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4th
International Report

CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY:
Trends and Perspectives

The 4th International Report

Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives

The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC), located in Montreal, Canada is the leading crime prevention institution at the international level. It has been promoting international standards of crime prevention and criminal justice with the goal of advancing community safety and improved quality of life for 20 years. ICPC works with member governments, international institutions, local authorities and organizations in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Oceania, by offering a knowledge base on crime prevention; policies, practices and tools to reduce risk factors associated with crime, violence and insecurity.

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Editorial and Production Team:

The 4th International Report was produced under the supervision of Daniel Cauchy, ICPC Director General.

Editor in chief: Margaret Shaw

Assistant editor: Vivien Carli

Research: Vivien Carli, Yvain Husseini, Juliette Jarvis, Pablo Madriaza, Céline Monnier

Production Manager: Anamaría Cardona

Layout and Cover Design: Épicentre

The Report also beneficiated from the collaboration of ICPC staff members: Kassa Bourne, Serges Bruneau, Fanny Buttigieg, Cvetanka Georgieva, and Roxane Martel-Perron.

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International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
465, rue Saint-Jean, bureau 803
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Telephone: +1 514 288-6731

Email: cipc@cipc-icpc.org

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Mr Innocent Chukwuma, Administrator
CLEEN Foundation

Mr Gerard Rolland, Administrator
Observatoire national de la délinquance dans les transports (ONDT)

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Matti Joutsen, HEUNI, Finland

Elena Azaola, *Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social,* Mexico

Claudio Beato, *Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais*, Brazil

Benoit Dupont, University of Montreal, Canada

Ross Hastings, University of Ottawa, Canada

Peter Homel, Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) and Asia Pacific Centre for the Prevention of Crime (APCPC) Australia

Tim Hope, University of Salford, UK

Azzedine Rakkah, *Centre d'études et de recherches internationales* (CERI), France

Dennis P. Rosenbaum, University of Illinois at Chicago, US

Elrena van der Spuy, University of Cape Town, South Africa

Anne Wyvekens, *Centre national de la recherche scientifique,* France

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A Message from the President of ICPC

This year – 2014 – marks the 20th year since ICPC's creation. It is a time to celebrate the Centre's many achievements in advancing the agenda of safety from the international to the local level around the world. After two decades, ICPC's mission and vision, initially inspired by Gilbert Bonnemaison's *politique de la ville*, remains extraordinarily relevant. ICPC continues to promote the role of governments and cities in developing integrated policies to promote the safety and quality of life of individuals and their communities. In fact that vision is now being carried forward by many other international organizations which recognize the effectiveness of strategic local action.

ICPC upholds its mission to share global knowledge about crime prevention developments and effective strategies and practices in a number of ways, including the production of its bi-annual *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety*. Since 2008, the report has provided ICPC members, its extensive global network, and the wider public with an overview of crime and prevention-related trends, and in-depth discussion of pertinent topics to inspire policy makers, local governments and practitioners.

For the 4th edition of the report, ICPC has chosen the overarching theme of migration – the movement of men and women and children from their places of origin – usually to cities and urban areas. Globalization brings many benefits but also challenges and opportunities, and migration is one of its most visible aspects. It is not always an easy process and has many implications for the safety of individuals and communities and their social cohesion. This report examines the challenges facing migrant women and men and local communities, the movement of indigenous men and women to urban areas, and the local implications of human trafficking. A fourth global topic of concern, and one which appears to be stubbornly resistant to change – intimate partner violence against women – is also examined in this report. All of these topics are strongly gendered: the experiences and involvement of women and men are very different, and this underlines the importance of tailoring prevention strategies to take account of these differences.

The 4th edition is the result of a tremendous effort by the ICPC team, the Director General, and ICPC's former Director of Analysis and Exchange, Margaret Shaw. As always, ICPC's members and partners have played an important role in providing guidance on the overall choice of topics and in some cases on the content of chapters, which we greatly appreciate. We would also like to express our gratitude to the Government of Canada for its ongoing support, without which this report would not have been made possible.

It is hoped that this edition will motivate key actors in countries and cities to recognize the value and effectiveness of prevention in our societies and to take action to ensure a safer and just future for all.

Chantal Bernier

President, ICPC

A Message from the Director General of ICPC

It is a great honour to be part of an organization that for 20 years has been dedicated to improving community safety and well-being. Over the last 20 years, ICPC has played a key role in successfully promoting crime prevention and community safety. Today the field has expanded enormously and increasingly international bodies and governments are adopting prevention strategies and policies, and recognizing its long-term benefits.

As a centre dedicated to knowledge building and exchange of ideas, ICPC continues to influence the field through its many activities, including its flagship publication – the *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety* – which presents multi-disciplinary information in an accessible manner and for a variety of readers. The report enables ICPC to engage with the wider prevention community: communications is of increasing importance to ICPC as it maintains and expands its network of governments, international and local organizations, practitioners and researchers.

The 4th edition of the report, like its predecessors, updates some of the significant global trends in crime, and provides an opportunity to examine trends in crime prevention, and some of the ways in which it is being affected by global changes in the economy and technology. Conventional property and violent crimes continue to decline in many regions, but have risen in others. New types of crime, notably cybercrimes, have emerged. Insecurity and fear of crime have not necessarily fallen along with crime rates, and in many countries the economic recession continues to have an impact on crime prevention practice. Nevertheless, innovative and informed responses, and knowledge about the cost benefits and cost-effectiveness of crime prevention continue to accumulate.

This edition focuses on a central theme – the migration of men and women – and the impact on migrants and local communities, and the opportunities and positive benefits that migrants bring. This theme is a principal preoccupation for many government members and partners of ICPC. Individual chapters examine trends in migration and in the movement of indigenous peoples to urban areas. Others look at the local manifestation and prevention of human trafficking, and intimate partner violence against women. This selection of topics provides a rich collection of information and ideas that are relevant for all key stakeholders and in each case promising prevention initiatives are highlighted.

Unlike other editions, this report has been produced within a very short time frame. I would like to congratulate the ICPC team and Margaret Shaw, the invited Editor, for producing an excellent and informative report. It has been a pleasure to have Margaret as part of the ICPC team again, and to lead this 4th edition. I would also like to thank the excellent external Contributors, all of them experts in their field, and ICPC's Scientific Committee for their input and ideas on the topics and main developments and trends.

I am certain that as has been the case with previous editions, the International Report will provide valuable information for its readers, in continuing to uphold international norms and standards and promote prevention as an essential component for improving the well-being of communities around the world.

Daniel Cauchy

Director General, ICPC

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List of Contributors

Cecilia ANDERSSON
Urban Safety Expert & Human Settlements Officer
Safer Cities Programme
Local Government and Decentralization Unit
UN-HABITAT
Nairobi
Kenya

Juma ASSIAGO
HSO/Lead Global Network on Safer Cities
Safer Cities Programme
Local Government and Decentralization Unit
UN-HABITAT
Nairobi
Kenya

Elena AZAOLA
Anthropologist & Psychoanalyst
Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores
en Antropología Social
Mexico City
Mexico

Rosemary BARBERET
Professor & Director Master of Arts Degree Program
in International Crime & Justice
John Jay College of Criminal Justice
New York
US

Nicole BARRETT
Director
International Justice and Human Rights Clinic
University of British Columbia and Osgoode Hall
Law Schools
British Columbia & Ontario
Canada

Olenka Ochoa BERRETEAGA
Expert in Safety and Urban Development
FEMUM-ALC Council Board
Lima
Peru

Vivien CARLI
Senior Analyst
International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)
Montreal, Quebec
Canada

Vincenzo CASTELLI
President Consorzio NOVA &
Advisor for Italian Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ripatransone (AP)
Italy

Rodrigo ELIZARRARAS
Coordinator Programa de Seguridad y Justica
Centro de Análisis de Políticas Públicas
Mexico City
Mexico

European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)
Vienna
Austria

Carmen GILL
Director
Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for Family
Violence Research
University of New Brunswick
Canada

Peter HOMEL
Professor
Asia Pacific Centre for the Prevention of Crime &
Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice & Governance
Griffith University
Australia

Barbara and Emma HOLTMANN
Social Transformation System
Parktown, Johannesburg
South Africa

Jacqui KARN
Formerly Senior Research & Development Officer
The Police Foundation
London
United Kingdom

Rolando OCHOA
Senior Research Analyst
Asia Pacific Centre for the Prevention of Crime
Griffith University
Australia

Harry PATRINOS
Lead Education Economist
World Bank
Washington DC
US

Dominique SIMON PEIRANO
Project Officer
Secrétariat général du comité interministériel de prévention
de la délinquance (CIPD)
Paris
France

Allison REID
Coordinator Cabot Square Project
Montreal, Quebec
Canada

Sarah SPENCER
Open Society Fellow &
Senior Fellow, Centre on Migration, Policy & Society
(COMPAS)
University of Oxford
United Kingdom

Karin SVANBERG
Division Head
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Bra)
Stockholm
Sweden

Kathryn TRAVERS
Executive Director
Women in Cities International
Montreal, Quebec
Canada

Marla WILLIAMS
Formerly Project Officer
Cabot Square Project
Montreal, Quebec
Canada

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A

AIC: Australian Institute of Criminology

AOC: Administrative Office of the Courts

APCPC: Asia – Pacific Centre for the Prevention of Crime

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

C

CBC: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation

CCTV: Closed-Circuit Television

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CELADE: Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (Latin American & Caribbean Demographic Centre)

CIDAC: Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo (Research Centre on Development)

CISCA: Canada Initiative for Security in Central America

CMPA: Community Mobilization Prince Albert Project

COE: Council of Europe

COR: Center of Responsibility

CPO: Crime Prevention Ottawa

CPRN: Canadian Policy Research Networks

D

DAIP: Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs

DHS: Demographic and Health Surveys

E

ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

ECPAT: End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes

ECRE: European Council on Refugees and Exiles

EFUS: European Forum for Urban Security

EU: European Union

EUCPN: European Crime Prevention Network

EUKN: European Urban Knowledge Network

E-MARIA: European Manual on Risk Assessment in the Field of Domestic Violence

F

FPDL: Fundatia Parteneri Pentru Dezvoltare Locala (Partners Foundation for Local Development)

FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights

FVPLS Victoria: Aboriginal Family Violence Prevention and Legal Service Victoria

G

GDP: Gross domestic product

GFMD: Global Forum on Migration and Development

GLA: Gangmasters Licensing Authority

GMG: Global Migration Group

GNP: Gross national product

GRETA: Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings

GREVIO: Group of experts on action against violence against women and domestic violence

GSS: General Social Survey

H

HEUNI: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control

HRRC: Houston Rescue and Restore Coalition

I

IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics)

ICC: Intercultural Cities Programme

ICCLR: International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy

ICPC: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime

ICT: Information & Communications Technologies

IDAS: Independent Domestic Abuse Services

IDB: Inter-American Development Bank

IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDP: Internally displaced persons

ILO: International Labour Organization

IMAGE: Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity

INEGI: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, México (National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Mexico)

INHESJ: Institut national des hautes études de la sécurité et de la justice (National Institute for Higher Studies in Security and Justice)

IOM: International Organization for Migration

IPC: Institute for the Prevention of Crime

IPV: Intimate partner violence

ISQ: Institut de la statistique du Québec (Institute of Statistics of Quebec)

IVAWS: International Violence Against Women Survey

IWDVS: Immigrant Women's Domestic Violence Service

K

KVINFO: Kon Viden Information og Forskning (Danish Centre for Information on Gender, Equality and Diversity)

L

LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean

LSHTM: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine

M

MEND: Men Ending Domestic Abuse

MIPEX: Migration Integration Policy Index

MOST: Men of Strength Club

MRCSSI: Muslim Resource Centre for Social Support and Integration

N

NA: North America

NAP: National action plan

NCPS: National Crime Prevention Strategy (South Africa)

NCVRW: National Crime Victims' Rights Week

NeON: Neighborhood Opportunity Network

NGO: Non-governmental organization

NHTRC: National Human Trafficking Resource Centre

NISVS: National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey

NSW: New South Wales (Australia)

NWAC: Native Women's Association of Canada

O

OAS: Organization of American States

OAS-ICM: Organization of American States – International Civilian Mission

OBSICA: Observatorio e índice de Seguridad Democrática del sistema de integración (Central American Integration System Observatory and Index on Democratic Security)

OCTIP: Office to Combat Trafficking in Persons

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

ONDRP: Observatoire national de la délinquance et des réponses pénales (National Observatory of Crime and Criminal Justice Responses)

ONDT: Observatoire national de la délinquance dans les transports (National Observatory of Crime on Public Transport)

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSI: Open Society Institute

OVS: Office of Victim Services

P

PACT-Ottawa: Persons Against the Crime of Trafficking in Humans

PAHO: Pan American Health Organization

PICUM: Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants

PREVIVA: Prevención de conductas de riesgo para la vida (Prevention of risky behaviours)

PRONASCI: Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania (Brazilian National Programme for Public Safety and Citizenship)

Q

QNW: Quebec Native Women Inc.

R

RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

S

SAS: Small Arms Survey

SEGOB: Secretaría de Gobernación (Secretariat of the Interior)

SENASP: Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública (Ministry of Justice National Public Security Secretariat)

SPVM: Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal (Montreal Police Service)

U

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UN DESA: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDG: United Nations Development Group

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund

UNGIFT: United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking

UN-HABITAT: United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHRP: United Nations Housing Rights Programme

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNIPP: United Nations Indigenous Peoples' Partnership

UNiTE: United Nations Secretary-General – End Violence against Women Campaign

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNPFII: United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues

UNSD: United Nations Statistics Division

UN Trust Fund: UN Trust Fund to End Violence against Women

UN ECOSOC: United Nations Economic and Social Council

UN WOMEN: United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women

UNV: United Nations Volunteers

UNWTO: World Tourism Organization

US: United States of America

V

VAW: Violence against women

VAWA: Violence Against Women Act

VAWG: Violence against women and girls

VPC: Violence Policy Center

W

WB: World Bank

WHO: World Health Organization

WICI: Women In Cities International

WIMSA: Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa

WOLA: Washington Office on Latin America

WRAPA: Worker Recruitment and Protection Act

1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

1

Since it was created in 1994 the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) has worked to raise awareness about the importance of crime prevention as a public policy and to place it on a par with criminal justice policy. Twenty years ago, recognition of the significance of prevention formed part of a growing movement internationally. This understood that responding to problems with repression and through the justice system alone was difficult, sometimes counter-productive and very costly. Preventing problems in the first place brings considerable benefits and cost savings, as well as improving the quality of many people's lives.

This movement reflected the enormous growth in academic and practitioner knowledge about how to prevent crime, violence and insecurity, evidence of the effectiveness of prevention policies, their broader cost benefits to society, and the crucial role played by governments in creating safer communities. The specific inspiration for the creation of ICPC, as well as sister organizations such as the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS), was the work of a group of 800 mayors in France, led by Gilbert Bonnemaison, who recognized the benefits of working collaboratively across all urban sectors to develop social programmes to prevent crime and disorder in cities. In France, this led very significantly to the development of the *politique de la ville*, a policy which specifically targeted funds to local governments to enable them to work in partnerships across sectors in developing prevention programmes in deprived areas of cities (De Maillard & Germain, 2012).

Over the past twenty years many governments at national, regional or local levels have invested in prevention policies and worked in partnership with local communities and civil society. The United Nations has adopted two sets of guidelines which set out the principles for effective crime prevention (UN, 1995, 2002). Many other international organizations now incorporate the notion of citizen security and the promotion of safe communities in their work. ICPC's role has been to act as an international resource centre on prevention practices, publishing reports on specific prevention topics and prevention approaches, and on innovative, effective or promising practices. It has worked with actors on the ground on the development of strategic prevention policies; and fostered the exchange of experience between policy makers, practitioners and researchers on the development, implementation and evaluation of prevention policies and programmes.

This is the fourth edition of ICPC's International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Since the first edition in 2008 it has been published every two years. From the start the aim has been to provide a bird's eye view – a resume of trends in crime and in crime prevention around the world – and an update on promising developments in creating safer cities and communities. This report, like its predecessors, is written primarily for three key sectors: decision-makers and elected officials responsible for policies creating safer and more just and inclusive communities; practitioners and professionals ranging from the police, social housing or health sectors to those working with youth on the street or within the justice system; and for researchers and academics interested in prevention and its evaluation, as well as civil society actors.

The International Report draws on data and information on developments in crime and its prevention from a wide range of sources. They include reports by international organizations such as the United Nations or the World Bank, regional, national and non-government organizations, reports and evaluations of programmes and practices, and academic research and analysis. ICPC's extensive international network of partners, member governments and organizations working in the field of prevention and community safety remains a unique resource and source of information. Each edition of the report has focused on a set of themes and topics (see Box 1.1 for a summary of the content of previous International Reports).

Box 1.1 **Themes in previous International Reports on Crime Prevention and Community Safety**

The three previous International Reports have reviewed trends in crime and insecurity, selected topics or themes, and approaches and trends in crime prevention and community safety.

Themes

2008: Women's safety, youth safety, school safety, safety in public spaces.
2010: Migration, organized crime, drugs and alcohol.
2012: Human trafficking and exploitation, informal settlements, post-conflict and post-disaster areas, drug production in developed countries.

Trends in crime prevention and community safety

2008: Global prevention norms, international exchange networks, national and local strategies; knowledge-based prevention; the role of public authorities including the police and judicial authorities; supporting community safety with new services (private security, mediation and conflict resolution); expanding the role of local government and community actors.
2010: Developments in crime prevention; good governance (devolution of powers, legitimacy, regulation of private security, developing civil society's role); social and educational approaches; training, professional development and capacity building; evaluation of crime prevention.
2012: Global survey of city safety strategies and their components, and municipal views on the most important safety issues they face.

The theme of this edition – The continuing movement of people within countries and across borders

> "…the Sahara is busier today with human traffic than it has been since the medieval age."[1]

The current report provides an opportunity to assess how crime prevention is evolving internationally in the face of some significant global changes and challenges, which are affecting the safety of individuals and communities, and social cohesion especially at the local level. Globalization, and the profound changes which it entails in terms of job creation and loss, economic wealth, urbanization, environmental and climate change, the increasing movement of people, and rapid changes in technology and communications among other things, affects everyone to varying degrees.

This report is concerned with exploring some of the complexities of these changes, how they affect men and women and communities differently, and how the changes impact people in different contexts in their cities, countries and regions. Against expectations over the past three years rates of crime have continued to decline in many developed countries, as they have done for the past decade or more. This includes the traditional major crime categories of homicide, robbery, burglary, and car theft.

There is increasing speculation, however, that patterns of criminal behaviour are shifting in the face of globalization and rapidly changing communications technology. It is widely reported that crimes which have international and cross-border dimensions such as internet-based cybercrime and identify theft, drug and arms trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling and labour and sexual exploitation are increasing (Dupont, 2012; UNODC, 2013a). This may in part reflect greater attention to these problems and better data collection. In all regions it is important to examine how men and women are differentially affected by these changes. The decline in traditional crime is, however, less evident in some middle and low income regions and countries, and rates of violence remain high, although there are some exceptions.

These changes in patterns of crime are also occurring during a period of economic downturn, and there appear to be a number of challenges to strategic crime prevention, including those involving policing, and security and social policies. Crime, violence and security remain priorities for the public and governments in many regions, such as Latin America and the Caribbean (Abizanda et al., 2012).

Against this backdrop, a number of sentinel events in 2012-2013 confirmed the choice of the overarching theme for this report: the continued and increasing migration of people across borders and within countries and regions. The massive movements of people from North Africa to Europe, for example, have resulted in catastrophic loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea.[2] They include the event which occurred in October 2013 off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa, when a boat with more than 440 people aboard sank. Scores of migrants were again drowned off the island of Lampedusa in

May 2014.[3] Other recent tragedies include the loss of 365 Syrian refugees attempting to reach Europe in October 2013, and the deaths of 92 men, women and children who tried to cross the Sahara desert from Niger sometime in the same month and died of starvation in the attempt.[4] It also includes the continuing migration of illegal immigrants from Mexico to the US, and within the Asia Pacific region.[5]

This report examines the impacts of these continuing migration patterns on both the migrants themselves and the primarily urban communities in which they settle. Within destination countries migrants find themselves increasingly the target of exclusion and abuse, and especially in cases where they are undocumented, of criminalization. While national/state or provincial policies remain very important, the report focuses especially on the local level, and what can be done by local governments in partnership with other actors and civil society to promote community safety, justice and inclusion in the face of these changes.

The report examines overall trends in crime and violence internationally, and trends in the prevention of crime. It then focuses on four specific themes which are related to the movement of people to cities and urban areas, and one theme which is becoming increasingly visible and requires renewed attention and investment. The themes are all part of wide international, regional and national concern, as well as being pressing concerns for many ICPC member governments and organizations:

- The impacts of migration on migrants and host communities;
- The implications of the increasing movement of indigenous populations to urban settings;
- The impacts of human trafficking and its prevention especially at the local level;
- The continuing burden of intimate partner violence against women.

For each of these themes, the report examines recent global and regional trends and international norms, assesses the key issues taking account of gender differences in their impacts, and ethno-cultural differences, and looks at promising prevention policies and programmes which address the problems identified, including the role of cities. Where possible, programmes which are based on good evidence and evaluation of their effectiveness are examined, and the report outlines some of the developing discussions about evidence-based policies. Each of the chapters in the report is accompanied by a number of contributions from invited experts in their fields, which help to illustrate many of the issues raised, and to provide some results of recent research.

Trends in crime and insecurity, and their implications for crime prevention

When the economic recession began in 2008, there was much expectation among policy makers and academics that rates of crime, especially property crime, would increase. This has clearly not happened, and the most recent world crime figures suggest that with one or two exceptions, the trend in falling crime rates in high-income countries such as the US, Canada and many European countries has continued. The continuing decline in rates of homicide in such countries shows different patterns. In Italy, for example, homicides fell by over 43% between 2007 and 2010, which is attributed to a change in attitude to the use of extreme violence among mafia groups, which is seen as bad for business (Massari, 2013). Nevertheless, crime is still distributed unevenly across the world, with Latin America and the Caribbean experiencing the highest rates of homicide, and violence has increased in some low and middle income countries.

