The Definition, Measurement and Institutionalization of Transparency in National Security

The Definition, Measurement and Institutionalization of Transparency in National Security PDF Version 873 KB)

Table of contents

• Executive Summary
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Definition
• 3. Measurement and Reporting
• 4. Institutionalization
• 5. COVID-19 and National Security Governance: Implications for Transparency.
  • 5.1 Shifting Boundaries and Heightened Complexity
  • 5.2 Cybersecurity and Data Privacy
  • 5.3 Oversight and Openness
• Annex A: Defining, Measuring and Institutionalizing National Security Transparency – Sample of Relevant Work from Around the World
• Annex B: NS-TAG Meeting Highlights, October 2020 – April 2021
• Footnotes

The National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG) is an independent, arms-length committee that is supported financially and in-kind by the Government of Canada. The opinions and views expressed in this document are strictly those of the NS-TAG members collectively, and should not be considered as the official view of the Government of Canada.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2021.

Cat. No: PS9-21/2021E-PDF

ISBN: 978-0-660-39315-5

Executive Summary

The National Security Transparency Advisory Group (NS-TAG) was created in 2019 as an independent and external body. Our role is to advise the Deputy Minister of Public Safety Canada, and the rest of the national security and intelligence community, on steps to infuse transparency into Canada’s national security policies, programs, and activities in a manner that will increase democratic accountability and public awareness, engagement, and access to national security and related intelligence information.

In our first report, published in December 2020, we offered a survey of the state of transparency in Canada’s national security community, and highlighted areas for future improvement.

In this second report, we lay out general principles related to the definition, measurement, and institutionalization of transparency in the national security and intelligence community. For greater transparency to be sustainable, it must be institutionalized and routinized; structures and processes must be put in place to define, measure and then ‘hardwire’ transparency into the national security community’s everyday work.

To do so, we recommend that individual departments and agencies with national security functions should:

• Develop and release a clear statement in which they express their commitment to greater transparency;

• Develop and release metrics to measure and evaluate the implementation of their transparency commitment;

• Institutionalize a range of initiatives to support their efforts to enhance transparency;

• Develop a common understanding around the purpose of community engagement and its importance in enhancing transparency and building trust, and invest more resources to better train and equip personnel with less experience with community engagement.

Introduction

Government transparency is foundational to the rights of citizens in democratic countries. A range of national and international legal instruments enshrine fundamental human rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and freedom to participate in public life. A lack of transparency impedes the realization of these rights and, invariably, the health of a democracy. In the absence of transparency, it is difficult to hold government to account, there is risk of government abuse and corruption, and public trust in government erodes. On the other hand, the social impacts of transparency are wide reaching and can touch on health, education and the economy. Additionally, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, new concerns about transparency and its impact on the work of the national security community have emerged. We briefly address these at the end of this report. 

Promoting transparency in the world of national security, which has historically been marred by a culture of secrecy, is complex. As we noted in our first report, despite recent improvements, the national security community in Canada does not have a strong record in meeting the highest standards of transparency. This has a negative impact on the confidence of citizens in national security institutions.

Through virtual meetings, the NS-TAG consulted extensively and meaningfully in preparing this report. We heard that the lack of transparency in national security is felt across many sectors. Journalists noted that they struggle to provide reliable information on national security. Many citizens mistrust national security institutions and, as noted above, are unable to benefit from their democratic rights to their fullest extent. The work of the national security community also suffers as it struggles to effectively engage with citizens. Weakened democratic health invariably results from a poorer flow of competing ideas.

Openness, transparency and civic engagement have become the basis of an international advocacy movement. The Open Government Partnership, an initiative founded in 2011 to promote accountability, transparency and inclusive government and of which Canada is a member, has grown from eight member countries to 78, in addition to a growing number of local governments. Non-governmental organizations such as Transparency International have been reporting on transparency for even longer. The International Budget Partnership, Publish What You Pay and the Open Contracting Partnership, to name a few, are among the many organizations that now work to promote transparency in various sectors.

Defining, measuring and institutionalizing transparency call for a basic understanding of not only why transparency matters, but also of the structural and cultural determinants of systemic reforms that can lead to improved institutional accountability and better performance. With respect to defining transparency, it is important to acknowledge varying approaches to articulating the concept in general terms, as well as in more applied contexts specific to agency mandates. While we see value in articulating a broad set of principles for the national security community, it is equally imperative to transform these principles into specific measurable outcomes across the community in ways that are relevant to both individual agencies and government as a whole.

