Parliamentary Committee Notes: Foreign Interference: An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference

Issue

On 6 May 2024, An Act respecting countering foreign interference was introduced in Parliament. Part IV of the bill, Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, is expected to garner significant attention as it moves through the Parliamentary Committee stage.

Proposed Response

• The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act seeks to strengthen Canada’s national security by creating a registration obligation (The Registry) that is intended to increase transparency for those who seek to conduct influence activities in non-transparent ways.
• The Registry is a transparency mechanism, and the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner will have the necessary tools and authorities to address issues of non-compliance through notices of violation, administrative monetary penalties and referral to enforcement authorities for criminal investigation and prosecution.
• The Registry will have only a few exemptions. This is intended to prevent foreign states and their proxies from exploiting loopholes to avoid disclosure of their influence activities. If required, additional exemptions can be added in the future via regulation.
• The Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner will be appointed in consultation with select members of the House of Commons and the Senate. While independent in direction and investigations, the Transparency Commissioner will be embedded within Public Safety Canada. This will facilitate the sharing of information as well as internal services support.

If pressed on delayed introduction

• The Government of Canada has been consulting Canadians since March 2023. Those consulted included provinces, territories and Indigenous governments and partners, as well as community organizations, academia, and the private sector. Feedback was meaningfully considered, and has informed this robust Bill.

If pressed on how long it will it take to implement the Bill after passage

• It is difficult to determine when the registry would be in place. This is a significant undertaking. I would note that the Bill sets out that a Governor-in-Council order will be required to bring the Act into force.
• This will allow time between Royal Assent and operationalization of the registry and supporting infrastructure. This time will also allow for the office to be stood up, guidance documentation to be designed and issued, and education initiatives to be undertaken by the office of the Transparency Commissioner.
• The education piece is particularly important and was identified as a key lesson learned from our allies.

If pressed on the independence of the Commissioner

• The Transparency Commissioner would be appointed by Governor-in-Council following consultation with recognized groups in both the Senate and House of Commons.
• While independent in direction and investigations, the Transparency Commissioner will be embedded within Public Safety Canada. This will facilitate the sharing of information as well as internal services support.
• The embedded Transparency Commissioner is a model that has precedent in Canada: both the Competition Commissioner and Superintendent of Bankruptcy are designed similarly. They’re models that have worked well and have allowed a high degree of professionalism and independence in investigations as well as enforcement, but also support robust information sharing through existing interdepartmental and inter-agency channels to support the overall administration.
• The Transparency Commissioner would also be held accountable through NSICOP and NSIRA.

If pressed on who may be required to register under the proposal

• There are three criteria that, when taken together, would trigger the registration requirement under the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act:
  
• Any individual or entity that enters into an arrangement (foreign influence arrangement) with a foreign principal, where that individual or entity acts at the direction of or in association with a foreign principal to engage in foreign influence activities.
• Undertakes any of the following foreign influence activities: communication with a public office holder; communication or dissemination of information to the public; or, disbursement of money or thing of value.
• The activity that is undertaken is in relation to a political or government process.
• Once the Bill is passed the Transparency Commissioner could issue public education and guidance documentation which may further clarify when and where registration obligations are triggered for certain groups.

If pressed on the meaning of acting “in association with” in the law

• An arrangement would require three elements:
• a person to act under the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal;
• the person would have to engage in at least one of the foreign influence activities listed in the definition; and,
• the activity would need to be done in relation to a political or governmental process in Canada.
• The definition of an arrangement has been kept sufficiently broad to encompass the various forms that a relationship between an individual or entity and a foreign principal may take and which may trigger a registration requirement.
  
• Importantly, the relationship does not need to include compensation or exchange of value to be registrable.
• The Transparency Commissioner may issue advisory opinions and interpretation bulletins with respect to the interpretation or application of this Act.

If pressed on application to other levels of government

• While the intent of this Bill is to bolster Canada’s national security toolkit, something the federal government takes as a very serious responsibility, we understand that it’s not just federal political or government processes that are targeted by foreign influence.
• The law is designed to apply to all levels of government in Canada, including provincial, territorial and Indigenous governments and organizations.
• This would include municipalities, which are creatures of provincial statute.
• Our Government undertook extensive consultations with provincial, territorial, and Indigenous partners on this proposal, and we are committed to continuing this work.

