VICTIMIZATION BEHIND THE WALLS:

SOCIAL CONTROL IN MALE FEDERAL PRISONS

A Report on Victimization in Male Prisons Prepared for
The Correctional Service of Canada

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> They don't give a fuck about what goes on after
> four o'clock, the shit stays here and they go
> home.
>
> If there is any oppression it is indifference.
> People really don't care - the guards, your CO,
> the NPB, nobody. This isn't unique to prisons -
> that's life but here things are magnified. You
> can't lose yourself here like you can in the
> community.

The prison is not a microcosm of free society. By its very

nature the prison is deviant. It houses people who have been

declared deviant by those in power. Rightly or wrongly, these

deviants are placed in an environment, a total institution, that

deprives them of their liberty, their freedom to move and

associate with whom they desire, their freedom to communicate

with the outside world and their freedom to engage in creative,

productive activity. Some of these freedoms are returned to

prisoners, although not in the absolute but as privileges subject

to the 'good order of the penitentiary' and the requisites of a

bureaucratic structure. In this environment deviants become prisoners.

Within this deviant environment, prisoners are 'encouraged' not to be deviant. All are given a bed and food, which is more than some had on the street. Most are subjected to a barrage of psychological testing to determine strengths but mostly weaknesses, and those most in need may be provided with psychological or psychiatric services. Some are offered programs - anger and stress management to assist them in learning coping skills, cognitive restructuring to make them think correctly, vocational skills to teach them to spot weld, Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous to relieve chemical addictions, or spiritual services for those who are so inclined. Most are given employment, however menial some jobs may be, and an income to purchase some necessities and luxury items. Some turn their back on what is offered, others accept it out of necessity, boredom or the seduction of an early release.

What is most remarkable about this deviant world is that some prisoners are 'rehabilitated'. Whether assisted by correctional services or in spite of them, some prisoners re-adjust to street life with little or no further contact with the criminal justice system. This is remarkable because the prison world in which they temporarily lived is one of violence and exploitation.

Over the past decade the problem of prison violence has been given a great deal of attention by prison researchers. The majority of this research has been directed at establishing correlates between individual and system level variables. For example, variables that have been associated with prison violence include the transiency of the prison population (Myers and Levy, 1978; Clements, 1982; Ellis, 1984; Gaes and McGuire, 1985; Porporino, 1986), age (Porporino, 1986; Flanagan, 1983; Anno, 1985; DeHeer, 1985), the racial composition of a prison (Gaes and McGuire, 1985; Leger, 1988), the absolute number of prisoners in a prison or prison system (Farrington and Nuttal, 1980; Winfree, 1987; Fry, 1988), the population density of a prison or prison system (D'Atri and Ostfeld, 1975; Nacci et.al., 1977; Megargee, 1976; Jan, 1980; Cox et.al., 1984), and the presence of prisoners convicted of violent crimes (Bonta and Nanckivell, 1980; Gaes and McGuire, 1985; Porporino, 1986). The existing state of knowledge regarding the relationship between these variables and prison violence, however, is not at all conclusive.

While some of the literature on prison violence displays a high degree of methodological sophistication, Rice et.al. (1989) argued that one consequence of attempting to establish correlates between individual and system level variables and prison violence has been the paucity of innovative theoretical advances in attempting to understand the dynamics of prison violence. The

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Prison Victimization Project represents an attempt to fill this void.

The Prison Victimization Project was designed to measure the prevalence and incidence of specified criminal victimizations within a sample of federal prisoners housed in maximum, medium and minimum security prisons. The project had three primary goals: (1) to provide a more accurate estimate of the extent of victimization within the sample, (2) to provide data on the nature of these victimizations, and, (3) to contribute to the theoretical understanding of victimization, and reactions to victimization, within the social world of the prison.

This document provides the results of the Prison Victimization Study. Chapters 2 and 3 review the literature on prison victimization and victimization surveys and the literature on the social world of the prison. Chapter 4 provides the methodology used in this project. Chapter 5 examines the concept of the 'inmate code'. The question addressed in this chapter is whether or not this concept adequately addressees the experiences of a sample of Canadian federal prisoners in the 1990s. It will be argued that the 'inmate code', as it has traditionally been defined in the prison literature, is not sufficient for this task. What does exist, however, is a set of informal rules of social control. The content and operation of these rules are outlined. Chapter 6 situates the informal rules of social

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control within the social world of the prison. Attention is paid to the manner in which these rules are produced and reproduced within the social arena of the prison. One of the goals of the Prison Victimization Project is to supplement official data on violence and related prison incidents by asking prisoners whether or not they had been the victim of specific victimization incidents within the previous twelve months. Chapter 7 provides incidence and prevalence data on victimization. Chapter 8 brings together the victimization data and the data on the social world of the prison. This Chapter develops an initial understanding of how the social world of the prison is produced and reproduced over time and the role victimization plays in this process. It will be shown that victimization is built into the very fabric of social relations in prison. The same processes that have the effect of limiting conflicts in prison simultaneously encourage their existence. Chapter 9 provides a preliminary attempt to construct a theory of social control within prison and provides directions for future research. It is hoped that examining victimization data will offer fresh insights into understanding this complex world.

It should be noted that this Project surveyed federal male prisoners. It may be the case that similar processes occur at the provincial level but this is a matter of future study. Additionally, no attempt should be made to generalize these results to female prisons. It is unlikely that similar patterns

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of victimization occur in prisons for women.

CHAPTER 2

VIOLENCE IN CANADIAN FEDERAL PRISONS

> When I first came to the max I didn't think the
> environment would change me until I went to a
> medium and realized that the other guys were
> paranoid of me, my values and attitudes had
> changed....I went through a period when I really
> didn't care. There were a few times when I was
> face to face with a few people and I really didn't
> give a fuck about getting stabbed, I was looking
> for a place to put it in him. It was 'I die or he
> dies'. That's what I meant by 'I didn't care'.

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, violence in Canadian

prisons was recognized as a problem area by corrections

researchers (Bonta and Nanckivell, 1980; Porporino and Marton,

1983; Ellis, 1984; Porporino et.al., 1987) and government

investigators (MacGuigan Committee, 1977; Vantour, 1984). An

examination of some of the violence statistics indicates the

degree of the violence problem.

During the 1970s, there was a rising trend in the absolute

number of prisoner suicides and prisoner homicides. Between 1970

and 1979 there were an average of 9.0 prisoner suicides per year; during the 1980s there were an average of 13.4 prisoner suicides per year. Prisoner homicides also rose over the time period. There were an average of 4.3 prisoner homicides between 1970 and 1979. Between 1980 and 1989 there were an average of 7 prisoner homicides.

TABLE 2.1

Major Security Incidents - 1970 to 1989

	Staff Homicide	Prisoner Homicide	Prisoner Suicide
1970-74	1	13	51
1975-79	7	30	39
1980-84	7	41	69
1985-89	0	29	65

Source: Porporino and Marton, 1983

In terms of homicide and suicide, Canadian federal prisons compare unfavourably to their American counterparts. A recent report produced for the Research and Statistics Branch, CSC (Cooley, 1989), found that of forty-one North American corrections jurisdictions, the Correctional Service of Canada had the highest seven-year mean rate of prisoner suicide and the fourth highest seven year mean rate of prisoner homicide. Moreover, a Canadian male federal prisoner between the age of fifteen and sixty-four is more likely to die a violent death while in prison than is his counterpart on the street or in an

American prison.

Recent official statistics on lesser forms of violence show that while the rates of some forms of violence have remained fairly stable, rates for other forms of violence have increased (ibid.). Table 2.2 shows a breakdown of the rate of selected officially recorded prison security incidents between 1983 and 1989.

TABLE 2.2

Major and Minor Violent Incidents, 1983 to 1989
Rates per 1000 Prisoners

Incident Type	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Assault-Major	4.81	5.62	4.43	3.94	3.01	2.53	3.64
Assault-Minor	40.69	40.96	39.09	44.69	46.43	46.96	47.73
Self Injury	29.38	38.32	27.04	27.49	22.36	27.40	23.11
Rate per 1000/ prisoners	74.82	84.90	70.56	76.12	71.80	76.89	74.48

Source: Cooley, 1989.

Although the total rate of major and minor <u>violent incidents</u> does not appear to be rising at a faster rate than the prisoner population, the total rate of <u>minor assaults</u> did increase substantially over the seven year period. In 1983 the rate of minor assaults was 40.69 per 1000 population. In 1989 there were 47.73 assaults per 1000 prisoners. While the prisoner population increased by 12.4%, the number of minor and major prisoner-prisoner assaults increased by 23.6%.

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These data suggest that violence in federal prisons is a major problem, however, the true depth, nature and extent of the problem is not fully realized. To date, the bulk of knowledge of security incidents, such as violence, in Canadian prisons comes from <u>officially</u> collected sources. It is not at all clear what is represented by official statistics on prisoner rule violations.

The use of official crime statistics has long been recognized as problematic. Officially collected statistics in the field of criminal justice are less than adequate indicators of the actual level of crime. For example, the Canadian Urban Victimization Survey (CUVS) (1983) estimated that in 1983 there were more than 700,000 personal victimizations and almost 900,000 household victimizations; only 42 percent of these victimizations were reported to the police or came to the attention of the police and subsequently became part of the official record on crime. What these figures suggest is that officially reported statistics <u>underestimate</u> the true depth, nature and extent of crime.

The idea of a 'crime funnel' has been used as a guide to measuring the usefulness of crime statistics. The crime funnel suggest that of all the possible crimes that occur in a society, only a small fraction are officially processed by the police and

only in a smaller fraction are suspects identified, a fraction of which are charged, and only a fraction of those charged are found guilty (Evans and Himelfarb, 1987:45). What shows up in official statistics is a distorted picture of reality. Brannigan (1984) has suggested that the crime funnel is an inadequate metaphor for official statistics. He suggests the notion of a 'crime net' be used. The metaphor of the 'crime net' recognizes that not all potential offences have the same likelihood of becoming recognized by the police. The official crime rate reflects the interests and organization of the police and courts. Whether or not a crime is officially recorded will depend on, among other factors, the nature of the victimization (both the amount of damage done and the willingness of the victim to engage the police), and, police priorities, the latter being an overtly political decision.

Based on what is known about official crime rates in the free community, official rates of prisoner rule violations must be approached with caution. It can be said with a great deal of certainty that official rates of prisoner rule violations do not reflect the 'true' extent of behaviours that could be classified as security incidents. To produce a 'true' security incident rate in prison or in the free community is theoretically impossible. Theoretical impossibilities aside, what do rates of prisoner rule violations indicate? They may indicate the most serious types of rule violations that occur in prison. It seems

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plausible that the limited resources of prison staff would be best utilized by concentrating on the most damaging types of rules infractions. It may be the case that the official rates of rule violations are product of decision-making of front-line staff and the administration. This would suggest that certain types of behaviour become the focus of the prison disciplinary apparatus, behaviours which may or may not be the most serious or damaging types of rule infractions.

It may also be the case that official statistics on rule violations reflect the prison administration and front-line staff's desire to concentrate their policing efforts on certain prisoners. It may be the case that specific prisoners who have a reputation of being particularly unmanageable are accorded a great deal of attention by the prison disciplinary mechanism. Similarly, it may be the case that certain categories of prisoners, for example prisoners convicted for a violent offence, may be targeted more often. Whatever the case, official statistics on rule violations are likely less indicative of the overall amount of rule violations in a prison or prison system and more likely a measure of bureaucratic priorities. Security incident statistics, then, provide only a rough estimate of the incidence and prevalence of rules violations in prison.

Another problem with using official reports of violence in prison is that, by definition, rule-breaking is seen as

exceptional. The picture that is presented by official statistics is one of a small percentage of prisoners committing the bulk of prison violations. This focus individualizes prisoner rule-breaking. It leads easily to the conclusion that rule-breaking is the result of a minority of incorrigible prisoners. The key to reducing rule violations is either to find out who these prisoners are in order to rehabilitate, deter or isolate them, or, to locate the structural factors of the prison environment that cause these individuals to violate the rules. Rule violators are either inherently wicked, in need of rehabilitation or improperly socialized. The idea that rules violations are exceptional, which is buttressed by the use of official statistics, obscures the possibility that disciplinary infractions are everyday occurrences in prisons. As will be shown is Chapter 7, disruptive behaviours are far from exceptional events in prison, and, as will be shown in Chapter 8, rules violations and the reactions to rules violations form an integral component of the social world of the prison; violence and victimization are woven into the very fabric of social relations in prison.

Victimization Surveys

Critical examinations of official statistics indicate that, overall, they are a less than adequate measure of the incidence and prevalence of crime in a particular community. Victimization surveys were developed to overcome some of the problems inherent with official crime statistics. It was felt that by directly asking persons whether they had been the victim of a specified criminal offence within a given period of time, victimologists could provide a more valid estimate of the prevalence and incidence of crime. Victimization surveys, however, have built-in limitations; one of which is conceptualizing the concept researchers desire to measure.

Conceptualizing Victimization

At first glance victimization is an apparently unproblematic concept, however, there have developed over the past two decades a myriad of conceptualizations and taxonomies from which to begin victimization research. For example, Fattah (1991) noted that victimization can be conceptualized according to (1) the type of victim, (2) the location of the victimization (institutional, corporate), (3) the quantity of victimization, or, (4) the frequency of victimization. Fattah's preferred conceptual schema locates the definition of victimization according to its source. For example, there are two primary sources of victimization:

natural victimization and victimization by human action. Natural victimization refers to victimizations that result from natural disasters, natural predatory agents and natural health hazards. Victimization by human agents refers to victimizations of oneself (suicide or self-mutilation, for example) and victimizations by others. Victimizations by others can be further sub-divided into structural victimizations (abuses of power), victimizations as a by-product of industrial or technological innovation (for example, environmental 'accidents'), victimizations that are violations of civil wrongs and criminal victimizations.

This project will focus exclusively on criminal victimization. Fattah (ibid.:10) defines criminal victimization in the following manner:

> victimization caused by, or resulting from, a
> criminal offense, which is an act committed in
> violation of the criminal law.

The legal definition of victimization includes heterogeneous acts such as murder, violent assaults, vandalism, fraud and extortion. In determining whether a behaviour is classified as a criminal victimization, the legal definition of victimization focuses not on the quality of the act (such as its harmfulness in terms of economic and/or physical damage) but on whether the act met certain legal criteria; whether an act is defined as a crime, placed in the criminal code and has attached to it some sort of sanction. This project uses a modefied version of teh legal definition of victimization.

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According to Fattah (ibid.) the legal definition of victimization has several advantages. The legal definition provides an objective (although non-exhaustive) base from which to begin victimization research. The Criminal Code of Canada lists a variety of prohibited acts and provides a skeletal framework from which to determine if a crime has occurred. Additionally, the legal definition of victimization has the benefit of providing some specificity to the otherwise amorphous concept of victimization. Victimization occurs in every shape and form; the extent to which victimizations occur and the diffuse character of the many forms of victimizations make impossible the task of developing a theoretically informed analysis without parameters. Utilizing the legal definition of victimization provides a degree of specificity to this otherwise unwieldy concept.

The legal definition of victimization is not without problems. First, even though the criminal code specifies what actions constitute criminal violations it must not be forgotten that crime does not exist independently of humans. For an act to be called a crime it must be interpreted as a crime. The process by which a certain act becomes defined as a crime has several layers. Initially, the act must be defined by one of the participants involved as criminal and worth reporting to the police, the police must interpret the act as sufficiently

criminal to warrant an investigation, if a perpetrator is suspected, again, the act must be defined and classed according to a specific legal definition set out in statute. This process of interpretation and reinterpretation is continued throughout the criminal justice process until, finally, the initial act is recorded in the official statistics (Lea and Young, 1984). The crime rate does not have an independent reality. It is the product of a series of political decisions (should charges be laid?, on what and where should criminal justice agents expend their resources?) and judicial interpretations (was there mens rea and actus rea?). Victimization surveys avoid some of these levels of interpretation by going directly to the victim but, ultimately, the decision to define an act as a crime rests on the interpretive process of either the interviewee or the interviewer. The objective criteria specified in the criminal code serve only as heuristic aids.

A related limitation of the legal definition of victimization is that one's scope of inquiry is limited to 'conventional crime'. The legal definition of victimization cannot account for victimizations that are not defined as criminal. For example, the legal definition of victimization does not include injury and killing in the workplace, or victimizations that result from violations of occupational health and safety regulations. In terms of objective physical damage, . these non-criminal victimizations are as costly, if not more

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costly, and are as prevalent, if not more prevalent, than certain types of criminal victimizations. For example, there is evidence to suggest that Canadians are eighteen times more likely to die as a result of a workplace victimization than they are from murder (Reasons et.al. 1986). Although both events are equally serious, only the latter is defined as a crime and a victimization survey that utilizes a legal definition of victimization necessarily excludes the former. In the case of prisoners, Drapkin (1976:103) argues that prisoners in some North American jurisdictions are victims of many non-criminal features of institutional life including problems relating to overcrowding, lack of hygienic conditions, poor medical facilities and scarce, monotonous and filthy food. These types of victimizations are not captured by the legal definition of victimization.

The limitations of the legal definition of victimization do not outweigh its benefits, especially if the researcher is well aware of the limitations and these limitations are kept in mind when one draws conclusions based on survey research.

Criminal Victimization Surveys

The legal definition of victimization has been the basis of the majority of victimization research. Criminal victimization surveys attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with the

layers of interpretation that result from official processing of crime. Instead of relying on official measures, criminal victimization surveys by-pass official processing and ask individuals if they have been the victim of crime within a specified time period.

Criminal victimization surveys provide answers to a variety of questions. First, criminal victimization surveys provide a more complete estimate of the number of criminal victimizations per specified crime category. Most criminal victimization surveyors limit their crime categories to the major offences most often encountered by the police. For example, the Canadian Urban Victimization Survey provides estimates for following criminal victimizations: sexual assault, robbery, assault, theft of personal property, theft of household property, motor vehicle theft, vandalism and break and enter (Fattah, 1991:34).

Estimates of criminal activity obtained from criminal victimization surveys provide a more complete picture of the incidence and prevalence of criminal activity in a community. For example, the Canadian Urban Victimization Survey estimated that fewer than 42% of all criminal victimizations were reported to the police. This finding suggests that far more Canadians are victimized by crime than is revealed in official statistics (Evans and Himelfarb, 1987). Furthermore, official accounts of criminal victimizations are skewed according to crime type.

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Automobile thefts are much more likely to be reported than sexual assaults. Nevertheless, criminal victimization surveys cannot uncover all of the 'dark figure of crime'. Criminal victimization surveys are based on a sample population. The size and representativeness of the sample will determine the survey's generalizability but a margin or error will always remain and, therefore, the survey will always remain an estimate (Fattah, 1991:49).

Prison Victimization

Although a considerable amount of criminal victimization research has been conducted at the national and local level, the majority of this type of research has taken the form of general social surveys and scant attention has been paid to victimization at the institutional level, such as schools and mental institutions. Virtually no research directed specifically at prison victimization has been conducted although prison victimization has been dealt with tangentially by Clemmer (1958), Sykes (1958) and Schragg (1954). The majority of research on victimization in prisons, however, has focused on acts of violence and has usually been concerned with uncovering correlations between violence and system-level variables or correlations between violence and characteristics of qualities of individual prisoner.

Sparks (1982:128) argued that the limited nature of systematic, empirical accounts of criminal victimization within prisons is due to the lack of public concern for prisoners. Prisoners, especially male prisoners, do not fit common-sense definitions of a 'victim'. Prisoners are not perceived as vulnerable targets of violence and exploitation, quite the opposite prisoners are 'predators'. As a result of this perception

> too little is known about the extent to which
> victimization - not only sexual attacks and
> assaults but also robbery, theft, and extortion -
> is a fact of life in prison and the extent to
> which the threat of victimization structures
> social relations among inmates and with staff
> (ibid.).

Sparks goes on to suggest that given the low levels of public concern for prisoners, there is a danger that 'criminal victimization' will, in the eyes of the public, refer exclusively to crimes committed in the free society. A convincing argument can be made that, by omission, 'criminal victimization' does not include behaviour that goes on behind the walls.

Fattah (1991) suggests that "institutional victimization" may be qualitatively different from victimization in the general community. He suggests that the victimizations may not vary in form but their is likely variation in the relationships between the victims and the offenders. Walklate (1989), however, suggests that victims and offenders in the community and in institutions may be similar in terms of power and exploitation

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but these relationships may be rendered more visible in examinations of victimization within institutions.

This project has two goals. One of the goals of this project is to fill the empirical void recognized by Sparks, Fattah and Walklate. Specifically, one aim of the project is to provide an estimate of the incidence and prevalence of victimization between August 1, 1990 and July 31, 1991 in a sample of male federal prisoners. The second goal of the project is to develop a preliminary account of the manner in which victimization shapes and reflects social relations in prison and to contribute to the literature on the social world of the prison. To this end, a series of questions on specific aspects of the prison world were posed to prisoners. Of particular concern was an examination of the 'inmate code', the central feature around which revolves the current debate in the sociological literature on the prison. This debate is reviewed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

THE INMATE CODE AND THE IMPORTATION-DEPRIVATION DEBATE

> But the old code - don't talk to the man - this
> doesn't apply anymore. There is heavy controversy
> over the code. Being in a medium you have to
> participate in programming. You can't really live
> by the code because if you do you won't get
> parole. They asked me "do you believe in the
> code". But to most people it's just a way of
> life. In here, staff have to break-down the code
> or they couldn't run the prison - divide and
> conquer.

Throughout the latter half of this century, the vast majority of

sociological investigations of the prison social system have

remained within a fairly narrow theoretical parameters of the

importation-deprivation debate. On one side of this debate are

those who claim that the prison social system develops as a

result of the structural constraints, or deprivations, of prison

life. On the other side of the debate are researchers who

believe that prisoners pre-prison experiences play a leading role

in structuring social relations in prison. This position is

known as the importation model. Both sides of the importation-

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deprivation debate begin with a similar conception of the inmate code. The cleavage between the two positions is the <u>source</u> of the inmate code. This chapter will provide a description of the inmate code and review the literature on how importation and deprivation theorists account for its development. It will be argued in this chapter that both positions have inherent limitations that limit their ability to provide an explanation of the social world of the prison.

The Inmate Code

The inmate code provides the point of departure for a great deal of the literature on the social organization of prisons. Generally, the inmate code is portrayed as follows. First, the inmate code is presented as a set of beliefs or attitudes that a significant proportion of prisoners are verbally aligned with and a lesser proportion use as a means of guiding their behaviour while in prison. Second, the content of the inmate code is generally thought to be in opposition to the attitudes and values of the prison administration and the conventional society, although some researchers have claimed that under certain circumstances the interests of prisoners and the prison administration are congruent (Maclean, 1983; Lowman, 1986; Cloward, 1968). Third, the inmate code provides a focal point around which the prisoner population unifies, creating a sense of group loyalty, organization and coherence in immediate opposition

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to the prison administration and, secondarily, to conventional

society.   Fourth, the antithesis of the prison social system

that develops around the inmate code is a war of all prisoners

against all prisoners.

The portrayal of the inmate code has remained fairly

consistent since the pioneering work of Clemmer (1958). Clemmer

argued that the basic principle of the code was that

> Inmates must refrain from helping prison or
> government officials in matters of discipline, and
> should never give them information of any kind,
> especially the kind which may harm a fellow
> prisoner (ibid.:152).

Clemmer added that supplementary to this principle was "the value

of loyalty among prisoners in their dealings with others". He

argued that the inmate code was established over many years as a

result of the conception of some prisoners that law-breakers and

the prison administration are "natural enemies" and that for "a

minority group to exist [it] must have cohesiveness and be secure

within itself". He argued that the inmate code is "charged with

hate", the hate of those who are held captive by a powerful

group.

Clemmer acknowledged that the inmate code is not totally

successful in controlling prisoners' behaviour; violations of the

code, such as "ratting" are frequent occurrences. Nevertheless,

he suggested that the code is effective in controlling the

behaviours of prisoners as the prison does possess a degree of

organization, a degree of certainty, a degree of sympathy and a degree of cohesiveness. The implication here is that if the inmate code was not successful in controlling prisoners' behaviour the prison would be more disorganized, more uncertain, more unsympathetic, and less cohesive.

A similar, but more detailed description of the inmate code was provided by Sykes and Messinger (1960). They argued that the "inmate code" consists of a series of normative imperatives that guide a prisoner's interactions with other prisoners and correctional staff and suggested it includes the following five maxims:

(1) "There are those maxims that caution: Don't interfere with inmate interests, which center of course in serving the least possible time and enjoying the greatest possible number of pleasures and privileges while in prison".
(2) "There are explicit injunctions to refrain from quarrels or arguments with fellow prisoners: Don't lose your head".
(3) "Prisoners assert that inmates should not take advantage of one another by means of force, fraud, or chicanery: Don't exploit inmates".
(4) "There are rules that have as their central theme the maintenance of self: Don't weaken".
(5) "Prisoners express a variety of maxims that forbid according prestige or respect to the custodians or the world for which they stand: Don't be a sucker" (ibid.:6-9).

There are various other rules that derive from the five major tenets of the inmate code, such as "do your own time", "don't break your word", "don't steal" and "never rat". Sykes and

Messinger inferred two major conclusions from their examination of the inmate code. First, these five maxims and their derivative rules have as their major themes group cohesion or prisoner solidarity against an enemy out-group (ibid.:11). The theoretical antipode to the group cohesion themes is a war of all against all. Second, Sykes and Messinger did not claim that all rules are expounded with equal intensity but, taken together, "the inmate code is outstanding for both the passion with which it is propounded and the almost universal alliance verbally accorded it" (ibid.:9).

