Parliamentary Committee Notes: Question and Answers: Foreign Interference and National Security Act

Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act

  1. General
  2. Details/Mechanics of the Bill
  3. Penalties
  4. Recourse
  5. Governance
  6. Review
  7. Legislative Approach
  8. Coming into force
  9. News Stories – Case Studies
  10. International
  11. aImpacts on specific stakeholders and outcomes of WWH Report
  12. Extra-territorial application

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

  1. Amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

General

Q1: What is the purpose of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry?
A1: The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA) seeks to strengthen Canada’s national security by shining a light on foreign influence.

I want to be clear that the focus of FITAA is transparency. Transparency from those who advocate on behalf of a foreign government or entity, and accountability from those who would seek to undertake this influence in non-transparent ways.   

Foreign governments have established, legal, and legitimate channels of engagement with Canada. This is a central part of rules-based international relations. However, we know that some foreign states and their proxies seek to influence, in a non-transparent manner, political and governmental processes in all jurisdictions in Canada. This can have a systemic effect throughout the country. Ultimately these non-transparent influence activities represent a danger to our democracy, sovereignty, and our core Canadian values. The FITAA will provide greater accountability for this type of non-transparent activity.  

We also consider that the FITAA could help protect individuals from unwittingly being influenced by foreign states. The Bill is intended to encourage individuals to undertake due diligence before entering into an arrangement with, or undertaking activity for, another individual or organization. This is especially important in areas of national security concern.

As an additional benefit, increasing transparency through the information on the registry would provide Government decision makers, sensitive sectors in the national security community and the general Canadian public, with a greater awareness of foreign influence currently being exerted in relation to Canadian political or governmental processes.

Q2: Does the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry prevent influence activities?
A2: No. At its core, the FITAA is designed as a transparency mechanism and does not prohibit influence activities in Canada. Foreign governments may still engage in and discuss Canadian political and governmental processes, including through proxies, but this Bill proposes they be required to do so transparently by disclosing their links and activities to the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner (Transparency Commissioner), who in turn would make this information publicly accessible.

Q3: Is this the same thing as a foreign agent registry?
A3: The FITAA is a foreign influence transparency registry.

What this means is that registration does not necessarily mean that someone is an “agent” of a foreign state. In many cases, they may only have a business or contractual arrangement, or be acting at the direction of a foreign state. And their activities or arrangement with the foreign state is not limited in any way by virtue of their registration under the FITAA. By registering under FITAA, individuals and entities are simply transparent about their connections and support Canada's national security objectives.

We heard loud and clear from Canadians throughout the consultation process that a transparency mechanism would be a key tool in Canada’s overall toolkit to counter foreign interference, so we’ve designed this Bill to fill that need. However, what was also clear to us during the consultation process is that a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry is not a single solution to address foreign interference.

We will continue to consider new approaches to bolster our counter-foreign interference toolkit.

Q4: Why would anyone register on this? How are you going to capture the truly hostile actors?
A4: The Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner will be provided the necessary tools and authorities to address issues of non-compliance. These include the ability to undertake investigations; leverage administrative enforcement mechanisms (e.g. issuing notices, or levying fines); or refer cases to law enforcement authorities for criminal investigation and prosecution. The Commissioners office will also be empowered to receive information from the public or from other departments and agencies.

With these measures in place there will be a significantly higher risk to anyone seeking to engage in foreign influence activities and not register. In such cases they would be liable to administrative penalties or prosecution.

This high risk is a deterrent for engaging in non-transparent influence activities directed towards Canadians. There would be both practical and reputational costs imposed. We anticipate that some actors may simply choose to not undertake the influence activity rather than make their efforts public – bolstering Canada’s deterrence framework for foreign interference.

Q5: How will you know if someone is acting “at the direction of or in association with” a foreign principal?
A5: The Office of the Commissioner will be empowered to receive information from the public by way of tips, and also receive information from other government departments and agencies to undertake investigation in instances where there is suspected non-compliance. The Commissioner is empowered to conduct investigations for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the registry, and can summon individuals to testify and/or produce documents to support that process. Ultimately, the intent is to make sure the Commissioner has all the tools and resources available to meaningfully investigate links between foreign principals and individuals or entities acting on their behalf.
I would also note that there is a provision in the Bill to provide a period of time between Royal Assent and coming into force. The intent is to provide time for the development of clear guidance documentation on to when and how the law applies, which will provide additional clarity about when a registration obligation is triggered.

