Parliamentary Committee Notes: Part 1 – CSIS Act Amendments

Issue

Can CSIS be trusted with new authorities given its controversies in recent years?

Proposed Response

If pressed on why CSIS needs to share datasets

• CSIS has trusted relationships with partners who are an important source of intelligence on threats to national security.

• New authorities would allow CSIS to share with partners that have legal authority to collect the information, with appropriate safeguards such as requiring approval from the Minister and the Federal Court for the sharing of Canadian datasets and the Intelligence Commissioner for foreign datasets.

If pressed on why CSIS wants to use datasets for security screening investigations

• The amendments would not expand CSIS’ authority to collect datasets. However, an amendment would permit CSIS to use Canadian datasets for the purpose of security screening.

• CSIS can already use lawfully retained foreign datasets, as authorized by the Minister and approved by the Intelligence Commissioner, for the purposes of security screening.

• The amendment would  allow CSIS to also leverage Canadian datasets for security screening investigations, because there may be relevant information about Canadians and people within Canada who may be connected to entities or actors of concern.

If pressed on deconflicting section 16 with CSE’s collection of foreign intelligence

• Foreign intelligence in electronic form is integral to CSIS operations and is frequently located outside our borders. However, Federal Court decisions have made it clear that under existing authorities, CSIS cannot collect foreign intelligence from within Canada when the information is located outside Canada.

• CSE cannot direct collection against individuals within Canada (regardless of where the information is located).

• This creates a foreign intelligence gap for information or intelligence located outside Canada when the information is about the activities of foreign individuals Canada.

• This gap must be closed to maintain Canada’s ability to understand the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign states or individuals.

If pressed on whether stakeholders will need a security clearance to receive information under s. 19

• Building resiliency to threats will require a broader sharing of CSIS information to those who may not always have a security clearance or the necessary secure facilities for the safe handling of classified information.

• The amendments have safeguards to protect the privacy of Canadians and people in Canada and CSIS will always consider the risks in disclosure before making a decision to disclose.

If pressed on whether broader disclosure allows CSIS to disclose more with foreign partners putting Canadians at risk

• The proposed changes would not broaden CSIS’ engagement with foreign partners, which are governed by other sections of the Act and remain subject to the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act.

• Exchanging information with the Five Eyes and other foreign agencies is a crucial component of Canada’s ability to effectively investigate and counter threats to Canada’s national security.

If pressed on whether CSIS will pick favourites when disclosing information, leaving certain groups more vulnerable having not received CSIS information

• CSIS would leverage the new resiliency authority to share information with those affected by national security threats based on what CSIS is observing in the threat landscape.

• CSIS exists to protect all Canadians, and the amendment aims to increase the resiliency of all Canadians – there are no favourites, and an enhanced national security dialogue is an important step in making Canada, and all of our diverse communities, more resilient to FI.

If pressed on whether the amendments just make it easier for CSIS to get a warrant

• The new single-use warrant authorizes a focused, single collection activity and would not require CSIS to establish investigative necessity by, for example, exhausting other investigative techniques first. This would allow CSIS to more efficiently advance its investigations into threat actors without requiring a full suite of investigative powers.

• CSIS would need to meet the reasonable grounds to believe threshold, the Minister must approve the application and the Federal Court maintains judicial discretion to approve any request from CSIS to use this new power.  .

• The Court may also impose any terms or conditions it deems appropriate.

If pressed on how the Bykovets decision will impact CSIS’ new warrant powers

• The proposed amendments are, in part, driven by changes in technology and are designed to ensure that privacy interests are properly respected. This is why all of the new collection authorities would require judicial authorization before CSIS could use them.

• The Bykovets decision, like all court decisions, would be taken into consideration in determining whether CSIS needs to obtain judicial authorization to conduct a particular collection activity, including under the proposed new authorities.

If pressed on five year review

• Regularly reviewing national security legislation ensures authorities remain current to the threat environment and evolving technology, and that Canadians’ voices are heard and expressed through their elected representatives.

• Parliament is the centre of Canada’s democracy; its independent and unique expertise, and accountability for national security legislation, will always be central to the Government’s efforts to protect Canadians and their institutions.

If pressed on PRC cyber targeting of Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China MPs

• CSIS and the Government have been warning that the People’s Republic of China and state-sponsored actors conduct foreign interference targeting elected officials from all parties and at all levels of government across Canada. The PRC is a highly capable cyber actor.

• CSIS works closely with the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, the Government of Canada’s experts on cyber security, to support them in their efforts to keep Canadians and their institutions safe from cyber threats.

• We are committed to equipping elected officials to identify foreign interference and cyber security threats so they can take measures to protect themselves.

If pressed on harassment, intimidation, and internal misconduct within CSIS

• CSIS’ leadership is committed to ensuring a workplace free from discrimination, bias, harassment, or bullying so that employees work every day in a safe, healthy and respectful environment.

• CSIS is in the process of establishing an independent ombudsperson, and employees have robust complaints mechanisms at their disposal. CSIS has taken concrete steps to  better communication with employees about their rights and encourages anyone to go to the police if they feel they may have been a victim of a crime.

If pressed on why the Government is moving ahead without receiving the NSIRA and NSICOP reviews first.

• The Government welcomes the NSIRA and NSICOP reports on foreign interference. These reviews provide valuable insights and suggestions to further bolster Canada’s toolkit against foreign interference threats.

• Foreign interference is a pervasive and pressing threat that requires action. Moving forward with these legislative proposals now does not prevent us from proposing additional changes later. Ensuring Canada’s national security toolkits are up-to-date is an ongoing effort, and we are committed to returning to Parliament and Canadians with any additional proposals as required.

 If pressed on NSIRA reports on CSIS’ dataset regime

• CSIS welcomes the findings and recommendations contained in NSIRA’s Dataset Regime Review. CSIS works with analogue authorities in a digital world. The dataset authority is extremely complex, and this has resulted in interpretative differences.

• The proposed CSIS Act amendments will clarify what information falls in or outside the dataset regime, while maintaining strong safeguards. This will ensure CSIS continues to be accountable to the Minister, the Federal Court, the Intelligence Commissioner, and ultimately Canadians, while enabling greater use of data for operations.

If pressed on duty of candour

• CSIS has a unique mandate and authorities, which require a heightened commitment to candour with the Federal Court. Protecting Canadians in a manner that is compliant with the law is something that CSIS is determined to uphold.

• CSIS has taken steps to address previous concerns and strengthen the manner in which it fulfills its duty of candour obligations.

• These include the creation of policies and training, and staffing a professional cadre of affiants that bring CSIS matters to the Court.

Date modified:

2024-10-04