Other conventional crimes including robbery, burglary, theft and car theft have similarly declined in many countries, prompting one observer to ask where all the burglars had gone, while drug crimes including trafficking and possession appear to continue to increase.[6] There is speculation that traditional data collection is failing to capture new forms of crime – cybercrimes which entail entirely new types of crime, or old forms using new means. The technical problems of capturing the extent of cybercrime, let alone its perpetrators, are immense, but it is evident that the financial losses (or gains) from cybercrimes far outstrip the losses and gains from the conventional crimes of acquisition.

The falling rates of crime coupled with economic recession have created some dilemmas for crime prevention. Crime rates in the UK, for example, as measured by police data and the British Crime Survey, show that levels of acquisitive and violent crime have been declining continually since the mid-1990's, and are now down to the levels of 1981. There has also been a change in police policy back to 'core mandates' of crime control and away from the wider prevention and community policing functions (Millie & Bullock, 2013; Karn, 2013). This is combined with severe cutbacks in funding to the police and other social service agencies, and changes in police appointments which are now determined by local election. A number of observers have concerns about the extent to which populist demands for targeted policing of minority communities may reduce the legitimacy of the police, and their ability to support the integration and safety concerns of local communities, including migrants (Bridges, 2011). It has been suggested that there is a need to focus policing on 'procedural justice' principles (Hough, 2013; Karn, 2013).[7]

Some of the questions posed for prevention by such shifts in crime, and in government funding and priorities, include: how can the police and local authorities and the public respond to old and new forms of crime without abandoning the work of building local partnerships? What kinds of strategic policies and programmes can help prevent emerging forms of crime such as migrant trafficking and exploitation, cybercrime and fraud? What responsibilities do the institutions and communities where migrants settle have in supporting integration, rather than just migrants themselves? As has been noted by one observer, in Europe, since the beginning of the 1990's questions about migration have changed from a preoccupation with social, economic, political and cultural concerns, to a "problem of security".[8] They have helped fuel a movement towards more punitive, defensive and exclusive social attitudes towards "outsiders" and strangers.

The question has also been raised of the value of national/state focus of much research and assessment. It is no longer possible to view crime trends as an internal issue resulting from a country's internal social, economic and political situation. For example, because of its geography, Italy is heavily affected by the regional and global trends in migration, smuggling and trafficking from North Africa and the Middle East (Nelkin, 2013). Italy's decisions about illegal migrants in turn affect other countries in Northern Europe. In the UK and other European countries, legitimate migration from the new member states of the European Union has seriously affected both the human rights of those migrants, and attitudes and reactions of receiving communities. Similarly, Swedish legislation to criminalize those who purchase sex rather than those who sell it, may have led to a reduction in trafficking for street prostitution in that country, but would appear to have led to the displacement of human trafficking and sexual exploitation to neighbouring countries (Skarhed, 2010). In the Asia Pacific region, migrant smuggling, human trafficking and sexual exploitation link many countries together (APCPC, 2013).

Trends in crime prevention

In his book *Blue Criminology*, Slawomir Redo provides testimony to the growth and evolution of the UN and especially UNODC's work to prevent crime through policy, training and education (Redo, 2012). As he points out, however, only four of some 60 legal instruments of international law which were adopted between 1955 and 2010 dealt with prevention, the rest were all concerned with controlling crime (Redo, 2012, p. 96). The movement towards prevention did not begin to emerge internationally until the 1990's. Over the twenty years of ICPC's existence, the field of crime prevention has continued to evolve and grow, and this edition of the International Report provides an opportunity to reflect on some of those changes.

From its beginnings, ICPC's concept of crime prevention has embraced the broader notion of community safety, and the promotion of safe and equitable communities, rather than being more narrowly restricted to reducing crime (ICPC, 2008, 2010). As always, it is grounded in the international norms and standards adopted by the UN in 1995 and 2002. The basic principles for the conduct of crime prevention policies and programmes are outlined in the *2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime*[9]:

- Government leadership – at national, sub-regional and local levels;
- Socio-economic development and inclusion – the integration of crime prevention into relevant social and economic policies, and particular emphasis on at-risk communities, children, families and youth;
- Cooperation and partnerships across ministries and between authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens;
- Sustainability and accountability – with adequate funding to establish and sustain programmes and their evaluation, and clear accountability for funding;
- The use of a knowledge base – with strategies, policies and programmes based on a broad multidisciplinary foundation of knowledge and evidence about crime problems, their causes, and effective practices;
- Respect for the rule of law and human rights, and the promotion of a culture of lawfulness;
- Interdependency – taking account of the links between national and local crime problems and international organized crime; and
- Differentiation – developing strategies that respond to the different needs of men and women, and vulnerable members of society.

The international norms are themselves informed by the knowledge gained over the years through research and practice in many countries about the most effective ways to create safer communities and prevent criminal behaviour. Four broad types of approaches are outlined in the Guidelines: crime prevention through social development; community or locally-based crime prevention; situational crime prevention; and the prevention of recidivism. A number of handbooks and tools to aid the application of the guidelines have been developed (e.g. UNODC & ICPC, 2010).

Drawing on its own twenty years of experience of the Safer Cities Programme, UN-HABITAT together with other organizations is currently working to develop new UN guidelines for urban safety for adoption by 2016. These will complement the existing UN guidelines, incorporating some of the lessons learned from recent experiences in cities around the world, including the important role of urban planning and management.[10]

Developments in understanding and knowledge about gender have also increased over the past twenty years. UN WOMEN was created in 2010 in acknowledgement of the need to increase the status of work to improve conditions for women and girls and the attention it receives. It recognises that the impacts of crime and violence on women and girls are specifically gendered (Barberet, 2014).

Developments in knowledge-based prevention

More nuanced evaluation and cost benefit studies continue to accumulate and to take account of the challenges of evaluating complex and community-based interventions (ICPC, 2010). Proponents of developmental crime prevention, for example, continue to search for ways to assist policy makers and practitioners to make informed choices and invest in long-term crime prevention planning (Farrington, 2013).

Recent reports include publications by WHO on violence against women (2010 and 2012), and the recent initiative of the IDB to promote innovative methodologies for cost-benefit studies of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (Corbacho & Scartascini, 2013). In Australia, an innovative study designed to aid the most efficient targeting of crime prevention, applies small area analysis to plot the locations of chronic offenders and criminal justice costs (Allard et al., 2013). A report for the State of Washington provides a valuable demonstration of the value of the cost benefits of prevention policies at the state level (Lee et al., 2012).

The remaining sections of this introductory chapter outline some of the issues raised by the themes which form the focus of this report.

Migration

> "A process to be managed instead of a problem to be solved."[11]

ICPC last examined the impact of increasing migration on community safety in its 2010 International Report. Since that time, rates of migration globally have continued to increase, in some regions very rapidly and with catastrophic consequences for the migrants themselves as suggested above. Within the European Union, the agreement to allow freedom of movement between members states, adopted in 2003, has resulted in rapidly changing patterns of migration from East to West as new countries have joined the Union. In a number of countries such as France, Italy and the UK, ethnic groups which have a long history of migration including the Roma have been subjected to increasing resentment and criminalization (Costi, 2010).

ICPC's 2010 International Report examined trends and patterns in migration, the criminalization of migrants, and discrimination and racism against migrant communities in their countries of destination. Reports from UN DESA and IOM in 2013 record the increasing rates of migration, and regional patterns and concerns (UN DESA, 2013; IOM, 2013a). As with all international estimation, there are discrepancies between sources, but the significance of South-South migration is underlined by the IOM in particular. The proportion of women migrating continues to increase rapidly. This underlines the importance of exploring the gender dimensions of migration, not just the trends in male and female migration, but the differential impacts on men and women, and the implications of policies which do not take account of gender (Altman & Pannell, 2012; Beneria et al. 2012). The number of children migrating also continues to increase. Violence against migrant workers and their families was the theme of the 21st session of the *Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice* in Vienna in 2011, and a number of recent reports show the prevalence of the exploitation of migrant labour (e.g. Dugan, 2013; Centre for Social Justice, 2013).

The benefits of migration

Some countries appear to be focusing on strengthening borders and deterrent approaches in relation to migration, and are failing to curb or discourage racist and xenophobic sentiments. In the UK, for example, an advertising campaign targeting illegal immigrants was piloted by the Home Office in a number of London boroughs with high migrant populations in July 2013. It asked "In the UK illegally? – Go Home or Face Arrest" (see Picture 1.1). The campaign was subsequently stopped, following considerable public concern.

Picture 1.1


In the UK illegally?
106 ARRESTS LAST WEEK IN YOUR AREA*
GO HOME OR FACE ARREST
Text HOME to 78070
for free advice, and help with travel documents
We can help you to return home voluntarily without fear of arrest or detention
www.promogroup.co.uk
020 7978 6399

Source: Sherwin (2013).

Some political parties may tend to emphasise, erroneously, forecasts of *immigrant crime waves*.[12] Yet research on the contribution of migrants to crime in their country of destination suggests that migrants generally commit little crime and tend to lower crime rates in the communities in which they settle. Other complaints focus on migrants benefiting from "free" health, social services and housing benefits. However, a number of studies in different countries have shown this to be a false assumption. For example, a recent study suggests that European "health tourists" contribute more to the British economy than they take out, and are less likely to receive disability or unemployment benefits than citizens.[13] A major issue is poverty, and the economic and social factors associated with being a stranger in a new city or community. Studies of the crime associated with large waves of immigration show clear evidence that migrants contribute no more to criminal activity than the existing populations themselves, and in some cases much less (Baker et al., 2013; Solvietti, 2012; Bell & Machin, 2012; Bell, Fasani & Machin, 2010). In the US there is strong evidence of the reduction of neighbourhood violence in areas with concentrations of immigrants – often referred to as *immigrant revitalization theory*.

> "A focus on crime is a distraction from the more important policy question of how to support the substantial social capital that immigrants bring to this country. Immigrants breathe new life into many areas where they have settled and often (not always) have reduced crime rates as an added bonus."[14]

An on-going study of the role of cities in providing services to undocumented immigrants illustrates some of the polarizing trends now becoming evident.[15] It is suggested that there are wide variations within countries and between cities. In some cities in the US, such as New York, for example, undocumented migrants can access health, education and welfare services, and their status is protected by the authorities. Unlike New York, the response in many European cities is to deny access to health and other services to undocumented migrants, and in other cities to provide limited access without documenting or publicising such actions.

The benefits of migration are being increasingly discussed, and it has been described as a mechanism for structural transformation (Devarajan, 2013). The benefits include rebalancing the age range of countries and social and economic advantages (OECD, 2013; Ambrosetti & Guindici, 2013). Countries of origin also benefit from the increasing size of remittances (three times that of development assistance). Recent experience in the US suggests that there is a need to change the arguments around migration, to focus much more on the positive contributions which migrants bring to their receiving societies and local communities (Spencer & Shama, 2013).

In response to some of these issues, the recent High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development has emphasised the benefits of migration for development, and the need to reduce its negative implications, and to uphold the human rights of migrants (IOM, 2013b). They argue that there has been a 'sea-change' in thinking about migration and its impacts, from seeing it as a problem, to recognizing its contribution to poverty reduction and development in countries of both origin and destination (IOM, 2013b, p. 19). A number of countries and cities have begun to develop more flexible policies which provide incentives for and promote good standards among recruiters and labour contractors, for example, and enable the inclusion and integration of migrants. A resolution issued by the European Forum for Urban Security in October 2013 calls for support among countries for cities in responding to the humanitarian crisis associated with migration in the EU, and for policies which educate the public against xenophobia and racism, protect the human rights of migrants, and promote their integration.[16]

Indigenous migration to urban areas

In many countries indigenous populations have a history of moving to urban areas in part as a consequence of the destruction of their own lands and livelihoods. Where they are recognized, their rights are often associated with their ancestral lands. Moving to urban areas means there may be few services or structures which respond to their needs, and no clear governance responsibilities. In September 2007 the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* was formally adopted by the General Assembly after some twenty years of debate.[17] As a review by IOM noted in 2008, "official data on the migration of indigenous peoples as well as policies to aid indigenous migrant communities remain limited."[18] Nevertheless, reviewing the state of the world's indigenous population in 2009, the UN noted that they form part of the trend to urbanization and that in some countries the majority of indigenous peoples live in urban areas.[19] At the international level a major review of the issues facing indigenous peoples when they migrate to urban areas was undertaken by UN-HABITAT in collaboration with OHCHR in 2010.[20]

ICPC has worked on issues concerning Indigenous peoples over the past ten years, including publishing comparative reports, establishing a virtual network and on-line Bulletins, and organizing international workshops, and an international conference on indigenous community safety in 2011.[21]

There are clear links with other migrant populations in terms of the exposure of Indigenous peoples to criminalization, discrimination and racism in urban settings (e.g. the issue of missing and murdered Indigenous women in Canada, and femicide involving migrant women in Central America). There are also links between indigenous population movement and trafficking for sexual exploitation. For example, in Canada (and possibly Australia) a great deal of internal human trafficking involves the movement of young Indigenous women and girls to urban areas and across provinces, for the purposes of sexual exploitation (Barrett & Shaw, 2011). Nevertheless, while urban indigenous populations face challenges which are similar to other migrants in terms of discrimination or access to housing, education and other services, they are also different (Carli, 2012). In Canada, for example, the federal government has traditionally defined its responsibilities in relation to those living on reserves, and not off reserve. In addition, many major cities in Canada were built on the sites of pre-existing indigenous settlements. As IOM has underlined, many indigenous populations inhabited areas which existed before the demarcation of modern states.[22]

In many countries it is civil society groups rather than cities who have tried to respond to these problems, and there is an absence of data and city-based action. The chapter provides an opportunity to review current trends in indigenous migration and the discrimination, policy gaps and absence of governance that urban indigenous populations often face in cities. It also considers some recent city policies and good practices which are attempting to respond to these concerns.

Human trafficking

Trafficking in persons, both internationally and within countries, continues to be a major global concern. While current data seriously underestimates the extent and patterns of the problem,[23] it is clearly a highly lucrative form of organized crime. Human trafficking takes place for the purposes of labour and sexual exploitation, as well as for other purposes such as human organs and marriage.

The UN *Protocol against trafficking in persons, especially women and children* was initially adopted in 2000 and became operational in 2003.[24] Much of the focus among governments tends to be on trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation, and labour trafficking has to some extent received less attention. Many countries have introduced human trafficking offences into their criminal code, and in some cases initiated or facilitated the development of victim protection and support services. However, as is often the case in response to criminal activities, countries tend to give less attention to prevention than prosecution and protection. Prevention has been primarily restricted to public awareness programmes, with a few more targeted awareness and information projects.

Human trafficking was a theme in ICPC's 2012 International Report, examining national legislation on trafficking in response to the UN Protocol on trafficking in persons, as well as national action plans to combat and prevent trafficking. ICPC has also previously worked on the issue of the prevention of human trafficking. In 2010-11, ICCLR and ICPC undertook a joint project for Public Safety Canada on the prevention of human trafficking, developing a discussion paper and organising international and national expert meetings.

The current chapter examines some of the trends and patterns in trafficking for labour and sexual purposes, and both internally and across borders, and the strong gender components associated with traffickers and trafficked persons. It considers some of the debates about the victimization of trafficking victims, and the dangers of overemphasizing a stereotypical view of trafficking. A number of countries including Canada now have national action plans, national information coordination systems, or rapporteur mechanisms to oversee policy, but action at the local level is often less evident (ICCLR, 2011). The prevention of human trafficking at the local level, where such exploitation takes place, now includes much more than awareness campaigns. It includes the development of local coordination partnerships, and the use of local safety audits to inform local human trafficking prevention plans, as well as training for service providers, the use of regulation, and local protocols with business communities and hotels for example.

Intimate partner violence against women

One of the ironies of the decline in violent crime in most developed countries is that homicide by intimate partners is now the leading cause of death for women. This is the case in European countries, in North America, both Canada and the US, and in South Africa for example (UNODC, 2014; Shaw, 2013). Estimates from victimization and health surveys of violence against women, suggest that such violence – both sexual and stranger violence, and violence by intimate partners – is widespread internationally in spite of the growth in public recognition, legislation and public policy to curb and prevent it over the past four decades.[25]

Intimate partner violence is one of a number of terms which have been used to describe violence experienced by women in private, in the home, or committed by people in close intimate relationships with them. Other terms, used at different times and in different countries, include domestic violence and family violence, but intimate partner violence against women (IPV) is now the most widely used term internationally. While IPV also includes violence by women against men or female partners (and violence between other family members) the overwhelming majority involves male violence against women. This report also looks at violence against girls or young women. Violence against women includes violence experienced in public settings including sexual assault, and in situations of armed conflict. In the past there has been a tendency to see public and private violence as two distinct sets of problems, but it is not possible to isolate the causes of IPV from broader cultural and gendered attitudes to women in society (Whitzman et al., 2013).

The safety of women and girls is a key concern for cities, and ICPC has produced a number of previous comparative reports and compendiums of good practice on the issue. Women's safety was the topic of ICPC's annual colloquium in Queretaro in 2008, and formed part of the crime prevention workshop organized by ICPC for the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in 2010.[26]

In spite of thirty years of legislative reform in many developed countries and the development of special courts, perpetrator programmes, and a high investment in victim support services and shelters – the issue of violence against women committed by intimate partners continues to be a major concern. At the international level, there have been some recent changes in attitudes, with some member states refusing to endorse resolutions on violence against women.[27] Policy changes and economic cuts in some countries have led to an evident decline in funding to support services for women (e.g. in the US and Canada). There have long been concerns about the failure of legislative changes alone to stem the tide of violence in many countries. Countries, such as India, have seen the beginning of widespread public condemnation of violence against women – especially following the gang rape and death of a young woman on a bus in 2012, leading to a national commission of inquiry, and government admission of the need to update laws and cultural attitudes.[28]

Nevertheless, there have been significant UN initiatives internationally, such as UNiTE, UNTF, and projects initiated by UN WOMEN; the recognition of all forms of violence against women, including femicide, and violence in conflict situations; and the development of indicators on violence against women and girls. In a review of the development of survey research on violence against women, Holly Johnson (2013) traces the considerable progress made in recent years, which is helping to provide more consistent and comparable information about the prevalence of violence against women. Victimization surveys have now been conducted in over 90 countries and handbooks and guidance on improving statistical data collection have been developed (UN, 2012). Cost-benefit studies of violence against women (e.g. Agüero, 2013) continue to underline the impacts of such violence on women, their families and society, and reinforce the case for prevention.

There has been a considerable expansion of research and action on violence against women in many regions, research on cultural attitudes of men and boys, and the development of programmes which aim to change traditional attitudes of men and boys to the use of violence against women. A number of recent compendiums of evaluated programmes to prevent sexual violence and intimate partner violence, help to increase awareness of the importance of evaluating programme outcomes.

The Fourth International Report

There is a cross-over between many of these issues. Migration, people smuggling, and human trafficking are integrally linked. They constitute a continuum from exploited and involuntary, through illegal and irregular, to legitimate and legal movement of human beings, all of whom have rights. The voluntary movement of people is integral to the future development of countries and cities. The attention given to each of these issues varies considerably. Some have argued that the predictors of human trafficking are similar to those for migration, yet the greater focus on trafficking tends to distract attention away from the social harms experienced by migrants (Rao & Presenti, 2012). Much trafficking takes place internally. Women and girls are increasingly involved in the movement of people, and it is very important to examine the differential patterns and impacts on these movements on men and women and girls and boys. Rates of violence against women are higher among indigenous populations than others, but they are often hidden because of cultural attitudes and practices. In the Asia Pacific region, IPV and sexual violence are closely linked with human trafficking and exploitation as well as with migrant smuggling. Among some migrant communities fear of the police or deportation, or cultural practices may inhibit women from speaking out about violence, or recognizing that IPV is a crime.

All of the themes in this report concern patterns of behaviour which are likely to increase with the continuing movement of people to other countries and cities. Prevention has a major role to play.

Endnotes

1 Mohamed, N. (2012, November 1). Migrants for whom the Sahara proves a graveyard started out in hope. *The Guardian Weekly.*

2 An estimated 20,000 people have died trying to reach the Southern borders of Europe over the past 20 years. See Shenker, J. (2013, 11-17 October). Despair at the gates of Europe. *The Guardian Weekly*.

3 On International Migrants Day, UNODC chief says more should be done to stem the tide of tragedy. Retrieved January 2014 from eNews@UNODC.

4 Mohamed, N. op. cit.

5 An estimated 2,269 migrants have died during border crossings from Mexico to the US between 1999 and 2012. *The Guardian Weekly* (2013, October 5).

6 (2013, July 20). Falling crime. Where have all the burglars gone? *The Economist*.

7 Procedural justice focuses on the need for justice institutions such as the police to use fair and respectful processes which will help to build trust and compliance on the part of citizens (see Hough, 2013).

8 Correspondence with Dr Manon Jendly, University of Lausanne, February, 18 2014.

9 Articles 7-14.

10 Global Network for Safer Cities and UN-HABITAT, see www.unhabitat.org.

11 See IOM (2013b, p. 92).

12 The UK Independent Party (UKip), for example, has consistently exploited fear of a Romanian crime wave, suggesting that 92% of ATM crime is committed by Romanians. Mason, R. (2013, September 27) *Guardian Weekly*. Nevertheless, two-thirds of UK residents surveyed said they welcomed future Eastern European migrants “if they integrate and work hard” (2014, January 3) *Guardian Weekly.*

13 Portes, J. (2013, October 14). Benefit tourism – the facts. *The Guardian*.

14 Lee, M. T. (2013, p. 277).

15 Open Society Foundations panel discussion (2013, October 16). *Why cities provide services to undocumented migrants*. Speakers Sarah Spencer, Open Society Fellow, and Fatima Shama, Commissioner for Immigrant Affairs NYC.

16 EFUS calls on the European Union to support local authorities in welcoming and integrating migrants. Resolution of the Executive Committee, Reggio Emilia 18th October 2013.

