Question Period Book - Minister of Public Safety (June 2025)
Public Safety Canada

Strengthening Border Security/C-2 Border Bill

Key Messages

• Strengthening our border is a key priority for our government, and an important area of Canada–U.S. cooperation.
• Canada's Border Plan, backed by a $1.3 billion investment, strengthens border security and our immigration system, and accelerates the fight against fentanyl and illegal drugs. Through these investments, we are ensuring enhanced border surveillance through new and existing technology and the mobilization of law enforcement resources, and deployment of new detection technology and increasing removals. Approximately 10,000 frontline personnel are working to protect the border.
• Bill C–2, the Strong Borders Act, will also give us critical new tools to protect our border, bolster our response to increasingly sophisticated criminal networks, and enhance the integrity and fairness of our immigration system while protecting Canadians' privacy and Charter rights.
• Other key actions include establishing a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to support law enforcement investigations, listing transnational criminal organizations as terrorist entities, and directing Canada's intelligence agencies to target cross–border criminal activities.
• These efforts are vital for maintaining our sovereignty and security, and we will continue to take action keep Canadians and our communities safe.

If Pressed

Q1 – How do Canada's Border Plan and Strong Borders Act help to prevent the smuggling of guns and other contraband into Canada

• Canada's Border Plan's focus is to detect and disrupt the trade of illegal substances and activities before they enter our country.
• We are equipping our law and border enforcement agencies new tools and equipment designed to capture a wide range of contraband, including other illegal drugs, weapons, and counterfeit goods.
• If passed, several measures in the Strong Borders Act will also contribute to combating the smuggling of guns and other contraband into the country, including:
  • Expanding the services offered by the Canadian Coast Guard to include security–related services which will assist law enforcement in intercepting contraband smuggled via maritime routes, including firearms and precursor chemicals for synthetic drugs.
  • Allowing for the search and seizure of contraband from Canada Post mail to target the growing use of postal services for smuggling fentanyl and firearms components.
  • Allow Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) inspectors to enter transporter–controlled premises (e.g., warehouses, shipping yards) to inspect goods destined for export, and to detain suspicious shipments and conduct on–site inspections, improving the ability to intercept smuggled firearms and narcotics before they leave or enter Canada.

Q2 – Strong Borders Act (Bill C–2)

• A strong Canada means strong borders. Our government made a commitment to keep Canada secure and sovereign, and to work with our American partners to strengthen our border.
• That is why, on June 3, 2025, we introduced The Strong Borders Act.
• It will keep Canadians safe by ensuring law enforcement has the right tools to keep our borders secure, combat transnational organized crime, stop the flow of illegal fentanyl, and crack down on money laundering.
• It will bolster our response to increasingly sophisticated criminal networks, and enhance the integrity and fairness of our immigration system while protecting Canadians' privacy and Charter rights.
• This legislation builds on the priorities set out in Canada's $1.3 Billion Border Plan, announced in December 2024.
• The bill proposes to update existing laws to better address national and economic security threats and to strengthen the security of our border and the integrity of our immigration system.
• This includes changes that would facilitate information sharing; disrupt the illicit flows of fentanyl, other drugs, and precursor chemicals; bolster migration security, and strengthen law enforcement operations.
• Canadians support a strong border and giving law enforcement the tools needed to keep it secure. The proposed legislation will complement a new economic and security relationship with the United States while protecting Canadian sovereignty.

Q3 – Surveillance on the Border

• Canada's Border Plan includes several measures that have enhanced surveillance of the Canada–U.S. border.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has deployed a new Aerial Intelligence Task Force, equipped with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers to monitor between ports of entry. This task force is supported by counter–drone technology to enhance border monitoring capabilities.
• Additionally, we are flying three Black Hawk helicopters and have procured drones and mobile surveillance towers to ensure continuous monitoring and rapid response to border incidents. Nearly 10,000 frontline personnel from federal, provincial, and Indigenous partners are working together on protecting the border.
• Together, these measures strengthen our sovereignty and security, while facilitating the legal flow of people and goods across the border.

Q4 – Expanding CBSA to Patrol Between Ports of Entry

• In Canada, border security and integrity is a shared mandate between the CBSA and the RCMP. The CBSA is responsible for enforcing the law at designated ports of entry and the RCMP is responsible for enforcing Canadian legislation between ports of entry.
• The CBSA plays a critical role in protecting our borders and ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. It enforces over 90 acts, regulations, and international agreements on behalf of other federal departments, agencies, provinces, and territories.
• While the current mandate focuses on operations at designated ports of entries (POE) the government is aware of and carefully considering recommendations from stakeholders regarding the potential expansion of CBSA's mandate to include enforcement between ports of entry.
• These discussions are ongoing, and any changes to the CBSA's mandate will be guided by evidence, operational needs, and respect for Canadian rights and freedoms. We remain committed to ensuring that CBSA has the tools and authority it needs to effectively manage our borders.

Q5 – Improving Operational Coordination

• Enhancing operational coordination is a key goal of the Border Plan, and as a key part of these efforts Canada has established a North American Joint Strike Force in collaboration with U.S. counterparts.
• It aims to target transnational organized crime through joint mapping and operational efforts. It will also leverage the work of Binational Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, as well as enhanced technical operations capabilities and infrastructure.
• The designation of seven cartels as terrorist entities enables key players from Canada's financial services sector and law enforcement to further improve intelligence collection and coordination, strengthening efforts against transnational organized crime.
• We are also setting up regional information–sharing hubs that will bring together key federal, provincial, local, and Indigenous law enforcement to support operational coordination.

Q6 – Increasing Information Sharing

• Canada's Border Plan includes significant measures to enhance information sharing.
• The plan improves real–time intelligence sharing between Canadian and U.S. officials, including: RCMP, CBSA, Public Safety Canada, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Health Canada, and provincial and territorial partners.
• This allows for better targeting and stronger actions against illegal border activities. It includes monitoring illegal migration trends and hot spots to respond swiftly and effectively.
• The designation of cartels as terrorist entities enables new partnerships involving key players from Canada's financial services sector (e.g., banks), such as the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) and law enforcement. These partnerships improve intelligence collection and coordination, bolstering efforts against sophisticated money laundering schemes and transnational organized crime.
• By strengthening the exchange of information, the government enhances our border security and safeguards our nation's safety, prosperity, and integrity.

Q7 – New Tools for Law Enforcement

• To bolster law enforcement capabilities, Canada has introduced an Aerial Intelligence Task Force, equipped with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers and supported by counter–drone technology.
• Additionally, artificial intelligence and imaging tools are deployed to detect illegal drugs, particularly fentanyl, before they enter Canada. The CBSA is also training and deploying new canine teams and chemical detection tools at high–risk ports of entry.
• We are also in the process of setting up regional information–sharing hubs that will bring together key federal, provincial, local, and Indigenous law enforcement.
• The government is committed to ensuring that law enforcement has the tools they need to keep our border safe and secure.

Background

Issue

Backed by an investment of $1.3 billion, Canada's Border Plan is bolstering border security, strengthening our immigration system, and contributing to ensuring Canada's future prosperity.

Canada's Border Plan

• The Government of Canada announced a significant investment of $1.3 billion to enhance border security and strengthen the immigration system. This plan, unveiled in December 2024, focuses on five key pillars:
  • Detecting and Disrupting the Fentanyl Trade: Enhanced support for law enforcement agencies, including new AI and imaging tools, additional dog detection teams, and new chemical detection tools at high–risk ports of entry.
  • Introducing Significant New Tools for Law Enforcement: Deployment of an Aerial Intelligence Task Force with helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers, along with counter–drone technology.
  • Enhancing Operational Coordination: Increased information sharing and collaboration between Canadian and U.S. officials, along with the creation of regional enforcement hubs and a proposed North American Joint Strikeforce, will enhance the targeting and disruption of organized crime and illegal border activities.
  • Increasing Information Sharing: Enhanced information and intelligence sharing with federal, provincial, and territorial authorities, the U.S., and international partners to better identify, monitor, and intercept high–risk individuals and goods moving between countries.
  • Minimizing Unnecessary Border Volumes: Implementation of changes to end "flagpoling," amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for greater control over immigration documents, new restrictions on non–cooperative countries, and maintenance of the Safe Third Country Agreement to strengthen immigration and asylum systems while collaborating with the U.S. to protect border integrity and combat illegal activities.
• This comprehensive plan aims to bolster security, improve the efficiency of the immigration system, and ensure the safety and prosperity of Canadians.
• Canada appointed Kevin Brosseau, former Deputy Commissioner of the RCMP and former Deputy National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister, as the Fentanyl Czar.

Strong Borders Act: Building a Safer and More Secure Canada

This proposed legislation will strengthen our laws and keep Canadians safe while protecting their privacy and Charter rights–because a strong Canada means strong borders.

Securing the Border

• Improving Canada Border Services Agency's ability to examine goods for export
• Strengthening information sharing on sex offender travel
• Strengthening authorities to cancel, suspend or change immigration documents, and cancel, suspend or stop accepting new applications
• Improving immigration–related information sharing with internal and external partners
• Protect the integrity of the asylum system against sudden increases in claims by introducing new ineligibility rules
• Improving how asylum claims are received, processed and decided
• Refer complete claims to the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) to speed up decisions and ensure that claims are only decided by the IRB while the claimant is physically present in Canada
• Speed up voluntary departures by making removal orders effective the same day a claim is withdrawn
• Help vulnerable claimants, like minors or those who don't understand the process, by assigning representatives to support them
• Expanding Coast Guard Services to include security activities

Combating Crime and Stopping Illegal Fentanyl

• Amend accelerated scheduling pathway for precursor chemicals
• Clarifying authority around law enforcement exemptions for the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act
• Equipping law enforcement with the right tools for today's criminal investigations, including facilitating timely access to basic information and data
• Enabling law enforcement to search the mail using a warrant as part of criminal investigations and expand Canada Post's inspection authority to open mail

Disrupting Illicit Financing

• Strengthening anti–money laundering supervision, compliance, and enforcement, including through increased civil and criminal penalties
• Addressing some of the most prevalent types of money laundering, including through new restrictions on large cash transactions and third–party cash deposits
• Adding the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) to the membership of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Committee
• Enhancing information sharing, including by clarifying public to private information sharing provisions and enabling FINTRAC disclosures to the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections

Detecting and Disrupting the Illegal Fentanyl Trade

Key Messages

• Protecting Canadians from the harms associated with the illegal drug trade is a top priority for our government.
• Our Border Plan expands support to stem the flow of illegal drugs and precursor chemicals across our borders. We have appointed a Fentanyl Czar and invested in new detection and imaging tools, detector dog teams, intelligence sharing capacity and a Joint Strike Force with our U.S. partners.
• We will hire 1000 new Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers and 1000 new border officers to fight drug trafficking and other crimes. We will invest in prosecution and put drug traffickers behind bars.
• We will continue to support enforcement as part of a federal drug policy that protects the health and safety of all Canadians.

If Pressed

Q1 – Listing transnational criminal organizations in Canada as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code

• The Government of Canada is committed to protecting the safety and security of people in Canada and Canadians abroad, and stopping the transnational criminal organizations behind the fentanyl crisis and other harmful criminal activity.
• The listed entities are transnational criminal organizations that do harm and spread fear by using extreme violence, trafficking drugs, arms and people, and engaging in other serious crimes.
• Based on their actions, these organizations meet the threshold for listing them as terrorist groups as set out in the Criminal Code.
• Listing these entities gives Canadian law and border enforcement more tools to help fight organized drug crime and keep Canadians safe.

Q2 – Money Laundering

• To strengthen Canada's ability to combat financial crimes and money laundering, the government has:
  • Created new Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec to undertake complex money laundering investigations;
  • Launched the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information sharing between law enforcement and Canada's financial sector;
  • Invested in modernizing the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)'s intelligence and compliance tools to enhance capacity to respond to money laundering threats; and
  • Provided $29.9 million to the Canada Border Services Agency to combat financial crime.

Q3 – Financial Action Task Force

• The Government of Canada takes the challenges identified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report of Canada seriously.
• Since 2018, the government has invested nearly $470 million to strengthen data resources, financial intelligence, information sharing, and investigative capacity to support anti–money laundering (AML) and anti–terrorist financing (ATF) investigations in Canada.
• In Canada's most recent follow–up report (October 2021), the FATF recognized improvements to Canada's AML/ATF Regime and elevated Canada's international standing in compliance with the FATF standards.
• Canada continues to identify and implement improvements to its AML/ATF regime and is currently undergoing a mutual evaluation by the FATF. Its evaluation report will be published in Summer/Fall 2026.

Q4 – International Engagement

• The Government of Canada understands that organized drug crime groups do not respect borders and that to combat the illegal drug trade we must work with our international partners, in bilateral and multilateral forums.
• Law and border enforcement officials work directly with international counterparts every day to keep our border secure and Canadians safe from drug threats.
• Our work through the Canada–U.S. Opioids Action Plan and the North American Drug Dialogue help us to share information, learn about best practices, and coordinate drug policies.
• We work through the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs to make sure fentanyl precursors are controlled in all countries.
• This engagement is helping the government to tackle this global threat and we will continue to support it.

Q5 – Law Enforcement (Policing)

• The RCMP's Federal Policing program detects, investigates, and disrupts major criminal threats to public safety, including the illegal fentanyl market. Their intelligence and investigative efforts target all aspects of the drug trade to disrupt transnational organized crime groups involved in fentanyl production and trafficking.
• Across Canada, the RCMP operates Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and Response teams that target organized crime groups involved in the production of illegal substances, including fentanyl, and provide specialized support to local law enforcement in detecting and dismantling clandestine drug laboratories.
• Since 2018, the RCMP and local law enforcement have identified and dismantled close to 50 clandestine laboratories where there were indications of fentanyl production.

Q6 – Law Enforcement (Border)

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) remains vigilant in the interdiction of illegal drugs to ensure these harmful substances remain off the streets and out of our communities. The Agency continues to seize fentanyl and other controlled substances, in addition to precursor chemicals that can be used in the production of illegal synthetic drugs.
• The CBSA works very closely with the RCMP and police of jurisdiction in Joint Force Operations to support criminal investigations and prosecutions.
• Through Canada's Border Plan, the CBSA is bolstering the frontline and ensuring officers have the tools and technology required to continue to interdict illegal drugs and firearms.

Background

Issue

• The opioid overdose crisis is a public health and safety emergency of significant concern.
• Canada works with domestic and international partners, including law and border enforcement, to combat the illegal fentanyl and precursor chemical trade; this includes Border Plan investments to detect and disrupt illicit supply chains.

Federal Responses

• Canada's Border Plan invests $1.3 billion to bolster border security and strengthen our immigration system, including by creating:
  • A Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to better leverage information sharing, analysis and actioning intelligence to target transnational organized crime and improve border security;
  • An Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information sharing between law enforcement and Canada's financial sector;
  • A North American Joint Strike Force with the U.S. to target transnational organized crime groups involved in illegal fentanyl production, trafficking, and money laundering; and
  • A Chemical Precursor Risk Management Unit and Canadian Drug Analysis Centre to provide greater insight into precursor chemicals and distribution channels.
• Canada appointed a Fentanyl Czar and listed seven organized crime groups as terrorist organizations to provide law enforcement with additional tools to fight drug crime.
• The Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy is the federal government's comprehensive, drug policy. It incorporates efforts in prevention and education, evidence, substance use services and supports (treatment, harm reduction and recovery), and substance controls.

Platform Commitments

• The 2025 Liberal Party of Canada platform commits to addressing the illegal drug trade, including fentanyl, by:
  • Ending drug trafficking in our communities, including by recruiting and training 1000 more RCMP personnel;
  • Cracking down on drugs, including fentanyl and its precursors. To this end, the Party commits to hiring 1000 new CBSA officers, standing up additional border scanners, drones and new detector dog teams to target suspicious shipments;
  • Investing in the Public Prosecution Service of Canada to prosecute more complex drug trafficking and organized crime offences;
  • Amending the Canada Post Corporation Act to allow police to search for and seize fentanyl and other contraband in the mail with a general warrant; and
  • Updating the Canada Coast Guard mandate to include countering criminal activity like drug trafficking.

Combatting Organized Crime

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is committed to protecting Canadians from organized crime and combatting transnational organized crime groups in collaboration with a range of national and international partners.
• The government's $1.3 billion Border Plan is enhancing our ability to prevent organized criminal activity at our borders, such as drug and firearms trafficking, and human smuggling. This includes significant investments in detection capacity, border surveillance capacity and federal border personnel.
• We are also combatting specific areas of organized crime through targeted strategies, including the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy, the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, and the National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft.
• These efforts are producing results. Since 2018, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and local law enforcement have identified and dismantled close to 50 clandestine drug labs and super labs. In late March 2025, the RCMP dismantled multiple illicit fentanyl labs across BC, seizing precursor chemicals and arresting two suspects.
• The Government of Canada will continue to make efforts to prevent crime, strengthen law enforcement, hold those responsible to account and disrupt and dismantle transnational organized crime groups.

If Pressed

Q1 – Money Laundering

• To strengthen Canada's ability to combat financial crimes and money laundering, the government has:
  • Created new Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec to undertake complex money laundering investigations;
  • Launched the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to increase targeted information sharing between law enforcement and Canada's financial sector;
  • Invested in modernizing the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)'s intelligence and compliance tools to enhance capacity to respond to money laundering threats; and
  • Provided $29.9 million to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to combat financial crime

Q2 – Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

• The Government of Canada takes the challenges identified by the FATF's 2016 Mutual Evaluation Report of Canada seriously.
• Since 2018, the government has invested nearly $470 million to strengthen data resources, financial intelligence, information sharing, and investigative capacity to support anti–money laundering (AML) and anti–terrorist financing (ATF) investigations in Canada.
• In Canada's most recent follow–up report (October 2021), the FATF recognized improvements to Canada's AML/ATF Regime and elevated Canada's international standing in compliance with the FATF standards.
• Canada continues to identify and implement improvements to its AML/ATF regime and is currently undergoing a mutual evaluation by the FATF. Its evaluation report will be published in Summer/Fall 2026.

Q3 – Drug Trafficking

• In addition to investments in border surveillance capacity, detection technology tools and federal border personnel through Canada's $1.3 billion Border Plan, we appointed a Fentanyl Czar to accelerate our work to fight the deadly fentanyl trade, established a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell targeting organized crime groups that traffic fentanyl, and listed seven cartels as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• The government established the Integrated Money Laundering Intelligence Partnership to bring together the financial sector and law enforcement to prevent laundering of drug proceeds.
• These new measures build on those implemented through the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy, which is an evidence–based approach to substance use that includes efforts to target organized crime involvement in the illegal drugs trade.
• CBSA and RCMP are actively working with domestic and international partners to disrupt the involvement of organized criminal groups in the production and trafficking of illegal drugs, including fentanyl.

Q4 – Extortion

• The Government of Canada is dedicated to protecting Canadians from criminal threats, including extortion and violence.
• The RCMP, serving as the national police force and the provincial and municipal police service for many regions, is tasked with preventing, detecting, and investigating serious and organized crime, as well as national security crimes.
• Online extortion, including instances of sextortion, may impact children as well as adults. The RCMP's National Child Exploitation Crime Centre works to address online child sexual exploitation, including sextortion offences, in Canada and internationally.
• $41.6 million over five years was allocated to Public Safety in 2022 to assist in better protecting children through the National Strategy for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation on the Internet. Ongoing investments to combat online child sexual exploitation total more than $27 million per year.
• The government supports the RCMP's efforts to address organized crime in all its forms and encourages anyone experiencing or witnessing extortion to report it to their local police of jurisdiction.

Q5 – Preventing Gang Involvement

• Public Safety renewed the Initiative to Take Action against Gun and Gang Violence in 2023, which provides $390.6 million over five years to provinces and territories, and augments the capacity of RCMP and CBSA to combat firearms trafficking.
• The government created new offences to address the growth in privately manufactured firearms (PMFs), classified all PMFs as prohibited, and imposed tougher penalties for firearms trafficking and smuggling.
• We created the National Action Plan to Combat Auto Theft, and invested $28 million to strengthen the CBSA's response as well as $15 million for policing against auto theft, which has already resulted in a reported 19% decline in auto theft claims nationally in 2024.
• Public Safety is continuing to implement the National Crime Prevention Strategy, which provides a policy framework for making crime prevention interventions across Canada and helps fund strategically–selected projects aimed at reducing crime, including for at–risk youth.
• The government is also providing $250 million to municipalities and Indigenous communities through the Building Safer Communities Fund. It is a targeted, evidence–based approach that will help build safer communities by strengthening local efforts to counter the social conditions that lead to criminal behavior.
• This initiative will aim to positively engage young people with their families, their schools, and their communities to prevent gang involvement. Intervention programs will aim to help young adults, adults, and families who are impacted by gang involvement.

Background

Issue

Organized crime poses a serious threat to the safety and security of Canadians. The organized crime landscape in Canada is highly complex and transnational in nature and scope, resulting in evolving threats to national and global security.

Threat Environment

• The Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) estimates that 4000+ Organized Crime Groups (OCG) operate in Canada, of which 668 (17%) were assessed in 2024. Of these, 7 OCGs are considered as national high–level threats and 128 are medium–level
• OCGs have become increasingly sophisticated, more agile and more diversified. They are increasingly developing networks with criminal actors outside of Canada and are working with hostile state actors to commit transnational repression, foreign interference and money laundering/terrorist financing; and are leveraging cyber capabilities, including to evade law enforcement.

Government of Canada strategies and initiatives to combatting organized crime

• In December 2024, the Government of Canada announced its Border Plan to curtail migrant and drug smuggling, particularly at the Canada–U.S. border. Supported by an investment of $1.3 billion, the Plan includes deploying new detection capabilities, eliminating illegal border crossings by investing in border surveillance equipment and capacity, increasing federal border personnel, and freeing up the time of existing personnel to focus on migrant and drug smuggling.
• Measures to address illegal drug production and trafficking build those implemented through the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy, Canada's evidence–based approach to substance use that balances public health and safety priorities. To this end, Canada engages with both domestic and international partners, including through forums such as the Canada–U.S. Opioids Action Plan, the North American Drug Dialogue and the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs.
• Since 2016, the federal government has invested more than $1.4 billion to address gun violence and keep guns out of the hands of gangs and criminals. This includes $840.1 million over 10 years (2018–2019 to 2027–2028) through the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV), $250 million through the Building Safer Communities Fund and $312 million over five years through the Enhancing Canada's Firearm Control Framework.
• The objectives of the ITAAGGV are further supported by legislative measures to strengthen Canada's firearms regime. For example, firearms trafficking and illegal manufacturing now has a maximum penalty of 14 years and all privately manufactured firearms are automatically classified as prohibited.
• In May 2024, the Government of Canada released its National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft, setting out a detailed approach to disrupt and dismantle the OCGs involved. The plan includes an investment of $9.1 million over three years (FY 2024–2025 to FY 2026–2027 for Ontario and Quebec and $3.5 million over three years (FY 2024 – 2025 to FY 2026–2027) to support INTERPOL in combatting transnational organized vehicle crime.
• The National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, supported by $10.28 million annually, brings together federal efforts to counter human trafficking through a victim–centered, survivor–informed and gender–responsive lens. As part of this strategy, PS invests in a national public awareness campaign, community–based empowerment projects, and the Canadian Human Trafficking Hotline, among other initiatives.

National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft

Key Messages

• The previous government took decisive actions to combat auto theft, including the launch of the National Action Plan, building on the successes of the February 2024 National Summit.
• Through collaborative efforts with provincial, territorial, municipal and industry partners, and as highlighted in the March 8, 2025 update to the National Action Plan, we are seeing positive results:
  • National auto theft trends for 2024 show a 18.6% decrease, as per the Équité Association 2024 Annual Auto Theft Trend Report.
  • The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) intercepted 2,277 stolen vehicles at its marine and intermodal ports in 2024, with significant interceptions in Quebec and Ontario. In addition, 574 vehicles have been detained thus far in the 2025 (as of May 13, 2025).
  • Finally, from February to December 2024, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) received 3,127 notifications about Canadian vehicles stolen and 578 international collaboration requests via INTERPOL's stolen motor vehicle database. Thus far in the 2025 (as of May 13, 2025), the RCMP has received 636 notifications and 130 international collaboration requests.
• We know that criminal networks are quick to adapt, and that is why our government will continue to work actively with all our partners to ensure a comprehensive and agile response to this evolving criminal trend.

If Pressed

Q1 – Intelligence or information sharing

• Key measures from this National Action Plan forms a robust network of information sharing and collaboration, ensuring we stay one step ahead of the criminals
• We are forging stronger partnerships between municipal, provincial, federal, and international law enforcement agencies. This united front supports criminal investigations and prosecutions like never before.
• By improving the exchange of information and intelligence between customs officials and police forces, we are making it easier to identify and retrieve stolen vehicles.
• We're deploying cutting–edge data analytics and technologies, including artificial intelligence, to track and target stolen vehicles. This disrupts the flow of stolen vehicles from Canada and strike a blow against organized crime.
• Leveraging financial intelligence from FINTRAC, we're bolstering investigations related to auto theft. This powerful tool is helping us uncover the financial networks behind these crimes.
• We're exploring and deploying new detection technologies at marine ports and intermodal facilities. These innovations enhance our ability to intercept stolen vehicles before they leave the country.

Q2 – Intervention

• Our National Action Plan contains significant measures that disrupts the activities of organized crime groups involved in auto theft and will enhance the overall security and recovery of vehicles.
• We are implementing advanced security features in vehicles to make them harder to steal. This includes technologies like immobilizers, tracking systems, and improved locking mechanisms.
• We are also enhancing methods to quickly locate and recover stolen vehicles. This involves using GPS tracking, collaboration with law enforcement, and public awareness campaigns to report stolen vehicles promptly.
• We are strengthening border controls and inspections to prevent stolen vehicles from being exported. This includes deploying detection technologies at marine ports and intermodal facilities to intercept stolen vehicles before they leave the country.
• We are supporting ongoing projects like Project VECTOR, Project RECHERCHER, and Project EMISSION. These initiatives involve collaboration between the CBSA, the RCMP and local police to tackle auto theft head–on.
• We are exploring and deploying new detection technologies, such as mobile technology at marine ports and intermodal facilities, and using advanced analytical tools to better track and target stolen vehicles.

Q3 – Legislation, regulations, and governance

• Successfully combatting auto theft and ensuring the success of this National Action Plan requires a strong legal and regulatory environment.
• That is why we have introduced stricter penalties for auto theft, particularly when it's linked to organized crime. This means harsher sentences and fines for those convicted, sending a strong message that auto theft will not be tolerated.
• New regulations are being implemented to enhance vehicle security standards. This includes mandating advanced anti–theft technologies in new vehicles, making them harder to steal.
• Robust governance structures have been established to oversee the implementation of the action plan. This ensures that all initiatives are executed effectively and that there is accountability at every level.
• The action plan is regularly reviewed and updated to respond to the evolving tactics used by criminal networks. This keeps our strategies current and effective against new methods of theft.
• We're strengthening legal frameworks to facilitate better cooperation and information sharing between law enforcement agencies and other stakeholders. This includes creating new laws and policies that support collaborative efforts to combat auto theft.

Background

Issue

According to the Insurance Bureau of Canada, an estimated 90K cars (or one car every six minutes) are stolen in Canada each year. This results in approximately $1.5B in annual costs to Canadian insurance policy–holders and taxpayers. On May 20, 2024, the Government of Canada released a National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft focused disrupting, dismantling and prosecuting the organized crime groups involved.

National Action Plan on Auto Theft

• On May 20, 2024, the Government of Canada released a National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft focused on disrupting, dismantling and prosecuting the organized crime groups involved. It builds on the Government of Canada's recent actions to combat auto theft that are already making a difference.
• The National Action Plan is informed by continued collaboration with our partners following the February 8, 2024, National Summit on Combatting Auto Theft. The Government of Canada continues to work with these crucial partners to coordinate our actions and ensure the plan remains current and flexible.
• Auto theft is a complex problem that requires manufacturers, insurance companies, shippers, law enforcement agencies and governments to work together on solutions. Each partner has a role play in reducing auto thefts. Recognizing the significant impact this issue is having on the lives of Canadians, and as highlighted in the most recent update to the National Action Plan, the government has advanced a number of initiatives that fall within federal authority during the past few months:
  • Legislation, regulations, and governance: Changes, including amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C–69) to institute tougher penalties for auto theft with ties to violence, organized crime and money laundering, new offences targeting the possession and distribution of devices that facilitate auto theft, a new aggravating factor applicable at sentencing where there is evidence that an offender involved a person under the age of 18 in the commission of an offence, as well as changes to the Radiocommunication Act providing the authorities to the minister to regulate devices used to steal cars, as committed in Budget 2024. These amendments have now become law. As well, the government launched a consultation to gather information relating to the use of wireless devices in auto theft. In addition, Transport Canada committed to reviewing and modernizing the Motor Vehicle Safety Regulations related to theft prevention to ensure they consider technological advancements to deter and prevent auto theft.
  • Intelligence/information sharing: Enhancements between municipal, provincial, federal and international police and customs officials in support of criminal investigations, charges, and prosecutions, building on joint efforts that are already under way.
  • Intervention: Improvements to allow more shipping containers to be examined, through increased capacity at the CBSA, collaboration with the RCMP, local police of jurisdiction (POJ) and INTERPOL, as well as the integration of new targeting tools. Transport Canada committed to working with Public Safety partners to identify high–risk port facilities and conduct targeted security assessments to revise and validate security plans for high–risk container facilities, as necessary. Also, prevention measures and programs targeting at–risk youth with an aim of diverting them from future involvement in criminal and anti–social activities.

Assault Style Firearms Compensation Program

Key Messages

• We cannot be tough on crime without being tough on firearms.
• We know that too many Canadians have been affected by acts of gun violence in communities across our country. That is why our government has adopted a multi–tiered approach to reducing gun violence through the delivery of the Assault–Style Firearms Compensation Program, investing in policing, border enforcement, and community gang prevention strategies.
• The government has prohibited over 2,500 makes and models of assault–style firearms and upper receivers, including those used in Canada's mass shootings. These firearms are not suitable for hunting or sport shooting and exceed safe civilian use.
• We are taking action to keep Canadians safe by removing assault–style firearms from our communities. The Program was launched for firearm business in December 2024 and is providing fair compensation for turning–in their banned firearms for destruction.
• Individual firearm owners will be able to participate in the Program later this year.

