Criminal Investigations Program supports organized crime disruption and combats firearm smuggling by employing a variety of investigative techniques to identify, interdict and prosecute entities seeking to exploit the border, conducting successful investigations across the country, both independently and through integrated teams involving other law enforcement agencies.

Canada is taking action to combat youth violence (PS)

Question Period Note – Crime Prevention Branch – September 16, 2025

Key messages

• The Government of Canada shares Canadians' alarm regarding recent acts of armed violence committed by youth.
• It is a troubling reality that some young people are drawn into violence early in life. Our government is taking clear action to steer youth away from crime, by investing in the areas that will stop crime before it starts.
• Public Safety Canada's National Crime Prevention Strategy is a targeted way that the federal government tackles youth violence. $47M annually supports youth-focused community interventions across Canada.
• Our Government has invested over $640M to support the work that provinces, territories, municipalities and Indigenous communities are doing to address gun and gang violence.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is also combatting youth violence, through the Centre for Youth Crime Prevention which provides police, parents and educators with valuable tools to work with youth on crime and victimization.
• And our government is responding to calls from Police, the Provinces and Territories and Canadians, that more tools are needed to get tough on crime, and has committed to introducing legislation this fall to strengthen our criminal justice system.
• Canadians can rest assured that our government will continue to work with partners to stop crime and ensure that all Canadians feel safe and secure in their communities.

Background

Issue

On September 16, 2025, media reported that a 12-year-old boy and a 20-year-old man had been charged in a series of violent, unprovoked attacks targeting vulnerable members of the city, including one that left a 62-year-old man dead. These attacks occurred in downtown Toronto on August 31, 2025. This arrest takes place after two other arrests of 12-year-olds for murder/gun violence, and other stories of youth involved in crime.

Information to support key messages

National Crime Prevention Strategy

• Through the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), Public Safety Canada (PS) invests over $47 million annually in the implementation of community-based crime prevention efforts that target youth. Projects funded through the NCPS funding programs aim to reduce risk factors associated with crime and build protective factors among vulnerable children, youth, and young adults; prevent youth violence; and foster crime prevention in Northern and Indigenous communities.
• The focus of the NCPS is on influencing the behaviours that can increase the likelihood of criminality, effectively working to address all types of crime. Accordingly, the NCPS focuses on children, youth, and young adults between the ages of 6-30.
• Current priorities of the NCPS include: direct interventions that reduce the harmful factors that lead youth to get involved in violent criminal activity, such as gun violence and auto theft; direct interventions that prevent bullying and cyberbullying; and strengthening community readiness for Indigenous populations.
• The Crime Prevention Action Fund (CPAF); the Northern and Indigenous Crime Prevention Fund (NICPF); and the Youth Gang Prevention Fund (YGPF) under the NCPS all support crime prevention efforts targeted towards youth.

Building Safer Communities Fund (BSCF)

In the 2020 Fall Economic Statement, the federal government announced $250 million in funding for municipalities and Indigenous communities, to implement prevention and intervention programs to reduce gun and gang violence. Toronto was allocated $12.3 million. The strategic goal of the program is to prevent and reduce gun and gang violence using a collaborative, multi-pronged approach which focuses on prevention and intervention activities at the community-level.

Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV)

• In 2023, $390.6 million from 2023-28 was allocated to the ITAAGGV. The majority of funds are allocated to provinces and territories (P/T) under the Gun and Gang Violence Action Fund (GGVAF) to combat gun and gang violence in communities across Canada.
• The objective of the GGVAF is to provide funding to six (6) key areas including intervention programming, training, action-oriented research, prosecution activities, improvement of data, and law enforcement efforts.

Youth Engagement

• Community Outreach and Engagement is a vital pillar of the work carried out by the RCMP National Youth Services (NYS). Through both in-person and virtual interactions, NYS fosters meaningful relationships with diverse communities, sharing knowledge and resources focused on youth crime prevention. These engagements not only help build trust but also empower communities with tools to support their youth and to respond to the unique needs of each community.
• The RCMP recognizes the value and impact of youth-led, community-based programs. The Youth Leadership Workshop is designed to empower young people by strengthening their leadership skills, fostering peer connections, and encouraging active participation in building safer, more inclusive communities. A central outcome of the workshop is the creation of a youth-led, police-supported community action plan. These plans allow participants to address local issues through diverse approaches, such as classroom presentations, cultural activities, and artistic expression.
• Another one of NYS' key programs is the RCMP National Youth Advisory Committee, an initiative that brings together youth from across Canada to share their perspectives on policing, crime prevention, and community safety. Their insights directly inform RCMP programs and educational resources.

Gender Based Violence and Intimate Partner Violence (PS)

Question Period Note – CPB – September 2025

Key messages

• There is no place in Canada for gender-based violence. The Government of Canada is committed to eliminating violence against women and girls, and is taking actions to combat these heinous crimes.
• This includes establishing the Federal Gender-Based Violence Strategy, and the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. The Government is also working with provinces and territories on the National Action Plan to End Gender-Based Violence.
• New legislation is in place to remove firearms from those who pose a danger, helping to reduce firearms-related family violence and self-harm.
• Public Safety also funds projects that prevent cyberbullying, violent extremism, and violent misogyny.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) participates in provincial Clare's Laws, which provide information about potentially harmful intimate partners.
• The Government of Canada is committed to supporting victims and ending gender-based violence (GBV) in Canada.

If pressed

Q1 – Gun control

• We have introduced strong gun control measures to improve public safety, and reduce the risks associated with intimate-partner and gender-based violence involving firearms.
• With new "red flag" laws, anyone can ask a court to prevent someone from guns if they are a risk to themselves or others.
• As well, someone suspected of domestic violence or stalking will have their firearms license revoked.
• Individuals are automatically ineligible to hold a firearms license if they have been convicted of an offence involving violence against an intimate partner or family member.

Q2 – Clare's Law

• Everyone has the right to know if they are at risk of abuse from their partner or potential partner.
• Clare's Law allows police to disclose a person's prior intimate partner violence information to a current or former intimate partner.
• The Government supports provinces and territories that have adopted Clare's Laws legislation, and has taken steps to ensure RCMP participation, including by amending regulations.
• Clare's Laws are enacted in several provinces across Canada, and more provinces are considering them.
• Supporting Clare's Laws is part of Canada's broader commitment to addressing gender-based violence.

Q3 – Countering Radicalization to Violence

• This government condemns all forms of gender-based violence, including radicalization to violence, such as violent misogyny and Incel forms of violent extremism.
• That is why Public Safety's Canada Centre for Community Engagement & Prevention of Violence works to address these extreme forms of hate involving violent misogyny and gender-based violence.
• Through the Community Resilience Fund, the Canada Centre financially supports research and frontline initiatives working to prevent and counter all forms of violent extremism in Canada. With this, the government seeks to protect Canadians and keep communities safe.

Q4 – Canada Community Security Program (formerly the Security Infrastructure Program)

• There is no place for hate in this country. All Canadians deserve to be safe where they work, live, and worship.
• The Canada Community Security Program provides support to communities at risk of hate-motivated crime by helping to enhance the security of community gathering spaces.
• This includes support for protection against gender-based violence directed towards the 2SLGBTQI+ community and for shelters serving victims of gender-based violence.
• Total funding for the program has been increased to $20.5 million for 2025-26. To respond quickly to urgent needs, organizations can now apply at any time during the year.
• Canada is working with partners to improve safety and security. This will protect the vibrancy and diversity of Canada's population.

Background

Issue

• Gender-based violence (GBV), including family violence and intimate partner violence (IPV), has been increasing. These forms of violence have long-lasting negative effects and women remain disproportionately affected. Firearms significantly heighten the risk and lethality of IPV.
• Our government made commitments to Canadians at the outset of our mandate to work to end gender-based violence by continuing investments in the National Action Plan to End Gender-Based Violence. This work will support victims and survivors, prevent violence, and support Indigenous-led approaches.
• Our government will also take action to better protect victims of sexual violence and IPV through new legislative measures.
• With this and a range of other efforts, the Government of Canada is taking action to combat these heinous crimes.

Gun control

• In December 2023, former Bill C-21 received Royal Assent with new measures to help keep communities safe, including a suite of harm reduction measures.
• "Red flag" laws allow anyone to apply to the courts for an order prohibiting someone from possessing firearms for up to 30 days when they pose a risk to themselves or others.
• In April 2025, enhanced licence revocation and ineligibility measures came into force to address the risks that firearms pose in situations of intimate partner violence and family violence.
• Individuals are not eligible to hold a licence if they have been convicted of an offence in which violence was used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner or any family member.
• A firearms licence will also be revoked if the Chief Firearms Officer suspects the licence holder has engaged in domestic violence or stalking.
• Work continues to operationalize new measures that require the refusal or revocation of a licence if someone is subject to a protection order. This requires that the term "protection order" be defined in regulation.