This conceptualization of the inmate code is present in a great deal of the literature on prison social systems that was published subsequent to the work of Clemmer and Sykes and Messinger. For example, McCorckle and Korn (1970) described the inmate code as a defensive mechanism that prevented social rejection from becoming self-rejection. Holding beliefs and values that ran counter to those of conventional society allowed prisoners to reject their rejecters. Ohlin (1956:28-29) described the code as an "organization of criminal values in clear-cut opposition to the values of conventional society, and to prison officials as representatives of that society". He argued the main tenet of the inmate code prohibited any type of positive interaction between prisoners and the prison administration whilst placing a strong emphasis on in-group loyalty and solidarity. Cloward (1968:79) described 'inmate

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culture' as "a system of social relationships governed by norms that are largely at odds with those espoused by the officials and the conventional society". For Cloward, the inmate code implies "bravery, fearlessness, loyalty to peers, avoidance of exploitation, adamant refusal to concede to the superiority of the official value system, and repudiation of the notion that the inmate is of a lower order" (ibid.:99).

Speaking of the social organization of a Canadian provincial prison, Mann (1967:113) described the inmate code in the following manner:

> The prisoners' code always concentrates on (i) no squealing to the administration, regardless of provocation, and no real confiding or fraternizing with guards, and (ii) the display of 'heart' or courage under stress, in particular being ready to fight when attacked or insulted.

According to Mann, the inmate code emphasizes physical strength and toughness, the ability to be loyal to other prisoners and a disdain towards the value of officialdom. The inmate code functions to (1) integrate an otherwise fragmented prisoner population, (2) limit the amount of exploitive behaviour amongst prisoners, (3) bolster the esteem of prisoners in relation to prison staff, and, (4) "support the sub-culture's emphasis on personal autonomy and self-respect by valuing courage and derogating any apple polishing" (ibid.). More recently, Maclean (1983) argued that one of the major factors limiting the effectiveness of Canadian prisons is the "contradiction between formal and informal social control" which is a result of the fact

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that "these two forms of social control are diametrically opposed to one another" (ibid.:403) and that prisoners and staff are "in permanent conflict with each other" (ibid.:405). In their analysis of female prisoners' adoption of the inmate code in a Canadian prison for women, Hartnagel and Gillan (1980) operationalized the inmate code according to female prisoners' scores on items measuring conflict with authority and attitudes on informing on other prisoners.

The picture that emerges from this portrayal of the social organization of the prison is fairly unified, cohesive, prisoner population bound together by the ties of loyalty and trust that are embodied in the inmate code. It is this conceptualization of the inmate code that informs the major theoretical debate in this area, the deprivation-importation debate. The tension in this debate is less the content of the inmate code, than it is the source of the inmate code. Deprivation theorists claim that the inmate code develops as a reaction to, or means of coping with, the immediate stresses and strains of the prison environment. Importation theorists claim that the inmate code is imported into prison, thus the source of the inmate code is in the pre-prison experiences of prisonsers rather than structure of the prison itself.

The Deprivation Model

Sykes' (1958) analysis of a maximum security prison in the
United States provided the initial testing ground for what has
come to be known as the 'deprivation model'. The deprivation
model of prison subculture suggests that a peculiar prisoner
social system develops in response to the hardships prisoners
must endure as a result of imprisonment. Sykes identified five
"pains of imprisonment": (1) the deprivation of liberty, (2) the
deprivation of goods and services, (3) the deprivation of
heterosexual relationships, (4) the deprivation of autonomy or
ability to make choices concerning one's life, and, (5) the
deprivation of security (1958:65-78). These deprivations make
incarceration painful and, according to Sykes, "they provide the
energy for the society of captives as a system of action"
(ibid.:79). The manner in which prisoners attempt to alleviate
or lessen these 'pains of imprisonment', or deprivations,
determines the social structures and systems of patterned
behaviour that occur in prisons.

Sykes argued that there are several methods of relieving the
pains of imprisonment. Some methods of relieving the pains of
imprisonment occur less frequently than others. For example,
escape, psychological withdrawal into a fantasy world, rebellion
and innovation are mechanisms that are infrequently utilized
because of the structural constraints of a total institution.

Two other patterns of behaviour that relieve or mitigate the pains of imprisonment are available to prisoners and it is these patterns of behaviour that structure the prison social system. In order to adapt to the pains of imprisonment, prisoners adopt patterns of behaviour or social roles that are either alienative or cohesive. Alienative and cohesive responses to the pains of imprisonment represent opposite sides of the 'inmate code'.

Sykes characterized alienative responses to the pains of imprisonment in the following manner:

> ...the prisoner attempts to reduce the rigors of prison life at the expense of fellow prisoners and the individual pursues his own interests, his own needs, without regard for the needs, rights, and opinions of others (ibid.:106-107).

A variety of argot roles typify alienative responses to the pains of imprisonment. For example, 'the rat' betrays the cohesion of the prison community by informing on other prisoners, the 'center man' sides with prison officials out of a commitment to the official view of the world, the 'gorilla' uses force or threats of force to obtain scarce material resources and the 'merchant' or 'peddler' sells material goods that are normally distributed as gifts. These argot roles identified by Sykes are alienative responses or individualistic adaptions to the pains of imprisonment. The prisoner takes what has been deprived without regard for other prisoners and does so in a manner that is in open violation to the tenets of the inmate code.

Opposed to the alienative patterns of adaption to the pains of imprisonment are cohesively-oriented patterns. Cohesively-oriented patterns of adaption support the major tents of the inmate code. The cluster of cohesively-oriented patterns of adaption, known by the argot role 'real man', was characterized by Sykes in the following manner:

> ..this term is often extended to cover social roles which involve loyalty, generosity, sexual restraint, and the minimizing of frictions among inmates as well as endurance with dignity (ibid.:107).

The 'real man' is neither subversive nor aggressive. The 'real man' maintains a comfortable distance from other prisoners and from staff. The 'real man' neither causes trouble for staff nor exploits other prisoners and is, therefore, respected by both. The 'real man' is a stabilizing force in a prison. The cohesively-oriented prisoners meets the deprivations of imprisonment with regard for other prisoners. The cohesively-oriented prisoner does not exploit others but works in co-operation such that scarce resources may be equitably distributed. Faced with the pains of imprisonment, the 'real man' guides his behaviour according to the maxims of the inmate code.

Based on his analysis of the dominant patterns of behaviour in prison and the relationship between these patterns of behaviour and the inmate code, Sykes made the following hypothesis:

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> And the greater the extent of "cohesive" responses
> - the greater the degree to which the society of
> captives moves in the direction of inmate
> solidarity - the greater is the likelihood that
> the pains of imprisonment will be rendered less
> severe for the inmate population as a whole
> (ibid.:107).

The pains of imprisonment can never be entirely eradicated but they can be lessened depending on the balance between alienative and cohesive responses (Sykes and Messinger, 1960). Prisons with a more cohesive group of prisoners are characterized by a more equitable distribution of scarce resources. Additionally, prisons with group cohesion tend to encourage solidarity of the condemned against the condemners. The stability of the prison social system depends on the balance between alienative and cohesive responses, a consequence of the number of prisoners who accept the major tents of the inmate code.

The Importation Model

Cressey and Irwin (1962) and Irwin (1970) were among the first to enter into a debate with the structural-functionalist interpretations of prison life that emphasized the notion that conditions internal to the prison environment stimulate the behaviour of prisoners. They argued that the deprivation model of prison social systems, or the indigenous model, glosses over the more traditional sociological notion that prisoners carry with them to prison cultural patterns and beliefs that they developed in free society. Cressey and Irwin (1962:145) stated

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their position as follows:

> It is our contention that the "functional" or "indigenous origin" notion has been overemphasized and that observers have overlooked the dramatic effect that external behavior patterns have on the conduct of inmates in any given prison....More specifically, it seems rather obvious that the "inmate code" - don't inform on or exploit another inmate, don't lose your head, be weak, or be a sucker, etc. - is also part of a criminal code, existing outside prisons.

Cressey and Irwin argued that a complete understanding of life in prison cannot be adequately grasped by exclusively examining the conditions of life within prison. They agreed with those who supported the deprivation model that there exists a distinct "prison society" and that this prison society is a response to the problems posed by life in prison but they claimed that many of the solutions to the pains of imprisonment are rooted in the "latent culture", or in the values and attitudes prisoners bring with them to prison.

Cressey and Irwin argued that there was not a prison subculture but three prison subcultures that, taken together, form the prison society. The three prison subcultures - the thief, the convict and the legitimate subcultures - are primarily determined by the cultural baggage prisoners bring with them to the prison. The thief culture, for example, promotes the values of what Sykes (1958) referred to as the "real man" or "right guy". The values of the thief culture include the notion that "criminals should not betray each other to the police, should be reliable, wily but trustworthy, cool headed, etc." (Cressey and

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Irwin, 1962:146). Having accepted these values, which are developed on the street but are applicable in the prison environment, allows members of the thief subculture to adjust quickly to prison life or to "do time standing on your head" (ibid.:147). Thus the thief "has learned how to do time long before he comes to prison" (Irwin, 1977:171). Prisoners in this subculture are not interested in gaining a footing in the prison hierarchy; their orientations are towards getting out (ibid.:151).

The second subculture that forms the amalgam of the prison culture is that of the convict. The convict subculture flourishes in total institutions characterized by deprivations and limitations on freedom and outside symbols of status. The central value of this subculture is utilitarianism and status is achieved by the ability to manipulate the environment to win privileges and to assert influence over others (ibid.:147). While the convict subculture flourishes in total institutions, Cressey and Irwin argue that "it is not correct to conclude, however, that even these behavior patterns are a consequence of the environment of any particular prison" (ibid.). Rather than being a product of the prison environment, the utilitarian and manipulative values of the convict culture are likely the result the lower class upbringing of offenders that stresses these attitudes (ibid.).

Cressey and Irwin said that the differences between the thief subculture and the convict subculture can be seen in their different orientations towards life in prison. For example, a member of the thief subculture may 'score' extra food for himself, whereas a member of the convict subculture may have a 'route' or constant supply of food which is sold to other prisoners. Similarly, Cressey and Irwin suggested that a member of the thief subculture may seek certain privileges such as extra food, a good job, or increased leisure time in order to make his stay more comfortable. On the other hand, a member of the convict culture may seek similar privileges in order to increase his status within the prison hierarchy.

The "legitimate subculture" is the third, and largest, subculture that forms the prison culture. The legitimate subculture includes men who are not members of the thief subculture upon entering a prison and who reject both the thief and convict subcultures of the prison. "Do rights" or "gleaners" choose to radically reconstruct their lives in prison. They participate in formal and informal educational, vocational and social skills training. For example, Irwin suggested that Malcom X "gleaned" through books after perceiving his educational status as inadequate (Irwin, 1977). These prisoners present only a small disciplinary problem for prison management as they are oriented towards achieving goals through means that are legitimate in free society.

Cressey and Irwin (1962:153) speculated that members of the three cultures bring to prison particular attitudes and behaviours and the "total 'prison culture' represents an adjustment or accommodation of these three systems within the official administrative system of deprivation and control". The importation model that Cressey and Irwin presented represents a challenge to the deprivation or "indigenous model" of prison social systems developed by, among others, Clemmer, Sykes and Messinger. According to Cressey and Irwin, prison culture is not a function of the imperatives of prison life but is a product of the characteristics, values and attitudes that prisoners import into prison.

Limitations of the Deprivation-Importation Debate

In both of the deprivation and importation models of prison culture, the content of the inmate code or its utility as a theoretical construct is not in question. What is at stake in this debate is the source of the inmate code. Deprivation theorists argue that the source of the code is located in the structure of the prison environment whereas importation theorists claim the source of the code is to be found in the pre-prison experiences of prisoners. Both models have been subject to extensive testing to determine their empirical validity and, more recently, there have been attempts to synthesize the two

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perspectives (Thomas, 1975). Currently, this debate appears to be at an impasse. Neither model is sufficient to adequately account for the intricate nature of the prison social world nor are attempts to combine the two models. It will be argued that the nature of the deprivation-importation debate has several limitations and that, taken together, these limitation call into question the utility of both the importation and deprivation models. These limitations are discussed below.

One criticism of the deprivation-importation debate is that, for the most part, the portrayal of the inmate code has remained relatively static over the past thirty years. The prison environment has changed markedly during this period. For example, the courts in the United States and to a lesser extent Canada have increasingly taken a more interventionist stance towards prisons. Between the 1950s and the 1990s there was the rise and decline of the rehabilitation ethos in American corrections. In the United States there was a meteoric rise in the number of prisoners, leaving many correctional jurisdictions with court orders to relieve crowded living conditions. During this period parole and early release systems were introduced and over-hauled several times in Canada and the United States. Some jurisdictions in the United States have seen the solidification of the power of gangs organized along racial lines. In Canada, the recent rise in aboriginal assertiveness may be producing changes in the social world of the prison, especially in western

provinces were natives comprise the majority of federal and provincial prison populations. Yet despite these and many more significant changes that have occurred in correctional jurisdictions, researchers' portrayal of the inmate code has, for the most part, remained constant.

Another problem that arises from engaging in the importation-deprivation debate is that both positions construct categories into which prisoners are assigned but these categories may hold little relevance in terms of the lived experiences of prisoners. Generally, the reference point for the construction of these categories is acceptance or non-acceptance of the inmate code. One of the problems of using the inmate code in this manner is that the inmate code is a theoretical construct or heuristic device used to separate and distinguish prisoners, yet "all of the evidence suggests that the accepted picture of prison solidarity rarely bears much relation to any real-life situation" (Hawkins, 1976:73). McCorckle and Korn (1970) found that "even the most sacred rule of the inmate code, the law against squealing, is daily violated and evaded with impunity". Sykes (1956) found that 41 percent of prisoners in a random sample "squeal" on fellow prisoners. In their discussion of the thief subculture, Cressey and Irwin (1962:146) make the following point:

> Despite the fact that adherence to the norms of
> the thief subculture is an ideal,... the behavior
> of the great majority of men arrested or convicted
> varies sharply from any "criminal code" which
> might be identified....

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More recently, Irwin (1970) has suggested that the role of one of the major purveyors of the inmate code - the thief - is diminishing yet he maintained that most prisoners are influenced by a "pervasive but rather uncohesive convict 'code'" (ibid.:184).

Even the inmate code as an ideal peculiar to prisoners has been questioned. Cressey and Irwin (1962:146) said that:

> It is probable, further, that use of this kind of values is not even peculiarly "criminal", for policemen, prison guards, college professors, students, and almost any other category of persons evaluate their behavior in terms of in-group loyalties.

Similarly, Wheeler (1961) examined the degree of conflict between prisoners and staff in their privately expressed conceptions of appropriate conduct in prisons. Wheeler found that on an attitudinal level there was less conflict than was expected between prisoners and staff. His data suggest that prisoners' privately expressed beliefs regarding what constitutes appropriate conduct among prisoners tend towards the norms of staff members, except in the case of violations of loyalty towards other prisoners. Nevertheless, Wheeler found that more than 50% of custody and treatment personnel approved of prisoners who did not inform on another prisoner, even if that prisoner was involved in a knifing situation (ibid.:237). The data provided by Wheeler and others call into question the distinct quality of the inmate code.

A related problem of using the inmate code as a central organizing feature of the prison social world is that it obscures the manner in which individuals, as agents of human activity, actively produce and reproduce their social existence. This is particularly evident in Sykes' structural-functionalist analysis. Sykes defined roles such as the 'real man' and the 'gorilla' with the stability of the prison dependent upon the types of roles prisoners accept. This conceptualization fails to account for the fact that prisoners, and humans in general, move into and out of roles. For example, a prisoner may appear to other prisoners as 'solid' yet be 'ratting out' in order to further his own chances for parole. A structural-functionalist framework is too inflexible and too restrictive to account to account for this type of role fluctuation.

Hawkins (1976:78) suggested that both the deprivation and importation models of prison social systems depict prisoners as "passive respondents to ulterior forces beyond their control". These two models of the social organization of the prison fail to see prisoners as fully social creatures actively engaging in the construction of their own reality. The deprivation model reduces prisoners' experiences to a series of adaptions forced upon them by pre-defined pressures of the social structure of the prison. The importation model views in-coming prisoners as pre-formed human beings whose pre-prison patterns of behaviours will, to a great extent, dictate their prison experience. This is not to

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say that importation and deprivation variables are unimportant in
the study of prison social systems, rather it is to assert the
importance human agency. The two traditional models of prison
present the inmate code and the inmate social system as pure
types. Divergences between the inmate code and how prisoners
actually live their lives are glossed over. The inmate code may
not be accepted by all or even most prisoners, yet the
deprivation-importation debate defines prisoners and the prison
social structure in terms of adherence to this code. Thus
research subjects - prisoners - are forced into the categories of
researchers rather then, as Bowker (1977:59) says, "allowing
inmates to speak for themselves, and then analyze this material
phenomenologically".

These criticisms suggest that using the inmate code as a
central organizing feature produces a reified view of life in
prison. At a conceptual level, the inmate code prescribes
certain modes of behaviour and clusters of attitudes yet at the
level of the reality of prisoners' lives it has been consistently
shown that the experience of prisoners and their orientation to
the inmate code is quite different. A more complete
understanding of prison social life entails an examination of the
manner in which prisoners are engaged in the production and
reproduction of their own world; an examination of the content
and operation of the 'inmate code'. The first step in this
process is to let inmates speak of their lives in prison. In

Chapter 5, the results of the questions designed to address these
issues will be discussed, however, before doing so the
methodology employed in this project will be discussed.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

> If you want to know what its like in here then
> kick-in a bank.

One of the goals of the Prison Victimization Project is to
provide an estimate of the incidence and prevalence of
victimization within a sample of prisoners housed in federal
prisons. To this end, a victimization survey targeted
specifically at prisoners was designed and administered to
prisoners housed in five federal prisons in one region under the
jurisdiction of the Correctional Service of Canada. This chapter
reviews the methodology employed in the project.

A total of 117 interviews were conducted at five prisons
were conducted between July 31, 1991 and September 6, 1991. It
was originally proposed that interviews would be conducted at six
federal prisons, however, because of a series of security

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incidents and the Public Service Alliance of Canada labour-management dispute, the interviewer was denied access to one maximum security prison. Interviews were conducted at one maximum security prison, two medium security prisons and two minimum security prisons. The interviews ranged in length from forty-five minutes to one hundred and twenty minutes. The modal interview length was approximately seventy five minutes. All interviews were voluntary and all information collected was confidential and anonymous. The interviews were conducted in person in the prison. All respondents were male.

The Sample

A random sample of prisoners was selected from six federal prison in one region. In order to be eligible for membership in the sample a prisoner must have been incarcerated in a federal prison for at least twelve months previous to the interview. Based on this criterion, the sample universe consisted of approximately two thousand prisoners. A random sample of prisoners was selected from each of six prisons in proportion to the prison's percentage of the total prisoner population of the region. Replacement sampling techniques were utilized to deal with refusals.

While care was taken to ensure the sample was random, there are several factors that mitigate against generalizing the data

to the Region or other CSC prisons. First, there was a
relatively high rate of refusers and non-contacts. Refusal and
non-contact rates ranged from a low of 15% at a minimum security
prison to a high of 37% at a medium security prison.

Another limit to the generalizability of the results is that
there is reason to believe that the data-base from which the
sample was drawn is not representative of the universe. The
sample was pulled from the National Headquarters data-base. This
data-base is not on-line with prisons therefore there is a time-
lag between the time a prisoner enters a prison and the time this
entry is recognized in the National Headquarters data-base.
Conversely, there is a time-lag between the time a prisoner
leaves a particular prison and the time this move is picked up by
in the national data set. The National Headquarters data-base,
therefore, does not accurately reflect the universe. Sample
selection for this project was hampered by these difficulties.
On several occasions, sample members had been transferred out of
the prison, or were on day parole, full parole or mandatory
supervision and were unable to be interviewed. This was
particularly frequent in minimum security prisons. On one
occasion a member of the sample had died several months prior to
the commencement of the interviews. Difficulties associated with
the sample limit the generalizability of the results.

The Questionnaire

The interview schedule for the Prison Victimization Project consisted of four separate questionnaires: () The Social Life Questionnaire, (2) the Victimization General Questionnaire, (3) the Victimization Screening Schedule, and, (4) the Incident Report Form. A combination of open- and closed-ended questions was used. Each component of the Victimization Survey was designed to measure prisoners' attitudes and behaviours on different aspects of prison life. For example, the Social Life Questionnaire addressed prisoners' friendships, prisoner loyalty to one another, the rules prisoners must know in order to survive in prison and the relationships that develop between prisoners and correctional staff.

The Victimization General Questionnaire was designed to address prisoners' perceptions of the level of potentially criminal activity in the prison. For example, respondents were asked to rate the chances that specific potentially criminal incidents would occur in the prison within the next month, they were asked if they worried about being the victim of certain incidents, and they were asked to provide characteristics of victims and aggressors most likely to be involved in these types of incidents.

The Victimization Screening Schedule was designed to uncover

whether prisoners had been the victim, within the previous twelve months, in an incident that could be classified as a criminal offence. If a prisoner indicated that he was involved in one of the incidents mentioned on the Victimization Screening Schedule, an Incident Report Form was completed. The Incident Report Form obtained specific information regarding the victimization such as time and location, whether the victim was assaulted, whether weapons were present and whether the victimization resulted in any property loss or damage.

Definitions and Coding Rules for the Victimization Screening Schedule

The Victimization Screening Schedule attempted to identify whether or not respondents had been the victim, between August 1, 1990 and July 31, 1991, of any of six victimization incidents. The survey was limited to victimizations that occurred while the prisoner was housed in a federal prison. Victimizations were further limited to events that involved the actions of another prisoner or an employee of the prison. Specific victimization incidents included: 1) robbery with force, threat of force and/or attempted robbery, (2) sexual assault, (3) assault with/without a weapon and threats of assault with/without a weapon, (4) theft of personal property, (5) vandalism and (6) two types of extortion (muscling and forced payment of protection money). These categories are different than those used in the Canadian Urban Victimization Survey (CUVS).

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CUVS includes eight victimization categories in their survey: (1) sexual assault, (2) robbery (including attempts), (3) assault, (4) break and enter, (5) theft of a motor vehicle, (6) theft or attempted theft of household property, (7) theft or attempted theft of personal property, and (8) vandalism. It was possible for a prisoner to be the victim in all of the victimization categories covered by CUVS. For example, one prisoner indicated that while he was in prison he allowed an acquaintance to use his car. The acquaintance eventually sold the car without the knowledge of the prisoner and the prisoner did not receive any of the proceeds of the sale. In this case a criminal victimization occurred. The prisoner was the victim of a theft or fraud. Because of the focus of this project, these types of victimizations were excluded.

For the purposes of this project, one generic category was used to categorize property thefts, however, based on the respondent's description of the incident it was possible to discern between 'cell thefts' and other types of theft. Additionally, this project asked questions on extortion, a victimization not dealt with by CUVS. During the Pilot Study there was only one category of extortion. The Pilot Study Report noted that some concern was expressed that there were no reported incidents of extortion. This seemed to contradict a great deal of the prison literature. It was decided that the most fruitful

method of tapping these types of behaviours was to split the question into two types of extortion: muscling and strong-arming for money or goods, and, muscling for protection money.

As noted in Chapter 2, a modified version of the legal definition of victimization served as the basis for measuring victimization. 'Victimization' was operationalized in the following manner. In order for a victimization to occur, two criteria must have been met. First, the respondent must have responded affirmatively to at least one of the incidents contained on the Victimization Screening Schedule. For example, each respondent was asked the following question: "Within the past twelve months, did someone attack you with a weapon". If the respondent answered affirmatively, he was considered to be a potential victim.

A detailed set of coding rules was followed when the Victimization Screening Schedule was completed. First, care was taken to not inflate the gravity of incidents. In cases where there was some ambiguity concerning the exact nature of an incident, the incident was coded in the category that resulted in the least serious victimization. Second, when more than one victimization occurred during the same incident, the incident was coded according to the most serious victimization. For example, if during a robbery attempt a prisoner's personal property was damaged the incident would be coded as a single robbery, and not

a robbery and a vandalism.

The second criterion in the operationalization of
'victimization' attempted to distinguish between provoked and
unprovoked victimizations. Incident Report Forms were completed
for each potential victimization. Among other things, the
Incident Report Form asked respondents to provide a detailed
description of the event. Based on this description, the
incident was coded as either provoked or unprovoked. An incident
was coded as provoked if the respondent indicated that he
actively initiated the incident. For example, one respondent
indicated that within the previous twelve months he was attacked
without a weapon. When the respondent was asked to provide
further details regarding the alleged attack, he indicated that
he initiated the attack by entering into another man's cell and
demanding that the man lower the volume on his radio. When the
man refused the respondent physically assaulted him. During the
course of this assault, the respondent received several blows to
his head. This incident was deemed to be provoked by the
respondent and was, therefore, not counted as a victimization.
This criterion is more restrictive than those used in most
victimization surveys in the community. For example, the
Canadian Urban Victimization Survey does not distinguish between
provoked and unprovoked victimizations. Thus even though a
survey respondent may have initiated a physical confrontation, if
he was assaulted during the incident he would be classified as a

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victim.

Also eliminated by this criterion are those events that
occurred during the normal course of a sporting event. Several
respondents indicated that they were "attacked with a weapon"
during hockey games. Incidents that occurred during the normal
course of an organized or unorganized sporting event were not
counted as victimizations. For example, one respondent indicated
that he was assaulted by an opponent during a hockey game. Upon
further questioning, the respondent revealed that the assault
occurred as a direct result of his play during the hockey game
and the confrontation between the players was not taken up again
that game or any time after the game ended. This incident was
not considered a victimization. On the other hand, a respondent
indicated that he and an acquaintance were playing an unorganized
game of floor hockey. His ball accidentally rolled to the other
end of the gym. When he went to retrieve the ball, another
prisoner, who was not involved in the game, asked the respondent
what he was doing in "his end" of the gym. The other prisoner
initiated a physical altercation with the respondent during which
the respondent was assaulted. In this case, the incident was
deemed not to be have occurred during the normal course of the
game and was counted as a victimization.