If Pressed

Q1 – When will this program be in full operation? Will it cover all the guns that have been prohibited

The program launched for licensed firearms businesses in December 2024 and has been successful. Work is well advanced to open the program to individual firearms owners. We have taken the time needed to get it right, and are committed to opening this phase of the program in the near future. We will be sharing more information on how to participate and which firearms are eligible for compensation in the near future.

Q2 – How many guns have been collected under this program

The Business Phase of this program has been successful with more than 12,300 assault style firearms claimed for compensation, and over 9,300 of those have already been destroyed.

Q4 – How much is this program going to cost

We are committed to this program being as cost–effective and efficient as possible, but cannot put a price on public safety. As we move ahead with launching the Individuals Phase of the program, we will have more information to share on the total costs.

Q5 – The Liberal platform "Canada Strong" released on April 19 2025 was to "Continue to implement an efficient gun buyback program for assault–style firearm." What efficiencies are involved, and how will you save money

We remain committed to this program being as cost–effective and efficient as possible. The goal remains to promote public safety by safely and securely removing assault–style firearms from our communities.

Q6 – How can you launch a national program when Alberta and Saskatchewan oppose it

As we move ahead with the program for individuals across Canada, we continue to extend the invitation for both provinces to participate so their impacted gun owners can receive fair compensation while coming into compliance with the law.

Q7 – Will delivering this program have an impact on frontline policing

The work required by the different police jurisdictions across Canada to implement the Assault–Style Firearms Compensation Program for individual firearms owners cannot, and will not compromise the crucial work that front–line police undertake to keep our communities safe everyday.

Background

Issue

• The government committed to providing fair compensation to businesses and individual firearms owners legally required to dispose of prohibited assault–style firearms (ASF).
• The previous government prohibited what is now over 2,500 makes and models of ASFs through three prohibitions. All of these prohibited firearms have semi–automatic action with sustained rapid–fire capability, which are not appropriate for hunting or sporting and exceed safe civilian use.
• There more than 19,000 estimated non–restricted makes and models, meaning that over 127,000 variations of firearms remain available for hunting and sport shooting in Canada.

Amnesty Order

• Three Amnesty Orders under the Criminal Code came into force at the same time as the amendments to the Regulations to protect lawful ASF owners and businesses from criminal liability and to allow them time to come into compliance with the law. The amnesties also provide a temporary exception for Indigenous Peoples' exercising their traditional hunting right, as recognized under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, as well as those who use firearms for sustenance hunting. This exception enables them to continue to use their prohibited firearms (if previously non–restricted) until a suitable replacement can be found. The May 2020 and December 2024 amnesty orders expire on October 30, 2025, and the March 2025 amnesty order expires on March 1, 2026.
• During the amnesty period, including throughout the implementation of the Program, owners may also choose to dispose of their affected ASFs and prohibited devices (i.e., upper receivers of the M16, AR–10, AR–15 and M4 pattern ASFs) as set out in Amnesty Order (e.g., turning them in to police, or having them deactivated for no compensation, or exported).

Update to the Program

• Since December 6, 2024, affected businesses have been able to ship their ASFs and devices by any licensed carrier for the purpose of destruction (supported by amendments made to the Amnesty Order in Spring 2024) or deactivation and submit their claims for compensation via a Web Portal and Case Management System.
• The Program is not yet available to individual gun owners, but is expected to be available later in 2025.
• The Government of Canada has also communicated its intent to provide fair compensation to businesses and individual firearms owners affected by the December 2024 and March 2025 prohibition as part of the Program. Information on the timelines for this activity will be shared publicly in due course.

Government Measures to Reduce Gun Violence

Key Messages

• Our government will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach to keep Canadians and Canadian communities safe.
• Our work will build on the significant new measures now in place to strengthen the firearms regime, combat illicit firearms activity, and address risks posed by firearms in gender–based and intimate partner violence.
• These measures complement significant investments to enhance law enforcement capacity in Canada and at the border, as well as to support community prevention and intervention programs.
• Everyone in Canada deserves to be safe and to feel safe in their homes and in their communities. Our government will continue to play a leadership role and stands ready to work with provinces, territories, municipalities, and Indigenous communities in taking action to reduce gun violence.

If Pressed

Q1 – Firearm Laws

• Significant enhancements have been made to Canada's firearms laws.
• New licence requirements are in effect, maximum penalties for firearms trafficking and smuggling have been increased, and a suite of new harm reduction tools are in place.
• Work will continue to ensure Canada's firearms regime is responsible and effective, supporting the safe use of firearms by law–abiding firearms owners across Canada and protecting Canadian communities against the devastating impact of firearms violence on our communities.

Q2 – Law enforcement

• Effective enforcement and operational cooperation is critical to combatting firearms violence, and significant investments have been made to enhance law enforcement and border security.
• This includes funding to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to increase capacity to trace crime guns and enhance anti–smuggling activities, and funding for Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) to strengthen border controls to prevent firearms smuggling into Canada.
• We will also continue to strengthen cooperation with United States partners, including through the Cross Border Firearms Task Force.

Background

Issue

• Canada saw a slight decrease in firearm–related homicides from 2022 to 2023, however there has been an increase in firearm–related violent crimes over a ten year period (2013–2023).
• The Government of Canada has launched several initiatives to strengthen the firearms regime and combat gun violence.

Firearms Investments

• The government has invested over $1.4 billion since 2016 in measures to reduce gun violence.
• In 2018, $356.1 million over five years was allocated for the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV). In 2023, the initiative was renewed for an additional five years through 2028. The majority of funds are allocated to provinces and territories (P/T) under the Gun and Gang Violence Action Fund (GGVAF) to combat gun and gang violence in communities across Canada.
• Launched in March 2022, the $250 million initiative seeks to counter social conditions that may lead to criminality by bolstering gang prevention programming through direct funding to municipalities and Indigenous communities. The program sunsets in March 2026. As of May 2024, 85 contribution agreements have been signed (including the one with the Province of Québec as per M – 30 legislation).
• In 2021, an investment of $312 million over five years, starting in 2021–22, and $41.4 million ongoing was made to enhance Canada's firearm control framework across Public Safety, CBSA and RCMP Canadian Firearms Program (CFP) to strengthen services to support the lawful acquisition, ownership and use of firearms by enhancing services to Canadians and law enforcement; to increase capacity to trace crime guns and target firearms smuggling and trafficking; and enhance firearms policy advice and promote awareness of firearms programs.
• Building on Budget 2021 investments, the government invested an additional $3.4 million over five years, starting in 2022–23, and $1.5 million ongoing to support the implementation of former Bill C–21, including a red flag awareness campaign.
• In 2024, as part of the government Response to the Mass Casualty Commission's Final Report, the government announced an investment of $22.5 million over five years and $3.3 million ongoing, starting 2024–25 to PS to increase public awareness, enhance firearms data collection and strengthen firearms regulations. Additionally, in 2024, an investment of $7.4 million over five years, starting in 2024–25 to the RCMP to modernize the CFP's telephone and case management systems.

Cross–Border Smuggling

• On February 23, 2021, the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.–Canada Partnership was unveiled, forming the Cross–Border Firearms Task Force (CBFTF), co–led by CBSA, RCMP, the American Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the United States' Immigration and Customs Enforcement under Homeland Security Investigations (ICE/HSI).
• The task force aims to identify primary sources of illicit firearms and disrupt their flow across the shared border.

Implementation of Former Bill C–21

• Former Bill C–21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms), received Royal Assent on December 15, 2023.
• The Bill enshrined in legislation the national freeze on handguns, which took effect via regulation in October 2022. The vast majority of individuals can no longer buy, sell, or import handguns into Canada.
• Maximum penalties for gun trafficking have increased from 10 to 14 years, and new authorities to combat firearms smuggling and related offences have been created.
• The Bill also introduced measures to address the growing threat of illegally manufactured firearms or "ghost guns", with new computer data offences targeting illegal manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing) and trafficking of "ghost guns", new licence requirements for certain firearms parts, and illegally made firearms now classified as prohibited.
• The Bill also introduced new "red flag" laws, which allow anyone to apply to a court for an order to temporarily remove or remove access to firearms for up to 30 days when a person may be a danger to themself or others.
• The Bill also introduced enhanced licence revocation and ineligibility measures. An individual is ineligible to hold a licence if they have been convicted of an offence in which violence was used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner or any member of their family or are subject to a protection order. And a licence will be revoked if the holder is subject to a protection order and must be revoked if a Chief Firearms Officer suspects the licence holder may have engaged in domestic violence.
• With one exception, all measures introduced in former Bill C–21 are in force and implemented. For the new licence revocation and ineligibility provisions to be fully operative, the term protection order must be defined in regulation and remaining provisions brought into force.

Combatting Hate

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is taking concrete action to combat all forms of hate because no one should feel afraid because of who they are or how they worship.
• Through Canada's first Action Plan on Combatting Hate, we are taking a whole–of–government approach to prevention, response, and support.
• Public Safety Canada is investing to improve access to hate crimes training for police, to prevent and counter extremism, and to assist vulnerable communities to protect their gathering spaces through the Canada Community Security Program.
• At the recent National Forum on Combatting Antisemitism, partners affirmed a shared responsibility to address hate crimes and we committed to further action against crimes targeting the Jewish community.
• Hate crime is unacceptable and our government will continue to take concrete action to ensure all Canadians can feel safe to be who they are without the threat of violence.

If Pressed

Q1 – Islamophobia and Antisemitism

• We respect the right of Canadians to freedom of expression and to engage in peaceful protest activities, but violence and hate speech of any kind will not be tolerated.
• Canadians deserve to live, work, and practice their faith without fear of being attacked. Antisemitism, Islamophobia, and all forms of hate, are completely unacceptable.
• Public Safety is working with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), as well as with the Special Representative on Combatting Islamophobia and the Special Envoy on Preserving Holocaust Remembrance and Combatting Anti–Semitism, in order to combat violent rhetoric and keep communities safe.

Q2 – Rights of 2SLGBTQI+ persons

• All people in Canada deserve to feel safe to express themselves and their identities freely and without threats of violence. I want to reassure Canadians, especially those in the 2SLGBTQI+ community, that our government takes any threat of violence very seriously.
• As part of this, the government is providing funding to support security needs for Pride festivals this season, as we have done in recent years. This funding, provided by Women and Gender Equality Canada (WAGE), will help offset rising security and insurance costs for events across the country, amid high levels of 2SLGBTQI+ hate.
• WAGE is also supporting projects to combat hate against 2SLGBTQI+ communities.
• These measures will keep all Canadians safer from hate–motivated violence.

Q3 – Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence

• The Government of Canada is concerned with violent extremism in all forms, including ideologically motivated violent extremism, religiously motivated violent extremism, and politically motivated violent extremism.
• The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence leads the federal government's efforts to prevent and counter all forms of radicalization to violence.
• It's focus is on addressing the destructive behaviors associated with violent extremism, including their impacts on Canadians and communities.
• Through the Community Resilience Fund, the Canada Centre financially supports grassroots prevention efforts, advancing research to better understand radicalization to violence in Canada, increasing Canada's capacity to meet its commitments to the Christchurch Call to Action.

Q4 – Canada Community Security Program

• There is no place for hate in this country. All Canadians deserve to be safe where they work, live, and worship.
• The Canada Community Security Program (CCSP) provides vital support to communities at risk of hate–motivated crime by helping to enhance the security of community gathering spaces.
• The CCSP replaces and enhances the work undertaken through the Security Infrastructure Program.
• We consulted with stakeholders and made enhancements to be more responsive to community needs and to provide more flexibility to organizations seeking financial support, including that they can now apply at any time throughout the year.

Q5 – RCMP efforts to Combat Hate

• The RCMP is committed to investigating all hate reported incidents in the communities it polices.
• The RCMP also plays an important leadership role, bringing together police, community advocates, academics and subject matter experts to exchange best practices and develop tools to help respond to hate crimes.
• For example, the RCMP has partnered with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation to co–chair the Hate Crimes Task Force–an important forum that is developing practical, front–line tools and solutions rooted in prevention, investigation and victim support.
• With additional funding announced under Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate, the RCMP intends to do more to respond to hate crimes in our communities, including developing specialized training and education for police across Canada.

Q6 – CSIS efforts to Combat Hate

• CSIS continues to investigate, advise on, and take measures to reduce all threats to the security of Canada and to Canadians that rise to the threshold set out in the CSIS Act. These threats can include extremist violence motivated by hateful ideologies, such as xenophobia (e.g., white nationalism), misogyny (e.g., involuntary celibacy or incel), anti–2SLGBTQI+, and anti – authority (e.g., violent militia).
• CSIS has also remained heavily engaged with community groups and organizations in Canada, many of whom represent groups that may be targeted by extremist violence. These outreach efforts are meant to support communities' ability to build awareness and resilience to these threats, equipping them with tools and strategies.

Q7 – National Forum on Combatting Antisemitism

• Hate–motivated crimes targeting Jewish communities remain among the most reported in Canada.
• Threats, harassment, and violent incidents have real impacts; they cause fear and pain to loved ones, friends, neighbours, and communities.
• The Government of Canada recognizes the urgent need for national leadership to ensure Jewish Canadians feel safe in their synagogues, schools and communities.
• Recognizing the urgent need to address the public safety threat of antisemitism, the federal government brought together Jewish community representatives, federal–provincial–territorial–municipal decisionmakers and policymakers, and law enforcement at a National Forum on Combatting Antisemitism.
• At the Forum, partners renewed their collective sense of urgency towards action, and committed to combat antisemitism through decisive, coordinated, and focused actions.

Background

Issue

• Over the last five years, hate–motivated crimes and incidents have been on the rise in Canada, taking many forms (i.e. hate crimes, organized hate groups, online hate, and hate speech).
• In Canada, the number of police–reported hate crimes has risen significantly, more than doubling since 2019. In 2024, there were 4,722 police–reported hate crimes–a 31% increase from 2022 but stable from 2023 (–1%, from 4,777).
• Hate crimes targeting a race or ethnicity made up the largest proportion of police–reported hate crimes (47%), followed by those targeting a religion (26%) and those targeting a sexual orientation (13%).
• In 2024, there was a 4% increase of hate crimes targeting a race or ethnicity. The number of hate crimes targeting the Black population (825) remained the highest (37% of race or ethnicity motivated).
• Compared to 2023, hate crimes targeting a religion slightly declined (–6%, from 1,284 incidents to 1,211). This was largely the result of slightly fewer hate crimes targeting Jewish (from 900 to 816) and Muslim (from 211 to 204) populations.
• However, both still exhibited a significant increase since 2019: 167% and 149% increases targeting the Jewish and Muslim communities, respectively.
• Despite the overall slight decline, the number of reported hate crimes is unacceptable. It is also anecdotally conveyed that many communities underreport.

Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate

• To confront hate in all of its forms, the government launched Canada's Action Plan on Combatting Hate (CAPCH) on September 24, 2024, investing $273.6 million over six years, starting in 2024–25, with $29.3 million ongoing. This includes:
• $32 million over six years, starting in 2024–25, and $11 million ongoing, to enhance the Security Infrastructure Program (SIP)–now referred to as the Canada Community Security Program;
• $19.5 million over three years, starting in 2024–25, allocated to Public Safety's Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence to increase financial support for frontline prevention programs through the Community Resilience Fund, strengthen Canada's commitments to the Christchurch Call to Action, and increase understanding of radicalization to violence in Canada through a new open–source data analytics capability;
• $20.2 million over six years, starting in 2024–25, and $3.2 million ongoing, to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Police College to enhance their anti–hate work with the Canadian Race Relations Foundation and policing partners through the Hate Crimes Task Force;
• $26.8 million over four years, starting in 2024–25, to Public Safety Canada to support police colleges to increase training on handling hate crimes.

Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre)

• The Canada Centre, housed in Public Safety Canada, leads the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence (National Strategy). The Canada Centre's aim is to prevent extreme, grievance–fueled violence that is linked to an ideology or belief system justifying the use of violence to advance a cause. As outlined in the National Strategy, the Canada Centre's activities complement national security and criminal justice efforts by supporting programs that divert individuals at risk of radicalization away from pathways to violent extremism or help individuals involved leave violent extremism behind.
• To this end, the Canada Centre's Community Resilience Fund (CRF) supports research initiatives, early prevention efforts, and interventions programs that strengthen local, frontline capacity to prevent and counter violent extremism. Specialized intervention programs are often led by health or social service professionals who address the needs and vulnerabilities of individuals in order to build protective factors and divert them from pathways towards violent extremism, engaging fields such as social work, mental health, employment, housing, policing, probation and parole, education, and child welfare services. Since its launch in 2017, the CRF has provided more than $85.4 million in funding to 81 projects.

Canada Community Security Program (CCSP)

• The CCSP provides time–limited funding to enhance security infrastructure for private, not–for–profit organizations at risk of hate–motivated crimes, including places of worship, private provincially and territorially recognized educational institutions, shelters for victims of gender–based violence, community centres, and privately run, not for profit, community–based facilities such as daycares and office spaces. Funding is provided for physical security equipment, minor renovations, security assessments and planning, training, and security personnel.
• In 2025–26, CCSP has $21.8M in funding, a significant increase from funding of $5.8M in 2022–23. Starting in 2026–27, funding will stabilize at $16.8M per year.

Hate Crimes Task Force

The Hate Crimes Task Force, launched in spring 2022 and chaired by the RCMP and the Canadian Race Relations Foundation, is a network of experts dedicated to enhancing police response to hate–motivated crimes in Canada by exchanging best practices, supporting investigations, and sharing knowledge on complex issues.

The National Forum on Combating Antisemitism

• To help address the growing public safety threat posed by antisemitism, on March 6, 2025, the Government of Canada held a National Forum on Combatting Antisemitism in Ottawa, co–chaired by the Ministers of Public Safety and the Minister of Justice.
• At the Forum, broad themes emerged during the discussions including: enhanced law enforcement and prosecution; legislative reform (bubble legislation, online harms, clear and accessible legislation); education and awareness (Jewish history, media literacy, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition); government coordination and leadership (intergovernmental cooperation, centralized implementation, federal leadership); addressing online hate; funding accountability; protecting public figures; addressing root causes; consistent messaging and definitions; and community engagement.
• At the Forum, the Government of Canada also announced several commitments to combatting hate and supporting communities at risk of hate–motivated crimes, including:
• Working collaboratively with provinces and territories and other partners to develop comprehensive National Action Commitments to combat antisemitism.
• Up to $10 million in immediate new funding to support grassroots organizations and work done on the ground to help address all forms of hate, including antisemitism through the Community Resilience Fund (CRF).
• Investing $26.8 million over four years to support police colleges to provide training on all hate crimes to provincial and municipal police forces and exploring ways to accelerate implementation of this work.
• Greater transparency in tracking the progress of our collective efforts in addressing the public safety threat of antisemitism.
• Working with Statistics Canada to better recognize and report on the existence of hate crimes, to improve data consistency and awareness in order to help everyone to better understand the extent of hate crimes in Canada, including antisemitism.
• Recognizing the Jewish community's dedication to building and maintaining its own security networks, the Government of Canada is committing to working in partnership with these community–led efforts to build and maintain their own security networks.
• In consultation with provinces and territories, examining potential amendments to the Criminal Code to strengthen tools for law enforcement and prosecutors to address hate crimes, including those motivated by antisemitism.
• Working with provinces and territories to share promising practices in provincial/territorial legislation and other approaches that address hate–related conduct, including conduct motivated by antisemitism.
• Working with provinces and territories to identify ways to improve the criminal justice system responses to hate crimes, including those motivated by antisemitism.
• Delivering $1.4 million in new funding for 7 new initiatives through the National Holocaust Remembrance Program.
• Ensuring that transfer payments are designed, delivered and managed with integrity, accountability and transparency, and that recipients of government funding respect the values underlying the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
• Working with partners across all orders of government to increase awareness of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition and all elements contained within the Canadian Handbook on the IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism.

Gender–based Violence and Intimate Partner Violence

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is unwavering in its commitment to eliminate violence against women and girls, and is taking actions to combat these heinous crimes.
• The government is implementing the Federal Gender–Based Violence Strategy and the National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence. The government is also working with provinces and territories on the National Action Plan to end gender-based violence.
• For its part, Public Safety has introduced legislation to remove firearms from those who pose a danger to themselves or others. This is a vital step to reducing firearms–related family violence and self–harm.
• We are ensuring the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) participates in provincial Clare's Laws, which give people information about potentially harmful intimate partners. Public Safety is also funding projects that prevent cyberbullying, violent extremism, and violent misogyny.
• Our government supports victims and survivors and is taking concrete actions to create a Canada free of gender–based violence.

If Pressed

Q1 – Red Flag, Yellow Flag Laws, and Licence revocation

• Former Bill C–21, which received Royal Assent on December 15, 2023, brought forth some of the strongest gun control measures in a generation to improve public safety, including reducing intimate partner violence and gender–based violence.
• The "red flag" laws, which are in effect, help victims and individuals to engage the courts to temporarily prohibit anyone that poses a risk to themselves or others from possessing or accessing firearms.
• Effective April 4, 2025, individuals will have their firearms licence revoked where it is suspected that they've been involved in domestic violence or stalking.
• Also, individuals are automatically ineligible to hold a firearms licence if they have been convicted of an offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner or family member.
• These measures complement existing protective tools and will help to reduce the risks associated with intimate–partner and gender–based violence involving firearms.

Q2 – Clare's Law

• No person should need to fear being abused by their partner.
• Clare's Law protects Canadians by allowing police to disclose a person's prior intimate partner violence information to a current or former intimate partner.
• The government encourages provinces and territories to adopt Clare's Laws and has taken steps to ensure RCMP participation, including amending regulations.
• Clare's Laws are enacted in Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador; other provinces like Ontario, BC, New Brunswick, and Manitoba are considering them.
• Supporting Clare's Laws is part of Canada's broader commitment to addressing gender–based violence (GBV) and violence against women.

Q3 – Countering Radicalization to Violence

• We know that gender–based violence can express itself as violent extremism and violent misogyny.
• That is why Public Safety's Canada Centre for Community Engagement & Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre) leads our government's efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism, including extreme forms of hate such as violent misogyny.
• Through the Community Resilience Fund, it supports research and frontline prevention and intervention initiatives aimed at addressing all forms of violent extremism.

Q4 – Canada Community Security Program (formerly the Security Infrastructure Program)

• There is no place for hate in this country. All Canadians deserve to be safe where they work, live, and worship.
• The Canada Community Security Program (CCSP) provides vital support to communities at risk of hate–motivated crime by helping to enhance the security of community gathering spaces.
• This includes support for protection against gender–based violence directed towards the 2SLGBTQI+ community and for shelters serving victims of gender – based violence.
• We consulted with stakeholders and the program is now more responsive to community needs, and provides more flexibility to organizations seeking financial support, including that organizations can now apply at any time throughout the year.

Background

Issue

• Gender–based violence, including family violence and intimate partner violence (IPV), has long–lasting negative effects and has been increasing. Despite a general decrease in intimate partner homicides, women remain disproportionately affected, and firearms significantly heighten the risk and lethality of IPV.
• The Government of Canada is taking significant actions to combat these heinous crimes.

Former Bill C–21

• In December 2023, former Bill C–21 received Royal Assent with significant new measures to strengthen the firearms regime and help keep communities safe, including a suite of harm reduction measures.
• "Red flag" laws, which have been in effect since Royal Assent, allow any individual to apply to the courts for an order to prohibit someone from possessing or accessing firearms when they pose a risk to themselves or others. The order would remain in effect for up to 30 days.
• In April 2025, enhanced licence revocation and ineligibility measures came into force to address the risks that firearms pose in situations of intimate partner violence and family violence.
• Individuals are not eligible to hold a licence if they are subject to a protection order or have been convicted of an offence in which violence was used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner or any member of their family. A firearms licence will also be revoked if the licence holder is subject to a protection order, and Chief Firearms Officer is also required to revoke a licence if they suspect domestic violence or stalking has occurred.
• Efforts continue to implement the new measures, including proposed regulations to define protection order. Until protection order is defined in regulation, those two elements will not be operative.

Federal Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender–Based Violence / National Action Plan to End Gender–Based

• The National Action Plan to End Gender–Based Violence, launched in November 2022, is a comprehensive 10–year plan aimed at creating a Canada free of gender–based violence (GBV). It focuses on prevention, support for victims and survivors, and systemic change, engaging all levels of government and communities across the country.
• It's Time: Canada's Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender–Based Violence (the federal Strategy) was launched in June 2017 and coordinates federal initiatives across three pillars: preventing gender–based violence, supporting victims and survivors, and promoting a responsive justice system.
• The federal Strategy is a component of the larger national effort to address GBV, with the National Action Plan serving as the overarching framework and the federal Strategy as the government's specific actions and investments within that framework.
• Cyberbullying is a form of gender–based violence and disproportionately affects young girls and vulnerable communities.
• Public Safety Canada receives $1 million annually through the federal Strategy, to support community–based projects that prevent and address bullying and cyberbullying.

Canada Community Security Program (CCSP)

• In response to concerns raised by a number of communities across Canada regarding their vulnerability to hate–motivated crime, the Security Infrastructure Program (SIP) was created in 2007.
• Eligible recipients are Canadian private, not–for–profit organizations. 2SLGBTQI+ community organizations that meet this criteria are eligible to apply.
• Shelters serving victims of gender–based violence are eligible to apply, which assists those affected by gender–based violence and intimate partner violence.
• The CCSP replaces and enhances the SIP to support communities by providing financial assistance to private and non–profit organizations to enhance the security of community gathering spaces that serve communities at risk of being targeted by hate–motivated crime.
• The federal government has designed the CCSP to be more responsive to the evolving security requirements of communities. Under the CCSP:
  • Eligible recipients now include office and administrative spaces, cemeteries, and child care centers.
  • Funding for time–limited security personnel is now a permanent feature.
  • Up to 70% of a project's eligible costs may be covered under the CCSP, an increase from 50% of the cost under the SIP.
  • Application requirements have been changed to reduce administrative barriers.
  • Organizations can now apply for funding at any time throughout the year through a continuous intake application.
• Since its creation, the CCSP has provided more than $30 million in funding to over 770 projects across Canada.

Clare's Law

• Clare's Law, often known officially as a Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme, is a policy originating in England and Wales. It was created as a guide for individuals to obtain information from the police regarding the risk of interpersonal violence posed by their current or former domestic partners. It was named in memory of Clare Wood, who was killed in 2009 by her former domestic partner, who had a record of violence against women of which she was unaware.
• In Canada, several provinces have adopted Clare's Law in the form of a statute, authorizing a police service to disclose certain risk–related information to a current or former intimate partner, where such information could assist the current or former partner in making informed decisions about their safety and the relationship.
• Clare's Law has been enacted in Saskatchewan and Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador
• These efforts are part of a broader commitment to address gender–based violence (GBV), especially against Indigenous women, through Canada's GBV Strategy.

Countering Radicalization to Violence

• Established in 2017, the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (Canada Centre), leads the federal government's efforts to counter all forms of radicalization to violence in Canada. It complements national security and criminal justice efforts, addressing hate and gender–based violence, including violent misogyny. Through the Community Resilience Fund, it supports research and prevention initiatives.
• Budget 2024 allocated $19.5 million over three years to enhance the Canada Centre's capacity to prevent violence, and to work with stakeholders in Canada and internationally to increase capacity to address radicalization to violence.

Online Child Sexual Exploitation

Key Messages

• The online sexual exploitation of children is a devastating crime that inflicts lifelong suffering on victims and survivors.
• The Government of Canada is dedicated to safeguarding children from all forms of sexual exploitation and that is why we are making significant investments in the National Strategy for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation on the Internet (National Strategy). Key actions include:
  • Addressing emerging trends like sextortion and generative AI.
  • Strengthening partnerships with the Canadian Centre for Child Protection (C3P), to enable tools like Cybertip to report suspected cases of online child sexual exploitation and Project Arachnid to combat the proliferation of child sexual abuse material.
  • Enhancing programs and services for victims and survivors.
  • Strengthening law enforcement capacity to investigate crimes.
  • Enhancing coordination through a Federal Provincial Territorial table on online child sexual exploitation.
  • Collaborating with industry and our international allies bilaterally and through fora such as the G7 and the Fives Eyes
• The Government of Canada is unwavering in its commitment to protecting children from the profound harm of online sexual exploitation. Through the National Strategy, we will continue to take bold, coordinated action to confront this evolving threat.

If Pressed

Q1 – Keeping Children Safe–Online Harms and Liberal Platform Commitments

• In February 2024, the government introduced Bill C–63, the Online Harms Act, which included measures to address a range of harmful content online, including content that sexually victimizes a child or revictimizes a survivor. This Bill died on the Order Paper in January of this year.
• Harmful content on social media platforms, including online child sexual exploitation, cyberbullying and violent extremist content, continues to undermine the safety of our communities, especially children.
• The Government of Canada remains committed to addressing online harms and protecting children from all forms of sexual exploitation through prevention, legislation and law enforcement.
• A top priority for our government is to ensure that our security and law enforcement agencies are fully equipped to address illegal activities online and to safeguard victims.
• Our legislative approach to addressing harmful content and activity online will be balanced and targeted, while upholding privacy and freedom of expression rights for all Canadians.
• We will continue to advance greater transparency and accountability among online service providers.

Background

Issue

• Online child sexual exploitation (OCSE) is one of the digital age's most pressing safety issues that continues to increase in terms of scope, reach and impacts.

National Strategy for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation on the Internet (National Strategy)

• From 2014 to 2022, OCSE rates have risen by 217%, with girls being the majority of victims.
• The National Strategy for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation on the Internet, is led by Public Safety Canada (PS) in partnership with the RCMP, Justice Canada, and C3P.
• The Strategy aims to coordinate federal efforts, support law enforcement, enable reporting, support victims, facilitate research, increase public awareness, and collaborate with the digital industry.
• PS leads policy development, funds Cybertip.ca for reporting online child sexual exploitation (OCSE), and supports Project Arachnid, which uses automated detection and a global team of analysts to combat child sexual abuse material online. The project quickly sends removal notices to electronic service providers, focusing on victim–centric solutions.
• The RCMP's National Child Exploitation Crime Centre handles OCSE investigations, while Justice Canada develops legislation and provides legal support.
• Key initiatives under the National Strategy include public awareness campaigns, support for Internet Child Exploitation Units, prevention programs, data collection by Statistics Canada, and knowledge–sharing events.
• PS is actively engaged with international counterparts, primarily through the Five Eyes and the G7 fora. Since 2024, Canada is chairing the G7 the Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Working Group, which monitors progress on delivering the G7 Action Plan to Combat CSEA under four pillars: encourage industry to play its part, strengthen domestic regimes, strengthen law enforcement cooperation, and protect children around the world.
• PS also engages with the digital industry to raise awareness of OCSE and encourage tech companies to adopt the Voluntary Principles to Counter Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, a standard set of concrete measures to enhance child safety on online platforms.
• Budget 2022 allocated $41.6 million over five years and $8.9 million ongoing to enhance child protection efforts. This builds on Budget 2019's $22.4 million over three years for prevention activities, prosecution enhancement, and knowledge expansion.
• Budget 2024 approved an additional $2.5 million for 2024–25 to support C3P ahead of implementing former Bill C–63, the Online Harms Act.