If pressed on possible interference in the nomination race of the Don Valley North riding

• The Bill will strengthen Canada’s capacity to protect against foreign interference and better address the evolving threats it presents. Specific to the Registry, the threat of administrative monetary penalties and criminal prosecution for those who carry out non-transparent influence activities will create a deterrence effect.

If pressed on the issue of overseas police stations

• The registry is an important tool to enhance transparency for those who act on behalf of foreign governments to influence our government and political and democratic processes. While the registry is not intended to address the full spectrum of foreign interference threats in Canada, ultimately how the law applies to such a scenario would be subject to the decision of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner. In particular, the proposed Act will regulate communication or dissemination of information to the public by individuals working for foreign states.
• In addition, the registry is being introduced alongside a number of other measures, such as amendments to the CSIS Act that would help detect and in some circumstances disrupt such activity, and changes to the Security of Information Act that may criminalize some transnational repression activities and address so-called ‘overseas police stations’. Collectively these measures will bolster Canada’s counter-foreign interference response, including to address situations such as overseas police stations.

If pressed on how the bill addresses findings of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions report

• The Government agrees with Justice Hogue’s assessment that Canadians’ trust in their government needs to be reaffirmed. The Bill will protect Canada and Canadians by equipping our security partners with the appropriate laws and tools to detect, investigate and deter threats in the modern threat landscape.

If pressed on the $250,000 transfer from PRC officials to political candidates

• How the law applies in this scenario would be subjection to the decision of the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner. However, the law imposes a registration obligation to an influence activity undertaken at the direction of, or in association with a foreign principal when there is a disbursement of funds or things of value with the intent to influence a political or government process.

Background

Foreign Interference

Foreign interference (FI) includes activities undertaken by state or non-state actors that are harmful to Canada's interests and are clandestine or deceptive, or involve a threat to any person. Techniques used to conduct FI can include espionage, sabotage, illicit and corrupt financing, and other threat activities. Foreign states leverage these activities to advance their strategic interests including: domestic stability, seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, and military advantage. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interests and values.

Foreign Influence Transparency Registry

Foreign governments have established, legal, and legitimate channels of engagement with the Government of Canada. When done openly, this is a normal feature of rules-based international relations. However, when individuals or entities seek to exert influence on behalf of foreign governments in non-transparent ways, this can have serious consequences. These non-transparent influence activities undertaken on behalf of a foreign government are known as malign foreign influence, which is a subset of FI.

These activities could result in policy and legislation favorable to foreign interests over Canadian ones. They could also impact the content of available material that informs public opinions and the exercise of democratic rights. In some instances, this information could be disseminated by Canadians who may not be fully aware it originates from a foreign principal or entity. Unclear labelling of state-backed communications can produce public or media messaging that reinforces interests of adversarial states.

Malign foreign influence is a particularly complex challenge to address, in part because detection can be difficult and attribution can be made only after influence has been exerted. Some of Canada’s closest allies and like-minded partners have brought forward additional measures, including legislative regimes, to specifically enhance foreign influence transparency in their respective countries. While Canada has some tools available aimed at increasing transparency, there have been calls for the Government of Canada to consider new measures to bolster defenses to the growing threat. At Parliamentary Committee hearings, members of the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations have made inquiries about the possibility of Canada adopting a foreign agent registry.

On March 10, 2023, the Government of Canada announced the launch of consultations to guide the creation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR) in Canada. Those consultations closed on May 9, 2023. The consultations, which garnered nearly 1,000 responses from across Canada and included roundtable discussions with a wide range of stakeholders, including Indigenous partners, Provincial/Territorial representatives, community groups, academia, business and the legal community informed the creation of the made-in-Canada Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

On 6 May, the Government introduced An Act respecting countering foreign interference, which includes amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Act, the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act. Additionally, Part IV of the bill introduced the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, that created the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.

Public Safety (PS), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and Department of Justice (JUS) have conducted numerous technical briefings for Parliamentarians and other elected officials, academics, the legal community, business leaders, community and advocacy groups to provide a nuanced explanation of the bill.

Recently, Conservative MP Michael Chong, the Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Minister LeBlanc proposing a unanimous consent motion at the end of the debate at second reading to facilitate the bill through the House of Commons and committee stage. MP Chong expressed an intent to ensure that safeguards against foreign interference are implemented before the next federal election. The bill passed through second reading and is currently going through the committee stage with Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU).

Date modified:

2024-10-09