Federal Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence / National Action Plan to End Gender-Based Violence

• The National Action Plan to End Gender-Based Violence, launched in November 2022, is a comprehensive 10-year plan aimed at creating a Canada free of gender-based violence (GBV). It focuses on prevention, support for victims and survivors, and systemic change, engaging all levels of government and communities across Canada.
• It's Time: Canada's Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence (the federal Strategy) was launched in June 2017 and coordinates federal initiatives across three pillars: preventing gender-based violence, supporting victims and survivors, and promoting a responsive justice system.
• The federal Strategy is a component of the national effort to address GBV, with the National Action Plan serving as the overarching framework and the federal Strategy as the Government's specific actions within that framework.
• Cyberbullying is a form of gender-based violence and disproportionately affects young girls and vulnerable communities.
• Public Safety Canada receives $1 million annually through the federal Strategy, to support community-based projects that prevent and address bullying and cyberbullying.

Canada Community Security Program (CCSP)

• The CCSP replaces and enhances the former Security Infrastructure Program by providing financial assistance to private and non-profit organizations to enhance the security of community gathering spaces that serve communities at risk of being targeted by hate-motivated crime.
• Measures that are eligible for funding under the CCSP include security equipment and hardware; minor renovations to enhance security; security and emergency assessments and plans; training; and time-limited third party security personnel.
• Eligible recipients are Canadian private, not-for-profit organizations, including 2SLGBTQI+ community organizations that meet this criteria and shelters serving victims of gender-based violence.
• Since 2011, the program has supported more than 900 projects representing an investment of more than $37M. The average Public Safety funding since October 2024 is $53,301 per project.

Clare's Law

• Clare's Law is a policy originating in England and Wales. It was created as a guide for individuals to obtain information from the police regarding the risk of interpersonal violence posed by their current or former domestic partners. It was named in memory of Clare Wood, who was killed in 2009 by her former domestic partner, who had a record of violence against women of which she was unaware.
• In Canada, several provinces have adopted Clare's Laws in the form of a statute, authorizing a police service to disclose certain risk-related information to a current or former intimate partner, where such information could assist the partner in making informed decisions about their safety and the relationship.
• Clare's Laws have been enacted in Saskatchewan, Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, and Manitoba.

Countering Radicalization to Violence

• Established in 2017, the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre), leads the federal government's efforts to counter all forms of radicalization to violence in Canada. It complements national security and criminal justice efforts, addressing hate and gender-based violence, including violent misogyny. Through the Community Resilience Fund, it supports research and prevention initiatives.
• Budget 2024 allocated $19.5 million over three years to enhance the Canada Centre's capacity to prevent violence, and to work with stakeholders in Canada and internationally to increase capacity to address radicalization to violence. Part of this funding was also allocated to create a data team of specialized analysts, who work on researching violent extremism trends, such as the involvement of gender-based violence including violent misogyny.

RCMP Response to GBV

• The RCMP is addressing gender-based violence and intimate partner violence by equipping its members with education and training, and by strengthening internal policies.
• Work is centred on providing members with the knowledge, tools and guidance they need to respond effectively and compassionately, ensuring the safety and well-being of victims while holding offenders accountable, and enhancing internal policies to reinforce a coordinated and informed approach to gender-based violence and intimate partner violence across the organization.

Lawful Access (PS)

Question Period Note – NCSB – October 2

Key messages – Part 14

• An important part of our legislative agenda is Bill C-2, reflecting our government's commitment to enhance security at Canada's borders, combat transnational organized crime and fentanyl trafficking, and disrupt illicit financing.
• The internet has fundamentally changed how serious offences are committed, and two Supreme Court of Canada decisions have impacted law enforcement's ability to obtain basic identifying information during the initial stages of an investigation.
• These agencies have also been dealing with an uptick in the volume and severity of crime, and increasingly complex national security threats. We know much of this activity occurs online.
• Part 14 of the bill proposes important tools for law enforcement, and for CSIS, to facilitate timely access to basic information to pursue investigations.
• For example, the proposed tools would enable police to obtain information that would assist in identifying an individual engaged in criminal activity. For example, the proposed tools could be used to better and more quickly find out who registered an IP address that is being used to post terrorist content, launder money, or sell drugs. This information is basic and needed to start investigations.
• Our government respects the privacy rights of Canadians and has designed these tools to be Charter-compliant. Where required, there is a role for the Court to oversee these new authorities.

Key messages – Drivers for Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (Part 15)

• Law enforcement and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) have been working in an increasingly digital world. Most criminal and intelligence investigations now have an online or digital aspect due to the rise of mobile and Internet communications, messaging platforms, service resellers, cloud hosting facilities, and other technologies.
• Canada's law enforcement agencies and CSIS are operating under a legal framework that does not require electronic service providers (ESP) to put in place and maintain capabilities to respond to legal authorizations such as a warrant or production order. Canada is the only Five Eyes or Western European country that does not have such a framework.
• When investigators have the legal authority to request and obtain information or intercept communications, ESPs may not have the ability to provide the information in a timely manner, if at all. This gap has resulted in investigative challenges, and even complete failures to advancing investigations.
• Today, electronic and digital information is everywhere and is as important, if not more, as physical evidence in criminal and intelligence investigations.
• Beyond hindering or delaying investigations domestically, the absence of capability legislation and the inability to keep pace with the changing technological environment means that Canada cannot collaborate fully and effectively on transnational investigations because we simply do not have access to the relevant domestic information.
• The Prime Minister tabled the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians' Special Report on the Lawful Access to Communications by Security and Intelligence Organizations on September 15, 2025.
• One of the Committee's key findings is that the absence of a legislative framework requiring communications service providers to maintain lawful intercept capability, is creating unnecessary risks for all stakeholders - including Canadian law enforcement of every jurisdictions, CSIS, industry and, ultimately, Canadians.
• As part of Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, the proposed Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA) will address key aspects of the recommendations.

Key messages – Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act

• SAAIA would require select ESPs to have the capability to enable law enforcement agencies and CSIS to obtain the information and data they are legally authorized to have and need to conduct criminal and intelligence investigations.
• Instead of requiring whole sectors, including small enterprises, to have capabilities in place, the Government would take a more targeted approach by defining the concept of "core providers" based on factors such as size and services. Additional capabilities development, on an as needed basis, could be compelled through Ministerial Orders (MOs)to specific ESPs.
• The Minister of Public Safety would be required to consult the Minister of Industry and the specific ESP before issuing a MO.
• It is important to note that SAAIA, on its own, would not create new authorities, such as surveillance powers, for law enforcement and CSIS. Rather, it would ensure that ESPs are able to give effect to legal requests from law enforcement and CSIS.
• Cybersecurity and privacy are very important issues for the government and as such, SAAIA includes safeguards to ensure ESPs are not obligated to implement requirements or MOs that would create systemic vulnerabilities in electronic protections or prevent them from being rectified.

Background

Issue

Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act proposes a comprehensive framework for lawful access.

Information to support Key messages - Part 14 – Timely Access to Data and Information

• Proposed changes would assist law enforcement in making requests to service providers based on "reasonable suspicion," to rule out or rule in suspects and initiate investigations.
• The Bill would amend the threshold for law enforcement to obtain basic subscriber information, from reasonable grounds to believe an offence has or will be committed and that this information will afford evidence of the offence, to reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has or will be committed and that the subscriber information will assist in the investigation. To receive basic subscriber information, law enforcement would require judicial authorization.
• The Bill would also provide law enforcement with the capacity to retrieve information without a warrant when there is an immediate danger. This addition would make clear in the Criminal Code that the principle of exigent circumstances can also apply to seizing subscriber information and/or data when an individual is in immediate danger, such as the live-streaming of a child being sexually abused.