Former Bill C–63, the Online Harms Act

• Bill C–63, the Online Harms Act, proposed to hold online platforms accountable for the harmful content they host. The Bill defined seven categories of harmful content, three of which were specific to children: (1) content that sexually victimizes a child or revictimizes a survivor, (2) content that induces a child to harm themselves, and (3) content used to bully a child.
• Bill C–63 was meant to complement efforts under the National Strategy for the Protection of Children from Sexual Exploitation on the Internet by providing a regulatory framework for online platforms, special protections for children and strengthened reporting of child pornography.
• The Act also included provision to address the significant rise in violent extremist content online. Recent reports indicate an increase in individuals perpetrating online child sexual exploitation as part of ideologically motivated violent extremism.
• The Bill died on the Order Paper in January 2025.

Human Trafficking

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is committed to combatting human trafficking in all its forms. This heinous crime has deep and lasting effects on victims' physical, psychological, emotional, and financial well–being.
• Supported by an ongoing investment of $10.28 million, the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking supports anti–human trafficking efforts that prevent, protect, prosecute, develop partnerships, and empower survivors.
• To support our work, our government is working closely with the newly appointed Chief Advisor to Combat Human Trafficking, Ms. Jennifer Richardson, who will provide ongoing advice and recommendations, and bring greater awareness both domestically and internationally.
• The Government of Canada continues to support a range of programs and initiatives aimed at combating human trafficking, and is now in the process of renewing the National Strategy. Through continued collaboration with stakeholders, including victims, survivors, Indigenous peoples, and community organizations, we will ensure that Canada's approach remains modern and responsive to the changing environment.

If Pressed

Q1 – Forced labour/labour trafficking

• The government takes the protection of foreign workers very seriously and will not tolerate any abuse of workers or their rights.
• The government has passed legislation targeting the use of forced and child labor in supply chains, requiring certain entities and government institutions to publicly report their efforts to reduce the risk of these practices in their business operations.
• As part of the National Strategy, the government is taking actions to combat labour trafficking, which complement existing government programs and policies to protect foreign workers.
• Public Safety Canada (PS) also delivers a national public awareness campaign to create awareness of human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation and forced labour.

Q2 – Human trafficking in First Nations Communities

• We recognize that Indigenous women and girls continue to be disproportionally targeted by sex traffickers, and that human trafficking and victimization of Indigenous women is significantly under–reported.
• Canada's National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking invests in a number of Indigenous organizations to deliver community–based projects that have been operational between two to five years and that directly serve Indigenous people.
• We will continue working collaboratively with Indigenous partners to ensure communication and awareness efforts address the specific needs of Indigenous peoples.
• This past year, PS has met with many Indigenous organizations to discuss efforts to combat violence against Indigenous communities. The findings from these sessions will help inform the renewal of the National Strategy.

Q3 – Former Bill S–211, An Act to enact the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act and to amend the Customs Tariff

• The Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act (Supply Chains Act) came into force on January 1, 2024.
• The Supply Chains Act aims to increase industry awareness and transparency about forced labour and child labour by compelling certain entities and government institutions to publicly report on what they are doing to prevent and reduce these risks.
• By the first reporting deadline (May 31, 2024), PS received approximately 6,000 reports from entities and government institutions which detailed their efforts to address forced labour in their supply chains.
• PS makes these reports publicly available on its website to promote transparency and continues to work with entities and government institutions to improve the quality of reports submitted under the Supply Chains Act.

Q4 – Import Prohibition on Goods Produced by Forced Labour

• Shipments containing goods suspected of being produced by forced labour are detained at the border for inspection by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). In 2024, 33 shipments were intercepted and assessed by the CBSA.
• Companies must take every step possible to ensure forced labour or child labour is not used in the production of the goods they import.
• We are committed to upholding human rights and international labour standards. The importation into Canada of goods mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour is prohibited.

Background

Issue

• Human trafficking, also referred to as trafficking in persons, involves the recruitment, transportation or harbouring of persons for the purpose of exploitation, typically sexual exploitation or forced labour.
• According to the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, police–reported incidents on human trafficking in Canada have steadily increased since 2010.

National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking

• In September 2019, the government launched the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking 2019–2024, supported by an investment of $57.22 million over five years and $10.28 million ongoing. These investments are shared among PS; Women and Gender Equality Canada; Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada; Public Services and Procurement Canada; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada; and the Canada Border Services Agency.
• PS activities under the National Strategy include investing in trauma–informed and culturally relevant community–based projects; fostering national and international coordination and cooperation; and delivering a national human trafficking awareness campaign.
• From August 2024 to March 2025, PS conducted a series of targeted engagement sessions with domestic and international stakeholders to inform the renewal of the National Strategy. Over 200 stakeholders took part in the meetings and/or submitted input through an online survey.
• In January 2025, the Government of Canada appointed Jennifer Richardson as Chief Advisor to Combat Human Trafficking. She will provide ongoing advice and recommendations to the on the Government of Canada's efforts to combat human trafficking and bring awareness both domestically and internationally, as well as advance Calls for Justice with respect to the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.

Canadian Human Trafficking Hotline

Complementary to the National Strategy, PS provides $2.5 million per year to the Canadian Centre to End Human Trafficking, to operate the Canadian Human Trafficking Hotline. The Hotline is a multi–lingual, 24/7, toll–free service to connect callers to local services, supports and law enforcement.

An Act to enact the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act and to amend the Customs Tariff

Formerly, Bill S–211, An Act to enact the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act and to amend the Customs Tariff (Supply Chains Act), received Royal Assent on May 11, 2023 and came into force on January 1, 2024. The Supply Chains Act imposes an obligation on certain government institutions and private–sector entities to report by May 31 of each year on the measures taken to prevent and reduce the risk that forced labour or child labour is used by them or in their supply chains.

Import Prohibition on Forced Labour

• Under the Customs Act, the CBSA has the authority to select shipments for examination. Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) is currently the Government of Canada's lead department for labour–related programs and the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) works closely with ESDC to identify goods that have been produced by forced labour and prevent their entry into Canada. ESDC's Labour Program is actively monitoring and researching evidence related to problematic supply chains, and documented evidence of goods being produced with forced labour is transmitted for CBSA's consideration. The CBSA conducts risk analyses on goods entering the country to determine if they are admissible. The CBSA may use this information to identify and intercept shipments containing goods that have been identified as suspected to have been produced by forced labour.
• The CBSA applies the tariff when it has sufficient evidence to do so. Tariff Classification determinations are made on a case–by–case basis for each specific shipment, based on available supporting evidence and analysis. As such, the Customs Tariff can not be used to prohibit the importation of goods solely on the basis of originating from a specific country or region, though it can serve of as a key indicator of risk. Implementing such restrictions would fall under the purview of Global Affairs Canada. Since the import ban has been in place, the CBSA has applied the prohibition but it remains difficult to enforce because of a number of reasons, including a lack of visual signs to indicate whether goods are produced using forced labour; and the limited availability of reliable supply chain information from importers.

First Nations and Inuit Policing Program

Key Messages

• Everyone in Canada should feel safe in their community.
• The Government of Canada is committed to working with First Nations and Inuit partners, provinces and territories, and with self–administered police services to support the delivery of culturally–responsive policing in First Nations and Inuit communities.
• Budget 2024 committed $267.5 million over five years, and $92.5 million per year ongoing, for the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program; and $200 million over five years, to repair, renovate and replace policing facilities in First Nations and Inuit communities.
• These investments are helping to stabilize the funding support for First Nations and Inuit police services, which is cost–shared based on a 52% federal–48% provincial/territorial ratio. The Government of Canada continues to work with provinces/territories and Indigenous partners to roll out these investments.

If Pressed

Q1 – Program Spending

• The government invested $334M in culturally–responsive policing through the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP) in 2024–25.
• FNIPP is a cost–shared program where the federal government works with provinces and territories to invest in in culturally–responsive policing.
• Unspent funds are largely due to Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officer vacancies or result when the province or territory fails to secure its share of funding.
• The government is working in partnership with provinces, territories, law enforcement and First Nations and Inuit communities to maximize program spending.

Q2 – Litigation

• In response to First Nations' calls for change through legal challenges and human rights complaints, Public Safety Canada is committed to investing in the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program as well as to updating the terms and conditions of the program to respond to the operational requirements of modern–day police services.
• More than $467 million was committed through Budget 2024 to support self–administered policing in First Nations and Inuit communities.
• Public Safety Canada is committed to continuing to work in partnership with First Nations and Inuit communities alongside provincial and territorial governments of jurisdiction so that First Nations and Inuit police services are financially supported to be professional, dedicated and culturally responsive to the communities they serve.

Q3 – Office of the Auditor General of Canada's Report 3–First Nations and Inuit Policing Program

• The Government of Canada welcomes this audit report.
• The audit findings are informing Public Safety's ongoing partnership with provinces and territories, law enforcement agencies (including the RCMP) and First Nations and Inuit communities, to strengthen the strategic focus and measurable impact of First Nations and Inuit Policing Program initiatives.
• The Government of Canada recognizes that it needs to do better. The recommendations came at a fitting time, as Public Safety Canada has been exploring ways to improve the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program in collaboration with provinces and territories, and First Nations and Inuit communities.
• We have engaged with key partners to develop a path forward and to develop a detailed action plan that addresses the recommendations outlined in the audit.

Q4 – Legislation Recognizing First Nation Police Services as Essential

• The Government of Canada is committed to working with First Nations and Inuit partners, provinces and territories, and police services to support culturally–responsive self–administered police service delivery in First Nations and Inuit communities. I want to acknowledge their leadership in advancing this work.
• A lot of effort went into co–developing legislation that would recognize First Nations police services as essential services. I am committed to connecting with First Nations leadership, police services, and provinces and territories to determine the best way forward to continue to support these services.

Q5 – RCMP Community Engagement and Trust Building

• It is important that people in Canada have trust and confidence in those who serve and protect them.
• The RCMP is committed to building trusting relationships with Indigenous people, communities, organizations, and governments across Canada. Supporting the safety and well–being of Indigenous communities is a priority, and efforts to enhance service delivery, trauma–informed investigative standards and advance reconciliation are underway.
• The RCMP is working with Indigenous communities and Divisions to create distinctions–based and uniquely specific Community Profiles that facilitate community input regarding their culture, language, or traditions, to improve police service delivery.
• The RCMP is engaging with national, regional and local First Nations, Inuit and Métis leaders to formalize working relationships to strengthen information sharing, and how they work together with Indigenous governments, partners and organizations.

Q6 – RCMP Vacancies and Response Times in Indigenous Communities

• The RCMP will continue taking numerous steps to increase recruitment and retention of Regular Members and to reinforce its position as a desired choice for new police officers within Canada.
• The RCMP is offering expedited processing to applicants interested in working in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as northern parts of provinces and the territories. The RCMP is also asking Regular Members and active reservists to consider a temporary deployment in Saskatchewan or Manitoba.
• The RCMP has also introduced an initiative whereby new and current Regular Members can agree to be posted to a specific Division where there are staffing shortages for a defined period (e.g. a three–year posting), with the understanding that the Regular Member will go to a preferred Division once they have completed their tenure in their current posting.

Background

Issue

• The Government of Canada is taking steps to ensure policing in First Nation and Inuit communities, supported through the First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP), are professional, dedicated and culturally responsive to the communities they serve.
• The December 2021 mandate letters for the Ministers of Public Safety, Indigenous Services and Crown–Indigenous Relations direct Ministers to: Continue to work with First Nations partners to co–develop a legislative framework for First Nations policing.

First Nations and Inuit Policing Program (FNIPP)

• FNIPP is a contribution program that enables the Government of Canada to support culturally–appropriate and responsive policing and community safety services in over 400 First Nation and Inuit communities, representing 60% of all First Nation and Inuit communities in Canada. FNIPP policing agreements are cost–shared between the federal government (52%) and the Provinces/Territories (PT) (48%). Funding under the FNIPP is provided to support two main policing models:
• Self–Administered Police Service Agreements (SA): A First Nation or Inuit police service is authorized or established by the PT government and provides day–to–day policing services to a First Nation or Inuit community; and,
• Community Tripartite Agreements (CTA): A contingent of police officers from the RCMP provides dedicated policing to a First Nation or Inuit community to supplement base–level policing services.

In addition to these two main policing models, the FNIPP provides support to other policing agreements, with additional police officer positions.

2024 Auditor General Report

• The Auditor General tabled a report on the FNIPP in March 2024 (the Report) which, among other things, was critical of Public Safety's (PS) financial management of the Program and found that the department, as well as the RCMP, did not work in partnership with First Nations and Inuit communities to provide equitable access to the program. PS and the RCMP fully accepted the findings and recommendations of the Report and are working with partners to both modernize the program and address Report recommendations.

Co–development of First Nations police services legislation

• From 2021 to 2024, PS worked with partners to co–develop federal legislation which would recognize First Nations police services as an essential service. The envisioned legislation would have been primarily designed to ensure equitable and predictable levels of federal funding and complement provincial/territorial policing legislation.
• The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) was PS's original co–development partner. However, the AFN has revised its mandate via three resolutions, most recently in July 2024 (resolution 42/2024), to direct the AFN to co–develop legislation that would recognize First Nations' inherent rights and jurisdiction over policing, which would include paramountcy of First Nations laws over provincial/territorial policing legislation. At the July 2024 AFN Annual General Assembly, the then Minister of Public Safety reaffirmed the government's commitment to tabling legislation within the original mandate and working with the National Chief to overcome the impasse.
• The co–development process was completed in Fall 2024 with the posting on PS's website of the "Proposed Elements to inform the First Nations police services legislation". These elements were the result of over three years of collaboration with provinces and territories, the First Nations Chiefs of Police Association and the First Nations Police Governance council and validated with First Nations leadership through Indigenous–led engagement. However, as the impasse with the AFN concerning the scope of the legislation was not overcome, legislation has not been introduced.

Focus on Federal Policing Mandate

Key Messages

• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is a world–class policing service with dedicated employees working to keep Canadians safe in a complex world.
• The RCMP has a broad and complex mandate, which includes a unique responsibility for addressing the highest–level threats to Canada's democratic institutions, as well as our national and economic security.
• Given the growing complexity of today's threat landscape, is it more evident than ever that Canada requires a strengthened federal policing presence capable of addressing the most serious threats to the nation's interests.
• Our government is committed to ensuring that the RCMP is positioned to keep Canadians safe and secure in this rapidly evolving threat environment.

If Pressed

Q1 – White Paper entitled "A New Policing Vision For Canada: Modernizing the RCMP" released by Former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau

• As Prime Minister Carney stated previously the White Paper released by Former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau represents a discussion document which is meant to stimulate discussion and debate.
• Our government will take the time necessary to assess the state of policing in Canada before making decisions with respect to RCMP policing services and mandates.

Q2 – Contract Policing

• The current contracts between Canada, provinces, territories and municipalities are in place until March 31, 2032.
• The 2012 contracts are 20 year agreements and it will be important that we take the time necessary to consider the breadth of issues that will inform the future of Contract Policing.
• We are committed to working with provinces and territories in recognition of their important role and responsibility for policing in their jurisdictions to gather information and have the necessary discussions in advance of making a timely decision on the way forward.

Q3 – Police Service Transitions

• The Government of Canada respects the authority of provinces, territories and municipalities to determine which policing models best reflect local needs and priorities.
• Canada is currently working closely with two municipalities to transition away from RCMP policing services to establish their own independent municipal policing services–Surrey, British Columbia, and Grande Prairie, Alberta.
• The government is committed to working closely with jurisdictions to manage these complex transitions in an effective and efficient manner to ensure seamless handovers that maintain public and officer safety.

Background

Issue

Several reports and inquiries have identified critical challenges and made a number of recommendations with respect to reforms that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) should undertake, including with respect to RCMP Federal Policing (FP). As a result, the Government of Canada has committed to augmenting RCMP federal policing training and capacity to tackle drugs and human trafficking, foreign interference, cybercrime, and the organized criminal gangs that steal cars.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

• The scope, scale, and complexity of the 21st threat landscape has increased with the digitization of society and the transnational nature of crime. As Canada's national police service, the RCMP is uniquely positioned to investigate significant criminal threats across jurisdictions, and collaborate with domestic and international law enforcement partners to mitigate these threats. The RCMP's FP mandate plays a crucial role in investigating and disrupting serious threats to Canada, such as national security, cybercrime, and organized crime. As such, it is playing a larger role in the face of a rapidly evolving threat environment that increasingly targets Canadian critical infrastructure and economic and national security.
• Several external and internal reports and inquiries have identified critical challenges facing the RCMP including the breadth of the RCMP mandate, and its ability to balance its contract policing obligations, which have shaped the organizations structure, governance, finances, and human resource and training models, with its FP remit. The RCMP has launched reform efforts in response to these reports and continues to adapt to the evolving threat environment. However, more work is required to support the RCMP in meeting the challenges it faces, and given an imminent, impending threat landscape, the scale of investment and scope of authority needed to effect meaningful change exceeds the ability of the RCMP alone.
• Prior to his departure former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau released a White Paper entitled "A New Policing Vision For Canada: Modernizing the RCMP" that suggested refocusing the RCMPs mandate on federal policing and working with provinces and territories that contract RCMP services to transition away from RCMP services. Previously, the Government of Canada had signaled to contract jurisdictions that it would work with them on an approach to the renegotiations of the agreements and ensure the proper path forward to support them in their needs and priorities when it comes to policing in their jurisdiction today and beyond 2032.
• While the newly elected Government of Canada has not made any decision yet related to the future of contract policing, there were commitments in its platform related to the RCMP, including:
  • recruit 1,000 more RCMP personnel to tackle drug and human trafficking, foreign interference, cybercrime, and the organized criminal gangs that steal cars, and
  • creating a new RCMP academy; and increasing pay for cadet recruits.

Parliamentary District Policing Program

Key Messages

• The Ottawa Police Service (OPS) is the police of jurisdiction in the nation's capital and responds to hundreds of demonstrations and events each year. A majority of these events occur primarily within or around the vicinity of the Parliamentary Precinct.
• The security of the Parliamentary Precinct and nearby area, as well as the safety of those who work and live in the area, elected officials, public servants, and visitors, is essential.
• Budget 2024 allocated $50 million over five years to bolster the OPS's presence within and around the Parliamentary Precinct.
• As announced on March 7, 2025, the Parliamentary District Policing Program will support the OPS in establishing a new detachment to facilitate real–time response to emerging situations unique to this area.
• This stable presence in the new OPS Parliamentary District comes at a critical time when elected officials and citizens are experiencing an emerging threat environment marked by rising political polarization and an increase in violent rhetoric and harassment.
• The new program will also assist the OPS in strengthening existing partnerships with key stakeholders, including the Parliamentary Protective Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, so they can better meet their collective goal of maintaining public safety.

If Pressed

Q1 – Why did the government create the Parliamentary District Policing Program (PDPP)

The establishment of the PDPP responds to recommendations from the Public Order Emergency Commission's Report of the Public Inquiry Into the 2022 Public Order Emergency, which pointed to the need to reconsider the division of responsibilities for policing and security in the National Capital Region.

Q2 – What is the objective of the PDPP

The overall objective of the new program is to enhance safety and security of the Parliamentary District, and is meant to support the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) in establishing a dedicated policing presence around Parliament Hill to help keep elected officials, visitors, and residents safe.

Q3 – What is the geographic footprint of the new OPS District

Currently, the Parliamentary District covers the area bordered by the Ottawa River, Lyon St, Queen St and Elgin St, and the area surrounding the Senate building at 2 Rideau St.

Q4 – When will the OPS's Parliamentary District be fully staffed

According to an OPS report submitted to the Ottawa Police Service Board in late–March 2025, it is our understanding that the OPS is aiming to have a full component (40 sworn members and nine civilian positions), by the last quarter of 2026.

Background

Issue

The Parliamentary District Policing Program (PDPP) was announced on March 7, 2025, with $50 million over five years for the City of Ottawa and the Ottawa Police Service to establish a new detachment dedicated to addressing policing and security around Parliament Hill to help keep elected officials, visitors and residents safe.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

• The Ottawa Police Service (OPS) is the police of jurisdiction in the nation's capital and responds to over 800 demonstrations and events each year. A majority of these events occur primarily within or around the vicinity of the Parliamentary Precinct.
• As per the March 7, 2025, announcement held with Mayor Sutcliffe, this dedicated funding under the new Parliamentary District Policing Program allows Public Safety Canada to support the efforts of the OPS in establishing a detachment dedicated to addressing policing and security matters within the new Parliamentary District.
• This stable and bolstered presence will facilitate real–time response to emerging situations unique to this area, and comes at a critical time when elected officials and citizens are experiencing an emerging threat environment marked by rising political polarization and an increase in violent rhetoric and harassment.
• The new program will also assist the OPS in strengthening existing partnerships with key stakeholders, including the Parliamentary Protective Service–which is responsible for the physical security in the Parliamentary Precinct and on Parliament Hill–and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police–which provides personal protection of designated Parliamentarians and investigates national security–related offences, among other duties–so they can better meet their collective goal of maintaining public safety.

Foreign Interference: Threats to Communities

Key Messages

• The government is aware that certain foreign states intimidate, coerce, harass, and harm people in Canada and their relatives living abroad. These actions are totally unacceptable.
• We are committed to strengthening our mechanisms of detection, deterrence and disruption to minimize foreign interference in Canada. One of our best tools to defend against these threats is to build societal resilience through increased prevention and awareness.
• Bill C–70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, enacted in 2024, amended a number of existing offences and created new ones to directly combat foreign interference (FI) and transnational repression (TNR).
• Bill C–70 also introduced a new disclosure authority for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to provide more information to partners outside the Government of Canada, including Canadian communities, industry, and academia, to increase awareness and build resilience against national security threats.
• The government is committed to developing and delivering targeted and multilingual awareness and engagement resources to enhance public safety within communities that may be at risk of foreign interference related activities.
• Anyone who feels threatened online or in person, should report these incidents to their local police, or contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police National Security Information Network.

If Pressed

Q1 – Misinformation and Disinformation

• The government is committed to upholding the integrity of the information space and fostering a more informed and resilient public and we are actively working to combat misinformation and disinformation by foreign actors through several initiatives.
• Canada leads the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism Secretariat, which strengthens coordination between G7 countries to identify and respond to foreign threats to democracy.
• The government dedicates resources to uncover false claims by state actors and counter them with facts. For example, Canada has exposed disinformation campaigns from Russia and China.
• By raising awareness and educating the public about disinformation, the government helps communities become more resilient and better equipped to identify and reject false information

Q2 – Transnational Repression

• TNR and FI continue to be pervasive threats. Canada has dedicated significant resources to combatting these issues.
• CSIS has identified an increasing trend in the use of acts of TNR by authoritarian governments in an attempt to silence their perceived critics and dissidents outside of their national borders.
• Hostile state actors use a variety of tactics to extend their reach into Canada, including physical intimidation/violence, threats against oversees relatives, manipulation of legal mechanisms (i.e., refusing visas), community ostracism or malicious digital activity.
• Bill C–70 now gives Canada's police additional laws to protect Canadians from transnational repression. For example, under S.20 (Foreign Influence Intimidation, Threats or Violence) new offences under C–70 make it much easier for police to investigate those agencies who have been harassing or intimidating individuals.
• CSIS continues to work closely with Canada's vulnerable communities as partners in investigating and building resiliency against this threat.
• Canada's National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator is responsible for developing and implementing strategies to detect, deter and counteract foreign interference/transnational repression that threatens Canada's democratic institutions.

Background

Issue

• There has been an increase in the frequency and sophistication of foreign interference and transnational repression (TNR) by countries, such as the People's Republic of China, Russia, India and Iran, seeking to advance their political, economic and security interests to the detriment of Canada's.
• Canada has introduced several significant measures to combat misinformation, disinformation, and TNR.

Threat Environment

Foreign regimes, emboldened by increasing isolationism, political polarization and muscular nationalism in historically democratic societies, are seeking to undermine the foundations of democracies, like Canada's. Some of these states, and their proxies, have publicly interfered in our elections and openly targeted members of diaspora communities. They have silenced dissent and leveraged disinformation and propaganda to foster societal rifts and promote their world view. Technological advances, like artificial intelligence, surveillance tech, and encrypted communications, have further enabled these actors by anonymizing activities and lowering the costs of operations. Canada and its allies need to rapidly adapt to deter and disrupt the ongoing operations of those threat actors.

Bill C–70, Countering Foreign Interference Act

• Bill C–70, which received royal assent on June 20, 2024, bolsters Canada's ability to detect, disrupt, and counter foreign interference. It also introduced several measures to combat misinformation, disinformation, and TNR including:
  • The most significant update to the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) since the Act was brought into force in 1984;
  • Modernizing foreign interference offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act (formerly the Security of Information Act) and the sabotage offence in the Criminal Code;
  • Changes to the Canada Evidence Act to establish a standardized regime for handling sensitive information in administrative proceedings; and
  • A framework for a new Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, which will be administered by an independent Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner.

Foreign Influence Transparency Registry

Key Messages

• Foreign partners regularly seek to influence the decisions we make as a country, just as Canada seeks to influence the decisions of others. Most foreign partners use legitimate and transparent means to advocate for their interests, such as lobbying, political dialogue, trade negotiations and diplomacy.
• However, some foreign governments cross the line from standard, legitimate activities when they seek to exert influence in non–transparent ways. This kind of activity is known as malign foreign influence. It is a form of foreign interference.
• When not addressed, these activities can have serious implications for Canadian interests, national security and our democratic processes and institutions.
• That's why members of Parliament widely supported Bill C–70, An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference, which received Royal Assent in June 2024.
• Part IV of the Bill introduced the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), which will create a new regime intended to address malign foreign influence. Once implemented, FITAA will:
  • Establish a new mechanism, a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, to shine a light on foreign influence activities;
  • Bolster deterrence to those who may seek to circumvent our laws; and,
  • Increase public awareness of attempts by foreign governments to influence our political or governmental processes.
• An independent Commissioner will be appointed to administer the Registry. The Commissioner will have a number of enforcement mechanisms at their disposal to deter foreign actors from engaging in malign foreign influence.
• In addition, there are criminal violations set out in the law and the Commissioner will be able to refer the matter to the police, who can conduct a criminal investigation and refer the matter to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada to take appropriate actions.
• The Government of Canada is working hard to implement this new regime, but notes that similar initiatives in the United Kingdom and Australia took over two years to implement. In an effort to operationalize the regime as efficiently and effectively as possible, the government is:
• Listening to Canadians by consulting with key groups during the regulations–making process;
• Setting clear rules with real consequences—both administrative and criminal—for those who break them;
• Using the best technology available to run the registry so it's accessible to everyone; and,
• Raising public awareness about why the registry matters and how it helps protect Canada's democracy.
• Taking the necessary time to conduct these steps will help create a strong and reliable registry that everyone can use to protect Canada's democratic values and national interests.

If Pressed

Q1 – Concerns that the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry could be perceived as targeting Canadian minorities

• The Government of Canada understands the concerns that the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry might unfairly target minority communities. We want to be clear:
  • Protecting rights and freedoms is a top priority. This legislation was carefully developed to respect the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
  • We've listened to communities. The government held wide–ranging consultations, including receiving nearly 1,000 online responses and holding over 80 meetings with stakeholders from diverse communities, advocacy groups, religious organizations, and professional associations.
  • We've heard the concerns. We know some people worry the registry could be misused or misunderstood. That's why we're committed to making the process of creating the registry as open and transparent as possible.
  • We're not done listening. As we move forward, we'll continue to consult—especially with communities most at risk of being the target of foreign interference—to make sure the registry protects Canadians without causing harm.
• Our goal is to build a tool that strengthens democracy while respecting the rights of all Canadians.

Q2 – Concerns with the time it is taking to operationalize the FITCO and the Registry

• Public Safety Canada is working hard to launch the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner's Office (FITCO). The main steps include:
• Making the regulations,
• Hiring staff and setting up the office,
• Setting up the investigations and compliance processes,
• Consulting stakeholders, both in and out of government, and
• Building the technology to run the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.
• This is a complex project that involves many areas—like law, policy, technology, operations, and administration—all of which need to work together. A lot of progress has already been made, and there's a detailed plan in place to keep things moving forward.
• Originally, the goal was to have everything ready by October 2025, in time for the fixed election date. When the last Parliament was dissolved in March 2025, it gave the Department a chance to adjust the pace of implementation.
• Setting up a brand new, independent office is a big undertaking, and doing it right takes time. Our allies with similar registries, like Australia and the U.K., have taken more than two years to set up their foreign influence systems. We have the benefit of learning from their experience, to build the best registry possible for Canada.

Background

Issue

In June 2024 the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) received Royal Assent. The FITAA created the position of a Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner (Commissioner) and established a built–for Canada Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR).

Background

• Following Royal Assent, Public Safety (PS) has taken steps to operationalize the Office of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner (FITCO), notably the appointment of the Commissioner, the development and implementation of the FITR, including associated regulations and an IM/IT solution, as well as the creation of the FITCO.
• The Commissioner, supported by public servants, would be housed at Public Safety, albeit in an independent capacity.
• To fund the FITCO, PS has requested $32.3 million over five years, and $5.7 million annually in ongoing funding. This will permit approximately 30 full time equivalents (FTEs) split between the FITCO and Public Safety's internal services. The Treasury Board submission is currently undergoing Substantive Review (SR1) and near completion for the Minister's consideration.

Current Status

• There are three streams of work to operationalize the FITAA project:
• Administration, encompassing finance, Human Resources (HR), Information Management/Information Technology (IM/IT) and accommodations;
• Policy and Engagement encompassing regulatory development, outreach and communications; and
• Investigations and Compliance encompassing operational policies, information sharing and investigative planning.
• To date, significant work has progressed in each of the steams noted above and while there was previously a desire for the legislation to come into force ahead of the fixed federal election in October 2025, Parliament was dissolved on March 23, 2025, which has allowed for a reassessment of the project plan and scope of work. The requirements for operationalizing the FITCO are substantial in scope and complexity, and include significant legal, regulatory, information management and information technology, operational, policy and administrative components with a high level of interdependency.