Q6: How will you ensure this registry is not wielded against people from ethnic and cultural minorities in Canada?
A6: We have heard loud and clear from Canadians, as well as prominent figures in media, politics, and academia, that the Government should proceed with caution in designing this registry given Canada’s history with laws that target foreigners of specific cultural or national backgrounds. We have kept this in mind at all times throughout the design of the Bill.

The FITAA is country-agnostic, and is a tool to protect, not persecute, communities from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds in Canada.

For the purpose of the administration of the FITAA, the link between the foreign government and an individual or entity working at the direction of, or in association with, the foreign government is what matters.

Q7: Why did this take so long to table?
A7: Since the launch of consultations on March 10, 2023, we have been meaningfully considering the feedback provided in designing the registry. We needed to take the time to ensure the Bill was designed with the feedback from consultations in mind, and that the Bill would not unduly impact Canadians – particularly those with cultural and familiar ties to foreign countries. 

Details/Mechanics of the Bill

Q8: Who will need to register?
A8: There are three criteria that, when taken together, would trigger the registration requirement under the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act:

A foreign principal could be a foreign economic entity, a foreign entity, a foreign power or a foreign state.  

I want to be clear that it’s not foreign principals that would be required to register. Instead, those individuals or entities acting at the direction of or in association with those foreign principals would have the registration obligation. There is no registration obligation imposed on anyone who is the subject of these influence activities, either.

Q9: What exactly does “in association with” mean?
A9: We know that some foreign states and their proxies seek to influence political and governmental processes in all jurisdictions in Canada, and that they may use creative means to achieve their goals while also obfuscating their relationships with proxies. The policy intent underpinning the FITAA is to ensure the Bill captures relationships between foreign principals and their proxies in the multitude of forms they come in, and to not provide unnecessary loopholes for complex arrangements which would allow these people to avoid disclosing their ties.

It's important to recognize that guidance will be issued by the Commissioner of Foreign Influence once the Bill is passed and before it comes into force, which will help clarify language and when a registration obligation would and would not apply.

Q10: Do arrangements have to involve money to be registrable?
A10: No. There is no requirement under the FITAA for there to be an exchange of money or things of value for the relationship between a foreign principal and an individual or entity to be established. An influence activity may include the distribution of money or items of value or providing a service or the use of a facility (exchange of value), but the use of money is not a requirement to trigger a registration obligation.

Q11: What about situations where a foreign principal promises to compensate or provide opportunities to an individual or entity in exchange for their influence work? Sometimes the monetary or non-monetary benefit(s) comes after the “arrangement” is made, or the benefit is accrued outside of Canada. Would this still be registrable?
A11: Yes. There is no need for payment or consideration to be exchanged for activities to be registerable. They only need to be at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal. Promises that are made or benefits provided could provide evidence of the existence of the arrangement but they are not required.

Q12: Can you walk us through the mechanics? How does registration work?
A12: First, it’s important to recognize that this Bill would only come into force at a future date to be set by the Governor in Council, which will allow time for guidance documentation to be issued that would provide greater clarity on the mechanics and parameters of registration. However, I can provide a brief overview of how this works in the context of the Bill:

If the Commissioner required more information, they would have the ability to send a notice requesting additional information for the registration disclosure.

Q13: Do people have to register before or after they undertake the influence activity?
A13: The Bill requires that arrangements must be registered within 15 days.

There is no prohibition on the activity being undertaken before the arrangement is registered, so long that it is registered before 15 days are up.

Designing the Bill in this manner is intended to not unnecessarily impede spontaneous political communication. This type of activity, when undertaken at the direction of or in association with a foreign principal, is allowed so long as there is a registration disclosure within the prescribed timelines.