Information to support Key Messages - Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA)

• Provide Lawful access refers to the process by which law enforcement agencies and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) use legally authorized powers to obtain information and assistance from electronic service providers (ESPs), which includes communications providers, app owners, platform operators, etc.
• These authorizations are found in the Criminal Code and the CSIS Act and are relied on by all law enforcement agencies in Canada, including but not limited to, at the federal level, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canada Border Services Agency, Canada Revenue Agency, and the Competition Bureau, as well as provincial/territorial/ municipal/indigenous police services (approximately 160 distinct services).
• Authorizations include requirements to produce stored data (such as content of emails), transmission data (typically referred to as metadata, such as location), or to intercept live private communications. Most authorizations do not compel the assistance of ESPs absent an explicit assistance order. Furthermore, authorizations do not create a requirement for an ESP to maintain a system capable of collecting the information.
• Currently, the only tool that requires intercept capability is a Condition of Licence for wireless operators of voice telephony services under the Radiocommunication Act. It is a non-legislative policy last updated in 1995 that is very limited in scope and applies only to telecommunications service providers offering wireless voice telephony services.
• Canada is the only member of the Five Eyes and most Western European countries that does not have some form of lawful access legislative framework. This absence and the potential impact on Canadians was highlighted in the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarian's "Special Report on the Lawful Access to Communications by Security and Intelligence Organizations" which called on the government to table this type of legislation.
• Part 15 of Bill C-2, the proposed Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA) would require select ESPs to have the capability to respond to requests from law enforcement agencies and CSIS for information and data they are legally authorised to receive, in support of criminal and intelligence investigations.
• Instead of requiring whole sectors, including small enterprises, to have capabilities in place, the Government would be able to take a more targeted approach. Specifically, based on criteria classes, would be created through regulations (which requires consultation with industry). For companies not captured in the regulations or for a request that goes beyond the regulatory scheme, Ministerial Orders could be issued.
• On its own SAAIA would not create new authorities, such as surveillance powers, for law enforcement and CSIS. But rather, it ensures that ESPs are able to give effect to legal requests.
• SAAIA includes safeguards to prevent any type of requirement that would result in the creation of systemic vulnerabilities in electronic protections, such as backdoors in encryption technology.
• SAAIA also has confidentiality provisions to protect details around law enforcement and CSIS capabilities and interests. There are also provisions to protect the technical discussions between ESPs and government experts on the feasibility of implementing obligations without introducing systemic vulnerabilities. Release of such information could provide insight to threat actors allowing them to change their method of operation.
• SAAIA expressly factors in previous consultations on Lawful Access (2016 led by then Minister Goodale), and lessons learned from Five Eyes and likeminded countries that have legislated Lawful Access and established centralized entities in the last 10 years.

RCMP Recruitment and Retention – Hiring of 1,000 additional RCMP personnel (RCMP)

Question Period Note – RCMP – September 12, 2025

Key messages

• Protecting the safety and security of Canadians is a priority for the Government of Canada, as evidenced by the commitment to hire an additional 1,000 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) personnel.
• Recruitment is a top priority for the RCMP. The organization is committed to increasing the number of police officers and ensuring that it strengthens its capacity to serve and protect communities. In addition, the RCMP actively promotes diversity through targeted recruitment programs, which is essential for the organization to truly represent the communities it serves.
• The RCMP has introduced many changes to improve recruitment, including increasing efforts to attract people to apply for a career in the RCMP, reducing application processing times, and removing barriers, particularly for those in employment equity groups.

If pressed

Q1 – Commitment to recruit and train 1000 more RCMP personnel

• Recruitment remains the top priority for the RCMP.
• The RCMP is committed to increasing the number of personnel on an urgent basis.
• I understand that the RCMP has reduced and streamlined steps in the application process and is increasing its capacity to handle more applications.
• Further, I understand that a Federal Policing direct entry pilot project is under development.

Q2 – Commitment to establish a new RCMP Academy within Depot

The RCMP is examining options to modernize and develop a Next Generation Induction Training Program at Depot.

Q3 – Commitment to increase pay for cadets

• The RCMP supports increasing the Cadet Recruitment Allowance for cadets while they complete the six-month Cadet Training Program.
• This will make it more attractive for people applying to become a regular member of the RCMP, and more affordable while they complete the training program.

Q4 – Indigenous people are underrepresented in terms of law enforcement services being provided in Indigenous communities—what is the RCMP doing about this

• As the RCMP renews its commitment to reconciliation, it continues to prioritize engagement and recruitment of First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples.
• The RCMP is working in direct partnership with several National Indigenous Organizations and Governments in relation to distinctions-specific recruiting initiatives within their communities.
• The RCMP is dedicated to supporting the recruitment, retention and advancement of First Nation, Inuit and Métis employees through modernizing and sensitizing human resources policies and processes.
• In addition, the RCMP is working to educate and engage its workforce on Indigenous cultures and histories, while coordinating outreach activities with Indigenous communities to strengthen relationships and support the wellbeing of First Nations, Inuit and Métis employees.

Q5 – What specific initiatives is the RCMP undertaking to attract Indigenous recruits

• The RCMP's Indigenous Pre-Cadet Training Program and the Indigenous Career Navigators Program support the recruitment, retention and advancement of Indigenous employees.
• These programs play a crucial role in modernizing internal human resources policies to align with reconciliation efforts. The RCMP is also fostering a culturally safe environment that respects and integrates First Nations, Inuit and Métis lived experiences through continued support to the RCMP Indigenous Employee Networks.
• A mentorship program is also being developed and piloted to support First Nations, Inuit and Métis applicants by reducing barriers in the application process. The goal is to eventually encompass all applicants.

Q6 – French Language Recruitment

• The RCMP recognizes that the Official Languages Act is fundamental to Canada, and is committed to making all efforts to respect the substantive equality of status and usage of French and English.
• The RCMP takes its linguistic obligations seriously. It has increased targeted recruitment efforts to create a workforce that is more representative of both official languages communities, and has increased access to second official language training to support a bilingual workforce.
• As part of its Official Languages Strategy, the RCMP is actively seeking to create a more diverse and inclusive culture, as it relates to the use of official languages, at all levels of the organization.
• The RCMP has taken targeted and proactive measures to recruit new police officers from both official language communities, and to increase employee participation in second official language training.
• Supports are in place and appropriate measures are being taken to ensure that services and communications are available to both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians in their preferred official language, as stipulated in the Official Languages Act.

Q7 – Critical Vacancies in certain divisions

• The RCMP, like other police organizations, is facing substantial recruitment challenges, which has a direct impact on the ability to fill hard vacancies.
• The RCMP is offering expedited processing to applicants interested in working in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as in the northern regions within the provinces, and the territories.

Background

Issue

Recent media reports have highlighted the challenges faced by the RCMP National Recruiting Program and the impact on staffing levels.

Information to support key messages

• The RCMP, like other police organizations, has faced recruitment challenges. These challenges include the limited quantity of cadet recruits and the inability to sustain minimum staffing levels in specific locations.
• The RCMP recruits members based on workforce planning, informed by attrition, and resourcing demands identified by municipal and provincial contract partners, as well as the organization's federal policing requirements. With attrition and increased demands for growth, the need for new cadet recruits outpaces the supply capacity.
• The RCMP has introduced many changes to improve recruitment, including increasing efforts to attract people to apply for a career in the RCMP, reducing application processing times, and removing barriers, particularly for those in employment equity groups.
• The Diverse and Inclusive Pre-Cadet Experience (DICE) is an initiative focused on reducing barriers for racialized and underrepresented groups who aspire to join the RCMP. DICE has two key components: mentorship provided by an RCMP Regular Member, and a three-week training program that offers valuable insights and practical experience. Since the DICE program was launched in early 2023, it has received over 1250 applicants.
• The Indigenous Pre-Cadet Training Program (IPTP) is an Indigenous recruiting initiative designed to provide potential First Nations, Inuit and Métis candidates with a first-hand look at a career in policing, while also preparing them to be competitive in the Regular Member application process.
• The RCMP is completing an end-to-end review of the recruitment process that will prioritize short-term, high impact changes, as well as long-term changes that promote optimization, efficiency, and adaptability.

High Profile Offender Residing in Minimum Security (CSC)

Question Period Note – CSC – September 5, 2025

Key messages

• Protecting the safety and security of correctional institutions and communities is a top priority for Correctional Service Canada (CSC).
• I am unable to comment on specific offender cases under the Privacy Act. There are important public safety reasons that we take into account as well.
• When an inmate's location is publicly disclosed, it can ultimately compromise the safety and security of not only CSC's inmates, but also the staff and the public who visit those facilities.
• When it comes to security classifications, CSC has the appropriate measures in place to safely manage offenders, including in minimum security.
• Canadians can be assured that their safety remains our top priority.

If pressed

Radicalization

• Radicalization to violent extremism is not a new phenomenon in federal corrections. CSC has long managed various offenders who fall under the definition of a radicalized offender.
• To manage this population there are continuous and extensive case management plans for radicalized offenders as well as detailed correctional plans which are specifically tailored to each offender based on their individual risk and needs.
• CSC does, and will, continue to share information with both domestic and international partners to keep Canadians safe.

Bill C-83

• Changes in security classifications are informed by evidence-based assessments along with the professional judgement of specialized staff.
• Transfers respect the principle that CSC use the least restrictive measures that are consistent with the protection of society, staff members and inmates.
• Despite the difference in wording between C-83 and the former Bill C-10 the Safe Streets and Communities Act, which used "necessary and proportionate", their guiding principles regarding the classification of inmates were the same.