Considerations

• All aspects of project's progress are dependent on receiving the appropriate funding as per the Treasury Board submission.
• Coming into force of the legislation is dependent on the regulations became made, the appointment of the Commissioner and the registry being ready to launch.
• The Commissioner is to be appointed by order of the Governor in Council (GIC), however the appointment must first be approved by resolutions in both the House of Commons and Senate.

Research Security

Key Messages

• The government recognizes that protecting Canada's national security and long–term economic prosperity requires a research environment that is both open and collaborative, yet adequately protected.
• That is why Canada is actively supporting the research community through the work of the Research Security Centre, alongside Canada's security and intelligence agencies, by engaging researchers on security matters, conducting outreach and developing useful guidance and tools to build a strong research security culture.
• In 2024, CSIS collaborated with Five Eyes partners to launch Secure Innovation, a shared security advice initiative to help protect emerging technology companies, researchers, and investors from threats.
• Additionally, with the implementation of the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnership and the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern, new eligibility criteria for federal grants has been introduced to protect Canadian investment into research. Federal research funding is closely reviewed by our national security agencies, which helps safeguard cutting edge research by mitigating research security risks.
• We continue to work closely with the academic and private sectors, as well as our closest international allies, to develop further ways to protect Canada's research.

If Pressed

Q1 – How is sensitive research being protected at Government of Canada's Labs

• Each government department has a dedicated security function to address and manage their unique security needs.
• Furthermore, the Research Security Centre has been providing support and outreach to government departments who possess sensitive science to reinforce security practices into their research practices.

Background

Issue

• Canadian research community is vulnerable to foreign threat actors seeking to exploit Canadian knowledge, data, and expertise.
• The Government of Canada is taking concrete measures to protect cutting–edge Canadian research, development, and technology that is being actively targeted by foreign state actors to advance their geopolitical, economic, and security interests.

Threat Environment

• Canada's open and collaborative research environment, supported by open science principles, makes it attractive for cutting–edge research but also vulnerable to foreign threat actors. These actors exploit academic collaborations, cyber–attacks, and other means to access Canadian knowledge, data, and expertise, targeting both dual–use technologies and social sciences.
• Foreign interference and espionage targeting Canada's research and academic institutions has been increasing steadily, especially from the PRC. Certain sectors, like biopharma, health, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology, and aerospace, face heightened threat activity.

Research Security Centre

Budget 2022 established the Research Security Centre at Public Safety Canada, which is comprised of two teams that implement the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships and the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern, create and distribute research security tools and resources, and provides direct support to researchers and universities. Since it's inception, the Centre's regional advisors have engaged with academics and universities over 1600 times to date to provide direct advice and guidance.

National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships

The government released the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships in 2021, developed with the Government of Canada–Universities Working Group to integrate national security considerations into the development, evaluation and funding of research partnerships with private partners. Researchers, research organizations and government funders are encouraged to use these guidelines to assess and protect their research and partnerships.

Policy on Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC)

In January 2024, the government released this policy and new eligibility criteria for federal grant applications after close consultations with implicated federal departments and agencies including Canada's federal granting councils as well as the Canada Foundation for Innovation, Global Affairs Canada and Government of Canada–Universities Working Group. In order to be eligible for federal funding, the policy prohibits collaboration in a defined sensitive technology research area with listed named research organizations that pose a risk to Canada's national security.

Safeguarding Science

Public Safety Canada, namely the Research Security Centre (RSC) has led the Safeguarding Science (SASC) initiative to provide interactive workshops to Canadian universities and the broader research community to equip them with the knowledge and tools required to protect their valuable research. The primary objective SASC is to raise awareness within Canada's research community of the potential for misuse of dual–use research, technology, and materials, along with potential risk indicators and mitigation tools to protect Canadian research assets. The RSC has also worked diligently with other government departments to develop additional modules based on varying research security–related pressures around the country. The RSC has partnered with Global Affairs Canada on export controls; Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada on the international student immigration process; and with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service on elements of dual–use technologies. In addition, RSC has developed modules Travel Safely and Conducting Open–Source Due–Diligence for researchers.

The Safeguarding Your Research Online Portal

In September 2020, the Government of Canada, in collaboration with universities, launched the Safeguarding Your Research online portal. This public resource raises awareness and provides tools and guidance on identifying and mitigating research security risks including offering best practices, a due diligence guide, and links to relevant content. The portal is similar to guidance from allies like the UK, Australia, and the US.

CSIS Academic Outreach

• CSIS regularly provides in–depth briefings that help secure Canada's world class advanced research ecosystem from threats of state–sponsored espionage and foreign interference. These briefings have been delivered directly to academic and research institutions, and to research advocacy associations across sensitive technologies, life sciences, and other sectors.
• Recent amendments to the CSIS Act facilitate this collaboration as they allow CSIS to better equip a broader range of national security stakeholders by providing them with more information to increase awareness and build resilience against threats.

Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure

Key Messages

• As Canada grows its clean economy of the future, we will increasingly rely on resilient systems to protect Canadians, Canadian businesses, critical infrastructure, and our democracy.
• These changes have come with cyber risks that are evolving at a rapid pace.
• Threats on this digital landscape, including cybercrime, are emerging dynamically, and we know that malicious actors–whether financially driven or state actors –continue to increase in number and sophistication, threatening our national and economic security.
• The Government of Canada is committed to tackling these serious, disruptive threats that can have profound consequences on individual Canadians.
• Following extensive community consultations with Canadians, we released a new National Cyber Security Strategy in February 2025. At its core, the new Strategy is about engagement and collaboration.
• Also at its core is a flexible approach to cyber security solutions. This will be put in place through issue–specific action plans that support the new Strategy's vision and objectives.
• Under the Strategy, we will implement a grants and contributions program to fund cyber security projects across Canada that that will underpin our collective digital prosperity. We will also create a forum to engage with key stakeholders to ensure that we are taking a whole–of–society approach to building our resilience to cyber threats.
• Public Safety Canada and its portfolio agencies support critical infrastructure across ten essential sectors, with self–assessment tools and guidance.
• We also coordinate the federal response to cyber security incidents through the Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan, which provides a reliable framework for coordination and information–sharing among government departments and agencies when managing significant cyber incidents or events affecting non–Government of Canada systems.
• The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is working closely with Canadians, industry, and academia to build awareness and resilience to cyber threats, including by sharing information through new authorities to alert Canadians to potential cyber vulnerabilities, and help them adopt robust security practices.
• Through this ongoing work, we continue to take strong action to protect and defend all people in Canada from cyber threats.

If Pressed

Q1 – Question on the reintroduction of former Bill C – 26, An Act Respecting Cyber Security

• An Act Respecting Cyber Security (formerly introduced as Bill C–26) was a bill with two distinct legislative initiatives intended to protect federally–regulated critical infrastructure from cyber threats.
• Part 1 proposed to amend the Telecommunications Act to add security as a policy objective and provide order–making powers to the Minister of Industry and Governor in Council, while Part 2 would have introduced the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act with the goal of establishing a regulatory framework to strengthen baseline cyber security across federally–regulated critical infrastructure sectors.
• The proposed legislation, which received near–unanimous approval in both the House and the Senate, had advanced to the final stages of the Parliamentary process before it died on the Order Paper due to prorogation while awaiting concurrence from the House of Commons on an administrative amendment made in the Senate.
• By introducing legislation establishing a cyber security framework for key federally regulated entities and centralizing cybercrime and cyber incident reporting, Canada will significantly enhance the cyber security of the federally–regulated critical infrastructure upon which Canadians rely, impacting our national and economic security, and ensure criminals are held accountable.
• Importantly, it also ensures that Canada does not fall further behind its like–minded allies who have experienced the same push to introduce and revise legislative measures to address cyber security.

Q2 – Question on the Detection and Reporting of Cybercrime

• The government is working with stakeholders to make it easier for the public and business to report cybercrime to ensure crimes reported are actioned properly.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) National Cybercrime Coordination Centre and Canadian Anti–Fraud Centre are jointly responsible for national cybercrime and fraud reporting in Canada, by both victims and victimized organizations with a nexus to Canada.
• These two centres are developing a new National Cybercrime and Fraud Reporting System to improve and streamline cybercrime and fraud reporting, enhance technical capabilities of these centres, and support Canadian law enforcement to action victim reporting of cybercrime and fraud.
• By improving and centralizing reporting, the RCMP can further aggregate, analyze, and improve information sharing with law enforcement and security partners to support prevention, deconfliction, and investigative efforts.
• Any individual who has been a victim of cybercrime, fraud or scams, should contact their local police and report it to the Canadian Anti–Fraud Centre.

Q3 – Question on Specific Incidents

• We are aware of the {Insert type of incident, city, province} and we are closely monitoring the situation.
• The federal cyber community meets regularly to discuss potential and ongoing incidents to coordinate the federal response. To this end, the Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan, for incidents affecting non–government of Canada systems, and the Government of Canada Cyber Security Event Management Plan, for incidents affecting Government of Canada systems, are escalated as needed according to the severity of the incident.
• The government Operations Centre is working to determine what type of federal assistance may be required by provinces and territories and the critical infrastructure providers to deal with the situation.
• First responders and provincial officials are responsible for addressing the immediate needs of citizens in the affected areas.
• As the situation is evolving rapidly, it would be inappropriate for us to comment further.

Q4 – Question on holding cybercriminals responsible

The RCMP Federal Policing Cybercrime Program investigates the highest levels of cyber–related criminal activity and threats to national security. This includes cybercrime directed against institutions of government, critical infrastructure of national importance, and key Canadian institutions and business assets. The RCMP has a broad mandate to combat cybercrime domestically and internationally, and deploys various enforcement measures to enable arrests, charges, and other disruption outcomes (e.g., actions to neutralize the threat, minimize victimization, and hold cybercriminals to account where possible).

Background

Issue

Malicious cyber activity directed at the digital systems that underpin essential services and critical infrastructure are a constant concern for businesses, individuals, and all levels of governments in Canada.

Threat Environment

• The 2025–2026 National Cyber Threat Assessment identifies ransomware as the top cybercrime threat to Canada's critical infrastructure, emphasizing state and state–sponsored threat actors more than the previous assessment. It lists China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and notably India, which was not identified in the 2023–2024 National Cyber Threat Assessment.
• The report highlights India's likely use of its cyber program for national security, espionage, counterterrorism, and enhancing its global status. It likely uses commercial vendors to enhance its cyber operations.
• The report also lists China as presenting the most comprehensive cyber security threat facing Canada today. The objectives of its operations include political and commercial gains, espionage, Intellectual Property theft, and transnational repression. Canadian politicians at all levels of government have been targeted.

Government of Canada Response

• The Government of Canada is responsible for responding to cyber threats and national security threats, as well as defending critical Government of Canada systems. Federal interventions include informing potential victims of cyber activity and aiding security professionals in adopting best practices to minimize the impact on essential operations.
• In its newly released National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS), the Government of Canada takes a whole–of–society and agile approach to cyber threats to advance adaptable cyber security policies.
• Following the announcement of the new Strategy in February 2025, Public Safety Canada secured funding to establish the flagship initiatives of the NCSS: the Canadian Cyber Defence Collective, which will formalize collaboration and information sharing between all levels of government, Indigenous organizations, private industry, and academia; and the next iteration of the Cyber Security Cooperation Program, which is Public Safety Canada's cyber–related grants and contributions initiative.
• Public Safety Canada supports critical infrastructure owners and operators, encompassing ten sectors essential to Canadians' well–being: energy and utilities, finance, food, transportation, government, information and communication technology, health, water, safety, and manufacturing. For example, Public Safety Canada, in collaboration with the Cyber Centre, developed the Canadian Cyber Security Tool for self–assessment.
• Public Safety Canada also co–chairs the Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan to coordinate responses to cyber incidents affecting non–Government of Canada systems, which serves to enhance situational awareness and inform decision making during significant cyber events.

Economic–based Threats to National Security

Key Messages

• This government takes all threats to national security seriously, and our security and intelligence community remains committed to identifying, mitigating, and responding to the modern and sophisticated risks facing Canada.
• As national security risks to our economy and sovereignty continue to evolve, Canada needs a targeted approach to better identify, understand, mitigate, and protect against these threats.
• That is why the government is strengthening Canada's ability to address national security threats to the economy, as part of our efforts to bolster economic growth, prosperity and Canada's strategic autonomy. A cohesive and integrated approach to Canada's national security requires cooperation across government and beyond. That is why we continue to consult with key stakeholders in the business community, academia, the provinces and territories, Indigenous governments, and civil society.

Background

National Security Threats to the Economy

• Canada's open and globalized economy brings risks as well as benefits. The COVID–19 pandemic brought to light significant vulnerabilities in our economy and highlighted the importance of securing partnerships to shore up critical supply chains.
• In the context of recent geopolitical shifts we need to reassess our approach to address national security threats to the economy. A strong, independent and resilient economy needs to be free from national security threats.

Economic–based Threats

• Foreign investment from hostile actors in strategic sectors and industries important to Canada's national security;
• Foreign hostile actors' access to or acquisition of sensitive technology, and expertise; or
• Foreign hostile actors' funding partnerships with our universities and research institutions to gain access to cutting–edge technology and intellectual property.

Government of Canada Tools to Protect the Canadian Economy

• Canada currently has defensive tools in the economic security space, focused on economic–based threats to national security (threats entering Canada via economic activities such as investment and research partnerships).
• Public Safety (PS) is working to broaden this approach, to focus on national security threats targeting our economy, by building resilience, taking a whole–of–economy perspective of economic security, and with the deliberate objective to secure Canadian control and/or unimpeded access to strategic economic assets, both tangible and intangible.
• Some current tools include:
  • the Controlled Goods Program (CGP), administered by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC);
  • the Investment Canada Act (ICA), administered by Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED), with PS leading the ICA–national security review of proposed foreign investments that threaten Canada's national security;
  • the Policy on Sensitive Technology Research Affiliations of Concern prevents funding of sensitive research if there are affiliations with organizations connected to the state security entities that could pose a risk to Canada's national security;
  • cyber security programs led by PS protect and aid Canadian businesses in the recovery from cyber incidents, including the Federal Cyber Incident Response Plan;
  • the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure which established a broad definition and 10 sectors that cover most of the Canadian economy; and
  • the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA), administered by Global Affairs Canada.

Listing of Terrorist Entities

Key Messages

• Canada's intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies continuously monitor for potential threats, and robust measures are in place to address them.
• We work closely with our partners and use every tool at our disposal to hold terrorists and those who participate in or facilitate terrorist activity accountable.
• Organizations meeting the Criminal Code's threshold are listed as terrorist entities through a rigorous process based on evidence, intelligence, and law.
• The listing carries significant consequences. It prohibits actions related to terrorist financing, and allows the government to seize, restrain, or forfeit assets.
• Individuals seeking entry into Canada can also be inadmissible if they are members of terrorist organizations.
• We are committed to holding terrorist groups accountable for their actions and to explore all options to respond to the threat they pose to Canada's security.

If Pressed

Q1 – Listing of Transnational Organized Criminal Groups

• Transnational organized criminal groups take hostages, attack civilian and critical infrastructure, actively disrupt the functions of local governments and law enforcement, and generate terror amongst civilian populations.
• These organizations also play a leading role in the production and distribution of fentanyl throughout our country.
• The Government of Canada is committed to using every available resource to disrupt the scourge of these organizations in our communities.
• Earlier this year, the Government of Canada listed 7 foreign criminal groups as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• We will continue to explore all possible measures to constrain the activities of those who would threaten the safety and security of Canadians, in collaboration with allies and like–minded partners.

Q2 – Listing Gangs in Haiti

• The Government of Canada is committed to promoting stability and democracy in Haiti. We are committed to being strong partners of the Haitian government as it looks to bring back safety and stability in its territory.
• Transnational Organized Crime Groups are a threat to the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad.
• Canada has sanctioned Haitian individuals under the Special Economic Measures Act for financial and operational support to armed gangs.
• Canada's listing process is based on intelligence, evidence and the law.
• As a result of this process, the government listed 7 criminal groups as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• We will not hesitate to protect the safety of Canadians and of our partners.

Q3 – Redefining Terrorism Beyond Ideological, Political, or Religious Motivations

• The nature of terrorism is rapidly evolving alongside uses of the internet, online radicalization, and the intersection between terrorism and crime.
• No matter the ideology, the Government of Canada is committed to using all available tools to address the threat posed by these actors, including by listing them as terrorist entities under the Criminal Code.
• The intelligence and security agencies are continually assessing threats to the safety and security of Canada, and will respond to the seriousness of these entities' activities.
• The terrorist listings process is based on evidence, intelligence, and law, and serves as one possible avenue of response to target malign terrorist actors both within Canada and abroad.

Background

Issue

• Canada's Criminal Code listing regime is an important tool for countering terrorism in Canada and globally, and is part of the government's commitment to keep people in Canada safe.
• The Criminal Code sets out a terrorist listing regime to help prevent the use of Canada's financial system to further terrorist activity, and to assist in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences.

Canada's Criminal Code listing regime

• The listing of terrorist entities is a rigorous process, based on evidence, intelligence, and the law, as a listing carries significant consequences. It involves cross–government consultations to ascertain if an entity meets the legal threshold for listing as set out in the Criminal Code.
• The Minister of Public Safety may recommend to the Governor in Council that individuals or groups be designated as "terrorist entities" pursuant to s. 83.05 (1) of the Criminal Code (establishment of list) if there are reasonable grounds to believe that an entity:
• has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or
• has knowingly acted on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with, an entity referred to in paragraph (a).
• Once an entity is listed, it is a "terrorist group" under Canadian criminal law. The Criminal Code prohibits certain actions in relation to terrorist groups, including those related to terrorist financing, travel, and recruitment. Furthermore, persons seeking entry into Canada are inadmissible if they are found to be members of organizations engaged in terrorism. The Criminal Code listing can be helpful for immigration and border officials to determine if individuals are deemed inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Key messages

• The Government of Canada is committed to countering the threat of terrorism and violent extremism.
• Canada's intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies continuously monitor potential threats to Canada and have robust measures in place to address them. This includes investigations and prosecutions, as well as terrorist listings, and taking measures to stop individuals from traveling to engage in terrorist activity.
• The threat posed by terrorists and violent extremists is rapidly evolving and complex. Addressing this threat requires close collaboration among domestic and international security and intelligence partners, the policing community, and social services.
• My department works hand–in–glove with the security and intelligence community to ensure that our tools and approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism remain effective in this changing threat environment.
• We are committed to using every tool at our disposal to keep our communities safe from this threat, and bring would–be doers of harm to justice.

If Pressed

Q1 – Prevention of Radicalization to Violent Extremism

• Canada is committed to countering and preventing all forms of radicalization to violence and violent extremism, emphasizing the need for public health–informed approaches, supported by collaborative efforts to ensure the safety of Canadians and international partners.
• Established in 2017, Public Safety's Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence (the Canada Centre) provides national leadership through policy guidance, coordination with various actors, financially supports research and prevention initiatives via its grants and contributions program–the Community Resilience Fund.
• The Canada Centre leads Canada's National Strategy to Counter Radicalization to Violence, which focuses on three priorities:
  • Building, sharing, and using knowledge to develop an evidence base to inform effective prevention policies.
  • Supporting front–line interventions tailored to local needs and strengths.
  • Addressing radicalization online, including efforts to prevent terrorist and violent extremist content.

Q2 – Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online

• Since 2022, there has been a significant rise in terrorist and violent extremist content online, driven in part by widespread layoffs in the tech industry that affected trust and safety teams, including content moderators.
• This trend was exacerbated by the Israel–Hamas war which has led to a surge in the use of social media platforms to glorify acts of violence and circulate graphic material.
• Violent extremist and terrorist groups are increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence to produce and disseminate terrorist and violent extremist content, amplifying their reach and influence online.
• Our government is particularly concerned with the growing exposure of minors to terrorist and violent extremist content through social media and gaming platforms.

Q3 – Does Canada's security and intelligence apparatus have all the tools needed to effectively identify and disrupt terrorism and violent extremism in the online space?

• Canada's security and intelligence community continues to rely on its well–established counterterrorism toolkit to counter the threat of violent extremism; however, like all countries, this threat has evolved toward violent extremists using encrypted channels and the dark web to organize, communicate, and plan their activities.
• We will continue to ensure that Canada's law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies are equipped with the tools and capabilities needed to investigate and counter threats in the online space.

Q4 – Canada's Approach to Addressing Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content

• Our government is committed to ensuring that its law enforcement and security and intelligence agencies are equipped with the tools and capabilities needed to investigate and counter threats in the online space.
• Canada's approach to addressing terrorist and violent extremist content online also involves close collaboration with technology companies, academics and researchers, civil society and likeminded international partners.
• Technology companies must be held accountable for the content on their platforms.
• We engage with tech platforms primarily through the industry–led Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism and the Christchurch Call Foundation, while also working closely with Five Eyes and G7 partners to share best practices and apply coordinated pressure on industry to act.
• In parallel, Public Safety Canada financially supports efforts to redirect users away from violent extremist content and to promote digital literacy.
• The government will continue to promote transparency and accountability among online service providers.
• Our efforts reflect the government's commitment to protecting Canadians online an upholding our international obligations under the Christchurch Call to Action.

Background

Issue

• Canada's terrorism and violent extremism (T/VE) threat landscape has expanded and become more complex and diverse.
• Radicalization is occurring more rapidly with a concerning prevalence of youth radicalization to violence.
• T/VE threat actors rapidly adopt new and emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence (AI) to facilitate their activities.

The Terrorism and Violent Extremism Threat in Canada

• Over the last ten years, new T/VE threats have emerged in Canada, motivated by extreme xenophobia (e.g., white nationalism), misogyny (e.g., involuntary celibacy or incel), anti–2SLGBTQI+, and anti – authority (e.g., violent militia) ideologies. These now account for the majority of T/VE criminal and intelligence investigations alongside religiously motivated violent extremists.
• Investigations by intelligence and law enforcement agencies are increasingly identifying younger threat actors, some as young as 13. The content that these young threat actors tend to share online is increasingly graphic (e.g., animal crushing and 'gore') in an attempt to desensitize viewers to violence. Since June 2023, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have arrested eleven (11) young people (25 of age and under) on terrorism–related charges.
• Individuals are increasingly self–radicalizing online as they seek out violent extremist content, consume terrorist propaganda, and meet with like–minded individuals in private group chats and online networks.
• Lone actors, including youth, motivated by a blend of personal grievances and ideological frameworks continue to pose a significant T/VE threat to Canada. These individuals are especially to difficult to detect and track before they act.
• Technological advancements, including AI, encryption, and algorithms, have accelerated radicalization in Canada with some individuals radicalizing to violence in the span of a few months. These technologies facilitate and amplify propaganda dissemination, secure communication, and drive users towards extremist content. Additionally, regulatory gaps in online spaces, especially gaming, are exploited by violent extremists to target and radicalize vulnerable individuals, including youth.

Canada's Counter T/VE Approach

• Canada is working on renewing its Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism Plan of Action to ensure that we are well–equipped to meet these new and evolving threats.
• The Government of Canada continues to rely on its well–established counter terrorism toolkit to address all forms of T/VE, including:
  • Prevention efforts led by the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence.
  • Investigations and reporting on violent extremist threats to Canada's national security as defined in section 2(c) and (d) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Act.
  • Threat reduction measures: CSIS may also take measures to reduce these threats, within defined legal parameters;
  • RCMP–Federal Policing investigates national security–related criminal offences, which may result in charges or terrorism peace bonds;
  • The Criminal Code terrorist listing regime, which helps prevent the use of Canada's financial system from furthering terrorist activity and can assist in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences;
  • The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Act, which authorizes CSE to gather and provide intelligence related to foreign violent extremist threat activities, such as attack planning, capacity building, recruitment, and radicalization impacting Canada and Canadians at home, abroad, and online;
  • Security screening to prevent threat actors from entering or gaining permanent residency or citizenship status under the Immigration and Refugees Protection Act and the Citizenship Act;
  • The Secure Air Travel Act ("No Fly List"), which prevents individuals from boarding a plane when they are suspected of posing a threat to aviation security or suspected of wanting to travel for terrorism–related purposes.
  • The Canadian Passport Order, which enables passports to be cancelled, refused or revoked to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence or for the national security of Canada or another state.

Canada Wildland Fire Situation

Key Messages

• Our thoughts continue to be with Canadians impacted by the wildland fires from British Columbia to Ontario–we are very mindful of the states of emergency in both Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Thousands of people are out of their homes, we have seen reports of homes and community infrastructure being lost, and we are most aware that two Manitobans have perished.
• The Government of Canada remains committed to working with provinces, territories and whole–of–society partners to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies across the country. The Canadian Armed Forces and Canadian Coast Guard have been providing airlift for evacuations and the Public Health Agency has provided cots, blankets and other medical supplies.
• We continue to be in close contact with colleagues and partners in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as with First Nations leadership. We are all working together to address a very challenging situation, and the federal government will continue to support our partners in protecting Canadians, their communities and their homes.
• In moments like these, Canadians come together. We stand united in our support for those affected. Provinces and Territories across Canada have already stepped up to assist, and we are grateful for their solidarity.

If Pressed

Q1 – Emergency Management Responsibilities in Canada

Emergencies are a shared responsibility between all levels of government, but are managed first at the local level. If municipalities need assistance, they request it from the province or territory. If the emergency overwhelms provincial or territorial capacity, the province or territory may seek assistance from the federal government.

Q2 – Requests for Federal Assistance

Should a province or territory make an official request for federal assistance, there is a well–established process in place for managing these requests through the government Operations Centre and includes interdepartmental consultation and coordination.

Q3 – What can Canadians do to prepare for emergencies

Emergencies can happen at any time and Canadians should always be prepared. Canadians are invited to visit getprepared.ca for information on preparing for emergencies.

Q4 – What type of support is currently being offered to these communities

• From May 29 to June 2, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) conducted evacuations of Mathias Colomb, Norway House, and Cross Lake, airlifting a total of 3,514 evacuees.
• The CAF has deployed 18 different type of aircrafts for evacuations and received support from Canadian Coast Guard with two helicopters.
• As of the morning of June 3, evacuations are mainly complete with mainly essential staff remaining in the mentioned communities.
• The CAF is anticipating redeploying air assets in a staggered approach over the next 48 hours. Discussions with the communities are occurring to ascertain if all the tasks in both Requests for Assistance have been fulfilled.
• At this time, there have not been any requests for federal assistance to Saskatchewan. The Government of Canada stands ready should they require it.
• Indigenous Service Canada is working alongside Indigenous leadership and provincial colleagues to coordinate response for Indigenous peoples impacted by these wildland fires.
• The Canadian Red Cross continues to assist with evacuation efforts and providing supports.
• This has and continues to be a difficult time for many communities. It's during these trying times that Canadians band together and that's what we're seeing.

Background

Issue

The 2025 Cyclical Event season is underway with flood and wildland fires impacting communities across the country. Tragically, there have been two fatalities as a result of wildland fires. The government Operations Centre stood up its Cyclical Event Response Team on April 8, 2025, to provide 24/7 monitoring and reporting on flooding and wildland fires and coordinating requests for federal assistance.

Government Operations Centre

Public Safety Canada's (PS) government Operations Centre (GOC) is mandated, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to lead and support response coordination of events affecting the national interest. It is an interdepartmental response–focused asset of the Government of Canada working in support of deputy heads, departments and agencies at the national (strategic) whole–of–government level. It brings all partners into a common environment to harmonize collective actions and abilities into efficient analysis and action.

During the flooding and wildland fire seasons, our government maintains continuous communication with our federal and provincial partners, including Indigenous Communities, while monitoring impacts on communities on a 24/7 basis.

Climate change is making natural disasters more severe, more frequent, more damaging and more expensive. In the past few years, the Minister of Emergency Preparedness, on behalf of the federal government, has accepted increasing numbers of Requests for Assistance (RFAs) for relief efforts from devastating events including the recent impacts from Hurricane Fiona, Atmospheric River events, and 2023 wildland fires.

Current Wildland Fire Situation

The National Preparedness Level is at level 5. There are 180 active wildland fires across Canada, 75 of which are out of control. Dense smoke from wildland fires is reducing air quality and visibility in northeastern British Columbia (BC), the Prairies, and northwestern Ontario, with extreme smoke levels in northern Alberta, central Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and northern Ontario. Dry conditions and minimal precipitation are increasing the risk of moderate to intense fire activity across northeastern BC, south–central Northwest Territories, the Prairies, and Ontario.

British Columbia

There are 73 active wildland fires in British Columbia. The provincial Agency Preparedness Level is 2 due to ongoing conditions.

There are two out–of–control wildland fires that are the main concern in British Columbia— one near the Kiskatinaw River, prompting evacuation orders, and one impacting Highway 97 near Fort Nelson which is one of the access roadways to Yukon.

Alberta

There are 55 active wildland fires in Alberta. The provincial Agency Preparedness Level is 4 due to ongoing conditions. As of last report, there are approximately 4,656 evacuees across the province.

Alberta continues to face significant wildland fire activity with multiple out–of–control fires, widespread evacuations affecting thousands, disruptions to oil production, and ongoing threats to critical infrastructure and communities.

Saskatchewan

There are six active wildland fires in Saskatchewan and six are out of control. The provincial Agency Preparedness level is 5–extreme–due to ongoing conditions.

Saskatchewan has declared a provincewide state of emergency on May 29, 2025, due to escalating wildland fires, with mass evacuations underway and critical infrastructure, including highways, airports, and communications, under threat. The province is at the highest preparedness level and air quality alerts have been issued across affected regions. The main wildland fires of concerns are the ones near Split Lake and La Ronge which have prompted evacuations orders and is threatening local critical infrastructure, specifically the airport in La Ronge.

There are initial reports of significant damage sustained to structures in the town of Denare Beach, Saskatchewan on June 3, 2025. The town is home to approximately 700 residents. The town is under an evacuation order.

Manitoba

There are 27 active wildland fires in Manitoba. The provincial Agency Preparedness Level is 5–extreme–due to ongoing conditions. As of last report, there are approximately 17,000 evacuees across the province.

Manitoba declared a provincewide state of emergency due to escalating wildland fires, prompting mass evacuations, federal and military support, and threats to critical infrastructure and northern communities, specifically, Mathias Colomb, Cross Lake, and Norway House. Evacuations are nearing completion with primarily essential staff remaining in the previously mentioned communities.