Measurement is equally essential: research and experience confirm that what gets measured matters in determining decisions and tracking impacts. Moreover, recent government reforms tied to open government and results-based management underscore the importance of providing clear indicators of performance goals. In a realm as complex as national security, it is important that reporting include quantitative and qualitative benchmarks, along with the regular holding of consultations with stakeholders and the public. Measurement must be viewed not as a singular linear exercise but as an enabler of learning, adjustment and continual improvement. Accordingly, measurement is an essential foundation for shared accountability and public engagement by grounding dialogue in indicators of success and failure, not only to better assess past performance, but also to prepare for emerging and increasingly complex challenges.

An emphasis on consultation and engagement is essential to institutionalize transparency in meaningful ways, and requires cultural and structural reforms to the governance of national security. Cultural change in any large organization takes effort and time, and this is especially relevant to national security where secrecy has been a hallmark of individual action and organizational leadership. The essence of the NS-TAG is to support the creation of a shared understanding for organizational cultural change, as well as specific policy and governance reforms that can help steer the process of institutionalizing transparency in pursuit of strengthened accountability and greater innovation.

2. Definition

This statement should represent a commitment to transparency, an articulation of the department or agency’s interpretation of what transparency means, why it is important, and how it will be measured and implemented. The commitment should be specific and provide a foundation for further reporting and accountability. In drafting this commitment, departments and agencies can use the government’s National Security Transparency Commitment as a foundation, while adapting it to their particular circumstances.^Footnote1

Departmental transparency statements should be made public. They should be hosted, in an easily accessible manner, preferably on existing departmental webpages dedicated to transparency (where they could be bundled with specific initiatives and documentation such as mandate letters, departmental reports and proactive disclosure).^Footnote2 By publicizing this statement, these organizations can establish the parameters for performance reporting and create a public expectation that they will pursue this commitment to transparency. We also encourage organizations to commit to review, and revise as necessary, their definition of transparency as they gather experience.

There are many definitions of transparency. At its most fundamental level, it can be defined as “official business conducted in such a way that substantive and procedural information is available to, and broadly understandable by, people and groups in society, subject to reasonable limits protecting security and privacy”.^Footnote3

Yet beyond this general definition, there are different types of transparency. It can be interpreted expansively, for example, or it can focus on the type of information to be released, or more on the processes governing these releases.

When defined narrowly and passively, transparency simply corresponds to the release of requested information. Demand-driven tools such as access to information requests, moreover, are principally used by a limited segment of society, such as journalists, academics and non-governmental organizations.  

A broader and more dynamic interpretation, one that the NS-TAG supports, also emphasizes bolstering citizen engagement and government responsiveness. Similarly, an expansive conception of transparency does not only describe what information is released (and why and how), but also what information cannot be released (not only its quantity and quality, but also based on what authorities and as a result of which process, with the availability of meaningful and rapid review to challenge omissions and redactions). It is, in this sense, essential to be ‘transparent about transparency’, as one of our invited speakers argued. Moreover, an essential pillar of a dynamic transparency strategy also promotes citizens’ ability to access information and supports their understanding of processes to do so, what can be labeled as latent transparency.^Footnote4

We recommend that departments and agencies with national security functions adopt a proactive definition of transparency, as opposed to a narrow, reactive and passive one. Departments and agencies should seek to engage stakeholders within and outside government in a dialogue to identify the scope of such an outward, expansive and dynamic definition of transparency. Such a dialogue would also serve as a basis for ongoing efforts to establish and refine measurement and to foster institutionalization and adaptation over time.

3. Measurement and Reporting

We recognize that measuring transparency can be challenging, and that it is labour-intensive. Nevertheless, we believe that it is essential. Without a clear process to measure transparency, it is difficult to assess whether commitments to become more transparent have been fulfilled. Indeed, the act of measuring transparency is itself a step toward transparency.

In this context, the NS-TAG believes that departments and agencies with national security functions should operationalize their definition of transparency and explain how they plan to measure and track their progress. This implies that they should also put in place the mechanisms to collect, analyze and then disseminate the results. Both the metrics and the regular reporting based on those metrics should be easily accessible to the public, possibly alongside the transparency statement on their website. We recommend, moreover, that departments and agencies should include a discussion of their transparency measurement and reporting efforts in their annual reports tabled in Parliament (the Departmental Plan, tabled annually and which provides parliamentarians and Canadians with a high-level summary of plans and priorities, and the Departmental Results Report, which accounts for results achieved against expectations set out in the Departmental Plan).

