



2008-2009 Summative Evaluation of the Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Initiative

Preparedness and Recovery
Directorate

Final

30 August 2007

Executive Summary

In compliance with Treasury Board requirements, an evaluation of the Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Initiative was completed in September 2007. This report documents the evaluation.

The goal of the HUSAR Initiative is to develop Heavy USAR teams for deployment to any Canadian disaster causing structural collapse as part of a coordinated, multi-jurisdictional, all-hazard emergency response system. Achievement of the goal is expected to improve federal/provincial/territorial first responder capacity and contribute to development of operating procedures associated with a national emergency response.

Funding for the HUSAR is through the Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) envelope announced in the 2001 Federal Budget. The funding provided was \$20 million over six years starting in 2001 and \$3 million on-going (subject to annual approval of Parliament).

The Initiative is administered by the National Exercise Division (NED), Preparedness and Recovery Directorate (PRD), Emergency Management and National Security Branch of Public Safety Canada (EMNS). The operational responsibility for the Initiative lies with the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM) of the EMNS Branch.

It is a component of the Public Service Canada (PSC) Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP). Contribution agreements issued through the HUSAR Initiative are required to comply to the rules, terms and conditions set out by JEPP.

This Summative Evaluation covers the initial six year period for the HUSAR Initiative starting in 2001. The evaluation was undertaken to provide evidence-based answers to the Treasury Board evaluation policy questions related to rationale and relevance, success, and cost-effectiveness and alternatives.

Key Findings

1. Rationale and relevance:

- There is a clear and relevant vision focused on the development of regional HUSAR capacity that can be deployed nationally;
- The Initiative has a goal and identified “areas of activity” but has not clearly articulated objectives, defined strategies to achieve objectives, or linked activities through outputs to direct, intermediate and final outcomes;
- There is evidence that there is a need for the federal government to continue contributions to build capacity and capability for teams focused on Heavy Urban Search and Rescue.

2. Success:

- First responder [HUSAR] capacity and capability has been improved;
- Development of light and medium USAR capacity has been a change in the original direction and has increased reach of the Initiative especially to jurisdictions that are not building HUSAR Teams;
- The uptake by the five HUSAR Teams has resulted in advanced skills and expertise being effectively applied to other roles and responsibilities related to emergency preparedness, response and recovery;

- The lack of dedicated resources to the Initiative has impacted the ability to significantly contribute to the development of (national) operating procedures associated with a national emergency response (multiple jurisdictions and multiple federal government organizations);
- The cost share requirement of JEPP has impacted the take-up rate by HUSAR Teams;
- The lack of defined objectives and direct outcomes, the JEPP funding formula, and the assignment of the Initiative as a responsibility of NED have resulted in a negative perception of the federal government and PSC by the HUSAR Teams;
- HUSAR Teams have not identified sufficient funds for ongoing operations or maintenance putting in question their sustainability as a national resource for emergency response.

3. **Cost-effectiveness and alternatives:**

- The Initiative has an established, albeit basic, governance structure;
- The Initiative has instituted controls to ensure that approved applications/proposals meet appropriate criteria, and terms and conditions of contribution agreements are followed;
- The Initiative is aligned with national priorities using JEPP mechanisms;
- The HUSAR Initiative has made strategic use of lessons learned in one region to build skills and capacity in another;
- Recipients (i.e. provincial/territorial governments) are often viewed as offering little or no benefit to end-beneficiaries and can affect the timely processing of applications and claims;
- In recent years, there has been minimal involvement of operational or policy organizations in the development of the HUSAR Teams;
- The Initiative has not taken a risk-based approach to management (e.g. there is no evidence that a risk-assessment of the Initiative has ever been completed);
- There is a lack of a comprehensive performance management framework to allow for effective management of outcomes or objectives;
- There has been minimal consideration of options/alternatives to increase cost-effectiveness or efficiency in delivery with the possible exception of the consideration by TBS to change JEPP and allow contributions to be applied to on-going operations and maintenance.

Recommendations

1. **Assessment of risk.** A risk assessment of the Initiative should be undertaken to gain a comprehensive understanding of threats, impacts and mitigation strategies considering all stakeholders including Canadians, end-beneficiaries, recipients, and initiative (program) delivery personnel. The risk assessment should be the first step in the refresh of the design of the Initiative (see: Recommendation 3).

The risk assessment should address:

- An effective contribution model and the threat to future success from existing JEPP terms and conditions including cost-share requirements;
- The sustainability of the HUSAR Teams;

- The ability to deploy nationally;
- The lack of inter-jurisdictional agreements at all levels of government;
- Integration with other urban search and rescue initiatives between all levels of government;
- The assignment of responsibility of an operational initiative (HUSAR) to a non-operational organization (NED) with a very different mandate.

The risk assessment should answer the question of whether to achieve continued success and meet the needs of Canadians:

- There is fundamental change required to the Initiative's design and delivery including roles, responsibility (considering NED, other directorates, PSC, other federal government organizations, jurisdictions) governance, activities, outputs, and objectives; or,
 - Refinements can be made within the current organization, design and delivery to achieve continued success.
2. **Allocate dedicated resources.** The HUSAR Teams are a national resource. To ensure the achievement of an effective national deployment capacity and capability, and subsequently to maintain an effective national readiness and operational state, the three levels of government should work to enhance HUSAR capabilities.
 3. **Program (initiative) refresh.** There are fundamental program design issues that need to be addressed including:
 - Clear definition of objectives, delivery strategies and expected results;
 - Development of a logic model that articulates and links activities, outputs, direct, intermediate and final outcomes;
 - Resources and funding;
 - Updated/validated governance;
 - Lack of a comprehensive reporting and performance management framework;
 - Lack of risk management.

The development and approval of an integrated RMAF/RBAF or equivalent would address these issues. However, the program refresh should go further in that it should:

- Baseline the current state of the HUSAR Teams' national deployment capacity and capacity, detail the future desired state and build a plan to bridge the gap between the two;
- Include development of on-going program improvement and business planning processes.

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Revision History

| Revision | Date | Title | Purpose/Change |
|----------|---------|---|---|
| 0.7 | 31/7/07 | Summative Evaluation of the PSAT HUSAR Initiative | Initial draft. Does not include Executive Summary |
| 1.0 | 30/8/07 | Summative Evaluation of the PSAT HUSAR Initiative | Final draft including Executive Summary and feedback on initial draft |

[*] - In accordance with the Privacy and Access to Information Acts, some information may have been severed from the original reports.

1 Introduction

In compliance with Treasury Board requirements, an evaluation of the Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Initiative was completed in September 2007. This report documents the evaluation.