One hundred Type–1 firefighters and 25 Fire Management Specialists and inbound to Manitoba with an expected arrival between June 4 and 5, 2025, to assist with fire suppression efforts. The CAF are anticipating redeploying air assets in a staggered approach over the next 48 hours following discussions with the communities to ascertain if all the tasks in both RFAs have been fulfilled.

Ontario

There are 17 active wildland fires in Ontario. The provincial Agency Preparedness level is 4 due to ongoing conditions.

Ongoing wildland fires in Ontario have led to the evacuation of thousands from First Nations communities, with evacuees being relocated to host sites including Niagara Falls, Toronto, and Barrie. Fires near Deer Lake and Webequie First Nations remain out of control, prompting urgent air evacuations and significant resource deployment amid province–wide response efforts.

Requests for Federal Assistance

On May 28 and early May 29, 2025, PS received and approved RFAs from Manitoba for the CAF to support the Mathias Colomb and Cross Lake Cree Nations in Manitoba. The CAF provided airlift capabilities to support evacuations and logistics, while the other was for liaison and coordination support to the incident command centre. Discussions are now taking place with the communities to ascertain if all the tasks in both RFAs have been fulfilled.

When a province or territory (PT) makes an official RFA, there is a well–established process in place for managing RFAs, through the GOC, that includes interdepartmental consultation and coordination of all departments as required. The GOC coordinates formal RFAs from the federal government and PTs and liaises with key organizations such as the CAF and non–governmental organizations like the Canadian Red Cross through the Humanitarian Work force program.

Indigenous Service Canada (ISC) has a responsibility to support First Nations on reserves in emergency management. When the emergency affects a First Nations community, their leadership, depending on relevant emergency management agreements, will work in collaboration with ISC and the PT to assess the emergency and propose a response. If a resolution is not possible through ISC, a RFA may be sought.

Emergency Management Strategy for Canada

Key Messages

• Disasters in Canada are increasing in frequency and severity. The Government of Canada is committed to protecting the safety and security of Canadians.
• The government launched the Emergency Management Strategy for Canada in 2019 to strengthen Canada's overall resilience to disasters by 2030.
• In February 2024, Federal, Provincial and Territorial emergency management partners approved a plan to advance the strategy.
• This plan will promote disaster risk reduction and ensure that Canadian communities are more resilient and better prepared.
• Engagement with partners to renew the Strategy will begin in 2025, ensuring an updated Strategy is in place by 2026.
• The Government of Canada is committed to advancing this work with the ongoing collaboration of Provincial, Territorial, and Indigenous partners.

Background

Issue

• Public Safety Canada works in collaboration with other federal departments and provincial and territorial governments, academia, national associations and non–governmental organizations to strengthen national emergency preparedness
• These efforts, taken prior to an emergency, are aimed at making Canadian communities safe and resilient.

Emergency Management Strategy for Canada

• In January 2019, Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FPT) Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management approved Canada's first–ever FPT Emergency Management Strategy for Canada (EM Strategy).
• The EM Strategy establishes FPT priorities to strengthen the resilience of Canadian society by 2030 and seeks to align the efforts of all Canadians, as well as to strengthen overall resilience through five priority areas of activity:
  • Enhance whole–of–society collaboration and governance to strengthen resilience;
  • Improve understanding of disaster risks in all sectors of society;
  • Increase focus on whole–of–society disaster prevention and mitigation activities;
  • Enhance disaster response capacity and coordination and foster the development of new capabilities; and,
  • Strengthen recovery efforts by building back better to minimize the impacts of future disasters.
• The Strategy is formally reviewed every five years; work to renew the Strategy will commence in 2025 in collaboration with provinces, territories and Indigenous partners.

Advancing the Federal–Provincial–Territorial Emergency Management Strategy: Areas for Action

• After approving the EM Strategy, FPT Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management directed the Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) to develop and advance a series of Action Plans to advance the implementation of the EM Strategy to 2030.
• In February 2024, FPT Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management approved and released a new, evergreen action plan, entitled Advancing the Federal–Provincial–Territorial Emergency Management Strategy: Areas for Action.

Mitigating Disaster Risks

Key Messages

• Climate–change hazards are increasingly threatening Canadians, and disaster mitigation is the most effective means of reducing the costs and impacts of these disasters.
• Canada's Federal, Provincial and Territorial Emergency Management Strategy outlines a coordinated approach, focused on proactive measures to prevent and mitigate the impacts of disasters before they occur.
• The Government of Canada is committed to building resilience to these hazards. This is why the Government of Canada launched the National Adaptation Strategy, aimed to support a shared vision for a resilient Canada.
• As flooding is Canada's costliest and most frequent disaster, the government is advancing initiatives to increase flood resilience across Canada.
• These initiatives will ensure the Government of Canada is able to better support impacted people and communities, and rebuild with greater resilience to future risk.

If Pressed

Q1 – Flood mitigation

• Flooding is the most frequent and costly natural disaster in Canada. This is why the Government of Canada is taking steps to prioritize flood risk reduction, prevention and mitigation to ensure that Canadians are better protected and better able to recover from flood events. Key initiatives include:
  • Developing a low–cost flood insurance program.
  • Creating a flood risk information portal.
  • Identifying high–risk flood areas and modernizing the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program.
• These efforts are supported by Federal, Provincial, Territorial, and Indigenous partners, aligning with the Emergency Management Strategy for Canada.

Q2 – Flood insurance

• The Government of Canada is committed to collaborating with provincial, territorial, municipal, Indigenous, and private sector partners towards a flood insurance solution.
• Budget 2023 confirmed the intention to stand up a low–cost flood–insurance program; Budget 2024 designated a Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation subsidiary to act as a federal reinsurer, and a Working Group on Flood Insurance was launched under Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management in January 2025. The program is targeted to be operational by April 2026.

Q3 – Federal Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) in cases of flood

• The federal DFAA will continue to remain available to Provinces and Territories, and provide support where insurance is not readily available.
• The Government of Canada has implemented a modernized DFAA program which incentivizes mitigation efforts, and ensures that there is a sustainable source of support for provinces and territories in the face of rising disaster risks. The new program launched on April 1, 2025.

Q4 – Wildfires mitigation

The Government of Canada is committed to working with provinces, territories and whole–of–society partners to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from wildfire events.

Background

Issue

• Climate–change driven hazards are increasing in both frequency and costs, and are a mounting threat to the safety and economic viability of Canadian businesses and communities.
• Disaster mitigation measures aim to reduce impacts before emergencies occur, enhancing resilience and safety across society.

Emergency Management Strategy for Canada

• In January 2019, Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FPT) Ministers Responsible for Emergency Management approved Canada's first–ever FPT Emergency Management Strategy for Canada (EM Strategy).
• Increasing the focus on whole–of–society disaster prevention and mitigation activities is one the Strategy's key priorities.

Residential Flood Insurance, Flood Mapping and Risk Awareness

• December 2021's mandate letter for the Minister for Emergency Preparedness committed to flood preparedness and recovery, including a low–cost national flood insurance program.
• A task force was set up in January 2021, leading to the August 2022 report "Adapting to Rising Flood Risk: An Analysis of Insurance Solutions for Canada".
• Budgets 2023 and 2024 announced the Government of Canada's intention to deliver flood insurance through a reinsurance entity and engagement with Provincial and Territorial counterparts toward a separate affordability subsidy program and risk reduction initiatives.
• The FPT Working Group on Flood Insurance began meeting under Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) in January 2025 to finalize program design for an April 2026 launch.
• Public Safety Canada (PS) collaborates with Natural Resources Canada and Environment and Climate Change Canada to advance flood mapping.

Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements

• The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program provides financial assistance to provincial and territorial governments for response and recovery costs from large–scale disasters caused by natural hazards.
• The modernized DFAA provides more flexibility for the kinds of costs that can be covered, more efficient program administration, faster payments, and significantly improved data collection on disaster recovery to better inform future policy development.

Wildfires Mitigation Investments

• Through Budget 2022, the Government of Canada committed to investing over $500 million to provide support to provinces, territories, and Indigenous communities in wildfire management.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Data Strategy

• An interdepartmental working group led by PS was convened in 2023 to produce a DRR Data Strategy. The Strategy will serve as the foundation for future work that enhances the federal government's capabilities in the realm of data–and model–driven insights for assessing, and taking actions to reduce disaster risks.
• The Strategy is at an advanced draft stage and is expected to be published in 2025.

National Public Alerting System (NPAS)

Key Messages

• Emergencies can happen at any moment and with little warning and it is important that Canadians have the information they need to protect themselves.
• An effective and reliable public alerting system is a responsibility shared by all orders of government and industry partners.
• The National Public Alerting System is an essential tool that is used to warn the public about imminent or possible dangers so they can take action to protect themselves.
• All orders of governments have a strong working relationship with public alerting partners. Together, we are committed to continued collaboration to improve the effectiveness of emergency alerting in Canada and to ensure Canadians have the critical information they need during emergencies.

If Pressed

Q1 – Testing of the system

• Regular testing and evaluation of the system is necessary to ensure that in times of an emergency or disaster, we are prepared to deliver urgent and lifesaving warnings to the public.
• Governments conduct public awareness tests of the system twice annually, in May during Emergency Preparedness Week, and November.
• The next national test will occur in November, exact date to be announced.
• Canadians are encouraged to visit AlertReady.ca to find the test schedule for their province or territory, as well as other useful information on wireless phone compatibility, and the types of emergency alerts sent through the system.

Q2 – Implementation of the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission Recommendations

• Strengthening the National Public Alerting System (NPAS) is a federal, provincial, and territorial (FPT) priority.
• FPT ministers underscored the importance of the system and collectively endorsed priorities to support the ongoing sustainability and enhancement of the system. Ministers also reviewed the public alerting recommendations of the Mass Casualty Commission Final Report.
• FPT governments are working collaboratively to advance these priorities and explore options on how best to strengthen the overall use and ensure the sustainability of the system.

Q3 – Official languages and Accessibility

• The system is capable of carrying emergency alerts in English, French, or both languages, at the discretion and in respect of the legislation of the issuing government authority.
• FPT governments work with broadcasters, wireless service providers, and the Canadian Radio–television and Telecommunications Commission to ensure that the visual and audible aspects of public alerts sent through the NPAS are readily recognizable by the Canadian public, and are presented in a consistent format.

Background

Issue

• Alert Ready, the National Public Alerting System (NPAS), provides emergency management organizations across the country with the capability to rapidly warn the public of imminent or unfolding hazards to life.
• The Final Report of the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission included recommendations related to public alerting.

Roles and responsibilities

• The NPAS is a standard alerting capability used by emergency management organizations throughout Canada to warn the public of imminent or unfolding hazards to life through radio, television, and on compatible wireless devices.
• All 13 provinces and territories are connected to the NPAS. Federal departments connected to the NPAS are Environment and Climate Change Canada, Public Safety Canada and Natural Resources Canada.
• Each jurisdiction determines who may issue alerts within their jurisdiction, when to issue an emergency alert, the alert type, the message content, its duration and geographical areas affected.
• The Canadian Radio–television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) sets out accessibility standards.
• The NPAS is owned and operated by Pelmorex Corp, owner of The Weather Network / MétéoMedia Television Channels.

Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission

• The Final Report of the Nova Scotia Mass Casualty Commission recommended "FPT governments to undertake a fundamental review of public emergency alerting to determine whether and how the Alert Ready system can be reformed". It also included recommendations around training and public education about public warnings.
• Public Safety Canada continues to advance collaborative work to strengthen the overall use, sustainability, and governance of the NPAS with federal, provincial and territorial (FPT) partners.
• In February, 2024, FPT Ministers responsible for emergency management met to review the progress and to explore considerations for the development of a future public alerting framework in collaboration with provinces and territories. FPT Ministers instructed their respective teams to continue this collaborative work, and to consider the recommendations of the Mass Casualty Commission report related to public alerting, as well as the long–term viability of the current system.

Results

In 2022, 2023, and 2024, 824, 1086, and 855 emergency alert messages were issued respectively. These emergency alerts have been credited with saving lives.

Public Safety Broadband Network (PSBN)

Key Messages

• Effective communications in times of emergency and during day–to–day operations are critical to improve the safety of first responders, help save lives, and keep communities safe.
• Advancing a Public Safety Broadband Network continues to be a federal, provincial, and territorial emergency management priority and significant collaborative work has been undertaken in partnership with the public safety community.
• In Summer 2024, Public Safety Canada led a consultation to inform the development of a governance framework for a nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network. The department recently published its report. Stakeholders welcomed the consultation and emphasized the importance of this next step.
• The Government of Canada will continue to work closely with stakeholders to bolster our readiness and keep Canadians and their communities safe.

If Pressed

Q1 – If Pressed on government Inaction and Funding for a Public Safety Broadband Network

• Federal decisions are needed to advance a Public Safety Broadband Network (PSBN) in Canada. This includes decisions around funding.
• The Government of Canada is working diligently to secure the necessary mandate to support the realization of a PSBN. Collaboration between governments and the public safety community will continue to be fundamental to the success of a future PSBN.
• At this time, the federal government has not committed funding for a PSBN. The Government of Canada is not in a position to commit to timelines for these decisions, or what the nature of these decisions would be.
• The success and financial viability of a PSBN is dependent on the widespread adoption by public safety users, as well as provincial and territorial commitment and leadership.

Q2 – If Pressed on the government's next steps and why it is taking a long time

• The key next step to realizing a nationwide PSBN in Canada is to put in place a governance framework that will designate a PSBN Authority responsible for overseeing and leading the development of the network.
• This framework will establish the form of the National PSBN Authority, its mandate and responsibilities, as well as the mechanisms for ensuring accountability, sustainability, and oversight of the network. The Government of Canada will also need to consider the regulatory and legislative framework and consider measures to support an effective PSBN implementation while maintaining an open and transparent market.
• The success and financial viability of a PSBN is dependent on the widespread adoption by public safety users, as well as provincial and territorial commitment and leadership. With a robust governance framework in place, stakeholders will have the certainty they need to plan for their involvement in supporting the realization of the PSBN in Canada.

Background

Issue

• Canada's public safety community faces significant interoperability challenges and relies on outdated communications technologies that do not meet the requirements of today and tomorrow's emergency response.
• A nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (PSBN) would provide a secure, resilient, and interoperable communications platform for responders, and enable new technologies and applications that enhance emergency response.

Recent steps taken to enable the creation of a Public Safety Broadband Network

• On May 19, 2017, the Government of Canada committed $3 million to engage stakeholders and analyze options for implementing and governing a PSBN in Canada. Stakeholders identified governance as a critical priority.
• In May 2018, a Temporary National Coordination Office (TNCO) was established with a two–year mandate to develop national options and recommendations for a future PSBN, supported by research, analysis, and stakeholder engagement.
• On March 17, 2022, federal, provincial and territorial (FPT) ministers responsible for emergency management released the TNCO's report, "A Public Safety Broadband Network for Canada: A Canadian Approach to Implementation of the Next Generation of Public Safety Communications." The report recommended a nationwide, interoperable PSBN and emphasized collaboration across all levels of government, industry, and first responders.
• Following the 2022 Rogers network outage, Minister Champagne committed to working with stakeholders to support the operationalization of a PSBN as part of the Telecommunications Reliability Agenda.
• On June 28, 2023, FPT Ministers discussed the continued development of a PSBN with a coordinated pan–Canadian approach, focusing on establishing a governance framework. The Government of Canada committed to launching targeted engagement to support this work.
• From August 6 to October 8, 2024, Public Safety Canada conducted targeted engagement to inform the governance framework for a nationwide PSBN.
• On March 6, 2025, Public Safety Canada published "Building Consensus: A Governance Framework for a Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network (PSBN)–What We Heard Report." This report outlines key themes and findings from the engagement and next steps for realizing a PSBN in Canada.

Emergency Preparedness and Response for Floods Wildland Fires and Hurricanes

Key Messages

• The 2025 Cyclical Event season is underway with flood and wildland fires impacting communities across the country. Tragically, there have been two fatalities as a result of wildland fires. Our thoughts are with those impacted by these events.
• The Government of Canada is committed to working with provinces, territories and whole–of–society partners to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies across the country.
• Public Safety Canada's government Operations Centre, on behalf of the Government of Canada, is the lead for federal response coordination for emergency events affecting the national interest and works in close collaboration with federal organizations, non–governmental organizations and provincial emergency management partners.
• Every year, the government Operations Centre works to develop risk assessments for cyclical events such as floods, wildland fires, and hurricanes and shares with key partners holding emergency management responsibilities.
• Of note, the wildland fire forecast indicates the potential for elevated fire activity in Western and Central Canada due to ongoing drought conditions and above–normal temperatures.
• The government Operations Centre maintains continuous communication with our federal, provincial and territorial partners, including Indigenous communities throughout the cyclical event season, and impacts on communities are monitored on a 24/7 basis.

If Pressed

Q1 – Emergency Management Responsibilities in Canada

Emergencies are a shared responsibility between all levels of government, but are managed first at the local level. If municipalities need assistance, they request it from the province or territory. If the emergency overwhelms provincial or territorial capacity, the province or territory may seek assistance from the federal government.

Q2 – Requests for Federal Assistance

Should a province or territory make an official request for federal assistance, there is a well–established process in place for managing these requests through the government Operations Centre and includes interdepartmental consultation and coordination.

Q3 – What can Canadians do to prepare for emergencies?

Emergencies can happen at any time and Canadians should always be prepared. Canadians are invited to visit getprepared.ca for information on preparing for emergencies.

Background

Issue

The 2025 Cyclical Event season is underway with flood and wildland fires impacting communities across the country. Tragically, there have been two fatalities as a result of wildland fires. The government Operations Centre (GOC) stood up its Cyclical Event Response Team on April 8, 2025 to provide 24/7 monitoring and reporting on flooding and wildland fires and coordinating requests for federal assistance.

Government Operations Centre and Requests for Federal Assistance

Public Safety Canada's GOC is mandated, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to lead and support response coordination of events affecting the national interest. It is an interdepartmental response–focused asset of the Government of Canada working in support of deputy heads, departments and agencies at the national (strategic) whole–of–government level. It brings all partners into a common environment to harmonize collective actions and abilities into efficient analysis and action. During the flooding and wildland fire seasons, our government maintains continuous communication with our federal and provincial partners, including Indigenous communities, while monitoring impacts on communities on a 24/7 basis. There are currently no cyclical–event related requests for federal assistance at this time. When a province or territory makes an official Request for Assistance (RFA), there is a well–established process in place for their management, through the GOC, that includes interdepartmental consultation and coordination of all departments as required.

Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) has a responsibility to support First Nations (FN) on reserves in emergency management. When the emergency affects a FN community, FN leadership, depending on relevant emergency management agreements, will work in collaboration with ISC and the province/territory to assess the emergency and propose a response. If a resolution is not possible through ISC, a RFA may be sought.

Climate change is making natural disasters more severe, more frequent, more damaging and more expensive. In the past few years, the Minister of Emergency Preparedness, on behalf of the federal government, has accepted increasing numbers of RFAs for relief efforts from devastating events including the recent impacts from Hurricane Fiona, atmospheric river events, and 2023 wildland fires.

2025 Cyclical Event Risk Assessments Process

Every year, the GOC works to develop risk assessments for key cyclical events such as floods, wildfires, and hurricanes. These assessments are based on data collected from key stakeholders such as Environment and Climate Change Canada, Agriculture and Agri–Food Canada, Natural Resources Canada, and ISC. The GOC also consults with provincial and territorial partners and non–government stakeholders.

2025 Annual Floods Risk Assessment and Current Situation

The GOC developed, validated and published its Annual Floods Risk Assessment in April. The forecast has proven accurate. No regions have been identified as potentially high risk for flooding; however, Northern Ontario is believed to be at moderate risk due to the risk of ice jam flooding that may impact James Bay fly–in communities. Seasonal flooding is expected in Northern Canada, and the GOC is monitoring both the Klondike and Porcupine rivers in the Yukon over the coming weeks.

Flooding has impacted various portions of Canada, however they have been effectively managed at the regional level.

2025 Annual Wildland Fires Risk Assessment and Current Situation

New projections for the 2025 wildland fire season indicate potential for elevated fire activity in western and central Canada because of ongoing drought conditions and above normal temperatures. In May and June, the potential for wildfires is above normal for much of southern British Columbia and the prairie provinces. While drought conditions have eased in some areas, pronounced drought persists in southern and northeastern British Columbia, southwestern and northwestern Alberta, and southwestern Northwest Territories.

June and July are expected to bring widespread above average fire severity across much of western, and central Canada, with August showing the highest potential for large and sustained wildfire activity in western Canada.

2025 Annual Hurricane Risk Assessment

The GOC will release its annual hurricane risk assessment in late June to early July. The Atlantic hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30.

Search and Rescue Policies and Programs

Key Messages

• Search and Rescue is a crucial emergency service, and the government dedicated to enhancing search and rescue to reduce the risk of injury or loss of life for Canadians.
• Responsibility for search and rescue is shared among federal, provincial, territorial and local authorities as well as volunteer organizations.
• Public Safety Canada plays a leadership role in search and rescue by coordinating national policy frameworks and programs through the National Search and Rescue Secretariat, supporting search and rescue initiatives via the Search and Rescue New Initiatives Fund, standardizing Heavy Urban Search and Rescue activities, and appoints Canada's Permanent Representative to the international COSPAS–SARSAT Programme.
• These efforts enhance search and rescue capabilities, foster interoperability, and ensure timely distress alert responses, saving lives and advancing search and rescue effectiveness nationwide.

If Pressed

Q1 – Public Safety Canada's Role in Search and Rescue Operations

• Responsibility for search and rescue is shared horizontally among federal, provincial, territorial and local authorities as well as volunteer organizations.
• The federal government, through the Canadian Armed Forces and the Canadian Coast Guard are responsible for responding to aeronautical and maritime search and rescue (SAR) incidents.
• Provinces and territories are responsible for providing response to Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) incidents. This responsibility is often delegated to the police of jurisdiction.
• Public Safety Canada (PS) does not have an operational role in SAR, however, support through the government Operations Centre (GOC) may be requested for additional or unusual resources.
• PS through the National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) provides national level leadership in fostering a resilient and effective response system and advancing initiatives that enhance safety, preparedness, and mutual support.

Q2 – Search and Rescue in Indigenous Communities

• Responsibility for a SAR response lies with the police agency having jurisdiction in most communities.
• Canada's National SAR system is dedicated to seamless search and rescue and requests for assistance through provincial/territorial support or requests for assistance for federal SAR support are available where appropriate.

Q3 – Interprovincial deploy ability of Heavy Urban Search and Rescue assets

• Canada's 6 Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Task Forces are based in Vancouver, Calgary, Manitoba, Toronto, Montréal, and Halifax.
• These resources are municipally or provincially owned.
• The HUSAR National Concept of Operations provides critical information and lays out the mechanisms required to request and receive support between provincial and territorial jurisdictions.
• PS through a provincial or territorial request for assistance may provide support in accessing the unique capabilities of HUSAR Task Forces in alignment with the given needs of an emergency.

Q4 – Government of Canada Support for Search and Rescue Volunteers

• SAR volunteers represented by their national associations–the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association, Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, and the Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada (SARVAC), provide support to those organizations with authorities and responsibilities in each of the three SAR jurisdictions–aeronautical, maritime and GSAR respectively.
• Funding is provided by the Government of Canada to each of the national SAR volunteer associations through the Department of National Defense, Canadian Armed Forces, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Coast Guard, and PS.
• SAR volunteers are eligible for the Search and Rescue Volunteer Tax Credit recently raised to $6,000 in recognition of the time and financial commitments volunteers provide.
• PS is also dedicated to supporting the mental health of SAR volunteers through the support of the Public Safety Personnel Network and the Canadian Institute for Public Safety Research and Treatment.

Q5 – Public Safety Canada Financial Support for Search and Rescue

• Responses should build on the main key messages and follow the same structure.
• As PS is part of a horizontal structure without direct operational authority, PS uses funding strategically to empower other organizations and initiatives that advance shared objectives.
  • The Search and Rescue New Initiatives Fund provides $7.6 million annually to eligible organizations to improve Canada's SAR system.
  • PS provides ongoing funding to support the efforts of the SARVAC to bring together volunteers from all 13 provinces and territories in support of national training, search and rescue prevention through the AdventureSmart Program, and the protection and support of ground SAR volunteers.
  • Where eligible, PS provides workers compensation funding to provincial workers compensation programs that recognize SAR volunteers.
  • Funding to support Canada's six HUSAR Task Forces builds local and national level capacity to support large and small scale disasters.
  • Support for the international COSPAS–SARSAT Programme
  • These programs are in addition to other federal government and provincial/territorial and local funding to support SAR operational readiness, response, and SAR prevention.

Background

Issue

• Search and Rescue (SAR) is part of the continuum of emergencies and fits into Canada's whole–of–government and whole–of–society Emergency Management Framework and Strategy.
• The Government of Canada is responsible for responding to aeronautical and maritime SAR incidents, coordinating national SAR policy frameworks, supporting SAR initiatives, and establishing policies and programs.

Roles and responsibilities regarding aeronautical, maritime and ground SAR response in Canada

• Public Safety Canada's (PS) National Search and Rescue Secretariat coordinates the development of strategic national SAR policy frameworks and programs in cooperation with partners. Additionally, through the Search and Rescue New Initiatives Fund, PS supports initiatives to improve SAR and helps organizations develop meaningful and impactful advances for SAR.
• The Public Safety–led National Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Program recognizes six HUSAR task forces across the country and coordinates cost–shared federal investments for specific domestic initiatives or projects. PS is working to standardize HUSAR activities across Canada and foster interoperability between task forces.
• PS serves as Canada's permanent representative to the international Search and Rescue Satellite–Aided Tracking (COSPAS–SARSAT) Programme. It is an international satellite–based, distress–alerting system that detects, locates and distributes distress alerts used by SAR responders around the world. The system is critical to saving lives and reducing the time between the detection of a distress alert to the delivery of SAR services.
• The Minister of Emergency Management and Community Resilience, while having the responsibility for establishing policies, programs, and sharing best practices for SAR, does not have operational authority for federal SAR resources. The Ministers of each department or agency having SAR–related mandates are ultimately responsible for their department's participation and operations within Canada's SAR system and are the lead spokespersons for their organization.
• Provinces and territories are responsible for providing response to ground SAR incidents. This responsibility is often delegated to the police of jurisdiction.

Federally Identified Flood Risk Areas and the Flood Risk Awareness Digital Resource

Key Messages

• Flooding is Canada's costliest natural disaster, and flood damages continue to increase as a result of climate change, demographic shifts, and development in high–risk areas.
• Public Safety Canada is advancing several initiatives to increase flood resilience across Canada to strengthen our ability to prevent, reduce, recover and adapt to flood risks.
• Together, the Federally Identified Flood Risk Areas and the Flood Risk Awareness Digital Resource will launch in Fall 2025 to identify flood risk ratings for all of Canada, inform federal infrastructure investment decisions, and increase Canadians' awareness of their flood risks.
• These initiatives reflect the government's commitment to emphasize proactive risk reduction and build back better in order to increase the resilience of Canadian society to future disasters.

If Pressed

Q1 – Federally Identified Flood Risk Areas

• Informed by a procured Canada–wide Flood Hazard Model, the Federally Identified Flood Risk Areas will identify a flood hazard rating ranging from Low to Extreme that can be used to ensure we are collectively taking action to build new infrastructure with appropriate flood mitigation design.
• In parallel, Public Safety Canada (PS) has initiated and funded a major National Sciences and Engineering Research Council research project with academic partners which is advancing a made–in–Canada flood model that will be open–source.

Q2 – Flood Risk Awareness Digital Resource

• The Digital Resource will provide all Canadians centralized access to information on their risk to flooding and resources on how to protect their homes and communities from flooding.
• Preliminary internal user testing of the prototype has completed. Further iterations and testing will be completed. The Digital Resource is on track to be launched in Fall 2025.

Q3 – Disaster Risk Reduction Data Strategy

• An interdepartmental working group led by PS was convened in 2023 to produce a Disaster Risk Reduction Data Strategy to ensure a common understanding and interoperability for all federal risk data (including exposure and hazard data), and set the foundation for a centralized, consistent source of disaster risk data to support a range of risk assessments.
• The Strategy is at an advanced draft stage and is expected to be published in 2025.
• The Strategy will serve as the foundation for future work that enhances the federal government's capabilities in the realm of data–and model–driven insights for assessing, and taking actions to reduce disaster risks.

Background

Issue

• Flooding is Canada's costliest natural disaster, and flood damages continue to increase as a result of climate change, demographic shifts, and further development in high–risk flood areas. Canadians, and in particular those in high–risk areas, are increasingly feeling the burden of disaster impacts and flood–related financial pressures, and Indigenous and vulnerable populations are disproportionately affected.
• Aligned with the Emergency Management Strategy for Canada and the United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), and the National Adaptation Strategy, the Government of Canada is committed to advance the systems–based approach required for enhancing disaster resilience.

Federally Identified Flood Risk Areas

• Public Safety Canada (PS) has the mandate to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks, including natural hazards such as flooding. PS's work requires a consistent and comprehensive understanding of flood hazard and flood risk for all of Canada. To meet PS's mandate, the department has been evaluating and applying Canada–wide flood hazard models since 2020.
• The Federally–Identified Flood Risk Areas (FIFRA) Initiative was developed to help address gaps in Canada–wide flood information. The goal of the FIFRA datasets is to provide nationally–consistent flood hazard information to supplement and complement other sources of flood hazard data, screen areas for further study and site specific analysis (i.e. as a screening tool), and help guide and target risk reduction efforts across Canada.

Flood Risk Awareness Digital Resource

• Budget 2023 provided $11.5 million over three years, starting in 2023–24, to PS to create a publicly accessible online flood risk awareness digital resource.
• The Digital Resource complements the Flood Hazard Identification and Mapping Program led by Natural Resources Canada.

Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements Modernization (DFAA)

Key Messages

• For over 50 years, the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements program has played a critical role in supporting the costs of large–scale disasters caused by natural hazards in Canada.
• Public Safety Canada launched a modernized Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements program on April 1, 2025.
• The modernized program is the culmination of over four years of extensive collaboration. Public Safety Canada continues to work closely with provinces and territories to ensure a smooth transition to the new Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements.
• Our modernized Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements prioritizes greater resilience and reduced disaster risks to Canadians. It empowers provinces and territories to develop tailored solutions, increased flexible funding and expanded post–disaster supports.
• This initiative will help to reduce the long-term costs and impacts of disasters on all Canadians.