National security departments and agencies should develop specific indicators to measure progress toward achieving greater transparency. These should be relevant to the mandate of each specific agency, though some indicators could also be common across the community. The National Security Transparency Secretariat in Public Safety Canada can help coordinate this process, along with the interdepartmental working groups charged with the implementation of the National Security Transparency Commitment.  Without prejudging the outcome, we can envision indicators such as:

• the proactive disclosure (where appropriate) of policies, operating parameters and activities;
• data about complaints and investigations, and specific outcomes from resolved disputes or litigation;
• disaggregated data on diversity, including on race, in individual departments and agencies;
• official documents for public access without necessitating Access to Information procedures;
• public outreach activities;
• the disaggregated budgetary allocations of national security organizations;
• information about cybersecurity threat assessments and potential privacy breaches;
• open data holdings and data-sharing policies and activities;
• qualitative and quantitative information on the use of emerging technologies (notably Artificial Intelligence systems) for national security purposes; and
• declassification of historical information and documents.

Again, we emphasize that in measuring their performance on these metrics, departments and agencies should consult widely: by definition, efforts at the level of measurement should be transparent. Consultations with stakeholders on the measurement of departmental performance, in particular, should be institutionalized. Even if consultations are labour-intensive, they are essential.

We also recommend that departments and agencies with national security functions consider developing a system to measure the transparency of their community engagement. In doing so, it is important not to limit this measurement to the number of outreach events or of training programs. Instead, the effectiveness of these initiatives should be carefully determined to measure quality over quantity. The benefits of these initiatives are difficult to measure in the short term. However, they can produce tangible benefits over the long term as trust and partnerships grow with communities and stakeholders.

4. Institutionalization

Here again, we offer general principles as well as specific proposals that could guide this ’hardwiring’ of transparency. It should be noted that the Government of Canada’s National Security Transparency Commitment already provides positive suggestions. For example, Principle 1 on “information transparency” calls on institutions to “examine their holdings and release summary information that demonstrates what they do and the scale of those efforts”. Principle 2 calls on departments and agencies to support Canadians in accessing national security information to the “maximum extent possible without compromising the national interest, the effectiveness of operations, or the safety or security of an individual.”

Institutionalizing transparency requires cultural change: mindsets that have traditionally privileged the hoarding of information as the default posture must evolve. The institutionalization of transparency also needs to be championed from the top. The national security community’s leadership must commit to transparency to motivate staff engagement and to increase trust among the rest of their organization. In this context, we recommend that the public service consider including a transparency commitment in the performance agreement for each deputy minister or head of agency in the national security community. Every department should also name a transparency champion at a senior level who would coordinate and promote efforts to better hardwire transparency from within.

Transparency is not just about releasing information. It is also about direct engagement with the public, including during the policy-making process, in line with Principle 6 of the National Security Transparency Commitment. There is, as such, a need for regular interaction, dialogue and consultation with civil society, media, academia and businesses. The national security community must build sustainable partnerships to achieve this, not merely organize occasional, ad hoc exchanges with a narrow subset of the population. For example, the CSIS Director recently gave a public speech in which he highlighted the need for CSIS’ legal authorities to evolve;^Footnote5 any such changes to the mandate and authorities of CSIS should be predicated on transparent and meaningful consultation.  

National security and intelligence personnel often do not have the necessary tools to implement initiatives to enhance transparency. As such, we recommend that the community adopt a greater commitment to training on transparency. Individual courses on transparency are necessary, but it is also essential to integrate transparency across personnel training, not just as part of separate modules. Personnel should, in particular, learn the skills necessary to write with a clearer and more concise style when documents are for public consumption. More broadly, institutional culture should better encourage open and honest communication with the public.

We also observe that one of the key impediments to greater transparency in the national security community is the widespread tendency to overclassify information.^Footnote6 This is largely explained by an imbalance of incentives, which steers national security personnel, more often than not, to err on the side of caution.^Footnote7 That is, the penalties for underclassification can be significant, while there are few, if any, for overclassification. There is, moreover, rarely a need to justify decisions to classify information at a higher level than necessary. The benefits of overclassification, as a result, are internal while the costs are externalized. Reducing overclassification, we believe, would be an essential step toward greater transparency and accountability. We therefore recommend that the national security and intelligence community consider making it harder to overclassify information. This could be accomplished by, for example, taking steps to lessen the fear of underclassifying information, adopting an explicit reference in performance management frameworks, and conducting spot audits or reviews of the appropriateness of classification levels.  