This is the first evaluation that has focused solely on the HUSAR Initiative¹ since its inception in 2001. The HUSAR Initiative is part of another program – the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program (JEPP). A summative evaluation of JEPP was conducted in 2003 and HUSAR was considered in the context of the overall JEPP.

The HUSAR Initiative Summative Evaluation has been completed by the National Exercise Division which has responsibility for administering the Initiative. Specifically, the evaluation was done by an independent consultant under the direction of the HUSAR Program Manager. It was conducted with the guidance of the “Guide for the Review of Evaluation Reports” prepared by Treasury Board’s Centre of Excellence for Evaluation, January 2004.

1.1 Initiative Profile

1.1.1 Overview

The HUSAR Initiative is funded through the Public Safety and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) envelope announced in the 2001 Federal Budget. The funding provided was \$20 million over six years starting in 2001 and \$3 million on-going (subject to annual approval of Parliament).

At the start of the HUSAR Initiative, instead of designing, planning, provisioning and delivering a new program with a new mandate and establishing new terms and conditions, for expediency the decision was made to add it to JEPP. As a result, contribution agreements issued through the HUSAR Initiative are required to comply to the rules, terms and conditions set out by the OIC

JEPP is included within the Public Safety Canada (PSC) Emergency Management and National Security (EMNS) Program Activity Area (PAA). It was established in 1980 to encourage and support cooperation among the federal and provincial/territorial governments in working toward a national capability to meet emergencies of all types with a reasonably uniform standard of emergency response. Through JEPP, the Government of Canada provides financial contributions to provinces and territories (recipients) to assist in meeting the costs of projects aimed at enhancing the national emergency response capability.

Eligible costs covered by JEPP include:

- Salaries and benefits, as well as in-kind contributions applicable to provincially-sponsored projects;
- Equipment and related technical training;
- Consultant fees and other out-of-pocket expenses that are directly tied to a deliverable or activity under the proposed JEPP project;
- Cost of training facilities, equipment and supplies, travel, food and accommodation;
- Taxes;

¹ In selected documents the “HUSAR Initiative” is also referenced as the “HUSAR Program” and the “Urban Search and Rescue Program”.

- Development, coordination and exercising of emergency plans and arrangements including risk, vulnerability or hazard assessments.

Costs not covered by JEPP include:

- Functions and equipment which are considered to be the routine responsibility of provincial ministries or first responder agencies such as police, fire, and ambulance;
- Ongoing operating and maintenance costs;
- Hospitality expenses except for meals provided during training exercises;
- Administrative costs which are not directly related to a specific JEPP project;
- Inflation allowance;
- Major capital costs which are considered to be the responsibility of provincial, territorial or community governments.

HUSAR is defined as the location of trapped persons in collapsed structures using dogs and sophisticated search equipment; the use of heavy equipment such as cranes to remove debris; the work to breach, shore, remove and lift structural components; the treatment and removal of victims; and the securing of partially or completely collapsed structures.

To be eligible for funds, recipient organizations (provinces/territories) must fund on a cost-share basis a minimum of 25 percent of the cost of a proposed project. The federal government, through JEPP and the HUSAR Initiative, will fund up to 75 percent of eligible projects.

First responders to emergencies (i.e. fire and emergency services departments in major urban centres) are the targeted end-beneficiaries, although Canadians are the ultimate beneficiaries.

The overall purpose of the Initiative is to build national HUSAR capacity and capability through as many as eight teams across the country, each located in a major urban centre. Key elements required to support a national HUSAR capability include the establishment of national coordination mechanisms and development of national arrangements to mobilize, support and sustain HUSAR teams operating in support of other jurisdictions in Canada.

In 2003, through a JEPP Annual Update Instruction (OIC), the HUSAR Initiative was expanded to allow for funding of light and medium Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) projects using the HUSAR Initiative PSAT funding envelope.

1.1.2 Governance

HUSAR is an Initiative within the National Exercise Division (NED), Preparedness and Recovery Directorate (PRD), Emergency Management and National Security Branch of Public Safety Canada (EMNS). The operational responsibility for the Initiative lies with the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM) of the EMNS Branch.

1.1.3 Program Resources

The Initiative does not have budgeted Full Time Equivalent (FTE) positions. NED assigns management and administration to a Program Manager. The Program Manager reviews and recommends applications/proposals, coordinates consultations and engagements with recipients and end-beneficiaries, and recommends payment of claims. JEPP personnel assure compliance to the JEPP terms and conditions.

1.1.4 Delivery

Provincial or territorial governments, on behalf of first responders, submit applications/proposals to JEPP. Applications/proposals can be received throughout the fiscal year. PSC Regional offices are available for consultation throughout the project life cycle, receive the initial application/proposal, and, if complete and appropriate, forward to the national JEPP program official. The applications/proposals are reviewed by JEPP Program Officer(s) and, if they abide by JEPP terms and conditions, are forwarded to the HUSAR Initiative Program Officer for review and recommendation. Applications/proposals recommended for acceptance are submitted to the SADM or designate for approval. The Director General (DG), Emergency Management Policy Directorate, has delegated authority for project funding of less than \$75K.

When a project has been completed or a measurable milestone has been achieved, a claim for full or partial payment is presented to the PSC regional office. Once satisfied with the claim and supporting documentation, the PSC Regional Director will recommend payment. The claim must be supported by a certified provincial/territorial auditor's signature for those projects with a Government of Canada contribution of \$50K or more. The certification by a designated provincial/territorial official with appropriate fiscal accountability under provincial/territorial financial administration acts is required for those projects with a Government of Canada contribution of less than \$50K. The claim is reviewed by JEPP and HUSAR Initiative officials at PSC headquarters and, if satisfied that all conditions have been met, they make a recommendation to the SADM for payment. The SADM authorizes payment to the province/territory.

All claims must be submitted to the PSC regional office no later than April 10 of the fiscal year following that in which the project was completed. Claims that cannot be supported administratively by that date are identified to the PSC Regional Office by April 10 for inclusion in the Federal Payables at Year-End (PAYE) procedures. These claims can then be submitted no later than June 15 of the same year.

1.2 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

This Summative Evaluation covers the initial six year period for the HUSAR Initiative starting in 2001. The evaluation was undertaken to provide evidence-based answers to the Treasury Board evaluation policy questions related to:

1. Relevance (i.e. is the Initiative still consistent with department and government-wide priorities, and does it realistically address an actual need);
2. Success (i.e. is the Initiative effective in meeting objectives, within budget and without unwanted consequences);
3. Cost-effectiveness/alternatives (i.e. are the most appropriate and efficient means being used to achieve objectives relative to alternative design and delivery approaches).

