Parliamentary Committee Notes: Foreign Interference

Commitments:

• Protect Canada’s democratic institutions against foreign interference/ disinformation
• Bring forward measures to counter the rise of ideologically-inspired violent extremism
• Increase resources to promote economic security and combat foreign interference
• Expand collaboration and information and intelligence sharing with Canadian partners and all orders of government to address security risks in foreign research and investment partnerships.
• Support innovation ecosystems across the country to support job creation, technology adoption and scale-up. This includes safeguarding Canada’s world-leading research ecosystem, as well as our intellectual property intensive businesses.

Overarching message on progress and priorities

• In recent years, a lot of critical work has been undertaken by our security and intelligence agencies to counter foreign interference.
• That said, foreign interference is a moving target. For this reason, over the past year, the Government of Canada has implemented a series of initiatives to assess and enhance our approach to ensure it keeps pace with the evolving threat environment.
• These initiatives are rooted in international best practices, and directly contribute to a number of key mandate letter commitments.

Protect Canada’s Democratic Institutions against Foreign Interference/Disinformation

• As the Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions, both in my previous role as the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities, and now as the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, I am glad to appear today to speak to what the government has done to protect Canada’s democratic institutions and electoral processes.
• We know that democratic institutions and processes around the world, including elections, are attractive targets for foreign interference. Canada is not immune to these threats.
• We also know that threat actors seek to deceptively and clandestinely target politicians, political parties, electoral nomination processes and media outlets to influence public opinion and ultimately advance their interests.
• These efforts can erode trust in our democratic institutions and stoke tensions about government policies and decisions.
• I want to be clear that Canada's democratic institutions and processes are strong and resilient. Our agencies support an integrated government response by monitoring and reporting on threats, and advising on such threats to ensure continued protection of our democracy.
  • The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) plays a key role in Government efforts against foreign interference. CSIS investigates threats, provides advice and, as necessary, may take measures to reduce threats to Canada's security including those orchestrated by foreign states. CSIS also engages with Canadian communities to better understand how threats against Canada’s democratic institutions impact communities and how the Government can better counter these threats.
  • The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) also plays an important role by investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference, including those targeting Canada's democratic institutions and processes.
  • Created as part of the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy in the lead up to the 2019 Federal Election, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE TF) also provides enhanced monitoring and assessment of foreign interference threats directed at federal elections. SITE partners, including CSIS, the RCMP, Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and Global Affairs Canada work closely to share information on election security and inform decision-making to ensure free and fair elections.
• Our Government has long taken steps to protect Canada’s democratic institutions, including, for example, through the publication of reports on threats to Canada’s democratic process beginning in 2017 and a CSIS publication titled “Foreign Interference Threats to Canada's Democratic Process”; the implementation of the Elections Modernization Act in 2018; and the creation and renewal of the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy in 2019 and 2021 respectively.
• We have also taken several actions since the most recent mandate letters were issued to protect Canada’s democratic institutions and processes from foreign interference and disinformation:
  • On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced the establishment of a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator at Public Safety Canada to coordinate efforts to combat foreign interference;
  • On March 10, 2023, the Government launched public consultations to guide the creation of a built-for-Canada Foreign Influence Transparency Registry. We received nearly 1,000 responses and engaged over 80 stakeholders to inform the design of a registry. While the consultations indicated broad support for the establishment of a FITR, stakeholders also indicated that broader reform on FI-related legislation was required;
  • For this reason, we undertook additional public and stakeholder consultations on legislative amendments to the Security of Information Act, CSIS Act, Criminal Code, and the Canada Evidence Act in November 2023. Through this process we received valuable feedback on how we can further strengthen Canada’s national security legislative toolkit;
  • On May16, 2023, a Ministerial Direction (MD) was issued to CSIS on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians. This MD recognizes that it is imperative that all parliamentarians are able to exercise their roles fully and without hindrance or interference from foreign states and hostile actors;
  • In 2022 alone, CSIS produced more than 2,500 intelligence products on foreign interference and other threats to Canada, and conducted 49 briefings with federal elected officials to help protected Canada’s democratic institutions and processes as part of it commitment to equipping elected officials to be able to identify foreign interference threats;
  • Since Summer of 2023, the SITE Task Force has provided enhanced monitoring and assessment of foreign interference threats directed at federal by-elections, and it has also been tasked with producing public reports following the day of the by-election vote;
  • Since December 2021 when the most recent mandate letters were issued, the Government has enhanced its communications regarding the threat of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic institutions and electoral processes. The government has issued a public report making further commitments regarding outstanding recommendations to protect Canada’s democratic institutions; and issued two public statements regarding social media campaigns targeting Canadian parliamentarians;
  • Our Government has also created the Protecting Democracy Unit at the Privy Council Office to develop, implement, and coordinate government-wide measures to combat disinformation; and renewed the Rapid Response Mechanism housed at Global Affairs Canada; and
  • We have made investments aimed at strengthening civil society capacity to combat challenges brought on by disinformation by renewing the Digital Citizen Initiative administered by the Department of Canadian Heritage, and by investing $5.5 million to create the Canadian Digital Media Research Network.
• The Government will continue to take action, including working with our allies, to protect Canadian values, principles, rights and freedoms.