For the purposes of this study, a respondent was victimized
if he responded affirmatively to at least one of the six types of

incidents on the Victimization Screening Schedule <u>and</u> based on the victim's account of the incident, he was judged not to have provoked the incident.

The prison presents a challenging environment in which to conduct interviews. The primary restriction to prison interviewing is the prison routine. Typically, researchers are allowed access to prisoners for a maximum of 4.5 to 5.5 hours per day. The Prison Victimization Survey took approximately seventy-five minutes to administer which meant that a maximum of four interviews were conducted per day. In order to balance these time constraints, the decision was made to reduce the length of some interviews in order to increase the amount of interviews completed each day. Because of time constraints, not all questions were asked to all respondents. The questions were ranked in priority to allow the interviewer to skip specified questions in the event of a shortage of time. <u>All respondents completed the Victimization Screening Schedule in its entirety</u>. Nevertheless, during some interviews it was impossible to complete Incident Report Forms for all potential victimization incidents, therefore, it was impossible to verify whether some potential victimization were 'provoked' or 'unprovoked'. Table 4.1 provides a comparison of potential victimizations and verified victimizations.

TABLE 4.1

Comparison of Potential Victimizations
With Verified Victimizations

Victimization Type	No. of Potential Victimizations	No. of Verified Victimizations	% Verified
Robbery·	7	4	57.14
Sexual Assault	6	6	100.00
Assault··	45	30	66.67
Threats··	29	23	79.31
Theft	45	42	93.33
Vandalism	5	0	-----
Extortion(1)	10	2	20.00
	147	107	72.79

·¹ncludes attempts
··With/without weapons

Fifty-five of 117 respondents (46.61%) met the first criteria for victimization by answering affirmatively to at least one of the victimizations types. These respondents reported a total of 147 separate potential victimization incidents, however, because of time constraints, Incident Report Forms were not completed in 40 potential victimization incidents. Four respondents accounted for these 40 victimizations incidents: one respondent reported 21 separate victimizations and only one Incident Report Form was completed; another reported 17 victimizations and five Incident Report Forms were completed; another reported 16 victimizations and only 12 Incident Report Forms were completed; and, one respondent reported four victimizations and only one Incident Report Form was completed.

The actual number of verified victimizations is 107, or 72%

of the total number of potential victimizations. The ratio of potential victimizations to verified victimizations - the ratio of reported victimizations to victimizations that resulted in an Incident Report Form - varied according to incident type. For example, five acts of vandalism were reported but due to limitations of time Incident Report Forms could not be completed and, hence, the act could not be verified. <u>Further discussion of the results of this study will involve only the 107 verified victimizations</u>.

Limitations

Great care was taken to ensure that the results of the survey were statistically sound, however, as was noted above, there were difficulties with regards to sampling that limit the generalizability of the results. There are other limitations to this study. Also previously noted, the sample included only males. Moreover, the racial composition of the Region where the study was undertaken is dissimilar to other regions, especially the relatively low proportion of natives. In some CSC prisons, native comprise over 50% of the prison population. The dynamics of this type of prison may be different than one in which the majority of the population are caucasian.

There are other difficulties inherent in victimization research. As in all survey research, the validity of the data is

dependent upon the accuracy of the information. While great case was taken to ensure that all information is recorded and coded reliably, researchers have little control over what information respondents provide. Fattah (1991) summarized intentional and unintentional sources of error in victimization research. Intentional sources of error include respondents misrepresenting or not revealing relevant information. Unintentional sources of error include telescoping victimizations into or out of the reference period, not knowing a victimization has occurred, forgetting a victimization has occurred and misdefining a victimization incident. As a response to these limitations, some victimization researchers have utilized reverse record checks to verify the validity of respondents' information. Fattah goes on to suggest that reverse record checks offer no significant impact on the data as, by definition, this technique is unable to verify victimizations that have not been reported to officials. In light of these inherent limitations of victimization research, the best indicator of the validity of survey data is future research.

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CHAPTER 5

THE INFORMAL RULES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

> A lot of people present themselves as solid. The
> men are less solid no matter where you go in the
> pens....The younger guys play the solid part until
> their own chance comes to gain something from
> ratting. There is not a new set of rules. The
> old code still applies but now there are holes in
> it. Now its 'you give trust and respect and you
> get it back'.
>
> The old rules don't apply anymore.

In Chapter 3 it was shown that the traditional characterization
of the inmate code suffers from many deficits which makes suspect
those theories that utilize this concept as a point of departure
and central organizing feature. This is not to suggest that
there is no inmate code but rather to call into question the
manner in which it has been presented in the prison literature.
One of the major criticisms of the literature on the sociology of
the prison is that it presents a reified world; researchers'
conceptualizations of the inmate code do not accurately reflect
prisoners' experiences within prison. This chapter addresses the

adequacy of the 'inmate code' in relation to the experiences of Canadian prisoners in the 1990s.

As part of the Prison Victimization Project, a series of open-ended exploratory questions were administered to allow prisoners to speak of their conditions of existence within the prison. The questions were both broad and narrow in scope. One question, in particular, was designed to elicit prisoners' views on informal social control mechanisms that structure prison life. Prisoners were asked: "What are the rules a prisoner must know in order to survive in prison". The goal of this question was to provide prisoners with an opportunity to voice their thoughts on the content and operation of the inmate code. Responses were hand recorded as close to verbatim as possible. Based on the responses of survey respondents, categories or themes of rules were developed and responses were coded. This chapter provides the results of this and other questions aimed at assessing the strength of the 'inmate code'.

During the course of this study visits were made to five different prisons spanning three security levels. Each of the prisons differed in terms of the prisoner population, the types of programs offered, the general 'reputation' of the prison and, most importantly, security level. For now, these differences will be set aside in favour of concentrating on the overall themes that emerged across prisons and security levels.

The Informal Rules of Social Control

The data provided in this section will show that an inmate code, as it is traditionally defined, does not exist in the federal prisons where the interviews were conducted. There does exist, however, a set of 'informal rules of social control' that are known among the prison population. It will be shown that informal rules of social control differ from what has traditionally been recognized as the inmate code in terms of content and operation. Some of the traditional themes of the inmate code are evident in the informal rules of social control. The low percentage of prisoners volunteering other categories suggests that some elements of the traditional inmate code may have declined in saliency. Additionally, the data indicate that two new themes are clearly evident. It will also be shown that the informal rules of social control operate differently than the inmate code. Sykes and others have argued that adherence to the inmate code moves the prison population in the direction of social cohesion and solidarity. Adherence to the informal rules of social control, however, does not necessarily lead to social cohesion. Taken together, the content and operation the rules prisoners viewed as important call into question the traditional conceptualization of the inmate code. The themes and some specific rules that constitute the informal rules of social control are described below. The percentage of prisoners

volunteering responses in each category is contained in brackets.

(1) Do your own time (70.9%).

Rules that make up this category define the public and the private realms of prison life in recognition that mobility and anonimity in prison is restricted. For example, there are rules such as 'don't rat', 'keep your nose out of others' business', 'don't ask too many questions', 'mind your own business', and 'don't look in somebody's house'. The rules that make up this category help prisoners maintain personal autonomy within the closed context of the prison. The rules prescribe that prisoners ought not interfere in the lives of other prisoners. A prisoner 'does his own time' by minding his own business. The most important component of this rule is that prisoners must never inform or 'rat' on other prisoners.

(2) Avoid the Prison Economy (33.8%).

This category of rules suggests that prisoners ensure they do not put themselves into a position where their safety might be jeopardized. This category of rules warns lenders and borrowers and buyers and sellers of the consequences of doing business in the informal economy. In the prison economy, cigarettes and drugs are the most frequently traded commodities. Unless

borrowed from a partner, cigarettes or drugs 'taken on the cuff'
carry extremely high interests rates. Negotiation may be the
first recourse for an unpaid debts, but not always. Physical
assault and getting 'rolled off the range' are common methods of
sending the message to others that unpaid debts will not be
tolerated. Other components to this category of rules include
'don't do drugs', 'don't borrow' and 'don't lend'.

(3) Don't trust anyone (25.6).

These rules caution prisoners to be wary of those with whom they
associate. Prisoners may be the target of direct or indirect
exploitation of cigarettes, canteen goods or other commodities.
Additionally, information is a potent source of power in the
prison environment. The fewer people to whom a prisoner divulges
personal information, the better. These rules protect a prisoner
from those who wish to inform other prisoners or staff about
one's street or institutional life. Corollaries to these rules
include 'pick your friends carefully' and 'avoid certain people'
who are known to be informants.

(4) Show respect (21.4%).

These rules prescribe the manner in which prisoners ought to
interact with other prisoners in the course of their daily   .
activities. Specific directives associated with this category of

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rules include: 'keep the noise down', 'don't bother others', and
'don't interrupt others in conversation'. These directives are
norms of courtesy in the prison population. The consequences for
violating these norms may range from ostracism to physical
assault.

(5) Don't talk to guards (11.9%).

These rules prohibit casual conversation between prisoners and
guards. Prisoners are to talk to guards on official business
only and even then a degree of caution and an acceptable social
distance is to be maintained.

(6) Don't exploit (10.3%).

This category of rules prohibits prisoners from exploiting other
prisoners. Exploitation occurs in several ways. Theft, non-
payment of debts, sexual exploitation and muscling are generally
not tolerated and may result in severe consequences to the
exploiter. Other forms of exploitation such as charging
exorbitant interest rates or over-pricing drugs, alcohol or
tobacco are also shunned but the consequences to the exploiter
are less severe.

Six distinct categories of rules were uncovered during the
interviews. The most frequently volunteered rules were

classified under the theme 'do your own time'. This should come
as no surprise to those familiar with prison populations. The
cluster of rules represented by this theme is well known among
researchers and practitioners, and is one of the features of
Sykes' inmate code. It should be noted that 'do your own time'
is often used by prisoners as a method of summarizing a great
many of the 'rules'. Care was taken to probe survey respondents
to unpack what was meant by this phrase. In many cases when
prisoners were probed to explain what they meant by 'do your own
time', other rules, such as 'don't exploit' or 'show respect'
emerged. In order to classify a prisoners response in under the
catch-all phrase of 'do your own time', a prisoner must have made
the some distinction between the public and private realms of the
prison world.

What is surprising is the low percentage of survey
respondents who volunteered the response 'don't talk to guards'
(11%). This category of rules is one of the significant
components the inmate code and one of the central organizing
features of the deprivation and importation theories as it
signifies the fundamental cleavage between keeper and kept, which
encouraged group solidarity against an enemy out-group. While
this division no doubt still stands, its saliency as a central
concept around which prisoners guide their action may be reduced
in importance. Furthermore, other elements of the inmate code as
portrayed by Sykes and others were infrequently mentioned. Only

four respondents (3.4%) provided responses that closely resembled the theme of 'don't weaken'. Finally, two themes not typically recognized in the literature on the inmate code emerged as frequently volunteered categories of rules. These themes are 'don't trust anybody' and 'avoid the prison economy'.

The categories of rules uncovered in this analysis bear only a mild resemblance to what has traditionally been defined as the 'inmate code.' Overall, these data indicate that of Sykes' five elements of the inmate code, only three received substantial support among survey respondents, and two rules not traditionally recognized as part of the inmate code were frequently endorsed by survey respondents. Thus, the responses volunteered by survey respondents call into question the traditional conceptualization of the inmate code.

One of the reasons that the inmate code was described as a 'code' of behaviour was the perception among researchers of the "passion" with which prisoners speak of the inmate code and the "almost universal alliance verbally accorded it" (Sykes and Messinger, 9:1960). These data suggest that there are certain rules that have saliency in the prison population yet the relative infrequency with which some of the rules are volunteered suggests that to call these rules an 'inmate code' is misleading. For example, only 10.3% of the respondents volunteered rules relating to exploitation and only 11.9% volunteered rules

relating to conversation with guards. The fact that relatively few prisoners volunteered these responses casts doubt to claims of "universal" verbal alliance to an inmate code.

One of the problems encountered with the importation-deprivation debate was an inconsistency between attitudes supportive of the code and behaviour that lived up to the expectations of the inmate code. The same discrepancy between attitudes and behaviours was found in this examination. Prisoners were asked "what percentage of the population do you think lives by these rules". Half of the survey respondents indicated that less than 30% of the prison population abide by the rules respondents volunteered and three-quarters of survey respondents indicated the rules that they volunteered are adhered to by 50% of the prison population. There are a set of informal rules that are known amongst a segment of the prison population, but respondents perceived that only a minority of prisoners actually abide by the rules they volunteered.

Based on the content of the rules volunteered by respondents, the frequency with which these rules were volunteered and prisoners' perceptions regarding adherence to the rules they volunteered, it would be misleading to suggest that an inmate code, as it has traditionally been conceptualized in the prison literature, exists in the prisons that were visited. What does exist, however, are a set 'informal rules of social

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control'. These rules are 'informal' in the sense that there exists no formal mechanisim to transmit the content of the rules throughout the population. It will be shown that these rules are a primary mechanism of social control in prison. Black refers to social control as "how people define and respond to deviant behaviour" or behaviour regarded as undesirable when judged against context-specific normative standards (Black, 1983). Social control includes all forms of punishment, ranging from mild disapporoval, to ostrcism, to physical sanction, and the procedures for administering these punishments. In this analysis, the 'informal rules of social control' refer to the manner in which prisoners define and respond to behaviour defined as deviant within the context of the prison.

Based on the classification scheme utilized above it is safe to say that at least six clusters, or themes of rules exist and these informal rules of social control differ from the traditional inmate code in terms of content. Inherent in the conceptualization of the informal rules of social control is the recognition that a significant portion of the prison population does not abide by these rules. The perception that a majority of the prisoner population does not abide by these rules does not make them redundant. In fact, just the opposite may be the case. Deviation from these rules acts as a catalyst to the production and reproduction of the rules themselves. As will be shown in Chapter 6 it is the process of production and reproduction of the

informal rules of social control that provides a framework within which the social world of the prison can be understood. However, before examining this process it is necessary to develop a preliminary understanding of how these informal rules of social control operate within the prison environment.

Operation of the Informal Rules of Social Control.

The more important question remains to be addressed: What is the place of the informal rules of social control in the social world of the prison? The existing literature suggests that the inmate code is the central organizing feature of the prison world and that the inmate code provides a set of normative guidelines around which an oppositional prison culture develops. The greater the adherence to the inmate code, the tighter the solidarity of the prison population. As mentioned earlier, the traditional conception of the inmate code suffers from several drawbacks, of which one is the way prison researchers depict its operation. This section will develop an understanding of how the informal rules of social control operate in prison. Contrary to the inmate code, it will be argued that the informal rules of social control do not have 'group cohesion' or 'solidarity' as their major theme. Rules such as 'don't trust anyone' and 'be wary of the prison economy' are clearly not oriented solely in the direction of group cohesion. These rules, in fact, suggest just the opposite - a movement towards atomization among

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prisoners. These rules suggest that it may be inappropriate to view the informal rules of social control as contributing <u>solely</u> to integrating the prison community.

Rather than viewing these rules as an integrative mechanism with group cohesion as their dominant theme, it may be more appropriate to view the informal rules of social control as having both centrifugal and centripetal effects. Centripetal effects move prisoners together into a cohesive community and promote solidarity. Centripetal effects provide the prisoner with a meaningful social group and a social network that can be used to overcome the difficulties associated with imprisonment and with the daily struggles of life faced by persons behind and beyond the walls. On the other hand, centrifugal effects work to counteract forces that push the prison population towards social cohesion. Centrifugal effects separate rather than unite prisoners. Centrifugal effects create a social system in which a prisoner not only faces the realities of prison life without a strong social support network but may even face the direct opposition from prisoners as he attempts to cope with these realities.

Centripetal effects produce movements toward social cohesion, centrifugal effects produce movements toward atomization. Some elements of the informal rules of social control have both centripetal and centrifugal effects, other

elements operate primarily in one direction. The centripetal and centrifugal effects of the informal rules of social control are outlined below.

Do Your Own Time

Centripetal and centrifugal effects are present in the theme of rules that cautions prisoners to 'do your own time'. This category of rules helps to construct the definition the public and private spheres of prison life. Rules such as 'don't rat' and 'don't look in another prisoner's house' allow prisoners to conduct their daily activities, both licit and illicit, with a degree of assurance that they will not be subject to administrative surveillance. 'Do your own time' rules provide a framework for delineating which aspects of a prisoner's life are in the public domain, and accessible to all prisoners, and which aspects of a prisoner's life are in the private domain and, therefore, not subject to interference from other prisoners.

This category of rules has the centripetal effect of encouraging social cohesion by helping to shape boundaries of admissible conduct in prison and, therefore, promoting order and minimizing friction. For example, one interview subject suggested that the best way to get by in prison is to do the following:

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> Just do your own time, mind you own business and
> worry about yourself. Keep and open mind, try to
> be laid back and don't expect anything because you
> don't get nothing. Younger guys want to have a
> high profile or be a shooter and they cause
> problems by trying to develop into a wheel. The
> older guys realize that it is easier to get along
> when you co-operate. By and large, most inmates
> want to live as easy and as smooth as possible and
> they tend to live that way. It is the same with
> staff. They try to facilitate that. But there
> are a few staff and cons that fuck up....Most of
> the time it runs smoothly but every now and then
> it gets in a turmoil.

To 'do your own time' is to minimize friction and to co-operate
with other prisoners. To be a high profile prisoner, a 'wheel',
or a 'shooter', to try and get a reputation by entering into the
affairs of another person at a point in time when such
intervention is unwarranted generates conflict between prisoners'
and is frowned upon.

The 'do your own time' rules tend to minimize frictions
between prisoners and thereby contribute to social cohesion.
However, this category of rules also has centrifugal effects.
Taken to their logical conclusion, these rules separate and
atomize prisoners by closing-off lines of communication. For
example, prisoners may severe meaningful ties with other
prisoners in order to avoid putting themselves into a position
where they may have to assist another prisoner. One prisoner
remarked:

> I have two people that I talk to frequently and
> others that I talk to less frequently but I don't
> have a partner. I am mostly a loner. That is the
> way I have always been in prison. Guys who get
> involved in gangs get into trouble. You always
> have to settle other guys' accounts.

Similarly, a prisoner is 'doing his own time' when he does not

intervene to assist another prisoner involved in a 'beef'.

> I get along with a lot of people but I wouldn't
> lay down my life for any. Its not a snobby thing
> but people come and go. The best way to get along
> is to do your own time. We all have problems, I
> don't want to inherit any. It's a self-
> preservation tool.

Moreover, these rules imply that prisoners not seek the

assistance of other prisoners. For example, one prisoner

indicated that he was subject to a series of brutal assaults. He

refused to react violently towards his aggressor. He informed

staff of the occurrences but they refused to act. He felt he was

unable to ask for the assistance of other prisoners, asking for

assistance is not 'doing your own time'. A neighbour happened to

witness an altercation between the victim and his aggressor. The

neighbour intervened and there were no further assaults. In this

case, the cluster of rules that warns prisoners against

intervening in the affairs of others prevented the victim from

asking for assistance, even when assistance may have put an end

to the attacks.

Respect

The rules that comprise this category prescribe the behavioural norms within the prison. Specific rules in this category include 'don't be rowdy', 'don't be loud', 'clean up after yourself', 'be polite', and 'don't bother others'. These rules prescribe how prisoners ought to interact with each other on a daily basis. For the most part, these rules are no different than those that would be found in any bureaucratic structure that brings together individuals, with the significant difference that sanctions for violating these rules are far more serious than in other bureaucratic settings.

Similar to 'do your own time', the rules that comprise the notion of 'respect' define what is acceptable behaviour and what is unacceptable behaviour, what is 'right' and what is 'wrong'. These rules also provide a preliminary means of measuring status within the prison world. Those who abide by the rules are accorded respect, those who do not are not accorded respect. Thus, these rules play a large role in determining the social hierarchy in prison. For example, the following comment is typical of responses to the question that was designed to elicit thoughts on respect in the prison community:

> ...those guys who are straight-forward, someone
> who is honest and won't bullshit you [gets
> respect]. It is just like in the free world.
> Even if you deal drugs people will treat you like
> a human being except if you rip people off. For
> example, a drug dealer broke another guy's jaw.
> He went to the hole for twenty days. That's a
> very lenient sentence. He ratted out so he gets
> no respect. I won't have anything to do with him.

Another prisoner offered the following comments:

> The ones that give respect demand respect. People
> who don't tolerate people who are disrespectful
> get respect. I demand that people give me my
> space. It is hard to describe. It's inmates who
> treat other guys with courtesy, who give them
> space, and who would call a guy up if he infringed
> on that space, that get respect, those with a well
> developed concept of justice and fairness. It is
> the same criteria as on the outside except that
> minor things take on added importance.

Additionally, by defining what is appropriate and
inappropriate behaviour, these rules provide a basis for the
system of justice that develops in prison. When prisoners are in
the 'right' they may be able to rely on the support of those
prisoners with whom they have developed friendships, however, if
they are in the wrong, if they have shown disrespect, the
likelihood that they will receive backing from others decreases.
For example, a prisoner described the limits of his friendship
with other prisoners in the following manner:

> I would back them up unless they were in the
> wrong, then I wouldn't. For example, if a friend
> owed money for drugs or if he ratted a guy out we
> wouldn't talk to him.

Being rowdy, playing music too loud, not cleaning up after
yourself, bothering others, and interrupting others are all

considered to be disrespectful and in the 'wrong'. If a prisoner displays behaviour that is disrespectful it is unlikely that he will receive the general support from the prison community.

These rules help define the system of justice that operates within the prison. For example, Prisoner X said that he was on the telephone. According to Prisoner X, Prisoner Y was playing his music too loud which interrupted Prisoner X's telephone call. The two prisoners initially exchanged words and a fight ensued. Later that evening, Prisoner Y came back and said he was in 'the wrong', apologized and shook hands with Prisoner X. Prisoner X accepted the apology and no further action was taken by either party. In this case, the rules of respect helped to placate a potentially volatile situation between two prisoners, therefore, contributing to the stability of the prison social system.

This type of negotiated justice does not always result following violations of the rules of respect. Often times, violations of the rules of 'respect' result in quite severe consequences and it is in these situations that the rules of respect, and the system of justice that develops around these rules, have centripetal effects. For example, Prisoner X said he left the common area in a state of disorder and was warned not to do it again. Later that day Prisoner X again left the common area in disorder and received a 'sucker shot' in the mouth. The prisoner was then transferred to another range.

The rules of 'respect' have centrifugal and centripetal effects. This category of rules, and the rudimentary system of justice that develops around it, contributes to the order and stability of the prison world but, at the very same time, the manner in which these rules are enforced de-stabilizes the prison by pitting prisoners against prisoners which leads to violent confrontations..

Don't Trust Others

This category of rules comprises directives that warn prisoners to be wary of the types of inter-personal relationships into which they enter. Specific rules include: 'don't trust anyone', 'watch out for others because they will manipulate you', 'beware of someone who wants to be your friends', 'don't reveal too much personal information' and 'stick with someone you can trust'. These rules caution prisoners against entering into personal relationships with other, types of relationships that may be beneficial to alleviating some of the stresses of imprisonment and life in general. Prisoners are forced to face difficult situations by themselves rather than relying on the assistance of other prisoners. The most obvious effect of these rules is to push the prison population towards atomization: if you can't trust them, then stay away from them.

These rules have developed in part because of the perception that prison informants - 'rats' or those who send 'kites' - have increased in number over the past few years. In prison, information is one source of power and revealing the right information to the wrong person may place a prisoner's safety in jeopardy. For example, the following comment is typical of prisoners' views on the level of trust in prison:

> My experience is that you can't trust anyone. To protect yourself you have to keep people away. If someone gets close he can hurt you by going to 'the man' or he can hurt you personally. I have learned this from experience. A few people screwed me up when I came in....They pretend to be a friend and then they talk behind your back. They sent kites in on me. For example, they sent a kite in on me this year saying that I wanted a transfer to another institution. They were close enough to me to know my FPS number so they put that on the kite. They wanted me to go to a PC institution. The administration called me up and wanted to know why I wanted a transfer. I showed them the birth date on the kite, they had the wrong birth date, and that ended that.

Another prisoner made the following comments:

> There is no loyalty in here. It is more of a dog-eat-dog world. Its just in the environment. In my case, it is my first time here. I am used to a circle of friends who are trustworthy and I can be myself. Having that habit I expected to behave as always. This isn't the case. Others have learned what I am just picking up on. They build up defenses against getting close, as a result everybody is looking out for themselves.

Additionally, prisoners are warned to be wary of those with whom they associate in order to avoid becoming involved in exploitive relationships:

You have to watch out for other cons who try to
manipulate you. Don't lend out or ensure that if
you do lend something you will get it back or you
will be marked as a sucker. Beware of somebody
bringing gifts. Always take precautions and never
turn your back on someone because they might stab
you. Pick your friends carefully and be your self
and don't try to be someone you're not.

Another prisoner said:

Those that accept you out of nowhere are the most
dangerous. You have to ask yourself: 'Why are
they friendly with me? What have I got that makes
people want to be my friend?'

These comments indicate the low level of trust that is found
among the population of the prisons. The centrifugal effects of
this low level of trust include hindering the development of
personal relationships amongst prisoners.

The extent to which the development of personal
relationships amongst prisoners is hindered is evident in the
data collected on friendships. Prisoners where asked how many
other prisoners they consider to be close, personal friends. If
a prisoner required clarification regarding the definition of
'friend', interviewers responded by saying a friend was someone
with whom they could share confidences with reasonable assurance
that confidentiality would not be violated. Table 5.1 shows the
results of this question.