Background

Issue

Media have been reporting on a high profile offender convicted of terrorism offences allegedly residing in "townhouse-style" living units in a minimum-security institution in the Prairie region.

Security Classification

• Initial security classification and subsequent security reclassification includes the use of evidence-based assessment instruments along with the professional judgment of specialized staff and psychological assessments, if applicable.
• The following factors are considered in assigning a security classification to each inmate:
  1. the seriousness of the offence committed by the inmate;
  2. any outstanding charges against the inmate;
  3. the inmate's performance and behaviour while under sentence;
  4. the inmate's social, criminal and, if available, young-offender history and any dangerous offender designation under the Criminal Code;
  5. any physical or mental illness or disorder suffered by the inmate;
  6. the inmate's potential for violent behaviour; and
  7. the inmate's continued involvement in criminal activities.
• This process considers the degree and type of custody and control required to ensure the safety of staff, the public, and institutions. The inmate's accessibility to family and other support mechanisms, the availability of appropriate programs and services, such as cultural initiatives, and the inmate's willingness to participate in those programs are also considered.

Transfers

• Transfers of inmates from one institution to another may occur for many reasons, including when an inmate's security classification is reviewed. All transfers of inmates to lower levels of security occur only after CSC has duly considered such aspects as public safety, institutional behaviour and the risk of escape.
• As inmates progress through the correctional system to lower security levels and earn more freedom of movement within the institution, the programs and activities are tailored to more closely reflect the conditions the inmate is likely to encounter once released into the community. A transfer to minimum security allows the inmate to experience greater autonomy to prepare for a safe reintegration into the community.
• The risk posed by inmates is constantly assessed by CSC staff. In the event of a change in the risk posed, the necessary measures are taken to ensure the safety of the public or our institutions, including the possibility of a reclassification to a higher security level.

Conditional Release (CSC)

Question Period Note – CSC – September 23

Key messages

• Protecting the safety and security of our communities is a top priority for the Government of Canada.
• For offenders in the community, any risk is managed through monitoring and supervision strategies that are tailored to each offender.
• Research shows that offenders have better outcomes when their release is gradual and structured. Conditional release with supervision helps them reintegrate safely and reduces the risk of reoffending.
• At any time, Correctional Service Canada (CSC) staff can take action if they believe an offender is violating their conditions, which can include suspending the release and returning them back to custody.

If pressed

Q1 – [REDACTED]

• The law requires that federal offenders who have served two-thirds of a fixed-length sentence be released under supervision at that point.
• Before an offender is released into any community, CSC undertakes a comprehensive pre-release planning process, including the completion of a community supervision strategy.
• CSC works closely with the police of jurisdiction on these supervision strategies and in this case local police issued a public notification about the release of this offender.

Background

Community Supervision

Community supervision is a key aspect of CSC's mandate to contribute to public safety. It involves monitoring and supporting offenders in the community to facilitate their safe and successful reintegration, including managing offenders on parole, statutory release, and long-term supervision orders.

Under the supervision of Parole Officers and multidisciplinary case management teams, offenders are held accountable while being supported in addressing the factors that led to their criminal behaviour. CSC works in close collaboration with community partners, police, Indigenous organizations, and non-governmental agencies to ensure that supervised offenders have access to housing, employment, treatment, and other services, thereby promoting rehabilitation, reducing recidivism, and fostering safer communities.

Under current legislation, there are different types of conditional release for offenders: Temporary Absences (i.e. Unescorted Temporary Absences and Escorted Temporary Absences), Work Release, Day Parole and Full Parole. Statutory Release is a legislated release at two-thirds of an offender's sentence fix-length sentence.

On September 23rd [REDACTED] was released from prison and is living in Vancouver. The Vancouver Police Department issued a public warning about [REDACTED] return to the community on statutory release.

Parliamentarian Visits (CSC)

Question Period Note – CSC – September 29, 2025

Key messages

• The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is proud to support visits to its institutions by Parliamentarians and Judges.
• Considering that prisons are unique and evolving security environments, Wardens are responsible for ensuring the safety of institutions and guests at all times.
• To this end, a member of CSC's management team typically accompanies visitors during these tours.
• This is a longstanding best practice which applies to Members of Parliament, Senators and Judges.
• CSC's management is also best placed to answer a breadth of questions about the institution, inmates or corrections as a whole.
• If a Parliamentarians wishes to meet with inmates or unions privately, CSC makes every effort to provide access to a meeting room. These, of course, can proceed without CSC management present.

Background

Issue

Section 72 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act

Every member of the House of Commons, every Senator and every judge of a court in Canada has the right to:

1. enter any penitentiary,
2. visit any part of a penitentiary, and
3. visit any inmate, with the consent of the inmate, subject to such reasonable limits as are prescribed for protecting the security of the penitentiary or the safety of persons.

Pursuant to the CCRA and its regulations, visits by Parliamentarians and judges must be authorized unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the visit would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person and restrictions would not be adequate to control the risk. Only an institutional head can refuse or suspend a visit.

As a best practise for VIP visits, which includes members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers, Senators, or Judges, Wardens (or a delegate) will be present for tours.

Implementation of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (PS)

Question Period Note – ONCFIC – September 15, 2025

Key messages

• Bringing the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act into force is a significant undertaking. Similar efforts by Canada's allies have taken at least two years to complete.
• We are committed to moving quickly and responsibly to implement Act while respecting the regulatory and parliamentary process.
• The Act will establish a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry to publicly disclose legitimate foreign influence activities in Canada, reinforcing transparency and accountability.
• The Registry will help counter covert or deceptive interference and promote trust in our democratic institutions and processes.
• The Registry will be overseen by a new Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner's Office. Appointing a Commissioner to lead its implementation is a key priority.

If pressed

Q1 – Concerns that the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry could be perceived as targeting Canadian minorities

• The Government of Canada is committed to protecting the rights and freedoms of all Canadians. The Foreign Influence Transparency Registry was developed in full respect of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
• We held broad consultations during the legislative process, including nearly 1,000 online responses and over 80 meetings with stakeholders, including community groups, advocacy organizations, and faith-based leaders. The initiative received wide support from those consulted.
• We are committed to ongoing engagement to ensure the Registry is fair, transparent, and helps protecting everyone from the threat of foreign interference.

Q2 – Concerns with the time it is taking to operationalize the FITCO and the Registry

• Bringing the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act into force is a major undertaking. Officials are working to ensure full and timely implementation.
• Similar efforts in allied countries have taken over two years to implement.
• The goal is to create a strong, fair, and lasting system that protects Canadians from foreign interference while respecting their rights.
• Work has been underway on all major components of the project, including:
  • Developing regulations to support the new system
  • Preparing for the appointment of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner
  • Setting up the Commissioner's Office
  • Building an enforcement system with financial penalties and possible criminal charges for serious violations
  • Developing a secure, user-friendly online platform for registration and public access

Q3 – When will a Commissioner be appointed?

• The appointment of a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner remains a key priority.
• The government is dedicated to ensuring that the appointment process is transparent, fair, and impartial.
• A candidate has been identified and is being proposed to Members of Parliament and Senators.

Background

Issue

The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) received Royal Assent in June 2024. Despite progress, the Government of Canada is being criticized over a perceived delay for its coming into force.

Context

Part IV of C-70, the FITAA sets out a registration requirement for persons that have an arrangement with a foreign principal to carry out activities in relation to a political or governmental process in Canada, thereby enhancing transparency related to the activities.

The following are required for the coming into force of the FITAA:

1. establishment of the Commissioner's office;
2. development of an IT solution to support the Registry and the case management system;
3. publication of final regulations.

Public Safety Canada plans to deliver a Registry and operational Office of the Commissioner within ambitious timelines, while focusing on building the best possible infrastructure and toolkit to combat malign foreign influence.

Work has been underway on all major components of the project, including developing the FITAA's regulations, setting up the Commissioner's Office, and developing a quality, enduring IT solution that will allow regulated persons to easily submit the required information and let Canadians search through published declarations.

Economic-based Threats to National Security (PS)

Question Period Note – NCSB – October 2, 2025

Key messages

• This government takes all threats to national security seriously, and our security and intelligence community remains committed to identifying, mitigating, and responding to the modern and sophisticated risks facing Canada.
• As Canada builds its economy, and national security risks to our economy and sovereignty continue to evolve, Canada needs a targeted approach to better identify, understand, mitigate, and protect against these threats.
• That is why the Government is strengthening Canada's ability to address national security threats to the economy, as part of our efforts to bolster economic growth, prosperity and our strategic autonomy. A cohesive and integrated approach to Canada's national security requires cooperation across government and beyond. Public Safety continues to consult with key stakeholders in the business community, academia, the provinces and territories, Indigenous governments, and civil society.
• A cohesive and integrated approach to Canada's national security requires cooperation across all levels of government and beyond. That is why we continue to consult with key stakeholders across the country.