Bring forward measures to counter the rise of ideologically-inspired violent extremism

• When Canada published its Counter-Terrorism Strategy entitled “Building Resilience Against Terrorism” in 2012, “violent Islamist extremism” was cited as “the leading threat to Canada’s national security.”
• Since then, the violent extremism and terrorism threat landscape has become more diverse and crowded. To be sure, religiously motivated violent extremism continues to pose a serious threat to Canada’s national security.
• At the same time, we have witnessed the rise and persistence of ideologically motivated and politically motivated violent extremism in Canada.
• What’s more, we are seeing a higher level of threat activity using the online space to spread mis- and disinformation, fuel hateful ideologies, and radicalize others – often lone actors, who remain under the security, intelligence, and law enforcement radar – to commit acts of violence.
• Polarization around social issues, geopolitical events and international conflicts also have the potential to exacerbate existing tensions domestically as we have seen following the onset of the Israel and Hamas conflict.
• From a federal government perspective, we are particularly concerned about the persistent and widespread occurrence of individuals crossing the line between rightful ad peaceful assembly and calling for hate and violence against certain communities.
• We have been engaging with a range of stakeholders from across Canada, including Provinces and Territories, universities, and community organizations to discuss the situation and get a better understanding of everyone’s concerns, preoccupations and realities but also to share with those groups what we are doing to address the situation.
• We recognize that Canada needs to modernize its approach to countering violent extremism and terrorism in all of its forms in this modern context, and are working towards this end. This includes:
• Better strategic communication with Canadians about the violent extremist and terrorist threat we face, starting with an updated Counter-Terrorism Strategy;
• An approach that considers whole-of-society impacts and drivers of violent extremism;
• Better understanding of the current threat, including how it will evolve and manifest in Canada and internationally; and
• Potential legislative changes to better enable intelligence and enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute violent extremist threat actors to prevent, detect, deter and, if necessary, respond to attacks.

Increase resources to promote economic security and combat foreign interference

• Due to our vibrant and innovative economic and research sectors, Canada continues to be a target for state-sponsored espionage, resulting in potential national security risks.
  
• Economic security is a key priority that the Government has been advancing over the past year, including through foreign investment review legislative modernization and research security measures.
  
• There is also ongoing collaboration and engagement with affected sectors to raise awareness of potential risks posed by foreign states or state-affiliated actors.
  