TABLE 5.1

Number of Personal Prelationships by % of Prisoners

	# of Personal Relationships				
	0	1	2	3	4+
% of Respondents	29.2	22.1	16.8	15.9	16

N=113

Almost one-third of the survey respondents indicated that they had no close, personal relationships in prison, while close to 40% of the survey respondents indicated that they entered into one or two close, personal relationships. In total just over two-thirds of the survey respondents said they had fewer than three close, personal relationships. Close, personal friendships in prison are relatively infrequent occurrences and when these types of relationships do develop they are most likely to develop amongst diads or triads. These data reflect the centrifugal effects of the 'don't trust anyone' rules.

This category of rules, however, does produce centripetal effects. While the general feeling is that most prisoners cannot be trusted, the potential exists for strong bonds of friendship to form between two prisoners that do develop a trusting, 'partner' relationship. The following comments indicate the nature of 'partner' relationships.

> I have one friend. We supply each other with tobacco. He looks out for me. He says he would step in if anyone ever touches me and a few times he has. I knew him from the street. I am always with him whenever I leave the range.

> I have one partner. All the rest of the prisoners
> here are temporary acquaintances. I have 100%
> trust in him. I would die for him and he would
> die for me.... We can argue and still be the best
> of friends which is unusual. Most guys would
> split after an argument because their bond is
> based solely on their relationship here.

> My partner keeps an eye out for me. We both go to
> the yard at the same time. My partner is afraid
> to go to the yard by himself. He is up on a rape
> charge and is worried about getting piped.

In an environment where lack of trust dominates, partner
relationships allow some prisoners to seek assistance and advice
with relative assurance that their confidences will not be
exposed. Additionally, partners may alleviate material
discomfort by pooling their canteen thereby ensuring that each
has an ample supply of tobacco or other necessities. Perhaps
most importantly, under certain circumstances, partners can be
counted on for backing or protection. The flip-side of the
'don't trust anyone' rules, then, is the production of strong
bonds between prisoners who, over a period of time, have
cultivated 'partner' relationships.

Avoid the Prison Economy

Another category of rules warns prisoners to avoid
borrowing, lending and getting into debt. These are rules that
suggest prisoners avoid becoming enmeshed in the prison economy
to ensure they do not put themselves into a position where their
safety might be jeopardized. Other components of these rules
include 'don't do drugs', 'don't borrow' and 'don't lend'. It

should be noted that this category if different than the 'don't exploit' category. Here, the emphasis is not on prohibiting the exploitation of others. The emphasis of these rules is on avoiding the consequences of being on either end of a debt. These rules are directed at lenders and borrowers and buyers and sellers.

There is a 'formal' prison economy that is sanctioned by the administration. Prisoners are employed in various jobs within the prison and are paid according to their employment performance. Rates of pay range from approximately $30.00 to $70.00 per two-week pay period. In some prisons, prisoners may earn up to several hundred dollars per month if they are employed in CORCAN, a prison-run office furniture production facility. A percentage of prisoners' bi-weekly employment income is deposited into a mandatory savings account. Prisoners are free use the remaining portion of their income to purchase tobacco, toiletries, stamps, food or other goods sold in the prison-run canteen. There is also a thriving informal economy. Goods available on the formal economy are available on the informal economy at inflated prices. Additionally, contraband items, such as drugs, are available on the informal economy.

Within the prison's informal economy there are sophisticated rules regarding wholesaling, retailing and price-setting of commodities, such as cigarettes and drugs. Unless borrowed from

a partner or another reliable source, cigarettes and drugs 'taken on the cuff' carry high interests rates. When debts cannot be paid negotiation may be the first recourse, but not always. Physical assault and getting 'rolled off the range' are common methods of sending the message to others that unpaid debts will not be tolerated.

In order for the prison economy to run effectively, debts must be paid within a reasonable period of time. On the street economy, purchasers must pay retailers, who must pay distributors, who must pay wholesalers, who must pay manufacturers. As one prisoner noted, a similar economic interdependence exists in the prison:

> Last year I was selling for a dealer. I needed a couple of grams so I took two grams as payment. When I went to the gym with the dealer, I bought three more grams for $100.00. It took about three weeks for me to get the money. He [the dealer] owed money to another guy. That guy came and wanted to beef me. I told him to back off.

Another prisoner described his method of negotiating a repayment schedule for a loan:

> I lent a guy a carton of smokes. He didn't want to pay. I asked him if he was going to pay and he didn't give me a straight answer so I broke his jaw and his nose. I hit him and two of his friends jumped me from behind and kicked me in the face. Then they were taken out because another guy stepped in to help me. The next day the guy paid back the carton.

Just as in the street economy, the informal prison economy requires a high degree of social cohesion to operate efficiently.

This category of rules that cautions prisoners to avoid becoming enmeshed in the prison economy assists in maintaining social cohesion by defining the outermost boundaries of economic pursuit. Thus, the centripetal effects of this category of rules include promoting social cohesion by forewarning prisoners of the consequences of not paying debts. For example, one prisoners suggested that new arrivals in the prison avoid the drug scene for the following reason:

> Don't get caught up in the drug bullshit or get into debt. I bought shoes that are worth over $100.00 from a guy for a carton and a half of smokes. It was a good deal. If the guys in here want dope they will sell their grandmother.

Another prisoner noted that it does not take long to accumulate a significant debt in prison and the problems that occur because of this:

> Dope is a major rip-off. For example, 1/3 of a gram of hash costs $20 cash when the supply gets low, and its very easy to run up hundreds of dollars in debts in a matter of minutes.

These rules provide order to the informal prison economy which serves to distribute scarce resources throughout the population, although it is clearly not the most effective means of distribution.

The rules that warn prisoners to avoid amassing debts also have centrifugal effects. These rules reflect the fact that many prisoners have been exploited or have heard of other prisoners being exploited in the prison economy and are reluctant to put themselves in that position again. One prisoner had this to say

about lending commodities:

> We all have signs on our doors that say "Don't
> fucking come". Guards tear them down. Guys will
> borrow a bail of tobacco and then check into the
> hole so to not pay. Then they get out and do it
> again.

Furthermore, enforcing these rules leads to atomization.

> ...if someone lends you smokes they want twice as
> much back and lots of guys get caught up in that.
> They get into debt. If they don't pay then the
> debt compounds. That is where dope and cell
> thieving come in. They have to hustle to pay
> their debts or they may run to PC [protective
> custody] even though there is nothing wrong with
> them.

Not lending goods, such as tobacco, forces prisoners to either go
without or find illegitimate methods, such as cell thieving, to
acquire goods which further perpetuates the problem of the
distribution of scarce resources.

Don't Exploit

A category of rules related to the 'don't borrow/lend' rules
are rules that caution prisoners not to exploit other prisoners.
Exploitation occurs in several ways. Theft, non-payment of
debts, sexual exploitation and muscling are generally not
tolerated and may result in severe consequences to the exploiter.
Other forms of exploitation such as charging exorbitant interest
rates or over-pricing drugs, alcohol or tobacco are also shunned
but the consequences to the exploiter are generally less severe.

This category of rules has the centripetal effect of

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promoting social cohesion by defining the limits of the market-
place which has the double effect of improving the efficiency of
the market-place and uniting prisoners in cases of violations.
In terms of the latter effect, there is virtually unanimous
disapproval of cell thieving. A question on the survey posed two
events. The first event was a physical assault that caused
enough physical damage to prevent a prisoner from going to work
or programming for two days. The second event was a $50.00 cell
theft. Survey respondents were asked which event they considered
to be the most serious. 51.7% of the survey respondents claimed
the cell theft was the most serious. The following comments are
typical of respondents who said the theft was more serious than
the assault:

> Theft is serious, its a rule in jail, don't steal
> from others. Some have so very little and will
> get very bitter, not only towards the thief but
> towards others. He won't let others in his cell.
> He won't lend things any more. This flows into
> all aspects of his life. He will snap at
> anything.

> If someone assaults me I was in the wrong.   If
> someone steals something from me they are in deep
> shit. It doesn't matter what the value is. Even
> if it was a pack of smokes its the morals of the
> guy doing it.

> If I am in a beef and I lost, big deal. But if I
> have something stolen - no matter what value -
> that is wrong. Even on the street I think the
> same way. When I steal, I steal from banks, not
> one individual who is working for $500.

> In here you only have a few things you can call
> your own. If someone stole my watch I would cave
> his head in. Most guys see it that way. We don't
> get much, what we have we cherish.

As these comments suggest, cell thieving is not taken lightly by

the prison community.

The presence of a cell thief on a range tends to draw members of the range together. When a prisoner discovers that some of his property has been stolen one response is to call a range meeting. Range members are told of the loss and are cautioned to be wary of further thefts. The victim may provide the thief, who may or may not be present at the range meeting, with the option of returning the goods anonymously in exchange for immunity. Another response to a cell theft is for members of the range to co-operate in setting a trap for the thief. For example, tobacco may be placed in a cell in open view of passers-by, while others watch to see if anyone enters the cell and takes the bait. These responses to a cell theft show the ways in which cell thieving draws members of a range together.

Another centripetal effect of the 'don't exploit' rules is that a violation against one is regarded as a violation against all. If a cell thief gets caught, generally members of the range participate in meting out the punishment:

> I've seen a box thief get caught years ago. I was
> in a jail that had sliding steal doors. They
> caught the guy coming off the range with two
> cartons of smokes. They slammed his arms in the
> door and threw him in front of the office. The
> coppers didn't do anything. They understand how
> things run most smoothly. They would prefer we
> deal with our own problems. They don't want
> problems.

> I've seen a guy get caught for it. He would have been killed if the guards didn't step in. He ended up with a broken jaw and stitches. He was doing life so now he will be in PC for the rest of his life.
>
> Everyone knows them - the cell thieves, the people who are NG [no good]. I saw a cell thief get caught, its not a pretty sight. He got a beating from everybody on the range for stealing tobacco. They hardly get caught in here but when they do everybody takes it out on them. They deserve it.

As noted by these prisoners, the punishment meted out to cell thieves can be quite severe. The brutal punishment of cell thieves, a punishment that typically involves the participation of more than just the victim, is an expression of the prison community's collective disapproval for an individual act against an individual victim. Yet despite these prohibitions against cell thieving, the data provided in Chapter 7 show that cell thefts were frequent occurrences in the prisons where the interviews were conducted.

The strength of the prohibition against cell thieving and the comments that prisoners volunteered during the interviews, signifies a sense of group social cohesion: 'we all don't have much, so there is no point in stealing from each other'. The reality, of course, is much different. Some prisoners have a great deal more personal possessions than others, nevertheless, the 'don't exploit' rules as they related to cell thieving unite prisoners against a common enemy.

Don't talk to guards.

This category of rules puts limits on casual conversation between prisoners and guards. Prisoners are to talk to guards on official business only, and even then an acceptable social distance is to be maintained. This category of rules serves to provides prisoners with a degree of privacy from administrative surveillance. Moreover, this category of rules not only allows prisoners to engage in illicit behaviours such as drug dealing and consumption, but offers a reprieve from the constant administrative surveillance of all their activities, both illicit and licit. This category of rules contributes to the social cohesion of the prison by creating an 'us against them' mentality amongst prisoners.

This category of rules has traditionally been regarded as one of the defining features of the social world of the prison, however, the relatively low rate at which these rules were volunteered during the interviews suggests that their saliency might be decreasing. The altered nature in the relationship between guards and prisoners was recognized by several survey respondents. For example, one prisoner made the following comment:

> When I came in I was 17. I was taken aside and
> told what to do. Don't talk to the guards, it
> doesn't matter if he's in a uniform or not. Do
> your own time and mind your own business. These
> guys who are coming in with new (FPS) numbers,
> they just come in and the joints aren't run like

they used to be, so they don't know what it used
to be like. It's tougher to get by. Lets say
that everybody does 2/3 of their time, no parole.
We'd fuck the system right up. They'd have no
control. Now they use the parole system to
control the population. The guards have a system
going. You have an old lady on the street and you
want to get your balls greased on a visit and then
you get a charge. The guards negotiate with the
guys. They get caught in the bathroom with a fit
[hypodermic needle] in their arm and they still
get a visit!

Another prisoner offered similar comments:

Before they weren't getting parole, now a lot more
guys get it. Individuals doing time realized that
they can get out quicker so that changed the whole
context of prison. You weren't so hostile to
guards and started working towards early release.
Once this line of communication opened the
solidarity decreased. Before they relied on one
another, know this has changed.

With the increase in the number of privileges prisoners can

receive and changes in the nature of conditional release it

appears that this hallmark of the prison social world - keep away

from 'the man' - is eroding. The perception among many prisoners

is that you must co-operate with staff in order to be granted an

early release. As one prisoner indicated, this leads to

decreased solidarity amongst the prison population. As will be

shown in Chapter 6, this new reality of prison life has profound

effects on social relations in prison.

Presenting the informal rules of social control as a

collection of discrete parts is somewhat misleading. The various

categories of rules that comprise the set of informal rules of

social control are not distinct from one another. Meaning is

given to each category of rules only in relation to the other rules and in relation to structural features the prison. For example, the rule 'don't trust others' is meaningless unless reference is made to other rules such as 'don't rat' and 'don't talk to the guards' and to the perception amongst prisoners that ratting-out is a sure way to attain a transfer to a lesser security prison or to receive a conditional release. The interdependence of the categories of rules is discussed in Chapter 6.

The data presented in this analysis suggest that the traditional portrayal of the inmate code requires a re-conceptualization. The informal rules of social control do not operate in one direction. Adherence to the informal rules of social control does not push prisoners toward solidarity. If every member of the prison population adhered to these rules there would not be unity or solidarity throughout the population. By their very nature, the informal rules of social control, as they are presented here, prevent this. Elements of the informal rules of social control produce centripetal and centrifugal effects of varying degrees of force. The same set of rules, in fact the same individual rule, that has the effect of moving the population towards social cohesion also has the effect of moving the prison population in the opposite direction, towards atomization.

Conceptualizing the informal rules of social control as containing centripetal and centrifugal effects allows for a much more fluid analysis of the social organization of the prison. A prison cannot be characterized as either 'solid' or not 'solid' according to the percentage of the population that abides by the inmate code. Nor can a prisoner be defined as a 'real man' or 'solid con'. There may be some prisoners who are more solid than others, and some who are considerably less solid, but it is inappropriate to view the informal rules of social control as a mechanism to assign prisoners to argot roles within the prison. The fluidity and contradictory nature of the informal rules of social control makes problematic argot roles such as the 'real man', or the 'gorilla' or the 'rat'. The manner in which these rules effect the social world of the prison is too flexible for this type of role assignment. Prisoners move in to, or out of these roles and, more importantly, at the very moment a prisoner is displaying behaviour that is 'solid', that prisoner is contributing to the disunity and atomization of the prisoner population. Conversely, even the actions of most despised prisoner, for example a cell thief, contribute both to solidarity and atomization of the prison social world.

Sykes argued that the prison can operate on an equilibrium until tension rises as unstable prisoners, prisoners who reject the major tenets of the inmate code, gain positions of power within the prison population. When this occurs a new equilibrium

is achieved by force, coercion or riot. The data presented in this analysis suggest that an equilibrium can never fully be realized. As will be shown in Chapter 6 there may be periods of 'relative calm', the prison is not always in a state of riot, but exploitive behaviour and an undercurrent of tension are entwined within the social fabric of the prison. This exploitive behaviour is built into the system, and the very nature of the informal rules of social control reflect this tension. The prison is a balance of centripetal and centrifugal effects produced simultaneously by each element of the informal rules of social control. Within the social world of the prison, there are elements of cohesion (a sophisticated economy and communication system) and there are elements of atomization (you can't trust anyone, kites and 'checking in' to protective custody to avoid paying debts). This inherent tension creates a world that is best characterized as 'partially unstable'. Stability or order is always partial, it can never be realized in full.

Moreover, when the traditional definition of the inmate code is abandoned, it is no longer tenable to view the rules that prisoners use to structure their lives, rules which have both centrifugal and centripetal effects, as 'anti-administration'. Elements of the informal rules of social control prescribe behaviours that are clearly against the interests of the administration. For example, the principles behind rules such as 'don't rat' and 'don't talk to guards' prevents the prison

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administration from gaining access to valuable information and, therefore, works against their interests. On the other hand, rules that minimize frictions between prisoners, for example the categories of 'respect' and 'do your own time', are aligned with the interests of the prison administration as they help to produce a peaceful prison environment. Informal rules of social control, which contain both centrifugal and centripetal effects, are neither pro- nor anti-administration.

Summary

The data presented in this chapter bring forward several important points for discussion. Based on the analysis of prisoners' responses to the question that was designed to tap perceptions on the rules prisoners use in order to survive in prison, it is evident that an 'inmate code', as it has been traditionally defined in the literature, does not exist. What does exist, however, are a set of informal rules of social control. These rules differ from the traditional inmate code in several respect. First, there is a degree of over-lap between the content of the informal rules of social control and the inmate code, however, the inmate code fails to capture crucial aspects of the prison experience, aspects that are recognized in the informal rules of social control. Second, the informal rules of social control do not operate solely in the direction of the social cohesion or solidarity. Contained within each rule, to a

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greater or lesser extent, are centripetal and centrifugal effects. As a result of the tension that is built into the informal rules of social control, the stability of the prison is always partial. Third, it was suggested that inherent in the conceptualization of the informal rules of social control is the recognition that a significant portion of the prison population is perceived not to abide by these rules. It was further suggested that this perception does not make these rules redundant. On the contrary, the perception that violations of these rules are frequent occurrences serves to produce the very conditions on which the rules are premised which, in turn, serves to reproduce both the rules and their conditions of existence. This process will be the focus of Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 6

THE INFORMAL RULES OF SOCIAL CONTROL
AND THE SOCIAL WORLD OF THE PRISON

> The first thing is to get out and that means
> ratting. That is how the system keeps control of
> inmates, by knowing that his neighbour will sell
> him down the road.

Chapter 5 provided data collected on questions designed
specifically to probe respondents' thoughts on the inmate code.
The data provided in Chapter 5 called into question the distinct
quality of the inmate code as traditionally defined in the
literature. The frequency with which rules were volunteered, the
perception that a low proportion of prisoners actually live by
these rules, and the manner in which these rules operate provide
evidence that a distinct inmate code does not exist in the five
prisons that were visited. What does exist, however, is a set of
informal rules of social control. Unlike the inmate code which
operates in one direction, these rules were shown to have
simultaneous centripetal and centrifugal effects, both pushing
the prisoner population towards social cohesion and towards

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atomization. Moreover, implicit in the conceptualization of these rules is the recognition that they are not adhered to by a significant portion of the population. It will be shown in this chapter that the tension embedded within the informal rules of social control plays a large role in structuring the social world of the prison.

The goals of this chapter are to (1) provide a description of the prison social world that emerged over the course of interviewing, (2) situate the informal rules of social control within the descriptive account of the social world of the prison and show how these rules produce and reproduce this social world and, and (3) illustrate how violations of these rules produce the conditions necessary for the production of the rules themselves.

Solidarity and the Social World of the Prison

It was shown is Chapter 5 that the informal rules of social control contained centrifugal elements that had the effect of moving the prison population towards atomization, and, simultaneously, centripetal effects that had the effect of moving the prison population towards solidarity. To a greater or lesser extent, each element of the informal rules of social control had both centripetal and centrifugal effects. It was suggested that the social world of the prison reflected the inherent tension in, the informal rules of social control and that the prison is best

described as 'partially unstable'. The prisons that were visited were neither in a constant state of chaos nor was there a harmonious consensus. Programs were delivered, counts were conducted, meals were prepared, distributed and consumed, drug deals were negotiated and goods were bought and sold, yet the potential always existed for victimization.

One of the key indicators of the partial instability of the prison is the degree of loyalty amongst prisoners. It has been argued that one of primary functions of the traditional inmate code was to create a social world in which strong bonds of loyalty developed between prisoners. The outgrowth of these bonds of loyalty was said to be prisoner solidarity and opposition to the administration and "conventional society". The data collected on the informal rules of social control appeared to call this belief into question. In fact, the most striking theme that emerged throughout the five prisons that were visited was, contrary to the established literature, an overwhelming lack of loyalty and solidarity amongst the prison population as a whole.

One question on the Social Life Questionnaire component of the Victimization Survey asked prisoners to describe the bonds of loyalty that exist amongst the general population of prisoners. Sixty seven percent of the survey respondents indicated that there was a low degree of loyalty amongst prisoners, a further

30% indicated that there was a moderate degree of loyalty amongst
prisoners. The remaining 3% said there was a high degree of
loyalty amongst prisoners. Prisoners' observations on the low
level of loyalty, trust and solidarity provide a descriptive
account of the changing nature of the prison and show how
elements of the informal rules of social control, such as 'don't
trust anyone' and 'do your own time' are produced by, and further
reproduce levels of loyalty, trust and solidarity that are far
less pronounced than traditionally depicted in the literature.

The picture that emerged over the course of interviewing,
especially in conversations with prisoners who had spent a
considerable length of time behind bars, was that any loyalty
that existed in past decades no longer exists in the 1990s. The
following are typical comments of survey respondents who had done
time in the 1960s and 1970s:

> Back in the 60s' it was more solid, tighter and
> closed. Today's world is more flexible. People
> are not hard-liners any more. They're all for
> themselves and will fuck their buddy and those
> around them. People stand up for principles in
> voice alone.

> I noticed the changes immediately when I came back
> in. Its all more sleazy, there is no more honour
> among the inmates. They are all out for
> themselves. Before if you were stuck people would
> help you out, now there is no more of that. There
> is less loyalty and solidarity. It is harder to
> do time because you used to know where you stood,
> now you don't.

The prisons, however, were not totally devoid of loyalty.
Some prisoners developed 'partner' relationships which are

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premised on a great deal of trust. Many prisoners felt that there was loyalty "amongst the older guys" or amongst the various cliques organized around race, city of residence or other group affiliations. But most prisoners who said loyalty existed amongst cliques tempered their comments by adding qualifiers such as "only in certain circumstances" or "depending on the situation".

These and other comments provided by survey respondents, and elements of the informal rules of social control such as 'don't trust anyone', reflect the partial instability of the prison system. The vast majority of prisoners interviewed do not know who they can trust. They feel that the whatever degree of respect, solidarity or loyalty that existed in the past, no longer exists which makes life behind the walls more difficult. The distribution of scarce resources, for example, is hindered as prisoners are unwilling to lend goods to 'unknown commodities', as is the development of meaningful relationships that can alleviate some of the emotional hardships of being held captive.

In many cases, prisoners were willing to offer an explanation for the lack of loyalty amongst the population. Explanations for the decline in prisoner loyalty fell into two categories: (1) changes in the composition of the prisoner population, and, (2) structural features of the prison that have the effect of creating cleavages in the prison population.

The 'Pepsi Generation' and Solidarity

Many survey respondents felt that a new generation of
prisoners is responsible for the overall decline in loyalty and
solidarity. This new generation of prisoners possesses different
values than prisoners who served time in the 1960s and 1970s
which is reflected in their styles of criminality and their
attitudes and behaviours on the street and in prison. One
prisoner characterized this new generation in the following
manner:

> I noticed that in society in general it is
> weakening. I don't see the best of society here
> but it's also weakening. There is no more code of
> ethics. The old saying is 'honour among thieves'
> but there isn't any. It's a newer generation, a
> revolution every two years. They get worse and
> worse, especially those involved in coke and crack
> freaks. They come in here and do [drugs] and they
> get paranoid and then put it on a guy and check
> in.

Other prisoners shared similar experiences with this new
generation of prisoners:

> I've seen things change a lot....Now there are too
> many young guys here. They are a bunch of kids.
> They come in with the attitude that this is a play
> ground and they don't have to live by the formal
> rules. It's harder to live now. You don't have
> the privacy you used to have.

Several prisoners made the distinction between criminals who
commit crimes because of their drug habits and 'true criminals':

> The whole class of convicts has changed. Now
> there are a lot of first time drug offenders who
> commit robbery because of their addiction. If you
> are a true criminal you are honourable, it's your

lifestyle but these guys have none of that. It's
harder to put up with these people. There is no
more solidarity.

Another prisoner noted:

> There are less 'criminals' now. People go out and
> get drunk then rob a store or fuck women. This is
> what we are seeing, drug related criminals. These
> aren't true criminals. Would you call someone who
> fools around with his car in his backyard a
> mechanic? These guys didn't plan their crime.
> They aren't criminals. They are addicts, 'bugs',
> they're crazy.

These prisoners premised their arguments on the fact that the

type of criminality younger criminals are engaged in differs from

older criminals. The new breed of criminal use crime as a means

to support a drug habit rather than an end in itself. As a

result of these changes in criminality, younger criminals do not

posses the types of criminal values that allow them to do their

time with the least amount of discomfort to themselves and others

around them.

Other prisoners looked to the broader culture to locate the

roots of declining prisoner loyalty. In this explanation,

changes in the prison social world parallel changes in the free

society. One prisoner made the connection between changes in

cultural values and changes in the prison experience in the

following manner:

> Five to ten years ago maybe [there was loyalty],
> now there is none at all....This is a total,
> drastic change from the past. Then there were
> people you could trust or talk to. Now days there
> is nobody like this. It's the Pepsi Generation.
> Youth brought up with less control and respect for
> others. Kids don't help, they think they are

'owed' something. They are brought up
differently. There are more kids here now then
there was ten years ago. There used to be more
respect. Now there is no respect.

Another prisoner suggested that the change in the social world of
the prison was likely a result of the multi-racial mix of the
general population:

I blame that [the decline in loyalty] on the Jane
and Finch crowd. I was here a few years ago and
there were a few blacks from the Jane and Finch
area. Now there are three times that amount.
They have a different mentality. They are looking
for marks. They think they are on the street
corner. You never saw that in the '70s, muscling
for stuff. Its the goddam crack dealers, a lot
have come in from the States that have the
mentality of the American prisons and bring that
shit here.