If pressed

Q1 – Should the Federal Government have Conducted a National Security Review of BC Ferries' Decision

• The government noted BC Ferries' announcement that it had selected China Merchants Industry Weihai Shipyards to build four new major vessels.
• Public Safety Canada conducts national security reviews of foreign direct investment under the Investment Canada Act. It does not, review procurement decisions.
• BC Ferries is under the jurisdiction of the government of British Columbia.
• Public Safety Canada looks forward to continuing coordination with the Government of British Columbia on all economic security matters.

Background

Issue

• Canada's open and globalized economy brings risks as well as benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic brought to light significant vulnerabilities in our economy and highlighted the importance of securing partnerships to shore up critical supply chains.
• In the context of recent geopolitical shifts, we need to reassess our approach to address national security threats to the economy. A strong, independent and resilient economy needs to be free from national security threats.

Government of Canada Tools to Protect the Canadian Economy

• Canada currently has defensive tools in the economic security space, focused on economic-based threats to national security (threats entering Canada via economic activities such as investment and research partnerships).
• Public Safety (PS) is working to broaden this approach, to focus on national security threats targeting our economy, by building resilience, taking a whole-of-economy perspective of economic security, and with the deliberate objective to secure Canadian control and/or unimpeded access to strategic economic assets, both tangible and intangible.
• Some current tools include:
  • The Controlled Goods Program, administered by Public Services and Procurement Canada;
  • The Investment Canada Act (ICA), administered by Innovation, Science and Economic Development, with PS leading the ICA-national security review of proposed foreign investments that threaten Canada's national security;
  • The Policy on Sensitive Technology Research Affiliations of Concern prevents funding of sensitive research if there are affiliations with organizations connected to the state security entities that could pose a risk to Canada's national security;
  • Cyber security programs led by PS protect and aid Canadian businesses in the recovery from cyber incidents, including the Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan;
  • The National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure which established a broad definition and 10 sectors that cover most of the Canadian economy; and
  • The Export and Import Permits Act, administered by Global Affairs Canada.

Cybersecurity and Bill C-8 (PS)

Question Period Note – NCSB – October 2, 2025

Key messages

• The Government of Canada is working with partners to protect Canadians and our businesses, critical infrastructure, and democratic institutions from cyber threats.
• Public Safety Canada and its portfolio agencies are ready to respond when cyber incidents affect the services Canadians rely on.
• The Government of Canada, through the National Cyber Security Strategy, is committed to taking a whole-of-society and agile approach to national cyber security.
• To bolster Canada's cyber resilience, this past June, Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security, was introduced in Parliament. This Bill would help protect Canada's federally regulated critical infrastructure from cyber threats, now and into the future.
• The Government of Canada will continue to invest in cyber security and take action to protect Canadians from cyber security threats.

If pressed

Q1 – Question on the Detection and Reporting of Cybercrime

• The government is working with stakeholders to make it easier for the public and business to report cybercrime.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) National Cybercrime Coordination Centre and Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre are jointly responsible for national cybercrime and fraud reporting in Canada, by both victims and victimized organizations with a nexus to Canada.
• These two Centres are developing a new National Cybercrime and Fraud Reporting System to improve and streamline cybercrime and fraud reporting, enhance technical capabilities of these Centres, and support Canadian law enforcement to action victim reporting of cybercrime and fraud.
• By improving and centralizing reporting, the RCMP can further aggregate, analyze, and improve information sharing with law enforcement and security partners to support prevention, deconfliction, and investigative efforts.

Q2 – Question on Specific Incidents

• We are aware of the {Insert type of incident, city, province} and we are closely monitoring the situation.
• The federal cyber community meets regularly to discuss potential and ongoing incidents to coordinate the federal response.
• The Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan is in place for incidents that affect non-government of Canada cyber systems.
• The Government is always ready to respond to incidents to keep Canadians safe.
• The Government Operations Centre is working to determine what type of federal assistance may be required by provinces and territories and the critical infrastructure providers to deal with the situation.
• First responders and provincial officials are responsible for addressing the immediate needs of citizens in the affected areas.
• As the situation is evolving rapidly, it would be inappropriate for us to comment further.
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) works closely with Canadians, industry, and academia to build awareness and resilience to cyber threats. Through new authorities obtained under bill C-70, CSIS is better able to share information with non-GC partners

Q3 – Question on Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security (Formerly Bill C-26)

• An Act Respecting Cyber Security (formerly introduced as Bill C-26) was a bill containing two separate legislative initiatives aimed at protecting federally regulated critical infrastructure from cyber threats and was reintroduced in June of this year following the formation of the government.
• Part 1 proposed to amend the Telecommunications Act to add security as a policy objective and confer order-making powers on the Minister of Industry and the Governor in Council that could be used to compel Canadian telecommunications service providers to secure Canada's telecommunications system against threats.
• Part 2 would have led to the introduction of the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act to establish a regulatory framework to strengthen basic cybersecurity in the four federally regulated critical infrastructure sectors.
• The proposed legislation, which had previously been approved almost unanimously by the House and Senate, had reached the final stages of the parliamentary process before dying on the Order Paper due to prorogation.
• The bill was the subject of lengthy debates, and several amendments were made to address the concerns of members of Parliament and stakeholders. These amendments are included in the new version of the bill.
• Furthermore, Bill C-8 is almost identical to the former Bill C-26, with only a few minor changes to ensure consistency and to respond to the Senate's intention to guarantee the application of the secure administrative procedures regime established by the Foreign Interference Prevention Act.
• By introducing legislation that establishes a cyber security regulatory framework for key federally regulated entities, including mandatory reporting of cyber incidents and centralization of cybercrime and cyber incident reporting, Canada will significantly strengthen the cyber security of federally regulated critical infrastructure that Canadians rely on, impacting our national and economic security, and ensuring that criminals are held accountable for their actions.
• Importantly, it would also ensure that Canada avoids falling further behind like-minded allies who have faced similar pressures to introduce and revise cybersecurity legislation.

Q4 – Question on holding cybercriminals responsible

• The RCMP investigates the highest levels of cyber-related criminal activity and threats to national security. This includes cybercrime directed against institutions of government, critical infrastructure, and key Canadian institutions and business assets.
• The RCMP has a broad mandate to combat cybercrime domestically and internationally, and deploys various enforcement measures to enable arrests, charges, and other disruption outcomes
• This can include actions to neutralize the threat, minimize victimization, and hold cybercriminals to account where possible.
• Additionally, Public Safety is working with partners to encourage reporting of cyber incidents, especially ransomware. More reporting will mean more information about how these incidents happen and how to stop them, which will support law enforcement efforts.

Background

Issue

Malicious cyber activity directed at the digital systems underpinning essential services and critical infrastructure is a constant concern for businesses, individuals, and all levels of governments.

Threat Environment

• The 2025-2026 National Cyber Threat Assessment identifies ransomware as the top cybercrime threat to Canada's critical infrastructure.
• Canada ranks second in the world for countries most affected by ransomware attacks.
• Ransomware incidents have an estimated recovery cost of CAD $4.5 million per incident.
• China presents the most comprehensive cyber security threat facing Canada today. Its objectives include political and commercial gains, espionage, Intellectual Property theft, and transnational repression. Canadian politicians at all levels of government have been targeted.
• Additionally, Russia's cyber program furthers Moscow's ambitions to confront and destabilize Canada as we are a valuable espionage target for Russian state-sponsored cyber threat actors, including through supply chain compromises, given Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, and presence in the Arctic.
• Iran uses its cyber program to coerce, harass, and repress its opponents, while managing escalation risks. Its increasing willingness to conduct disruptive cyber attacks beyond the Middle East and its persistent efforts to track and monitor regime opponents through cyberspace present a growing cyber security challenge for Canada and our allies.

Government of Canada Response

• The Government of Canada is responsible for responding to cyber threats, national security threats, and threats to critical Government of Canada systems.
• Public Safety Canada coordinates the federal response to cyber security incidents through the Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan, which provides a reliable framework for coordination and information-sharing among government departments and agencies when managing significant cyber incidents or events affecting non-Government of Canada systems.

National Cyber Security Strategy

• Canada's new National Cyber Security Strategy outlines two overarching principles that will serve as a guide to Canada's approach to cyber security; taking a whole-of-society approach that will cultivate enduring partnerships with stakeholders to tackle key issues in the cyber security landscape; and taking an agile approach to cyber threats.
• The two flagship initiatives of the NCSS are: the Canadian Cyber Defence Collective, which will formalize collaboration and information sharing between all levels of government, Indigenous organizations, private industry, and academia; and the next iteration of the Cyber Security Cooperation Program, which is Public Safety Canada's cyber-related grants and contributions program.
• In an excellent example of how partnerships with academia can increase Canada's research and innovation capabilities while contributing to our national and economic security, the Government of Canada committed $10 million to fund a Cybersecurity Attribution Data Centre (CADC) at the Canadian Institute of Cybersecurity (CIC) at the University of New Brunswick (UNB).

Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security

• On June 18, the Government introduced Bill C-8, An Act Respecting Cyber Security (formerly Bill C-26). This legislative package includes two complementary initiatives:
  • Part One introduces amendments to the Telecommunications Act to add security as a policy objective of the Act and create new authorities, which could be used to secure Canada's telecommunications system against any threats including those posed by high-risk suppliers in line with the Government's May 2022 policy statement.
  • Part Two introduces a cross-sectoral framework to protect Canada's federally-regulated critical infrastructure in the finance, telecommunications, energy, and transportation sectors.
• Bill C-8 is landmark legislation that would ensure our defences meet the moment – to protect Canada's national security, public safety and the economy. It will also demonstrate that Canada is a reliable ally, and ensure Canada remains secure, competitive, and connected.
• The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is working closely with Canadians, industry, and academia to build awareness and resilience to cyber threats. Through new authorities obtained under Bill C-70, CSIS is better able to share information with non-GoC partners.

Critical Infrastructure Protection and Bill C-8 (PS)

Question Period Note – NCSB – October 2, 2025

Key messages

• Critical infrastructure (CI) is the backbone of Canada's economy. It is essential to the health, safety, and prosperity of Canadians, as well as the effective operation of government.
• Canada's CI is vulnerable to complex and converging threats—both cyber and physical—that pose significant risks to national security, public safety, and economic stability.
• The importance of CI to Canada's sovereignty, prosperity, and economy makes these assets and systems a high-value target for threat actors.
• CI in Canada is mostly privately owned, and operates as a highly interconnected network that spans provinces, territories, and international borders.
• To remain at pace with the changing threat environment, federal, provincial, and territorial governments must implement whole-of-government approaches—and work closely with the private sector—to enhance the security and resilience of Canada's CI.

If pressed

Q1 – Threats

• Threats include criminality (e.g., copper wire theft, vandalism), cyberattacks on operational technologies and data systems (e.g., ransomware), and other hybrid/grey zone activities (e.g., espionage, hostile investment, cutting undersea cables).
• The evolving threat environment is compounded by the increasing frequency, intensity, and severity of natural hazards brought on by climate change.
• Cyber and physical threats often originate from sophisticated actors aiming to undermine Canada's sovereignty and strategic interests.
• The potential for disruption to Canada's economy, and erosion of national security, is magnified given CI is highly interconnected and digitalized; these factors compound the risk of disruption triggering cascading failures across multiple sectors and across borders, with the potential for catastrophic impacts.

Q2 – Current Government of Canada actions

The Government of Canada introduced Bill C-8, which imposes mandatory cybersecurity requirements for the four federally regulated CI sectors: Information and Communications Technology, Energy and Utilities, Finance, and Transportation.

• The government also introduced Bill C-70 to strengthen the Criminal Code to address sabotage of CI.
• Canada is also considering how we might best align and coordinate with partners and allies, who are all taking steps to strengthen their statutes / approaches to identify and protect their most prominent CI.
• This includes identifying Canada's most important CI so that it can be better protected.

Backgrounder

Issue

The increasing interconnectivity between cyber and physical systems has heightened the vulnerability of CI to a broad spectrum of threats.

The Minister of Public Safety has exercised national leadership for CI protection under the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act (2005) and the Emergency Management Act (2007). However, responsibility for CI remains fragmented across the Government of Canada, with various departments and agencies holding regulatory authority over specific sectors.

CI sectors span provincial, territorial, and municipal jurisdictions, and the majority of CI assets are owned and operated by the private sector and other orders of government.

Information to support key messages

The Government of Canada's top priority is to protect the safety and security of Canadians, both domestically and internationally. To support this objective, Public Safety Canada is implementing a whole-of-government approach in collaboration with CI owners and operators.

This coordinated effort aims to strengthen the resilience of Canada's essential assets and systems, including electricity grids, transportation networks, communications infrastructure, and public safety services, thereby safeguarding Canada's economic prosperity and the well-being of its people.

Listing of Terrorist Entities (PS)

Question Period Note – NCSB – October 1, 2025

Key messages

• Canada's intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies continuously monitor for potential threats.
• Once threats are identified, robust measures are in place to address them.
• We work closely with our partners and use every tool at our disposal to hold accountable terrorists and those who participate in or facilitate terrorist activity.
• Organizations meeting the threshold in the Criminal Code are listed as terrorist entities based on evidence, intelligence, and the law.
• The listing carries significant consequences. It prohibits actions related to terrorist financing, and allows the Government to seize, restrain, or forfeit assets.
• Individuals seeking entry into Canada are also inadmissible if they are members of terrorist organizations.
• We are committed to holding terrorist groups accountable for their actions and to explore all options to respond to the threat they pose to Canada's security.

If pressed

Q1 – Listing the Lawrence Bishnoi Gang

• On September 29, 2025, the Government of Canada announced that it had listed the Bishnoi Gang as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code.
• The Bishnoi Gang creates a climate of insecurity in Canada as it targets specific communities, their prominent members, their businesses, as well as cultural figures within the community.
• The Government of Canada is committed to protecting the safety and security of all people in Canada and Canadians abroad.
• The Government of Canada will continue to work closely with our partners and use every tool at our disposal to hold terrorists and those who participate in or facilitate terrorist activity accountable.

Q2 – How will this impact the current relationship between Canada and India

• The Bishnoi gang creates a climate of fear and has been linked to a number of violent crimes and murders in India.
• Indian authorities have already laid multiple charges against the gang; a number of gang members have also been sentenced to prison and its leader has been in prison in India since 2014.
• Addressing transnational crime is a priority for both of our countries.
• As the gang has networks in both Canada and India, both of our countries are working together to deal with this issue.

Q3 – Listing of seven Transnational Organized Crime Groups

• The transnational organized crime groups listed in February 2025 take hostages, attack civilian and critical infrastructure, actively disrupt the functions of local governments and law enforcement, and generate terror amongst civilian populations.
• These organizations also play a leading role in the production and distribution of fentanyl throughout our country.
• The Government of Canada is committed to using every available resource to disrupt the scourge of these organizations in our communities.
• We will continue to explore all possible measures to constrain the activities of those who would threaten the safety and security of all people in Canada and Canadians abroad, in collaboration with allies and like-minded partners.

Q4 – Listing Gangs in Haiti

• The Government of Canada is committed to promoting stability and democracy in Haiti. We are committed to being strong partners of the Haitian government as it looks to bring back safety and stability in its territory.
• Transnational Organized Crime Groups are a threat to the safety and security of all people in Canada and Canadians abroad.
• Canada has sanctioned Haitian individuals under the Special Economic Measures Act for financial and operational support to armed gangs.
• Canada's listing process is based on intelligence, evidence and the law.
• As a result of this process, the government listed 7 transnational organized crime groups as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• We will not hesitate to take measures necessary to protect the safety of Canadians and of our partners.

Q5 – Redefining Terrorism Beyond Ideological, Political, or Religious Motivations

• The nature of terrorism is rapidly evolving due to the internet, online radicalization, and the intersection between terrorism and crime.
• Complicating this environment is the emergence of lone actors, who do not subscribe to a particular ideological, political or religious belief, but are motivated to commit violent acts based on a personalized mix of many beliefs unique to them.
• No matter the ideology, the Government of Canada is committed to using all available tools to address the threat posed by these actors, including by listing them as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• The intelligence and security agencies are continually assessing threats to the safety and security of Canada, and will respond to the seriousness of these entities' activities.
• The terrorist listings process is based on evidence, intelligence, and law, and serves as one possible avenue of response to target malign terrorist actors both within Canada and abroad.
• The Government of Canada is committed to promoting stability and democracy in Haiti. We are committed to being strong partners of the Haitian government as it looks to bring back safety and stability in its territory.
• Transnational Organized Crime Groups are a threat to the safety and security of all people in Canada and Canadians abroad.

Background

Issue

• Canada's Criminal Code listing regime is an important tool for countering terrorism in Canada and globally, and is part of the government's commitment to keep people in Canada safe.
• The Criminal Code sets out a terrorist listing regime to help prevent the use of Canada's financial system to further terrorist activity, and to assist in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences.