If pressed on impact on elections: I understand the concern that there could be a lot of non-transparent foreign influence activities in the immediate lead-up to an election, and that this could be problematic given disclosures are only required within 15 days of the arrangement. To be clear on this point, there are laws set out in other legislation, such as the Canada Elections Act, which may come in to play in this particular scenario.

Q14: Why are there so few exemptions?
A14: Throughout the design process we considered exemptions for many different activities. Ultimately, we pursued an approach that had fewer exemptions – the exemptions in the current Bill cover employees of foreign principals acting openly in their official capacity, diplomats, and arrangements to which His Majesty in Right of Canada is a party.

Our general view is that fewer exemptions create fewer loopholes which could be exploited by foreign states and their proxies who seek to avoid disclosure of their influence activities. This is something we heard from many Canadians during our consultation. We are of the view that this ultimately best supports the main purpose of the law – to enhance transparency over all sources of foreign influence related to Canadian political or governmental processes.

Having said that, we know that the foreign interference and influence threat environment is emergent and dynamic. To ensure the law is flexible to meet future realities, we’ve ensured that additional exemptions can be added by way of regulation.

Q15: How would someone know they are acting at the direction of a foreign principal? What if the Canadian individual/business is not aware of the foreign link?
A15: If the Commissioner is of the view, based on information and evidence available to him/her, that there is an individual or entity that is either wittingly or unwittingly undertaking foreign influence activities in Canada related to political or governmental processes, there would be several tools available to address this. These could include notices issued publicly identifying certain organizations/individuals as a “foreign principal” for the purpose of the administration of the FITAA (Transparency Notice, although this is not set out in legislation).

Alternatively, the Commissioner could issue a notice which would set out that the person is in violation of the regime and is under a registration obligation. I want to be clear that should this process be engaged, there are mechanisms built into the Bill to ensure there is due process – allowing for the individual or entity to make representations and otherwise engage with the Commissioner’s office regarding the violation.

I also want to underscore that it would be the Commissioners responsibility to issue guidance documentation which would provide additional information regarding the types of notices that the office could issue, and how it would inform individuals that they may be in a registration obligation.

Our policy intent was to provide the Commissioner with a menu of scalable options to enforce compliance. There is sufficient flexibility in the Bill to allow for the Commissioner to issue minor penalties or more severe penalties, which would be dependent on the nature of the particular case of non-compliance.

Penalties

Q16: What exactly are the offences under this Bill?
A16: There are a few offences in the Act of note. Failure to register an arrangement on time, or failing to update information is an offence (s. 23(1)). We’ve also included an obstruction offence in the Bill (S. 24) for instances where someone willfully obstruct the Commissioners work. For example, this includes knowingly providing false information to the Commissioner, or interfering in a non-compliance investigation.

Q17: When would administrative monetary penalties be pursued, as opposed to Criminal prosecutions?
A17: The decision on which compliance tool is to be used will ultimately be at the discretion of the Transparency Commissioner.

The purpose of administrative monetary penalties are to enforce compliance with the Act. AMPs could be levied in instances of non-compliance where a person failed to register and was advised of their obligation to do so.

Criminal investigations are also possible where, in the opinion of the Commissioner, the offence should be pursued under that particular mechanism. Ultimately it’s the decision of the Transparency Commissioner on how to proceed on a particular case. In all cases, the intent of the Bill is not to unduly punish people who may not have known they are in a registrable arrangement.

We’ve designed the Bill to ensure the Commissioner has the tools available to make sure people are aware of their potential obligations, and that there is no excessive administrative burden to register.

Recourse

Q18: If the Commissioner is authorized to both undertake investigations and levy administrative penalties, how will you ensure that there is due process in place?
A18: There are several provisions which provide due process to investigations undertaken by the Commissioner. Under Section 19 (2) of the Act, the Commissioner may issue a notice of violation where there is suspected non-compliance. The notice must afford the person an opportunity to, within 30 days, either pay the penalty or make representations to the Commissioner.

In addition, if the Commissioner decides to levy a monetary penalty, that decision would be reviewable by application to the Federal Court.