17 UN General Assembly *Resolution 61/295 and Annex*, 13th September 2007. Canada signed the Declaration in 2012.

18 IOM (2008, p. 8).

19 UNPFII (2009).

20 UNPFII (2013).

21 Capobianco, L., Shaw, M., Dubuc, S. (2003) *Crime Prevention and Indigenous Communities: Current International Strategies and Programmes*. Montreal: ICPC; Capobianco, L. (2006) *Community Safety ‘by’ and ‘with’ Indigenous Peoples*. Montreal: ICPC; *Indigenous Community Safety Seminar. Seminar Report* (ICPC, 2011). Montreal: ICPC.

22 IOM (2008, p. 8) op. cit.

23 For example, estimates of the extent of trafficking by UNODC, ILO and the US report on Trafficking in Persons rely on different sources and vary considerably.

24 The Protocol against trafficking in persons is one of three protocols which form part of the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime adopted in 2000. The other Protocols are Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea or Air, and Trafficking in Firearms.

25 UN Secretary General, (2006). *In-depth study of all forms of violence against women*. UN GA A/61/122/Add.1.

26 E.g. ICPC (2004). *Developing Trust. International Approaches to Women’s Safety*. Montreal: ICPC; ICPC (2008). *Women’s Safety* Chapter 2 of the 2008 International Report; ICPC (2008) *Women’s Safety: A shared global concern. Compendium of practices and policies.* Montreal: ICPC.

27 E.g. the 2012 Commission on the Status of Women failed to reach agreed conclusions on this issue although it did do so in 2013.

28 Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law, Justice J.S. Verma, Justice L. Seth & G. Subramanium, January 23 2012.

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2

TRENDS IN CRIME AND ITS PREVENTION

Trends in crime and its prevention

2

Part I – Trends in crime

Previous editions of the International Report have included discussion of global trends in crime and insecurity to help place developments in crime prevention and community safety in context. The first part of this chapter provides a synopsis of recent crime trends and some of the significant regional and country differences. It also looks briefly at emerging crimes and concerns.

The second part of the chapter provides an update of trends in crime prevention internationally, and in knowledge and tools, and discusses some of the implications of these trends for the future of prevention.

Global trends in crime

As is well known, and earlier editions of this report have stressed, estimating levels of crime within a country, or attempting to compare rates of crime between countries, is fraught with difficulties. Much depends on the sources of information used (e.g. police reports or victimization studies), the willingness of people to report crimes to the police, the technical capacities and infrastructure of a country, and levels of corruption.

In many countries, distrust of the police, lack of training of the police, or poorly developed data collection systems will mean that much of the crime which takes place is not reported, or that the data collected fails to provide sufficient information on the circumstances and people involved. Information on the age, sex or ethno-cultural background of offenders and victims may not be recorded. Crimes such as intimate personal or sexual violence, or against migrants or minority groups, are among those most likely to be underreported. It is for this reason that victimization surveys which ask individuals about their own experience of crime are seen as much better measures of the actual extent of law breaking than police reported crime. However, victimization surveys are costly, and few countries undertake them on a routine basis.[1]

Another major source of information, especially for estimating rates of violent crime involving injury or death are health and household surveys such as those conducted by PAHO or WHO, and the collection of forensic data such as the National Injury Mortality Surveillance System in South Africa, and the National Vital Statistics System in the US.

Data on homicide is generally accepted to be the most reliably reported crime, but it is still poorly reported (and recorded) in many regions such as Africa and parts of Asia, and in conflict settings.[2] Nevertheless, using international sources it is possible to look at some overall trends over time. In its annual review of world crime trends, and drawing on the UN Crime Trends Surveys from countries with long-term data, UNODC reported in 2013 that between 1995 and 2011 – a period of seventeen years – there has been an overall decline or stabilization in many conventional

Figure 2.1 **Trends in conventional types of crime in countries for which long-term trend data are available, 1995-2011**



Index 1995=100

Source: UNODC (2013a, p. 5)

Figure 2.2 **Homicide rates by region**



Source: UNDP (2013a, p. 39). Calculations based on UNODC (2011).

crimes.[3] This includes violent crime such as homicide, robbery and rape, and property crimes such as burglary and theft of motor vehicles (see Figure 2.1). Only drug-related crimes, especially drug possession, show an increase. Offences related to drug possession currently comprise 83% of total global drug-related offences, up from 80% in 2005. There are, however, very marked regional differences in crime trends.

The most recent UNODC review of crime trends between 2003 and 2012 includes a much larger number of countries, and finds similar patterns of decline in conventional crimes apart from drug-related crime, but again with marked regional variations (UNODC, 2014a).

Homicide trends

As the Small Arms Survey among others has noted, far more people are victims of intentional homicide in countries which are not at war, than in countries experiencing conflict. In addition, the rate of homicide in some countries not experiencing civil or international conflict exceeds that of countries at war (SAS, 2013; Geneva Declaration, 2011).[4]

Intentional homicide is estimated to have killed 437,000 people in 2012, a rate of 6.2 per 100,000 (UNODC, 2014b). Overall the rate of homicide is decreasing, although rates vary substantially by region, with low rates of homicide and generally decreasing trends notably in Europe, North America and Asia, and higher and sometimes increasing rates, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNODC, 2014b & 2013a; Clarke, 2013; UNDP, 2013a & b; ONDRP, 2013). The map compiled by UNDP, illustrates the wide regional differences in homicide levels ranging from an average of 22 per 100,000 in Latin America and the Caribbean, to 2.8 in East Asia and the Pacific (see Figure 2.2).[5] Sub-Saharan Africa also experiences very high levels of homicide. The rate in South Africa, for example, is four and a half times the international average, in spite of the country's overall development and relative wealth (Jaynes, 2013).

Within countries there are also wide variations in rates of homicide across states and municipalities. In Mexico, for example, between 2006 and 2010, 80% of all homicides took place in only 7% of municipalities, and were located primarily in 5 of the 32 states (Costa, 2012, p. 3). Similarly, in South Africa rates of homicide across the provinces in 2011-12 ranged from 13.2 to 48 per 100,000 population with five of the nine provinces well above the national average (Gilgen, 2012). Urban areas in general tend to have higher rates of crime than rural areas (UNODC, 2014b).

Different factors drive rates of homicide across the regions. In countries with high rates, such as Latin and Central America and the Caribbean, organized crime and gang activities associated with drug trafficking are major factors, and firearms are heavily implicated (UNODC, 2013a). The rate of firearm homicide is very high throughout the region, accounting for between 60-70% of all homicides (Gilgen, 2012, p. 11). Globally, the Small Arms Survey estimates that

40-60% of fatal violence is committed with firearms, and in countries where the availability of firearms is high, they are likely to be highly associated with homicide (Alvazzi del Frate & Del Montino, 2013).

By contrast, in countries where rates of homicide are less high, it tends to be associated with property crime such as robbery or carjacking, while in countries with the lowest rates, the majority of homicides are committed by intimate partners and family members (UNODC, 2013a).

Homicide continues to affect different groups disproportionately. The majority of victims (and perpetrators) of homicide globally (79% of victims and 95% of perpetrators in 2013) are male, and primarily young (UNODC, 2014b). In Latin America 90% of victims are male, and the rate for young men aged 15 to 29 is double the rate for the region (Costa, 2012). This pattern of young male deaths is repeated in many countries. In Mexico homicide was the primary cause of death for young men between 2007 and 2009, where rates increased by 124% – 156% for those aged 15-19 and 20-24 years (Azaola, 2012). Similarly, in Somaliland young males aged 10 to 39 are the main victims of homicide (Quero, Widmer & Peterson, 2011). Race is also a major factor. In Brazil, for example, rates of homicide for young black men are more than twice as high as those for white youths (see Box 2.1).

The overwhelming involvement of men in homicide as both perpetrators and victims, as well as other types of offending, has meant that much less attention tends to be given to femicide, and the separate impacts of violence on women.[6] Not only are women and girls much more likely than men to be killed by current or former intimate partners, they are also more likely to be sexually assaulted and killed outside the home, and by acquaintances and strangers, than men (WHO & LSHTM, 2010). Guatemala and Mexico are two countries where large numbers of non-intimate deaths of women have received little attention until recently (Prieto-Carron et al., 2007; Beltran & Freeman, 2007). In Mexico, for example, the border city of Ciudad Juarez has experienced extreme levels of femicide over the past two decades, the majority involving non-intimate partner events which were never investigated or resolved (Geneva Declaration, 2011). In Canada, it is now reported that over the past 30 years over 1000 Indigenous women and girls have been murdered, and almost 225 remain unaccounted for (RCMP, 2014; NWAC, 2013). Until recently, very little attention was given to this high rate of homicide among Indigenous women.[7] International concern about femicide is underlined by the adoption of a UN resolution in March 2013 by member states, which recognizes its seriousness.[8]

Box 2.1 **Reductions in Homicide in Brazil**

From 1980 the rate of homicide in Brazil increased dramatically, and has been above the average for the Latin American region for many years. The majority of the victims (in 2010 over 91%) have been males, especially young men aged 15 to 24, and primarily Afro-Brazilian. Young men aged 15 to 29 represent 25.5% of the population but 54.7% of homicide victims. Afro-Brazilian youth are more than twice as likely to be victims of homicide than white youth.

Firearms are the main cause of death for both men and women. The rate of female homicide, or femicide, also doubled from 1980 to 2010, and Brazil ranks 7th among 84 countries in terms of its rate of femicide.

In 2008, for the first time, the homicide rate fell below the regional average, in part because of increases in other countries, but also because of marked declines in homicide evident in major cities such as Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro over the past decade. Like many other countries, however, homicide is unequally distributed, and while the state of Sao Paulo experienced a 67% drop in homicides from 2000-2010, others such as Bahia experienced a significant increase. The rates of homicide for some cities also indicate clear declines: the rate for the city of Sao Paulo dropped 76% between 2000 and 2008; Belo Horizonte 33% between 2003 and 2008; and Rio de Janeiro 25% between 2003 and 2010.

Analysis of the reasons for the decline between 2000 and 2010 by the World Bank suggests that the drivers included a drop in the male cohort of 15-19 year olds, a reduction in income inequality, and a reduction in school dropout rates. As with explanations for the drop in crime in the US in the 1990's, the authors suggest there is no single explanation for the decline in homicides, and that a wide range of policies appear to have contributed to this decline including: "results-oriented policing, gun and alcohol control, and programs targeting youth at-risk and hot spots for crime and violence, all guided by integrated and multi-stakeholder citizen security subnational strategies" (World Bank, 2013, p. 13).

Sources: World Bank (2013); Waiselfisz (2012).

Figure 2.3 **Homicide by relationship of perpetrator to victim and sex, 16 European countries 2011 or latest year available**



Source: SAS (2013), elaboration of data from UNECE (2012).

In the case of intimate partner violence, women are the primary victims. Some 47% of all female homicide victims are killed by intimate partners, and less often by other family members, compared with 6% of male victims (UNODC, 2014b). Among European countries, for example, between 2007 and 2011, over 75% of victims of intimate partner violence were women, killed by a male partner (UNODC, 2011). Figure 2.3 illustrates the relationship between homicide victims and perpetrators among European countries – with 3% of men killed by a female spouse, compared with 43% of women killed by their male spouse. Overall, rates of intimate partner violence globally tend to remain stable over time, underlining the challenges it presents (UNODC, 2014b).[9]

As suggested above, the long-term decline in rates of homicide, noted in previous editions of the International Report, appears to be continuing, especially in countries with low rates. In the US, the homicide rate declined by 49% between 1992 and 2011, from 9.3 to 4.7 homicides per 100,000 (Smith & Cooper, 2013). The number of recorded homicides in 2011 was also at its lowest in 36 years – since 1968. In Canada, the number of homicides recorded in 2012 fell 10% from 2011, to 1.56 victims per 100,000, the lowest rate since 1966 (Statistics Canada, 2013). In Europe, rates of homicide in Eastern European countries have fallen by 50% since 2004, while Mafia-related homicides in Italy declined by around 43% between 2007 and 2010 (Massari, 2013). In France in 2013, homicides were at their lowest level since 1996, although there appears to have been an increase in attempted homicides between 2007 and 2011 (see Box 2.3).

Even some countries with traditionally very high levels of homicide, such as Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, are also experiencing a decline. Mexico has registered a slight drop in the rate of homicides between 2011 and 2013 according to reports by the government statistical agency (INEGI).[10] Latin America as a whole has experienced some degree of stabilization, or a drop in homicides, which has been evident between 2005 and 2011 (UNDP, 2013b). In Central America, the region with the highest homicide rates in the world, rates doubled in the last decade, but appear to be levelling off over the past few years especially in El Salvador and Guatemala (UNODC 2013a; UNDP, 2013b). Colombia and Brazil have both reduced their rate of homicide by around half over the past ten years. Nevertheless, rates are rarely uniform across a country. Brazilian states such as Sao Paulo have experienced a 67% reduction in homicide while other states experienced an increase (see Box 2.1). In South Africa, the rate of homicide, while still well above the global average, has declined steadily since the end of the apartheid era in 1994 from a rate of 66.9 per 100,000 to 30.9 in 2011-12 (Jaynes, 2013).

Explanations for declining trends in homicide rates vary, depending on the regional and country context, but as the World Bank (2013) argues, they include a range of factors rather than a single cause. Social and economic policies which reduce inequalities, policing and crime prevention strategies, and legislation restricting the use of firearms appear to be significant. In South Africa, there is evidence that legislation restricting the use of firearms, and in relation to domestic violence, have affected the rate of homicide in general and that of intimate partner homicides (Jaynes, 2013). The reduction in homicides in Italy is thought to relate to strategic changes in patterns of organized crime by the Mafia, to avoid law enforcement attention and enter legal markets (Massari, 2013). In countries such as El Salvador, where gangs have been a major driver of homicide, pacts reached between governments and gangs appear to have helped reduce the rate of homicide (UNDP, 2013b). In Mexico, it is suggested that homicide takes a number of different forms, with organized crime and drug-related homicides over-shadowing the on-going

Box 2.2 **Explaining Homicide and Violence in Mexico (La violencia de hoy, las violencias de siempre)**

After years of decline, rates of homicide in Mexico rose from 14.7 per 100,000 in 2000 to 25 per 100,000 in 2011. In a recent article summarised here, Elena Azaola (2012)[11] outlines three arguments which help to explain the escalation in violent crime in Mexico, especially between 2007 and 2011. Many explanations have been offered for the escalation in violence over that period, ranging from the spread of firearms, drugs and organized criminal activity, to the repressive nature of the security policies introduced in 2006 by the incoming President. Azaola suggests there are three main explanations:

1. The prevalence of types of violence, unrelated to organized criminal activity, that have existed for many years but have been tolerated and ignored. These types of violence, combined with other more recent factors, have contributed to the escalation in violence.
2. The weakness and breakdown of judicial and police institutions, and their lack of capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes, have increased levels of impunity and facilitated crime in general and especially violent crime.
3. The failure of Mexican economic and social policies to reduce inequalities and promote inclusion for large sectors of the population. A better integration of socio-economic and security policies is needed, with much clearer definition of their common goals.

Everyday violence

Drawing on the work of Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois (2004), the author distinguishes between two broad types of violence in Mexico: “everyday” violence and “extraordinary” violence. “Everyday” violence is violence that takes place on a daily basis and is normalized in Mexican society and, therefore, overlooked. It ranges from suicide, violence in families, in schools and against young people, to sexual violence, femicide and institutional violence. For example, from 2007-2009, there was a 68% increase in femicides, while between 1979 and 2004, an average of two children under the age of 14 were killed every day in family violence-related incidents (Lozano et al., 2006). The family has been described as one of the most violent of social institutions (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004. p.3) often associated with structural violence where socio-economic exclusion and discrimination have increased the likelihood of violent behaviour as “the only possible recourse”. There is continuity between both types of violence, and “everyday” violence has facilitated the “extraordinary, pathological, excessive or gratuitous” forms of violence, and thus contributed to higher rates of violent crime.

The violence of crime and the policies to control it

The author argues that police and justice policies put in place to reduce violent crime under the administration of President Felipe Calderon have in fact exacerbated the situation in Mexico. Between 2006 and 2009, the national security budget was increased by 71%, with large increases in the number of municipal and federal police, however, during the same period abductions increased by 83%, intentional homicides by 34%, and robbery with violence by 31%. The weakness of government institutions and lack of capacity to investigate and prosecute reported crimes has resulted in impunity for many. In 2007 impunity for all crimes reported nationally stood at 98.7%. Internationally, Mexico is one of the countries with the highest levels of impunity (CIDAC, 2009); 80% of homicides went unsolved or prosecuted in 2008 (Mexico Evaluá, 2009). In some States, organized crime groups have in certain respects replaced state power. In addition, the government received 11,680 complaints against military and public security personnel regarding human rights violations and misuse of authority between 2006 and 2011. A number of scientific studies have concluded that the increase in the provocative use of force by the government against drug cartels in this period without doubt increased the level of violence. Further, the use of violence on the “margins of the law” by the state has had a corrosive effect on social institutions, on the credibility of the security services, and the confidence of citizens in the police, ultimately destroying social cohesion.

The violence of exclusion

Levels of inequality in Mexico have increased in recent years, with larger numbers of people living in poverty, and a lack of educational opportunities and employment. Millions of young people are neither in education nor work, facing the alternatives of migration, working in the informal economy or illegally. Border states and cities have been facing increasing numbers of deported migrants who they are unable to integrate or absorb. The result has been a growth of cynicism and apathy, a lack of good governance and confidence in society, and low levels of social capital. The government used a very narrow notion of public security as an end in itself, not one which envisioned citizens living safe, normal and prosperous lives. Thus the increase in violence has in part resulted from the failure of socio-economic policies to reduce inequalities, to advance the inclusion of all groups in society, and to provide opportunities for development. Further, by focusing on the use of force to attain security, the government paid insufficient attention to its deficits, and to the significant and growing socio-economic gaps in society, instead helping to promote conflict and exacerbate violence.

Conclusion

The government needs to take account of these three arguments for the escalation of violence in Mexico. It should recognize the continuity between everyday violence which is ignored, and extraordinary violence which has received so much attention. It needs to recognize the contributing role of aggressive security policies and the need to improve the capacity of the criminal justice system to investigate, prosecute, and reduce impunity, and it needs to re-build social ties and increase social cohesion. Socio-economic and security policies need to be integrated, with the links between security and social and economic policies and prevention clearly articulated. Such policies should prioritise preventing and reducing crime and violence by closing socio-economic gaps, strengthening public institutions and addressing deeply entrenched institutional corruption.

Source: Azaola, E. (2012).

and "accepted" "every-day" forms of homicide, including youth homicide, femicide, family violence and intimate partner violence against women (see Box 2.2).

Trends in other types of crime and in levels of insecurity

As noted at the beginning of the chapter, with the exception of drug-related offences, others forms of violent and property crime such as robbery, assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft are also declining especially in high income countries.[12] Apart from North America, this is evident in Australia (AIC, 2013) and in Europe where overall figures show long term declining trends since the 1990's, although there are some variations (Clarke, 2013). Most of the 28 countries in the European Union experienced declines in property and violent crime between 2006 and 2010 with major declines in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (Clarke, 2013). This prompted one journalist to ask "Where have all the burglars gone?"[13]

Violent crime including sexual assault and rape has declined in most European countries, although a recent European survey of violence against women in 28 countries has found that 1 in 3 women has experienced physical or sexual violence since the age of 15, and 8% in the past twelve months (FRA, 2014). Globally, surveys of violence against women in 81 countries report that 30% of women have experienced physical or sexual abuse by a partner since the age of 15 (Devries et al., 2013) (see Chapter 6).

In England and Wales, both police records and the annual crime survey show a continuing decline in almost all types of crime, including a 10% drop from 2011-12 to 2012-13 (UK, 2013). Crime levels are now at the lowest level since crime victimization surveys began in 1981, and have dropped continually over a period of twenty years. In France, police reports on crime and the *Cadre de vie et sécurité* victimization survey both report a decline in property crime between 2007 and 2012, although some increases in violence and attempted homicide were evident. Nevertheless, the victimization survey suggests that levels of insecurity have increased in France, in spite of reported declines in household and personal victimization (Box 2.3).

The global increase in drug-related crime relates primarily to increasing arrests for consumption rather than drug trafficking, especially in Africa, Europe and Asia (UNODC, 2013a). Arrests for drug trafficking appear to be relatively stable, although they have increased in parts of Africa in recent years. Over the past fifteen years, for example, West Africa has become a transit region for cocaine and heroin from Latin America and Asia en route for Europe (Aning & Pokoo, 2013), while East African countries have become a route for opiates from Afghanistan (UNODC, 2013a). The increase in trafficking in Africa could have some major consequences for countries without strong capacities and governance structures, including increasing violence between drug cartels and governments and at the local level, and the use of drug money to finance armed groups (Aning & Pokoo, 2013).

Box 2.3 **Trends in crime and insecurity in France**

The main sources of information on criminality in France are statistics on reported crime collected by the National Police and the *Gendarmerie*,* which are collated by the National Observatory on Crime and Penal Responses (ONDRP). This data is supplemented by the national victimization survey – the *Cadre de vie et sécurité* – administered annually by ONDRP. The Observatory forms part of the National Institute for Higher Studies in Security and Justice (INHESI). All sources confirm that there has been a decline in property crime between 2007 and 2012. National police statistics suggest an increase in robbery, although the national victimization survey shows a very significant decline. Both the police and *Gendamerie* statistics suggest a significant increase in offences against the person between 2007 and 2012. Homicides are at their lowest level since 1996, however, although both sources suggest attempted homicides have increased considerably.

It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that the 2013 national victimization survey shows a decline in all types of household and personal victimization, both violent and non-violent, levels of insecurity in the home and neighbourhood in 2013 were distinctly higher than in all previous years since 2007. In other words there has been a decline in victimization, but an increase in the sense of insecurity.

In relation to migrants and other non-French citizens, in the Île de France and the Greater Paris region, infractions against immigration and related laws fell by 32.6% in 2013, and non-French citizens represented 18.6% of non-traffic and non-immigration offences recorded by the National police in 2013.

* The National Police are responsible for Paris and large urban areas; the *Gendarmerie* primarily police smaller towns and rural areas.