Canada's Criminal Code listing regime

• The listing of terrorist entities is a process, based on evidence, intelligence, and the law, as a listing carries significant consequences. It involves cross-government consultations to ascertain if an entity meets the legal threshold for listing as set out in the Criminal Code.
• The Minister of Public Safety may recommend to the Governor in Council that individuals or groups be designated as "terrorist entities" pursuant to s. 83.05 (1) of the Criminal Code (establishment of list) if there are reasonable grounds to believe that an entity:
  1. has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or
  2. has knowingly acted on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with, an entity referred to in paragraph (a).
• For the purposes of this determination, "terrorist activity" includes acts such as hijacking planes, taking hostages, bombings, and other acts described in section 83.01 (1) of the Criminal Code.
• Once an entity is listed, it is a "terrorist group" under Canadian criminal law. The Criminal Code prohibits certain actions in relation to terrorist groups, including those related to terrorist financing, travel, and recruitment. Furthermore, persons seeking entry into Canada are inadmissible if they are found to be members of organizations engaged in terrorism. The Criminal Code listing can be helpful for immigration and border officials to determine if individuals are deemed inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (PS)

Question Period Note – NCSB – October 2, 2025

Key messages

• The Government of Canada is committed to countering and preventing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism, in both the physical and online spaces.
• Canada's intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies continuously monitor for these potential threats to Canada and abroad, enabled with a variety of measures to address them. This includes terrorist listings, investigations, threat reduction measures, preventing individuals from traveling to engage in terrorist activity and prosecutions.
• The threat posed by terrorists and violent extremists to Canada and Canadians is real. Addressing these threats requires close collaboration among domestic and international security and intelligence partners, the policing community, and social services.
• My Portfolio works collaboratively to ensure that our tools and approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism remain effective in this changing threat environment.
• We are committed to using every tool at our disposal to keep our communities safe from this threat all while respecting Charter-protected freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression.

If pressed

Q1 – Prevention of Radicalization to Violent Extremism

• Canada is committed to countering and preventing all forms of radicalization to violence and violent extremism, including online, emphasizing the need for public health-informed approaches, supported by collaborative efforts to ensure the safety of Canadians and international partners.
• Established in 2017, Public Safety's Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (the Canada Centre) provides national leadership through policy guidance, coordination with various actors, and financially supports research and prevention initiatives via its grants and contributions program – the Community Resilience Fund.
• The Canada Centre leads Canada's National Strategy to Counter Radicalization to Violence, which focuses on three priorities:
  • Building, sharing, and using knowledge to develop an evidence base to inform effective prevention policies.
  • Supporting front-line intervention and prevention efforts tailored to local needs and strengths.
  • Addressing radicalization online, including efforts to prevent terrorist and violent extremist content.

Q2 – Terrorist and Violent Extremist Use of the Internet

• Since 2022, there has been a significant rise in terrorist and violent extremist content online, driven in part by widespread layoffs in the tech industry that affected trust and safety teams, including content moderators.
• This trend was exacerbated by the Israel-Hamas war which has led to a surge in the use of social media platforms to glorify acts of violence and circulate graphic material.
• Our Government is particularly concerned with the growing exposure of minors and youth to terrorist and violent extremist content through social media and gaming platforms.

Q3 – Does Canada's Security and Intelligence Apparatus have all the Tools Needed to Effectively Identify and Disrupt Terrorism and Violent Extremism in the Online Space?

• Canada's security and intelligence community continues to rely on its well-established counterterrorism toolkit to counter the threat of terrorism and violent extremism; however, like all countries, this threat has evolved toward violent extremists using the online space, encrypted communication platforms and channels to organize, communicate, and plan their activities.
• We will continue to ensure that Canada's law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies are equipped with the tools and capabilities needed to investigate and counter threats in the online space.

Q4 – Canada's Approach to Combatting Online Extremism

• Harmful content on social media undermines Canada's public safety, national security and social cohesion.
• Canada's approach to addressing terrorist and violent extremist content online involves close collaboration with academics and researchers, civil society organizations, and likeminded governments such as Five Eyes and G7 partners to share best practices and apply coordinated pressure on industry to act.
• The Government engages with tech platforms about addressing terrorist and violent extremist content primarily through multilateral fora, such as the industry-led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism and the Christchurch Call Foundation.
• Technology companies must be held accountable for harmful content hosted on their platforms.
• In parallel, Public Safety Canada funds prevention efforts, including to redirect users away from terrorist and violent extremist content online, and to promote digital literacy.
• Our work in this area aligns with our international commitments, including under the Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online.

Background

Issue

• Canada's terrorism and violent extremism (T/VE) threat landscape has expanded and become more complex and diverse, including ideological motivated violent extremism, religiously motivated violent extremism, and politically motivated violent extremism.
• Radicalization is occurring more rapidly with concerning prevalence of youth and older Canadians radicalizing to violence.
• T/VE threat actors rapidly adopt new and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI), which presents additional challenges for Canada's security and intelligence community.

The T/VE Threat in Canada

• The T/VE threat landscape is complex, diverse, chaotic, and constantly evolving. While the threat of religiously-motivated violent extremism remains ever present, new T/VE threats have emerged in Canada over the last ten years, motivated by extreme xenophobia (e.g. white nationalism), misogyny (e.g. violent militia), anti-2SLGBTQI+, anti-authority, as well as nihilistic violent extremism ideologies.
• Threat actors are progressively driven by a range of – often seemingly contradictory – grievances, personalize narratives and ideologies that are often intertwined with conspiracy theories.
• The landscape is also transnational, as individuals from around the world gather in online communities to share their grievances, ideas, hatred, and attack plans.
• Investigations by intelligence and law enforcement agencies are increasingly identifying young threat actors, some as young as 13. The content that these young threat actors tend to share online is increasingly graphic (e.g. animal crushing and 'gore') in an attempt to desensitize viewers to violence. Since June 2023, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have arrested eighteen (18) young people (25 of age and under) on terrorism-related charges.
• Individuals are increasingly radicalized online as they seek out violent extremist content, consume terrorist propaganda, and meet with like-minded individuals in private group chats and online communities.
• Technological advancements, such as AI, encryption, and algorithms can facilitate and amplify propaganda dissemination (particularly through enhanced language translation capacity) and drive users towards extremist content. Additionally, regulatory gaps in online spaces, especially gaming, are exploited by violent extremists to target and radicalise vulnerable individuals, including youth.

Canada's Counter T/VE Approach

• Canada is working on renewing its Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Plan of Action to ensure that we are well-equipped to meet these new and evolving threats.
• The Government of Canada continues to rely on its well-established counter terrorism toolkit to address all forms of T/VE, including:
  • Prevention efforts led by the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence.
  • Investigations and reporting on violent extremist threats to Canada's national security as defined in section 2(c) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act.
  • Threat reduction measures: CSIS may also take measures to reduce these threats, within defined legal parameters;
  • RCMP – Federal Policing investigates national security-related criminal offences, which may result in charges or terrorism peace bonds;
  • The Criminal Code terrorist listing regime, which helps prevent the use of Canada's financial system from furthering terrorist activity and can assist in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences;
  • The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Act, which authorizes CSE to gather and provide intelligence related to foreign violent extremist threat activities, such as attack planning, capacity building, recruitment, and radicalization impacting Canada and Canadians at home, abroad, and online;
  • Security screening to prevent threat actors from entering or gaining permanent residency or citizenship status under the Immigration and Refugees Protection Act and the Citizenship Act;
  • The Secure Air Travel Act ("No Fly List"), which prevents individuals from boarding a plane when they are suspected of posing a threat to aviation security or suspected of wanting to travel for terrorism-related purposes.
  • The Canadian Passport Order, which enables passports to be cancelled, refused or revoked to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence or for the national security of Canada or another state.

The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre)

• Established in 2017, the Canada Centre leads federal efforts to combat violent extremism including by implementing the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence.
• The Canada Centre applies a public health-informed approach to countering all forms of radicalization to violence, including online. This is done by convening the full range of stakeholders, supporting partnerships and frontline practitioners through the Community Resilience Fund grants and contributions program, and breaking new ground in research and policy development in support of its community outreach.
• Key initiatives aimed at combatting terrorist and violent extremist content online include $2.9 million in support to the non-governmental organization Tech Against Terrorism for the development of their Terrorist Content Analytics Platform, a secure online tool that automates the detection, notification, and analysis of verified terrorist content.
• Budget 2024 invested $19.5 million over three years for the Canada Centre's work:
  • $10.5 million over three years to increase funding to the Community Resilience Fund;
  • $6 million over three years to bolster the Canada Centre's analytical capacity, in the form of specialized, open-source data integration and behavioural analytics team; and
  • $3 million over three years to increase the Canada Centre's capacity to specifically advance work on the Christchurch Call to Action.