This is not an evaluation of PSAT or JEPP although they may be referenced to provide background, set context and formulate conclusions and recommendations.

1.3 Audience

The audience for this report includes PSC, PSAT Initiative and TBS program officials and executives with roles and responsibilities associated with and impacting the HUSAR Initiative.

1.4 Structure of Report

This report has the following sections:

Section 1 provides a description of the Initiative and highlights the purpose and scope of the evaluation;

Section 2 discusses evaluation methodology and constraints;

Section 3 presents findings;

Section 4 summarizes conclusions;

Section 5 presents recommendations.

1.5 Contact Information

Queries related to this evaluation can be directed to:

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2 Evaluation Methodology and Constraints

This evaluation has been informed by and follows, where possible, the “*PSAT HUSAR Initiative Evaluation Plan*”, December 2003.

2.1 Evaluation Questions

Eight specific evaluation questions have been addressed as identified in the “*PSAT HUSAR Initiative Evaluation Plan*”.

Rationale and relevance:

1. Is there a clear and relevant vision and objectives for HUSAR activities under the PSAT initiative?
2. Does the department’s contribution to the Initiative continue to be consistent with government-wide priorities relating to Emergency Preparedness (EP) and PSAT?
3. Is there a continued need for the department’s contribution?

Success:

4. Have the expected outcomes and reach been achieved through the activities under PSAT?
5. Have there been any unexpected outcomes?

Cost-effectiveness and alternatives:

6. Are there appropriate management and decision-making structures in place to meet the objectives?
7. Has there been an assessment and strategic use of lessons learned?
8. Has there been consideration of options/alternatives to increase cost-effectiveness or efficiency in delivery?

2.2 Lines of Inquiry

The following types of data and methods were used to conduct the evaluation.

- Document review: documents reviewed are identified in Appendix ‘A’;
- Interviews and consultations with key informants; individuals consulted are identified in Appendix ‘B’.

2.3 Constraints

The Evaluation study encountered the following constraints.

- A Results-Based Management Accountability Framework (RMAF) or equivalent focused on the HUSAR Initiative does not exist. There is a lack of defined performance metrics and performance targets over the life of the initiative, and subsequently there is a lack of available statistical performance data. The reliance on empirical evidence or consultations may raise concerns about conclusions and recommendations.
- A short timeframe and a tight budget to complete the evaluation limited the types of inquiry that could be completed and contributed to a reliance on empirical evidence identified in documentation and consultations.

3 Findings

3.1 Rationale and Relevance

This section addresses the following issues:

- Is there a clear and relevant vision and objectives for HUSAR Initiative activities under the PSAT initiative?
- Does the department's contribution to the Initiative continue to be consistent with government-wide priorities relating to Emergency Preparedness (EP) and PSAT?
- Is there a continued need for the department's contribution?

3.1.1 Clear and Relevant Vision and Objectives

The HUSAR Initiative vision focuses on the development of regional capacity that can be deployed nationally.

The vision of the HUSAR Initiative is, “for Canada to have a national USAR capacity built on teams located in major urban centres that have developed or are in development of a Heavy USAR capacity that can be deployed outside their home jurisdictions across their province or anywhere in Canada.²”

The vision is relevant to the PSAT Initiative because one of its (PSAT) key themes is Emergency Planning and Management³. Emergency Planning and Management addresses the capability and capacity to respond to and recover from all types of emergencies including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and/or Explosive (CBRN-E), natural or human-induced disasters. Heavy USAR is a component of overall Emergency Management capability and capacity.

The HUSAR Initiative has a “goal” and identified “areas of activity” but has not clearly articulated objectives or linked activities through outputs to direct, intermediate and final outcomes.

The HUSAR Initiative does not have clearly articulated objectives or defined direct outcomes. However, it does have a clearly stated goal:

“To develop Heavy USAR teams for deployment to any Canadian disaster causing structural collapse as part of a coordinated, multi-jurisdictional, all-hazard emergency response system.

Achievement of the goal is expected to improve federal/provincial/territorial first responder capacity and contribute to development of operating procedures associated with a national emergency response.”⁴

In the pursuit of achievement of the goal, the Initiative throughout its life cycle has addressed five areas of activity.

1. Standardized array of (HUSAR) tools and equipment suitable for air movement and designed for self-sustaining operations at disaster sites;

² “Position Paper, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) in Canada: Creating a National Capability”, OCIPEP, February 2003.

³ “Public Security Coordination, The Way Forward”, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, March 2007.

⁴ “Public Security and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) Annual Report”, PSEPC, HUSAR Initiative, 2003/04.

2. Plans, policies and protocols on responsibilities of the federal government, HUSAR teams deployed outside home jurisdictions and afflicted jurisdictions;
3. (HUSAR) Training in technical skills and joint operations with other teams;
4. Exercises to hone and maintain (HUSAR) capability and develop interoperability;
5. Canadian national guidelines or standards (for HUSAR), where required.

Annual PSAT reports consistently focus on results obtained within these activities. The identification of these activities has evolved during the life of the Initiative. At different times they have been identified as areas, priorities, elements, development streams and outcomes. There is a lack of clarity of expected activity outputs, performance expectations and direct outcomes that can be attributable to the absence of an RMAF, defined strategy and annual business plan. There is a logic model identified in the HUSAR Initiative Summative Evaluation Plan that links activities and outputs to intermediate outcomes. However, the logic model is not well-developed as evidenced by the fact it is not consistent with the five identified areas of activity (e.g. does not include exercises), it does not clearly define outputs (i.e. outputs are not separated from activities) and direct outcomes are not identified.

3.1.2 Consistency with Government-Wide Priorities

The HUSAR Initiative continues to be consistent with government-wide priorities related to emergency preparedness and PSAT.

Disasters that cause serious disruptions in the services that are essential for the normal operation of a community and frequently result in widespread human and environmental losses are not uncommon. In Canada, major floods and forest fires are common. Such disruptions can exceed the emergency management capabilities of the affected area. There is no evidence that the need for specialized USAR teams and the capability to move them from an unaffected area to an affected region has changed since the inception of the HUSAR Initiative. There is (still) a need for cooperation and coordination for a scaled, national response in the possible occurrence of a catastrophic event. There have been many recent events world-wide that bear witness to this need (e.g. Japan Earthquake (2007), urban transit bombings in London (2005) and Madrid (2004), recent attempted bombing in the United Kingdom (2007), alleged bombing plot in Canada (2006), and Hurricane Katrina (2005)).