While rates vary greatly across the region, Latin America continues to experience high levels of violence apart from homicides, which reduce the quality of life and increase feelings of insecurity (Corbacho & Scartascini, 2013). In 2008-2010 a survey of perceptions of insecurity in all countries in the region found that 43% of the population said they felt "somewhat" or "very unsafe". This compared with 23% in Canada and the US (Costa, 2012, p. 6). On the basis of public opinion surveys conducted in 2012, UNDP reports that between 45% and 65% of people surveyed have stopped going out at night, and between 16.8% and 51.5% have limited the places where they shop, for fear of crime (UNDP, 2013b). However, one study has questioned why perceptions of insecurity have been found to be lower in Latin America and the Caribbean with its high levels of violence than in other regions with lower levels of victimization, and why it varies across a country (Graham & Chaparro, 2011).[14] As these authors note, cross-country differences in perceptions of insecurity do not correlate with homicide rates. They found that being a victim of crime had a negative effect on people's happiness and health, and on their confidence in public institutions, but suggest that people may adapt to high levels of crime, depending on their age and circumstances.

Overall, victimization surveys in the region up to 2010 have suggested that crimes such as robbery, assault or theft have remained stable or declined in the past decade. In part this is thought to reflect social and economic improvements in the region, as well as improvements in the functioning of criminal justice systems (Costa, 2012).

The Asia Pacific region has always experienced low levels of reported violence and crime apart from that related to conflict. A series of fact sheets on Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Papua New Guinea published by the Asia Pacific Crime Prevention Centre (APCPC)[15] provides a snapshot of reported offending and crime trends in five countries in the region (see Box 2.4). In all cases levels of corruption also appear to be high. See also the contribution by Peter Homel and Rolando Ochoa at the end of this chapter *Crime and Safety in South East Asia and the Western Pacific.*

Emerging crimes – Cybercrime

The decline in conventional crimes in regions such as Europe and North America has raised considerable speculation about whether their place is being taken by "new" forms of crime which are not being captured by police reports or victim surveys, and in particular internet-enabled crimes. Cybercrime, which includes a wide range of behaviours from fraud and identity theft, to pornography, sexual exploitation, harassment and bullying, has become a serious concern for many countries and at the international level. At the request of the UN General Assembly, a comprehensive study of cybercrime has recently been undertaken to examine its impacts and the options for strengthening national and international prevention and responses.[16] It is seen by organizations such as Interpol as one of the most rapidly expanding and increasing crimes.[17]

Box 2.4 **Crime in the Asia Pacific Region**

In Cambodia (population c.13 million) crime rates are relatively low, and victimization studies suggest a decline in violent victimization between 2004 and 2010. However, migrant smuggling and trafficking have become serious concerns, with many Cambodians being trafficked or smuggled to Thailand, making them highly susceptible to sexual and labour exploitation.

Indonesia (population c.238 million) has one of the lowest levels of homicide in the world, but overcrowded informal settlements in urban areas such as Jakarta are seriously affected by crime, and violence against women is seriously under-reported.

Malaysia (population c. 28 million) has low levels of crime and violence but recently experienced an increase in homicides, which is thought to be related to gangs with easy access to firearms, and in spite of tough firearms laws. Like Indonesia, violence against women is a serious and under-reported issue, often associated with alcohol and drugs.

Unlike other countries in the region, Papua New Guinea (population c. 7 million) a low income country, has very high rates of homicide and violence, comparable to some countries in Latin America. This is especially the case in the capital Port Moresby, and one survey found 57% of households reported being victimized in the previous year. Gang rape has also been a significant problem. Alcohol is a major factor in violence, associated with the deaths of teenagers, domestic violence, and road accidents.

Vietnam (population c.90 million) has a very low homicide rate comparable to France and Australia, but is experiencing rapid development and social change. Levels of youth offending appear to have increased and the at-risk population expanded. In addition, cases of trafficking in persons have increased markedly over the past decade, and smuggling of migrants is also thought to be a problem, as well as trafficking in natural resources and other artefacts.

Sources: APCPC (2013).

Cybercrime is a phenomenon which exploits the easy accessibility and anonymity of the Internet, with less apparent physical exposure and risk than traditional crimes. In 2011 there were some 2.3 billion internet users in the world, and it is estimated that 70% of the world's population will become connected by 2017, offering enormous scope for criminal activity (UNODC, 2013b, p. xvii; Dupont, 2012).

There is no universally agreed definition of cybercrime since it encompasses a broad range of activities, and countries define it for different purposes. Australia, for example, uses the term to refer to crimes directly related to computers and ICT technology, and the use of computers to commit "traditional" crimes such as theft and fraud (see Box 2.5). At its core, cybercrime includes acts against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data or systems, and computer-related acts for personal or financial gain (UNODC, 2013b, p.11).

It is especially hard to identify the perpetrators of cybercrime which can be individuals or groups. It requires very specialized information technology competencies. Young men in developing countries are becoming increasingly involved (UNODC, 2013b, p. xviii). Constant innovations in software mean that traditionally secure domains may now be "attacked",

Box 2.5 **Defining cybercrime**

In Australia the term cybercrime is used to describe:

- Crimes directed at computers or other information communications technologies (ICTs) (such as hacking and denial of service attacks), and "hacktivists".
- Crimes where computers or ICTs are an integral part of an offence (such as online fraud, identity theft and the distribution of child exploitation material).

The first category consists of offences which only exist in the digital world, such as criminals hacking networks to steal sensitive business information or attacks against websites to extort money or by "hacktivists". The second category covers old crimes committed in new ways. The internet and digital technologies provide a platform for committing crimes such as fraud and identity theft on an industrial scale.

Attorney General's Department (2013). *National Plan to Combat Cybercrime.* Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, p. 4-5.

while on-line transactions, mobile phone technology and social media all facilitate access.[18] It is suggested that 80% of cybercrime acts involve some form of organized activity (UNODC, 2013b, p. xvii). Private businesses, individuals and governments may all be victims, but according to one survey, 80% of private individuals do not report crimes to the police (UNODC, 2013b, p. xxi). The figure below taken from the UNODC study, illustrates the wide range of cybercrime activities which are being reported to national police forces.

The costs of cybercrime are difficult to calculate given the absence of reporting, but various estimates put the reported losses in Europe, for example, at 750 billion Euros ($1,020US billion) a year.[19] In the US costs were estimated in 2011 to be $194US a head, while American banks were reported to have lost some $12US billion dollars.[20] In terms of identity theft, much of which involves cybercrime, the US estimates that the direct and indirect losses totalled $24.7US billion in 2012. This was far higher than losses incurred through property crimes such as burglary and theft ($14US billion) and motor vehicle theft ($3US billion) (Harrell & Langton, 2013).

Figure 2.4 **Most common cybercrime acts encountered by national police**



Source: UNODC (2013b, p. 26)

In relation to the prevention of cybercrime, the UNODC expert group notes the unequal responses around the world, with strong legislation and protections in some regions and inadequate legislation and poor capacity for enforcement in others, especially in parts of Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. Apart from strengthening legislation and increasing training and capacity, they note the importance of cooperation at the international level coupled with partnerships between governments, the private sector, academics and communities. The past six years has seen the adoption of binding agreements by some 82 countries, and a number of countries have developed national strategic plans which include prevention components such as targeted awareness raising, training, and protocols and partnerships across sectors and internationally. The European Union provides a good example of coordination. Since the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, it has improved coordination between member states, developed two legal instruments, and in 2013 inaugurated the European Cybercrime Centre (known as EC3) based at Europol (Buono, 2012). A joint EU-Council of Europe regional project has also been strengthening criminal justice capacities and cooperation among countries in the Balkan region. A number of guides on good prevention strategies and practice have been produced, such as that by the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN, 2010).

Nevertheless, at the international level issues of cybercrime and identity-related crimes continue to be of concern, as well as corruption, and the need to improve the quality and availability of crime statistics at national and international levels.[21] A workshop on cybercrime will take place during the 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Qatar in 2015.

The 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 2015

The 13th Congress marks the 60th anniversary of UN Congresses on crime prevention and criminal justice, and the provisional agenda provides a resume of current concerns and preoccupations in relation to crime trends and in crime prevention (Box 2.6) and to which Part II of this chapter now turns.

Box 2.6 **Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 2015** [22]

Congress Theme:
Integrating crime prevention and criminal justice into the wider United Nations agenda to address social and economic challenges and to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and public participation.

Agenda items:

- Successes and challenges in implementing comprehensive crime prevention and criminal justice policies and strategies to promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and to support sustainable development.
- International cooperation, including at the national level to combat transnational organized crime.
- Comprehensive and balanced approaches to prevent and adequately respond to new and emerging forms of transnational crime.
- National approaches to public participation in strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice.

Workshops:

- Role of the United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice in support of effective, fair, humane and accountable criminal justice systems: experiences and lessons learned in meeting the unique needs of women and children, in particular the treatment and social reintegration of offenders.
- Trafficking in persons and smuggling migrants: successes and challenges in criminalization, in mutual legal assistance and in effective protection of witnesses and trafficking victims.
- Strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice responses to evolving forms of crime such as cybercrime and trafficking in cultural property, including lessons learned and international cooperation.
- Public contribution to crime prevention and raising awareness of criminal justice: experiences and lessons learned.

Part II – Trends in crime prevention

Building on twenty years of experience

As the introduction to this report indicates, there are now some twenty years of accumulated global experience on the value of a collaborative and knowledge-based approach to crime prevention, and which is supported by two sets of UN guidelines on the prevention of crime. This experience built on the concept of the central role of cities in promoting integrated policies to prevent social unrest, first developed by Gilbert Bonnemaison and fellow mayors in France in the late 1980's, and one which led to the *politique de la ville* in France. Together with increasingly positive findings from the evaluation of innovative projects and practice on the ground and their replication elsewhere, this movement became the inspiration for the creation of ICPC and EFUS and for UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme.

By 1999 nine countries had developed national crime prevention strategies which recognized the importance of the role of cities, and with permanent bodies responsible for implementing those strategies (Sansfaçon & Welsh, 1999).[23] By 2006, and following the adoption of the 2002 UN Guidelines on the Prevention of Crime, more than 37 countries were known to have established some form of a national strategy on crime prevention; and in 2009 ICPC identified 57 countries (ICPC, 2008; ICPC, 2010). While there are evident differences between regions in the priorities identified in national strategies, they continue to recognize the importance of action at the local level.[24] Such strategies have usually adopted a multi-sector approach, and encouraged through funding, or in some cases required, local municipalities to undertake safety audits, develop and implement strategies, or establish their own local crime prevention councils.

National strategies have taken a variety of forms, been renewed or modified over time, or changed their priorities in the light of knowledge, events or changes in government. In some cases there has been limited implementation. Change in the priorities attached to national strategies are illustrated by the example of the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention – Bra. The council was established in 1998 under the Ministry of Justice, initially with responsibility for undertaking crime prevention research and development at the local level. Their role has evolved over the past 15 years, from supporting the creation of local councils, to a strong focus on evidence-based prevention in the mid 2000's, and more recently a greater emphasis on the "more pragmatic" processes of implementing strategic crime prevention. This involves improving the technical capacities of local crime prevention councils to utilize mapping and analysis techniques, for example. (See the contribution by Karin Svanberg on *Local Crime Prevention in Sweden* at the end of this chapter).

More recent examples of national prevention strategies include the Brazilian National Programme for Public Safety and Citizenship, PRONASCI, established in 2007. PRONASCI benefited from the experience of some of its own cities, including Diadema, as well as other countries' experience in developing national prevention strategies. The first phase of the programme included a series of targeted funding streams directed at eleven metropolitan cities with the greatest needs. Both states and municipal governments could apply for funds to develop local prevention programmes, in partnership with other institutions and civil society (Shaw & Carli, 2011). The importance of coordinated management to ensure that programmes are properly implemented and evaluated was well understood. As a condition of receiving funding, local municipalities were required to establish an integrated management office for the development, coordination and evaluation of their programmes. PRONASCI has since been renewed and extended across the whole country.

Other examples include Mexico and Bulgaria. In Mexico, the new government of President Peña Nieto launched a *National Programme for the Social Prevention of Crime and Violence* in 2013. The programme is led by the Secretariat for Prevention and Citizen Participation within the Ministry of the Interior (SEGOB). It plans to target funding for interventions in 57 municipalities or metropolitan areas with high levels of violence, and programmes to keep children in school and to prevent drug addiction will be funded in a further 251 municipalities.[25] Bulgaria, a member of the European Union Crime Prevention Network, launched a new national crime prevention strategy in 2012, with a focus on the prevention of domestic violence, delinquency, drugs, recidivism, and property crime.[26]

A number of countries have recently renewed their national strategies. France has launched a new national strategy for the prevention of crime for the period 2014-2020 (National Strategy on the Prevention of Crime – *Stratégie nationale de prévention de la délinquance*).[27] It has three priorities: targeting youth at risk; the prevention of violence against women, including domestic violence and victim assistance; and reducing fear of crime and improving the public's sense of safety. It was developed following national consultations, especially with those working on the ground, with the association of mayors and the national council on cities, mediation and prevention groups, and across government ministries (see the contribution by France, *France: National Strategy for the Prevention of Crime 2013-2017* at the end of this chapter). Similarly, South Africa is renewing its strategy to respond to changing priorities and knowledge, with two new white papers on policing and safety and security being released in 2014 (Box 2.7).

In a number of countries regional, state or provincial bodies and policies have been developed. In Australia, for example, in the State of New South Wales, Community Safety Officers have been part of local municipal councils from the 1980's and 1990's (Shepherdson et al., 2014). In Canada, the provinces of Quebec and Alberta have had provincial crime prevention strategies for a number of years, and Ontario is currently developing one.

Increased recognition of the role of cities

"Security is a central responsibility of cities …"[28]

In November 2013 the city of Liege in Belgium organized a colloquium to commemorate its 20 years of using an integrated global approach to preventing urban crime and insecurity.[29] In other parts of the world, where levels of crime and violence are much higher, cities such as Medellin and Bogota in Colombia have adopted integrated policies combining *social urbanism*, urban development and social and community prevention approaches with local community participation. They have seen some quite dramatic reductions in levels of homicide and violence, and improvements in other aspects of urban life (UNDP, 2013b; Perez, 2011; Shaw & Carli, 2011).

In Europe, the expansion of EFUS since its initial foundation in 1987 is a testament to the growing number of cities which see prevention as a rational and effective approach to urban safety. The EFUS network now includes 250 cities from 17 European countries, as well as a number of national forums on urban safety. In December 2012 a new cities manifesto highlighting the role of cities in prevention was adopted at a conference on the "future of prevention" organized by EFUS.[30] The manifesto *Security, Democracy and Cities: The Manifesto of Aubervilliers and St Denis* includes 19 recommendations covering specific aspects of prevention, ranging from the use of safety audits, to mediation and public private partnerships, and sets out five major principles:

- Long term prevention policies must be endorsed.
- Prevention is a rational and strategic choice.
- Citizen participation, especially youth participation, is fundamental.
- Women's rights and sexual equality must be constantly promoted.
- Security policies must be systematically evaluated.

Box 2.7 **Developments in policing, safety and security in South Africa**

South Africa adopted its National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in 1996, and was one of the first countries globally to do so. The NCPS outlined the government's overarching policy on prevention which incorporated proactive intervention in place of reactive crime control. It was followed by the *White Paper of Safety and Security* in 1998 which underlined the importance of social crime prevention as a government responsibility, using a multi-disciplinary approach to promote safer communities.

Over the next twenty years it seems generally agreed that the NCPS and the White Paper were not properly implemented, in part because of lack of capacity, but they were also overshadowed for a number of years by reactive, short-term and tough criminal justice approaches, and high rates of violence and incarceration (Berg & Shearing, 2011). In 2011 a new *Integrated Social Crime Prevention Strategy* was launched by the Department of Social Development to help strengthen social prevention (South Africa, 2011). Developed on the basis of a detailed review of social crime prevention research and legislation, the strategy has a number of objectives including increased capacity, equitable and integrated site delivery, targeted partnerships, sustainability, improving the social fabric and family cohesion, and investment in early intervention and prevention.

In 2014, the government published two new White Papers which replaced the 1998 White Paper. *The White Paper on the Police* aims to increase the professionalism and competence of the police, and clarify their roles in crime control and in crime prevention. It emphasizes intelligence-led policing and a community-centred prevention approach, and partnerships with other institutions and civil society.[31]

The *White Paper on Safety and Security 2014* recognizes that crime prevention policies are not delivered in a vacuum, and need strong institutional support. It aims to revive the NCPS, recognising the important roles of schools, communities, police agencies, courts and corrections and local government in the promotion of prevention, and emphasizes that a coordinated national response which addresses the root causes of crime is required.

Over the past 17 years UN-HABITAT's *Safer Cities Programme* has gained valuable experience working in some 70 cities around the world. Initially developed in response to requests from African mayors, the Safer Cities Programme has gradually expanded its conception of safety and prevention. Its initial urban crime prevention model included strengthening local government capacities to promote safe and secure cities, and the implementation of social and environmental projects to prevent crime and violence, especially against women, girls and youth. The second phase incorporated the broader concept of human security, which focuses on the security needs of individuals or communities rather than states, and includes not only crime, but the linked issues of poverty, conflict, tenure and environmental security (UN-HABITAT, 2007). Currently the work of the programme now incorporates notions of social capital, and the enhancement of safety and social integration in cities, through planning, management and governance. This is now being conceptualized through the *Global Network on Safer Cities* which was launched by UN-HABITAT in 2012.

The Global Network on Safer Cities recognizes the new challenges which face cities and their inhabitants – the impacts of globalization, environmental and climate changes, technology, and increasing urbanization (Vanderschueren, 2013). It aims to build on the knowledge gained over the years and scale up the work of the Safer Cities Programme globally. It plans to support cities in a more systematic way through technological tools which will help local governments develop clearer analyses of the patterning of crime and social problems in their cities, and enable them to benefit from the increasing range of experience in effective prevention. Among the goals of the Network are the development of a series of regional indicators for safer cities (the Urban Safety Monitor), and supporting the development of new UN Guidelines for urban crime prevention, to update and complement the crime prevention Guidelines adopted in 1995 and 2002. The Safer Cities Programme's contribution at the end of this chapter (*The Global Network on Safer Cities*) summarises progress and future plans for the Global Network.

Crime prevention as a prerequisite for development

One of the significant movements over the past ten years has been the widespread recognition that crime prevention is a prerequisite for social and economic development, as well as the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2013a & b; Shaw & Carli, 2011). UNODC published a series of regional reports demonstrating the negative impacts of crime and violence on development.[32] It continues to work with countries and cities in all regions on the development of prevention strategies. In 2012, the UN Secretary General made prevention, and building a safer and more secure world, two of his five priorities for action.[33] UNODC has accordingly made the mainstreaming of crime prevention in all areas of its mandate a priority, issuing a Guidance Note to all its staff and country and field offices (UNODC, 2013d).[34]

Other international organizations apart from UN-HABITAT such as WHO, the World Bank, IDB, UNDP, UN WOMEN and the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development[35] now promote models of crime prevention centred on local government and collaborative partnerships with the community, private and business sectors. WHO's violence prevention approach, grounded in a public health model, recognizes the importance of assessing and addressing the risk and protective factors for violence, from the individual to family, community and societal levels, and building strategic responses. The Strathclyde Police in Glasgow, Scotland, for example, successfully implemented the WHO approach through its Violence Reduction Unit created in 2005, and the model is now extended to the whole of Scotland.[36] WHO regularly publishes violence prevention resources which emphasize effective prevention approaches, such as *Violence prevention: the evidence* – a series of seven briefings on effective prevention programmes targeting specific problems and groups (WHO, 2010).[37]

IDB's *Citizen Security Programme*, which works specifically at the local government level, has been extensively developed in Latin America and the Caribbean over the past decade, and achieved some important results (Albizanda et al., 2012). Crime and violence are the main priority and concern of countries in the region. IDB's approach includes support for capacity building of institutions in areas of social and situational crime prevention, preventive policing, and for judicial and rehabilitative approaches to the prevention of crime and violence. The World Bank has similarly developed a number of urban crime and violence prevention initiatives in recent years, and its e-Institute offers training courses on the topic.[38]

UNDP similarly sees citizen security as an urgent challenge for the development of countries (UNDP, 2013b). In its assessment of recent international lessons for Latin America and the Caribbean it concludes that there is clear evidence that prevention can have direct effects on levels of violence and is cost effective; that repressive *iron fist* policies in the region have not only failed but had a negative impact on democracy and human rights; that multi-level comprehensive interventions which are adapted to local contexts are required; and that citizen participation is a crucial element to ensure inclusiveness.

One of the first initiatives launched by UN WOMEN following its creation in 2010 was the global flagship programme *Safe Cities Free of Violence for Women and Girls (2011-2017)*. The programme was inspired by the work of a number of women's organizations, UN agencies and cities using participatory research and partnerships to increase women's safety in urban settings (WICI, 2010, 2012; CISCA, 2006).[39] It aims to develop, implement and assess holistic strategies to reduce and prevent sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in public spaces. The pilot phase of the programme involves the five cities of Cairo, Kigali, New Delhi, Port Moresby and Quito where the methodology, tools and monitoring and evaluation are being developed.[40] These are being implemented in partnership with local and national governments, local women's organizations and businesses, and other UN agencies. The model approaches will then be available to other cities for adaptation and scaling-up. The second two phases of the programme to 2017 target at least 35 cities globally, and an impact evaluation of the initial cities. The Safe Cities Global Initiative now includes an additional 17 cities in developing and developed countries which are adopting the model, and a global mapping project on women and girls' perspectives on safety, in collaboration with UN-HABITAT, UNICEF and other UN agencies.[41]

The work of many of these organizations, including UN-HABITAT, has demonstrated that crime prevention involves much more than a narrow focus on crime. They have underlined the fact that cities form a crucial basis for action, and that it is not the size of cities, which impacts whether or not they face problems of insecurity, crime and violence, but their governance and management.

Recent debates and developments in knowledge-based crime prevention

> "Some say good ideas come from inspiration or even intuition. Others say good ideas come from systematic analysis. According to the Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman…both views are right."[42]

Knowledge-based and evidence-based crime prevention encompass a number of concepts, but principally entail the application of good research principles and theory, and well-constructed evaluation methods, which enable users to have some degree of confidence that an intervention has produced the results expected. Over the past twenty years, interest in knowledge-based crime prevention has continually grown stronger, techniques have improved, and debates about the value and effectiveness of various kinds of crime prevention interventions or approaches show little sign of stopping.