Whether evaluated in terms of their patterns of criminality of
their street behaviour, to these prisoners, the new 'Pepsi
Generation' of younger, first-time offenders abide by a different
set of values than the older generation of prisoners. Younger
prisoners are more likely to be involved in drugs, both on the
street and in prison, which creates problems amongst the prison
population. This new class of prisoners does not represent the
values of the 'true criminals' of previous decades. Taken
together, these changes in the composition of the prison
population have lowered levels of loyalty, trust and solidarity.

The extent to which the values of prisoners have changed
over the years is not known. There is reason to believe that the
prison population is changing in a manner that is consistent with
the 'Pepsi Generation' hypothesis. The percentage of prisoners

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serving time for drug convictions has increased over the past decade, as have sentence lengths and the percentage of non-caucasian prisoners. However, contrary to the 'Pepsi Generation' hypothesis, the mean age of federal prisoners has increased over the past decade.

There are several problems with the 'Pepsi Generation' hypothesis. It is difficult to accept the distinction between a 'true criminal' of the past and contemporary criminals. The use of drugs may have increased over the past decade, however, drug and alcohol abuse have been associated with crime for several decades. The 'Pepsi Generation' hypothesis is characteristic of the type of thinly veiled racist and gender-biased moral and political commentary current in North American society which longs for the 'good old days'. The difficulty with this type of rhetoric is that the 'good old days' of a 'kinder and gentler' society may never have existed at all. While this hypothesis deserves further examination, there are other structural features of the prison environment that may have a more direct effect on changes in the nature of the prison social system, features that are also amenable to change.

The 'Rat System' and Solidarity

The second aspect that prisoners identified as having an impact on the degree of loyalty among prisoners related to structural features of the prison environment, or more specifically to administrative polices and practices of those who run the prisons. Many prisoners felt that the specific policies and practices involving the passage of information between prisoners and the administration had either the direct or indirect effect of driving a wedge between prisoners and eroding whatever bonds of loyalty existed in the past and preventing the creation of bonds of solidarity. In this regard, the two policies and practices most frequently mentioned were (1) the perception that the administration actively encourages the use of the 'rats' to acquire information on prisoners' behaviour, and, (2) the perception that prisoners who exchanged information with the administration would receive preferential privileges such as visits, transfers and favourable conditional release recommendations.

There is no doubt that ratting has always existed in prison. Indeed, one of the limitations of the deprivation-importation debate is that both perspectives gloss over what are obvious violations to the 'inmate code'. The data collected in this analysis, however, suggest that ratting is not an exception but the rule. The frequency with which this behaviour is said to

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occur and, more importantly, the perception of its occurrence are powerful forces in the prison environment. Perceptions of ratting give meaning to the informal rules of social control that help to structure the lives of prisoners. It is within this context that a more complete understanding of some of the rules outlined in Chapter 5 can be realized.

Most prisoners felt that 'ratting' and sending in 'kites' were daily occurrences in prison. For example, one prisoner made the following comment regarding the system of information exchange that has developed between prisoners and guards:

> There are lots of fucking stoolies in here. The
> mail box if full of kites every morning. It's
> much worse than other joints. If you want to do
> something then don't let anyone know about it.
> This used to be a good joint in the mid-70s, rough
> but good. You knew who you could trust back then.
> There are very few you can trust know. I only
> trust my friends....[Guards] know what's going on
> before it happens. They get it through other
> inmates....You have to know when to talk and when
> not to. I watch out for that. You can't call a
> person a rat unless you can prove it. It's not
> hard to prove. You just watch them and pick up on
> it.

Another prisoner had similar thoughts:

> There isn't any more loyalty. There used to be
> loyalty and maybe there still is in some prisons
> but not here. I was in the hole and there was
> some writing on the wall: 'This joint is so solid
> it sticks together like a soup sandwich'. At one
> time we all used to think the same way. Not any
> more. It's changed because there are more
> divisions. Cons are talking and doing the work of
> the guards. They do anything to get out of here.

It was clear throughout the interviews that a majority of the population held the perception that prisoners are a potent source

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of information concerning the licit and illicit activities of others, that this practice has increased over the years, and that ratting contributes to an environment where prisoners are leery about entering into trusting relationships.

Many prisoners believed that the administration actively encourages the use of rats in order to keep the prison population unstable. In one prison a confidential memorandum signed by a prison administrator was intercepted and circulated amongst the prison population. The memorandum indicated the administration's intent to integrate protective custody prisoners into the general population. Protective custody is used as a means of protecting a prisoner from other prisoners. Prisoners may be admitted to the protective custody wing of a prison for several reasons, including unpaid debts, cell thieving, or ratting, or because a 'street beef' has been carried over into the prison, or because of the offence they have committed. In the region where the interviews were conducted a parallel system of 'PC joints' has been informally established. This parallel system includes maximum, medium and minimum prisons. If the problem that resulted in the prisoner being sent to the PC wing of the prison cannot be resolved internally, a 'PC case' may be transferred to a 'PC joint'. Next to a sex offender, PC cases are among the least respected members of the prison population because they have been publicly marked for violating the informal rules of social control that exist among prisoners. Once a prisoner has

received the PC label it is difficult to remove, even when transferred to another prison.

One prisoner described the effect of the policy to integrate PC cases into the general population in the following manner:

> There was a memo that said they're bringing in PC cases to the population. They wanted 75% of the population to be PC. That's harder on the rest of us. If a guy's trying to smoke a joint and another guy drops a kite, he may lose his parole. You don't know who you can trust any more.

Another prisoner from this prison said:

> The biggest change is that there is no solidarity. People stick together only if they are from your area but the system is designed to weaken us by putting PC cases in the population. I don't want to know who the PC cases are, others might but when PC cases are filtered in then you know who is in control.

No investigations were made to determine whether the policy of integrating protective custody prisoners into the general population was actually in place. But regardless of whether or not this policy is in place, the effect of the perception of prisoners that protective custody cases are being integrated into the general population is to reduce the level of loyalty, trust and solidarity amongst the population as a whole.

Whether solicited or unsolicited, the use of rats in prison has several consequences. First, as noted by the comments of prisoners, the existence of rats divides the population. Second, rats provide security-related information to the administration which, from the administration's point of view has the potential

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to be beneficial to investigations into security incidents. It was the perception of prisoners that information from rats generally led to further investigations by the administration. Third, because prisoners know that the administration takes seriously the information provided by rats, many prisoners use the rat system to their advantage. For example, if a prisoner goes into debt he may use the rat system to avoid repayment. This tactic works as follows:

> Guys get into debt and then book in [to PC] and everybody gets burned....That's why so many people are in PC. Half of them that are in PC are there for debts. Guys have to give a reason for going there so they tell them someone is going to dummy them. Then they go to camp.

In this case a prisoner will write a kite saying that his security is in danger and ask for a transfer to another prison, thus avoiding paying his debt. Other tactics include providing staff with incriminating evidence against a fellow prisoner in order to have that prisoner transferred or providing staff with invalid information in order to draw suspicion to another prisoner who may be disliked or feared. One prisoner related his experiences with these tactics as follows:

> [Rats] can have anyone locked up on the simplest accusation without corroboration. They are very dangerous because cons screw up all the time. [Rats] act out of jealousy, fear or that they can get something for nothing. A lot of this goes on because it is so widely accepted by the Warden. He acts on it first, then he may question it's validity. A lot of times the institution may have a hard-on for a guy, he may be a suspect and with a little evidence a guy can get...a person locked up, or transferred to the max, with just one kite. The person has no way of defending or answering to the charges. It's just suspicion, the Warden

> doesn't have to justify it to anyone. This goes on
> in [the maximum security prison] but not so
> blatantly and it's not relied upon as much.
> Someone may fear another person so the person puts
> a kite in saying that the other person may be
> killed. This gets the other person locked up.
> Here, the staff encourage this type of activity.
> It's the Warden's way of controlling. Keep us
> divided so we can never unite and deal with the
> real issues we have in jail. Twice I was nearly
> shipped out because of kites. I never got to see
> them.

These examples indicate how prisoners use the rat system for
their own advantage in the attempt to avoid debts or evade a
potentially harmful prisoner. However, it was a common
perception that the most powerful levers available to the
administration with which to entice prisoners into providing
information are transfers to minimum security camps and the
various forms of temporary and conditional release.

The prison administration does not have the power to grant
all types of conditional release but having the support of the
administration at a parole hearing increases the likelihood of a
favourable decision. The administration also carries a great
deal of weight in determining what portion of a prisoner's
sentence is spent in closed custody. In terms of relative
freedom, placement to a minimum security camp is the next best
thing to an early release. It is the perception of many
prisoners that the quickest way to receive a temporary absence,
or to receive the administration's support at a conditional
release hearing, or to receive a transfer to a lower security
prison, is to rat on fellow prisoners.

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> In the old days you new where you stood. Guards
> and inmates all stood behind each other. You
> either stood with us or you didn't. Now you don't
> know these things. You get into a beef and the
> guards don't see. The next day there are 20 kites
> because guys want to go to camp or a day parole.
> That's what they tell them, that's how they run
> the place.

Another prisoner drew a similar connection between exchanging
information and increasing one's chances of early release.

> I thought I came back to a solid prison but this
> place is loose. There are too many PC cases and
> they think they can get out by rolling over
> someone – which is true! They get out of here
> faster, they get to camp faster. Guys like me who
> admit what they did but don't want to make anyone
> else's life worse don't get out. They don't need
> to approach inmates, they go to them. But a lot
> of people are stupid enough to let other inmates
> know stuff about themselves....Then they run
> straight the administration.

In fact, some prisoners felt that if they did not rat they would
not gain access to certain privileges.

> ...staff aren't accustomed to people who won't
> rat. One staff said being a rat was being a good
> citizen. I told him I would finish my time in a
> max if that was what being a good citizen was.

The effect of the perceived 'rat policy' is to drive a wedge
through the prison population. Prisoners do not know who they
can trust, therefore, they trust nobody and prisoner loyalty and
solidarity decreases. These feelings of mistrust and lack of
solidarity are encouraged by prisoners' perceptions that ratting
is endorsed by the administration. This is especially the case
when it comes to prisoners' perceptions that providing
information is the most effective route to acquiring some form of
early release.

It should be noted that no investigation was undertaken to determine the _actual_ practice or policies of the Correctional Service of Canada thus no evidence can be provided to indicate the degree to which CSC actively seeks out information from prisoners. Regardless of whether or not the practice of trading information for privileges is a frequent occurrence in prison (although based on the uniformity of prisoners' accounts there is no reason to believe that these types negotiations do not occur), the effects of this perception are real and structure the social relations that exist within prison.

Solidarity and the Informal Rules of Social Control

A more complete understanding of some of the informal rules of social control prisoners can now be realized. Situated within the type of environment just described, rules such as 'do your own time' and 'don't trust anyone' are tangible reminders of the furtive tactics prisoners perceive other prisoners to be engaged in with, at the least, the acquiescence of the administration and, at the most, the administration's encouragement. Given the perception of ratting in prison, and consequently the low levels of trust, loyalty and solidarity, the rules that caution prisoners to 'do your own time' provide prisoners with a degree of protection from the surveillance of _other_ prisoners _and_ the administration: if you can't trust anyone, stay away from them.

The data presented in Chapter 5 showed that the perception was that a significant portion of the prison population does not 'do their own time', the combination of the perceptions of ratting and the perception that most prisoners do not 'do their own time' contributes to the creation of the rules that warn prisoners not to trust others. The rules that caution prisoners not to trust anyone also provide a degree of protection from 'unknown commodities' who may be using the pretence of friendship as a means of exploitation.

This lack of trust has a spill-over effect into the prison economy where the exploitation and unpaid debts are frequent occurrences, out of which arise the rules that caution prisoners to avoid the prison economy. Strategies prisoners use to avoid paying debts include 'checking in' to protective custody or utilizing the rat system. These strategies, in turn, reinforce the other categories of rules. In this way the informal rules of social control are linked in a complex pattern of mutual interdependence. The centripetal and centrifugal effects of one of the informal rules of social control contributes to the creation of other rules. Similarly, violations of one of the informal rules of social control contributes to the creation of other rules.

It is now possible to see how the inherent tension in these rules contributes to the creation of an environment that is best

characterized as 'partially unstable'. These categories of rules
are produced in a social system that encourages ratting and,
because of their centrifugal effects of atomizing prisoners,
these rules also help reproduce social relations that facilitate
the rat system by preventing bonds of loyalty and solidarity from
forming. While the rat system may provide the administration
with some potentially valuable information, the benefits of this
information must be weighed against the centrifugal effects of
this practice.

The Prison Status Hierarchy

The low level of loyalty and trust among the population,
which produces and is reproduced by rules such as 'do your own
time' and 'don't trust anyone', also provide meaning to the rules
that warn prisoners to 'respect' others. The rules of 'respect'
set out the basic norms within the prison and provide rudimentary
elements of the prison justice system. In an environment where
intrinsic bonds of solidarity, loyalty and trust are lacking,
outward behaviours are a major source of determining status.
Outward behaviours are judged according to the rules respect.

The rules of respect are used, among other factors that will
be discussed, as a means of determining status within the social
world of the prison. The rules of 'respect' define what is
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Prisoners who follow

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these rules are accorded a degree of respect from other
prisoners, those who do not are 'goofs' or 'waterheads' and
occupy the lowest positions on the prison social hierarchy. This
system of establishing respect interacts with a hierarchy of
criminal status, which is based on perceptions of power, and
patriarchal and paternalistic cultural values, to contribute to
the overall prison hierarchy. The criminal status hierarchy
places 'lifers'. and serious violent offenders on top and rapists
(skin hounds) and child molesters (diddlers) on the bottom.

Because of the reputation they establish as a result of
their criminal behaviour, lifers and serious violent offenders
are perceived to have 'nothing to lose' therefore upon entering
the prison they are provided a degree of distance from other
prisoners. For example, one prisoner said:

> I don't see too much respect unless they think you
> will beat them up or you are crazy. If they think
> you can hurt then they will give you respect.

> The one's who are crazy, that will kill someone
> without even thinking [get respect]. A lot of
> guys think they are like that but there are really
> only about ten.

At the bottom of the criminal status hierarchy are sex offenders
- skin hounds and diddlers. Skin hounds and diddlers are the
absolute lowest form of life in prison. For example, one
prisoner talked about a notorious sex offender who received a
life sentence:

> We didn't consider [prisoner X] a lifer even
> though he had a life sentence - he's just a skin
> hound, a sexual fucking beast. [Prisoner X] and
> the other fucking pukes are not lifers.

Skin hounds and diddlers meet with almost unanimous disapproval amongst prisoners and, if a skin hound or diddler's charge becomes known amongst the population, it is likely that he will be the recipients of continuous threats. In many cases In many cases, skin hounds and diddlers are housed in the PC wing of the prison or in a 'PC joint'. But even protective custody does not guarantee the safety of a sex offender.

Although no investigations were conducted specifically to determine the source of this animosity, it may be speculated that prisoners' attitudes towards sex offenders reflect the patriarchal value structure of the free society that cherishes femininity and, in terms of the interaction between women and the criminal justice system, fosters paternalistic attitudes. Comments by some prisoners appear to support this speculation. Two prisoners related their animosity towards sex offenders as follows:

> I hate rape hounds and child molesters because I
> have a family and I know how I would react if
> anything happened to them. I just stay away from
> them. They are known in the population. They
> survive, or just get by I guess. It's not like it
> used to be on my first bit in '83.

> When I was in [another prison] I would see all
> these skin hounds and wonder why this guy was
> allowed to live but I knew if I did anything to
> him I wouldn't get out. You can't shut it out of
> your mind. I have a family and kids. When I was
> on the street I used to say that if I ever went to

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> jail I would kill them. When I got here I had
> terrible fights with myself. I felt I was
> compromising because I didn't step in and kill the
> fucking weasels.

It might be hypothesized that these comments reflect the
patriarchal and paternalistic value structure of free society.
Women and children are in need of protection from a strong,
masculine figure. Male prisoners, unable to fulfil their role as
protectors of the traditional family unit deflect their
frustrations on those most threatening: sex offenders. At this
point this hypothesis is speculative, nevertheless, the point
remains that skin hounds and diddlers are relegated to the bottom
of the criminal status hierarchy.

The rules of respect interact with the criminal status
hierarchy to form the social hierarchy of the prison. Lifers and
serious violent offenders are immediately granted a higher status
but the status of a lifer or a serious violent offender may be
lowered depending on how close his behaviour corresponds to the
rules of 'respect'. For example, some prisoners responded to the
question regarding who gets respect in the following manner:

> Guys that deserve it. It doesn't matter if you
> shot a cop or if you are a lifer. It's how you
> present yourself, how you talk to others. I treat
> people the way I expect to be treated.

> In the eyes of the young guys it's the lifers
> because they think these guys have nothing to lose
> which isn't true because 96% don't want any
> problems. It's a big deal for these young guys.
> They think highly of them. I respect everybody
> and hopefully I will receive some back but I never
> do.

> A lot of guys say 'he's a lifer so he's OK' but
> that doesn't mean much. You respect somebody and
> others will respect you. 'Don't do to others what
> you don't want done to you'.

While lifers and serious violent offenders may start out with an
edge, ultimately, the respect they are accorded depends on their
behaviour in prison. On the other hand, it is likely that no
matter how a sex offender performs in prison, if his charge is
known to others he will almost always occupy the lowest order.

> People watch you, how you conduct yourself and
> they judge you for that. What you do, who you
> talk to, so respect gets respect. There are a lot
> of people here who are NG [no good] and those low-
> lifes – rape hounds – get no respect, period. You
> don't have to like it but you have to accept that
> they are here. You can't step out and take them
> out because you jeopardize yourself.

The interaction between criminal status and respect determines
where one is situated on the overall prison hierarchy. The
prison social hierarchy is a semi-caste system as some types of
prisoners can have upward and downward mobility while others are
largely denied any mobility.

It should also be noted that various cliques or five to ten
prisoners develop which are either formally or informally
organized. Cliques are organized around common bonds amongst
prisoners. Race, for example, is one common factor around which
cliques develop. Other cliques are organized around city of
residence (the 'Hamilton clique' or the 'Toronto clique'),
'outlaw' motor cycle clubs, or simply common interests among
prisoners. There appeared to be less unity on the degree to

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which cliques tolerate disrespectful behaviour. Some prisoners indicated that the rules of respect applied to clique members and if a clique member showed disrespect others members of the clique would not associate with him. Others prisoners claimed that "cliques protect their own" and disrespectful behaviour would be tolerated or dealt with internally. Some of these comments came from white prisoners speaking about the 'black cliques' or the 'native cliques' and were sometimes accompanied by calls for a 'white clique' which is forbidden by the administration.

With limited intrinsic bonds of loyalty or solidarity, outward behaviour becomes the key determinant of social status within the prison environment. Criminal status and the rules of respect interact to produce the prison social hierarchy. The rules of respect have both centrifugal and centripetal effects. The centripetal effects include providing a set of rules of common courtesy in prison that minimizes frictions between prisoners. Rules such as 'don't be loud', 'be polite' and 'don't bother others' define what is acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour. It was also shown in Chapter 5 that contained within the rules of respect is a rudimentary system of justice based on what is 'right' and what is 'wrong'.

The centrifugal effects of the rules of respect include the manner in which the rules are enforced. Prisoners violating these rules may be warned once but repeated violations may result

in physical punishment. To continually violate the rules of respect may result in a loss of status for a prisoner. Not to enforce the rules of respect may also lead to a loss of status for the person who was violated; if a prisoner does not challenge someone who has been disrespectful, that prisoner loses status. One prisoner explained how the rules of respect encourage prisoners to confront those who are disrespectful.

> If you have no respect in here you're in big trouble. To stay above water you have to be stable....It doesn't matter what happens when you are in the right, you have to go [fight]. If you don't go you might as well leave. If you lose respect in here you are in big trouble. You might as well weld the door [to your cell] shut and stay in there.

Another prisoner explained why he thought being assaulted was a more serious victimization than a cell theft:

> Of course, being assaulted. Physical violence is just pure aggression. Stolen goods you can replace. During an assault you never know what can happen. In here its a big thing to have respect. If you get the shit beat out of you are looked down on and the odds are high that it will happen again.

Physical power and coercion underpin the rules of respect. If a prisoner does not physically retaliate against someone who has shown disrespect towards him, that prisoner is marked as an easy target and may become the victim of other prisoners. Whether or not a prisoner triumphs in the physical confrontation matters less than if he 'stepped out' to 'right' the 'wrong'.

Summary

Based on the accounts of prison life documented above, it is now possible to provide a more complete picture of the social world of the prison. The most striking feature of prison life is the lack of solidarity and loyalty amongst prisoners. The perception of prisoners is that ratting and sending in kites are daily occurrences in prison. Whether solicited or unsolicited the use of rats to acquire information on the behaviours of prisoners causes distrust and suspicion amongst the population as a whole. This distrust and suspicion gives meaning to the rules that caution prisoners to 'do your own time', 'don't trust others' and to 'avoid the prison economy'. While these rules provide a degree of social cohesion, they also act back upon the very conditions that brought about their existence and thus reproduce an environment characterized by lack of loyalty and solidarity. In an environment that lacks intrinsic bonds of loyalty and solidarity, outward behaviour becomes the crucial determinant of status. Together with the hierarchy of criminal statuses and patriarchal and paternalistic cultural values, how a prisoner's behaviour corresponds to the rules of respect - which contribute to the social cohesion of the prison - plays a role in determining the prisoners place on the prison status hierarchy. The rules of respect, however, are underpinned by physical violence and coercion which further contributes to atomization of the population. The social world of the prison, then, reflects

the tension between the centrifugal and centripetal effects inherent in the informal rules of social control and, because of this tension, is best described as 'partially unstable'.

It is within this type of environment that victimization must be situated. The next chapter will provide the results of the victimization data. As will be shown in Chapter 8, the tension within the informal rules of social control provides sufficient conditions for victimization to occur. The types of victimizations, the relationship between victims and offenders and the manner in which victimization incidents are resolved provide evidence of the centripetal and centrifugal effects of the informal rules of social control and the partial instability of the social world of the prison.

CHAPTER 7

VICTIMIZATION IN PRISON

> From what you believe about rhetoric, this is a
> terribly violent place but you're probably much
> safer here than on the street. This is an
> amazingly passive place.

The goals of Chapters 5 and 6 were to provide an account of the

social world of the prison. The responses to the open-ended

questions designed to probe prisoners' experiences in prison

called into question the distinct quality of the 'inmate code'.

The world that survey respondents described was markedly

different than the accounts given by most prison researchers. It

is within this world that the victimization data must be

situated. This chapter provides the results of the criminal

victimization component of the Prison Victimization Project.

Chapter 8 brings together the data provided in this chapter with

prisoners' accounts of the social world of the prison.

A total of 117 interviews were conducted in five prisons.

Thirty interviews were conducted in a maximum security prison, sixty-five were conducted in medium security prisons and twenty-two were conducted in minimum security prisons. Fifty-five of 117 survey respondents (47.0%) indicated they were the victim of at least one incident mentioned on the Victimization Screening Schedule. 107 separate victimization incidents were uncovered. The victimization incidents and the victims of these incidents are discussed separately.

Victimization Incidents

The survey uncovered 107 separate victimization incidents during the twelve month reference period. The most frequently reported victimization was theft, which accounted for forty-two of the 107 victimizations (39.3%). In total, however, personal victimizations (robbery, sexual assault, assault, threats and extortion) were more frequently reported than victimizations involving property (theft and vandalism). Approximately 61% of the reported victimizations were personal incidents compared to 39.3% for property incidents. Table 7.1 shows the breakdown of victimizations by incident type.

TABLE 7.1

Victimization Incidents by Incident Type

Victimization Incident	# of Incidents·	% of Incidents	Incidence Rate/1000 Prisoners
Robbery· ·	4	3.74	34.19
Sexual Assault	6	5.61	51.28
Assault· · ·	30	28.03	256.41
Assault – Threat· · ·	23	21.50	196.58
Extortion	2	1.87	17.09
Theft	42	39.25	358.97
Vandalism	0	-----	------
Personal	65	60.75	555.56
Property	42	39.25	358.97

· (N=107)
· ·Includes attempts
· · ·With/without weapons

The most serious types of incidents (sexual assault and robbery) were least likely to be reported by survey respondents. The most commonly reported type of personal victimization was assault which accounted for 46.15% of all _personal_ victimizations and 28.03% of personal and property victimizations. There were a greater number of assaults than there were threats of assault, but taken together these two categories constitute approximately 82% of all personal victimizations uncovered during the course of the survey.

Personal Victimizations

Forty-one of the forty-two incidents of theft involved theft
of articles from the victim's cell and did not involve face-to-
face contact with the aggressor. Face-to-face contact between
the aggressor and the victim was made in the sixty-five personal
victimizations. The victim was physically assaulted in forty of
the sixty-five personal victimizations (61.5%) and the victim was
threatened with assault in the remaining twenty-five personal
victimizations (38.5%). Table 7.2 shows the most serious type of
aggression reported by the respondent.

TABLE 7.2

Victimization Incidents by Degree of Aggression

	No Physical Aggression	Verbal Threats	Physical Assault
# of Incidents	42	25	40
		Punched -	26
		Kicked -	4
	Hit with	object/	
		Stabbed -	4
	Sexual	Assault -	6

The forty cases in which the victim was physically assaulted by
the aggressor included thirty assault victimizations, six sexual
assault victimizations and four robbery victimizations. Some
assaults were minor altercations that lasted less than a minute.
Others assaults were of greater intensity and involved attacks
over a period of days, including one prisoner who was the victim

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of six sexual assaults perpetuated by teh same aggressor over a period of several weeks. Another prisoner indicated that he backed up a friend in the yard. He and his friend were involved in a fight. The next day a group of friends attacked both parties with a knife and a shank. 'Others', such as the aggressor, bystanders, and co-victims, were harmed in thirty-three victimizations.