• Recent initiatives to address economic and research security include:
  • The creation of a Research Security Centre as of 2023;
  • The new Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC) policy announced on January 16, 2024, that will enhance Canada’s research security by ensuring federal grant applications to advance a sensitive technology research area submitted through a university or an affiliated research institution will be subject to security-based scrutiny; and
  • Specifically, applicants will be ineligible for federal funding if any of the researchers involved in activities supported by the grant are affiliated with, or in receipt of funding or in-kind support, from a university, research institute or laboratory connected to foreign military, national defence or state security entities that pose a risk to Canada’s national security.
• We have also made significant investments in our counter-foreign interference capabilities. This includes:
  • $13.5 million over five years and $3.1 million ongoing to set up the office of the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator to enhance coordination within the federal government as well as outreach efforts with non-federal stakeholders; and
  • $48.9 million over three years for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation by foreign actors, to increase its investigative capacity, and to more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted.

Expand information and intelligence sharing with partners and safeguard Canada’s world-leading research ecosystem, as well as our intellectual property intensive businesses

• Part of the public consultations on potential legislative amendments included consultations on amending the CSIS Act to authorize CSIS to disclose information to those outside of the Government of Canada. This is intended to help build resiliency against threats, such as foreign interference and bolster Canada’s counter-foreign interference toolkit.
• Public Safety is bolstering research security across the country, and has stood up the Research Security Centre which is tasked with providing advice and guidance directly to Canadian researchers and universities, processing security reviews under the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships, and developing research security policy.

Background:

Foreign Interference

Foreign interference (FI) includes activities undertaken by state or non-state actors that are harmful to Canada's interests and are clandestine or deceptive, or involve a threat to any person. Techniques used to conduct FI can include espionage, sabotage, illicit and corrupt financing, and other threat activities. Foreign states leverage these activities to advance their strategic interests including: domestic stability, seeking geopolitical influence, economic advancement, revision of the rules-based international order, and military advantage. These activities can be directed at Canadians, or residents of Canada, or against Canadian institutions to advance their strategic interests at the expense of our national interests and values.

Through its mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, including foreign interference, CSIS has seen multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canadian institutions and communities. As well, the RCMP is aware that illegal state-backed activities are committed against Canadians and Canadian interests, and investigates these activities further to its mandate.

Several reports have highlighted the threat of FI in Canada. For example, in its 2021 Public Report, CSIS stated that FI activities in Canada continue to be sophisticated, persistent, and pervasive. Espionage and foreign-influenced activities are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside of Canada, and directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests. In its 2022 Public Report, CSIS highlighted examples of how foreign states undertake this activity, including clandestinely spreading mis- and dis-information, as well as monitoring, intimidating and harassing communities in Canada. Prior to these reports, the 2019 Annual Report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) outlined FI activities, including the targeting of Canadian democratic institutions by threat actors. The NSICOP (2019) report pointed to Russia and China as being particularly active in Canada and made a number of recommendations for Canada to bolster its response to the threat of FI.

As the threat environment evolves, Canada is enhancing measures already in place, as well as bolstering its toolkit and legislative framework. In recognition of the current threat landscape, the Government of Canada announced a series of new initiatives aimed at combatting FI in the spring of 2023, including:

• Public and stakeholder consultations to guide the creation of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry (FITR). The online component of the consultations closed on May 9, 2023 and garnered submissions from a wide range of stakeholders across Canada. Preliminary analysis indicated broad support for a registry and policy refinement continues;
• A new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator to allow for a more proactive and coordinated approach and to enhance partnerships between federal and non-federal stakeholders;
• Investments in the amount of $5.5 million to strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to counter disinformation;
• Review by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) of the state of FI in federal electoral processes;
• Review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) of how Canada’s national security agencies handled the threat of FI during the 43rd and 44th federal general elections;
• Release of the First Report from the Right Honourable David Johnston, Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference, reaffirming the effectiveness of Canada’s approach to election security in the of 2019 and 2021 elections;
• Delivered a report to the Prime Minister entitled Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions; and
• Launch of a Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions.