If Pressed

Q1 – Why was the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements review undertaken

• Since 1970, the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) has paid out more than $9.6 billion, with over 60% of these costs paid out in the last 10 years. The average disaster costs in Canada have also risen more than 1,250% since the creation of the program.
• In light of this rising frequency and severity of disasters in Canada, in 2021 the Minister of Emergency Preparedness was asked to undertake a comprehensive review of the DFAA and bring forward program amendments.
• The Minister also stood up an expert Advisory Panel in early 2022 to provide recommendations on how the DFAA could remain a relevant, effective and sustainable instrument for recovery, risk reduction, and resilience in the context of rising impacts of disasters.

Q2 – How were provinces and territories engaged in the modernization process

Provincial and territorial (PT) partners have been actively engaged throughout the DFAA modernization process, contributing to policy development, program design, and multiple rounds of feedback. In 2023, the Canadian Council of Emergency Management Organizations recognized this engagement as an excellent model of collaborative consultation. The modernized program addresses 35 of 36 PT recommendations for the DFAA from 2021. Recent endorsements from Manitoba and the Northwest Territories further highlight the positive reception of these efforts.

Q3 – If pressed on overall funding levels in the modernized Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements

• The modernized DFAA has a net increase in federal funding of approximately 3–5% per year.
• The previous program had a cost sharing range of 50–90%, with an average of 82%. The new program has a cost sharing range of 70–100%.
• The net increase in overall funding comes from the program's significant increased funding for building back better, risk reduction, and strategic mitigation. Jurisdictions that choose not to build back better or mitigate their highest risks will leave federal funding on the table that is intended to increase the resiliency for the whole of society and, over time, to reduce the costs and impacts of future disasters for all levels of government.
• Estimates show that with full uptake of mitigation and resilience funding following a disaster, a subsequent disaster could be expected to cost 65% less.

Q4 – If pressed on consulting provinces and territories on cost–sharing levels

• Starting in spring 2023, multiple Federal, Provincial and Territorial (FPT) meetings and two Ministerial meetings (June 2023, Jan 2024) were briefed on the "New program format based on expense type (with highest cost sharing for reducing risk and supporting vulnerable people)"; no issues were raised.
• In fall 2023, PTs were given the draft program streams, which noted reconstruction would get "medium" cost–share, while response would get "higher", supporting people and communities would get "highest", and mitigation would be "variable"; clearly indicating a minimum of 3 different cost–share levels across the program. PTs did not raise issue with this approach during the feedback period, nor during the subsequent FPT Minister's meeting in February 2024.
• PS provided the final cost–share percentages of the new program with PTs when it released the new Terms and Conditions in April 2024.

Q5 – If pressed on wildfire coverage under the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements

• The modernized DFAA covers costs for wildfires which directly threaten communities, also known as wildland urban interface fires.
• Under the modernized program, response costs; repairing, restoring and rebuilding uninsurable infrastructure (private dwellings/businesses are generally insured for fire damage); improvements to damaged infrastructure or new community or region–wide mitigation projects; and recovery supports like legal, financial, or mental health counselling can be cost shared under the DFAA to improve the resilience of communities that have suffered a disaster.
• With this new program, mitigation funding is available for any eligible disaster type under the DFAA. Therefore, a PT that suffers a disaster stemming from a natural hazard, such as a wildfire, and is eligible for DFAA funding, can use the DFAA to increase the resilience of the affected communities.

Q6 – Recent active events (One "question on" for each event)

• There are currently 89 active events under the DFAA, the most recent request for financial assistance coming from Newfoundland and Labrador.
• The province submitted a request for the storm surge in January 2025, and our government is working closely with provincial officials to promptly provide assistance to support the affected coastal communities.
• The Government of Canada is committed to working with provinces, territories and whole–of–society partners to prevent, respond to and recover from disasters.

Q7 – Jasper Recovery

• On September 19, 2024, the Province of Alberta requested financial assistance through the DFAA for costs incurred as a result of the 2024 fire disaster in Jasper.
• The estimated federal share is up to $57 million.
• In February 2025, Public Safety Canada provided the province an advance payment of $19.6 million to assist with early relief efforts and cover a portion of eligible wildfire response costs incurred.
• The Government of Canada and the government of Alberta agreed to match donations from individual Canadians and corporations to the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) for the wildfire disaster relief and recovery efforts in the province. The CRC confirmed that $12.6 million in eligible donations were collected during the matching period, for a total of $38 million raised.

Background

Issue

• The Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements program (DFAA) provides financial assistance when response and recovery costs exceed what individual provinces and territories could reasonably be expected to bear on their own.
• The Government of Canada publicly announced the modernized DFAA program on January 29, 2025, with the program coming into effect on April 1, 2025.

General–Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements (DFAA) program

• Effective January 1, 2025, provinces or territories can request federal assistance when eligible expenditures surpass $3.84 per capita (based on the provincial or territorial population).
• The program outlines eligible costs for cost–sharing, including response, repairing essential personal property, restoring resilient public infrastructure, relief and recovery supports, and strategic mitigation.
• To ensure that assistance is provided in a consistent and equitable manner, the federal share is calculated using a set cost–sharing formula that ranges from 70–90% for provinces, and 80–100% for territories.

Program Modernization

• The most recent review of the DFAA took place from 2020–2023 and was the most comprehensive evaluation and review of the DFAA in its history.
• A Minister–appointed expert advisory panel on the DFAA published its final report Building Forward Together: Toward a more resilient Canada in April 2023.
• In Budget 2023, the government announced its intention to modernize the DFAA based on the review, with an emphasis on incentivizing mitigation and risk reduction.
• Public Safety Canada (PS) worked closely with provinces and territories (PTs) on modernizing the program. Engagement with PTs took place from spring 2023 to spring 2024.

Key Changes to the Modernized Program

• The new program prioritizes funding for improving recovery outcomes, increasing resilience to disasters, and reducing future risk. Key changes to the program include:
• A shift to an objectives–based approach where the program deploys a logical framework of 5 funding streams;
• Flexibility for PTs to design projects and/or assistance programs in their jurisdiction;
• Multiple avenues for PTs to access significant amounts of mitigation, risk reduction, and resilience funding that is more flexible and strategic;
• More opportunities to support people post–disaster.
• PS has launched a new centralized IM/IT solution that support PTs in program implementation and eliminate the old program's paper–based system.
• PS is continuing to deliver training to PTs on the modernized program, and having now met with all jurisdictions except Nunavut. Open invitations to PTs for bilateral meetings, customized workshops and/or training sessions remain available.

Canadian Centre of Recovery Excellence

• The policy direction from Cabinet in 2022 called for the creation of a Canadian Centre of Recovery Excellence at Public Safety Canada to provide guidance and support to communities on how to incorporate risk reduction and resilience measures into disaster recovery so communities are safer and more resilient to future disasters.
• This Centre is a key resource for PTs in realizing the benefits of the modernized DFAA program by providing resources on effective recovery practices.

Border Security Initiatives–Migrant Smuggling

Key Messages

• Migrant smuggling networks are sophisticated, highly lucrative transnational organized crime groups that endanger migrants' lives and pose a danger to the public safety of the communities in which they operate.
• Migrant smuggling is a global problem that requires domestic and international partnerships to gather and share information to detect and investigate organized crime groups and networks.
• Funding from Canada's Border Plan builds on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) existing initiatives to monitor and secure the border between ports of entry and reduce cross border crime, including the investigation of migrant smuggling.

If Pressed

Q1 – What specific measures is the RCMP taking to identify and dismantle organized crime networks involved in migrant smuggling operations in Canada and abroad

• The RCMP is responsible for securing Canada's borders between official Ports of Entry (POE) from inbound and outbound serious criminal threats. To do this, the RCMP takes a layered approach to border security, working to prevent, detect and disrupt the greatest threats using technology and intelligence.
• The RCMP uses a variety of surveillance tools and technologies as well as patrol assets to monitor in between the ports of entry, within Canadian laws and regulations.
• The RCMP Federal Policing Border Integrity team is dedicated to addressing serious crimes at the Canadian border; this includes migrant smuggling.

Q2 – How does the RCMP collaborate with international law enforcement partners to prevent migrant smuggling before individuals reach Canadian borders

• The RCMP works closely with international law enforcement partners to help secure the Canada's borders and expansive coastline.
• The RCMP works closely with U.S. counterparts at the border to investigate transnational human smuggling networks that facilitate the movement of people. Close collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Homeland Security Investigations, and the U.S. Coast Guard allows for coordinated cross–border activities and investigations.
• For instance, the RCMP collaborates with U.S. law enforcement partners through the Cross–Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee and the Integrated Cross–Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, also known as Shiprider.

Q3 – What is the RCMP's mandate for southbound migration

• Southbound migration falls within the RCMP's mandate to ensure border security between official Ports of Entry.
• Southbound migration is difficult, since the crime is committed only once the individual has crossed into the U.S.–outside of Canadian jurisdiction. This is where the RCMP leverages its partnerships with the U.S. law enforcement partners.

Background

Issue

Migrant smuggling across the Canada–U.S. border remains a public safety concern.

Background

Migrant smuggling, also referred to as human smuggling, involves the facilitation of the illegal entry of individuals into a country of which they are neither citizens nor permanent residents. This crime typically occurs with the consent of the individual who will be smuggled, who pays the smuggler in exchange for services such as fraudulent travel documents (e.g., passports or visas), clandestine transportation, accommodation, and other forms of logistical support. In some instances, individuals who initially consent to being smuggled may subsequently become victims of human trafficking, subjected to exploitation by their smugglers.

Transnational serious and organized crime groups engaged in migrant smuggling exploit the desperation of vulnerable individuals for financial gain. The profits generated by migrant smuggling networks are frequently used to fund other forms of illicit activity, including drug trafficking, firearms smuggling, and corruption.

Investigating migrant smuggling operations presents significant challenges for law enforcement. These criminal networks often consist of loosely connected actors operating across multiple countries, with limited direct interaction with the migrants themselves. The transnational and complex nature of these networks creates obstacles to obtaining evidence and securing witness cooperation. As such, joint investigations and timely information sharing among domestic and international law enforcement partners are essential to effectively identify, disrupt, and dismantle these networks.

RCMP Efforts to Combat Migrant Smuggling

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is responsible for border security between official ports of entry (POE) along the Canada–U.S. border, across all domains (air, land, marine and Arctic,). The goal is to prevent illegal activity that may pose a threat to the safety and security of Canada. The RCMP collaborates with Canadian law enforcement and Indigenous partners to further Canada's collective approach to secure the borders from serious criminal threats. Canada and the U.S. have a long tradition of working together on initiatives that allow for joint operations and investigations of criminal threats to the Canada–U.S. border, including migrant smuggling (e.g., the Integrated Border Enforcement teams and the Integrated Cross–border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (Shiprider).

The RCMP uses a variety of surveillance tools and technologies as well as patrols to monitor and secure the border in between the POE. The RCMP is leveraging investments from Canada's Border Plan to deploy a new Aerial Intelligence Task Force comprising helicopters, drones, and mobile surveillance towers to further strengthen surveillance between POE. In addition, the RCMP provided national direction to mobilize resources along the Canada–U.S. border, increasing capacity to patrol, detect, respond to, and investigate north and south bound threats.

RCMP Recruitment and Retention

Key Messages

• Protecting the safety and security of Canadians is a priority for the Government of Canada. Recruitment remains a key focus for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the organization is committed to growing the total number of police officers that serve our communities.
• The RCMP is taking steps to make the organization more attractive and accessible to potential applicants:
  • The RCMP is increasing inclusivity and diversity through the Diverse and Inclusive Pre–Cadet Experience (DICE) and the Indigenous Pre–Cadet Training Program (IPTP).
  • Applicants can now identify their preferred choice of province or territory for their first posting, through the Flexible Posting Plan.
  • Permanent residents of Canada can now apply.
  • The RCMP is committed to ensuring that recruiting material and events are available to applicants in both official languages.
• In the fiscal year 2024–25, 895 cadets graduated from the RCMP Training Academy (CTP) at Depot Division in Regina Saskatchewan. This exceeds the previous fiscal year's total of 541 cadets.

If Pressed

Q1 – Recruit and train 1000 more RCMP personnel

• Recruitment remains the top priority for the RCMP.
• The RCMP is committed to increasing the number of personnel on an urgent basis.
• We have offered applicants more choice in where they will be posted; reduced and streamlined steps in our application process; and are increasing our capacity to handle more applications.

Q2 – Establish a new RCMP academy within Depot

• The RCMP is looking at options to modernize and develop a new RCMP Training academy within Depot.

Q3 – Increase pay for cadet recruits

• The RCMP supports increasing the Cadet Recruit Allowance for cadets while training at Depot.
• This will make it more attractive for people applying to become a regular member of the RCMP.

Q4 – Indigenous people are underrepresented in terms of law enforcement services being provided in Indigenous communities–what is the RCMP doing about this

• As the RCMP renews its commitment to reconciliation, it continues to prioritize engagement and recruitment of First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples.
• The RCMP is working in partnership with several National Indigenous Organizations and governments directly in relation to distinction–specific recruiting initiatives within their communities.
• The RCMP is dedicated to supporting the recruitment, retention and advancement of First Nation, Inuit and Métis employees through modernizing and sensitizing human resources policies and processes.
• In addition, the RCMP is working to educate and engage its workforce on Indigenous cultures and histories, while coordinating outreach activities with Indigenous communities to strengthen relationships and support the wellbeing of First Nations, Inuit and Métis employees.

Q5 – What specific initiatives is the RCMP undertaking to attract Indigenous recruits

• The RCMP has the Indigenous Pre–Cadet Training Program and the Indigenous Career Navigators Program to support the recruitment, retention and advancement of Indigenous employees.
• These programs play a crucial role in modernizing internal human resources policies to align with reconciliation efforts and to foster a culturally safe environment that respects and integrates First Nations, Inuit and Métis lived experiences through the continued support provided to the RCMP Indigenous Employee Networks.
• A mentorship program is also being developed and piloted to support First Nations, Inuit and Métis applicants and reduce barriers in the application process, with the plan to eventually encompass all applicants.

Q6 – French Language Recruitment

• The RCMP recognizes the Official Languages Act is fundamental to Canada and is committed to making all efforts to respect the substantive equality of status and usage of French and English.
• The RCMP takes its linguistic obligations seriously. It has increased targeted recruitment efforts to create a workforce that is more representative of both official languages communities, and has increased access to second official language training as a means to increase a bilingual workforce.
• As part of its Official Languages Strategy, the RCMP is actively seeking to create a more diverse and inclusive culture, in particular as it relates to the use of official languages, at all levels of the organization.
  • The Strategy is centered on four priority areas:
    • Strengthening Leadership in Official Languages;
    • Promoting Legislative Compliance with the Official Languages Act; Creating a Culture of Inclusion; and
    • Ensuring Accountability, Transparency and Measuring Progress.
• The RCMP, like other police organizations, is facing substantial recruitment challenges. The RCMP has taken targeted and proactive measures to recruit new police officers from both official language communities and to increase employee participation in second official language training.
• Supports are in place at all levels of the organization and appropriate measures are being taken to ensure that services and communications are available to both French–speaking and English–speaking Canadians in their preferred official language, as stipulated in the Official Languages Act.
• All information on the RCMP Careers website is provided in both official languages. In addition, each Divisional recruiting office–– even those that are not located in a designated bilingual region–– has a minimum of one bilingual recruiter.
• The RCMP is working with the Divisional recruiting offices to ensure that local recruitment events and activities are rooted in substantive equality and are actively providing services to members of the public in the official language of their choice.
• Efforts are ongoing to provide second language training for all levels of employment to help fill the existing gaps. This includes offering second language training for new recruits to increase the number of bilingual members entering the workforce.
• In regions where bilingualism is more widespread among the general population, recruiting events are regularly offered in a bilingual format.

Background

Issue

Recent media reports have highlighted the challenges faced by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Recruiting Program and the impact on staffing levels.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

The RCMP, like other police organizations, has faced recruitment challenges. These challenges include the limited quantity of cadet recruits and the inability to sustain minimum staffing levels in specific locations.

The RCMP recruits members based on workforce planning, informed by attrition, and resourcing demands identified by municipal and provincial contract partners, as well as the organization's federal policing requirements. With attrition and increased demands for growth, the need for new cadet recruits outpaces the supply capacity.

The RCMP has introduced many changes to improve recruitment, including increasing efforts to attract people to apply for a career in the RCMP, reducing application processing times, and removing barriers, particularly for those in employment equity groups.

The Diverse and Inclusive Pre–Cadet Experience (DICE) is an initiative focused on reducing barriers for racialized and underrepresented groups who aspire to join the RCMP. DICE has two key components: mentorship provided by an RCMP Regular Member, and a three–week training program that offers valuable insights and practical experience. Since the DICE program was launched in early 2023, it has received over 1250 applicants.

The Indigenous Pre–Cadet Training Program (IPTP) is an Indigenous recruiting initiative designed to provide potential First Nations, Inuit and Métis candidates with a first–hand look at a career in policing, while also preparing them to be competitive in the Regular Member application process. Additionally, the RCMP provides applicants with the opportunity to identify their preferred choice of first posting; expedites applications to much–needed locations; and offers long and short–term deployments.

The RCMP has also introduced an initiative for new and current Regular Members. This is an arrangement whereby the Regular Member agrees to be posted to a specific Division where there are staffing shortages for a defined period (e.g. a three–year posting) with the understanding that the Regular Member will go to a preferred division once they have completed their tenure in their current posting.

The RCMP is offering expedited processing to applicants interested in working in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, as well as northern provinces and territories. We are also asking Regular Members and active reservists to consider a temporary deployment in Saskatchewan or Manitoba between February and May this year.

Deaths of Indigenous Peoples During Interactions with Police

Key Messages

• Ensuring the safety and well–being of Indigenous communities is a priority for the Government of Canada, as we continue to advance reconciliation efforts.
• The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) continues to strengthen trust and partnerships with local, regional and national Indigenous leaders, organizations and governments to guide the delivery of professional, dedicated and culturally–responsive police services that meet the needs of Indigenous communities.
• The RCMP Act sets out internal and external review processes to manage issues related to officer conduct, to ensure RCMP officers are accountable for all occurrences involving the use of police intervention options.
• It is critically important for Canadians to feel protected by the police, and absolutely paramount that employees, communities, partners and Canadians have trust and confidence in those who serve and protect their communities.

Responsive only

• Of all RCMP interactions with the public, 99.9% do not involve any use of force.
• Overall, between 2010 and 2023 there has been a 39% decrease in the rate of reportable application of police intervention options.
• RCMP officers are required to complete mandatory training on crisis intervention and de–escalation, including annual re–certifications.

If Pressed

Q1 – RCMP Work in Indigenous Communities

The RCMP is committed to building trusting relationships and delivering culturally–responsive and trauma–informed policing services that meet the needs of Indigenous communities across Canada.

To foster reconciliation, the RCMP embraces the "Nothing about us, without us" principle, and is working to acknowledge its role in historic events; increase knowledge; expand consultations and engagement with Indigenous organizations and governments; and increase Indigenous representation within the workforce.

The RCMP engages with Indigenous Peoples and communities to continue ensuring the provision of professional, dedicated and culturally–responsive policing to the needs and cultures of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Peoples it serves.

The RCMP has developed mandatory courses for its employees such as Uniting Against Racism and Cultural Awareness and Humility, for all employees. In addition, RCMP employees interacting with the public are required to take the Using a Trauma Informed Approach course to better understand the impacts of culture and personal identity on actions, perceptions, interactions and experiences.

Q2 – Prevalence of Use of Force and De–escalation

Across the country, RCMP members are involved in approximately 3 million occurrences each year. The overwhelming majority of occurrences are resolved through communication and de–escalation.

There has been a significant decrease in use of force across the RCMP since 2010.

Communication and de–escalation are invaluable tools in ensuring the public and police are as safe as possible; unfortunately, this does not always resolve a situation, and physical intervention may be required.

The RCMP is continuing to collaborate with external academic partners, as well as the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police's Use of Force Advisory Committee to examine current training standards on the use of force and to conduct a review of de–escalation training across Canada.

There is always room for continual improvement, which is why the RCMP continues to pursue modernization around the use of force, as evidenced by the organization's extensive work on:

• Body–worn cameras
• Race–based data collection
• Enhanced de–escalation and crisis intervention training
• National use–of–force standards
• A new public and police safety framework
• Recruitment and resourcing

Q3 – Incidents Investigations and Accountability

The RCMP makes referrals to independent bodies (predominately civilian–led), or has other processes in place, to ensure that matters involving RCMP members are reviewed appropriately.

Circumstances that would be referred by the RCMP for independent review include: (1) a serious injury or death of an individual involving an RCMP member; or (2) instances where it appears that an RCMP member may have contravened a provision of the Criminal Code or other statute, and the matter is of a serious or sensitive nature.

RCMP members de–escalate most situations and, in the rare occurrences when force is used, it is lawful, reasonable, necessary and proportional.

It is exceptionally rare for members to be charged in relation to on–duty police use of force incidents.

Background

Issue

A number of deaths of Indigenous Peoples that took place during interactions with police, beginning in August 2024, have placed renewed focus on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) relationship with Indigenous communities.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

The RCMP recognizes its historical role in colonization. As the RCMP moves toward reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, it understands that this work must be advanced in partnership, with a focus on rebuilding trust and improving community safety and well–being, enhancing investigative standards, and delivering high quality, trauma–informed, culturally–responsive policing services.

The RCMP provides policing services to approximately 550 Indigenous communities: 450 First Nations, 40 Inuit and 58 Métis communities. Contributing to the safety and well–being of Indigenous communities is one of the RCMP's five organizational operational priorities and a critical component of the RCMP's service delivery model.

Crisis Intervention and De–escalation (CID)

All incidents involving police intervention are complex, dynamic and constantly evolving, oftentimes in a highly–charged atmosphere. The RCMP recognizes that even in situations where Crisis Intervention and De–escalation (CID) techniques can be used, additional police intervention may still be necessary to protect the individual, the public, and the officers. Police officers are often the first responders on the scene when someone is experiencing a mental health crisis. Though they are not medical professionals and cannot diagnose individuals, it is important for the police to understand mental health, including signs and symptoms of distress, in order to conduct effective risk assessments and de–escalate a mental health crisis, wherever tactically feasible.

Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM)

The Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM) framework is used by RCMP officers to assess and manage risk in all encounters with the public. It assists officers in determining what intervention is needed by continually assessing risk, based on the totality of the situation. This includes tactical considerations, the officer's perceptions, situational factors, and the subject's behaviour(s).

Oversight and Accountability

The RCMP Act, Part IV, provides legislated internal and external review processes to manage issues related to officer conduct. These are in addition to the Commissioner's Standing Orders; the Code of Conduct, which is found in the RCMP Regulations and establishes responsibilities and standards for conduct, both on and off duty; and operational and administrative policies. These processes ensure RCMP officers are accountable for all occurrences involving the use of police intervention options, including officer–involved shootings.

Commanding Officer of the Saskatchewan RCMP

Key Messages

• Assistant Commissioner Rhonda Blackmore has dedicated nearly 30 years to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), serving with integrity and commitment to public safety.
• She will assume a new role within the RCMP. While personnel matters are confidential, it's essential that such decisions uphold the principles of fairness and due process.
• The Government of Canada recognizes the dedication of all RCMP members in Saskatchewan and across Canada. Their commitment to community safety is invaluable and we support them during this period of transition.
• C/Supt Robin McNeil has been appointed as the interim Commanding Officer to ensure the continuity of leadership in Saskatchewan. The RCMP continues to maintain its operations effectively during this time.

If Pressed

Q1 – About her reason for removal

• Decisions regarding the administration of RCMP personnel followed the established processes and guidelines, and are confidential. As a result, I am not able to comment on internal Human Resources matters or ongoing reviews.
• All members, regardless of rank, are expected to meet the highest standards of conduct and accountability.

Q2 – About the anonymous complaints

Complaints are confidential and are taken seriously within the RCMP's established processes and legislation. The RCMP determined that the information received in this case warranted further review and assessment. It is important that all members have access to safe and confidential ways to raise concerns.

Q3 – About the investigation/process what will be undertaken

As with any complaint, the RCMP is responsible for taking the necessary administrative steps. This may include mandating an investigation as well as imposing appropriate interim administrative measures.

Q4 – about the expected length of the investigation/process

The duration of any administrative processes is contingent upon the nature and the complexity of each case. The RCMP consistently strives to advance any administrative processes in an efficient and timely manner.

Background

Issue

Assistant Commissioner Rhonda Blackmore has been removed from her position as Commanding Officer of Saskatchewan RCMP, a role she has held since April 12, 2021.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

Assistant Commissioner Rhonda Blackmore has been removed from her position as Commanding Officer of Saskatchewan RCMP, a role she has held since April 12, 2021. Media reports indicate that her removal was based on anonymous complaints.

Assistant Commissioner Rhonda Blackmore's tenure included leading the RCMP during significant events, such as the 2022 mass stabbings in James Smith Cree Nation and Weldon, where her leadership was noted for its professionalism under challenging circumstances.

RCMP Operational Communications Centres Dispatch Officers

Key Messages

• Protecting the safety and security of Canadians is a priority for the Government of Canada.
• Telecommunications operators play a critical role, as they are the first person a caller speaks to when calling 9–1–1 or requesting emergency assistance.
• The government is aware of the stress and strain on employees who work in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) Operational Communications Centres, and that retention has become a significant issue for the organization.
• The RCMP has reviewed the evaluation of RCMP Operational Communications Centres, and accepts the findings and recommendations as provided.
• The health and wellbeing of RCMP Operational Communications Centre operators remains a priority, and ensuring sufficient and consistent support for employees is vital.

If Pressed

Q1 – SFT commitment to recruit and train 1000 more RCMP officers

• Recruitment remains a top priority for the RCMP.
• The RCMP is committed to increasing the number of officers on an urgent basis.
• We have offered applicants more choice in where they will be posted; reduced and streamlined steps in our application process; and are increasing our capacity to handle more applications.

Q2 – Shortage of Dispatch Officers

• Recruitment remains a top priority for the RCMP.
• Following the RCMP's internal evaluation of the Operational Communications Centres (OCC), the RCMP recognizes the challenge of high vacancies and is committed to addressing the needs represented by the OCC program. Note: the OCC program involves operators who provide emergency and administrative services from contract, federal and municipal Operational Communications Centres across Canada, and from the RCMP Operational Coordination Centre (ROCC).
• The recent evaluation makes five recommendations, including a call for a national recruitment and retention strategy, updated training to better prepare operators, and a tailor–made health and wellness strategy.
• The RCMP accepts the recommendations and is taking action to address these issues.
  • In response to the call for mental health supports, the RCMP is piloting the delivery of Emotional Resilience Skills Training (ERST) to newly–hired OCC operators.
  • The RCMP continues to collaborate with unions through two working groups focused on mental health and retention.
• The RCMP remains committed to supporting the OCC Program and will continue to encourage opportunities for OCC recruitment and retention.

Background

Issue

The RCMP's Operational Communications Centres are facing a number of challenges, as highlighted in a recent internal evaluation report. These include recruitment and retention issues.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

The RCMP has approximately 1000 operators who provide emergency and administrative services from contract, federal and municipal Operational Communications Centres (OCC) across Canada, and from the RCMP Operational Coordination Centre (ROCC).

On May 20, 2025, the RCMP Internal Audit, Evaluation, Risk and Research (IAERR) Unit published the findings of the Evaluation of the RCMP's Operational Communications Centres. In this report, the IAERR communicated the following findings:

• While there is a governance structure in place for the OCC program, limited national oversight has impacted program delivery.
• Many Operational Communications Centres lack sufficient personnel to maintain program delivery over the long-term.
• OCC training is preparing operators to perform the core duties; however, there are barriers to better preparing employees for the role of an OCC operator.
• OCC operators are experiencing high levels of work–related stress, resulting in employee burnout and an increased number of vacancies.
• Current mental health and wellness resources are insufficient for OCC employees and are inconsistent across divisions.
• The OCC program provides effective support to RCMP regular members; however, staffing shortages limit the overall effectiveness of service delivery.
• While some OCCs have realized efficiencies in certain areas, there may be opportunities to achieve greater program efficiency overall.

The Evaluation Report made the following recommendations:

• Examine the governance of the OCC program with a view to enhancing national oversight of its design and delivery, including establishing and communicating clear roles, responsibilities, and authorities within the OCC program.
• Establish a national recruitment and retention strategy that incorporates the sharing of lessons learned and best practices, and encourages collaboration across the program.
• Update training to ensure it better prepares operators, fulfills the needs of all OCCs, and reflects the recommendations of the Mass Casualty Commission and other reviews.
• Establish an OCC–specific health and wellness strategy to ensure employees are receiving sufficient and consistent support.
• Strengthen the approach to performance measurement with the objective of enhancing program efficiency, supporting decision–making and monitoring program effectiveness.
• On June 3, 2025, CBC News reported that "a recently released RCMP audit says its 911 dispatch centres across the country are struggling with severe staff shortages and burnout, putting front–line Mounties and the public at risk." The article further described the RCMP as responsible for 17 operational communications centres, where dispatchers within operational communications centres (OCCs) field calls in almost every province and all three territories.

RCMP Reform

Key Messages

• The Government of Canada is committed to supporting the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as it undertakes organizational reforms to better serve Canadians in response to recommendations and calls for change.
• Recognizing the importance of getting things right, the RCMP established a sector to drive forward reforms holistically across the organization, starting with the response to the Mass Casualty Commission's (MCC) final report.
• The RCMP is taking steps to transform the federal policing program to evolve and meet emerging criminal threats.
• The RCMP also works directly with contract jurisdictions to respond to feedback received through the Contract Policing Assessment.
• Recognizing that there is still more to do, the RCMP will continue to work with stakeholders across the country to modernize service delivery and respond to evolving priorities.
• These efforts reflect the Government of Canada's commitment to keep Canadians safe and secure, while improving accountability, transparency, and public trust in the RCMP.

If Pressed

Q1 – What changes have been implemented by the RCMP in response to the recommendations of the Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission

• The RCMP is hard at work implementing the MCC recommendations. In fact, they began addressing gaps immediately after the tragic events in Nova Scotia.
• Since then, they've made significant improvements, ranging from new policies on Alert Ready to deploying specialized technology to 911 centres.
• So far, the RCMP has completed work on 37 initiatives and concluded ten MCC recommendations.
• As part of its commitment to transparency, the RCMP is posting its progress on its public website.
• It is also reporting regularly to the Progress Monitoring Committee and the RCMP's Management Advisory Board (MAB).