5. COVID-19 and National Security Governance: Implications for Transparency

The COVID-19 pandemic has had significant impacts on national security; we believe that it is important for the NS-TAG to briefly address these challenges here. As new threats and challenges have emerged, the governance of national security must evolve. Indeed, within any ‘new normal’ taking shape, learning and adaptation are essential. With respect to transparency, there are three areas that stand out as especially relevant to the NS-TAG’s efforts: shifting boundaries of national security policies and heightened complexity; cybersecurity and data privacy; and the evolution of openness and oversight.

5.1 Shifting Boundaries and Heightened Complexity

Important debates have emerged within and outside government about the degree to which the implications of the pandemic should be viewed as elements within a shifting mosaic of national security threats, actors and policies, or whether they represent a new overarching paradigm going forward.^Footnote8 What seems clear is that as governments seek to foster holistic pandemic responses, horizontal coordination, information and data sharing, and collaboration within and across governments and other sectors become more essential.

The pandemic has had an impact on a range of critical matters such as health intelligence, security of supply chains and border management. Moreover, one of the key themes in the first year of our work has been to encourage a better articulation of the parameters and functioning of the national security community to Canadians. As such, we suggest that understanding how and why the governance of national security is changing is a crucial element of transparency and accountability.

5.2 Cybersecurity and Data Privacy

COVID-19 has accelerated the pre-existing trend of digitization across society. As a result, building secure and resilient infrastructure within and outside the public sector is a critical concern. CSE reports, for example, that the Government of Canada alone is the subject of more than 1.6 billion malicious threats every day. As more Canadians make use of digital service channels, and as more pandemic-related data sources are gathered, analyzed and shared (from mobile applications for contact alerts to the emergence of vaccine passports), cybersecurity and data privacy become more closely intertwined with national security.

The pandemic has also brought about a host of new online threats, ranging from misinformation to more targeted conspiracy theories meant to seed domestic unrest and instability, as well as ‘dark web’ markets for vaccines and other medical supplies. From a transparency perspective, exposing and better explaining such threats can contribute to societal learning and resilience, improving public trust and government capacity for innovation.

Regarding data privacy, the emergence of vaccine passports in many countries raises both new and familiar questions in terms of openness and trust. The State of New York’s fledgling and controversial partnership with IBM to deploy blockchain technologies for its own digitized vaccine passport is a case in point, while the UK has undertaken a broad review of the operational and privacy implications of such passports. Whether and how such data sources and mechanisms are used within the national security apparatus further underscores the importance of openness and transparency.

5.3 Oversight and Openness

As has been reported by Canadian media, the pandemic has affected the efforts of new oversight bodies. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), for example, has acknowledged facing delays and obstacles.^Footnote9 Similarly, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) has also faced new hurdles arising from COVID-19.^Footnote10 

Such challenges are not unexpected. Given the unprecedented scope of the public health crisis, new oversight bodies may struggle to create organizational systems and recruit skilled workers, while departments and agencies face distractions and potential delays in meeting their nonetheless important oversight obligations. At the same time, we are encouraged that NSIRA intends to broaden its focus to include considerations of the pandemic – committing, for example, to exploring how “the Government of Canada collects intelligence on medical issues or in relation to the health of Canadians.”^Footnote11

From the NS-TAG’s vantage point, there is an additional risk that if backlogged oversight demands are prioritized over more proactive forms of openness, the necessary impetus for our own proposed reforms might be neglected. As COVID-19 recasts government priorities and operations, it is essential that new and existing oversight and review bodies are equipped to ensure accountability. At the same time, political and senior managerial commitments toward embracing transparency as a basis for deeper and more systemic change are equally vital.

Annex A: Defining, Measuring and Institutionalizing National Security Transparency – Sample of Relevant Work from Around the World ^Footnote12

The tables below provide examples of work related or relevant to transparency in national security. There are examples from a national security context as well as other areas where transparency was considered in the organization’s initiatives. Please note that this is not an exhaustive list. For instance, countries listed below may have other transparency-related initiatives. The purpose of the information is to serve as a starting point for looking at transparency in national security. It is based on publicly available resources across a few jurisdictions, with supporting examples from international organizations and academic groups.

For the purposes of material to include in this chart, “Transparency” concerned policies, programs, mechanisms or activities that proactively disclose information to citizens, residents or stakeholders. Reactive disclosure systems – such as access to information mechanisms – were covered in annex 5.1 of the NS-TAG first report published in December 2020.