Five victimizations resulted in the victim receiving medical attention. Three prisoners required routine first aid for cuts and bruises they received during the course of an altercation. One prisoner required eighteen stitches and two weeks hospitalization after being assaulted. A fifth prisoner received dental services after losing his front teeth in a fight. Other victimizations may have required medical attention, however, there is great pressure on the victim not to seek the aid of administration following these types of incidents.

Weapons were present in twenty-two of the sixty-five personal victimizations (33.8%). Weapons were used in fifteen assaults and were present but not used in seven other victimizations. The weapon of choice was a knife (twelve of twenty-two victimizations), followed by a pipe (five of twenty-two victimizations). Other weapons included a telephone receiver, a bowl, and a pitch fork. Weapons were equally likely to be used in maximum and medium security prisons. Of the

twenty-two victimizations in which weapons were present, eight occurred in the maximum security prison, ten occurred in a medium security prison and three occurred in a minimum security prison.

The types of weapons used by aggressors, the physical damage caused by a victimization and the nature of medical treatment received as a result of a victimization are objective measures of the seriousness of the victimizations, however, in many cases threats of physical assault were equally serious. For example, one respondent said that another prisoner approached the respondent while the respondent was in his cell. The aggressor then threw a lit cigarette on the respondent's bed and indicated that if the respondent did not transfer to another range, his cell would be 'burned out'. Shortly after the incident a guard entered the respondent's cell and told the respondent to pack his possessions as he was being transferred to protective custody. In this case, the victim was not directly harmed but the threat of physical violence was made abundantly clear.

Property Victimizations

The data on personal victimizations indicates that direct violence and threats of direct violence are relatively frequent occurrences in prison. Fewer property victimizations were uncovered, however, the incidence and prevalence of property

FIGURE 7.1
Value of Stolen or Damaged Property

victimizations remained high. Forty-two victimizations resulted
in the loss or damage of property; forty-one of these
victimizations involved another person entering the victim's cell
and, without the victim's knowledge, removing personal property,
or 'cell thefts'.

Figure 7.1 provides data on the dollar value of the loss or
damage of personal property. Financial losses reported from
these thefts ranged from $1.00 to $125.00. The mean financial
loss from theft was $25.90 and the median loss was $12.00.
Tobacco products were most frequently stolen (39.6%), followed by
jewellery (14.6%), clothes (10.4%), food (8.3%) and drugs (6.3%).
Missing property was recovered in only four cases. In all cases
of cell theft, the stolen property was never recovered and the
cell thief was never identified.

The absolute dollar value of property victimizations appears
low compared to property victimizations on the street, however,
relative to their average daily income, the dollar value of
property victimizations in prison is quite high. If a prisoner
does not have money coming in from the street he must rely on
prison employment for income. Prisoners' pay ranges from
approximately $30.00 to approximately $70.00 over a two week
period. Even though prisoners do not have to pay for food or
shelter, they do have to purchase toiletries and other sundry
items which consumes a good portion of disposable income. If a

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prisoner uses tobacco, disposable income decreases at a faster
rate. During the time of the interviews a package of cigarettes
cost approximately $3.35 or one half of a prisoner's maximum
daily wage. Given these pay rates, the loss of a carton of
cigarettes - or for those prisoners on the low end of the pay
scale, the loss of a package of cigarettes - is an onerous
financial set-back.

There was a mild correlation (r=-.2174, p<.001) between
security level and victimization. Prisoners in maximum and
medium security settings were more likely to be victimized than
were prisoners in a minimum security setting. Figure 7.2 shows
the breakdown of victimizations by security level. Two-thirds
of the survey respondents housed in maximum security indicated
that they were involved in at least one victimization incident.
The number of survey respondents involved in at least one
victimization incident drops off as one moves below the maximum
security level. The percentage of respondents reporting
victimizations at the medium and minimum security level are
virtually identical, 39.4% and 38.1% respectively. There was,
however, no relationship between security level and personal or
property victimizations. Victims housed in maximum and medium
security prison were equally likely to be victimized by either a
property or a personal victimization.

FIGURE 7.2
Victimization by Security Level
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Respondents

Security Level

■ Non-Victims   ▨ Victims

p<.01

The Victims

The previous section provided data on the incidence of criminal victimization. Incidence rates provide an estimate of the volume of victimization that occurred during the twelve month reference period. Incidence rates do not provide information on the prevalence of victimization. Prevalence rates measure the proportion of the population that is subject to a specific phenomenon. In this case, the prevalence rate for victimization refers to the measure of how many persons were victimized. This section, then, provides data on the victims of prison victimization incidents.

Multiple Victimization

Fifty-five of 117 survey respondents (47.0%) indicated that they were involved in at least one of the incidents mentioned on the Victimization Screening Schedule. Table 7.3 shows the number of victims by victimization type.

TABLE 7.3

Number of Victimization Incidents and Victims by Victimization Type

Victimization Type	No. of Incidents	No. of Victims	Prevalence Rate/1000 Prisoners
Robbery··	4	3	25.64
Sexual Assault	6	1	8.55
Assault···	30	22	188.03
Threats···	23	21	179.49
Extortion	2	2	17.09
Theft	42	23	196.58
Vandalism	0	0	-----
Personal	65	49	418.80
Property	42	23.	196.58

·N=117
··Includes Attempts
···With/without weapons

Forty-nine of the 117 respondents (41.8%) were victims of at least one personal victimization incident and twenty-three of 117 respondents (19.7%) reported being a victim of at least one property victimization incident. Individuals were most frequently victimized by assault, threats and theft. Table 7.3 also shows that in many cases there were multiple victimizations. For example, there were six separate incidents of sexual assault but only one victim and forty-two separate incidents of theft were distributed among twenty-three different victims. On the other hand, there were twenty-three separate incidents of 'threats' and twenty-one victims and thirty separate incidents of assault and twenty-three separate victims. What these data suggest is that apart from sexual assault and theft, few victims were victims in the same incident more than once during the

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twelve month period.

While victims were not likely to be the victim of the same incident more than once during the twelve month reference period, a significant number of survey respondents reported that they were multiple victims. Figure 7.3 shows data on multiple victimization. 58% of the victims were victimized once during the twelve month reference period whereas 41% of the victims reported that they were victimized more than once during the twelve month period, including 10.9% of the sample who were victimized four or more times.

Victims v. Non-Victims

Victims and non-victims were compared on several variables related to their previous penal history and current incarceration, however, only two relationships showed statistically significant differences between the two groups. First, as noted above, victims were more likely to be housed in either a maximum or a medium security prison than a minimum security prison. Second, younger prisoners were more likely than are older prisoners to report being a victim in at least one incident.

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FIGURE 7.3
Multiple Victimization
% of Victims by # of Victimizations

FIGURE 7.4
Victimization by Age
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Respondents

Age

■ Non-Victims ▨ Victims

p<.001

FIGURE 7.5
Victimization by Aggregate Sentence
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Respondents

Aggregate Sentence

Non-Victims   Victims

p<.157

FIGURE 7.6
Victimization by Admission Date
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Respondents

Admission Date

◼ Non-Victims   ▨ Victims

p<.358

FIGURE 7.7
Victimization by Offence Type
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Respondents

p<.433

FIGURE 7.8
Victimization by Warrant Expiry Date
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Repsondents

WED

■ Non-Victims ▨ Victims

p<.216

FIGURE 7.9
Victimization by Previous Federal Terms
Victims v. Non-Victims

% of Respondents

# of Previous Federal Terms

■ Non-Victims   ▨ Victims

p<.885

Figure 7.4 shows that 81% of survey respondents under the age of twenty-eight reported being a victim of at least one incident, as compared to 18.2% who indicated they were not a victim (r=-.3646, p<.01). On the other hand, 72.7% of survey respondents over the age of forty reported they were not a victim compared to 27.3% of this age group that were victims. Younger victims, however, were equally likely to be multiple victims as were older prisoners.

As shown in Figures 7.5 to 7.9, there were no significant differences between victims and non-victims in terms of aggregate sentence, the absolute amount of time served on their current offence, the offence type for which they are currently incarcerated, the amount of time left until their warrant expiry date, or the number of previous federal convictions.

Predicting Victimization

Only two of the bivariate relationships (age and victimization and security level and victimization) proved to be statistically significant. Two multivariate analyses were conducted to determine whether multiple combinations of variables could successfully distinguish between victims and non-victims.

Discriminant function analysis (DFA) techniques were used to determine which variables best discriminated between survey

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respondents who were victims from survey respondents who were not victims. DFA is a statistical technique that can be used to predict group membership. DFA determines the best combination of variables that discriminate between groups. In the case of two group discrimination, discriminant function analysis provides the best discrimination along one discriminant function. If the goal of a research project is to discriminate cases into two or more groups, DFA produces a solution that discriminates the cases along k dimensions, where k equals the lesser of the number of groups or the total number of predictor variables.

Two separate DFA solutions were computed. The first solution attempted to discriminate between victims and non-victims and the second attempted to discriminate between non-victims, victims of one incident and multiple victims. The two solutions are discussed separately.

DFA cannot handle cases with one or more missing values therefore of the 117 original cases twenty cases were eliminated owing to missing data for one or more predictor variables. Ninety-seven cases were used to produce the DFA solution. Nine variables were entered into the equation: (1) security level, (2) age (logged), (3) number of previous federal commitments (logged), (4) offence type, (5) admission date (logged), (6) amount of time served on current offence (logged), (7) the amount of time served in the current prison (logged), (8) the number of

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previous provincial terms (logged), and, (9) the percentage of
their current offence served.

Table 7.4 shows the summary tabl: `or the` `.o-group`
discriminant solution that attempted to distin`.`_sh between
victims and non-victims. In the two-group DFA, one discriminant
function was produced with a $\alpha^2(3)=16.315,p<.001$. As Table 7.4
indicates, three variables were found to be statistically
significant predictors of victimization: logged age (LOGAGE),
security level (SECURITY) and logged aggregate sentence (LOGSEN).
Compared to non-victims, victims were younger, were housed in
higher levels prisons and had shorter sentences.

TABLE 7.4

**Summary Table for Two-group
Discriminant Function Analysis**

Variable Name	Standardized Discriminant Coefficient	Wilks' Lambda	Sig.
LOGAGE	0.741	.882	0.0006
SECURITY	0.572	.854	0.0006
LOGSEN	0.348	.840	0.0010

Canonical Correlation = .4001

Variable LOGAGE had the largest standardized discriminant
coefficient (0.741) which means that this variable is the primary
variable that distinguishes between victims and non-victims.
Security level (SECURITY) and logged aggregate sentence (LOGSEN)
also contributed to discrimination between victims and non-
victims. Overall the solution did not provide a great deal of

discriminating power. A canonical correlation of 0.4001

indicates that roughly 16% of the variance between victims and

non-victims was accounted for by the discriminant function.

A second DFA solution was computed. This solution attempted

to discriminate between respondents who were not victimized,

respondents who were victimized once during the twelve month

reference period and respondents who were victimized more than

once during the twelve month reference period. Two discriminant

functions are produced in a three group DFA.

Two discriminant functions were calculated with a combined

$\alpha^2(6)=21.526$, p<.01. When the first function was removed, there

was little significant discriminating power left, $\alpha^2(2)=1.878$,

p<.390. The first discriminant function accounted for 91.16% of

the between-group variability and the second discriminant

function accounted for 8.84%.

An examination of the group centroids, Table 7.5, indicates

that the first discriminant function distinguished between those

who were never victimized and those who were victimized more than

once. The second discriminant function distinguished those who

were victimized once.

TABLE 7.5

Canonical Discriminant Functions Evaluated at Group Means (Group Centroids)

Group	Function 1	Function 2
Zero Victimizations	0.4178	−0.0408
One Victimization	−0.2542	0.2321
>One Victimization	−0.6430	−0.1534

Similar to the two-group DFA, logged age (LOGAGE), security level (SECURITY) and logged aggregate sentence (LOGSEN) were statistically significant discriminators. Table 7.6 shows the summary statistics.

TABLE 7.6

Summary Table for Three-group Discriminant Function Analysis

Variable Name	Standardized Discriminant Coefficient	Wilks' Lambda	Sig.
LOGAGE	0.707	.870	0.0015
SECURITY	0.523	.840	0.0026
LOGSEN	0.432	.810	0.0032

Function 1 Canonical Correlation = .4170
Function 2 Canonical Correlation = .1414

Table 7.7 shows the loading matrix of correlations between the three predictor variables and the two discriminant functions.

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TABLE 7.7

Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients

	Function 1	Function 2
LOGAGE	0.707	-0.488
SECURITY	0.523	-0.099
LOGSEN	0.432	0.733

LOGAGE and SECURITY loaded on the first discriminant function that discriminated between respondents with no victimizations and respondents who were victimized once, LOGAGE providing the greatest amount of discriminatory power. LOGSEN loaded on the second discriminant function that discriminated respondents who were victimized more than once.

The three-group DFA was slightly more successful in accounting for the variance in victimization than was the two-group case. In the three-group DFA, the first discriminant function accounted for 17% of the variance, while the second discriminant function accounted for approximately 2% of the variance.

Discriminant function analysis techniques were run using victimization as the discriminating group and nine criminal and penal history measures as predictor variables. The two- and three-group discriminant solutions produced similar predictor variables. In both cases (logged) age, (logged) aggregate sentence and security level loaded on the discriminant functions,

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however, both solutions were weak, accounting for 16% and 18% of the variance, respectively. In the two- and three-group cases, prisoners who were older, serving longer sentences and serving time in a lower security facility were least likely to be victimized.

Prison Victimization Rates and Official Rates of Security Incidents and Community Rates of Victimization

A final question to be addressed in this chapter concerns the relative magnitude of victimization in federal prisons. Previous research has indicated that violence in CSC prisons is relatively high compared to violence in other correctional jurisdictions. Comparative analyses are limited, however, as the majority of prison violence research utilizes official statistics. One of the goals of this project was to provide a more accurate account of the level of violence and lesser forms of rules violations in a sample of federal prisons. The fact that 107 victimizations were uncovered in 117 interviews suggests that rates of victimization are high in the prisons were interviews were conducted.

One indicator of the extent of victimization in prison is to compare the data collected on the victimization survey with official security incident data for the region where the interviews were conducted. Only one category of victimization is directly comparable to the officially collected data. Figure

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7.10 shows compares the prison victimization survey incidence and prevelance rates for assault (excluding threats) with officially collected security incidents for 'major and minor assaults on prisoners' and 'major and minor prisoner fights'.

The incidence rate for officially recorded major and minor prisoner fights and major and minor assaults on prisoners was 42.7/1000 prisoners. The comparable rate collected on the victimization survey was 256.4/1000. Similarly, the prevelence rate for officially recorded major and minor prisoner fights and major and minor assaults on prisoners was 59.0/1000 prisoners. The comparable rate collected on the victimization survey was 188.0/1000.

Similar to the relationship between community victimization surveys and the community crime rate, the victimization survey data appear to suggest official records on security incidents substantially underestimate the extent on victimization in prison. The survey data show that the incidence rate for assault is six times greater than reported in official data and the prevelance rate is three times greater.

Another indicator of the magnitude of the victimization problem in CSC prisons is the rate of victimization in prison compared to the rate of victimization in the community. Table 7.8 provides data on the incidence of selected victimizations

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FIGURE 7.10
Comparison of Survey and Official Data
Assault, Rate Per 1000 Prisoners

Rate per 1000

Assault

Incidence Rate   Prevalence Rate

■ Survey Data   ▨ Official Data

(excludes 'threats')

uncovered in this study compared to similar victimizations reported by the Canadian General Social Survey (GSS) (1990). These numbers are provided for heuristic purposes only. For reasons that have already been mentioned it is difficult to compute confidence intervals for the prison data because of problems with the randomness of the sample. Moreover, the raw numbers for victimizations, especially sexual assault and robbery, are small therefore caution should be used when rates per thousand are extrapolated. On the other hand, it should be remembered that compared to the GSS, the prison victimization data are based on more stringent criteria for what constitutes a victimization. Had the GSS criteria been applied in the prison victimization survey, the rates of prison victimizations would have been substantially higher.

TABLE 7.8

**Comparison of Victimization Rates Per 1000
Prison v. Males in the Community**

Victimization Type	Rate per 1000 Prisoners (all ages)	Rate per 1000 Males (age 15-24)	Rate per 1000 Males
Robbery	34.18	17.00	49.00
Assault·	452.99	74.00	166.00
Personal	538.46	90.00	214.00

· includes threats
Source: Patterns of Criminal Victimization in Canada. General Social Survey Series. Statistics Canada, 1990.

The General Social Survey reported that the overall rate of personal victimization (robbery, sexual assault and assault,

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including threats) for males over the age of fifteen was 90/1000 population and the rate for males aged fifteen to twenty-four was over twice as high. The comparable rate for similar personal victimization in the five prisons was 538.46/1000. A similar pattern emerged when the rate of cell thefts in prison was compared to the combined rate for break and enter and theft of household property in the community. The community rate for these victimizations was 102/1000 households, the prison rate for property theft was 358.97/1000 prisoners (ibid.).

Comparing rates of victimization collected on the General Social Survey with rates of victimization in the prison provides a rough gauge of the magnitude of victimization problem in prison. Over all, the incidence of property crime is approximately three times higher in the five prisons than it is in the community and the incidence of personal crime is six times higher in prison than it is in the community. Previous research shows that officially recorded rates of prisoner-prisoner assaults and prisoner-staff assaults in CSC prisons are among the highest among North America prison jusrisdictions. The victimization data suggest that the 'dark figure' of victimization is much greater than is revealed in officially collected statistics.

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Summary

The data presented in this chapter indicate that victimization rates in the five prisons that were visited are high in comparison to officially collected security incident data and in comparison to community rates. Fifty-five of 117 survey respondents (47.0%) reported a total of 107 separate victimizations. Victimizations ranged in severity from serious and repeated sexual assaults to relatively minor property thefts. Personal victimizations (sexual assault, robbery, assault and threats) were more likely to be reported than were property victimizations (theft and vandalism). Of all victims, 41% were multiple victims. Respondents who indicated they were multiple victims were more likely to be victimized by two or more different victimizations than they were to be victims of the same incident on more than one occasion.

Age was negatively related to victimization and security level was positively related to victimization and both were statistically significant. There were no statistically significant associations between victimization and other offence related variables or variables related to penal history. Discriminant function analyses indicated that age, security level and aggregate sentence were statistically significant predictors of victimization, however, the discriminant solutions produced in these analyses accounted for only a small portion of the variance

in victimization.

The data uncovered by the victimization survey provide a
much needed supplement to officially collected data on violence
and related incidents in prison. What remains to be addressed,
however, is accounting for the patterns of victimization and role
or place of victimizations in the prison community. The
bivariate tabulations produced few statistically significant
results and the multivariate, predictive solutions were less than
adequate discriminators of victimization. One reason why these
solutions may have proved unsuccessful in their task is that
these types of models fail to adequately address the complexity
of prison life. Placing the victimization data within the
description of the social world of the prison outlined in
Chapters 5 and 6 may provide a more adequate, although less
statistically rigorous, understanding of victimization within
prison.

CHAPTER 8

VICTIMIZATION AND THE PARTIAL INSTABILITY OF THE PRISON

> It has two sides. It can get as kicked-back as it
> can be. It can be quite relaxed - very easy to
> socialize, the same as on the street. But at the
> same time, you can't underestimate the danger here
> if you are foolish, careless or selfish. It could
> be a complete nightmare. But nobody wants trouble
> here so we all try to make life the best. If
> someone slips they are pulled up immediately. It
> wouldn't take much to put your life or somebody's
> life in jeopardy.

There is an identifiable set of rules that exists in the prisons

where the interviews were conducted, however, as the frequency

with which prisoners volunteered these rules and the content of

the rules suggest, the informal rules of social control fall

short of constituting an 'inmate code' as it has been

traditionally defined in the literature. Rather than an 'inmate

code', these rules combine to form the informal rules of social

control. Inherent in the conceptualization of the informal rules

of social control is the recognition that they are frequently

violated by a substantial portion of the prison population.

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Moreover, elements of the informal rules of social control do not operate uni-directionally. Elements of the informal rules of social control produce centripetal and centrifugal effects. The tension embedded within the elements of the informal rules of social control creates a world that is best characterized as 'partially unstable'. Even if all prisoners followed these rules - which the data clearly indicate is not the case - the prison would not be totally stable. The nature of the rules themselves, the centrifugal effects of the rules, create instability. These rules are produced and reproduced by the concrete behaviours of prisoners and the structural conditions of the prison environment, including policies and practices of the prison administration.

The partial instability of the prison can be seen in the patterns of victimization that were reported on the Victimization Screening Questionnaire and the nature of the victimizations as reported on Incident Report Schedules. The types of incidents most frequently reported on the survey are one indicator of the 'partially unstable' character of the social world of the prison. Personal victimizations, while not totally unpredictable, have a high degree of spontaneity. A similar spontaneity exists with property victimizations. This spontaneity contributes to instability in prison. But the prison is not totally unstable. In the case of personal victimizations, the way in which prisoners resolve their disputes returns a sense of order to

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prison life, both at an individual level and at a community level. In the case of property victimizations, cell thieving, and the fear of cell thieving, is moderated by group disapproval for a common enemy: the cell thief.

This chapter provides data on the social nature of personal and property victimizations in prison. Emphasis is placed on the relationship between victims and aggressors and the impact of victimizations on the larger prison community. Property and personal victimizations are discussed separately.

Property Victimizations

As noted in Chapters 5 and 6, the prohibition against cell thieving is particularly strong amongst prisoners. Almost half of the survey respondents indicated that a cell theft was more serious than a physical assault that resulted in extensive bodily harm. Efforts to investigate cell thefts, and capture and punish a cell thief, often involve several members of a range and are expressive of group disapproval for the act. Yet despite the strong prohibitions against cell thieving, cell thefts are frequent occurrences in prison. Forty-one of the 107 victimization incidents (38.3%) involved theft of personal property from a prisoner's cell and twenty-three of 117 survey respondents (19.7%) indicated they had been the victim of at least one cell theft during the twelve month reference period.

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Thus, even though there is mass disapproval for cell thieving, the incidence and prevalence of cell theft is high.

One of the reasons that may account for the incidence and prevalence of cell thieving is that despite well-known and severe consequences for cell thieving, few cell thieves are caught. In all cases of cell thefts uncovered during the course of the survey, the cell thief was not discovered. The types of items most frequently stolen - for example, cigarettes (39.5% of all property victimizations) and jewellery (14.6% of all property victimizations) - are easily consumed, hidden or passed to visitors. Identifiable commodities such as televisions or cassette players are rarely stolen. If a cell thief picks his target carefully the data suggest there is a high probability that the thief will not be apprehended. The unpredictability of cell thieving promotes instability in the prison environment.

One can only wonder why there are not more cell thefts in prison? There are several conditions in prison that would appear to be 'criminogenic'. Low rates of pay combined with relatively high prices for consumer items creates an environment where some prisoners have significantly less purchasing power than others. In any society, there is a possibility that an unequal distribution of commodities can lead to dissent. This is especially the case when commodity shortages involve addictive substances such as cigarettes and illicit drugs. Moreover, the

centrifugal effects of the 'do your own time rules' and the rules
that caution against trusting others create an environment with
relatively low levels of trust and solidarity which inhibits the
distribution of goods and increases the probability that theft
will occur. Finally, there is ample opportunity for theft to
occur. In most of the prisons that were visited, prisoners were
unable to control the locks on their doors which meant that cell
doors were frequently open while prisoners were working or in
recreation. The combination of these structural features of the
social world of the prison produce optimal conditions for crime
and a high success rate for cell thefts.

There are several methods available to prisoners to prevent
cell thieving. Prisoners may carry their belongings with them at
all times or hid them in their cells, but this is not always
practical. Prisoners may 'hire' another prisoner to guard their
possessions, but this option is not available to all prisoners.
One reason that cell thieving does not occur more frequently is
likely a result of the prohibitions against cell thieving. The
centripetal effects of the 'don't exploit' rules help to maintain
a check on the level of cell thieving in prison. The fear of
getting caught and punished prevents some prisoners from stealing
from others.

The mutual abhorrence of cell thieves provides prisoners
with a sense of solidarity against an enemy out group: the cell

thief. Thus even in an environment that tends to encourage theft, 80.8% of respondents indicated they did not worry about cell thefts. Many respondents relied on community standards as the reason why they did not worry about theft:

> On my range most of the guys are lifers. It's a good range. Everybody knows everybody. I don't worry about it.

> I don't worry. It doesn't happen too much and when it does it's not tolerated.

As was shown is Chapter 6, the rationale for this abhorrence was not so much the loss of property but the violation of the prisoners sense of privacy, a feeling that is not unlike that of victims of property theft in the community. But even this abhorrence is not enough to eliminate cell thieving or even maintain cell thieving at 'reasonable' levels.

While certain structural features of the prison environment make cell thieving an unpredictable occurrence and, hence, encourage the instability of the prison, this instability is moderated by the 'don't exploit' rules which promote group solidarity against the cell thief. The combined effect of these contradictory forces is to create a world that is partially unstable.

Personal Victimizations

The data on personal victimizations provide an even clearer indicator of the partial instability of the social world of the prison. The nature of the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the events that lead to the victimization, and the manner in which the victimizations were resolved show how the informal rules of social control operate in prison. Victimizations in prison are produced by, and reproduce the informal social rules of social control. This can be shown when the analysis moves away from the 'social facts' of the victimizations - rates, the use of weapons, physical harm caused by the victimization - and towards an analysis of the social relations of victimization in prison.

In order to develop an understanding of the social relations of victimization in prison, prisoners were asked to provide an account of victimization incidents they reported. The victimizations were categorized according to the relationship between the victim and the aggressor. Victimization surveys in the community classify the relationship between the victim and the aggressor based on how 'well known' the aggressor was to the victim. This classification scheme breaks down when applied to the prison environment. The common-sense notion of a 'victim of crime' - two strangers meeting on a dark street - simply does not fit the prison environment (and may not even be relevant in the

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community). The prison is a closed world in which it is difficult to maintain anonymity. Most prisoners have some knowledge of the majority of other prisoners in their prison, knowledge that is gained through direct personal ties, conversations with others or observation. In this sense, it is likely that the majority of victims had some previous relationship with their aggressor, however fleeting that relationship may have been.