Governance

Q19: Who will choose who the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner is?
A19: The Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner (Transparency Commissioner) will be a Governor-in-Council (GiC) appointment, but the appointment has to be made after consultation with opposition parties in the Senate and the House of Commons. The Commissioner has a set term of up to 7 years, and is eligible to be reappointed for an additional term of up to 7 years.

Q20: Why is the Commissioner not an Independent Agent of Parliament similar to the Lobbying Commissioner?
A20: In designing the FITAA we considered many governance models and approaches. We looked both domestically and internationally to learn from best practices and design a model that worked best for Canada. The embedded commissioner is a model that has precedent in Canada: both the Competition Commissioner and Superintendent of Bankruptcy are designed similarly. They’re models that have worked well and have allowed a high degree of professionalism and independence in investigations as well as enforcement, but also support robust information sharing through existing interdepartmental and inter-agency channels to support the overall administration.

Q21: Which Minister will have authority over the office? How can you prevent the political level from influencing investigation decisions?
A21: It is expected that the Commissioner and support office would be embedded within the Department of Public Safety Canada. However, the embedded commissioner model means that the Commissioner can exercise independent authority in investigation and undertaking administrative enforcement actions, as necessary. The Commissioner would not take direction on these matters from the Minister of Public Safety.

Q22: Won’t the Minister be able to influence the Commissioner by restricting or threatening to restrict funding/support?
A22: There would be safeguards in place to ensure the Commissioner has independence from political influence. These would be similar to safeguards that exist for other embedded Commissioners in the federal government, such as the Competition Commissioner and the Superintended of Bankruptcy, who by design are able to meaningfully exercise independence in decision-making on enforcement matters.

The Commissioner would be entitled to be paid, in accordance with Treasury Board Directives, for reasonable travel and living expenses incurred so as to prevent any political interference in funding in the performance of their official duties.

Similar to the Competition Bureau, it is expected that the Transparency Commissioner would manage all regular staffing processes. Staffing processes would be conducted following established policies common to all federal departments and agencies. The Public Service Commission would be responsible for independently safeguarding the integrity of the staffing system and the non-partisan nature of the public service.

To further bolster the independence of the office, the Commissioner would be required to submit an annual report in Parliament each year, which the responsible Minister would be obliged to table and would not be afforded statutory authority to amend or alter.
Lastly, the Minister would not be able to request that the Commissioner launch an investigation into any individual or entity that enters into an arrangement with a foreign principal, or the foreign principal.

Q23: Will the Minister and/or the Government be able to direct the Commissioner to investigate an issue or produce a report?
A23: No. The Transparency Commissioner may issue a special report at their discretion on a particular case or issue, but under the current design of the Bill this cannot be initiated by the responsible Minister. In preparing the report, the Commissioner would be required to consult across government departments and agencies to ensure no sensitive information is being improperly included for disclosure, and once the report is complete the responsible Minister would be required to table the report within 15 days of receiving it.

Q24: This seems like a significant endeavor. How much is this going to cost to administer?
A24: Final costing details for this proposal have not yet been made public.

Having said that, the office of the Commissioner will need to be adequately resourced to perform certain core duties and functions. For example, there will need to be sufficient IT infrastructure in place to ensure that the Commissioner’s office can receive and process registration information, as well as maintain the public-facing registry. Similarly, the office will need to include staff focused on developing and publishing education and guidance documentation to ensure the public is appraised of their obligations under the law. The office will also need staff to oversee investigations and administrative enforcement proceedings.

To determine resource requirements, we continue to look at similar models, as well as at how some of our closest allies and partners have organized themselves to administer similar foreign influence transparency registries.  

Review

Q25: Will the Commissioner be accountable to review agencies/bodies?
A25: Yes. Review mechanisms are an important part of Canada’s national security approach. The FITAA and the work of the Commissioner and supporting office will be reviewable by Canada’s National Security Intelligence and Review Agency, as well as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. In addition, the Bill is consistent with other accountability and transparency acts of parliament, such as the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act. 

As an additional transparency measure, the Commissioner will be required to table an annual report before Parliament each year.

The Commissioner may also issue a special report at any time, which would be tabled in Parliament and provide additional transparency on a given matter.