As the experience of cities such as Medellin and Bogota in Colombia have demonstrated the development of effective interventions in crime prevention requires innovation and adaptation, as well as careful evaluation of the outcomes. Relying only on previously evaluated practices alone has been described as inherently conservative and anti-innovation as the following quotation suggests:

> "So we want to require evidence as a foundation for action, but we also acknowledge that a narrow construction of evidence – what has already been shown to work – can be too restrictive…Evidence per se is inherently conservative as a standard. It imposes a discipline on action that, in the area of crime control, is decidedly unwelcome."[43]

Finding the right balance between innovation, and the adaptation or replication of existing projects shown to produce good results elsewhere, always seems to be a challenge for crime prevention policy makers and practitioners. It is also influenced by political concerns and public demands. The focus of many researchers and policy makers in crime prevention has often been on "what works", on the approaches which show relatively rapid results or outcomes, and which are easy to assess and evaluate, as a previous edition of this report discussed (ICPC, 2010). Situational crime prevention, for example, lends itself to strong evaluation methods and relatively quick results. Developmental crime prevention, while longer term, is also responsive to high standards of evaluation, and both approaches have received considerable academic and policy attention. They have been able to demonstrate the effectiveness of interventions over time and their transferability. Some social and community crime prevention initiatives present greater challenges because of the range of activities and variables involved. Many countries, nevertheless, continue to invest in social and community prevention initiatives, and they form a central part of many strategies, while more nuanced monitoring and evaluation approaches continue to be developed (Shaw, 2013; Sherman, 2012; ICPC, 2010).

A growing number of academics are arguing against a focus *only* on backward-looking and cause-and-effect approaches in selecting policy interventions, on the grounds that it has led to an increasingly narrow set of questions (and options) about "what works" (Sampson et al., 2013). Policy makers, it is argued, need to know much more than this. They need to know about how things work, and in different contexts and over time, about how they affect different populations such as men and women, and about a much wider range of effects than crime alone – what is termed "system-level knowledge of how policy is expected to work within a larger social context" (Sampson et al., 2013, p. 588). This would enable policy makers to apply "current and the best available knowledge to policy-relevant questions" (Blomberg et al., 2013, p. 575). Some of the ways in which policy makers and practitioners themselves use research have also been explored, and represent a further step in understanding how good crime prevention policies are developed and implemented (Box 2.8).

Box 2.8 **Four examples of the use of research by policy makers and practitioners**

Tactical use: Where evidence is used to justify an existing policy, position, practice.

Imposed use: Where funding awards are restricted to implementing only proven or evidence-based practices.

Instrumental use: Where empirical evidence is directly applied to programme or policy decisions.

Conceptual use: Where research evidence informs policy makers' and practitioners' interpretations of problems, challenges.

Source: Adapted from Blomberg et al. (2013, p. 578-579).

A detailed analysis of social crime prevention in late modern Europe shows that European countries have varied in the kind of emphasis and approach to crime prevention which they have used over time (Hebberecht & Baillergeau, 2012).[44] It provides some important insights into the range of interventions which can be seen as constituting social crime prevention – what they define as measures which aim to tackle the social causes of crime – and they recognize the difficulties of clearly defining the boundaries between prevention approaches. They also note the challenges presented by changes in government or social and economic pressures. In France, for example, social crime prevention and social conflict mediation in public space have been central aspects of city prevention strategies and *la politique de la ville* since the 1990's (Raynaud, 2014; Wyvekens, 2009; Hebberecht & Baillergeau, 2012). The objective was to protect children and young people, especially through educational and recreational interventions, and use mediation to help resolve conflict. Since around 2006, however, with a change in government, there has been increased interest at the national level in the use of situational prevention approaches, and notably CCTV (De Maillard & Germain, 2012). The crucial importance of a return to the use of mediation, and to the active engagement of citizens in local policies, especially in the most disadvantaged urban areas which house high concentrations of recent immigrants, has recently been underlined (Raynaud, 2014). The new national strategy in France does emphasize the use of social mediation in combination with other approaches (see the contribution at the end of the chapter).

In their analysis of developments in crime prevention in the UK, Crawford & Traynor (2012) note that situational crime prevention, and especially the expansion in the use of CCTV, formed a strong component of prevention strategies funded by the government from the early 1990's. From 1998, nevertheless, under the *Crime and Disorder Act*, social and community crime prevention received significant funding in the form of initiatives such as *Sure Start, Youth Inclusion Programmes* and *Family Intervention Programmes*. There was also considerable support for community-based interventions, in particular the development of community support officers in local neighbourhoods, and local "reassurance policing" working in partnership with local government. Subsequently, the focus of the government shifted to an emphasis on fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, and the activation of civil Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. Under the current government, early intervention programmes which target families and children at risk (developmental prevention) appear to be receiving increasing support.

In a recent review of crime prevention Jendly (2013) argues that in philosophical, scientific and economic terms it is more effective to focus on the productive cooperative aspects of prevention, and not on a "fight" or a "war against crime". Rather than championing one approach over others, she sees all core approaches to crime prevention – social and developmental, community, environmental and situational – working to include excluded populations and groups and as having a place in strategic prevention plans. She also notes the dangers that popular and media rhetoric can lead to the dichotomizing of individuals and groups as desirable or undesirable, encouraging a focus on security concerns, rather than the safety and quality of life of communities.

Declining crime, changing behaviours, reduced budgets – some implications for crime prevention

The decline in traditional forms of crime noted in the first part of the chapter, as well as the increase in transnational and internet-based crimes, all raise important questions for crime prevention. This is especially the case at a time when many countries are experiencing economic pressures and reduced budgets, as well as the impacts of increasing migration and mobility of populations. In New South Wales, Australia, for example, one of the main challenges recently identified by Community Safety Officers at the local government level concerns cost shifting from the State to local governments (Shepherdson et al., 2014). This often entails the withdrawal or reduction of financial support for programmes once they are established. A change in priorities and culture is also identified, with an almost exclusive focus on situational prevention, with its more ready ability to show quick results, and a lack of support for social interventions to tackle more complex problems.

There are also indications that in spite of the decline in traditional crime, levels of insecurity among citizens remain high in many countries, and people often assume that crime is still increasing (Maffei & Markopoulou, 2013). Some of the questions posed for prevention include how can the police and local authorities and the public respond to old and new forms of crime and not abandon the work of building local partnerships? What responsibilities do receiving communities have towards new migrants rather than assuming it is for them to adapt?

The case of the UK illustrates some of the dilemmas for crime prevention. As discussed above, levels of acquisitive and violent crime in the UK have been declining continually since the mid-1990's, and are now comparable to the crime rate in 1981. However, in relation to policing, three converging developments are evident. In the first place there have been changes in national government priorities in relation to the police. This involves a return to what is seen as the "core" police mandate of crime control, moving away from the wider order maintenance and social service functions of policing (Millie & Bullock, 2013; Karn, 2013). For example, the role of the police in school and neighbourhood policing, both of which have expanded and developed extensively over the past twenty years, are being outsourced to the private sector, along with crowd control. Secondly, there have been serious cut backs in funding to the police, amounting to a 20% cut in their 2014-15 budgets. This is in addition to heavy cuts to local authority funding for social services. Both of these changes place at risk the crime prevention gains from well-developed neighbourhood policing and the work of building local partnerships, as well as good school-police initiatives. Other trends include less focus on national standards and targets, and greater use of private sector and voluntary entrepreneurs rather than state provision (Crawford & Traynor, 2012).

The third change relates to the way the police are governed locally, with the introduction in 2011 of a system of local public election of civilian Police and Crime Commissioners to replace unelected police authorities. The government has argued that this will make policing more democratic and responsive to local concerns. However, in the initial election for Police and Crime Commissioners in 2012 only 15% of the public voted. This has led observers to question whether the commissioners can be seen to be truly democratic, and to argue that the system is open to abuse (Millie & Bullock, 2013; Reiner, 2013; Bridges, 2011). The public might demand that the police focus their crime control on 'unpopular' communities or minority groups, for example. This would impact race relations with the use of policing techniques such as stop and search, or hot spots policing, in ways which are perceived as unfairly targeting minority populations, and thus helping to reduce the legitimacy of the police. It might also shift the focus away from important issues such as the recruitment of minorities into the police, or the monitoring of approaches such as stop and search.

Some of these issues are explored in more detail in the contribution by Jacqui Karn *Policing and Crime Reduction in a Changing World: The implications for practice* at the end of this chapter. Among other concerns, the contribution raises the issue of the need for policing and crime prevention to find better ways of relating to increasingly diverse urban communities, and the changing nature of crime and community interaction. It touches on a movement which is receiving considerable current attention, in countries ranging from the US and Europe to Australia: that of procedural justice (Hough, 2013; Karn, 2013; Maffei & Markopoulou, 2013; Tyler, 2007).

> "In times of austerity, principles of procedural justice may enable the police to achieve 'more with less'… Procedural justice theories are, in essence, theories about the use of authority. Central organizing concepts are trust in justice, legitimacy, cooperation and compliance."[45]

In Europe, a current research project Fiducia, is examining new crime trends and data, the effectiveness of current criminal policies, fear of crime, trust in justice, and punitive attitudes among citizens.[46] It responds to rapid population changes, increasing feelings of insecurity and fear of crime, and demands from the public for more punitive justice policies, all of which are common concerns among European countries. Examining crime control strategies, the researchers also argue in favour of a procedural justice model which would entail legitimacy and fairness in how the police and justice system respond to crime and related problems. They argue in favour of:

> "…a shift from narrow instrumentalism to a broader approach to compliance, putting more emphasis on legitimacy, the fairness and quality of judicial processes, and on mechanisms of normative control (trust-based policies). Acting on social norms, trust-based policies aim to ensure sustained compliance over time, reducing the level of crime and the recidivism rate, while avoiding extremely costly measures such as extensive incarceration. As a welcome side effect, they should decrease the prominence of so-called penal populism, keeping at the same [time] politicians responsive to public opinion, and to the demands coming from citizens."[47]

Some examples of targeted police-partnership approaches which incorporate some of these concerns are outlined in Box 2.9. They are community level crime prevention projects inspired by the work of the Violence Prevention Unit developed by the Strathclyde Police in Scotland, previously discussed.

Costs and benefits

Much of the argument as to why countries and cities should invest in crime prevention (and public health) has always rested on evidence of the costs and benefits of prevention compared with its alternatives. These have variously shown that the social and economic costs of crime and victimization, especially in relation to the criminal justice and health costs, as well as lost earnings etc., are much higher than those entailed in prevention programmes.[49] In the 1990's, studies by the Rand Corporation among others, for example, showed that for every dollar invested in programmes to help children stay in school, or to provide pre-school educational support to families, saved many more dollars in justice and welfare interventions which would not be required for those children and families later in their lives (Greenwood et al., 1996). A variety of approaches for estimating the tangible and intangible costs of crime have been developed over the years.[50]

In periods of scarce resources these arguments become even more pertinent, and some recent research has returned to this issue. In 2012-2013 the IDB initiated a series of innovative studies of the costs of crime in Latin America and the Caribbean to help policy makers understand the full magnitude of the impacts of crime and violence on their citizens. Among the findings, studies showed that domestic violence against women in Latin America and Peru had negative effects on the health of children in the household (Agüero, 2013); that violence in a community affected the birth weights of children and hence their life prospects (Koppensteiner & Manacorda, 2013); and that increases in rates of homicide in municipalities in Mexico were clearly associated with reduced economic development and work opportunities, and declining work forces (Robles et al., 2013).[51]

In Canada, a detailed study of the costs of violent crime in 2009 estimates that it had an economic impact of $11.7US billion, of which the majority related to victim costs (Beeby, 2014).[52] This included short and long term medical costs, lost wages, court and social welfare costs, as well as intangible costs such as pain and suffering. An earlier study of the cost impacts of spousal (intimate partner) violence estimated the total economic impact at $6.8US billion in one year (Zhang et al., 2012). This work has been

Box 2.9 **Public health and targeted prevention: Canadian Community Mobilization Projects**

The Community Mobilization Prince Albert Project (CMPA) Saskatchewan, Canada

The CMPA project in the city of Prince Albert was created in 2009 through funding from the Province of Saskatchewan. The CMPA was inspired by research carried out in Glasgow, Scotland that led to the development of a community mobilization group and a comprehensive violence reduction strategy involving various sectors of society. The CMPA focuses on the prevention and suppression of crime and violence by bringing together multiple partners[48] to provide short and long-term interventions for at-risk individuals. Research and analysis are used to deliver targeted and effective services to those at risk of engaging in criminal behaviour. It targets the root causes of criminality by offering counselling and supports to individuals and families in need, such as those suffering from addictions and mental health issues, or those requiring further education and employment training. The CMPA consists of two components:

1. The Hub: A group of approximately 20 individuals from the various CMPA partners that meets twice a week. This group identifies emerging problems and/or at-risk individuals and provides immediate, coordinated and integrated responses. Any HUB stakeholder, member, or outside community organization can introduce a case to the group.
2. The COR (Centre of Responsibility): A group of professionals from participating ministries and policing partners that examines the notion of community safety and wellness on a larger scale. It establishes longer-term community goals and solutions for crime prevention and reduction. Its recommendations are based on extensive research, analysis and experience. The COR provides reports on patterns and lessons learned, offers liaising support to participating agencies, works with the Province to create a series of measures, and is a source for research data, information and consultation. COR compiled a statistical profile to guide the Hub's actions in 2013, which showed that 62% of the Hub's discussions involve the risk of alcohol abuse. As a response, the CMPA will be developing a comprehensive alcohol strategy.

City of Winnipeg – Block-by-Block crime strategy (Manitoba, Canada)

Despite an overall reduction in the crime rate between 1991 and 2010, much of it due to a decline in car theft, violent crime and community safety remain significant challenges for the city of Winnipeg. As a response, in 2013 the Province of Manitoba, the City of Winnipeg, and the Winnipeg Police Service began to set up the Block-by-Block crime strategy (officially implemented in March 2014). The strategy is modelled on the Prince Albert CMPA programme. Winnipeg's Block-by-Block crime strategy focuses on prevention and early intervention, and will begin by targeting 21 blocks in a particular neighbourhood. It will develop a co-ordinated programme including the police, city government, social agencies and community groups to tackle the root causes of crime and related problems in the neighbourhood.

inspired by recent detailed costing analysis developed in the US, Australia and the UK, to demonstrate the value of reducing crime.

In the US, the state of Washington has adopted guidelines for policy makers on the cost benefits of crime prevention (Lee et al., 2013). More generally in the US, there has been considerable recent debate on the cost implications of high spending on the correctional system compared with the low funding of the police, and the evidence that certain kinds of policing among other interventions can effectively reduce crime.[53] Among other arguments, targeted prevention interventions such as "hot spots" policing have been shown to effectively reduce crime in those areas where most crimes occurred, and without resulting in its displacement to neighbouring areas of cities, and are, therefore, cost effective.

Justice reinvestment

The justice reinvestment initiative has also been gaining ground in the US over the past few years. Originally launched by the Bureau of Justice Assistance in 2006, it was initiated by Congress in 2010.[54] The core of the initiative is cost-effectiveness and the use of evidence-based strategies to improve public safety and reduce expenditures on the correctional and criminal justice system, by reinvesting funds into reducing crime and strengthening neighbourhoods. It has resulted in some important changes in levels of incarceration, and a renewed interest in alternatives to incarceration and community engagement. The federal government passed legislation reducing the use of mandatory minimums for drug offenders in 2013 which has had some important impacts on levels of incarceration. Mandatory minimum sentences are now to be restricted to serious, violent and high-level drug offenders. In New York City, the NeON (Neighbourhood Opportunity Network) programme provides a good example of reinvestment.[55] Recognizing that very high rates of incarceration were concentrated in seven neighbourhoods in the city, the probation department developed a strategic plan to "do no harm", "do more good" and "do it in the community". Probation offices have been relocated to a series of satellite offices in community centres which are designed to become neighbourhood hubs, involving and welcoming community members who are now seen as part of the solution rather than the problem. A range of other initiatives have been developed in partnership with the city and community organizations (e.g. The Mayor's Young Men's Initiative and Community Education Pathways to Success) and the implementation of the project is being evaluated.

A recent Australian study looked at the cost implications of targeting crime prevention interventions to populations or places where crime and victimization are most concentrated (Allard et al., 2013). Using notions of criminal careers and the links between crime and place, the study followed an offender cohort born in 1990. They identified five different groups of repeat offenders (depending on the age at which they became involved in the justice system), their locations using geographic mapping techniques, and estimated the costs of criminal justice interventions and wider social and economic costs over time. Those who came to notice as children or adolescents represented only 5% of the cohort, but accounted for 47% of the total costs. In addition, the chronic offenders tended to be highly concentrated in a small number of geographic urban areas. The latter areas were usually characterized by "extreme social and economic disadvantage" (Allard et al., 2013, p. 35). Targeting early intervention social and educational programmes to these areas, they argue, would help to prevent future cohorts of children becoming involved with the justice system and possibly chronic offenders.

Advancements in evaluation and tools

> "In general, we hypothesize that the more complicated interventions will require more resources, but they will be better tailored to the actual crime problems – and get better results."[56]

Observatories

Interest in the development of observatories on crime and social problems continues internationally. They respond to the need for accurate and reliable data to help develop strategic interventions. They include not only crime observatories concerned with prevention, but those linked to specific areas such as public transport, or related concerns such as public health or peace building. There are now a number which operate at national and at regional levels. National examples include the French *Observatoire national de la délinquance et des réponses pénales* (ONDRP – National Observatory of Crime and Criminal Justice Responses) and the *Observatoire national de la délinquance dans les transports* (ONDT – National Observatory of Crime on Public Transport). Regional examples include the Central American Integration System Observatory and Index on Democratic Security (OBSICA), a regional observatory located in El Salvador. OBSICA's role is to analyse, monitor and evaluate crime and security information from countries in the region and to aid in the development of public policies and strategies to improve safety. International organizations such as the OAS Inter-American Observatory on Security, and UNDP are providing development and technical assistance to crime observatories, in addition to existing tools such as an OAS Manual for National Observatories, and ICPC's Review of international observatories (ICPC, 2009).

Since 2007 ICPC has co-organized a series of international meetings on crime observatories.[57] The fourth meeting held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia in August 2013, brought together representatives from a number of observatories, as well as policy makers, crime data research centres and academics. Among the recommendations of the meeting was the need to develop norms and standards to standardise crime observatories and ensure a minimum level of quality, including the possibility of accreditation; the need for an international body to oversee such a standardization process; and the importance of having a forum for exchange and dialogue and to facilitate partnership building (ICPC, 2014). The Geneva Declaration and Small Arms Survey also held an expert meeting on observatories and armed violence monitoring systems in June 2013.[58]

Safety audits and evaluation tools

As discussed earlier, evaluation has always remained one of the most problematic aspects of crime prevention. Apart from the difficulties of demonstrating clear results from multi-intervention programmes, policy makers and donors have not always provided sufficient funding, resources or time for projects to be well evaluated. Short term results tend to be given priority over long term ones, and practitioners have often not had the technical skills required to build in and undertake project evaluation. The development of tools for implementing and evaluating evidence-based prevention has expanded globally in recent years. This includes guides to evaluating programmes, improved tools for geographic mapping, inventories of effective practice, and guidance on conducting local safety audits, which form the basis of all local strategic planning in crime prevention.

In the US, the National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs now maintains a database on effective crime prevention and criminal justice programmes and practices, drawing on rigorous research findings.[59] It also makes available a free spatial statistics programme for crime mapping *CrimeStat IV*.[60] This enables a range of different crime incidents to be plotted and aids in the identification of crime "hot spots" among other concerns. A review of crime forecasting approaches known as *predictive policing* has also been produced to help guide police forces (Perry et al., 2013). The authors review methods for predicting crimes, offenders, perpetrator identities and victims of crime and the range of approaches which can be used. In general, predictive policing analysis requires large datasets and complex analysis methodologies, compared with conventional crime analysis, but the authors emphasize that the role of prediction is to provide a foundation for preventive interventions.

In Europe, EFUS is currently coordinating the project AUDITS, to provide guidance to cities on how to conduct and use safety audits. The project is developing a local safety audit guide for European cities to increase the ability of cities to undertake good scientific analysis of crime and victimization problems in preparation for developing city safety strategies. It is modelled on the international compendium on safety audits originally published in 2007 (EFUS, 2007).[61]

In Latin America a series of safety audits has been conducted in Medellin and Caucasia, and in seven municipalities in the State of Antioquia, Colombia to provide baseline and evidence-based data on crime trends and patterns. It forms part of a collaborative project between the government and the State of Antioquia and UNODC, to help to strengthen citizen security policies. Some of the municipalities are in areas which were affected by internal conflict in the past decades. A report on the variety and use of safety audits and their role in developing safety and citizen security action plans in different contexts, summarises the main findings from seven of the audits.[62] The safety audit methodology has since been incorporated into local crime prevention policy as a model. A more targeted safety audit guide for local governments has been developed in Canada by the National Crime Prevention Centre on the prevention of human trafficking and sexual exploitation (Public Safety Canada, 2013). The guide is being piloted in a number of Canadian municipalities (see Chapter 5).

To support its citizen security programme, IDB has also published a protocol for developing and evaluating citizen security programmes in Latin America (Sherman, 2012). Drawing on evidence-based crime prevention knowledge, Sherman emphasizes that developing and testing crime prevention initiatives involves the use of theories to explain how and why they do or do not work, the importance of measuring the implementation and its outputs, and making "fair comparisons" which enable the effectiveness of the outcomes to be measured. He sets out some key principles for evidence-based crime prevention, including that crime: must be measured reliably and precisely by well-audited systems (e.g. detailed police reports, victimization surveys, video and GPS systems); classified in ways that support crime prevention (e.g. incident-based police reporting systems, rather than total number of crime categories in an area and information about local characteristics etc.); and analysed in multiple units and categories (e.g. offenders, crime networks, victims, micro-places, communities, times, days of the week etc.).