“Illustration 1: Logic Model – Alignment with PSC and Government Priorities”, a logic model created during the evaluation shows how the HUSAR Initiative continues to be consistent with government-wide priorities related to emergency preparedness and PSAT. Although HUSAR Teams have yet to be deployed in a national emergency, logic and evidence collected through national emergency exercises suggests that the development of HUSAR Teams for deployment to any Canadian disaster causing structural collapse will “enhance national emergency preparedness capacity to meet emergencies of all types”, and ultimately, “public safety, security and emergency preparedness in an open society.”

“Illustration 2, Logic Model – Alignment of HUSAR Activities with JEPP Outcomes”, a second logic model created during the evaluation, shows how the HUSAR Initiative areas of activities and outputs contribute to the achievement of direct outcomes, which in turn, contribute to the achievement of the JEPP outcome. This model restates the HUSAR goal achievement⁵ as direct outcomes.

⁵ Achievement of the HUSAR goal is described in Section 3.1.1.

Summative Evaluation of the PSAT HUSAR Initiative




Illustration 1: Logic Model – Alignment with PSC and Government Priorities




Illustration 2: Logic Model – Alignment of HUSAR Activities with JEPP Outcomes

3.1.3 Need for Contribution

There is evidence that there is a need for the federal government to continue contributions to build capacity and capability for teams focused on Heavy Urban Search and Rescue.

Five HUSAR Teams (Vancouver, Calgary, Manitoba, Toronto, and Halifax) are being developed across Canada. Evidence shows the teams are in various evolutionary states. Toronto, Manitoba and Vancouver are close to being in a national, deployable state with minimal limitations; Halifax and Calgary have major limitations to overcome. Every team still has a need to build additional capacity and capability and no team is in a readiness state in which they are fully tooled, skilled and air mobile to be deployed anywhere in Canada upon notification. In the future, skills will need to be continuously updated and tools replaced. “Table 1, HUSAR Team Limitations” summarizes the major gaps to be surmounted by each team.

Table 1: HUSAR Team Limitations

| HUSAR Team | Limitations |
|-------------------|---|
| Vancouver | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of a permanent facility • Lack of cold weather capability (tools and equipment) • Limited on-going operating and maintenance funds to ensure deployment readiness • Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for national deployment is in draft form but completion is contingent upon the development of plans and protocols (for national deployment) which are not yet defined and/or complete |
| Calgary | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizational issues related to labour rules that block deployment outside the province • Limited on-going operating and maintenance funds to ensure deployment readiness • MOU for national deployment is in draft form but completion is contingent upon the development of plans and protocols (for national deployment) which are not yet defined and/or complete |
| Manitoba | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MOU for national deployment is in draft form but completion is contingent upon the development of plans and protocols (for national deployment) which are not yet defined and/or complete |
| Toronto | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tool and equipment cache is complete except for a medical cache • Limited on-going operating and maintenance funds to ensure deployment readiness • MOU for national deployment is in draft form but completion is contingent upon the development of plans and protocols (for national deployment) which are not yet defined and/or complete |
| Halifax | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of a permanent facility • Tool and equipment cache is not complete and has major limitations • Resources need to be recruited and trained • Limited on-going operating and maintenance funds to ensure deployment readiness • MOU for national deployment is in draft form but completion is |

| HUSAR Team | Limitations |
|-------------------|--|
| | contingent upon the development of plans and protocols (for national deployment) which are not yet defined and/or complete |

HUSAR Team Leaders expressed their difficulties in obtaining the necessary 25 percent funding from provincial or municipal governments to participate in the Initiative. Obtaining 100 percent of funding from non-federal government sources is outside the financial capability of most teams. Team Leaders suggested that, without national funding, the USAR capability would continue in one shape or another appropriate for their respective regions. The focus would be on equipping to meet local, internal USAR needs for response and recovery to local events. This would be at the expense of specialized tools too costly to be maintained, national deployment capability, common national standards for tools and training, and interoperability with other teams for a coordinated and cohesive response to a national disaster.

There was no evidence found that alternative funding vehicles exist that would be effective in developing the HUSAR Teams for national deployment.

3.2 Success

This section addresses the following issues:

- Have the expected outcomes and reach been achieved through the activities under PSAT?
- Have there been any unexpected outcomes?

3.2.1 Achievement of Outcomes and Reach

The HUSAR Initiative has improved first responder capacity and capability.

Evidence shows that the Initiative has resulted in achievements despite a lack of clarity of objectives and outcomes. The goal previously identified has partially been achieved.

Specifically, the Initiative has achieved the following.

- Emergency Management and response capacity has been strengthened.
 - Prior to the Initiative, Vancouver was home of the only deployable HUSAR capable team in Canada. There were no federally-funded HUSAR teams with a national mandate. By comparison, the United States had 28 funded teams. Today there are five teams located in major centres across Canada - Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, Manitoba, and Halifax – that have completed or in-process projects which have been funded by the federal government.
 - More than 50 Heavy USAR projects have been funded during the development of the five teams.
 - Three teams (Vancouver, Toronto, and Manitoba) effectively, with limitations, have the capacity and capability to be deployable nation-wide.
 - One team (Calgary) has the capacity but not the ability to be deployed nation-wide.
 - One team (Halifax) is in the process of developing its capacity but has certain capabilities that could be deployed, if necessary, to support other HUSAR Teams.
 - There are more than 375 personnel available nation-wide skilled in aspects of HUSAR techniques.

| HUSAR Team | Personnel⁶ |
|-------------------|------------------------------|
| Vancouver | 72 |
| Calgary | 74 |
| Toronto | 103 |
| Manitoba | 100 |
| Halifax | 30 |

Illustration 2: HUSAR Team Resources

- Emergency Management programming has been improved through the development of Canadian National Guidelines and Standards.
 - The Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Classification Guide was developed and published. It informs the Canadian USAR organizations about recommended equipment and training for teams to achieve light, medium and heavy operational capacity and capability.
 - National USAR canine guidelines were completed in 2007.
- Response and recovery capabilities, including deployment readiness and team interoperability have been improved as a result of USAR exercises⁷ conducted on a national and local basis.
- Emergency Management communication and cooperation on a national basis has been improved through joint training activities, regular meetings of Team Leaders and representatives of PSC, and the initiation of an annual national exercise to hone and maintain capability, and to promote inter-operability. The first of these exercises was “MARCH Forward” in Calgary in 2006 involving 150 responders representing all HUSAR Teams.