Legislative Approach

Q26: Why are so many parts of the Bill left to regulations?
A26: It’s difficult to envision new threat vectors which may emerge in the years to come, so our intent in this Bill has been to provide flexibility in how the FITAA may apply in certain scenarios in the future. Foreign Interference and the proliferation of malign foreign influence often leverages emergent technologies to undertake the influence activities. It’s important that Canada’s laws can adapt to these new realities as they arise.

Q27: Why bring this Bill forward before the Public Inquiry has issued recommendations?
A27: Our Government announced the launch of public and stakeholder consultations to inform the design of a registry in March 2023. We’ve heard loud and clear from Canadians, including representatives from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, that action is urgently needed to bolster our counter-foreign interference toolkit. Introducing this Bill is a much-needed step in the right direction, and does not preclude the work to be undertaken as part of the Public Inquiry.

Q28: How is this Bill different than the Lobbying Act?
A28: The Lobbying Act is administered by an independent agent of parliament and is intended to regulate paid communications activities to public office holders. The FITAA is different in several key ways.

First and foremost, the FITAA is designed to address and entirely different issue. Non-transparent state-backed foreign influence poses a significant national security risks. These threats can have systemic effects throughout the country and endanger democracy, sovereignty and core Canadian values.

Another important distinction is that the FITAA addresses non-transparent foreign influence activities that target Canadian political or governmental processes, not only those targeted directly towards public office holders. We know that some communities in Canada are disproportionately targeted by influence campaigns undertaken by foreign states. We heard consistently stakeholders that this is a problem, and that current Canadian laws and authorities have not done a sufficient job to provide protection. This is something that the FITAA is designed to help with and address, and is outside the scope of the Lobbying Act.

The Lobbying Act only applies to Federal public office holders, while the FITAA is intended to cover influence activities directed towards and in relation to political and governmental processes across all jurisdictions in Canada.

There are other differences, but the bottom line is that this Bill is designed to address a very different concern than the Lobbying Act. I would also add that this is why some of our closest allies and partners have also chosen to implement influence registries, to complement their own existing lobbying laws and regulations.

Q29: Could someone have to register under both the Lobbying Act and the FITAA?
A29:It’s possible that someone could be undertaking a communications activity that meets registration criteria under both acts. Once the Bill passes and the Commissioners’ office begins to be stood up, we would expect there to be guidance issued regarding potential dual registration scenarios.

Coming into force

Q30: When will the FITAA be in place? Why have a delayed coming into force?
A30: We cannot predict the parliamentary process, so it is difficult to determine when the FITAA would be in place.

What I can say is that we have set out in the Bill a pre-requisite of a Governor-in-Council order before the Bill would come into force. This will allow for some time between Royal Assent and operationalization of the registry and supporting infrastructure. This time will also allow for the office to be stood up, guidance documentation to be designed and issued, and education initiatives to be undertaken by the office of the Commissioner.

The education piece is particularly important. We’ve heard from some of our allies who have brought in similar registries that we should not underestimate the importance of ensuring the public and stakeholders have clear guidance on potential obligations under the Act. This would also likely include making materials available in many languages beyond English and French, but this is something that would need be looked at after the Bill receives Royal Assent.

Q31: Will this Bill apply to other jurisdictions in Canada? Will the federal government require the consent of provinces, territories, and Indigenous governments?
A31: We plan to continue conversations with other jurisdictions in Canada regarding the FITAA and how it would apply. While the intent of this Bill is to bolster Canada’s national security toolkit, something the federal government takes as a very serious responsibility, we understand that it’s not just federal political or government processes that are targeted by foreign influence. For that reason, it’s important that we continue to engage provincial, territorial, and Indigenous partners on how this Bill would apply to them, and how information can be shared to support enforcement and administration.

Public Safety officials have already had several conversations with PT governments and Indigenous representatives. We plan to continue this work while the Bill is making its way through Parliament.

News Stories – Case Studies

Q32: (Transnational Repression Application) - Will the FITAA address reported Overseas Police Stations operated by the Chinese Government? Harassment and Intimidation from Iranian Government officials?
A32: Ultimately how the law applies to such a scenario would be subject to the decision of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner.