UN WOMEN's Safe Cities Global Initiative to make cities safe for women and girls previously discussed, has been specifically designed to enable impact evaluation, and has produced a number of tools to provide guidance to safer city teams on the evaluation. It is anticipated that each pilot site will be able to assess reductions in sexual harassment and other forms of sexual violence; a reduction in fear and increased feelings of safety among women and girls; and increased autonomy and mobility among women and girls using public spaces, in line with the initial evaluation framework developed for the initiative.[63]

Conclusion

The downward trend in violence and conventional forms of crime continues in a number of regions, but is still very unevenly distributed. Homicide rates continue to decline overall, although there appears to be a polarisation between regions with very high and very low homicide rates. Young males continue to be the group most at risk of homicide. Yet in some regions, homicide resulting from intimate partner violence against women has become the leading cause of intentional death for women, and almost reaches parity with male homicides. Global changes and communications technology may be having a transformative impact on crime, however, creating both new forms of crime and enabling traditional crimes to be committed in new ways. Cybercrime is advancing rapidly, and the monetary costs of cybercrime theft appear to be far higher than losses from traditional property crimes.

In terms of crime prevention, economic uncertainty coupled with increasingly mobile populations has clearly affected many countries, and created dilemmas for prevention. The drop in crime in a number of countries has not been accompanied by an increasing sense of security, and racism, intolerance and a decline in social cohesion are evident in a number of regions. Reductions in funding for policing and other services may result in changes in community-level prevention and partnerships, and threaten the legitimacy of local justice. Trends in crime continue to underline the importance of examining gender differences.

Nevertheless, in reviewing developments in crime prevention there is increasing agreement at the international level on the importance of promoting crime prevention, especially at the local level and with a focus on integrated approaches and citizen engagement. As ICPC's 2010 International Report noted, crime prevention is now being mainstreamed in the work of many international organizations, as a prerequisite for development, and as a humane and cost-effective way to balance public policies. Four years later that trend appears to have intensified, with increasing evidence of effective interventions, even in countries with high levels of violence, and of their cost-effectiveness. The needs of policy makers in developing crime prevention policies are also more widely recognized, with an increasing emphasis on using the best currently available knowledge about policy questions, and not relying only on those which have been subject to rigorous cause and effect evaluation. Implementation of crime prevention strategies, and long-term funding, as always, remain a challenge.

Crime and safety in South East Asia and the Western Pacific

Peter Homel and Rolando Ochoa[64]

Contribution

Figure 1 **South East Asia and the Western Pacific**


Russia
Bering Sea
Sea of Okhotsk
Mongolia
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
North Korea
South Korea
Japan
Yellow Sea
China
Pacific Ocean
East China Sea
Nepal
Bhutan
India
Bangladesh
Taiwan
Myanmar
Laos
Northern Mariana Islands (US)
Thailand
Vietnam
Guam (US)
Marshall Islands
Cambodia
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Brunei
Palau
Micronesia
Malaysia
Singapore
Papua New Guinea
Nauru
Kiribati
Indonesia
Solomon Islands
Tuvalu
Tokelau (NZ)
East Timor
Wallis and Futuna (FR)
Vanuatu
Samoa
Fiji
Indien Ocean
New Caledonia (FR)
Tonga
Australia
Nive (NZ)
American Samoa (US)
New Zealand

Source: Wikimedia Commons

The Asia and Pacific region is made up of 63 countries and territories that are grouped in five sub regions: East and North-East Asia, South-East Asia, South and South-West Asia, North and Central Asia, and the Pacific. As a whole, Asia is the largest region in the world, with 30 per cent of the land mass and 60 per cent of the population, and very diverse. (UN-HABITAT & UN ESCAP, 2010, p. 4). The vast spread of the Asia-Pacific region features high-, middle- and low-income economies, as well as a complex mix of diverse societies and cultures. It ranges from highly urbanized to much less urbanized countries.

The focus here is on the South-East Asian and Pacific countries that make up the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Pacific Islands Forum.[65] South-East Asia alone represents 20% of the world's total population. The population of SE Asia trebled from 178m in 1950 to 522m in 2000 and continues to be one of the fastest growing in the world. As a result, the region has one of the world's youngest populations with young people (15-24 years) accounting for around 22% of the workforce and 59% of the unemployed (UN–HABITAT & UN ESCAP, 2009, p. 35).

By 2030, 50% will live in urban settlements or cities making the region the most heavily urbanised in the world. Rural Pacific Island populations have some of the fastest urbanisation rates in the world, and a recent history of social and political instability and economic stress. (UN-HABITAT & UN ESCAP, 2009, p. 49).

Figure 2 illustrates this economic situation for three typical countries in the Asia Pacific region – Indonesia, Thailand and Papua New Guinea. On the one hand the entire region has had significant GDP growth – with an average of 7.5% for the East Asia and Pacific region (which includes China and South Korea) in 2012, which has led to significant increases in wealth production. However, this has been coupled with high levels of inequality (measured by the GINI coefficient). Inequalities have come hand in hand with growth and this has had a significant impact in crime and violence levels.

Figure 2 **Selected GDP and GINI coefficient rates for selected SE Asian and Pacific Island nations**

COUNTRY	GDP GROWTH (%)	GINI
Indonesia	6.2 (2012)	38.1 (2011)
Thailand	6.5 (2012)	39.4 (2010)
PNG	8.0 (2012)	42.4 (2006)

Source: World Bank indicators http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/

Despite high rates of poverty and inequality the majority of Asian and Pacific cities have, to date, not faced problems of crime on a scale familiar to western developed countries. Also, perceptions of safety have generally been higher than elsewhere in the developing world. However, while recorded crime rates may not be high, community experience of social and institutional violence is. In almost all urban areas there are worsening perceptions of safety and more emphasis (and investment) given to ensuring personal and household security (UN-HABITAT & UN ESCAP, 2009, p. 2). Threats to safety and human security are becoming more pressing issues in the region. They range in scale and scope from organized crime (including terrorist attacks, and environmental crimes such as illegal fishing and logging, and wild-life smuggling); public disturbances and riots (fuelled variously by ethnic or political tensions); human trafficking; drug related crime; community and household violence, including acute or chronic problems of domestic abuse; to physical and armed assaults; gang activity and the emergence of alternative power structures associated with informal economies; and homicide (UNODC, 2013, p. iii).

However, since crime rates have apparently been quite low for so long, little attention has been given to strategies and approaches to the prevention of crime and the promotion of community safety across the region. The main reasons for this appear to be:

- The attitude that household violence is "private";
- A concern that you should not widely and openly publicise and debate ethnic and religious factors in violence;
- A lack of serious concern given to the impacts of crime on the poor and a corresponding capacity of the wealthy to insulate themselves from crime; and
- Most significantly, a widely held belief that "development", or more often high economic growth, will result in the eradication of poverty and therefore crime (UN-HABITAT & UN ESCAP, 2009, p. 1).

A major implication of this situation is a general unpreparedness for developing and implementing effective and sustainable crime prevention measures across the region. This is in spite of the fact that experience shows that this is also the very best time to develop effective long term prevention strategies – i.e. before problems emerge or become so large as to be difficult to manage (Homel, 2009).

The following are the main issues identified by the small number of reviews of the crime and safety situation in the SE Asian and Western Pacific region that have been undertaken in recent years. Essentially, these are the key factors that confront the development of a coherent strategic approach to the development of effective and efficient crime prevention programmes across the region:

- Growing income disparity and urban poverty.
- Emerging violence, crime, safety issues.
- Rapid urbanisation and the growth of informal settlements and the associated informal economy.
- Negotiating changing youth, gender and household dynamics.
- Lack of modernised policing approaches.
- Problems with developing and applying new governance arrangements, particularly in relation to regional and local government.
- Problems with reliable data and planning information.
- Corruption and organized crime.
- Limited use of peace-building and community safety approaches.

However, this does not mean that these issues are not being dealt with across the region. For example, the Thai Institute of Justice addresses most of these topics by prioritising its work on:

- Women and Children in the Criminal Justice System
- The Rule of Law
- Crime and Development
- Transitional Justice, Peace and Security
- Human Rights Education
- Crime and Justice Statistics

Underlying this agenda is a commitment to a rights-based approach to prevention, that believes in the philosophy that crime can be prevented and must be tackled at its root causes, which often include poverty, lack of development, education, access to health and other basic services. There is also a recognition that crime and justice policy-making requires sound evidence-based research and data collection and analysis.

In other parts of the region there is growing evidence of a commitment to developing more systematic and evidence based approaches to the prevention of crime and the development of safe communities, particularly in response to the need to address potential problems associated with the region's growing youth population. For example, in Vietnam, the government has partnered with a major non-government group, PLAN Vietnam, to develop and implement an innovative juvenile crime prevention and reintegration programme (Plan Vietnam, 2011).

The Malaysian Crime Prevention Foundation has led the development of a national network of school based Crime Prevention Clubs which aims to raise awareness about anti-social behaviour; promote cooperation between schools and police in order to prevent crime; and establish a network of student mentors to promote the KPC's motto of "Prevention is better than Fighting".[66]

Similar national crime prevention foundations or councils exist in several SE Asian countries including Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore and most are affiliated with the Asian Crime Prevention Foundation (ACPF), which is an international NGO with general consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The nature of these crime prevention foundations varies between countries, with some operating purely as non-government agencies and others having a much closer association with government. Each also pursues an agenda that is reflective of the problems and concerns within their own country. For example, the Singapore National Crime Prevention Council gives prominence in its work to the prevention of crime directed at ageing people, while the Indonesian Crime Prevention Foundation provides a focus on preventing organized crime and corruption.

The Pacific Islands Forum has adopted a Human Security Framework for the Pacific. The Framework sets the goal of a Pacific region where communities, families and individuals are secure and safe from threats to their wellbeing and dignity, and enjoy political stability, sustainable economic development and social fulfilment in the unique context of the region. Some of the actions adopted in order to strengthen community, family and personal security include:

- Strengthening policies and institutions to tackle gender based violence;
- Utilising equitable traditional conflict resolution mechanisms;
- Promoting peace and tolerance in school curricula;
- Expanding opportunities for young people;
- Improving customary land administration to minimise land-related conflict; and
- Promoting community traditions that strengthen equity and harmony (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2012, p. 7).

In practical terms, these commitments are being implemented to varying degrees by different nations to reflect local priorities. For example, a number of Melanesian countries have chosen to focus on violence prevention programmes, particularly those associated with family and gender based violence (UN-HABITAT & ESCAP, 2009, p. 61). While these issues are also of significance in Micronesian and Polynesian parts of the Pacific, their prominence varies.

The Pacific Islands Forum's Framework on Human Security is one of the rare comprehensive strategies for delivering safe communities through crime prevention in the wider region. As Redo (2012) has observed, crime prevention policies and practices, as they are recognised in Europe, North America and Australasia, remain quite rare or underdeveloped in much of Africa and the Asia-Pacific region.

Circumstances are rapidly changing and nations in Asia and the Pacific are increasingly turning to lessons based on the crime prevention experience of Western countries to assist in developing their own responses to the social and economic consequences of crime associated with urban and industrial growth. In doing this they are confronting the fact that the theories, evidence bases and practical experience of the traditional crime prevention literature are rooted in different cultural and economic experiences and may not be adequate for all of the challenges specific to the region.

Apart from the need to accommodate the obvious pressures wrought by rapid social and economic change there is also the need to develop new forms of governance to be better able to deal with emerging circumstances. In particular, the Asia Pacific region needs to confront the pressures of moving towards more representative and responsive forms of government for the management of the economy and social organization and, in many cases, the transformation and reform of the security sector. These new forms of governance could include, although not exclusively, expanding democratic rights and accountability in the region, recognizing community based forms of governance and their strength and providing forms of fairer and more transparent economic governance to fight inequality and corruption. An example is the World Bank Community Based Rural Infrastructure Project in Vietnam, which among other goals is seeking to strengthen decentralized planning and implementation capacity in a country with a highly centralized system of government.

At the same time this is also a region that is very susceptible to natural disasters, something that is increasingly aggravated by the impact of climate change, each of which presents its own challenge for the development of sustainable safe and harmonious communities.

Local crime prevention in Sweden

Karin Svanberg[67]

The National Council for Crime Prevention: Brå

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet – Brå) – an agency under the Ministry of Justice – is a centre for research and development within the judicial system. Brå primarily works to reduce crime and improve levels of safety in society by producing data and disseminating knowledge on crime and crime prevention work. The Council also collects Sweden's official crime statistics, conducts the country's crime survey, evaluates reforms, conducts research to develop new knowledge and provides support to local crime prevention work.

Brå's Unit for Local Crime Prevention[68] was set up in 1998, and since then has been developing and advancing knowledge on local crime prevention through handbooks, conferences, seminars and its website.[69] The Unit also distributes a small amount of financial support. Around the early 2000's, support was mainly provided to set up local councils. By the mid 2000's, there was growing interest in evidence-based crime prevention, and support was directed towards more rigorous methods and evaluation of initiatives. The focus on evidence-based continues (e.g. mapping, analysis, choosing methods, evaluation/follow-up), however there is a stronger interest in the process of crime prevention and a growing understanding that evidence-based practice is not always the best model in addressing social issues.

National crime prevention strategy – Our Collective Responsibility

In 1996, the government adopted its comprehensive national crime prevention strategy: *Our Collective Responsibility*. The 1996 strategy has not been updated, yet separate, more focused strategies have been developed and focus on the following issues: alcohol and drug abuse; violence against women; and organized crime.

The national strategy is based on the idea that local problems necessitate local solutions, and therefore it focuses on everyday crime: theft; vandalism; violence against women, etc. It emphasizes the importance of cooperation at the local level between a broad range of stakeholders, including the police, social services, schools, local organizations, local businesses, etc.

As part of the strategy, the Swedish police[70] underwent a community policing reform with the goal of implementing problem-oriented policing. This new approach aimed to increase police involvement in prevention and to work more closely with the community in order to build knowledge and trust. However, evaluations show that there are insufficient resources to fully implement the approach.

Local level initiatives – Governing local work in Sweden:

Local crime prevention councils

The national strategy called for the development of local crime prevention councils, which are intended to be a platform for cooperation between local stakeholders on a grassroots level. These councils generally have a local coordinator, and consist mostly of police, social services and schools. By 2009, 88% of municipalities and city districts had a council for crime prevention. Councils commonly focus on: alcohol and drug prevention; youth at risk; crime prevention in schools; and more generally on safety and security (e.g. video camera surveillance, outdoor lighting, neighbourhood watch and/or neighbourhood safety walks and surveys).

Cooperation Agreements

In 2008, the National Police Board commissioned all regional police chiefs to sign Cooperation Agreements between the police and local authorities.[71] Currently, about 85 per cent of municipalities have signed an agreement with the police. A recent study from Brå shows that the agreements are perceived to have improved relations between the police and the municipalities, and increased collaboration. According to the study, the agreements have also inspired different parties to understand the importance of prevention and of having a long-term vision. One main challenge is that about half of the cooperation agreements lack an analysis of the causes of local crime problems, therefore there is a need to develop local stakeholders' capacity to analyze local issues.

Local crime prevention work in Rinkeby

Rinkeby is a district in the city of Stockholm that has a comparatively high degree of socio-economic problems. The unemployment rate is 10%, compared with 3.3% in Stockholm. The mean income is half of that of Stockholm as a whole, and most residents live in rented apartments. About 90.5% of the population are first or second generation immigrants, compared to 33.2% of the population of Stockholm, and many come as refugees from war-torn countries.

Despite these challenges, since the 1990's Rinkeby has been a model district in terms of its crime prevention work. For example, the Rinkeby school won the European Crime Prevention Award in 1998 for their preventive work with youth, and the Rinkeby local crime prevention council – set up in the early 2000's and financed by the state to work in areas with high unemployment – is very active. The local council mainly focuses on situational prevention, which has shown positive results. In 2013, the council began to do situational and social crime prevention, and advancing more collaborative efforts between social services and other stakeholders.[72] Such collaborative initiatives tend to focus on drug abuse prevention, social inclusion, prevention of youth at risk of being recruited into criminal groups, and prevention of intimate partner violence and family violence, including honour-related violence.

Around 2004, Rinkeby experienced heightened levels of civil disorder among youth, and increasing confrontations between youth and the police. As a response, in 2011 the police set up a project to prevent social unrest by working in cooperation with local authorities, social services and the community. As part of the project, in 2013, the police published the *Methodological manual for cooperation to counteract social unrest*. The manual looks at the principles of community policing: befriending and listening to the local community as a part of crime prevention intelligence. The manual focuses on issues that may stimulate unrest, such as the lack of social inclusion, economic disparities and living in a multicultural society. It also highlights the importance of social inclusion of youth, applying situational crime prevention, and building partnerships between the police, social services, schools and the community.

Future challenges

Local crime prevention work in Sweden has mainly focused on youth and alcohol-related crimes, and the most common type of crime prevention practice is information-sharing (e.g. informing students or parents of the dangers of alcohol and drugs). Therefore, a future challenge is to broaden crime prevention activities. Further, the evaluation of the cooperation agreements revealed implementation problems due to a lack of resources. There is work to be done to convince high-level government officials of the need to invest more in prevention, and to professionalize crime preventive work and build capacity so that local mapping and analysis can be conducted at the local level.

France: National Strategy for the Prevention of Crime 2013-2017

(Stratégie nationale de prévention de la délinquance 2013-2017)

The new National Strategy for the Prevention of Crime in France was announced on 4th July 2013 in a circular issued by the Prime Minister. It replaces the previous strategy 2010-2012. It has three main priorities of which the most important are defining a public policy on the prevention of crime which brings together the fields of educational and social prevention, professional training, and security and justice; and an approach which identifies needs on the ground, as well as recognizing local competencies, and uses both universal and targeted approaches. It combines primary prevention approaches with secondary prevention for high risk populations, and tertiary prevention to prevent recidivism.

The National Strategy includes three programmes of action:

1. Programme of action targeting youth at risk of crime

This programme aims to eradicate the root causes of crime and delinquency, using primary, secondary and tertiary prevention approaches, and complements educational and parental policies. Initiatives will be locally developed, with the mayor playing a pivotal role, supported by higher levels of government including the General Secretariat of the Interministerial Committee for the Prevention of Crime (*Secrétariat général du comité interministériel de prévention de la délinquance (CIPD)*)**,** and the national justice, education and interior security services. This requires the joint mobilization of available resources and the clarification of responsibilities. Action includes the identification of youth by institutions and partner organizations working with at risk youth; the sharing of confidential information within the parameters of the law; and designation of responsibilities for overseeing and following the progress of identified youth. A national interministerial committee oversees the initiative. The measures proposed for the youth targeted vary, depending on the situation. Those at risk, but not heavily involved with the justice system, will be involved in educational programmes such as work experience and professional training; community service; and enrolment in preventive and social programmes. For those who already have a record of offending and more serious recidivists, and are subject to judicial measures (including custody, alternative measures, judicial protection if they are minors, or probation and parole) mayors can develop local initiatives such as courses on citizenship and the law, and restoration or repair work, and social and professional re-insertion programmes for recidivists.

2. Programme of action to prevent violence against women and family violence, and aid victims

A variety of different action plans have been developed over the years to respond to female victims of intimate partner or family violence including: social workers working in partnership with the police, support services for female victims of intimate partner violence, victims aid offices, help lines etc. There are however, wide variations across the country, and not all projects have been well developed. To complement existing Departmental resources, a greater focus on working in local partnerships is now required, and the development of local plans of action which respond to local needs and competencies. Global and individual approaches will be developed, including the protection, accompaniment and support of victims.

3. Programme of action to improve public peace

The main emphasis is on developing an approach which combines situational prevention with human intervention and presence. This involves not only technical tools such as the use of CCTV and street lighting, but the use of social mediation in public spaces. Mayors and Prefects as well as public transport and social agencies have developed a number of interventions to promote public peace, and are encouraged to continue to do

> so. Other institutions and the general public can also collaborate and help to identify the places and times which are of most concern in terms of disturbances and insecurity. Action plans which are implemented and regularly monitored will help to promote a sense of security in public spaces.

The National Strategy is to be implemented across the entire country. Departmental Prefects were required to meet with all local actors in 2013 to develop and adopt their own Departmental plans, in line with the National Strategy. At the local level, the local safety and crime prevention councils (*Conseils locaux de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance (CLSPD)*) have been invited to integrate these priorities into their local strategies over the course of 2014. Funds to support action programmes which fall under the new National Strategy are being raised. Different ministries are mobilizing resources, and local groups are partners and co-financers.

The Global Network on Safer Cities

Juma Assiago and Cecilia Andersson[73]

The Safer Cities Programme

UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme was launched in 1996 at the request of African Mayors seeking to tackle urban crime and violence in their cities. The Safer Cities approach was initially developed in collaboration with ICPC, EFUS and research institutes such as the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa. To date the Safer Cities Programme has supported initiatives in 77 cities in 24 countries worldwide.

The Programme has evolved over time through a series of phases, as knowledge about the drivers of urban insecurity has increased, and approaches to addressing it have been refined. Today the Programme embraces a holistic, integrated, multi-level government and multi-sectorial approach to improving the livability of cities, and the quality of life of all urban residents. It is grounded in the knowledge that good urban governance, planning and management can improve the safety of cities and neighbourhoods.

The first phase of the Safer Cities Programme was based on an *Urban Crime Prevention Approach* with three pillars:

- Institutional crime and violence prevention – promoting the role of local government in providing safety and security for their inhabitants, promoting alternative forms of policing (community policing and problem-oriented policing), and alternative forms of justice, bringing justice closer to the people (e.g. through tribunals and traditional community conflict mediation mechanisms);
- Social crime prevention – targeting some of the causes of crime and violence through social and educational programmes, with a specific focus on youth at risk and the safety of women and girls;
- Situational crime prevention – particularly improving the physical environment.

The second phase focused on integrating the urban crime prevention approach within a broader and *multi-dimensional concept of urban safety* or *Human Security* – in particular the risk areas of:

- Security of tenure and forced evictions – land ownership is often the cause of urban violence and conflict (e.g. Colombia and Kenya);
- Natural disasters – these can often result in situations of lawlessness and increases in insecurity (e.g. Hurricane Katrina and the earthquake in Haiti were both followed by a situation of complete lawlessness and the collapse of public institutions).

The third phase has again expanded tapping into the social capital of cities, in terms of social integration and cohesion – *enhancing safety through planning, management and governance for social integration*. This is premised on the knowledge that:

- The planning (and the un-planning) of cities has an effect on safety and people's feelings of safety;
- The management of city streets and public spaces is key to ensuring that neighbourhoods are kept safe – this is not only the role of the local authority, there are models where community ownership and management is crucial to ensuring that neighbourhood spaces are safe;
- Good governance and well-functioning governments support safe cities – cities with weak governance are cities often rife with crime and violence.