Evidence suggests the Initiative has not achieved all expectations.

The HUSAR Initiative has not significantly contributed to the development of (national) operating procedures associated with a national emergency response involving multiple jurisdictions and multiple federal government organizations. Evidence suggests that this may largely be the result of the lack of dedicated resources. The absence of procedures due to the lack of resources brings into question how effectively HUSAR Teams can be deployed on a national scale.

- The activity area - plans, policies and protocols on responsibilities of the federal government, HUSAR Teams deployed outside home jurisdictions and afflicted jurisdictions - has not achieved significant results.
 - There is uncertainty at both the federal and HUSAR Team level surrounding the actual deployment of teams in the event of a national or international emergency. There are no existing Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) at the federal level specific to the operational deployment of the HUSAR Teams. There are individual draft Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) between the federal government, the applicable provincial/territorial government and the home jurisdiction of the HUSAR Team. The objective of the MOU is to ensure that HUSAR Teams are available on a Canada-wide basis to enhance local resources responding to a large-scale structural collapse in a planned, organized and timely way. The scope of the MOU is to provide a financial and administrative framework to manage mobilization out-of-jurisdiction and re-establishment of HUSAR Teams that would not otherwise be possible without cooperative arrangement among Canadian governments. The negotiation of the MOU at

⁶ As reported in August 2006 by the HUSAR Teams.

⁷ The National Exercise Division augments HUSAR exercises through financial and human resources.

the provincial and local level has stalled for each of the five teams. As a result, HUSAR Teams may have developed capacity in terms of skills and tools, but they may not have the capability to be nationally deployed because of a lack of defined activation, deployment, mobilization, demobilization and re-establishment procedures.

- The Initiative does not have an allocation of Full-Time Equivalent personnel (FTE). The National Exercise Division allocates a portion of one FTE (estimated at 0.5) to administer the Initiative. The Department of Justice provides legal support as needed and required. JEPP provides administration for the provision of funds for approved HUSAR projects. Hence, activities related to contributions (i.e. evaluation applications and proposals and the administration of claims) have been relatively successful in terms of results achieved. Activities that rely on engagement and consultation with stakeholders such as plans, policies and procedures have been less successful.
- Evidence suggests that achievements in this area have been a result of the planning and execution of exercises and subsequent recommendations (e.g. the development, testing and evaluation of templates – deployment plans, checklists, other documents - for use in a disaster)⁸.

The cost share requirement of JEPP has impacted the take-up rate by HUSAR Teams

JEPP terms and conditions require recipients (provinces/territories) to share project costs. Most provinces/territories have been reluctant to allocate funds. To participate in the HUSAR Initiative, regional municipal governments have had to (with exceptions) re-profile and re-allocate existing budget. The estimated start-up cost for a HUSAR Team in 2001 was \$2 million⁹, 75 percent of which the federal government has been willing to fund but also forcing new HUSAR Teams to locate \$500,000 in non-HUSAR Initiative funding. This has had a clear impact on the timeframe in which Teams could build capacity and capability, especially those located in smaller municipalities (i.e. Halifax). Appendix 'C' presents a summary of total project funding by year and by province. Halifax (Nova Scotia) and Manitoba have received contributions of \$531K and \$1.12 million respectively, far short of the estimated \$1.5 million (i.e. 75 percent of \$2 million) each that could have been expected from the federal government to start new HUSAR Teams.

No evidence was collected to determine whether the longer start-up time and the possible effects of inflation have resulted, or will result, in higher start-up costs.

3.2.2 Unexpected Outcomes

Development of light and medium USAR capacity has been a change in the original direction and the increased reach has been an unexpected outcome of the Initiative.

In its initial years, provinces and territories could not fund projects at a level to allow for the contribution of all federal funds available under the HUSAR Initiative. This resulted in the lapsing of unused funds. In 2003-2004, the terms and conditions of JEPP were modified through an AUI to enable HUSAR funds to be directed to light and medium USAR projects. Since then, more than 50 light or medium USAR projects have been approved. The majority of these projects have funded the procurement of tools or training by municipalities across Canada outside the five jurisdictions developing HUSAR capacity and capability. There is no evidence that expected outcomes were updated to reflect the change.

⁸ "Exercise March Forward, After-Action Report", 2006.

⁹ Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, "Heavy Urban Search and Rescue: Towards a National Capability, Discussion Paper", Draft, December 2002, p.9.

The uptake by the five HUSAR Teams has resulted in advanced skills and expertise being effectively applied to other roles and responsibilities related to emergency preparedness, response and recovery.

The HUSAR Teams are comprised of emergency management personnel who volunteer for a HUSAR Team position but retain their roles and responsibilities in their originating emergency organizations. Under the HUSAR Initiative, these individuals become more highly skilled through specialized training and emergency exercises. When these skills are applied to daily, non-HUSAR roles, Team Leaders indicated that supervisors have observed a higher level of individual performance.

The lack of defined objectives and direct outcomes, the JEPP funding formula, and the assignment of the Initiative as a responsibility of NED have resulted in a negative perception of the federal government and PSC by the HUSAR Teams.

There is a perception at the HUSAR Team level that the federal government through Public Safety Canada is not effectively and efficiently managing the HUSAR Initiative. This perception can be traced back to the beginning of the Initiative and continues today.

- Information is not available identifying why the Initiative was allocated \$20 million over six years starting in 2001 and \$3 million on-going. Participants stated that there was very little consultation, consideration of options and planning in the early stages of the Initiative. End-beneficiaries were not prepared and as a result, there were not enough projects proposed and approved to use all of the funding available. Municipalities were on a multi-year budget cycle. Obligated to contribute 25 percent of the total cost, usually without the help of the province, they had to find their share within allocated funds that had already been targeted for different purposes. In the last year the majority of the annual available funds were contributed to projects but not before approximately \$8 million of the initial \$20 million allocated lapsed.
- The HUSAR Initiative was to be part of a federally developed and coordinated national emergency system. Some teams had the expectation that, because the federal government was going to invest significantly to start up each HUSAR Team, it would take an assertive role in defining standards on how teams were to be organized and the tools and resources they must have or obtain. This has not happened. Instead the federal government has forced the provinces to share 25 percent of the cost but otherwise it largely recommends and allows the province and municipalities to determine how they organize and how they build the team with adequate tools and skills. If an application for HUSAR tools or training is recommended and the funds are available the federal government has typically approved the project. The result is that there are now five teams organized differently and, as near as can be determined from the data available, different capacity and capabilities. Team Leaders have a relatively coherent understanding of their own HUSAR Team capacity and capability, but as a whole they lack an overall, coherent understanding of the national HUSAR capacity and capability.
- The HUSAR Initiative is administered by the National Exercise Division, an organization whose stated mandate is “to maintain and enhance federal/national emergency response capability through exercises.” A contribution initiative such as HUSAR is not part of NED’s vision, mission, strategy, objectives, activities, outputs or direct outcomes.