The FITAA is designed primarily as a tool to enhance transparency for those who act on behalf of foreign governments to influence our government and political processes. While it does not address the full spectrum of foreign interference threats in Canada, it is an important tool in Canada’s toolkit that will align us closer with the approaches taken by our Five Eyes allies, and overall help bolster our defences to malign foreign influence. Our Government is actively considering other legislative tools and approaches to address other specific aspects of foreign interference.

Q33: How would the FITAA address the alleged influence campaign targeting MP Chong?
A33: Ultimately how the law applies to such a scenario would be subject to the decision of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner.

However, in my view the alleged influence campaign targeting MP Chong included several influence activities that would likely be registrable under FITAA. For example, spreading narratives about an MP and his political stances, if done at the direction of or in association with a foreign principal, would be registrable. By not registering, the perpetrators of this type of influence campaign would expose themselves to administrative monetary penalties or a criminal indictment.

International

Q34: Did you consult with any other countries to learn about best practices?
A34: Yes. We spoke to some of our closest partners and allies to learn best practices from their experience designing and implementing influence registries.

Foreign Influence Transparency Registries are increasingly viewed as an international best practice to counter malign foreign influence, and we look forward to continuing to work with our allies and partners to share information and approaches.

Q35: How is this Bill different than Foreign Agent laws in Russia that are designed to stymie civil society?
A35: Canada believes in a free and open democratic society, and remains committed to working with our international allies and partners to uphold a rules based international order. However, we know that some countries around the world seek to undermine this order, including by implementing laws that are not designed with protections for democratic rights of association and expression in mind. Foreign agent registries and foreign influence registries are not all designed the same. In some countries, they may be designed to override rights and freedoms while in others they seek to be consistent with constitutional protections.

At all times throughout the design process for the FITAA, we sought to ensure that it was compliant with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Bill is intended to be a transparency mechanism, and is not designed as a prohibition scheme.

Impacts on specific stakeholders and outcomes of WWH Report

Q36: Will this infringe on academic freedoms?
A36: No. Academic collaboration will only require registration if it involves influence activities undertaken at the direction of, or in association with foreign principals. Even in the event that registration is required due to the nature of such a relationship, this will not mean that academic and research collaborations will require approval or have their activities curtailed. The ultimate goal of the Bill is transparency and not prohibition of activities. At the end of the day, we think there is positive impact on Canada and Canadian society generally when the sources of foreign state-backed influence are made transparent. The Bill is designed with this governing principal in mind.

We also heard during consultations that there are concerns this Bill could impact a University or academic institutions’ ability to advocate on behalf of international students (e.g. Universities lobbying the federal government to increase levels of international student intake). I think, again, it’s important to note that this Bill would not prohibit such activities, and only require registration where the university is doing such an activity at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal.

Q37: Will this Bill affect the ability of charities or NGOs to campaign on political issues?
A37: No. Charities or NGOs would only need to register in instances where they are acting at the direction of, or in association with a foreign principal to undertake influence activities about a Canadian political or government process. Where charities or NGOs operate independently there would be no requirement to register under FITAA.

Even in the event that there is a registration obligation imposed on charities or NGOs, this will not mean that relationships between foreign governments and charities/NGOS will require approval before they can be struck. The goal of the Bill is transparency over sources of state-backed foreign influence, and does not prohibit the relationship.

Q38: What about lawyers that represent foreign governments in legal processes in Canada. Will they be required to register?
A38: If the lawyer is undertaking influence activities in relation to a Canadian political or governmental process at the direction of a foreign government, they would be required to register their arrangement with that foreign principal. Political or governmental processes do not explicitly include representing clients in court proceedings or similar legal matters, so there need not be a registration obligation in those circumstances.

However, I want to be clear that the Bill does not interfere with the provision of legal advice in a solicitor-client privileged relationship.

In designing the FITAA we wanted to make sure that foreign governments could not use legal representatives as proxies to influence Canada and avoid registration obligations due to a blanket exemption for all legal representation. This is a key lessons learned from public and stakeholder consultations, as well as discussions with some of our international partners and allies. However, we are aware that some prominent legal stakeholders advocated during the consultation process that there should be a legal exemption for bona fide legal activities.