In addition, on November 23, 2023, Public Safety Canada (PS), in partnership with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Department of Justice (JUS) launched public consultations to examine the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act and the Canada Evidence Act to potentially:

• modernize criminal law, including by introducing new foreign interference-related offences to better capture the evolving threat;
• provide Canada's national security agencies with the legal ability to share threat information with a wider set of Canadian partners than the federal government;
• improve the ways that the legal system deals with intelligence information in administrative and criminal proceedings; and

• make sure that CSIS has modernized authorities to be able to adequately protect Canadians and Canadian institutions in a digital world, and to engage with a broader set of partners than the federal government.

Threats to Democracy

Canada has observed state-sponsored information campaigns, aimed at reshaping or undermining the rules-based-international order. Disinformation, originating from anywhere in the world, can have serious consequences including threats to the safety and security of Canadians, erosion of trust in our democratic institutions, and confusion about government policies and notices.

Although Canada's electoral system is strong, threat actors have sought to target its politicians, political parties, elections, and media outlets in order to manipulate Canadian public opinion and interfere with Canada's democracy.

CSIS delivers briefings to protect against this threat, with the aim of promoting awareness of hostile activities by state actors and strengthening security practices. The provision of CSIS intelligence and assessments to senior levels of government allows for informed decision-making when responding to and developing policies to address these threats. Likewise, the RCMP has a broad, multifaceted mandate to ensure public safety by investigating, disrupting and preventing foreign interference drawing upon authorities enshrined in various legislation.

Information manipulation has been a subject of international collaboration across a variety of bilateral and multilateral engagements and fora. For example, you represent Canada at the Five-Country Ministerial (FCM), an annual forum where Five Eyes security ministers meet to discuss opportunities for collaboration, coordination, and information sharing on various national security issues, including on countering foreign interference.

Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference

On September 7, 2023, you announced the establishment of a Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. The inquiry is led by the Honourable Marie-Josée Hogue, puisne judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal, whose work as Commissioner began on September 18, 2023. Justice Hogue is mandated to examine and assess interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or nonstate actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th federal general elections at the national and electoral district levels.

The Commissioner is directed to deliver an interim report by May 3, 2024, and a final report by December 2024. The Commissioner may deliver a classified report containing any relevant classified content, if required, and a report suitable for disclosure to the public.

Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism

The Government of Canada’s effort in the counter-terrorism/violent extremism (VE) space is informed by the 2012 Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its four pillars: Prevent, Detect, Disrupt, and Respond. In 2019, the Government of Canada adopted three broad, non-mutually exclusive categories with respect to VE: Religiously-Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), Politically-Motivated Violent Extremism (PMVE), and Ideologically-Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE), which is further broken down into the following four subcategories: xenophobic violence, anti-authority violence, gender-driven violence and other grievance-driven and ideologically motivated violence.

Since 2014, there has been a significant increase in attacks inspired by IMVE narratives worldwide. Canadian attacks motivated in whole or in part by IMVE include: 2014 Moncton shooter, 2017 Quebec mosque shooter and 2018 Toronto van attacker. On June 6, 2023, Ontario’s Superior Court ruled that the February 2020 Toronto Massage Parlor murder met the Criminal Code definition of terrorism. The ruling does not constitute a separate terror charge; rather, the decision will factor into the accused's sentence, which has yet to be determined. This is the first terrorism charge and ruling against an IMV extremist, let alone against a perpetrator connected to the involuntary celibate (incel) movement. Most recently, on November 16th, 2023, the perpetrator of the vehicular attack that killed four members of a Muslim family and seriously injured another in London, Ontario, was found guilty of first-degree murder. In his sentencing, the judge also ruled Veltman’s actions constitute as terrorism under Canadian law.

Over the course of the past year, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has developed an IMVE Strategy that outlines the gaps and challenges investigators face when identifying and disrupting potential IMVE threat actors. This Strategy lays the groundwork for the RCMP to take inventory of its own tools and identifies areas where additional resources would be required to effectively mitigate potential threats.

In response to concerns over fragmented social cohesion giving rise to the spread of disinformation, increasing polarization, and the potential for radicalization and violent extremism, officials from PS, CSIS, the RCMP, and the JUS have conducted a series of engagement sessions with representatives of the Jewish, Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim communities in Canada, to address community safety concerns. These community groups expressed concerns about potential bias and misinformation in media and public discourse skewing public perceptions and reinforcing negative stereotypes of their communities, enflaming tensions, and stigmatizing their members leading to potential hate-fueled violence.