JEPP builds EMO resource capacity and capability but does not address ongoing operations or maintenance. This has resulted in the development of five HUSAR Teams that may not be sustainable in the long term especially as a national resource for emergency response.

The HUSAR Initiative is regulated by the terms and conditions of JEPP. These terms and conditions are conducive to moving from a state of inadequate capacity and capability to a state of adequate capacity and capability. The language of JEPP “objectives” revolves around

achieving a level of national civil preparedness for emergencies, building capacity and enhancing capability. All of which have been appropriate in the initial stages of the HUSAR Initiative and the building of HUSAR Teams. Most of the HUSAR Teams (the exception being Halifax) are in, or very close, to a state of adequate capacity and capability. The focus is changing from developing to maintaining the state of adequate capacity and capability as well as transitioning to and ensuring a state of operational readiness for a national deployment, something for which JEPP terms and conditions were not created.

HUSAR Team Leaders stated, because they do not have adequate funds for on-going operations and maintenance that the sustainability of their organizations is in jeopardy as is their ability to fulfill their missions in the long-term. Their assertion is that continued development and future sustainability of HUSAR Teams for coordinated national deployment is dependent upon contributions from the federal government. They want the federal government to provide funding to ensure the sustainability of the HUSAR Teams. Their rationale is grounded in the following:

- The HUSAR Teams are a national resource;
- The HUSAR Initiative is national in scope and its development has been substantially led and financed by the federal government;
- HUSAR Teams can only be deployed outside of their home provinces with the involvement of the federal government.

3.3 Cost-Effectiveness and Alternatives

This section addresses the following issues:

- Are there appropriate management and decision-making structures in place to meet the objectives?
- Has there been an assessment and strategic use of lessons learned?
- Has there been consideration of options/alternatives to increase cost-effectiveness or efficiency in delivery?

3.3.1 Management and Decision-Making Structures

The HUSAR Initiative has an established, albeit basic, governance structure.

The Program Manager for the HUSAR Initiative is a direct report of the Director, National Exercise Program, who reports to the Director General (DG), Preparedness and Recovery Branch.

The Program Manager of JEPP is a direct report of the Director, Disaster Financial Assistance and Preparedness Programs, who reports to the Director General, Emergency Management Policy Directorate. Both DGs report to the Senior Assistant Deputy Minister (SADM), Emergency Management and National Security Branch.

The HUSAR Initiative is aligned with national priorities using JEPP mechanisms.

Each year, at a federal/provincial/territorial conference, Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management (SOREM) review national priorities and make recommendations to the SADM, Emergency Management and National Security. The SADM considers recommendations of SOREM and recommendations of the JEPP Committee¹⁰ and includes approved national priorities in (AUIs). Within the constraints of its terms and conditions, JEPP uses the AUIs to ensure that approved projects align with national priorities. #9 expanded the HUSAR Initiative to

¹⁰ The role of the JEPP Committee is described in the “JEPP Manual”.

allow for the funding of projects focused on building light and medium USAR capability and capacity.

The Advisory Committee, comprised of industry experts and having the purpose of contributing independent advice, recommendations and guidance, has not met since 2004.

In the initial years, the HUSAR Initiative had accountability to the Policies and Priorities Committee chaired by the Directors General, Policy and Programs. The Policies and Priorities Committee endorsed the establishment of a HUSAR Advisory Committee. The Committee was comprised of individuals selected from HUSAR Teams, Fire Services (i.e. Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs, International Association of Fire Fighters, and the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal), Emergency Measures Organizations (EMO's), federal government departments and agencies with a mandate relevant to the HUSAR Initiative and regulatory/standards bodies. The mandate of the Advisory Committee was to contribute independent advice, recommendations and guidance to PSC in the design and development of a national HUSAR "system".¹¹ The Advisory Committee met in 2002, 2003, and 2004. There is no record of subsequent meetings of the Advisory Committee after 2004 primarily because it was created to provide policy advice and the Initiative was viewed as entering an implementation phase. Subsequently, there is record of regular meetings¹² and conferences between PSC HUSAR Initiative program officials and HUSAR Team Leaders/representatives.

The provincial/territorial governments are often viewed as offering little or no benefit to end-beneficiaries and can affect the timely processing of applications and claims.

During the Initiative's existence, with the exception of Manitoba, there has been limited engagement of provinces/territories – the actual recipients of contributions. As recipients, the provincial/territorial governments have accountability to the federal government to ensure the terms and conditions of contribution agreements are met. Existing recipients/provinces were members of the Advisory Committee & two or three would participate in meetings. Team Leaders (with the exception of Manitoba) indicated that the provinces rarely funded the 25 percent "provincial" share. The provinces do, as required by JEPP, approve and forward applications/proposals and claims to the PSC Regional Director. These may or may not be processed by the provinces in a timeframe that is advantageous to the end-beneficiary.

In recent years, there has been minimal involvement of operational or policy organizations in the development of the HUSAR Teams.

Within PSC and across the Government of Canada, engagement in recent years has primarily involved HUSAR Initiative (Program) personnel who meet with Team Leaders. There has been minimal engagement of operational or policy organizations that (a) would request deployment of a HUSAR Team in the event of a national emergency and (b) expect them to operate to specific (SOPs).

The HUSAR Initiative has not taken a risk-based approach to management.

There is no record that a comprehensive risk assessment of the HUSAR Initiative identifying possible threats and impacts, and mitigation strategy has ever been completed. This applies to the risk to the success of the Initiative, risks associated with recipients and end-beneficiaries, as well as Canadians.

¹¹ "Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Advisory Committee, Terms of Reference", October 2002.

¹² "Heavy Urban Search and rescue (HUSAR) Team Leaders' Conference Meeting Minutes", November 2006.

The Initiative has instituted controls to ensure that approved applications/proposals meet appropriate criteria and terms and conditions of contribution agreements are followed.

The Program Manager for the HUSAR Initiative has primary responsibility to evaluate and assess applications/proposals against HUSAR-specific criteria and make recommendation on approval or not. There is well-defined USAR criterion¹³ against which proposals can be compared and appropriately recommended for funding. Subsequently, if the proposal is recommended, the Program Manager of JEPP manages the approval process and the resulting contribution agreement as per the terms and conditions of JEPP.