Once the Bill is passed the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner would be tasked with issuing public education and guidance documentation which may further clarify when and where registration obligations are triggered for certain groups, including lawyers.

Q39: Will media organizations that receive foreign funding be required to register?
A39: It will depend on the facts of each particular scenario, but in some cases media organizations may have a registration obligation. Where a media organization is acting at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign government and undertaking influence activities in relation to a Canadian political or governmental process, registration would be required for that particular arrangement.

Once the Bill is passed the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner would be tasked with issuing public education and guidance documentation which may further clarify when and where registration obligations are triggered for certain groups, including for media organizations.

Q40: Based on the WWH Report, it seems like some respondents wanted the registry to be country-specific. Why have you not done this?
A40: There was debate as to whether the registry should be country agnostic or country specific. Some argued that foreign interference emanates from a few specific countries and, therefore, only these countries should be targeted. Some said that Canada’s allies should be exempted from the registry.

However, the vast majority of stakeholders were in favour of country agnosticism based on the premise that transparency in public affairs is strongly supported. Further, there were concerns raise that a country-specific registry could unnecessarily stoke racial and ethnic exclusion, and result in a “blacklist”, rather than a means of transparency. We have listened to these views in the design of the FITAA.

Extra-territorial application

Q41: Does this registry apply to non-Canadians?
A41: Yes. The registration obligation applies to individuals regardless of if they are Canadian or not, and regardless of their geographic location when the arrangement is made. We know that many influence activities originate from overseas, and leverage social media and other technologies to accomplish their goals. The nexus to Canada built in the Bill is that it applies when the influence activity is in relation to a political or governmental process, regardless of the location of the activity.

Q42: How will the Commissioner enforce this Bill overseas?
A42: Once the Bill is passed the Commissioner would be required to issue guidance, which may provide additional information regarding extra-territorial application and enforcement. I do not have further information to provide at this time.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

In November 2023, the Government of Canada launched public consultations on possible legislative measures to help Canada and Canadians better confront threats of foreign interference. Recognizing that this threat activity targets all facets of Canadian life – from government operations and democratic institutions to economic prosperity and social cohesion – it is critical to engage Canadians from all sectors in order to protect the health and vibrancy of Canadian democracy. For the first time in its history, as part of its ongoing efforts to build trust with Canadians, CSIS played a leadership role in these consultations, deliberately inviting stakeholders and partners from across multiple sectors whose voices have traditionally been excluded from important discussions on national security and intelligence matters. These consultations were intended to ensure that as the Government of Canada proceeds to modernize national security and intelligence authorities to protect Canadians from modern threats, it does so in a way that reflects and incorporates new and unique perspectives and experiences of all Canadians.

Amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act

Q43: What is the intent of the amendments to the CSIS Act?
A43: While the CSIS Act has been amended before, CSIS’ authorities were originally written in 1984 at a time when the prolific use and expansion of digital technology could not have been foreseen. In order to detect and disrupt the threat posed by foreign interference, CSIS requires a toolkit appropriate for modern technology and modern day threats. Amendments to the CSIS Act would better equip CSIS to carry out its mandate to investigate, advise the Government of Canada, and take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including foreign interference. The amendments would also allow CSIS to build resiliency against foreign interference threats that target all aspects of Canadian society.

Q44: What was the purpose of the CSIS Act consultations?
A44: The purpose of these consultations was to seek input from stakeholders and the public with the goal of updating the CSIS Act and better protecting people in Canada against the threats posed by foreign interference.

The Government of Canada consulted the Canadian public, as well as provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments and partners, the private sector, academia, legal, privacy and transparency experts, and community representatives on the potential for CSIS Act amendments in key areas including:

Q45: What did the Government of Canada hear in the consultations on the CSIS Act?
A45: From November 24, 2023 to February 2, 2024, CSIS and Public Safety held public consultations on updating the CSIS Act. Three hundred and sixty individuals submitted responses to the online survey. Government officials also engaged directly with a diverse range of partners and stakeholders, including those from provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments and partners, academia, businesses, and communities, during roundtables.