These consolidated phases consider the city-wide plan for safety as the main outcome: a tool for social integration, focusing on neighbourhood planning, with tools for community appropriation, access rights, and allocation of streets and public spaces as sites for the construction of citizenship values. The three phases should not be seen as separate, but as layers building on top of each other, refining and enhancing each other, and moving towards a more comprehensive approach to urban safety than one narrowly focused on the prevention of crime and violence alone.

Why the Global Network on Safer Cities?

The development of the Global Network on Safer Cities (GNSC) was originally mooted by UN-HABITAT in September 2010, to build on the experience gained in implementing the Safer Cities Programme over 16 years. In April 2011, Member States at the 23rd Session of the UN-HABITAT Governing Council in Nairobi adopted a resolution supporting the establishment of the GNSC, to allow for learning, exchange and structured dialogue, based on proven practices on safer cities in 53 cities worldwide. It was anticipated that this could ultimately lead to the development of new UN Guidelines on Safer Cities.

The operational framework for the Network was developed at a series of partners consultations convened by UN-HABITAT. The resulting Working Paper on the governance and administration of the GNSC provided the basis for the 2012 cycle of activities. The Network was launched in Naples in September 2012 at the Sixth session of the World Urban Forum.

The GNSC is envisioned as serving as the foremost international platform for cities and urban stakeholders, with the overall goal of equipping them to deliver urban safety, and secure the urban advantage for all. The Network's design supports cities in the prevention of urban crime and the enhancement of urban safety strategies, acting as a common platform that links existing crime and violence prevention networks with the different cadre of urban players. In essence, the GNSC recognizes and embraces the capacity building of networks and actors engaged in promoting policies and practices in crime and violence prevention globally; indeed the success of these networks and their knowledge and partnerships are key dimensions of the GNSC. By connecting these networks to the urban debate and to demand, particularly at the city level, the GNSC plays a key role in expanding the visibility, scope and outreach of all partners involved.

The GNSC responds to the need to analyze the urban crime and violence challenges that cities are facing around the world, to systematize their experiences and perspectives, especially in regions of the South, and to develop more cost effective prevention and urban safety policies. It is a 'one-stop' shop for knowledge-sharing and exchange, and to foster debate among government agents, experts, politicians, international agencies, activists, civil society, academics, institutions and citizens.

GNSC Phase One – 2012-2016

The first phase of the GNSC from 2012 to 2016 is a four year 'incubation' period for definition, planning, development, monitoring and evaluation, with UN-HABITAT as the Secretariat. This involves first, a cost-effective *virtual platform* to enable cities to exchange experiences and collaborate, and facilitate the pooling of human skills and technical resources, thus making expert service more accessible to local authorities. Secondly, the Network is convening a *cities and partner's platform*, to institutionalize the Network's city-to-city cooperation structure. It is envisaged that by 2016 the Network will be fully sustainable, able to function independently from UN-HABITAT, and integrated within the global institutional framework of local authorities.

The GNSC provides five core services:

1. *Expert service*: a hub that draws on existing expertise and knowledge on urban safety and the prevention of urban crime to support policy and institutional reform.
2. *Citizens advocacy and outreach*: mobilizing citizens to participate in making their cities safer.
3. *Knowledge exchange*: development and exchange of tools and working practices on urban safety and the prevention of crime.
4. *Training and capacity development*: facilitating city-to-city networking and training programmes.
5. *Resource mobilization*: assisting in the securing of financial support for urban safety projects at the city level, from global resources allocated to both the urban development and the security sectors.

It is envisioned that these core services will be supported by:

New UN Guidelines on Safer Cities: adoption of a set of internationally validated standards on safer cities, providing comprehensive guidance on improving the quality and consistency of policy-making and programming. These will update the 1995 *UN Guidelines for the prevention of urban crime,* and supplement the 2002 *UN Guidelines for the prevention of crime.*

Global Safer City Award: an award to celebrate the achievements of local authorities in improving safety and security for all. The Award will become the international benchmark by which local public sector innovation in the safety and security realm is judged.

Urban Safety Monitor: the Monitor, currently in development, will serve to benchmark urban security. It will be a composite index, based on comparable indicators including the incidence of violence and crime and other factors. The Monitor will not be a global index, but be based on regional peer-to-peer comparisons.

Establishment of the UN Trust Fund for Safer Cities: a UN system-wide funding mechanism that will catalyze a wide range of financial resources for specific service lines, using a competitive call-for-proposals format.

Design service: a locally responsive service for cities and national authorities to assist them in diagnosing and resolving issues affecting urban safety.

Initial achievements of the GNSC

- Work on the development of *UN Guidelines on Safer Cities* and the *Urban Safety Monitor* has begun. Resolutions supporting new guidelines were adopted by both the Governing Council of UN-HABITAT and UNODC's Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in April 2013.
- The *Cities Assembly on Safer Cities* has been established as an inclusive platform/coalition of partners and cities for the exchange of knowledge and experiences.
- The *Steering Committee of the Global Network on Safer Cities* was established in New York in March 2013. It includes 10 mayors and Habitat agenda partners (see Picture 1). Its role is to provide political guidance and regional and global advocacy to advance the UN Guidelines on Safer Cities, the Governance and Administration framework of the GNSC, and the establishment of the Trust Fund for Safer Cities. A global plan of action 2013 – 2016 was launched on 5th November 2013 in Mexico City.
- The *GNSC Advisory Group* of experts was established in September 2012 to support the Network and the Steering Committee. Its role is to provide technical expertise on the development of the Guidelines on Safer Cities, the urban safety monitor, regional guidelines on safer cities, and the identification of promising practices. It can provide direct technical support to cities as required.
- The *Partners Consultative Group* is being constituted, bringing together relevant tools and expertise that can support cities in the development and implementation of city-wide crime prevention and urban safety strategies. EFUS, World Vision International, Citynet, amongst others have formally become partners. Other on-going institutional collaborations include UN-Women, UNICEF, UNODC, Plan International, the Huairou Commission, ICPC and Women in Cities International (WICI).
- The GNSC has also entered into discussion with institutions in Santiago, Cape Town and Sydney towards the development of *Regional Centres of Excellence on Safer Cities.* Their role will be to support the development and implementation of regional plans of action, and provide technical support to local authorities on the development and implementation of urban safety strategies in collaboration with UN-HABITAT regional offices.
- The GNSC and partners have launched *Regional Networks on Safer Cities* for Africa and the Asia/Pacific.
- *National Networks on Safer Cities* are developing in Mexico (14 cities), Colombia (5 cities), Argentina (3 cities), Chile (4 cities) and South Africa (at least 4 cities).

Picture 1 **GNSC Steering Committee of Mayors with UN-HABITAT Executive Director, March 2013, New York City**

Source: Safer Cities Programme, UN-HABITAT (2013, December 23). Progress Report – Global Network on Safer Cities (GNSC).[74]

Policing and crime reduction in a changing world: The implications for practice

Jacqui Karn[75]

Contribution

Since the mid-1990s recorded crime rates in England and Wales, as in most High Income Countries (HICs), have been falling, as has self-reported victimization in national surveys. The Crime Survey of England and Wales 2013 recorded the lowest reported victimization since the survey began in 1981, with overall falls of more than 10% since 2010, mirroring officially recorded crime. Despite the economic recession, which many predicted would push acquisitive offences up again, this declining trend has continued in the UK, as in other high-income countries, resulting in considerable debate as to how to understand it (Police Foundation, 2013).

While reductions in volume acquisitive crime, such as domestic burglary and particularly vehicle crime, have been ascribed to improvements in security technology, and some reductions may be associated with a national decline in young problem drug users,[76] both official statistics and victimization surveys in England and Wales have come under greater scrutiny as measures of crime. Conventional concerns about victim under-reporting, and the accuracy of officially recorded crime – especially in the context of pressure on the police to demonstrate their performance through declines in recorded crime – have been raised, but these do not adequately explain the parallel decline across both official and self-report victimization measures (UK Statistics Authority, 2014).

Increasingly concerns are being raised that current measurements of crime/victimization do not adequately capture the changing nature of acquisitive crime, particularly that exploiting the rapid increase in the use of new forms of communication technology. These 'new' acquisitive crimes, such as internet fraud and cybercrime, are not generally measured by victimization surveys, and are more frequently reported to financial and commercial institutions than the police. It has been suggested that there may have been some shift towards these new forms of criminality, and the people engaged in it, since it provides a degree of anonymity and limited personal risk more appealing to white collar offenders. This is highly speculative, but there are also a number of disincentives for the police to proactively investigate such offences. They require specialist skills, and an ability to work across regional and national borders, and an investigating force may feel they do not get sufficient credit for doing so in terms of performance measures.

Concerns about measuring the extent and nature of contemporary crime represent only one facet of the challenges of adapting to changes in the nature of criminality in the wake of wider global social and economic changes which characterise Post-Modern conditions. These conditions are recognisable in practical terms by most police officers working in places that are increasingly globally connected. These are culturally diverse neighbourhoods and – where they are able to attract young migrant workers and have high birth rates – youthful and rapidly growing. For police officers it is apparent that with more mobility and migration, people, including offenders, move around more and can organize their lives and their activities over long distances, often fleetingly with people they hardly know. Places increasingly house people who may relate to their workplace or social network more than where they live, or include transient populations moving frequently. Both can make police engagement with, and maintenance of good relations and channels of information in place-based 'communities' difficult. With a more mobile, transient and culturally diverse population, there is a need to think more creatively about community engagement in decision-making, and building trust and legitimacy.

Local crime may also be as driven by a global market, for example, for scrap metal or gold, as by local markets for consumer goods. This places considerable pressures on policing and crime prevention agencies to work across borders and stay ahead of, or at least keep abreast of, the operations of crime networks and advances in technology. This is the case even when dealing with conventional offences. At the same time they must still try to meet local demands for tackling low level disorder, and continue to provide reassurance to the community. Academic commentators and senior officers alike have increasingly questioned the degree to which an existing twentieth century model of policing – based on street-level knowledge of local offenders and communities – is capable of meeting the challenges posed by these twenty-first century conditions (Innes et al., 2009).

Moreover, there have been considerable concerns in the UK that significant cuts in public spending (20% of the policing budget and variable cuts of up to 50% in some local authorities) could cause retrenchment to the core reactive policing functions. That is unlikely to meet the challenges of current demand for service, let alone reduce demand or address new ones. These challenges have also come at a time of growing scepticism among senior and frontline officers about the unintended consequences of past policing approaches to improving effectiveness in reducing crime. There now seems to be a real appetite among officers to draw on "evidence-based" approaches to effective crime reduction.

Further, community safety partnerships at the local level, which are a statutory requirement in the UK, have been under strain as agencies adjust to fewer resources, organizational restructuring, and privatisation of the bulk of probation services. As agencies adapt to the new funding climate there is widespread acknowledgement of the need for an approach that is sustainable long term, and of necessity an approach that brings the resources of partner agencies to bear on problems. However, very little of the existing research evidence on effective and integrated partnership approaches to crime reduction has directly addressed the applicability of those findings to the changing conditions.

The Police Foundation is currently working in collaboration with agencies in two towns in the south of England faced with numerous challenges of adapting services and infrastructure to rapidly changing conditions. Both have average crime rates but growing, globally connected, youthful, 'super-diverse' and new migrant populations.[77] In part to inform this work, the Foundation recently published a report outlining what we know from research on police effectiveness and crime reduction (Karn, 2013). The report provides some suggestions on how that knowledge could be integrated into current practice, and help policing and crime reduction practice better adjust to this changing context.

Broadly the report highlights the strength of evidence from research on policing and crime reduction on the measurable effects of *targeting resources* in small vulnerable locations (hotspots), or on victims and/or offenders. Targeting has been shown to be demonstrably more effective than random police patrol or reactive approaches. This is not news to most police officers, and has a clear operational logic in terms of the effective use of resources. But the report also demonstrates the evidence that some initiatives have larger and/or more enduring effects than others, depending on what kind of resources and tactics are deployed. Although there is evidence to show that targeted police patrol, for example, has a small effect on crime rates, the effects are unlikely to last long. Unsurprisingly, the most effective and lasting approaches come broadly under the heading of 'problem-solving policing', particularly when they take full account of community concerns, and the history and sensitivities around policing in an area, use multiple resources through partnership, and where decisions are based on a careful analysis of local problems.

A more proactive approach to building connections with knowledgeable residents in all areas has been advocated – rather than relying on residents to attend meetings (Innes et al., 2009). It is arguable that those most knowledgeable about crime and disorder in an area are those closer to it, and approaches that build relationships with more 'suspect' residents and offenders may mean paying greater attention to the impact of *everyday* police encounters. This is reinforced by a convincing body of evidence that *everyday officer conduct* may influence crime rates, as experience of fair and respectful police conduct has an influence on willingness to cooperate with officers, and on compliance with the law in future, and could reduce the likelihood of re-offending (Tyler, 2004; Mazerolle et al., 2013).

Equally, there is a case for focussing on engaging residents in local decision-making. Research evidence demonstrates that communities with greater collective efficacy tend to experience less crime (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997).[78] This research tradition has tended to explore the protective effects of collective efficacy at *whole area* level, however, recent research has suggested that this may also be true at a micro-hotspot level, within otherwise high crime areas, as greater natural surveillance and informal control makes them less attractive to local offenders (Bottoms, 2012). Focussing community engagement on micro-hotspots provides a more targeted approach to building resilience in the most vulnerable places, even those with a transient population invested temporarily in their street or block, but not necessarily with a wider place-based community.

The Fondation's report makes a number of suggestions for research and practice for police officers attempting to use evidence-based approaches to help them adapt to changing social, economic and technological conditions. Although these cannot be explored here in depth, they include:

- the need to ensure that community engagement is not considered a separate activity from the police day job, but instead recognises the impact of everyday police encounters on people's willingness to comply with the law (including victims and offenders who are often the same people);

- that partnership working be focused to bring together multiple resources to build community resilience and engage with residents in targeted ways, in the most vulnerable *micro-hotspot* areas;
- that problem-solving and intelligence gathering skills among frontline officers need to be improved;
- and that improvements to data analysis and intelligence systems will enable a more preventative multi-agency approach to crime reduction.

A commitment to structured community engagement, ensuring quality of contact in everyday encounters with police, and improvement in the techniques and capacity of analysts, to some degree requires a culture change in police services culturally resistant to change. However, this could focus adaptations on those aspects of effective practice that have the potential to reduce harm to their communities, and *sustainably reduce demand for service*, responding to long term challenges, rather than attempting to manage demand in the short term with fewer resources.

Endnotes

1 Examples of routine surveys include the Crime Survey of England and Wales, the US National Crime Victimization Survey, the *Cadre de vie et sécurité* in France, and the Victims of Crime Survey in South Africa.

2 The risk factors used to explain homicide rates globally are quite general (e.g. the Gini index of inequality, infant mortality rates etc.) and do not capture more proximal factors. A new research project based at the University of Montreal, the World Homicide Survey, is currently developing a methodology to provide a more detailed analysis of homicide patterns and its correlates (Ouimet et al., 2013).

3 The data refers to countries for which long-term trends in police-reported data are available. These mainly include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, North America, Asia and Oceania.

4 The Small Arms Survey, which is concerned with armed violence in conflict and non-conflict settings, uses the term 'lethal violence' since homicide requires a law to define it.

5 UNDP report a small negative correlation between the Human Development Index and homicide, with low development associated with higher homicide rates (UNDP, 2013a p. 39).

6 Femicide is generally understood to refer to the killing of women because they are women (see WHO, 2012). It also includes honour and dowry killings.

7 The issue of missing and murdered Aboriginal women has been documented and researched since around 2005 by the National Aboriginal Women's Coalition, see www.nwac.ca/sites/default/files/imce/FACT%20SHEET_AB.pdf

8 UN Women, see www.unwomen.org/es/news/stories/2013/5/un-women-calls-for-urgent-and-effective-action-against-femicide

9 Chapter 6 discusses some of these issues in more detail.

10 See (2013, July 31). Mexico murder rate falls to 22 per 100,000 from 24. *The Associated Press.*

11 Anthropologist and Psychoanalyst at the Centre de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, Mexico.

12 Explanations for the drop in motor vehicle theft are probably the simplest and relate to the much improved technical design of cars.

13 (2013, July 20). *The Economist.*

14 Costa's study used victimization measures from surveys conducted by Latinobarometro from 1995-2010. Chapman and Chaparro used the Gallup World Poll surveys conducted in 2006 and 2007 which show the differential rates of victimization and insecurity by region.

15 APCPC www.griffith.edu.au

16 General Assembly resolution 65/230 requested the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to set up an open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime. The first report of the group *Comprehensive Study of Cybercrime* was released in 2013 (UNODC, 2013b).

17 Interpol, www.interpol.int/fr/Criminalité/Cybercriminalité/Cybercriminalité.

18 According to the US based enterprise Symantec, there was a 58% increase in malware attacks on mobile phone between 2011 and 2012 (Symantec, 2013, p.12).

19 Opening Remarks of Interpol President Khoo Boon Hui, May 8, 2012.

20 Symantec (2013, p. 19), and Le Monde Technologies, www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2012/05/08/la-cybercriminalite-coute-plus-cher-que-les-trafics-de-cocaine-heroine-et-marijuana_1698207_651865.html

21 These were topics at the 22rd Session of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna in April 2013.

22 See Discussion Guide for the Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ_session22/ECN152013_CRP1_eV1380049.pdf

23 They included Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK and the US.

24 See Chapter 5 of ICPC (2010) for a detailed discussion of the national strategies identified.

25 www.gobernation.gob.ms/es_mx/SEGOB/Programa_Nacional_para_la_Prevencion_Social_de_la_Violencia_y_la_Delincuencia

26 *Strategic Framework of the Crime Prevention Policy in the New Bulgarian Crime Prevention Strategy.* www.eucpn.org

27 http://ffsu.org/fileadmin/ffsu/pdf/Vie_sociale/2013/Article_site_strategie_nationale_prevention_delinquance.pdf

28 Vanderschueren (2013, p. 31).

29 See EFUS newsletter (2013, November) http://efus.eu/en/resources/newsletters

30 http://efus.eu/en/resources/publications

31 Civilian Secretariat for Police, Ministry of Police, South Africa. www.policesecretariat.gov.za

32 E.g. UNODC (2007). *Crime and Development in Central America: Caught in the Crossfire*.

33 UN Secretary General (2013, January 25). *Remarks to the General Assembly on his Five-Year Action Agenda: The Future we Want*.

34 *Mainstreaming Crime Prevention in the Work of UNODC*. (2012). Guidance Note for UNODC Staff.

35 The Geneva Declaration is a high level diplomatic initiative originally adopted in 2006, and over 100 States have now endorsed it. Its objective is to help countries reduce levels of armed violence.

36 See Violence Reduction Unit www.actiononviolence.com and *Violence Reduction Unit Scotland* Case study www.moreforless.reform.co.uk

37 The topics are developing stable child-family relations; life skills for children and adolescents; reducing harmful alcohol use; reducing access to lethal means such as guns, knives and pesticides; violence against women; changing cultural norms supporting violence, and victim care and support programmes.

38 Urban Crime and Violence is one of a series of courses offered by the World Bank e-Institute. The bank organized a meeting on *Comprehensive Solutions for the Prevention of Crime and Violence – Strengthening local institutions for citizen security and coexistence in America*, in Cali, Colombia in June 2013.

39 The NGO's include Women in Cities International, Red Mujer y Habitat, CISCA, as well as UN-HABITAT.

40 The programme is modelled in part on earlier participatory research on women's safety in cities developed by UNIFEM, Women in Cities International, among other organizations.

41 For more information see www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/creating-safe-public-spaces

42 Sherman (2012, p. 2).

43 Presidential Address to the American Society of Criminology (Clear, 2010, p. 7, 13).

44 The authors characterize "late modernity" in terms of such factors as globalization, individualisation, neo-liberalism, and the decline of the welfare state (Hebberecht & Baillergeau, 2012, p. 8)

45 Hough (2013, p. 182)

46 The research project Fiducia, funded by the European Commission from 2012-2015, and the first volume of papers reports on findings (Maffei & Markopoulou, 2013).

47 Campana et al. (2013, p. 50).

48 Social Services Child Protection, Social Services Income Assistance, Mental Health, Addiction Services, Prince Albert Police Service, Catholic School Division, Sask. Rivers School Division, Prince Albert Grand Council, RCMP, City of Prince Albert, Mobile Crisis, Public Health, Adult Probation, Youth Probation, Corrections, Prince Albert Fire Department, Bylaw Services, Prince Albert Parkland Health Region and the Prince Albert Housing Team.

49 See for example ICPC's *Investing Wisely in Crime Prevention* published by the US Bureau of Justice (Waller & Sansfaçon, 2000); and Waller (2014) *Smarter Crime Control*.

50 The most commonly used is the accounting approach which estimates losses and expenses entailed; other methods are contingent valuation which estimates people's support for e.g. treatment programmes or imprisonment; and modelling approaches. Tangible costs refer to the actual or estimated costs of e.g. public and private services, lost earnings or health costs etc. which would be saved if there was no crime, and intangible costs attempt to measure less precise factors such as grief and the impact on the quality of life of victims.

51 IDB initiated a series of studies on this topic in 2012-13, see Corbacho & Scartascini (2013, February) *The Costs of Crime and Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean*, blogs.iadb.org.

52 Beeby, D. (2014, March 2). Cost of violent crimes topped $12-billion on one year' Justice Canada study. *The Globe and Mail*.

53 Cook and Ludwig (2011a & b); see also Tierney, J. (2013, January 25). Prison population can shrink when police crowd streets. *New York Times.*

54 www.bja.gov

55 www.nyc.gov/html/prob/htm/neon/neon.shtml

56 Perry et al. (2013).

57 These took place in Paris in 2007, Santiago in 2009 and Montreal in 2010.

58 www.genevadeclaration.org/events/expert-meetings/observatories-2013.html

59 www.crimesolutions.gov

60 www.nij.gov/topics/technology/maps/Pages/crimestat.asxp

61 As part of the project the Belgium Forum for Prevention and Urban Security organized a seminar in December 2013 on *Methodological tools for developing local urban security policies in Europe. An in-depth study of evaluation* (EFUS Newsletter November 2013).