The SADM directly approves all projects that feature a federal contribution of \$75,000 or more. For projects less than \$75,000, the DG Preparedness and Recovery Directorate has delegated authority. The vast majority of HUSAR Projects are greater than \$75,000.

Upon completion of a project payment milestone, the applicable provincial government submits a claim, including required documentation, for full or partial payment to the regional office of Public Safety. If a claim is \$50,000 or more, it must be certified by a designated provincial/territorial official with appropriate fiscal accountability under provincial/territorial financial administration acts. The Regional Director, PSC recommends payment (or not) to the JEPP Program Manager and HUSAR Initiative Program Manager, who in turn, reviews the claim to ensure all conditions have been met. If so, payment is recommended to the SADM or delegate.

There is a lack of a comprehensive performance management framework to allow for effective management of outcomes or objectives.

The Initiative has not implemented a comprehensive performance management framework to allow effective tracking of expected versus actual results. There are no annual reports from the HUSAR Teams that provide a synopsis of their deployment capability, what has been achieved to date, what is planned, and the associated risks.

3.3.2 Use of Lessons Learned

The HUSAR Initiative has made strategic use of lessons learned in one region to build skills and capacity in another. International experiences have been reviewed and implemented where appropriate.

The HUSAR Initiative has made use of lessons learned and leveraged knowledge, skills and experience of one jurisdiction or region to build capability in another.

- The Vancouver HUSAR Team had been substantially developed at the inception of the program. Their knowledge and experience was used to develop national training guidelines, train personnel in other regions, and to inform the types of tools and skills required by other teams.
- The HUSAR Advisory Committee was comprised of individuals selected from HUSAR Teams, Fire Services (i.e. Canadian Association of Fire Chiefs, International Association of Fire Fighters, and the Canadian Forces Fire Marshal), Emergency Measures Organizations (EMOs), Federal Government departments and agencies with a mandate relevant to the HUSAR Initiative, and Regulatory/Standards bodies. The mandate of the Advisory Committee is to contribute independent advice, recommendations and guidance to PSC in the design and development of a national HUSAR “system”.¹⁴ Annual meetings were held until 2004.

¹³ “Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Classification Guide”.

¹⁴ “Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Advisory Committee, Terms of Reference”, October 2002.

- The development of the Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Classification Guide drew on existing bodies of knowledge to define operational skills, systems and safety standards.
- Exercises at both the local and national level have been completed to test operating procedures, the effectiveness of tools and personnel. Results are assessed and recommendations for improvements are made.
- Canada contributes and has access to the work of the United Nations International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) including exercises and lessons learned. During the building of a training plan tailored to Canadian conditions, the Vancouver Team reviewed past experience and the experience of the United States' Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) US&R Teams.¹⁵
- Vancouver's HUSAR Team has been accredited to international standards for response capacity with the United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).¹⁶
- Following exercise MARCH FORWARD in 2006, PSC sponsored a meeting to review HUSAR instructional methods and consider a way forward to promote interoperability and to provide a path for knowledge transfer to teams at the light and medium operational levels.

3.3.3 Increased Cost Effectiveness or Efficiency

The option to change JEPP to allow for contributions to be applied to on-going operations and maintenance is being considered by TBS.

The HUSAR Teams have a need for on-going operating and maintenance funding to ensure sustainability. Without such funding there is a risk that some or all of the HUSAR Teams will not survive. The provinces with exceptions (notably Manitoba) have not offered funding resources to maintain, what is perceived to be a federal government initiative. Regional-municipalities claim not to have sufficient budget to maintain a nationally-deployable HUSAR capability and capacity that has largely been built using federal funds. [*].

There is a lack of data and management processes to assess cost effectiveness or efficiency.

As previously noted, the Initiative does not have a comprehensive performance management framework in which it identifies expected results, measures actual results, compares the two and considers options or alternatives for on-going improvement including increased cost effectiveness or efficiency. There is minimal evidence suggesting that delivery or design options, other than a change in JEPP terms and conditions to allow for funding of on-going operations and maintenance costs, has been identified or considered.

¹⁵ "The Way Forward for Development of National USAR Training Guidelines", March 15, 2004.

¹⁶ This does not mean that the Vancouver HUSAR Team can be deployed internationally. To date, there is no federal government policy for the international deployment of HUSAR Teams.

4 Conclusions

4.1 Rationale and Relevance

Evidence suggests that the HUSAR Initiative is still consistent with department and government-wide priorities related to Emergency Preparedness and PSAT, and it realistically addresses an actual need (i.e. nationally deployable HUSAR capability and capacity), however the design and implementation of the Initiative should be improved:

- There is a clear and relevant vision that focuses on the development of regional HUSAR capacity that can be deployed nationally;
- The Initiative has a goal and identified “areas of activity” but has not clearly articulated objectives, defined strategies to achieve objectives, or linked activities through outputs to direct, intermediate and final outcomes;
- There is evidence of is a need for the federal government to continue contributions to build capacity and capability for teams focused on Heavy Urban Search and Rescue.

4.2 Success

The HUSAR Initiative has had significant positive results, expected and unexpected, within the allocated budget but also with unwanted consequences bringing into question how effectively HUSAR Teams can be deployed on a national scale:

- First responder (HUSAR) capacity and capability has been improved;
- Development of light and medium USAR capacity has been a change in the original direction and has increased reach of the Initiative, especially to jurisdictions that are not building HUSAR Teams;
- The uptake by the five HUSAR Teams has resulted in advanced skills and expertise being effectively applied to other roles and responsibilities related to emergency preparedness, response and recovery;
- The lack of dedicated resources to the Initiative has impacted the ability to significantly contribute to the development of national operating procedures associated with a national emergency response (multiple jurisdictions and multiple federal government organizations);
- The cost share requirement of JEPP has impacted the take-up rate by Teams;
- The lack of defined objectives and direct outcomes, the JEPP funding formula, and the assignment of the Initiative as a responsibility of NED have resulted in a negative perception of the federal government and PSC by the HUSAR Teams;
- HUSAR Teams have not identified sufficient funds for ongoing operations or maintenance putting in question their sustainability as a national resource for emergency response.