The data bear this out. Prisoners involved in a victimization incident were asked to indicate 'how well' they knew their aggressor. Excluding incidents of cell theft, Table 8.1 shows the relationship between the victim's knowledge of the aggressor and personal victimization incidents. .

TABLE 8.1

Victim's Knowledge of Aggressor, Personal Victimizations

Knowledge of Aggressor

	Well Known/ Friend	Casual Acquaintance	Known by Sight	Not Known
% of Victims	26.7%	30.0%	36.7%	6.7%

(N=60)

56.7% of the aggressors in personal offences were either well known or a friend of the victim or were a casual acquaintance of the victim and 93% of all aggressors were 'known by sight'. In only 6.7% of all personal victimizations was the aggressor 'not

known' to the victim. Thus, the victim had some previous knowledge of the aggressor in almost all of the personal victimization incidents.

In order to account for the closed nature of the prison environment, an alternate classification scheme was developed. Based on the victim's account of the incident, victimizations were categorized as either 'interpersonal' or 'situational'. A victimization was classified as 'interpersonal' if, based on the victim's account, it met the following criteria:

(1) the respondent and the aggressor had a significant relationship prior to the victimization, and,
(2) the victimization was directly or indirectly the result of the relationship between the victim and the offender.

The following is an example of an 'interpersonal' victimization:

> I got into a beef with a guy. He owed me $100
> cash because I paid off a $240 debt for him, I
> phoned people on the street and they sent money to
> his account. He thought we were even. I said he
> owed me $100. He said he would not pay. We
> argued and I got pissed off and said lets go to
> the back of the range. He said no. We talked it
> out and he said he would pay. The next thing I
> know he came up the range and I had my back turned
> and he piped me in the head. I saw stars. He hit
> me a few more times. I took the pipe and hit him
> back. A few of my friends broke it up. He
> eventually paid me $75 then he was released to the
> street.

In this case the victimization was related to previous financial transactions between the victim and the aggressor and the victimization was coded 'interpersonal'.

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The following criteria were used to categorized 'situational' victimizations:

   (1)   there was no significant relationship between the respondent and the aggressor prior to the victimization, or,
   (2)   if the respondent and the aggressor had a previous significant relationship, this relationship was not implicated in the victimization.

The following incident is a typical 'situational' victimization:

> We had a social. There was screaming at the window. Another con came over and told the guy to stop screaming. I said he didn't scream. He punched me in the face and said mind your own business....I got up and he kicked me in the knee then in the face with his steel toed boots. Then I fell to the floor and he kicked me in the side of his head with his boot.

According to the victim, there was no previous relationship between the victim and the aggressor. The victimization was a direct result of the immediate relationship in which the victim and the aggressor were placed.

Table 8.2 shows the breakdown of the sixty-five personal victimizations by the relationship between the victim and the aggressor.

TABLE 8.2

Relationship Between the Victim and Aggressor
Personal Victimizations

	Interpersonal	Situational	Not Classifiable
# of Victims	35 (53.8%)	27 (41.5%)	3 (4.6%)
(N=65)			

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Approximately 54% of the personal victimizations were categorized as 'interpersonal', 41.5% of the victimizations were 'situational' and the remaining 4.7% could not be classified.

The victimization incidents were also categorized according to the circumstances surrounding the victimization. Five categories were used for this classification: 'drugs/debts', 'respect', 'ratting', property (excluding debts), and sex-related victimizations. Victimizations categorized as 'drugs/debts' related to incidents arising out of drug trafficking and disputes over debts arising out of drug trafficking, and, disputes over debts arising out of non-drug related transactions. The category of 'respect' refers to victimizations that were precipitated as a result of breaking one of the prison 'rules of respect' (for example, playing a stereo too loud). 'Ratting' refers to a victimizations as a result of being accused of passing information to the administration. 'Property' refers to personal victimizations that were the result of a property dispute between prisoners that did not involve drugs or debts. Sex-related victimizations refer to victimizations that involved forced sexual contact between prisoners, and victimizations that were the result of a prisoner being convicted of a sex crime.

Table 8.3 shows the breakdown of the victimizations by the circumstances precipitating the victimization.

TABLE 8.3

Percentage of Victims by Victimization Type
Personal Victimizations

	Debt/ Drugs	'Respect'	Ratting	Property	Sex-Rel.	Other
%	20	33.8	1.5	4.6	18.5	16.9

One-third of all personal victimizations were the result of violations of the norms of respect. One-fifth of the victimizations involved drug transactions or debts and an almost equal amount involved victimizations relating to sex.

Table 8.4 shows the cross-tabulation between victim-aggressor relationship and type of victimization.

TABLE 8.4

Victim-Aggressor Relationship by Type of Victimization
Personal Victimizations

	Debt/ Drugs	'Respect'	Ratting	Property	'Sex'	Other	Tot.
Interpers.	12 35.2% 92.3%	3 8.8% 13.6%	1 2.9% 100%	-- -- --	11 32.4% 100%	7 20.6% 63.6%	34 100% 56%
Situation.	1 3.7% 7.7	19 70.4% 83.4%	-- -- --	3 11.1% 100%	-- -- --	4 14.8% 36.4%	27 100% 44%
Total	13 21.3%	22 36.1%	1 1.6%	3 4.9%	11 18.0%	11 18.0%	61 100%

(missing cases=4)

Taken together, the relationship between the victim and the

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aggressor and the circumstances precipitating the victimization indicate the manner in which the informal rules of social control reflect social relations in prison and the manner in which these rules are produced and reproduced over time. What is immediately apparent from the data presented in Table 8.4 is that some types of victimizations were relatively unlikely to be reported. Personal victimizations relating to 'ratting' and 'property' occurred much less frequently than other types of personal victimizations. The single victimization relating to 'ratting' involved one prisoner falsely accusing another prisoner of passing information to the administration. The accusations were accompanied by threats against the prisoner's life. The three property-related victimizations included one robbery, an assault resulting from a false accusation of cell-theft, and an assault arising out of a 'muscling' incident.

The victimization data in relation to ratting and property victimizations are interesting not for what they show but for what they do not show. Ratting and cell thefts are perceived to be regularly occurring events. In terms of cell theft, the victimization data substantiate this claim, yet a small proportion of <u>personal</u> victimizations related to these types of incidents. One explanation for the lack of these types of events is an unwillingness on the part of survey respondents to admit that they were assaulted as a result of ratting or cell thieving. This explanation is quite plausible given the seriousness of the

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charge. Another explanation is that prisoners are able to engage in these acts a high degree of assurance that they will not be caught and punished by others. The fact that no cell thieves were apprehended lends credibility to this hypothesis. Similarly, the anonymity involved in 'sending in a kite', the protective custody system and transfers to other prisons provide informants a degree of protection from other prisoners. Moreover, it is likely that rates for these types of incidents would have been higher had more interviews been conducted with prisoners housed in protective custody wings.

Whatever the explanation for the lack of 'ratting' and 'property' related victimizations, the implications for the prison population are clear. Because informants and cell thieves are able to operate with a relative degree of impunity, prisoners' trust in others decreases and overall prisoner solidarity is threatened. The most effective way of avoiding these types of incidents is to 'do your own time' and 'don't trust others'.

Six of the seven sex-related 'interpersonal' victimizations involved one party forcing another to have sexual relations. All six of these victimizations involved the same two parties. These victimizations are difficult to explain with respect to the informal rules of social control that operate in the prison. While it can only be speculated, it is likely that forced sexual

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relations in prison operate according to similar dynamics of power, exploitation and commodification that promote women abuse in the community.

The four sex-related 'situational' victimizations resulted from a victim's charge. According to official records, thirteen survey respondents were in prison for rape or sexual assault or 'other' sex-related crimes. Six of these respondents reported a total of 10 separate victimizations. Only one of these six respondents indicated that his victimizations were a direct result of his conviction. This respondent reported four separate victimizations. On one occasion he had been the target of repeated threats against his life, threats which stemmed from his desire to enter a program for sex offenders. On three other occasion he was physically assaulted. These victimizations are a brutal reinforcement of prisoners' attitudes towards sex offenders and their place in the prison social hierarchy.

The most frequently occurring type of 'interpersonal' personal victimization involved disputes arising out drug trafficking (nine cases) and non-drug debts (three cases). The following is a typical description of a non-drug related interpersonal victimization:

> My friend left. He owed $120.00 and 12 cartons of smokes. I told the guy to give me a few weeks so I could pay. I wanted to buy the smokes so I could pay the guy off. The guy owed smokes to others and was stuck. I told him I took the debts to help him. He started coming on to me, putting

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pressure on me. He said if I didn't pay he'd be back with friends.

Another prisoner described his victimization as follows:

> I was making a brew. A guy said he would by three PJ's [peanut butter jars] of shine on loan and would pay that night. The guy then said he wouldn't pay. He told me he would pipe me. I went to my buddy and told him what was going on. He went and got two others. We had a message come to us that he would pipe me. I sent word back that we would be out in the yard. On the way to the yard two of his friends came and were apologetic, trying to get out of it. They gave a gram and a half of hash as payment. We settled it that way. From then on, business went great.

Drug-related interpersonal victimizations involve similar dynamics of the market-place:

> Somebody felt that money was sent to a dealer I'm involved with. Because I was the middle-man, they figure I was responsible because the money didn't show up. He took a swing at me in the yard. We gave each other five or six shots. Then it broke up. We met twenty minutes later and he apologized. He claimed the dealer had his money but it had not been transferred into a third parties account yet. Today we get along great.

These examples of drug related and non-drug related 'interpersonal' victimizations, and the remaining eight victimizations in this category, occurred as a result of transactions in the marketplace and involved either a prisoner refusing to pay a debt or a prisoner being falsely accused of owing money or drugs to another prisoner.

Twelve of the thirteen drug/debt related victimizations occurred _after_ the transactions had taken place, hence a

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relationship between the victim and the aggressor was established and the victimizations were coded as 'interpersonal'. Threats of violence or actual violence were used in all cases of interpersonal victimizations involving drugs or debts. In seven cases the dispute was settled to the satisfaction of both parties; either one party paid the debt or the dispute over ownership of the debt was resolved. One case involved an aggressive resolution and another was never resolved.

The only drug/debt-related victimization that was classified as 'situational' involved a prisoner threatening another with physical assault if the latter did not smuggle drugs into the prison. What is interesting is that no victimizations resulted from immediate economic transactions between parties. No victimizations resulted, for example, from a dispute arising out of the price of a particular commodity. Similarly, no drug/debt-related victimizations resulted from the sale of faulty or misrepresented goods. This is surprising given the fact that several prisoners admitted that a 'gram' of hash weighed substantially less than a one gram weight. Had these types of incidents occurred, more victimizations would have been classified as 'situational'.

These data suggest that, from a purchasers point of view, the marketplace appears operate with reasonable efficiencey. Most conflicts that arise in the market place result from non-

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payment subsequent to the delivery of a good. This is precisely what the informal rules of social control warn against. Rules such as 'don't trust others' and 'avoid the prison economy' are less in place to warn prisoners about being exploited at the point of purchase. These rules warn prisoners of the consequences of going into debt and the dangers of 'fronting' a particular commodity. One prisoner made the following comments:

> Lots of people are getting ripped off. I saw a
> case today. He owed lots of money, about $100.00
> - he was eating pills, so he booked it. They got
> him all pilled-up and he didn't know what he was
> doing so its partly their fault.

This prisoner claimed that a principle market ethic is 'seller beware', the seller should have realized that the buyer was in no position to fulfil his financial obligations.

The fact that all cases of interpersonal debt/drug-related victimizations resulted in some form of violence further suggests that the rules that warn prisoners against entering into the marketplace are to protect prisoners from other prisoners. Based on this data, the prison economy is 'partially unstable'. While there may be few problems at the point of purchase, the overall prison economy has an element of instability. The informal rules of social control assist in regulating and providing stability to cash-flow in the prison economy but the manner in which these rules are enforced, the fact that threats of violence are necessary to settle accounts, (and, even then, threats or actual violence may not be have the desired effect) reflects and

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promotes instability.

The tension within the informal rules of social control and the 'partially unstable' prison environment that is produced and reproduced by these rules is also evident in victimizations classified under the heading of 'respect'. Twenty-two personal victimizations (36.1%) were respect-related. These types of victimizations are difficult to decompose into finer sub-categories. It is possible that there could be a victimization for every norm associated with the rules of respect because the rules of respect, and the prison status hierarchy that these rules help produce, is underpinned by violence and coercion: if someone shows disrespect towards you, you must 'step out' or challenge that person in order to maintain respect in the eyes of others. This challenge may end at a verbal stand-off or it may escalate into violence. Thus a for every possible breach of prison etiquette a subsequent victimization is possible.

The types of victimizations classified under the category of 'respect' reflect the diversity of behaviour in prison. Using another prisoner's weight bench, interrupting conversations, bumping into someone and talking too loud are examples of the types of 'disrespectful' behaviour that lead to victimizations. For example, one prisoner explained a victimization incident as follows:

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> It was in the dining room, during breakfast. I
> was pissed off and threw some coffee in the drain.
> Some hit him and he got wet. He came running at
> me and tried to punch me. I gave him a couple of
> smacks and told him to slow down. I didn't know
> the guy before this happened. Staff was standing
> right there...we both got charged but I beat it in
> court because I was defending myself.

Another prisoner described a respect-related victimization as

follows:

> I asked him to turn down his radio, to have
> respect for others because there were people on
> the phone. He took it the wrong way. We
> exchanged words. He punched me several times. He
> was a big guy.

Looking at it from an aggressor's point of view, one prisoner

explained why he instigated an assault:

> A guy was playing his stereo too loud. I said
> 'turn it down' and he said 'fuck off'. I went to
> his cell to turn it off. We argued and had a fist
> fight. I got him good, he took eight stitches in
> the mouth. I never apologized and he's been
> transferred. He's steered clear of me. He knew
> he was in the wrong and I'm sure others told him
> the same thing.

While this incident did not meet the criteria for a

victimization, it does indicate the manner in which the rules of

respect operate in prison. The rules of respect define

acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in prison. Nineteen of the

twenty-two victimizations classified as relating to 'respect'

were situational which means that a previous relationship between

the victim and the aggressor did not precipitate the

victimization; the 'cause' of the victimization was in the

immediate context of the event - for example, inadvertent contact

in a corridor, a misinterpreted glance or leaving a mess in a

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common area. The victimizations relating to 'respect' highlight the centrifugal aspects of these rules. It is not difficult to breech one of the rules of respect but any breech has the potential to explode into a confrontation with another prisoner. What appear from the viewpoint as relatively minor incidents take on much greater consequences in prison.

While the rules of respect contribute to the stability of the prison (centripetal effects) by defining what is acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, what is 'right' and what is 'wrong', the system of justice that arises out of these rules and the manner in which this system of justice interacts with the prison status hierarchy contributes to the atomization of prisoners (centrifugal effects). The nineteen respect-related, situational victimizations were not spontaneous; aggressors likely calculate the probability that their threats will be taken up and the probability of 'winning' a physical confrontation. But these types of victimizations are not likely to be predicted. These types of events point to an environment that is partially unstable, an environment when, at any given intersection between two prisoners, a potentially serious victimization may result.

Prisoners' attitudes towards being assaulted reflect the unpredictability of victimizations and the partially unstable environment of the prison. Prisoners were asked if they worried about being the victim of an assault and 84.2% indicated that

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they did not. When asked why he did not worry about being

assaulted, one prisoner responded:

> I don't worry because worrying ain't going to stop
> it. Why worry, things happen. If your going to
> worry about it your going to drive yourself crazy.

Another prisoner said:

> No, it can happen anytime, who knows? To worry
> about that in a place like this is crazy. That
> would take up my whole day. I have better things
> to do than worry.

The most frequently reported reason for not worrying about being

assaulted was that prisoners try to avoid situations that may

result in some type of physical confrontation:

> If it [an assault] happens, it happens. If you
> are going to get it you will. There is no use
> worrying. If you mind your own business you have
> no fear. I don't take any precautions to avoid
> it.

> I don't look for trouble. You have to put yourself
> in the position or the place for trouble to
> happen. I've learned to be joint smart and to
> sense trouble and get out of those places.

Prisoners can never be free of the threat of victimization. They

can, however, minimize their chances of being assaulted by

keeping to themselves, by doing their own time and showing

respect for others.

Resolution and Order

For the most part, the victimization data point to the

instability of the prison environment. That is the nature of

victimization research. By definition, victimization focusses on

breeches of order. It has been argued, however, that the prison is best characterized as 'partially unstable'. The stability of the prison environment can be seen in the resolution of victimization incidents. The resolution of victimization incidents reflects the rules of respect that operate in prison.

It should be noted that when discussing the resolution of victimization incidents, reference is made to resolutions between prisoners. Little data were collected on the administration's response to victimization incidents and the data that were collected came from prisoners. Victims were asked if, to the their knowledge, staff were aware of the incident. If a victim indicated that staff were aware of the incident, the victim was asked to describe their response. Table 8.5 shows the result of this question.

TABLE 8.5

Staff Awareness of Personal Victimization Incidents

	Yes	No
# of Victimizations	21	37
No staff response - 9		
Administrative Segregation/ Institutional Charge - 5		
Transfer victim/aggressor to another range - 3		
Transfer victim/aggressor to another prison - 1		
No response - 3		

(N=58, missing cases=7)

According to the victim, staff were aware of 21 of 58 personal

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victimizations (36.2%). Victims indicated that staff responded

with some type of action in less than half of these

victimizations. These data provide an imprecise estimate of the

number of victimizations that are recognized and followed-up by

the administration. Given the perception of ratting, it is

highly probable that staff were aware of a great deal more

victimization than is revealed by these figures, however, this

would require analyses of official documentation. But even is

staff were aware of more victimizations, ultimately it is the

prerogative of the parties involved to reach some type of

resolution to the incident. The manner in which prisoners

resolve disputes provides insight into the social world of the

prison. Violence and threats of violence inherent in prison

victimization incidents contribute to the instability of the

social world of the prison. This was especially the case in

terms of the victimizations related to 'respect'. The prison is

not, however, continually on the brink of disorder. The manner

in which prisoners resolve their disputes shows how stability is

returned to the relationship between the victim and the aggressor

after a victimization incident and how, on a larger scale, this

contributes to the stability of the prison.

Survey respondents were asked to provide details of how

victimization incidents were resolved and their responses were

coded into three categories: (1) no resolution, (2) non-

aggressive resolution, (3) aggressive resolution. The following

coding rules were used to classify victimization incidents:

No Resolution: Victimizations where neither party made any attempt to resolve the incident, for example, incidents that are 'forgotten' **and/or** if one party is transferred to another institution **and/or** if one party attempts to engage in a peaceful resolution without the co-operation of the other party.

Non-aggressive resolution: Victimizations where the parties negotiate a non-aggressive resolution to the incident including payment of debts or replacement of property, apologies by either party **and/or** third party mediation is used to partially or fully negotiate a settlement ot the dispute.

Aggressive resolution: Victimizations that are followed by aggressive acts of 'revenge' (including threats and assaults) by either the victim or the offender **and/or** by third parties on behalf of the victim and the offender. There must be a time-lag between the initial victimization and follow-up aggression.

Not Classifiable: Victimizations that cannot be classified according to the coding rules listed above.

Table 8.6 shows the 47.4% of all personal victimization had no resolution. That is, the victim sustained a victimization and there were no 'revenge' attempts by the victim and no apologies or reconciliation attempts from the aggressor. An equal percentage of victimizations resulted in non-aggressive resolutions. That is, in almost half of the personal victimizations the victim and the aggressor reached some type of settlement of reconciliation and no further action was taken on the part of the aggressor and no retaliatory acts were taken on the part of the victim. Revenge attacks or subsequent victimizations were rare, occurring in only three personal

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victimization incidents (5.2%). Each of these incidents involved
an initial victimization followed by a subsequent victimization.
In each of these cases friends of the victim and/or the aggressor
were drawn into the confrontation.

TABLE 8.6

Resolution of Victimization Incidents, Personal Victimizations

Type of Resolution

No Res.	Non-Aggressive Res.	Aggressive Res.
27 (47.4%)	27 (47.4%)	3 (5.2%)

(N=57, missing=8)

The most frequent method of arriving at a non-aggressive
resolution to a victimization was for the aggressor to apologize
to the victim. Nineteen of the twenty-seven non-aggressive
resolutions (70.4%) involved an apology, three involved repayment
of a debt (11.1%) and six involved third party mediation without
an apology (22.1%). In cases involving an apology, the aggressor
realized that his actions were inappropriate, he had stepped over
the admissible boundaries of what is 'right' and what is 'wrong'.
For example, Prisoner Y accidently bumped Prisoner X. Prisoner X
challenged Prisoner Y to a physical confrontation. Later that
day, Prisoner X apologized to Prisoner Y for acting
inappropriately and the incident was resolved non-aggressively
and the two parties became friends. This incident shows the
complex manner in which the rules of respect operate. Prisoner Y
was in the wrong for not recognizing he bumped into Prisoner X.

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Prisoner X was reacted to the disrespectful behaviour by
challenging Prison Y. Prisoner Y later apologized for 'losing
his cool'. The negotiation between these two prisoners allowed
both to maintain 'respect' in the eyes of others.

The incident noted above shows how a non-aggressive
resolution to a victimization returned stability to the
relationship between two prisoners. An apology also plays a more
symbolic role and brings stability to the larger social system.
For example, a misunderstanding regarding the ownership of a debt
caused a physical confrontation between two prisoners. A third
party intervened and clarified the misunderstanding. The two
parties realized the mistake. The victim in this incident
described the resolution process:

> The situation was resolved with his own people.
> It was a misunderstanding and his people worked it
> out. My friends wanted to get in a beef with his
> friends because they thought the fight was
> bullshit. I then settled my friends down and went
> to the other guy. We walked around the yard to
> show people we talked and then shook hands to show
> it was all over. Therefore we avoided a mean
> situation.

In this case the apology served as a symbolic gesture that
notified others that a potentially violent situation had been
resolved. The apology served to reconcile the parties involved
and show the larger prison community that their relationship had
stabilized.

The rules of respect determine what is 'right' and 'wrong'

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behaviour in prison. One means of acknowledging to another

prisoner or the prison society that one is in the wrong is to

apologize to the aggrieved party. Thus in almost one-third of

the victimizations the aggressor apologized to the victim. The

apology served to invoke closure on a victimization and ensure

that retaliatory acts will not ensue. The apology also returned

a sense of stability to parties involved and to the larger prison

community.

A Note on Minimum Security Prisons

Interviews were in five prison and across three security

levels. It was noted in Chapter 5 that, for the most part, the

similarities across the prisons were striking. There was,

however, one major difference across prisons. There was a

statistically significant relationship between security level and

victimization. Medium and maximum security prisons had similar

rates of victimization. Minimum security prisons had lower rates

of victimization.

It was evident from the interviews that minimum security

prisons are similar to medium and maximum security prisons in

terms of perceptions of informing, loyalty, solidarity, and

trust. In fact, there is reason to believe that these

characteristics are more acute in minimum security prisons since,

and this is based solely on the perceptions of prisoners, minimum

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security prisons are perceived to be the 'dumping ground' for
rats, skin hounds, diddlers and others prisoners who are not
wanted in the general population of other prisons. One prisoner
from a minimum security prison noted that the effect of these
perceptions is similar to medium and maximum security prisons:

> There are too many pigeons and rape hounds in
> here. 75-80% are diddlers, that's what this camp
> is all about. That means no trust at all. You
> don't talk to them, you just do your own time.
> They get fucked up on drugs then and stay in their
> cells. Then they get scared and they put it on
> somebody in hope that they get a parole.

Another prisoner made similar comments:

> Pigeons and rape hounds have power. If you give
> information you get everything. You can get rid
> of anyone by putting a kite in. We know who some
> of them are but what can you do? If you open your
> mouth, if you threaten them, you are gone. He'll
> put it on you as soon as he can. I just don't
> bother them. I stay out of their way. If someone
> knows anything about you, you are gone, shipped
> away.

One of the major differences between maximum and medium prisons
and minimum security prisons is that the risks of engaging in the
types of behaviours that result in victimizations are much
greater. One prisoner described why there was so little
victimization in minimum security prisons:

> In this environment it is very minimal because we
> are all too close to the street and don't want to
> fuck up and some who have reached this stage are
> tired of the jail scene and just want to stay
> clean.

Another prisoner made similar comments:

> Over here, I've learned if you say anything to
> someone they get paranoid but don't touch them
> because this a paradise island. How can you touch
> them here? You just can't associate with them.

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> You have to be very careful who you talk to. The
> administration would love to have a good reason to
> ship me out of here.

These comments suggest maximum, medium and minimum security
prisons operate according to similar processes which result in
similar relations between prisoners. What distinguishes minimum
security prisons are structural features of the prison system,
specifically the opportunity to be released to the street.

The relationship between victims and aggressors, the events
that lead to victimization, and the manner in which
victimizations are resolved show how the informal rules of social
control operate in prison. Victimizations in prison are produced
by, and reproduce the informal social rules of social control.
Chapter 9 assess the utility of importation and deprivation
theories in accounting for the nature and extent of victimization
in prison and the and the description of the social world of the
prison advanced thus far. It will be argued that these theories
are inadequate for this task. An alternate theoretical model
will be advanced that better accounts for the patterns of social
relations observed during the course of the interviews.

CHAPTER 9

THE INFORMAL RULES OF SOCIAL CONTROL
AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

> Prison life has changed me because I'm more devoid
> of emotions. If you see someone on the ground,
> with his head bleeding and he's lying in a pool of
> blood you just step over him because it's time to
> eat and you get locked down soon.