Q2 – How is the RCMP responding to calls to reform the federal policing program i.e., National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Report, White Paper released by the former Prime Minister, MAB Report

• The RCMP must continue to adapt to an evolving criminal threat environment to protect Canadians from unprecedented challenges to our security, economy, and sovereignty.
• To date, the RCMP has realigned the federal policing program into four regions to focus resources on national investigative priorities, and introduced changes to support a modernized federal policing workforce with the training and tools to combat the most serious threats to Canada.
• Our government will take the time necessary to assess the state of policing in Canada before making decisions with respect to the RCMP's federal policing mandate.

Q3 – What reforms is the government considering in relation to contract policing

• The RCMP continues to work with contract jurisdictions to respond to feedback received during the Contract Policing Assessment.
• The current contracts among Canada, provinces, territories and municipalities are in place until March 31, 2032.
• Our government has not yet had the time to consider the breadth of issues to support an informed decision on the future of Contract Policing.
• We are committed to gathering the information and having the necessary discussions in advance of making a timely decision on the way forward.

Background

Issue

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has been the subject of a range of reports that have identified challenges and made recommendations with respect to reforms that the RCMP should undertake in order to modernize the organization.

Background

The RCMP continues to advance efforts on a number of key initiatives that are intended to strengthen the organization and respond to recommendations made through a series of recent reports, including the Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission, the Special Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians on Federal Policing, and the Management Advisory Board. These reform efforts are fundamental to the Commissioner's three organizational priorities: improving its recruitment, fostering a workplace culture that is healthy, inclusive and trusted by its employees, and supporting operations.

In May 2023, the Commissioner demonstrated his commitment to modernizing the organization by announcing the creation of a new sector, with a mandate to lead and support major reform and renewal initiatives across the RCMP's business lines, lead the RCMP's response to significant external reviews, and provide strategic advice, oversight and coordination of change initiatives.

The RCMP continues to advance work to meet emerging needs and recognizes that changes are necessary to enhance the sustainability of the organization and better position the RCMP to address crime at the municipal, provincial/territorial and federal levels. These organizational reform efforts extend to ongoing work to transform federal policing and the future of contract policing beyond 2032.

While the RCMP has built a strong foundation on which it can advance organizational reforms, more work and resources are required to propel the organization forward and meet the evolving criminal threat environment.

Crimes Against Humanity–War Crimes Program

Structural Investigation–Israel–Hamas

Purpose

To provide information on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) initiatives surrounding war crimes investigations and the structural investigation into the Israel–Hamas conflict.

Background and Current Status

Background of Program

In 1988, the Government of Canada established the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (CAHWC) Program. The mandate of the Program is to support Canada's policy to deny safe haven in Canada to persons believed to have committed or been complicit in war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide (collectively "core crimes") and to seek accountability for their conduct (No Safe Haven Policy).

Structural Investigation

The decision to initiate a structural investigation in this case was influenced by several factors, including the outbreak of hostilities in October 2023. The RCMP's objective is to proactively collect, preserve, and analyze information that may support future investigative steps both domestically and to provide evidence to international like–minded partners, should jurisdictional and legal thresholds be met.

Other government Partners

The structural investigation consists of working with our program partners including; Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC); and Department of Justice (DOJ). Other non–governmental organizations are also leveraged to collect information from individuals who are potential victims or witnesses to acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These offences are also known as core international crimes.

International Partners

International partnerships are a key to investigation under the CAHWCA and are developed as the investigation progresses. Partnerships evolve based primarily on the locations of victims, witnesses, perpetrators and evidence around the world.

Strategic Considerations

The Toronto Star article prematurely announced the RCMP's structural investigation. The disclosure to the reporter was done inadvertently, during background questioning about the CAHWC Program and other structural investigations. The RCMP had yet to publicly announce the structural investigation because the supporting tools, such as the secure online portal, are not yet operational. The intention was to ensure that once announced, individuals would have a clear, safe, and accessible mechanism through which to share information.

Key Messages

The RCMP, as part of Canada's War Crimes Program, is firmly committed to fairness, impartiality, and non–partisanship in the investigation of alleged war crimes, regardless of where they occur or who is involved.

The objective remains consistent: to ensure that Canada does not become a safe haven for individuals who have committed grave international crimes, and to support justice for victims–regardless of nationality, background, or geopolitical context.

A Structural Investigation is used as a data collection initiative, to preserve evidence during a time of active conflict. Materials collected in this process may or may not be used for future criminal investigations.

Structural Investigations have been used in past instances such as the Ukraine conflict and crimes committed against the Yazidi population in Syria and Iraq.

Border Plan–CBSA

Key Messages

• Canada's border is strong and we're making it stronger.
• The Border Plan announced a few months ago is the largest single investment in the border in Canadian history.
• Of the $1.3 billion investment, over $355 million will help the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) bolster its frontline and get the latest tools and technology to stop more drugs and firearms.

Background

Issue

Canada is investing $1.3 billion to bolster security at the border and strengthen the immigration system, all while keeping Canadians safe. This includes $355.4M for the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

Canada has a strong border, and is making it stronger. Canada's Border Plan is backed by an investment of $1.3 billion to bolster border security, strengthen our immigration system, and contribute to Canada's prosperity.

The Border Plan specifically allocates over $355 million for the CBSA. This funding not only includes the hiring of over 100 additional CBSA personnel, including border services officers, intelligence analysts and specialized chemists, but also the training of up to nine new detector dogs teams, as well as the procurement of chemical detection tools and scanners that will be deployed to the border. We are bolstering our frontlines and ensuring that they have the tools and technology they need to continue to interdict illicit drugs and illegal firearms. The CBSA already employs several different kinds of tools to stem the flow of illegal and prohibited goods into Canada. Guided by intelligence, our officers use contraband detection tools, such as handheld devices, small–scale and large–scale X–ray machines, and K–9 units. Their specialized training, expertise, and knowledge allow them to always be on the lookout for drugs, firearms, and any other threat.

The CBSA carefully monitors and analyses changing trends and smuggling strategies to better inform interdiction efforts. As part of Canada's Border Plan, the CBSA has launched Operation Blizzard, a targeted, cross–country initiative aimed at intercepting illegal contraband arriving and leaving Canada, with a focus on fentanyl and other synthetic narcotics. During this one month blitz, border services officers increased examinations of inbound and outbound shipments. They also acted on increased referrals from CBSA's National Targeting Centre based on risk assessments.

That said, Canada is not a significant source of fentanyl entering the US. Less than 1% of fentanyl seized in the U.S. comes from Canada. Additionally Canada's Border Plan also proposes to:

• Improve operational coordination by: creating regional hubs to coordinate national, regional, and local law enforcement activities against organized crime and illegal drugs; and proposing to United States the creation of a new North American Joint Strike Force to target transnational organized crime, including operational surges, dedicated synthetic drug units, expanded Combined Forces Special Enforcement Units, Binational Integrated Border Enforcement Teams, and new technical operations capacity and infrastructure.
• Introduce legislative requirements to expressly obligate port owners and operators to provide CBSA, free of charge, with the space and facilities it needs to conduct export inspections, just as they do for imports.
• Enhancing and expanding information and intelligence sharing arrangements between federal, provincial, territorial and Indigenous authorities to manage the border, with a focus on fentanyl, human smuggling and organized crime.
• Enhancing vetting with the United States of all eTA (Electronic Travel Authorization) applicants to screen for high–risk individuals.
• Ending the practice of 'flagpoling' which uses significant resources at the border and distracts border officers from enforcement activities and slows cross–border traffic.

Canada Border Service Agency Assessment and Revenue Management System (CARM)–Release Prior to Payment Program (RPP)

Key Messages

• Each year, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) manages $40 billion in duties and taxes.
• Previously, the CBSA's inability to claim against an importer's debt resulted in significant annual losses to revenue.
• To address this liability, the CBSA's CARM Client Portal now requires importers to post financial security in order to have their goods released prior to payment.
• This change is targeted to reduce debt write–off by $13 million annually.

If Pressed on Release Prior to Payment Program (RPP)

• Previously, the CBSA's inability to claim against an importer's debt resulted in significant annual losses to revenue.
• To address this liability, the CBSA's CARM Client Portal now requires importers to post financial security in order to have their goods released prior to payment.
• This change is targeted to reduce debt write–off by $13 million annually.

Background

Issue

Canada Border Service Agency Assessment and Revenue Management System (CARM) and the Release Prior to Payment Program (RPP)

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

On October 21, 2024, Legislative and regulatory amendments came into effect making CARM the official system for managing the $40B in duties and taxes collected by the CBSA. CARM provides businesses with an account view of their importing history, allows them to make payments, establish a financial security agreement and submit digital forms. It improves compliance with trade rules, protects Government of Canada revenue and simplifies the import process by replacing paper based processes.

Transitional measures were put in place to support trade chain partners as they adjust to CARM and, more specifically, changes to the regulations relating to financial security.

Guiding the process, Accounting for Imported Goods and Payment of Duties Regulations (SOR/86–1062) have been in place for years; compliance with the regulations had been satisfied by allowing the importer to use the financial security of a customs broker. While this model facilitated the movement of goods it impeded the CBSA from collecting on debts owing to the Crown. The inability to claim against a customs brokers financial security to pay an importers bad debt resulted in annual debt write offs.

Following the deployment of the CARM system on October 21 2024, a transition period was introduced to give commercial importers additional time to post their financial security electronically while continuing to benefit from the Release Prior to Payment (RPP) Program. This transition period ended at 3 am EDT on May 20, 2025. The change in liability is targeted to reduce debt write off by $13M annually. The changes also align with legislative changes planned to come into force in January 2026 that will provide greater clarity between the role of the importer and the customs broker.

In order to support the continued flow of commercial shipments at the border after the transition period ends, the CBSA will allow goods to move in bond to an inland sufferance warehouse providing the transporting carrier is bonded. If an importer does not have RPP upon arrival of their goods, they may choose to either post the financial security required in order to benefit from RPP or submit a Commercial Accounting Declaration at a CBSA office and pay the applicable amounts owing. Importers may choose to pay the applicable amounts owing using a credit card, up to a maximum of $5,000.00, or a debit card or a cheque. The security deposit option may be suitable for businesses whom import infrequently, seasonally and/or have low amounts of duties and taxes payable. This deposit can be paid with a credit card.

Awareness sessions and outreach across a broad range of stakeholders including small, medium and large size importers, customs brokers and transportation companies proved to be effective in raising awareness and mitigating the risk of border delays. Border Wait Times for processing commercial shipments remains within service standards and as of May 2025, over 157,000 businesses have registered in the CARM Client Portal. Importers who have posted financial security to obtain Release Prior to Payment represent over 93% of the volume.

Most recently, the CBSA is using CARM to implement surtax and remission orders in a timely and targeted manner in response to U.S. trade actions and other global developments. Through automated tariff coding updates and centralized importer account management, CARM allows for immediate application of new fiscal measures without the delays previously caused by manual processing and dispersed systems.

The cost of the CARM system was $438.4 million–within an overall budget of $526M. Deloitte has been contracted in the design, development and implementation of CARM, and is now supporting the systems ongoing operation. Deloitte receives $22M annually to manage the CARM service.

Removals

Key Messages

• Removing those who are not eligible to stay in Canada is critical, especially those who pose threats to the safety of Canadians.
• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) removed over 18,000 inadmissible people last year–the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before.
• The Border Plan provided $55.5M to support immigration and asylum processing and to increase CBSA's capacity to reach 20,000 removals for the next two years.

Background

Issue

Enforcing removal of people who do not have the right to stay in Canada.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

The removal of foreign nationals that are deemed inadmissible as per the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) is an integral part of the CBSA's security mandate. Individuals may be inadmissible for a variety of reasons including security; criminality; demands on Canadian society, or non–compliance with the IRPA. Following various legal and administrative processes, including admissibility hearings or redress options through the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), inadmissible persons are issued a removal order, which the Agency is mandated to enforce as quickly as possible.

The CBSA prioritizes removals based on a risk management regime that assigns the highest priority to cases involving security, organized crime, crimes against humanity, criminality, and failed irregular arrival refugee claimants. These are followed by failed refugee claimants as second tier, and all other inadmissible persons as the lowest priority.

CBSA's removal efforts may be hindered and delayed by impediments such as uncooperative foreign nationals who do not provide necessary information or documentation to allow for their removal, or foreign governments that refuse the return of their nationals, or fail to promptly issue timely travel documents. The CBSA works closely with foreign governments, Canadian officials abroad, and other departments to resolve these challenges, and participates in international forums to identify joint strategies and best practices to achieve timely removals of inadmissible persons.

The Fall Economic Statement (FES) provided $55.5 million over three years to the CBSA to support front–end immigration and asylum processing activities, and achieve a 25% increase in the number of removals enforced. This includes reducing inventory backlogs, increasing removal capacity and addressing the anticipated increase in associated removals litigation. The funding will primarily be used to secure regional staff and ensure the program has necessary resources to achieve 20,000 removals in FY2025–26 and FY2026–27.

In response to the significant increase in individuals making asylum claims in Canada, the CBSA aligned its resources to enforce removal orders in a more efficient and timely manner. A Removals Action Plan has also been developed to further enhance program delivery and address outstanding issues, including prioritizing cases to overcome impediments to removal, leveraging existing resources more efficiently, and engaging priority countries to expedite removal processes.

Facial recognition technology at the border

Key Messages

• By using digital tools and new technologies, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is allowing border services officers to focus on enforcement activities and addressing travellers' needs for easier and faster self–service.
• The CBSA has been using facial recognition technology at Canadian airports to verify traveller identity since 2017.
• Privacy is at the forefront of the development of new technologies and tools, through ongoing engagement with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.

Background

Issue

Traveller Modernization–Advance Declaration and Biometrics

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is working to enhance border processing efficiency while ensuring safety and security. As part of the Traveller Modernization initiative, we are introducing a series of improvements to systems and processes at Canada's ports of entries over the coming months and years. By using digital tools and biometric technologies, these initiatives will streamline the border processing experience for low–risk travellers. This will not only expedite their crossing but also allow the CBSA to focus our resources on higher risk travellers and enforcement measures.

Currently, Advance Declaration allows travellers to make their customs and immigration declaration in advance to save time at the 10 largest airports. Where it is available, Advance Declaration is being used by approximately 12% of travellers every month. Work with the airport authorities is needed to increase the usage of Advance Declaration [REDACTED].

Traveller Modernization will add new features to the existing application such as border wait times and other self–serve functions. Advance Declaration use will also be expanded to travellers arriving by land so they can make use of available technology to expedite and facilitate their travel. These changes will allow greater flexibility for travellers and we expect that uptake of this technology will continue to grow as new features are added.

The CBSA will ensure that privacy is at the forefront of the development of new technologies and tools as part of the Traveller Modernization initiative, through current and ongoing engagement with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. The Traveller Modernization initiative will continue to follow the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada's privacy practices for developing mobile apps. With regards to biometrics more specifically, work is underway to amend regulations and policies to ensure that the privacy rights and freedoms of Canadians are protected at every step of the way.

The use of all of these tools are voluntary. Travellers have the option to continue using traditional officer assisted processing.

Firearms from the United States

Key Messages

• In 2024, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) seized more than 930 firearms–90% came from the US. Over the last five years, over 3,000 firearms seized at our border came from the U.S.
• The CBSA works with domestic and U.S. law enforcement partners in a joint effort to investigate, prevent criminal activity, seize guns and protect our communities.
• Of the $1.3 billion Border Plan, over $355 million will help the CBSA bolster its frontline and get the latest tools and technology to stop drugs and firearms from entering Canada.

Background

Issue

The flow of firearms across the Canada/United States border.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

As part of its mandate, the CBSA controls the movement of firearms, weapons and other devices to ensure compliance with existing laws, regulations and orders, including the Customs Act, the Firearms Act and the Criminal Code.

The CBSA actively participates in firearm–related criminal investigations with a border nexus, including joint investigations alongside domestic and international law enforcement partners, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other Canadian police agencies, provincial and territorial governments, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Homeland Security Investigations, and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in a joint effort to and guns and prevent those who engage in criminal activity from entering Canada. The Agency regularly shares relevant information on border and national security issues with its national and international law enforcement partners as well as other government departments in Canada, to ensure the health, safety, and security of Canadians.

Border security and integrity is a shared mandate between the CBSA and the RCMP in Canada. The CBSA is responsible for enforcing the law at designated ports of entry in Canada and the RCMP is responsible for enforcing Canadian legislation between ports of entry. The CBSA is also working with federal government partners, provincial, territorial and Indigenous communities, as well as local law enforcement agencies to ensure a coordinated approach to border security.

In March 2023, the CBSA signed an information sharing Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives that enables efficient and direct information sharing between both organizations including information relating to the origins of seized firearms. The CBSA has a policy to trace 100% of firearms seized at the border. Where serial numbers have been removed, altered or obliterated, efforts are made to restore the serial number with partner assistance. In 2024, the U.S. was the main source of firearms seized by the CBSA, with approximately 90% of all successful traces leading back to U.S. purchasers or retailers.

On April 29, 2024, the Agency appointed an Executive Director for Combatting Firearms Smuggling to bolster our considerable efforts and recent successes. The Executive Director, located in the CBSA's Greater Toronto Area Region, helps coordinate and lead our Agency–wide efforts against illegal firearms smuggling and to create more direct linkages between headquarters, frontline operations, and domestic and international partners. The Executive Director for Combatting Firearms Smuggling is working closely with U.S. partners to improve information sharing aimed at building greater intelligence and investigative leads around persons and organized crime groups attempting to exploit our shared border.

The CBSA screens all goods entering Canada, including international mail shipments, to make sure they are properly declared and meet import requirements. The CBSA processes international mail at three processing centres in Vancouver, Toronto or Montreal, in addition to mail arriving by courier. The CBSA prioritizes investigating cases where a cross–border interception suggests smuggling or other criminal intent such as the unauthorized manufacturing of guns in Canada. As smugglers are increasingly using more sophisticated concealment methods in smuggling attempts, the CBSA employs a number of tools and tradecraft to stem the flow of illegal and prohibited materials into Canada. Guided by intelligence, our officers are also assisted by contraband detection tools such as handheld devices, small scale and large–scale X–ray machines, and detector dogs. Their specialized training, expertise and knowledge, in detecting contraband and prohibited or restricted goods, allows them to always be on the lookout for dangerous goods. The CBSA continues ongoing review and analysis of seizures of firearms, prohibited weapons and devices occurring in/or destined to Canada to help identify trends and indicators to assist with targeting. Intelligence personnel focus their efforts on priority files based on a number of indicators, and facilitate referrals to the Criminal Investigations Division where appropriate. This work also includes a focus on education and compliance with respect to importers/consignees in the postal and courier areas. The CBSA also has different teams that work together and play specific roles in the detection and interception of firearms and contraband:

• The Intelligence and Investigations Program teams play a key role in identifying border risks. Intelligence activities are conducted to identify, entities of interest to the CBSA in connection with organized crime, human smuggling and immigration, fraud, terrorism and other violations of the Customs Act and Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
• The targeting program team identifies individuals and goods bound for Canada that may pose a threat to the safety and security of the country by using a number of automated pre–arrival information sources.
• The National Firearms Intelligence Desk team, was created in 2021 to maintain a real–time picture of illicit gun threats in Canada and their movement across our borders.
• 4. The Criminal Investigations Program supports organized crime disruption and combats firearm smuggling by employing a variety of investigative techniques to identify, interdict and prosecute entities seeking to exploit the border, conducting successful investigations across the country, both independently and through integrated teams involving other law enforcement agencies.

Immigration Detention

Key Messages

• With the loss of access to provincial correctional facilities, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is currently upgrading its immigration holding centres to house high-risk detainees.
• To safely manage high-risk detainees, the CBSA will also be using vacant Correctional Service Canada infrastructure in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec. This holding centre will only be used to detain adult males who present a significant risk to public safety.
• Of individuals requiring CBSA supervision, 98.8% are enrolled in an alternative to detention, only 1% are detained in a CBSA Immigration Holding Centre, and 0.2% are detained in a provincial correctional facility.
• The priority remains to remove inadmissible individuals from Canada as soon as possible, with a focus on those who are inadmissible for serious criminality.

Background

Issue

Immigration Detention–Canada Border Services Agency and Correctional Service Canada assistance agreement: Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines facility

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

Canada's Immigration Detention Program is governed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and its regulations.

Immigration detention is based on the principle that detention shall be used only as a measure of last resort, in limited circumstances.

Over the last eight years, the CBSA has reduced the use of detention by increasing alternatives to detention, such as in-person and remote reporting, Community Case Management and Supervision, and Electronic Monitoring. However, in certain cases, detention is deemed necessary when:

1. an individual presents a risk to public safety (i.e. when an individual has a documented history or pattern of violent or aggressive crimes/behaviour),
2. the CBSA is unable to establish an individual's legitimate identity, and/or
3. the behaviour of the individual threatens program integrity (such as immigration proceedings or removal).

As of May 21, 2025, the percentage breakdown for type of immigration detention is:

• 98.8% enrolled in alternatives to detention
• 1% were held in an immigration holding centre
• 0.2% were detained in a provincial correctional facility

Historically, the CBSA partnered with provincial governments to have individuals who were assessed as high-risk held in provincial correctional facilities. This allowed the CBSA to manage public safety risks in cases that could not be managed through other means, such as alternatives to detention or within CBSA immigration holding centres.

Following multiple provincial governments' decisions to withdraw from immigration detention arrangements, the CBSA started making significant infrastructure upgrades and changes to its operations and staffing in order to house high-risk detainees in separate and enhanced areas of its immigration holding centres. The CBSA currently has the capacity to hold low-to-medium-risk cases in their immigration holding centres, and once retrofitting projects are completed, these facilities will be able to hold high-risk cases as well. In addition, further to an arrangement between the CBSA and Correctional Service Canada to allow for the use (until June 2029) of federal correctional facilities for the purpose of high-risk immigration detention, the CBSA is creating capacity in a Designated Immigrant Station within the Regional Reception Centre located in Sainte-Anne-des-Plaines, Quebec. Once ready, the location will only be used to detain high-risk adult males who pose a significant risk to public safety.

Updated policies, procedures, and training are being implemented, and increased tools and staffing complements are being introduced, to ensure immigration holding centre and Designated Immigrant Station staff are adequately prepared and resourced. These measures will ensure that the CBSA is able to continue to detain all individuals subject to enforcement measures under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, for whom release on an alternative to detention is not an option. The CBSA continues to work with partners to maintain community safety, and to ensure all immigration detainees are treated in a dignified and compassionate manner.

Operation Blizzard

Key Messages

• Launched as part of Canada's Border Plan, Operation Blizzard was a month-long, cross-country surge operation to intercept fentanyl and other illegal drugs at the border.
• In total, the Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) executed over 2,600 seizures of narcotics and precursors across the country.
• 67.5% of all seizures made were of illegal narcotics coming to Canada from the United States, while 17.5% were of narcotics going to the United States.
• 1.44 kg of fentanyl was intercepted while on route to the United States. The CBSA will continue to disrupt the supply chain for fentanyl and other illicit drugs as part of Canada's efforts to strengthen border security and combat organized crime.

Background

Issue

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) concluded the targeted blitz named Operation Blizzard to intercept contraband in all transportation modes.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

CBSA plays an important role in keeping fentanyl, its precursors and other dangerous drugs off our streets.

Launched as part of Canada's Border Plan, Operation Blizzard was a month-long (February 12th to March 13th), cross-country surge operation to intercept fentanyl and other illegal drugs in postal, air cargo and marine containers.

During the operation, Border Services Officers examined shipments, with a special focus on mail, air freight and sea containers going to the United States. They acted on increased referrals from CBSA's National Targeting Centre based on risk assessments. In total, the CBSA executed over 2,600 seizures of suspected narcotics and precursors across the country. 67.5% of all seizures made were of illegal narcotics coming to Canada from the United States, while 17.5% were of narcotics going to the United States. These included:

• 116 fentanyl seizures (1.73 kg), intercepted in British Columbia, Québec and Alberta. Of these seizures, 1.44 kg were on route to the United States and 0.26 kg were destined to other countries
• 17 meth seizures (5.38 kg and 89 pills)
• 24 cocaine seizures (13 kg)
• 26 heroin seizures (0.19 kg)
• 17 opium seizures (38.84 kg and 11 bottles)
• 48 MDMA seizures (2.32 kg and 82 pills)
• 249 cannabis and cannabis related product seizures

By comparison, according to publicly available U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) statistics, the CBP has seized 250kg of fentanyl so far in 2025. Of this total less than 0.01% is identified as coming from their Northern Border.

As part of the Border Plan, the CBSA deployed new imaging and chemical detection tools at high-risk ports of entry and train and deploy new canine teams to intercept illegal drugs. The CBSA activated the Special Investigation and Examination for Greater Enforcement (SIEGE) capacity, which is a part of the $1.3B Border Plan. This enabled front-line Border Services Officers (BSOs) to conduct targeted blitzes, focusing on fentanyl and its chemical precursors with a primary focus and nexus to the United States.

The CBSA has already seized 25,589 kg of drugs since the beginning of 2025 (from January 1 to April 29, 2025). Of this total, 2,145 g were fentanyl seizures.

In 2024, the CBSA seized 4.9 kilograms of fentanyl. 4.1 kg was intercepted outbound before it could be smuggled towards the Netherlands.

CBSA Personnel and Border Services Officers Training

Key Messages

• Day in and day out, approximately 8,600 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) frontline personnel play a crucial role protecting our communities.
• While the border plan allocated significant funding for new technology, it also included funding for up to 100 new Border Services Officers, intelligence analysts, specialized chemists and new detector dog teams.
• In keeping with the government's commitment, the Prime Minister announced upcoming investments to hire 1000 additional CBSA officers.

If Pressed on Student Border Services Officers

• Approximately 5% of the frontline CBSA personnel are Student Border Services Officers–550 students.
• Student Border Services Officers are deployed in airports at mail processing centres and at the reporting centre.
• Students are important to our operations and provide additional capacity to support surges in volumes.

Background

Issue

The Customs and Immigration Union continues to make comments through various media that the CBSA would need to hire upwards of 2,000 to 3,000 more Border Services Officers to meet operational demands.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

• The more than 8,600 frontline personnel include both employees and middle managers in the FB classification and Student Border Services Officers (SBSO) that actively serve on the frontline.
• Agency growth outside of the frontline workforce since 2015, directly or indirectly, supports the frontlines in areas of work such as enforcement, trade, policy, information and technology and other enabling program areas.
• The number of Border Services Officer graduates from the Canada Border Services College has continuously increased year over year since 2016, with the exception of 2020 due to the College temporarily having to shut down (and moved to online learning for a short period) because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
• The CBSA College continues to undertake the necessary planning, recruitment, and training of sufficient new recruits into the College each year to maintain workforce requirements.
• The Agency has made investments to increase the number of officers who support Asylum processing and intelligence activities across Canada. This is consistent with investments made by the government to address pressures in the immigration system.
• Through its renewal efforts and commitment to sustainability, the CBSA continues to implement technology aimed at making the border experience more efficient, streamlining processing to reallocate critical resources to interdiction and enforcement activities. This includes initiatives like the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management project and Travellers Modernization project.
• An Student Border Services Officer (SBSO) can perform certain duties of the Border Services Officer, but they do not require arming. They are subject to a comprehensive training program that consists of 9 days of theoretical (in class) followed by 8 days of Control and Defensive Tactics (CDT) for a total of 17 days of training.
• SBSOs are currently deployed mostly within the airport environment (to process travellers), at mail processing centers and at the National Telephone Reporting Center. Beginning this year, SBSOs will now be deployed to the Vancouver Cruise Ship Operations on the West Coast.
• The CBSA has hired on average around 700 SBSOs each year from 2020 to 2025 to complement operations at busy ports of entry across the country.

Refugee Claims

Key Messages

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has plans in place to maintain a secure border in the event of an increased number of refugee claimants from the United States.
• In processing individuals claiming asylum, CBSA officers determine whether the person is admissible into Canada. They also assess whether they meet an exception to the Safe Third Country Agreement–and if they do not, they are returned to the U.S.
• As of mid-May, the CBSA had processed approximately 13,500 asylum applications in Canada, which is 50% less than last year.

If Pressed

Q1 – Safe Third Country Agreement and Removals

• From January to May, 2025, approximately 1440 asylum claimants were removed to the U.S. for their ineligibility under the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA).
• The CBSA removed over 18,000 inadmissible people in fiscal year 2024-25—the highest in a decade and an increase from approximately 16,000 the year before. The Border Plan provided $55.5M to support immigration and asylum processing and to increase CBSA's capacity to reach 20,000 removals for the next two years.

Background

Issue

Increases of number of asylum claims at the border crossing in Lacolle, Quebec.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

The CBSA's role at ports of entry is to assess the admissibility of persons coming to Canada. All persons seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and may be subject to a more in-depth examination. Admissibility of travelers is decided on a case-by-case basis and based on the information made available at the time of entry.

Having obtained a temporary resident visa (visitor visa) or having been previously authorized to enter Canada does not guarantee the right to enter Canada. On arrival at a Canadian port of entry, all travelers must demonstrate that they meet the requirements to enter. Foreign nationals seeking to visit, study, or work in Canada must establish that they hold a valid visa (if required) and that they are admissible to enter Canada and will leave Canada by the end of the period authorized for their stay.

When a traveler makes a refugee claim upon arrival in Canada, the CBSA is obligated to process them in accordance with the law. This means determining whether or not the claim is eligible. If eligible, the person's file will be referred to the Immigration Refugee Board for consideration and the person will be authorized to enter Canada to pursue their claim for protection. If ineligible, they may be removed from Canada.

Canada reserves refugee protection for individuals who are forced to flee their countries because of a well-founded fear of persecution. For example, refugees may face a danger of torture, death, or cruel and unusual treatment/punishment if they return to their home country. Foreign nationals who misrepresent their circumstances to claim asylum when there is no real risk of persecution are abusing Canada's refugee system and delaying the processing of genuine refugees in need of protection. When the CBSA becomes aware of situations where there are possible violations of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act, including fraudulent refugee claims, we investigate and take appropriate action.