The degree of support for each of the amendments varied, though overall, sentiments were generally positive across all five proposals. While support was strong, not all participants favoured all the proposals. A minority of respondents expressed privacy concerns and the need for strong oversight and accountability, with input also reflecting the importance of building trust in CSIS and encouraging continued transparency. Overall, participants recognized the need for legislative amendments that would better equip the government to respond to national security threats such as foreign interference. This included provinces and territories who consistently noted that more information from the federal government on the threat of foreign interference would aid them in making decisions, while acknowledging ongoing discussions would be needed on how such information could be distributed and used.

Many participants also expressed a general interest and desire to learn more about CSIS’ work. CSIS will continue to work on conveying what it does and how it meets its mandate.

Q46: Are there additional safeguards being introduced with these amendments?
A46: Safeguards include:

Q47: How would CSIS and other security agencies ensure respect for the privacy rights of people in Canada including rights under the Charter once these amendments are in place?
A47: CSIS is committed to ensuring that its activities are consistent with Canadian laws and that the Canadian public has trust in their security intelligence service. Maintaining legal compliance, as well as systems of review, oversight, and transparency have been primary objectives with these proposed amendments. Informed by respondents’ input during the consultations, these proposals have been developed with the high privacy expectations of people in Canada including as protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The amendments would operate within existing systems of review, oversight, and transparency, and as the Canadian public would expect with the granting of new powers, introduce new safeguards.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also provide a review function for CSIS’ activities. Additionally, certain CSIS activities are subject to the review and approval of the Intelligence Commissioner.

Q48: Why is the government already pursuing changes to the dataset regime that was only established six years ago?
A48: The changes to the CSIS Act introduced by the National Security Act (2017) established a framework for the collection, retention, and use of datasets by CSIS. The framework authorizes the collection of datasets that are likely to assist CSIS in the performance of its duties and functions. The regime includes robust safeguards to protect Canadians’ rights and freedoms, including privacy. These protections include enhanced requirements for ministerial accountability, safeguards on the handling of datasets, and judicial oversight.

The changes to the dataset regime brought by the proposed amendments would not overhaul the regime, but address unforeseen roadblocks and unintended inefficiencies. The amendments seek to clarify the application of the dataset authority, and allow more flexibility in the evaluation and retention of datasets to improve usability of the regime.

Q49: If the threat environment has evolved so considerably, why is the government not seeking to broaden the definition of “threats to the security of Canada”?
A49: The current definition of threats to the security of Canada in section 2 of the CSIS Act adequately captures foreign interference. No changes are required in order to enable CSIS to investigate foreign interference activity. The definition, a term that is foundational to CSIS’ core mandate of section 12, is referenced in at least 13 other statutes, therefore any change to section 2 would have consequential impacts to how national security threats are defined in Canada writ large and the core mandate of CSIS. Significant additional study is required on how other programs would be affected by updating this definition.

The bill includes a recurring statutory review, so that issues such as the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” can be carefully considered by Parliamentarians and the CSIS Act can be amended in the future if necessary.

Q50: Why are CSIS Act amendments being tabled before the PIFI, NSIRA and NSICOP foreign interference reviews and recommendations?
A50: The government is looking forward to addressing the findings and recommendations in the upcoming NSIRA, NSICOP and PIFI reviews. In the meantime, the Government of Canada continues to observe pervasive, persistent, and sophisticated state-sponsored threat activity targeting Canadian democratic institutions, which require immediate action and which people in Canada expect.

Foreign interference has been observed at all levels of government across Canada and across party lines targeting individuals in positions of potential influence. The recently concluded public consultations on the proposed CSIS Act amendments outlined a number of important authorities that would better protect Canada against today’s threats. Tabling legislation now allows Parliamentarians to review and debate these authorities in a timely manner given the nature of the foreign interference threat.

The government is committed to cooperating with the work of the Commission, NSIRA and NSICOP and will be responsive to any further requests and recommendations it receives. The Government of Canada recognizes the importance independent review plays in maintaining and strengthening the trust of the Canadian public in their national security institutions.

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