The material is presented as follows:

• Source;
• Scope (what was covered, what was it about, what was done);
• How transparency was defined (or a term closely related to transparency such as accountability, integrity and trust);
• What indicators, measures, parameters, etc. were used or suggested;
• Elements relevant to institutionalizing or hardwiring transparency (or related concept) or on the cultural change process;
• Observations on the material.

Important: This annex and the information contained within was last verified on May 3rd, 2021, and is subject to change in the future. This document will not be updated.

A. Canada

B. United States

C. United Kingdom

D. Australia

E. New Zealand

F. International Organizations, Think-Tanks, Academic Research and Other Jurisdictions

Annex B: NS-TAG Meeting Highlights, October 2020 – April 2021

Regular Meeting – October 7, 2020, Virtual

Theme/Topic: “Transparency by Design: Definition, Evaluation and Institutionalization of National Security Transparency – Part One: Open Government”

Highlights:

• Discussion with guests on the concept of open government: metrics considerations; institutionalization and change; the scope and end goal of transparency and the drivers behind current Government of Canada efforts; and fundamental questions that should be addressed when attempting to achieve “transparency by design.”
• Internal discussion on the completion and publication of the NS-TAG first report.

The full summary is available online.

Regular Meeting – November 4, 2020, Virtual

Theme/Topic: “Transparency by Design: Definition, Evaluation and Institutionalization of National Security Transparency – Part Two: The United States’ Experience”

Highlights:

• The discussion with guests focused on the work being done at the United States’ Office of Civil Liberties, Privacy and Transparency, within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Members and guests discussed the fundamental goals of transparency and why it is important, both for national security institutions and for the public, and how to approach it as a good business practice. They also shared considerations for institutionalizing and measuring transparency, and outlined a number of transparency initiatives led by the Office that had widespread implications across the United States’ national security and intelligence community.
• Discussion and adoption of amendments to the NS-TAG’s Terms of Reference. Members re-appointed the non-governmental co-chair for a second one-year term.
• Update and discussion on the production and release of the NS-TAG’s first report, including on raising public awareness on the report.

The full summary is available online.

Special Meeting – December 14, 2020, Virtual

Theme/Topic: Discussion with the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Highlights:

• The NS-TAG welcomed the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Deputy Director of Policy and Strategic Partnerships. Opening remarks and responses to members’ questions covered a number of topics including: community engagement, diversity and inclusion in the workplace, new terminology for violent extremism, datasets, and review and accountability.

The full summary is available online.

Regular Meeting – January 20, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic: “Transparency by Design: Definition, Evaluation and Institutionalization of National Security Transparency – Part Three”

Highlights:

• The discussion session with guests focused on how to build transparency in organizations, how to improve access to information, and the relationship between accountability, integrity and transparency.
• Members discussed outreach activities they conducted following the publication of the Group’s initial report in late 2020. This included two outreach video sessions on January 14, interviews with social media, and written media publications.
• The Group also discussed programming for upcoming meetings and when the Group will move to the next theme.

The full summary is available online.

Regular Meeting – February 17, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic: “Transparency by Design: Definition, Evaluation and Institutionalization of National Security Transparency – Part Four”

Highlights:

• The discussion session with guests focused on: access to information, the duty of candor, digital technologies and data, culture change and challenges related to measurement and key indicators, as well as some of the areas where transparency could be improved.
• Members discussed the approach to their second report and its outline.

The full summary is available online.

Regular Meeting – March 17, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic: “Transparency by Design: Definition, Evaluation and Institutionalization of National Security Transparency – Part Five”

Highlights:

• The discussion with guests was centered on the Communications Security Establishment’s – including the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security – mission, key principles, and transformation in recent years. In particular, members discussed the progress CSE has made in terms of transparency, including several examples of concrete outreach and engagement initiatives they have put in place.
• The Transparency Secretariat provided an update on the National Security Transparency Commitment’s implementation across departments and agencies and presented the preliminary results of recent public opinion research on national security transparency and information sharing, the final report of which will be made public.
• Members discussed the current draft of their second report and members’ respective involvement in writing the next draft.

The full summary is available online.

Regular Meeting – April 21, 2021, Virtual

Theme/Topic: “Transparency by Design: Definition, Evaluation and Institutionalization of National Security Transparency – Part Six”

Highlights:

• To conclude discussions on the current theme, members and guests exchanged views on: overclassification and why it happens, measures to prevent the overclassification of documents, the importance of accountability and culture change, selected European projects on digital rights, surveillance and democracy, and challenges and limits of transparency.
• Internal discussion on the current draft of the Group’s second report and the timeline for publication.

The full summary is available online.

Date modified:

2022-07-22