Economic Security

Increased global trade together with rapid technological innovation have provided Canada with immense opportunities for economic growth and increased prosperity. Important emerging fields of technology have become key drivers of economic growth and development. However, these advancements have also given rise to new and serious national security vulnerabilities that are emanating through a range of entry points into Canada’s economy. Sensitive technologies with military or dual-use applications, sensitive personal data of Canadians, and critical infrastructure are among the key assets that drive our economy and are often most targeted by hostile actors. As an example, in his remarks to the Centre for International Governance Innovation in February 2021, CSIS Director David Vigneault named Canada’s biopharmaceutical and health sector, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, ocean technology and aerospace sectors as facing particularly severe threat activity.

These threats may come from: foreign investments from hostile actors in strategic sectors and industries important to Canada’s national security; the acquisition sensitive goods, technology, and expertise; or funding partnerships with our universities and research institutions to gain access to cutting edge technology and IP.

The Government of Canada has a suite of tools at its disposal to protect the Canadian economy and, more broadly, Canadian strategic interests from harm. These include: the Controlled Goods Program (CGP), administered by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC); the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA), administered by Global Affairs Canada (GAC); and the Investment Canada Act (ICA), administered by Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED), with Public Safety Canada leading the ICA-national security review of proposed foreign investments that threaten Canada’s national security.

Several of Canada’s security partners, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have upgraded their capabilities to more readily identify and mitigate economic-based threats to national security. Canada is seeking to build on the current regime protecting our most valuable assets while maintaining the openness and innovation crucial to the Canadian economy.

Information Sharing/Safeguarding the Research Ecosystem

Research Security Centre

Budget 2022 announced the creation of the Research Security Centre, housed at Public Safety. The Centre has three primary responsibilities: (1) implementing and managing the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships; (2) Creating and distributing tools and resources on research security to Canada’s academic community, and; (3) providing specific advice to researchers and universities about their research and how to secure it.

The Centre includes a team of regional advisors, located across Canada who provide the advice and guidance directly to universities and researchers. The regional advisors have had over 300 engagements with academics and universities across the country.

National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships

The Government released the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships on July 12, 2021. The Guidelines were developed in consultation with the Government of Canada-Universities Working Group. All researchers are encouraged to use the National Security Guidelines for Research Partnerships to assess all research partnerships, with any partner or funder, to protect their work. A phased, risk-based process is being used to implement the guidelines, starting with the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council’s (NSERC) Alliance Grants for applications involving a private sector partner. As of Fall 2023, the program was expanded to the Canadian Biomedical Research Fund/Biomedical Research Infrastructure Fund phase 2 call. Further expansion will continue in early 2024.

Research Security Statement

On February 14, 2023, the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, and the Minister of Health Canada announced new eligibility criteria for federal research grant funding from Canada’s granting councils and the Canada Foundation for Innovation. Once implemented, these new rules would prohibit research funding from being awarded to a proposal where any of the researchers are affiliated with – or in receipt of funding or in-kind contributions – from a university, research institute or laboratory connected to military, national defence or state security entities of foreign state actors that pose a risk to our national security.

On January 16, 2024, the Ministers released further information regarding the implementation of the Sensitive Technology Research and Affiliations of Concern (STRAC) policy. As part of the new policy, Public Safety developed two lists:

• Sensitive Technology Research Areas (Stra) List: Consists of advanced and emerging technologies that are important to Canadian research and development, but may also be of interest to other malign foreign state, state-sponsored, and non-state actors, seeking to undermine Canada’s technological advantage. 
• Named Research Organizations (Nro) List: Includes research organizations that pose the highest risk due to their connection to malign foreign state, state-sponsored, and non-state actors, that seek to undermine Canada’s technological advantage.  

Date modified:

2024-08-07