4.3 Cost-Effectiveness and Alternatives

There is evidence that efficient means are being used to achieve results, however there is a lack of risk and performance data available to determine whether they (i.e. the means) are the most effective relative to alternative design and delivery approaches:

- The Initiative has an established, albeit basic, governance structure;

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- The Initiative has instituted controls to ensure that approved applications/proposals meet appropriate criteria and terms and conditions of contribution agreements are followed;
- The Initiative is aligned with national priorities using JEPP mechanisms;
- The HUSAR Initiative has made strategic use of lessons learned in one region to build skills and capacity in another;
- There was an Advisory Committee, comprised of industry experts and having the purpose of contributing independent advice, recommendations and guidance, but it has not met since 2004. Instead Team Leaders' conferences have been held regularly;
- Recipients (i.e. the provincial/territorial governments) are often viewed as offering little or no benefit to end-beneficiaries and can affect the timely processing of applications and claims;
- In recent years, there has been minimal involvement of operational or policy organizations in the development of the HUSAR Teams;
- The Initiative has not taken a risk-based approach to management (e.g. there is no evidence that a risk-assessment of the Initiative has ever been completed);
- There is a lack of a comprehensive performance management framework to allow for effective management of outcomes or objectives;
- There has been minimal consideration of options/alternatives to increase cost-effectiveness or efficiency in delivery, with the possible exception of the consideration by TBS to change JEPP and allow contributions to be applied to on-going operations and maintenance.

5 Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Assessment of Risk

Complete a risk assessment of the Initiative to gain a comprehensive understanding of threats, impacts and mitigation strategies considering all stakeholders including Canadians, end-beneficiaries, recipients, and initiative (program) delivery personnel. The risk assessment should be the first step in the refresh of the design of the initiative (see: Recommendation 3).

The risk assessment should address:

- An effective contribution model and the threat to future success from existing JEPP terms and conditions including cost-share requirements;
- The sustainability of the HUSAR Teams;
- The ability to deploy nationally;
- The lack of inter-jurisdictional agreements at all levels of government;
- Integration with other urban search and rescue initiatives between all levels of government;
- The assignment of responsibility of an operational initiative (HUSAR) to a non-operational organization (NED) with a very different mandate.

The risk assessment should answer the question of whether, to achieve continued success and meet the needs of Canadians:

- There is fundamental change required to the Initiative's design and delivery including roles, responsibility (considering NED, other directorates, PSC, other federal government organizations, jurisdictions) , governance, activities, outputs, and objectives; or,
- Refinements can be made within the current organization, design and delivery to achieve continued success.

Recommendation 2: Allocate Dedicated Resources

The HUSAR Teams are a national resource. To ensure the achievement of an effective national deployment capacity and capability, and subsequently to maintain an effective national readiness and operational state, the three levels of government should work to enhance HUSAR capabilities.

Recommendation 3: Program (Initiative) Refresh

There are fundamental program design issues that need to be addressed including:

- Definition of objectives;
- Delivery strategies;
- Development of a logic model that clearly articulates and links activities, outputs, direct, intermediate and final outcomes;
- Resources and funding;
- Expected results;
- Updated/validated governance;
- Reporting and performance management framework;

- Risk management.

The development and approval of an integrated RMAF/RBAF or equivalent would address these issues. However, the program refresh should go further in that it should:

- Baseline the current state of the HUSAR Teams' national deployment capacity and capacity, detail the future desired state and build a plan to bridge the gap between the two;
- Include development of on-going program improvement and business planning processes.

Fundamentally, this third recommendation builds upon the risk assessment identified in Recommendation 1.

Appendix 'A' – Documents Reviewed

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[*].

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[*].

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Public Safety Canada, “Canadian Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Classification Guide”.

Public Safety Canada, “Memorandum of Understanding among the Department of Public Safety and the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services for the Province of Ontario and the City of Toronto concerning Participation and Funding for the Activation, Deployment, Mobilization, Demobilization and Re-Establishment of a Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) Team”, Draft, 2006.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “2006-2007 Public Security and Anti-Terrorism Reporting: Processes and Procedures”, March 2002 & 2003, 2007.

Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Public Security Coordination, The Way Forward”, March 2007.

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Advisory Committee, “Summary Record, Third Meeting of the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Advisory Committee, Draft, April 2004.

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Advisory Committee, “Summary Record”, December 12, 2002.

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Advisory Committee, “Terms of Reference”, Draft, January 2004.

Appendix 'B' – Participants

The following individuals were consulted or interviewed in the preparation of the evaluation and provided information that has been used in this report.

Don Campbell, Manager Policy and Plans, Public Health Agency of Canada

Therese Coady, A/Director, Government Operations Centre, Public Safety Canada

Diane Denis, Senior Program Officer, Plans and Logistics, Public Safety Canada

Paul Shannon, Team Leader, HUSAR CTF 5, Halifax

Terry Boyko, Deputy Fire Chief, Toronto Fire Services

Tony Comella, Team Leader, HUSAR CTF 3, Toronto

Ed Czank, Exercise Manager, National Exercise Division, Public Safety Canada

Bruce Gray, Team Leader, HUSAR CTF 2, Calgary

Brian Inglis, Team Leader, HUSAR CTF 1, Vancouver

Dave Neville, Director, Disaster Financial Assistance and Preparedness Programs, Public Safety Canada

Nicole Lemieux, Manager, Joint Emergency Preparedness Program, Public Safety Canada

Appendix 'C' – HUSAR Initiative Project Funding Approved¹⁷

| Recipient | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006-2007 | Total |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| AB | 649,981.47 | 413,658.18 | 160,008.13 | 1,091,913.08 | 469,204.90 | 0 | 2,784,765.76 |
| BC | 0 | 264,995.46 | 156,822.39 | 166,276.37 | 32,093.19 | 81,161.33 | 701,348.74 |
| MB | 0 | 68,548.71 | 238,013.01 | 374,171.96 | 322,088.68 | 142,944.70 | 1,145,767.06 |
| NS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 39,657.89 | 216,976.95 | 273,931.50 | 530,566.34 |
| NW | 0 | 0 | 74,687.75 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 74,687.75 |
| ON | 131,405.54 | 151,354.39 | 883,565.66 | 278,123.73 | 1,867,569.00 | 2,419,945.80 | 5,731,964.12 |
| PQ | 0 | 0 | 53,182.00 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53,182.00 |
| SK | 0 | 70,110.03 | 171,484.16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 241,594.19 |
| Total | 781,387.01 | 968,666.77 | 1,737,763.10 | 1,950,143.03 | 2,907,932.72 | 2,917,983.33 | 11,263,875.96 |

Note: in 2003-2004, \$710,000 was re-profiled from Grants and Contributions to Operations and Maintenance to fund targeted developmental exercises and studies. Total estimated spending for the project in the first six years was \$11,973,875.96.

¹⁷ Source: JEPP Program Database