Christchurch Call

• The Government of Canada is a signatory to the Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist & Violent Extremist Content Online (Christchurch Call).
• The Christchurch Call was launched by the governments of France and New Zealand in 2019, following a terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch that killed 51 individuals. One of the attacks was live streamed on Facebook.
• In 2024, the Christchurch Call transitioned into a non-governmental organization known as the Christchurch Call Foundation, with Canada playing a key advisory role throughout the transition.

Firearms and Gender-Based Violence Data

Background Information - CPB – October 7, 2025

• Data on gender-based violence using firearms is limited, however intimate partner violence (IPV) data, which is a subset of gender-based violence, is available. From 2014 to 2021, the rate and number of victims of IPV where a firearm was present increased every year. This rate slightly declined in 2022, and then increased again in 2023, where a firearm was present for 1.2% (1,038) of victims of police-reported IPV, and 84% of these victims were women and girls. Beyond the presence of a firearm, between 2020 and 2024, 0.9% of all victims of intimate partner violence in Canada were involved in an incident with a firearm. Between 2014 and 2023, 12.68% of victims of firearm-related homicide were a spouse, family member, or intimate partner of the accused.
• Between 2015 and 2022, approximately 32.5% of perpetrators of intimate partner firearm-related homicide legally possessed their firearms (meaning individuals were licensed, and the firearm was registered, as required).
• More generally, rates for police-reported family violence increased by 3%, and intimate partner violence increased by 1%, in 2023. There were 139,020 victims of family violence and 123,319 victims (aged 12 years and older) of intimate partner violence that came to the attention of police.
• By gender, the highest rate of police-reported intimate partner violence in 2023 was among women and girls aged 12 to 24 years (752 per 100,000 population), a rate nearly seven times higher than that for men and boys of that age group (111). Among all adults aged 25 to 64 years, the rate was more than three times higher for women (688) than for men (210). While intimate partner violence increased for adults aged 25 to 64 years (+22%) and seniors aged 65 years and older (+36%) since 2018, it decreased for youth and young adults aged 12 to 24 years (-3%). In terms of family violence, the majority of victims were female (girls or women).
• In 2024, there was a large increase in the proportion of women who were killed by a spouse or intimate partner (with or without a firearm), increasing from 32% of women IPV victims in 2023 to 42% of women IPV victims in 2024. More specifically, the proportion of women facing IPV who were killed by their spouse or intimate partner (42%) was approximately seven times higher than the proportion of men (6%).
• It should be noted that GBV and IPV are largely underreported to police. According to the General Social Survey on Victimization, the large majority (80%) of spousal violence victims said the violence they experienced was not reported to police.

Firearms Acronyms

ATC

Authorization to Cary

ATT

Authorization to Transport

CFP

Canadian Firearms Program

CFSC

Canadian Firearms Safety Course

CFO

Chief Firearms Officer

FRT

Firearms Reference Table

LCM

Large Capacity Magazine

PAL

Possession and Acquisition Licence

RPAL

Restricted Possession and Acquisition Licence

Trends in police-reported crime in Canada and the United States

Question Period Note – CPB – October 8, 2025

Key messages

• Our government is committed to keeping Canadians safe by supporting a fair, effective, and responsive criminal justice system that meets the evolving needs of communities across the country, including in rural and remote regions.
• The newly released reports from Statistics Canada provides useful information that will help us better understand crime trends and patterns in Canada as compared to the US.
• These trends spanning from 1998-2023 are important and helpful to better support our Government's work on combating crime.
• Recent Statistic Canada data has showed a promising trend: In 2024, we saw decreases in the overall and violent crime rates (-4%; -1%) and Crime Severity Indexes for all Canadians (-4%; -1%), including youth (-3%; -4%).
• We recognize the ongoing concerns about community safety and the criminal justice system. We will continue to work with communities and law enforcement partners, and make investments to combat crime, ensuring that we continue to see decreasing crime trends year after year.
• We know that coordinated action across all orders of government can drive meaningful change and help build safer communities, and we will continue to do that through actions, like ensuring the passage of Bill C-12.

If pressed

Q1 – Combating organized crime

• The Government of Canada remains firmly committed to protecting Canadians from organized crime and combatting transnational organized crime groups through coordinated action with a range of domestic and international partners.
• The Government's $1.3 billion Border Plan is enhancing our ability to prevent organized criminal activity at our borders, such as drug and firearms trafficking, and human smuggling. This includes significant investments in detection capacity, border surveillance capacity and border personnel.

Q2 – Detecting and Disrupting the Illegal Fentanyl Trade

• Protecting Canadians from the harms associated with the illegal drug trade is a top priority for our government.
• We have made Border Plan investments in detection and imaging tools, intelligence sharing capacity, and a Joint Strike Force with the U.S.
• We are also expanding enforcement capacity by investing in 1,000 new Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers, 1,000 new border officers, and prosecution to fight drug trafficking and other crimes, and put drug traffickers behind bars.

Q3 – National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft

• Our government has taken decisive actions to combat auto theft, including the launch of the National Action Plan, building on the successes of the February 2024 National Summit.
• Collaborative efforts with all levels of government and industry are yielding results. Auto theft dropped 19.1% nationwide in early 2025 (Équité Association). CBSA intercepted over 2,200 stolen vehicles in 2024 and detained 1,155 more in 2025 (as of Sept. 23). Integration with the International Criminal Police Organization's (INTERPOL) Stolen Motor Vehicle Database has enabled the RCMP to receive thousands of alerts and international collaboration requests.

Q4 – Government Measures to Reduce Gun Violence

• Our Government will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach to keep Canadians and Canadian communities safe from gun violence.
• This work will build on significant measures now in place to strengthen the firearms regime, combat illicit firearms and gang activity, and address risks posed by firearms in gender-based and intimate partner violence.
• These measures complement significant investments to enhance law enforcement capacity in Canada and at the border, and to support community prevention and intervention programs.

Q5 – National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS)

• Public Safety Canada's National Crime Prevention Strategy is an important component of the Government's agenda to tackle crime and create safer neighborhoods and communities.
• The government invests approximately $60M per year, to support community-based crime prevention projects through four funding programs: Crime Prevention Action Fund, Youth Gang Prevention Fund, Northern and Indigenous Crime Prevention Fund, and the Canada Community Security Program.

Background

Issue

On October 8, 2025, Statistics Canada released two comparative reports analyzing crime trends and regional variations between Canada and the U.S. One covers national trends from 1998 to 2023; the other compares 2023 crime patterns across urban, rural, and metropolitan areas.

Trends in police-reported crime in Canada and the United States: A comparative analysis

• While violent crime rates remain higher in the U.S. than in Canada, the gap has narrowed over the past 25 years—reflecting declines in violent crime in the U.S. and increases in Canada.
• Homicide rates are much higher in the U.S. (5.7 homicides per 100,000 population) than in Canada (1.9 homicides per 100,000)—primarily due to firearm-related incidents. However, long-term trends show similar declines in both countries since the late 1970 and early 1980s.
• Police-reported major assaults are less common in Canada (197 incidents per 100,000) than in the U.S (263 incidents per 100,000); but rates in Canada have increased (+46%) over the past 25 years (since 1998), while rates in have declined (-27%) during this same period in the US.
• Over the last 25 years, robbery rates have decreased in both countries, with sharper declines in the U.S. (-60%) than in Canada (-51%) resulting in more similar rates between the two countries in 2023 (66 victims per 100,000 population in the US; 53 victims per 100,000 population in Canada) after decades of higher rates in the US.
• Break and enters were less common in 2023 than 25 years earlier in both countries. In 2023, Canada (328 incidents per 100,000 population) recorded a higher rate than the U.S. (249 incidents).
• Trends in motor vehicle thefts are nearly indistinguishable between the two countries—both countries saw substantial declines between 2005 and 2013, followed by recent increases.

Regional variations in police-reported crime: comparing Canada and the United States

• Regional patterns in police-reported crime were similar in both countries. As in Canada, higher rates of violent and property crime were observed in the Northern U.S. regions (e.g. Alaska), while lower rates were found in Atlantic and Central regions.
• Urban-rural differences in violent crime vary significantly between Canada and the United States. In Canada, violent crime rates tend to be lower in large metropolitan areas and higher in smaller, non-metropolitan regions. In contrast, the U.S. sees its highest violent crime rates in the largest metropolitan areas. In 2023, violent crime rates in Canada's largest cities were 40% lower than those in comparable U.S. cities, while rates in Canada's non-metropolitan areas were 89% higher than in similar U.S. regions.
• Property crime rates were higher in Canada (1,990 incidents per 100,000 population in 2023) than in the U.S. (1,906 incidents), across both urban and rural regions. The one exception among property crimes was motor vehicle theft, where the rate was lower in Canada (282 vs 317 incidents per 100,000 population).