This analysis began with an examination of micro-level rules that

prisoners use in order to survive in prison. The goal of this

micro-level analysis was to examine the validity of the

sociological concept of the 'inmate code'. It was shown that

prisoners volunteered a set of rules - described as informal

rules of social control - that differed markedly from the

traditional conceptualization of the inmate code. This analysis

then proceeded to develop an understanding of how these informal

rules of social control are produced and reproduced in the prison

environment. It was suggested that the tension embedded within

the informal rules of social control - the centripetal and

centrifugal aspects of these rules - reproduce the very

embedded within the informal rules of social control gave rise to the 'partially unstable' quality of the prison, a quality that was reflected in the nature and extent of victimization and responses to victimization.

The goal of this chapter is to return to the importation-deprivation debate outlined earlier and assess this debate in terms of the understanding of the social world of the prison developed thus far. It will be argued that neither position in this debate can account for the system of social relations that existed in the prisons that were visited. An alternate theoretical explanation will be advanced. It will be suggested that the informal rules of social control constitute a system of conflict management. This system of conflict management arises from the complex configuration of social and structural relations that were outlined in the preceding chapters

The Deprivation-Importation Debate

If the traditional 'inmate code' is abandoned in favour of the more fluid concept of the 'informal rules of social control', the question of whether the importation-deprivation debate is relevant is pushed to the foreground. As noted in Chapter 3, internal criticisms of each perspective make the utility of both theories suspect. The data presented in this analysis further challenge the traditional hypotheses. To the extent that the

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informal rules of social control are accepted as an accurate
portrayal of the guidelines prisoners use as behavioural
references, the value of deprivation theory is seriously
undermined. Deprivation theory assumes that the inmate code
operates in the direction of social cohesion, thus Sykes claims
the stability of the prison varies directly with prisoners'
acceptance to the inmate code. This hypothesis is tenable
insofar as the inmate code operates uni-directionally. It was
shown that the informal rules of social control do not operate
solely in the direction of social cohesion. The tension embedded
within the informal rules of social control, a tension created by
the counteracting centripetal and centrifugal effects of the
rules, makes stability or 'equilibrium' a theoretical
impossibility. Violence and victimization are not exceptional
events limited periods of disequilibrium or to particularly
incorrigible prisoners, violence and exploitation are woven into
the fabric of social relations in prison. Violence and
victimization provide the material with which the informal rules
of social control are fabricated, and, in turn, the informal
rules of social control reproduce these conditions. It is this
process that creates the 'partially unstable' character of the
social world of the prison. At the level of the lived
experiences, prisons may oscillate between degrees of stability,
but stability is always partial, tempered by the structural
features of the prison environment and the social relations these
features help reproduce.

The informal rules of social control provide for a much more fluid analysis than the inmate code. Within both the deprivation and the importation theories, there is the assumption that prisoners assume roles when they enter the prison community, whether the role of the 'wolf', 'gorilla' or 'right guy' in the case of deprivation theory or the role of the 'square john', 'thief' or 'convict' in the case of importation theory. While Irwin (1970) does recognize that there is some room for a prisoner to move out of one role and into another, for the most part both theories are fairly static in this regard. The traditional theories of the prison fail to recognize the multiplicity of behaviours prisoners engage in, behaviours that promote and inhibit social cohesion and solidarity. Because of their fluidity, the informal rules of social control acknowledge the countervailing tendencies of prisoners' behaviours and, more importantly, the countervailing tendencies embedded within each of the informal rules of social control and how these rules structured the social relations of the prison. It is precisely this feature of the informal rules of social control that contributes to the partial instability of the prison.

The importation-deprivation debate was preoccupied with the question of the origin of the inmate code. By focussing on the origin of the inmate code, this debate neatly side-stepped the question of how human activity - human agency - actively produces

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and reproduces the social world of the prison. In deprivation theory, a prisoner enters into prison and assumes one of several pre-defined roles. In the importation theory, one's role as a prisoner is, for the most part, a continuation of one's role on the street. In both cases, the origin of the inmate code is located beyond the concrete activity of individuals as prisoners. In the present analysis an attempt was made to indicate the manner in which the behaviour of prisoners was implicated in both the production and reproduction of the informal rules of social control. For example, structural features of the prison environment facilitate certain types of behaviour, such as 'ratting'. The behaviours some prisoners invoke to counteract 'ratting', the 'do your own time' rules and the 'don't trust anyone' rules, act both as protection from ratting and, at the very same time, contribute to the conditions that create an environment that encourages ratting. This example shows the manner in which human agency actively contributes to the creation of the social world in which prisoners live. By focussing on the origin of the inmate code, the importation-deprivation debate by-passed the more important questions of how prisoners create their social world.

Forms of Conflict Management

How is the social world of the prison to understood theoretically? In order to answer this question it is necessary

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..to move to a higher level of abstraction and examine the question of how order is possible in the social world of the prison. Taken at face value, the prison appears to be an environment where one would least expect to find social order. 'Law', in the sense of governmental social control, is relatively unavailable to prisoners both in their dealings with the administration and with each other. Official mechanisms in place to control the behaviours of prisoners, such as the conditional release system, transfers and certain privileges, are of some benefit but as was shown in the preceding chapters, official control mechanisms have inherent contradictions; they control the behaviours of some prisoners whilst creating cleavages amongst others. Furthermore, official social control measures operate in the context of a pervasive lack of legitimacy on the part of those who are subjected to control. Thus, the inherent contradictions of official social control mechanisms limit their utility.

In terms of formal relations between prisoners, the prison social system lacks a well defined and accountable system of government. Most Canadian prisons do have a nominally democratic Inmate Committee that performs many positive functions on behalf of the general population but the power of the Inmate Committee is always circumscribed by administrative fiat. Many prisoners claimed that inmate welfare committees are merely puppet councils whose strings are pulled by wardens and security officers. In short, the prison lacks all the trappings of modern systems of

government that are (accurately or inaccurately) believed to be
essential for social control. Moreover, the prison contains many
individuals (but not all) who have demonstrated some degree of
unwillingness to live by a set of rules that are said to provide
order to society. One might simply ask "if prisoners can't live
by the rules on the street why would you except them to live by
rules in prison?".

One means of understanding how order is possible within the
prison and, hence, developing a theoretical understanding of the
informal rules of social control and the patterns of prison
victimization, is to follow Black's lead and examine social
control as conflict management. It has been argued that the
informal rules of social control define the types of behaviours
that are 'right' and 'wrong' within the prison social world and
provide appropriate definitions for reacting to deviant behaviour
by way of the rudimentary system of justice that develops around
the rules of respect. By defining deviant behaviour, and
appropriate responses to deviant behaviour within a given social
context, the informal rules of social control are a mechanism of
conflict management. Black (1990:61) argued that "conflict
management is isomorphic with its social field". That is,
particular forms of conflict management arise out of structural
and social relations specific to the social arena in which they
operate. Moreover, Black argued that particular modes of
conflict management reproduce their social environment. Conflict

management is a reflection of the types of social relations that develop within a society, but conflict management "recapitulates and intensifies its larger environment" (ibid.:62).

By 'forms' of social control or conflict management, Black (1984a:7) referred to the manner in which persons or groups express grievances. Black outlined five forms of conflict management and the characteristics of their corresponding social field. Two of the five forms of conflict management are evident in the prison victimization data: (1) self-help, and, (2) negotiation. Each form of conflict management has a corresponding social field in which it operates. The informal rules of social control represent a mixture of self-help and negotiation forms of conflict management.

Self-help refers to "handling a grievance by unilateral aggression" and encompasses gestures ranging from disapproving glares to blood feuds. Within this general form of conflict management there are two sub-categories: (1) vengeance, and, (2) discipline and rebellion. Vengeance refers to reciprocal aggression. Aggression can be either physical or non-physical. In the latter case, Black argued that individual vengeance often arises out of violations of 'codes of honour' where aggression takes the form of affronts to morality. Discipline and rebellion is another form of self-help but arises under social relations . different than vengeance. Discipline and rebellion occurs in its

purest form in the master-salve relationship. Self-help flowing

from the master is discipline, self-help flowing from the slave

is rebellion. 'Negotiation' refers to handling a grievance by

joint decision and involves at least one, but often both parties,

moving towards repairing the harm done by the aggression.

Individual vengeance, discipline and rebellion and negotiation as

forms of conflict management are evident in the prison

victimization data and are reflected in the informal rules of

social control.

Drawing on an extensive review of cross-cultural forms of

conflict management, Black argued that forms of conflict

management have a corresponding 'social field'. 'Social field'

refers to a particular configuration of social relations. Social

fields differ in terms of social segmentation (both horizontal

and vertical segmentation), the interdependence of members of the

social field, mobility, and the degree of intimacy between

members of the social field (social or relational distance). For

example, highly mobile, independent, socially distant and

vertically segmented social fields will have a different form of

conflict management that immobile, interdependent, intimate and

egalitarian societies. Social fields that mix these

characteristics will have multiple forms of conflict management.

The prison represents a social field that has a mixture of these

characteristics and, therefore, a mixture of two types of

conflict management: (1) self-help in the form of individual

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vengeance and discipline and rebellion, and, (2) negotiation.

Black argued that individual vengeance operates between parties of equal standing or rank. He wrote that 'codes of honour' which "specify who should seek redress against whom, and under what circumstances, and how" are most prominent in stratified societies but pertain to relations among peers. Individual vengeance is most likely to occur where social distance, or horizontal segmentation, is great but mobility is restricted. Individual vengeance is also most likely in social arenas where individuals are independent of each other for their well-being.

Social arenas where negotiation is prominent have qualities similar to those where individual vengeance is prominent with respect to equality and mobility. Negotiation is most likely to occur among equal parties and amongst parties that are physically proximate to one another. Negotiation differs from vengeance in terms of functional unity and cross-linkages. Negotiation is most likely to occur in social arenas where there is homogeneity or some type of shared cultural language or other mutual ties that functionally unify prisoners. Cross-linkages, or social bridges that link parties, are also necessary. Whereas vengeance predominates in social arenas that are horizontally segmented, negotiation is most likely in social arenas where parties are associated at least through indirect ties.

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While vengeance and negotiation operate among equals, discipline and rebellion is most likely to occur in vertically segmented and unequal societies such as the master-slave relationship. Downward social control is discipline, upward social control is rebellion. Discipline and rebellion exist in a mutual relationship, although as Black argued, rebellion may be less frequent and less visible than discipline. Social distance between those who discipline and those who are disciplined is also necessary as is immobility and functional unity, or as Black (1990:49) said when persons "participate in the same enterprise, whether production, warfare, imprisonment, or education".

This brief review of two forms of conflict management and the characteristics of the social fields in which they are most likely to occur can be applied to the analysis of the prison developed in the previous chapters.

Conflict Management in Prison

The prison represents a combination of two forms of conflict management and their corresponding social fields. First, the prison, by definition, provides the requisite degree of immobility that is required by all three modes of conflict management. Second, the prison social hierarchy provides the segmentation structure appropriate to each form of conflict

management. The prison social hierarchy is a semi-caste system, with the majority of prisoners occupying positions of relative equality based on how their behaviour corresponds to the 'rules of respect'. A prisoner can be relegated to the bottom rung of the prison social hierarchy, he can be given the status of a 'goof', depending on his behaviour. Once given this status, upward mobility is difficult. Some prisoners, such as known skin hounds, diddlers and rats, are relegated to the bottom rung of the prison social hierarchy regardless of their behaviour and almost never progress higher than the class of 'goofs'. Individual vengeance and negotiation operate among equals, discipline operates downward, from those higher in status to those lower in status.

Black suggested that individual vengeance is "frequent and often fatal in American prisons" and in American slums where honour is important (ibid.:45). The social world of the prison provides the requisite conditions for individual vengeance to occur. The rules of respect operate similar to the 'codes of honour' described by Black. They define when and how prisoners are to respond to disrespectful behaviours. The rules of respect dictate that failing to respond to disrespectful behaviour begets further disrespectful behaviour and a loss of status. Violations of the rules of respect call for vengeance on behalf of the party who was violated. The rules of respect operate amongst prisoners of equal social status, amongst the mass of prisoners who are

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'respected'. The horizontal segmentation of the prison, the lack of loyalty and trust that prisoners exhibit towards each other which is reflected in rules such as 'do your own time' and 'don't trust anybody', provide the appropriate degree of social distance required for individual vengeance. Moreover, horizontal segmentation reproduces the conditions that initially gave rise to the rules of respect: it is precisely because prisoners are horizontally segmented that outward behaviours, how one follows the rules of respect, take on such great importance. As was shown is Table 8.4, nineteen of twenty-two 'respect-related' victimizations were 'situational'; they occurred under conditions of social distance as the victimization incident did not result from a previous significant relationship between the two parties.

While the dominant characteristic of the prison is the lack of loyalty and trust amongst prisoners - horizontal segmentation - the prison is not totally atomized. One area where social cohesion, or cross-linkage, is present is the prison economy. The prison economy requires at least a minimum level of functional interdependence in order to operate. Drug suppliers must have knowledge of dealers, who must have knowledge of runners, who must have knowledge of buyers. Thus Table 8.4 showed that twelve of thirteen debt/drug-related victimizations were 'interpersonal'. The victim and the aggressor were associated through mutual ties and the victimization was the result of this previous relationship. Of the twelve

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interpersonal, debt/drug-related victimizations seven resulted in a 'peaceful resolution' or mediated settlement where the dispute was resolved via an apology, compensation or repayment of a good. Of the remaining five victimizations, one resulted in an aggressive resolution, one resulted in no resolution and three could not be classified. Although the numbers are extremely small, these data indicate that where victimizations involve functional interdependence and cross-linkages among equals, there is likely to be negotiation.

Discipline and rebellion are most prominent in settings with vertical segmentation. While vengeance operates between equals who may live within a vertically segmented social field, discipline and rebellion operate between superiors and inferiors. The primary axes along which the prison is vertically segmented are offence type and prison behaviour: known 'skin hounds', 'child molesters' and other sex offenders and 'goofs' and 'waterheads' are on the bottom of the prison social hierarchy. In terms of the victimization data, the sex-related victimizations most represent this type of conflict management. Black argued that discipline and rebellion are "normally penal in style and authoritarian in procedure". The sexual assault victimizations and the victimizations against the sex offender represent two different assertions of the power used against those deemed subordinate in the prison social hierarchy. In each case the victim rebelled either through physical force or through

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removing himself from the prison.

One question that cannot be addressed within the context of the data collected in the analysis has to do with cell thefts. The reason this type of victimization is difficult to accommodate within this framework is that the data collected provide no knowledge of the circumstances that lead prisoners to steal from others. Black posited that much of what is labelled 'crime', including theft, is actually self-help. For example, he argued that many crimes involving confiscation or destruction of property are moralistic in intent, such as when theft involves those in spousal or familial relationships or when a thief specifically targets victims who are disliked in a community or targets affluent members of a community (Black, 1984b:11). It is possible that cell thefts are an example of individual vengeance. If cell thefts are a form of individual vengeance one would expect they are precipitated by prisoners who have been subject to a personal affront by a peer. Another possibility is that cell thefts are a form of secret rebellion on the part of those in inferior positions. Here, cell thefts are a means of striking back against those in positions of power and domination. The specific form of conflict management, or combination of forms, represented by cell thefts would require greater detail regarding the circumstances surrounding cell thefts. This type of detail was not collected during the course of interviewing. Nevertheless, prisoners' perceptions that being victimized by a

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.cell theft is a personal affront, regardless of the value of the property stolen, would suggest that reactions to cell thieving are a form of individual vengeance; retaliations against the aggressor resulting from a personal affront, rather than, for example, a demand to be compensated for the loss of property.

Placed within the context of forms of conflict management as outlined by Black, it is possible to see how the informal rules of social control provide order to the social world and delineate the social and structural relations that give rise to these rules. It is not simply the case that the deprivations of prison result in patterned behaviours, although alleviations of material deprivations may be a consequence of the informal rules of social control. Nor is it the case that the informal rules of social control represent an accommodation to various patterns of behaviour imported into prison. The informal rules of social control are a form of conflict management.

The informal rules of social control correspond to the structural and social relations of the prison. The lack of loyalty and trust that is pervasive in prison and is partially induced by structural features of the prison environment (such as the perception of a 'rat policy' and the existence of various privileges) creates cleavages amongst prisoners hence giving rise to horizontal segmentation and social distance. Informal rules of social control such as 'do your own time', 'don't talk to

guards' and 'don't trust anybody' are produced by and, in turn, reproduce these structural features and social relations in the prison. In a world that lacks intrinsic bonds between prisoners, outward behaviours - how one's behaviour corresponds to the rules of respect - combine with patriarchal and paternalistic attitudes towards women to form the axes along which the prison is vertically segmented. But the prison is not fully devoid of social cohesion. Social cohesion, or functional interdependence, does exist, for example in the prison economy, which is regulated by the informal rules of social control that caution prisoners to avoid amassing debts. The prison economy fosters cross-linkages and functional interdependence between prisoners. the combination of these forces creates vertical and horizontal segmentation taht are nbecessary for individual vengeance, discipline and rebellion and negotiation.

Within this structure it is possible to provide a diagram of possible confrontation relationships within the social world of the prison and the conflict management structure that operates in each case. Using this diagram it is possible to generate hypotheses regarding the nature of conflict management in prison.

FIGURE 9.1

The Prison Conflict Management Structure

Horizontal Segmentation

A <————————> C <————> D

B

E<————————>F   Vertical Segmentation

The vertical and horizontal double solid lines represent vertical and horizontal axes of segmentation. Line ABC represents a confrontation between prisoners where cross-linkages exist among status equals. A typical victimization involving this type of relationship is an interpersonal, drug/debt victimization. In situations such as these the form of conflict management likely to take place is negotiation. Line AC and EF represent confrontations between horizontally segmented individuals. The victimization data suggest that the rules of respect are in operation in these cases and conflict management is likely to involve individual vengeance as a 'face saving' tactic. Lines AE and CF represent examples of discipline and rebellion. Actions flowing from A to E are discipline, actions flowing from E to A are rebellion. Acts ·of rebellion were difficult to isolate in

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the data, but acts of discipline, such as the power relationships that existed between aggressors and sex offenders are reflective of the authoritarian and penal style of social control that is typical of this type of relationship. Line CD may represent confrontations between prisoners who are neither vertically nor horizontally segmented, relationships of a trusting nature or 'partnerships'. In these cases, social control or conflict management would operate according to a logic not likely to result in a victimization. There were, for example, only a small percentage of victimizations that were classified as 'interpersonal', respect-related victimizations.

Individual vengeance, discipline and rebellion and negotiation are three common types of conflict management that were produced and reproduced within the social world of the prisons that were visited. There are, however, other possible forms of conflict management that operate under different social configurations. For example, group vengeance is one form of conflict management that was not evident to any great extent in the victimization data. Group vengeance operates according to the same logic as individual vengeance with the exception that vengeance is precipitated by groups as opposed to individuals. If groups of prisoners are socially intimate with each other yet socially distanced from other groups that exist on an equal status level, and, there no little are cross-linkage between the groups, then one may expect the appearance of group vengeance as

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a form of conflict management.

It is not unforeseeable that group vengeance as a mode of conflict management may make an appearance in Canadian prisons. For example, during interviews many prisoners indicated that cliques organized around home cities and race were prevalent, however, the loyalty among members of these groups was low, or conversely, there was a high degree of social distance between clique members. Should these cliques solidify into intimate but discrete masses the potential exists for group vengeance to appear as a form of conflict management. This is not to say that cliques are inherently aggressive. Cliques have the potential to offer a great deal of support to prisoners. If appropriate cross-linkages exist between cliques then negotiation may be the form conflict management assumes. But the potential for group vengeance to take hold exists when cliques are socially intimate in and of themselves, yet socially distanced or horizontally segmented from other cliques. In such as situation line AC of Figure 9.1 would represent a confrontation between Clique A and Clique C. In fact, it may be speculated that this is the pattern of conflict management that exists in some prisons in the United States where gang affiliations are more intense.

The social and structural relations that exist in prison give rise to the informal rules of social control which, in turn, produce and produce the conditions of their existence. The

informal rules of social control are a means of conflict
management within prison. The types of victimizations and the
responses to the victimizations reflect the forms of conflict
management that arise from the specific configuration these
relations within of the social arena of the prison.

If one wishes to alter the pattern of conflict management in
prison, to reduce the level of victimization in prison, it is not
enough to simply modify the official mechanisms of social
control. As was indicated previously, because of a number of
inherent contradictions official mechanisms of social control are
not likely to alter the pattern of conflict management that
currently exists in the prisons that were visited. On the
contrary, intensifying existing official social control
mechanisms may widen the cleavages in prison and increase the
social distance between prisoners. Widening the social distance
between prisoners will likely result in increased individual
vengeance and decrease the likelihood that less costly forms of
conflict management such as negotiation and mediation will
emerge. For more positive forms of conflict management to emerge
in prison, the social distance that currently exists in prison,
the lack of loyalty, trust and social cohesion, must be bridged.

Future Research

There are two directions in which future research on the relationship between prison victimization, the informal rules of social control and forms of conflict management may be pursued. Future research may take the form of a replication of the current project. There is great value is ascertaining estimates of prevalence and incidence rates for victimization on a national level. It may be the case that there are variations in victimization rates across regions, or within regions. The structure of conflict management developed in this section can then be used as a means of explaining the observed variation. Moreover, the effect of race on prison solidarity can be examined more fully.

Future research on social control within prison may take an alternate course. One of the problems encountered during this analysis was conceptualizing victimization. The common-sense notion of a 'victim of crime' does not appear to have a neat fit with observed victimizations within prison. It was rare for victimizations to take the form of predatory attacks between strangers. Because of the totality of the prison, in the vast majority of cases victims were acquainted with their aggressor, even though in some situations this relationship may not have been directly implicated in victimization incident. It may be fruitful to abandon the victim-aggressor dichotomy and examine

social control as a dependent variable. This is the strategy favoured by Black (1984a).

Black (ibid.:5-6) argued that a great deal of sociological work in the area of social control, law and punishment has been directed towards explaining how official and unofficial modes of social control effect behaviour. In recent years there has been much discussion regarding how official punishments, as one form of social control, influence the crime rate. Thus, deterrence research uses judicial sanctions as an independent variable and recidivism as a dependent variable. Black does not suggest that this type of research be abandoned. He does suggest that this research be supplemented by analyses that begin with different questions. If social control is viewed as a dependent variable, as a sociological phenomena worthy of explanation, the research question to be addressed becomes how social control varies in time and space.

If social control is viewed as a dependent variable, the type of research undertaken in this analysis need not be abandoned but merely broadened and flipped on its head. It was argued that the various types of victimization observed during the course of this project constituted forms of social control within prison. By definition, two limitations were placed on this analysis. First, the analysis was limited to a one-sided account (the victim's) of how social control operates and,

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secondly, the analysis was limited to a particular types of conflict management (those that met the criteria for victimization). If social control is viewed as a dependent variable one's analytic framework is broadened to include not only 'victim's' accounts of disputes and dispute settlements but also 'aggressor's' accounts. Moreover, once social control becomes the dependent variable then the full range of disputes and means of dispute settlement become the focus of research. For example, because this project focussed on 'victimization' two types of conflict situations could not be adequately addressed: cell theft's and disputes among partners. Broadening one's analytical framework provides space for examinations of these types of events.

If social control is viewed as a dependent variable, the victim-aggressor dichotomy breaks down. Research is no longer driven by 'victimization', rather the broader notion of a 'conflict situation' becomes the independent variable that predicts and explains the particular form of conflict management that is used to resolve the dispute. Take, for example, two violations of the informal rules of social control. A conflict situation arises. In one case, the violation is met with disapproval and a verbal reprimand. In another case the violation results in an assault. If research is driven by the traditional notion of victimization, this conflict situation is emperically relevant only in the latter case, or more generally,

if a specific form of conflict management (for example, individual vengeance) is utilized. If one's analytic framework breaks out of the narrow confines of 'victimization' then research is directed toward explaining the form of conflict management assumes in a specific social context. One's research question becomes: 'Why did one action result in a verbal reprimand and the other a physical assault'. One's analysis is both broadened and flipped on its head. Social control has become the dependent variable.

The informal rules of social control described in the previous chapters and the conflict management structure outlined in Figure 9.1 provide a sketch of the necessary components of a theory of the prison. The goal of this chapter was to develop a preliminary theory of the prison. At this point the theory remains partial. One factor that has been given only cursory examination is the role of prison officials in the production and reproduction of the social world of the prison. There is strong evidence to suggest that the actions of prison officials are directly implicated in the construction of the prison world. Because the focus of this project was on 'victimization', prison officials - guards, preventative security officers, treatment staff and wardens - were not interviewed. Broadening the analysis to an examination of 'conflict situations' and using social control as a dependent variable will highlight the contributions of prison officials to the production and reproduction of the social world of the prison. By interviewing

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prison officials, researchers can examine under what circumstances prison officials choose to intervene in disputes between prisoners as opposed to remaining aloof and allowing prisoners to resolve their disputes internally. Additionally, including prison officials in the analysis will highlight the various types of relationships that develop between prison officials and guards and the forms of conflict management that are used in disputes between prisoners and guards.

Traditional victimization research and the type of research suggested by Black are valuable and worthy of future research. Base rates of victimization in prison and examinations of the factors that contribute to victimization within prison provide much needed statistical data that can be used to develop criminal justice policy. The data uncovered in this analysis suggest that incidence and prevalence rates of victimization in prison are exceedingly high, much higher than is revealed by officially collected data on prison security incidents. Combining these data with an examination of the forms of social control within prison poses a serious challenge to those who doubt the negative effects of imprisonment. How a single prisoner copes with violence and exploitation is an individual matter, but the fact that violence and victimization are woven into the very fabric of social relations in prison is a matter that must be dealt with at a systems level.

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