CSIS Workplace Culture

Key Messages

• All Canadians should have access to a workplace that is free from bias, discrimination, harassment, and bullying.
• Since the 2023 allegations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has taken many steps to ensure that its workplace culture is respectful, safe, and inclusive.
• For example, CSIS recently appointed it's first-ever Ombuds. Their office will offer tangible support for individuals navigating challenges relating to harassment, discrimination, and other broad forms of misconduct.
• CSIS has taken steps to improve its internal processes and support mechanisms available to employees who have witnessed or experienced misconduct or wrongdoing in the workplace, and to bolster awareness of these processes and support mechanisms.
• CSIS will also soon publish its first annual public report on misconduct and wrongdoing in the workplace. The report outlines CSIS' efforts to provide a safe and supportive workplace for all employees by supporting a culture of integrity, respect and accountability.

If Pressed

Q1 – On CSIS policies.

CSIS has robust policies in place to address harassment, violence, discrimination or misconduct in the workplace.

Q2 – On a CSIS employee's ability to report instances of wrongdoing.

• CSIS employees are encouraged to report incidents of harassment, discrimination, or bullying without fear of reprisal.
• I want to be clear that employment with CSIS does not, and will never, prevent employees from reporting a crime to the police.

Q3 – On the specific allegations regarding the British Columbia regional office.

• Immediately upon learning of the allegations of inappropriate workplace behaviour, CSIS launched a third-party investigation without delay and the individual implicated by the allegations was removed from the workplace.
• I can assure Canadians that the employee who was the subject of the internal investigation is no longer with the Service.

Background

Issue

In late 2023, the Canadian Press published an article regarding allegations of rape, harassment and a toxic workplace culture in the British Columbia office of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

• Immediately upon learning of the allegations of inappropriate workplace behaviour, CSIS launched an independent third-party investigation, and the alleged perpetrator was removed from the workplace.
• In light of the allegations, CSIS undertook a Workplace Climate Assessment in its British Columbia regional office.
• Media reporting indicated that the employee in question felt that she could not go to the police. CSIS has therefore taken concrete steps to ensure that employees know that they can, and are encouraged, to go to the police if they feel they may have been a victim of a crime.
• CSIS continues to strengthen its processes to ensure that its workplace is safe and respectful:
  • In the event of wrongdoing, employees have been encouraged to speak to their management and file a complaint with CSIS' occupational health and safety branch. Once a complaint has been received, CSIS launches an independent investigation and advises the complainant of the details and steps of the investigative process.
  • CSIS has published an internal communications page that employees can access to learn about the various mechanisms available to them.
  • In cases of founded harassment, violence, discrimination or misconduct, appropriate disciplinary and corrective measures are determined by a Discipline Committee. These measures can and have included termination of employment.

Penitentiary Agriculture Program

Key Messages

• One of the ways that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) upholds the safety of our institutions and communities is through the Penitentiary Agriculture Program.
• We know that inmates who participate in CORCAN employment programs while incarcerated are more likely to find employment in the community.
• They are also less likely to reoffend or return to federal custody, thereby making communities safer for all.
• The farms at Joyceville and Collins Bay institutions incorporate technical and transferable employment skills and community partnerships for inmates in line with market demand.
• The farms work to better protect our communities and CSC will continue to evaluate and make improvements, to the program as necessary.

Background

Issue

Implementation of the Penitentiary Agriculture Program commenced in fiscal year 2018-19 and continues in a phased manner. In March 2021, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) updated its Penitentiary Farm Program at Joyceville and Collins Bay institutions to focus its dairy operations on the dairy cow program.

As of October 30, 2024, under the designated research of Dairy Farmers of Ontario, CORCAN commenced shipping cow milk. As of the end of December 2024, CSC is at the formal designed capacity of the main Joyceville dairy barn of 86 production milking cows. CORCAN will continue to focus on total herd management to ensure it has the appropriate numbers for its milking capacity.

CORCAN has created linkages with Dairy Farmers of Ontario and McGill University for various research and vocational training opportunities for offenders participating in the Agricultural Program.

Products generated through the agriculture program, including produce, crops, milk, and other potential by-products of these operations will be determined by internal use requirements, agreements and contracts signed as implementation occurs and products are available.

CSC will continually re-evaluate its operations as the plan is executed and will consider elements such as sustainability and market availability, noting that dairy cow milk will be managed in accordance with Canada's system of supply management for this product. All revenues generated are reinvested into the offender employment and employability program.

Contraband and Drones

Key Messages

• Protecting the safety and security of our institutions remains a top priority for the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC).
• CSC responds to the threat posed by drones through several security practices, intelligence activities, technological supports, and infrastructure enhancements.
• This includes current work on the deployment of body scanners at institutions while working towards the implementation of radiofrequency jammers to prevent unauthorized communications and contraband deliveries.
• We are confident that with further technological innovations, along with the ability of our frontline officers to detect and seize contraband, we will continue to produce better results, through increased seizures or decreased introduction of contraband into institutions.

Background

Issue

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) continues to respond to the threat posed by drones and contraband with a layered approach which includes the use of security practices, adoption of technologies, intelligence activities and infrastructure enhancements. Specifically, this includes:

Technological Supports

• Intrusion detection systems (drones and throw-overs)
• Ferromagnetic detectors;
• Ion scanners; and
• Increased adoption of body scanners.

Non-Technological Security Supports

• Detector Dog Teams (drugs, firearms and ammunition, electronic storage devices); and;
• Infrastructure enhancements.

We continue to research and introduce new technologies as they become available to facilitate the detection of contraband, including contraband introduced via drones. Recently, in October 2024, regulations governing the use of body scanners came into force and we are now working on the deployment of these systems. To further complement existing measures, in March 2025 it was announced that CSC will have an exemption to use radiofrequency jammers in institutions to prevent unauthorized communications and contraband deliveries. For security purposes, CSC is not disclosing publicly details on the specifics of the use of technology, including where the technology will be used.

Since 2015-16, drug-related seizures within our institutions have increased by nearly 170% (from 2,444 to 6,586), due to the ongoing vigilance of correctional staff, particularly in dealing with the increase in UAV (drone) incursions. We are confident that with further technological innovations that make it easier to detect and seize contraband items, along with the ability and professionalism of our frontline officers, we will continue to produce better results, through increased seizures or decreased introduction of contraband into institutions.

Security Classification and Transfers

Key Messages

• The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) contributes to the safety of our institutions and communities by ensuring that all inmates are placed in institutions that match their security level.
• Inmates are classified based on the necessary degree of supervision and control within the penitentiary, escape risk, and risk to public safety in the event of an escape.
• Transfers from one institution to another may occur for many reasons, including when an inmate's security classification is reviewed.
• All transfers to lower levels of security occur only after CSC has duly considered an inmate's risk and how best to manage it.
• An inmate can be returned to a higher security level at any point if deemed necessary to ensure the safety of the public or our institutions.

Background

Issue

Security Classification and Transfers

Security Classification

All inmates entering federal custody undergo a full assessment and referral process to identify their program and security needs, which may include health considerations, correctional programs, as well as employment and education assessments.

Initial security classification and subsequent security reclassification includes the use of evidence-based assessment instruments along with the professional judgment of specialized staff and psychological assessments, if applicable.

This process considers the degree and type of custody and control required to ensure the safety of our staff, the public, and our institutions. The inmate's accessibility to family and other support mechanisms, the availability of appropriate programs and services, such as cultural initiatives, and the inmate's willingness to participate in those programs are also considered.

As per policy, CSC must review the security classification of medium and maximum-security inmates at least every two years. However, classification reviews must also be undertaken following a significant event (i.e., serious incident; escape, etc.). The inmate security classification process also takes into consideration Indigenous Social History (ISH) for Indigenous inmates.

Transfers

Transfers of inmates from one institution to another may occur for many reasons, including when an inmate's security classification is reviewed. All transfers of inmates to lower levels of security occur only after CSC has duly considered such aspects as public safety, institutional behaviour and the risk of escape.

As inmates progress through the correctional system to lower security levels and earn more freedom of movement within the institution, the programs and activities are tailored to more closely reflect the conditions the inmate is likely to encounter once released into the community. A transfer to minimum security allows the inmate to experience greater autonomy to prepare for a safe reintegration into the community.

The risk posed by inmates is constantly assessed by our staff. In the event of a change in the risk posed, the necessary measures are taken to ensure the safety of the public or our institutions, including the possibility of a reclassification to a higher security level.

Victims Services

Key Messages

• The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is committed to upholding victims' rights and taking a trauma-informed, victim-centered approach to providing victim services.
• This includes the provision of timely and accurate information to victims of federal offenders so they can have an effective voice in the federal corrections and conditional release process.
• CSC has more than 9,000 registered victims and completes over 50,000 notifications a year to victims, who can also provide CSC with information that must be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
• As part of its commitment to providing the best possible services to victims, CSC engages in ongoing consultations with victims, organizations and criminal justice partners to gain greater awareness of victims' needs.

Background

Issue

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) provides information and notifications to victims for individuals who meet the definition of a victim under the law. To receive information about the offender who harmed them, victims are asked to register with either CSC or the Parole Board of Canada, which is done to ensure that the individual meets the definition of a victim and to gather their notification preferences. CSC provides information by telephone, mail and/or electronically through our secure, online Victims Portal, available 24/7, depending on the victim's preferences, which can be adjusted at any time.

Victims may request to receive ongoing information about the offender as it relates to their progress in meeting the objectives of their Correctional Plan. Victims also have the right to receive ongoing notifications of changes, such as when federal offenders are transferred to other federal or provincial facilities, including advance notification of a transfer to a minimum-security institution or a healing lodge. With consideration to public safety, CSC also provides victims with certain types of information at the time of certain releases, such as the offender's release date, destination (and whether the offender will be in the vicinity of the victims while travelling to that destination), any conditions of release and a current photograph of the offender.

It is important to note that victims do not automatically receive information from CSC following the conviction of an offender, and victim information is not currently transferred to CSC from other victim service providers. Therefore, victims must find out about CSC's National Victim Services Program and opt into the program by registering. With the coming into force of a revised clause in the Criminal Code of Canada, anticipated for late 2025, CSC will receive contact information for victims from courts to proactively reach out to them and make an active offer to register. CSC is presently negotiating Memorandas of Understanding with all of the Provinces and Territories to facilitate secure information sharing.

Overrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples

Key Messages

• The overrepresentation of Indigenous Peoples in correctional institutions underscores deep-rooted systemic inequities that persist within our society.
• The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) continues to work with Indigenous communities and organizations alongside other departments, provinces and territories to advance efforts in addressing this issue.
• Prioritization of placements to Healing Lodges increased utilization, providing Indigenous offenders culturally relevant environments that support them.
• Despite these efforts, there is more to be done to support the rehabilitation of Indigenous offenders and ensure they are provided the tools and services they need to successfully reintegrate into the community.

Background

Issue

Indigenous Peoples continue to be overrepresented in the federal correctional system. While according to the 2021 Census, Indigenous Peoples represent 5% of the Canadian population. However, at the end of the 2024-25 fiscal year, 29% of offenders under the Correctional Service of Canada's jurisdiction were Indigenous. Broken down further, Indigenous Peoples accounted for 46.2% of the women offender population and 31.8% of the men offender population.

CSC has taken actions to address factors that have contributed to the disproportion, which include:

• Appointed a Deputy Commissioner for Indigenous Corrections (DCIC)
• Creation of Indigenous Interventions Centres
• Increased access to culturally-relevant interventions and programs for Indigenous offenders
• Strengthened the Pathways Initiative for offenders
• Expansion of the Indigenous Offender Employment Initiative
• Streamlined the Section 84 release process
• Continuing efforts to eliminate barriers to optimize the full utilization of existing Section 81 agreements
• Full utilization of the Community Reintegration Fund (CRF)
• Working collaboratively with criminal justice partners, agencies, organizations and community stakeholders, including Indigenous communities, Elders, and Indigenous advisory boards, to support the healing and rehabilitation, and enhance safe reintegration of Indigenous men and women offenders into the community.
• Working with independent external partners, in relation to the development of evidence-informed and culturally responsive approaches to strengthen and enhance the assessment and classification process for federally sentenced Indigenous offenders.

Gender Diverse Offenders

Key Messages

• The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) works to ensure that all offenders, including gender diverse offenders, are in an environment that contributes to their safe rehabilitation and reintegration.
• CSC may place or transfer a gender diverse offender to an institution that better aligns with their gender, unless there are overriding health or safety concerns that cannot be resolved.
• Each accommodation request is assessed on a case-by-case basis and requires a robust assessment of an offender's needs and risks, as well as any overriding health or safety concerns.
• When a request to be housed in a specific facility is denied, alternative measures to meet the offender's needs will be put in place at their current institution.

Background

Issue

The Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is committed to ensuring that gender diverse offenders receive the same protections, dignity and rights as other offenders under its care. In response to Bill C-16 and following extensive consultations, CSC issued Commissioner's Directive 100: Gender Diverse Offenders in May 2022.

Penitentiary Placements and Transfers

Under policy, CSC may place or transfer a gender diverse offender to an institution that better aligns with their gender, unless there are overriding health or safety concerns that cannot be resolved. All requests to be housed in a different institution type (men's or women's), are assessed on a case-by-case basis and requires a thorough assessment of the offender's needs and risks, as well as any health or safety concerns, along with mitigation strategies to address identified concerns. The request may be denied, if overriding health or safety concerns are identified and cannot be effectively resolved without constituting undue hardship. In such cases, alternative measures to meet the offender's needs will be put in place at their current institution.

Health Services for Gender Diverse Offenders

Health care to inmates in custody ensures that accountability, consistency, and best practices are tailored to the needs of CSC's population, including gender diverse offenders. The National Essential Health Care Framework defines consistent access to health care and outlines the specialized services available, based on individual offender needs, as determined by health professionals. Guided by this Framework, essential health services are aligned with professionally accepted standards and the care coverage provided by provincial and territorial publicly funded health care systems. The Framework is reviewed and approved annually, ensuring that CSC aligns with the level of health care available through provincially public-funded health and social services programs.

Mother-Child Program

Key Messages

• The safety and security of all children who participate in the Mother-Child Program is our top priority.
• That is why there are rigorous eligibility criteria protocols in place for participation in this program.
• This includes rigorous child welfare screening, as well as ensuring that those residing in the Unit have not been convicted of an offence against a child.
• Children who participate in the Mother-Child Program at any institution are supervised at all times and are never left unattended.
• The best interests of the child will remain our priority.

Background

Issue

The Institutional Mother-Child Program was piloted in 1996 and implemented in 2001. The objective of the program is to foster positive relationships between mothers and their children by keeping them together, where appropriate, and providing a supportive environment that promotes stability and continuity to the relationship.

This program is available in all women's institutions and at the Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge. It offers a range of options for incarcerated women to develop, maintain and/or strengthen the bond with their children.

A cohabitation component of the Mother-Child Program enables children to stay with their mother while they are incarcerated on a part-time (under seven years old) or a full-time basis (under five years old.) Other bonding services are also available to all incarcerated mothers including in-person and video visits, counselling, education, legal and mediation support/liaison with child and family agencies, reading programs, and pre- and post-natal services.

The best interests of the child are the primary consideration in all decisions relating to participation in this program. This is done by ensuring the physical, emotional, psychological, and spiritual well-being of the child, as well as the safety and security of the institution.

There have been close to 200 participations in the cohabitation component of the Mother-Child Program since it was implemented.

During the month of April 2025, five children participated in the cohabitation component of the Mother-Child Program.

Safety of Children in the Program

There are rigorous eligibility criteria protocols in place for participation in this program, including child welfare screening completed by provincial and territorial child and family services, as well as ensuring that those residing in the Mother-Child Living Unit have not been convicted of an offence against a child. Mothers classified as maximum security are not eligible for full or part-time participation with their children but could access the other bonding services.

Prison Needle Exchange Program

Key Messages

• Canadians have been impacted by the ongoing opioid crisis, including inmates within federal correctional institutions.
• To prevent overdoses and the spread infectious diseases, the Correctional Service of Canada has introduced harm reduction measures.
• The Prison Needle Exchange Program is a harm reduction program that works to limit the transmission of infectious diseases, such as HIV and Hepatitis C (HCV).
• This program reduces the public health and safety risk to other inmates, staff, and the community.
• There have been no reported assaults involving staff or inmates associated with this program.

Background

Issue

Lifetime prevalence of problematic alcohol and substance use at the time of admission to federal institutions is assessed as 61% (men) and 61.6% (women) and higher for Indigenous men (85.2%) and women (85.7%). Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) research findings also show that over 50% of the incoming men offender population at time of assessment reported a current substance use problem, and the majority (68%) have a concurrent mental health disorder.

Approximately 20-22% of men and 27-29% of women report a lifetime history of injection drug use. This finding is consistent across multiple research and surveillance activities (e.g. 2007 Inmate Survey, standardized intake assessments, and health care records).

Those who inject drugs were 10 times more likely to acquire Hepatitis C (HCV) in custody. In CSC, 47% of all new HCV infections were associated with injection drug use.

Substance Use Services in CSC

CSC's harm reduction approach is consistent with the federal government's Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy and recommendations by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and views substance use as a health issue. CSC provides a range of substance use services, including harm reduction, treatment, psychoeducation, and support in recovery to promote overall wellbeing.

CSC's harm reduction measures include Opioid Agonist Treatment (OAT), PNEP, and Overdose Prevention Services (OPS).

To ensure the safety and security of staff, inmates and the institution, a Treat Risk Assessment (TRA) is conducted to review all PNEP applications. TRAs evaluate factors that could pose a danger to the management of an inmate, the safety of others and the security of an operational unit. This is the same model that is used for the distribution of EpiPens and insulin needles. Appropriate safeguards have been established in every institution to ensure that PNEP kits are safely stored and accounted for at all times.

As of May 2025, the PNEP has been implemented at 14 locations across the country.

Structured Intervention Units

Key Messages

• Structured Intervention Units (SIUs) are part of a historic transformation of the federal correctional system that saw the abolition of administrative segregation.
• While they are only used as a last resort and as a temporary measure, inmates are provided with opportunities to be out of their cells for a minimum of four hours daily, and to interact with others for a minimum of two hours each day.
• This includes access to rehabilitative interventions, cultural/spiritual services and health care.
• SIUs include external reviews by Independent External Decision Makers (IEDMs), which includes the review of the duration of the inmate's placement to an SIU, and conditions of confinement.
• CSC continues to make improvements to the SIU model based on internal and external recommendations, and ongoing work with staff and stakeholders.

If Pressed - Actions Taken

• CSC has introduced an enhanced staffing model for the SIUs, which provides additional intervention options to inmates with specific needs and more accurate data.
• CSC is working with external organizations to implement innovative approaches to increase interventions and additional options for time out of cell and interactions with others.
• An example includes the Dad HERO program being offered at most SIU locations by the Canadian Families and Corrections Network.
• CSC has gathered best practices from all sites and have shared feedback with all regions to assess if these practices could be implemented in other sites, while considering their local realities.

If Pressed - Overrepresentation of Indigenous Offenders in SIUs

• Bill C-83 enshrined in law CSC's obligation to consider systemic and background factors unique to Indigenous offenders in all decision-making.
• Before authorizing the transfer of an Indigenous inmate to an SIU, CSC must consider their Indigenous Social History.
• When a transfer is necessary, CSC continues to offer culturally appropriate support through access to Elders, Spiritual Advisors, and Indigenous Liaison Officers.
• Examples of initiatives to increase interactions with others in SIUs:
  • Stony Mountain Institution built a sweat lodge and dedicated a cultural room specifically for inmates in the SIU.
  • Kent Institution staff developed a painting initiative to increase interaction for Indigenous inmates in the SIU.

Background

Issue

In June 2019, Bill C-83 - An Act to amend the Corrections and Conditional Release Act and another Act received Royal Assent. Bill C-83's purpose was to, among other things, eliminate administrative segregation and create Structured Intervention Units (SIUs) for inmates who cannot be safely managed within a mainstream inmate population.

SIU provisions of Bill C-83 came into force on November 30, 2019.

All 5 women's institutions and 9 men's institutions have an SIU. SIUs may open at additional institutions if and where need exists.

An inmate could be transferred to an SIU if they are a threat to any person or the security of the institution, their safety is in jeopardy or their placement in the mainstream population would interfere with an investigation, and there is no reasonable alternative.

The SIUs support the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) mission to help offenders become law-abiding citizens, while exercising safe, reasonable, secure and humane control. SIUs allow CSC to respond to institutional security risks while ensuring that inmates continue to engage in their Correctional Plan and address the specific factors or behaviours that led to their transfer to an SIU.

Inmates in SIUs are offered a minimum of four hours outside the cell every day and two hours of "meaningful human contact" with someone such as an elder, chaplain, counsellor, family member, friend, or compatible inmate.

The SIU model includes a continuous review and decision process, that includes both internal reviews and decisions at various levels of CSC and external reviews by Independent External Decision Makers (IEDMs). IEDMs review include both a review of the inmate's duration and appropriateness of their confinement in an SIU as well as the inmate's conditions of confinement.

Clause 40.1 provides that a comprehensive review of the provisions enacted by Bill C-83 must be undertaken by a parliamentary committee at the start of the fifth year after the day on which this section comes into force. This review has not yet begun.

Postponement of Parole Board of Canada - Hearing for Offender Hugo Bernier

Key Messages

• The Parole Board of Canada is committed to respecting the rights of victims and facilitating their participation in the conditional release process.
• This includes a victim's right to attend the hearing of the offender who harmed them, to present a victim statement outlining the effect of the crime on them, and to request that special conditions be placed on an offender's release, if granted.
• Last year alone, the Parole Board had over 24,000 contacts with victims and facilitated the participation of 1,070 victims at its hearings, including 386 victim presentations.
• Under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, an offender can request to delay their review. The Parole Board recognizes that this can be both upsetting and inconvenient for victims and makes every effort to inform victims as soon as possible when a postponement happens.

If Pressed

Q1 – Postponements like this are unfair to the victims. What do you say to victims?

• The Parole Board recognizes that last-minute postponements can be both inconvenient and upsetting for victims, who have taken the time to emotionally and mentally prepare for, and make arrangements to attend, a hearing.
• As soon as the date of the rescheduled hearing has been confirmed, the PBC notifies victims so that they can make arrangements to attend.
• Under the law, an offender has the right to request to delay their review, up to and including the day of the hearing.
• The reasons for a postponement can include:
  • a procedural safeguard that cannot be met before the review;
  • the offender wishes to complete an assessment, treatment, or program before the review;
  • pending court or appeal decision; or
  • the individual's assistant is not available for the scheduled hearing date.
• If the Parole Board has reasonable grounds to believe that an offender is attempting to frustrate or control the system through a postponement, it can proceed with the review in order to avoid abuse of the process.

Background

Issue

A hearing for offender Hugo Bernier for an Escorted Temporary Absence (ETA), originally scheduled for March 12th, 2025, was postponed on the day of the hearing. This individual is serving a life sentence for first degree murder in the killing of a 27-year-old Sherbrooke woman in 2002. The victim's father, Pierre-Hugues Boisvenu, is a prominent former Senator who has been a vocal proponent of victims' rights and is active in the media.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

Postponements

A postponement is a written request submitted by an individual to delay their conditional release review. A postponement request may be submitted at any time prior to a review or during a hearing.

Reasons for the request may include but are not limited to:

• a procedural safeguard cannot be met before the review;
• the offender wishes to complete an assessment, treatment, or program before the review;
• pending court or appeal decision; or
• the individual's assistant is not available for the scheduled hearing date.

The Parole Board of Canada has the discretion to either accept a postponement request or reject the request and proceed with the review.

If the postponement request is accepted, the review is conducted or resumed as soon as practicable, but generally no longer than four months following the month that the review was originally scheduled.

When a hearing is postponed, the PBC contacts all registered victims and observers to inform them of the hearing postponement. Under the law, the PBC is not able to provide reasons for postponements to victims (unlike the ability to provide reasons when an offender waives a hearing). Victims are subsequently contacted at a later date when the new scheduled hearing date is known.

Where the PBC has reasonable grounds to believe that an offender is attempting to frustrate or control the system through a postponement, it can, and will, proceed with the review in order to avoid abuse of the process. This measure would be taken only following several previous postponements by the offender.

Scheduling of hearings

• Eligibility for various forms of conditional release is legislated under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) and eligibility dates are calculated by the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC).
• CSC is responsible for the preparation of cases for conditional release. Although an offender may be eligible for a type of conditional release, the scheduling of a review by the Parole Board of Canada is often dependent upon receiving an application and required file information from CSC.
• When scheduling hearings or reviews, the PBC takes several operational considerations into account, including considerations related to the hearing participants, such as Board members, PBC and CSC staff, observers (including victims) and the offender.
• Additional factors that may impact the hearing date include legislative timeframes, language, location, technological requirements, cultural requirements, victim presentations and/or attendance.
• Once the PBC has the information required to move forward with scheduling, the month of the hearing is identified and provided to victims as soon as possible. This notification usually takes place approximately two to three months before the hearing.
• Once the day of the hearing has been confirmed, the PBC notifies victims as soon as possible so that they can make arrangements to attend.
• A hearing can be cancelled or rescheduled at any time, up to and including the day of the hearing. This includes cases where the offender requests a postponement or withdraws or waives the review. Victims are informed as soon as possible when a hearing is cancelled or rescheduled.

Office of the Privacy Commissioner Report

Key Messages

• We thank the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for their important work.
• The Canadian Border Service Agency (CBSA) takes its privacy responsibilities very seriously and will take appropriate action to address the findings of the report.
• The CBSA is committed to respecting the privacy of all travellers to Canada.

Background

Issue

• The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) tabled its annual report on Thursday, June 5.
• The Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA) is mentioned in the top institutions by number of complaints accepted

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

All complaints received by the CBSA taken seriously and are handled in a professional and impartial manner. The CBSA's Privacy Code of Principles provides information and guidelines for CBSA employees on the procedures that protect the personal information managed in our offices. CBSA employees are held to a high standard and are expected to adhere to these guidelines, in order to preserve public trust and confidence in the integrity of the organization. Where a privacy breach is suspected, the CBSA has procedures in place to help contain the spread of information.

In 2024-2025, the OPC accepted 1,279 complaints related to the public sector Privacy Act. Of these, the CBSA received 107 complaints.

In 2023-2024, the OPC accepted a total of 1,113 Privacy Act complaints. Of these, the CBSA received 103 complaints.

OPC Investigation–TV show

An OPC investigation determined that a personal search carried out by the CBSA was disclosed in real time to employees of a TV production company without the individual's consent. The OPC concluded that the personal information collected by the CBSA during the search itself related directly to the CBSA's operating programs and activities, and that the collection was therefore consistent with the Privacy Act. However, the OPC also found that the CBSA did not obtain the valid consent of the complainant to disclose their personal information to the production company in connection with the search. The OPC also raised concerns regarding the problematic nature of the disclosure in this case. Given the privacy implications surrounding personal searches at the border, the real-time disclosure of the complainant's personal search represented a serious invasion of privacy. The CBSA accepted the OPC's recommendations to enhance protections and controls around personal searches and has agreed to implement them.

Primary Inspection Kiosk Outage

Key Messages

• The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) experienced a system outage this morning creating kiosk connectivity issues at airports.
• They worked with partners to restore the service as soon as possible.
• During outages, travellers are re-directed to the primary inspection lines for manual processing. Safety and security standards are upheld at all times, with border services officers working to verify travellers' identities, receive their declarations, and conduct any additional screening warranted by each traveller's individual circumstances. The CBSA works closely with airport management to expedite traveller processing, minimize delays, and complete verifications as required.
• We thank all travellers and stakeholders for their cooperation and apologize for any inconvenience.

Background

Issue

• On June 5, 2025, at 0218 ET, an outage and slowdowns impacting Interactive Advance Passenger Information (IAPI) Board / No Board (BNB) messages to the CBSA have been reported by multiple carriers and service providers.
• On June 5, 2025, at 0746 ET, it was reported that a major network connectivity issue was impacting multiple systems including but not limited to IAPI Board/No Board, CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management, eManifest and Canadian Export Reporting System Portals, Primary Inspection Kiosks, SRA. Shared Services Canada Networking was actively working to restore service.
• On June 5, at 0802 ET, Primary Inspection Kiosks and all portals were returned to operations.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIK) is a large-scale IT system that was introduced by the CBSA in late 2013 in partnership with airport authorities across Canada to enhance security, reduce wait times for travellers at Canada's busiest international airports.

Kiosks are available at the following locations:

• Vancouver International Airport (YVR)
• Calgary International Airport (YYC)
• Edmonton International Airport (YEG)
• Winnipeg Richardson International Airport (YWG)
• Toronto Pearson International Airport (YYZ) (Terminal 1 and 3)
• Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (YTZ)
• Ottawa International Airport (YOW)
• Montreal-Trudeau International Airport (YUL)
• Québec City Jean Lesage International Airport (YQB)
• Halifax Stanfield International Airport (YHZ)

The CBSA, in collaboration with airport authorities, began introducing next generation Primary Inspection Kiosks (PIKs) in March 2017 and throughout 2019.

Upon arrival, travellers use a next-generation PIK to verify their travel documents, confirm their identity and complete an on-screen declaration. Those looking to save more time at the kiosk can prepare their declaration in advance using the CBSA Advance Declaration and scan their quick response (QR) code at a kiosk upon arrival.

Project Motor City

Key Messages

• We share the same goal with the United States of keeping our border safe and secure. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol are both working vigilantly on their respective sides of our shared border to protect communities from harm.
• This includes the authority of both U.S. and Canadian border officers to examine travellers and cargo entering and leaving the country for guns, dangerous drugs such like fentanyl and other illegal goods.
• On June 3, we introduced Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, which includes changes to give Canada's border officers more authority and better tools to secure our borders against drug trafficking, weapons smuggling and auto theft.

Background

Issue

United States Customs and Border Parol (US CBP) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) will run an outbound enforcement blitz at the Ambassador and Bluewater Bridges and Detroit Metropolitan Airport (DMA) from June 4 to June 13.

Information to support statements made in the Key Messages

Started on June 4 at 0600 hrs and running until June 13 at 1600 hrs, the United States Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), in conjunction with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) are running an outbound enforcement blitz at the Ambassador and Bluewater bridges and at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.

Through this blitz, US CBP plan on examining 100% of outbound commercial trucks crossing at the Ambassador and Bluewater bridges and individuals boarding flights between Detroit and Toronto and Detroit and Montreal will be examined.

Fluctuations of commercial traffic at the Windsor and Sarnia ports of entry are anticipated and the timely movement of goods in to Canada with minimal disruption is our priority.

Canadian representatives from CBSA, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Provincial Police and Windsor Police will be participating via the Joint Intelligence Centre in Detroit.

Previously, media extensively reported on a similar U.S. CBP operation in the beginning of May where individuals returning to Canada reported additional U.S. checkpoints in B.C.