62 Cano Asesor, J. & Castaño Giraldo, J. *Security Audits in Medium-Sized Cities of sub-regions of Antioquia with high-levels of complexity* (Auditorias de Seguridad en ciudades intermedias de sub-regiones de alta complejidad en el departamento de Antioquia). The report is in Spanish only.

63 www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/un_women_sc_gp_ie_strategy_february_2011.pdf

64 Professor Peter Homel established the Asia Pacific Centre for the Prevention of Crime as a programme within the Key Centre for Ethics Law Justice and Governance at Griffith University in 2011. Dr Rolando Ochoa is a Senior Research Analyst at the APCPC. (www.griffith.edu.au/asia-pacific-centre-prevention-of-crime)

65 ASEAN countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

66 See www.mcpf.org.my/v3/node/31 for details.

67 Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention

68 Recently changed to the Unit for Development of Crime Prevention

69 See www.bra.se

70 The Swedish Police Service consists of the Swedish National Police Board and 21 police authorities, each of which is responsible for policing one of the counties of the country. In 2013 the Swedish Parliament decided to reorganise the Swedish Police Service and so county police authorities will be replaced by one national police force. The new national police authority will be implemented on January 1, 2015.

71 Local authorities are responsible for social services, schools, emergency services, the physical environment etc. and are elected by separate municipal elections. There are 290 municipalities in Sweden and they have a great deal of autonomy.

72 E.g. religious groups, youth organizations, landlords, housing associations, women's shelters, local businesses.

73 Respectively, HSO/Lead, Global Network on Safer Cities Safer Cities Programme, Local Government and Decentralisation Unit, UN-HABITAT, Nairobi, Kenya.

74 Picture 1: GNSC Steering Committee of Mayors with UN-HABITAT Executive Director. From L-R: Norman Quijano (Mayor of San Salvador), Guillermo Pintos (Mayor of Matosinhos), Francois Amichia (Treichville), Antonio Villaraigosa (ex-mayor of Los Angeles), Marcelo Ebrard (Ex-Mayor of Mexico City), Annise Parker (Mayor of Houston), Joan Clos (Executive Director, UN-HABITAT), Gustavo Pedro (Mayor of Bogota), Bilal Hamad (Mayor of Beirut), Parks Tau (Mayor of Johannesburg), Roberto Porto (Secretary, Citizenship Security, Sao Paulo).

75 Formerly Senior Research & Development Officer, The Police Foundation, London, UK

76 Problem drug use refers to heroine and/or crack cocaine use. See for example Hay, Rael dos Santos and Millar (2013).

77 The population of Luton, for example, increased by 10.2% between 2001-11 of which six small areas saw a growth of over 50% (Census of England and Wales, 2011). "Super-diversity" refers to Steven Vertovec's definition of complexity of ethnic and cultural population make-up in the UK (see Vertovec, S. (2007). Super-diversity and its implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 29*(6), 1024-54).

78 Collective efficacy refers to a sense of mutual trust, capacity for informal control and ability to influence local decision-making.

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CHAPTER 2
Trends in crime and its prevention

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3

MIGRATION

Migration

3

Introduction

The migration of people from one country to another, or within their country of birth, has come to absorb much of the attention of governments around the world in recent years. As noted in the introductory chapter of this report, the massive movements of people from North Africa to Europe or within the Middle East have resulted in catastrophic loss of life over the past few years. Whether they have been people seeking a better life and a way out of poverty, or fleeing from war or persecution, they represent a very serious and shared global concern. At the same time, the continuing migration of people in other parts of the world, across Africa, from Latin America and the Caribbean to the US, from rural to urban China, or within the Asia Pacific region shows little sign of stopping. Nearly one in seven people on the planet has moved to live in a new region at least once during his or her lifetime.[1]

ICPC last examined the issue of migration and its implications for community safety in its 2010 International Report. That report examined trends and patterns in migration and the impacts of migration on migrants themselves – including their criminalization, and discrimination and racism against migrant communities in their countries of destination. Since that time, rates of migration globally have continued to increase. Some of the trends identified in 2010 continue – the importance of internal migration and of South-South migration – which help to place northern experiences in perspective – the increase in the proportions of women and children and young people among migrant populations, and the discriminatory treatment of migrants. As with other topics in this report, it is important that the gender dimensions of migration are explored – not just trends in male and female migration – but the differential impacts on men and women (Altman & Pannell, 2012; Beneria et al., 2012).

The arrival of newcomers is often accompanied by fear, prejudice and misinformation on the part of the public, the media, and sometimes governments. This includes perceptions that migrants are responsible for increases in crime, that they come to take advantage of a host country's social security benefits, take jobs from the existing population, and bring little positive in return. In reality, their human rights are often violated, and they are subject to discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity and culture. They frequently experience poor working conditions, sometimes akin to slavery as reports on the labour exploitation of migrant workers in the UK have recently underlined (Dugan, 2013; Centre for Social Justice, 2013). They can be subject to unjustified detention, and lack access to healthcare or education, as well as being vulnerable to becoming victims of crime and violence. These concerns apply as much to legal migrants as to those who are undocumented or "irregular".

Yet migration brings benefits to host communities, to countries of origin, and to migrants themselves. It has been estimated, for example, that if countries opened their borders to migrant workers, rather than restricting them, global GDP would increase by 50% to 150% (Clemens, 2011). In the US among other countries there is strong evidence that immigration has a very positive effect on employment, on social cohesion, and on crime rates, particularly in poorer neighbourhoods (Lee & Martinez, 2009).

This chapter examines recent trends in migration, both legal and undocumented. It looks at the impacts on migrants themselves and on the primarily urban communities in which they settle, in terms of the myths and negative attitudes which are generated, and at the strong evidence demonstrating the substantial economic and social contributions they make to their countries of destination. It also looks at the continuing criminalization of migrants, and at recent international norms and standards, which set out the key concerns and principles for policies and interventions.

While national or state/provincial policies remain very important, it is local governments who bear the brunt of the practical and day-to-day impacts of new arrivals in their communities. The final section of the chapter, therefore, considers what can be done by local governments, in partnership with other actors and civil society, to promote community safety, justice and inclusion in the face of these challenges, and looks at some of the kinds of programmes which are being developed in different countries.

The main migration trends

Migration takes a range of different forms. The first main distinction is between international migration which includes all those who cross borders, and internal migration which often means migration from rural areas, or from smaller to larger cities within a country. International migration may also take place within a region which has agreements on freedom of travel between countries in the region. This is the case in the European Union, for example, where travel between the 28 member countries is permitted, yet in some cases increasingly disputed.

Secondly, migrants may have legal status, with appropriate documentation and permission, or they may enter a country illegally without documentation, in which case they are often referred to as "irregular" or undocumented migrants. Undocumented migrants may also include smuggled and trafficking victims, asylum seekers and migrants who have failed to be granted residence permits, or those who entered legitimately but have overstayed permits and visas.

Finally, the reasons for migrating range widely from joining family members, wanting jobs and improved economic and social prospects, to escaping persecution or war and conflict in their country of origin in the case of asylum seekers and refugees.

The main sources of information on migration trends are reports by the UN DESA and the IOM (IOM, 2013), both of which published updates in 2013, while OECD also maintains a database. ILO compiles information on migrant labour. As with all international estimation, there are discrepancies between sources since they use different methods for calculating population movements.[2]

Internal migration

Lack of data and methodological problems make it very difficult to provide precise figures for the extent of internal migration, or to make accurate cross-country comparisons. While it is thought to have slowed down in some regions over the past three decades, there is a general consensus that internal migration is probably much more significant than international migration (Bell & Charles-Edwards, 2013). It is estimated that 763 million individuals have, at one point or another, lived in a region other than the one in which they currently reside (Bell & Charles-Edwards, 2013). Compared with the estimates for levels of international migration (currently around 232 million) internal migration is much more extensive. It has also brought about fundamental changes in countries and in people's lives. It has contributed to the huge growth in urbanization, and the creation of mega cities and metropolitan areas, with over half of the world's population now living in cities (UN DESA, 2011). A recent Gallup study conducted in 2011-12 estimates that, in the previous five years, 8% of the world's population over the age of 15, or approximately 381 million individuals, has relocated within their own country (Esipova, Pugliese & Ray, 2013).

International migration

In 2013, UN DESA estimated that the number of international migrants had reached 232 million, the largest ever seen (UN DESA, 2013d). Developed countries continue to receive the majority of the world's migrants (approximately 59% of the total), and the majority of them come from developing countries in the South (71%) (UN DESA, 2013d).

However, patterns of migration are undergoing a major transformation, with developing countries in the South increasingly becoming a destination for migrants. In 2013, the number of South-South migrants (36% of all migrants) was already slightly higher than the number going from the South to the North (35%) (UN DESA, 2013d) (see Figure 3.1). These figures may be even higher because informal movements in a South-South direction are known to be very common, but difficult to document (IOM, 2013).

In terms of regional migration, Europe and Asia continue to experience higher rates of movement than other regions (Figure 3.2). In Europe, regular immigration has exceeded emigration since around 1962, but increased significantly in the 1990's following the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes (Kraler & Rogoz, 2011). Since around 2003 and with the expansion of the European Union, citizens of many of those countries now have freedom of movement within the EU region.

Figure 3.1 **Global migration in 2013**



Source: UN DESA (2013d, p. 1)

Figure 3.2 **International migration by region (in thousands)**



* Latin America and the Caribbean.

Source: UN DESA (2013e)

UNDP has suggested that the change in migration patterns with a greater flow between countries in the South may be associated with the 2008-2009 economic crisis in developed countries, during which period the economy of developing countries continued to grow (UNDP, 2013). Not only were developing countries able to retain their potential migrants, but also to attract those who live in neighbouring countries (UNDP, 2013).

However, South-South migration presents challenges for migrants since developed and developing regions also exist within countries, and socio-economic inequalities are often greater than in the North (IOM, 2013; World Bank, 2013b). In Brazil, for example, while the richest individuals (10% of the population) receive 40% of the country's income, the poorest (40% of the population) receive only 14.2% (ECLAC, 2013). In addition, the labour market in countries of the South is often less regulated and less protected (GFMD, 2012, p. 5).

Slower rates of growth

Despite the fact that migration continues to increase globally, the rate of growth at the beginning of this decade has been slower than for 2000-2010 (see Figure 3.3). The trend varies across regions. Over the last two decades, for example, Europe returned to a growth rate in international migration similar to that of the 1990s, while North America experienced a gradual decline. On the other hand, the developing regions experienced either a slight slowdown (e.g. Latin America and Oceania) or a gradual increase (e.g. Africa).

Figure 3.3 **Average growth rate of international migration per year (in percentage)**

	1990-2000	2000-2010	2010-2013
World	1.2%	2.3%	1.6%
Developed countries	2.3%	2.3%	1.5%
Developing countries	-0.1%	2.5%	1.8%
Africa	0.0%	0.9%	2.8%
Asia	0.1%	3.0%	1.5%
Europe	1.4%	2.1%	1.5%
LAC*	-0.9%	2.2%	1.8%
North America	3.7%	2.4%	1.2%
Oceania	1.5%	3.1%	2.6%

* Latin America and the Caribbean.

Source: UN DESA (2013e)

The growing role of women in migration

Historically, the presence of women in migration has been overlooked, despite the fact that historical data shows that in some countries in the past, female migrants outnumbered males (for example in the US after 1930 (Green, 2012)). This invisibility probably stemmed from the social representation of women as the "companions" of male migrants (Donato et al., 2006; Morokvasic, 2011). However, in recent decades researchers have begun to seriously examine the increasing phenomenon of migrant women, and what is termed the "feminization of migration" (Donato et al., 2011; Morokvasic, 2011; Verschuur & Reysoo, 2005). In 2013, women accounted for almost half of the world's migrant population (48%), and in some regions their numbers clearly exceed those of male migrants (see Figure 3.4).[3]

This trend is especially noticeable in developed countries, which has helped to contribute to the notion of the feminization of migration, and has been attributed to three phenomena. First, migrant women are now more independent and able to migrate alone and more frequently for work-related reasons, rather than solely as a member of a family (Morokvasic, 2011).[4] Second, the growing demand for domestic workers and caregivers, in particular child care, has

Figure 3.4 **Proportion of migrants by gender 2013 (in percentages)**



* Latin America and the Caribbean
** North America

Source: UN DESA (2013b)

created a relatively stable labour market for migrant women who, unlike migrant men, have not been as affected by the economic crisis in developed countries (Benería et al., 2012; OECD, 2013).[5] Finally, despite the gradual closing of borders to migrant workers due to tighter immigration control policies in many developed countries (affecting men, for the most part), family reunification policies still help to maintain the flow of women and children joining migrants already established in those countries (Green, 2012). One consequence of this trend is that their children too are left to be cared for by others in their country of origin.

However, despite the growing presence of women in migration, they are often subject to discrimination and victimization, including becoming victims of crime, whether in their country of origin, while travelling, or upon reaching their destination (UNGA, 2012). In relation to work, migrant women tend to find themselves taking jobs at the bottom of the labour market in their country of destination for which they are overqualified, and are often subject to a variety of forms of mistreatment and discrimination (Beneria et al., 2012; Dumont et al., 2010; Gallotti & Mertens, 2013) including:

- A lack of social recognition, and lower salaries than women in the host country with similar training, or than migrant men.
- For those women who have equal or better education than migrant men, migration often results in a process of disqualification and the loss of skills they once possessed.[6]
- Isolated jobs in economic sectors that are the least regulated and the most frequently segregated by gender, in particular domestic work and care-giving.
- More likely than men to be on temporary contracts which tie them to specific employers, limiting their ability to seek better working conditions, or to obtain permanent residency status.
- Significant barriers to accessing health care and social security benefits.
- Extreme vulnerability, sometimes amounting to forced labour and slavery.
- Extreme vulnerability to all forms of violence (sexual, physical, psychological, etc.).

In light of these factors, some researchers have argued that the triple dimension of woman, migrant and worker has resulted in a new division of labour at the international level, based on gender and ethnicity, which relegates female migrants to insecure employment (Morokvasic, 2011; Verschuur & Reysoo, 2005).

Furthermore, migrant women are especially vulnerable to becoming victims of human trafficking, notably for sexual exploitation purposes. UNODC has estimated that between 2007 and 2010, 58% of human trafficking was for the purposes of sexual exploitation, and that some 70% to 80% of detected victims of sexual exploitation were women (UNODC, 2012) (and see Chapter 5). Female victims of trafficking are exposed not only to sexual and other forms of violence, but also to infection by sexually transmitted diseases.

Child and adolescent migrants

In 2013, the numbers of children and young people under the age of 20 in the global migrant population rose to 15% (34.8 million), with the majority between 10 and 19 years of age (OECD & UN DESA, 2013; UN DESA, 2013a) (see Figure 3.5). However, the percentage is higher in developing countries (22.6%) than developed countries, where it represents only 9.7% of the global migrant population. Child migrants are of particular significance in Africa, where they represent almost a third of the region's migrant population. It is probable that the growth in intra-regional migration in the South is linked to the growing numbers of young migrants in developing countries (GFMD, 2012).

The increasing number of migrant children and adolescents in migration has received greater attention in recent years. Research and public policy on migration have tended to be adult-centric and based on traditional views of childhood as a time of innocence, dependence and vulnerability (White et al., 2011; Fass, 2005). Concern has usually focused on the potential violation of their rights, or on issues of assimilation and integration (Gardner, 2012). More recently, there has been a greater emphasis on research "with children" and not solely "on children", in other words, recognizing that children can play an active role in

Figure 3.5 **Percentage of migrant children and adolescents in global migrant population (2013)**



* Latin America and the Caribbean
** North America

Source: UN DESA (2013b)

processes and decision-making related to migration (White et al., 2011; Doná & Veale, 2011). Among other roles, children and adolescents play a central part in a family's ability to create ties in a context where they are non-existent or weak, for example between the school or members of the school community and their parents (what is referred to as *frontiering*). In cases where a family has maintained ties with their country of origin, they also play a role in developing or maintaining extended family ties across borders (*relativizing*) (Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002, cited in Gardner, 2012).

However, there is increasing concern that children and adolescents may be viewed by destination countries as either a victim or a threat, with corresponding differences in how they are treated and whether their international rights as children are upheld (Dona & Veale, 2011; Bailleau et al., 2009). For example, unaccompanied children and adolescents who migrate without their families, either by choice or because of war, conflict, natural disasters or poverty, may be seen as victims to be treated, or as a threat and subject to re-education and detention (see Box 3.1). The contribution by Barbara Holtmann and Emma Holtmann *Children's safety in migrant Johannesburg* at the end of this chapter, documents some of the problems experienced by migrant children and families in the inner city.

Box 3.1 **Migration children: Victims or a threat?**

Children who are asylum seekers, refugees, victims of genocide, or unaccompanied minors escaping persecution or poverty, may be seen as victims of violence and in need of protection and assistance (Doná & Veale, 2011; White et al., 2011). On the other hand some of them, and especially adolescents, those who are stateless, street youth or in some countries former child soldiers may be seen as a threat to national security and in need of re-education, detention and deportation. In the UK and Ireland, this has led some social workers and counsellors to label children and adolescents as victims suffering from trauma and mental health issues, to avoid their detention in migrant detention centres. In situations where a child's age is uncertain on arrival, they may be placed in detention in closed young offender facilities, or in some cases, in adult prisons.

Displaced persons and refugees

Climate change, armed conflict and violence are major causes of population displacement (UN-HABITAT, 2011). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees argues that they are likely to be among the greatest challenges of the 21st century (UNHCR, 2013).

By the end of 2012, 45.2 million people, the highest figure since 1994, were forcibly displaced globally because of persecution, armed conflict and violence (UNHCR, 2013). The global total included 15.4 million refugees and 28.8 million internally displaced people, and nearly a million asylum seekers.[7] While Sub-Saharan Africa represents a third of all displacements at the regional level in 2012, Colombia, Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had the highest number of internally displaced persons. Compared to 2011, the number of refugees increased by 2.3 million, or an average of 3,000 individuals per day, and five times more than in 2010 (UNHCR, 2013).

Internationally in 2012, UNHCR noted that a third of all refugees worldwide (70% of whom were from Afghanistan), moved to the Asia-Pacific region; one quarter (the majority from Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) re-located in Sub-Saharan Africa; and 15% of refugees (primarily from Iraq and Syria) were hosted by the Middle East and North Africa region (UNHCR, 2013) (see Figures 3.6 and 3.7). Among them, women and girls represented 48% and children 46%, a proportion that has remained constant in recent years.

Figure 3.6 **Major source countries of refugees (end of 2012)**



Source: UNHCR (2013, p. 13)

Figure 3.7 **Major refugee-hosting countries (end of 2012)**



Source: UNHCR (2013, p. 14)

In addition to conflict, some 32.4 million people are estimated to have been displaced internally worldwide following natural disasters in 2012, the majority associated with climate change (IDMC, 2013). This occurred primarily in Asia and Africa. Flooding in Nigeria and India alone represented 41% of the global total (IDMC, 2013). While natural disasters have often been associated with developing countries, climate change is a transversal phenomenon. For example, in 2012 in the US, 1.3 million people were displaced due to climate-related natural disasters (IDMC, 2013).

Undocumented migrants

A major political concern for many countries is the issue of undocumented or irregular migrants. By definition, undocumented migrants are difficult to count since they arrive with false papers, overstay their right to stay, or enter a country undetected, including through being smuggled and trafficked across borders.

Estimates produced by the IOM in 2010 suggested that 10-15% of all international migrants are undocumented (PICUM, 2013). In the US, it is estimated that there are some 11.1 million undocumented migrants living in the country (PICUM, 2013). A research project funded by the EU in 2007-9 (Clandestino project) estimated that the number of irregular migrants in the EU at that time ranged from 1.9 to 2.8 million people, and OECD suggested they represented 10-15% of all migrants (Kraler & Rogoz, 2011; OECD, 2007).[8] The numbers of undocumented migrants increased in the 1990’s following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, peaking in around 2003. Since that time, there appears to have been a significant decline, with the entry of former Eastern European countries into the EU – a major source of undocumented migrants. Patterns of migration vary across the EU, but the general decline appears to be continuing although the patterns of origin are changing. In Greece, for example, the entry of undocumented Albanians from the mid 2000’s has to some extent been replaced by undocumented migrants from Asia (Maroukis, 2012).

Negative attitudes towards migrants

> “…migration remains inadequately integrated into development frameworks at national and local levels, and there is limited public understanding and appreciation of the contribution that migrants make to the development of their countries of origin and destination.”[9]

> “The ability of immigrants to revitalize their communities may depend on how attached immigrants feel towards receiving communities. By marginalizing newcomers, creating political cynicism, and instilling mistrust of the police and local authority, hostile regimes may set in motion the very processes they fear.”[10]

Fear of the other

That many people in destination countries strongly oppose migration is nothing new (McAdam, 2013; Zatz & Smith, 2012). Australia, for example, has “long suffered a disproportionate anxiety about being ‘invaded’ from the sea” (McAdam, 2013, p. 1). A recent survey found that 47% of Americans and 44% of Europeans viewed migration as a problem (Transatlantic Trends, 2011). Immigrants are often perceived as a threat, both to residents living in an increasingly insecure work environment, and to the sovereignty of countries and their national identities and boundaries, and in a context where regional or international agreements are increasingly at odds with national laws (den Boer, 2008). This helps to contribute to negative images of immigrants which in the majority of cases are far from reality. Stereotypical views about immigrants often see their arrival as resulting in increases in criminality in a neighbourhood, and in unemployment among local workers. They are seen as a burden on the State, in particular because they are perceived to take much more from the social security system than they contribute in terms of taxes (Vollmer, 2011).

The factors influencing negative attitudes have been the subject of considerable debate. A number of researchers have argued that the demographic characteristics and the composition of a neighbourhood in terms of local schools, amenities or workplaces, have a greater impact on attitudes to immigrants than their economic impact (Card, Dustmann, & Preston, 2012). Newcomers change the mix of habits, culture and religion of a country and local neighbourhood, which can be seen as threatening. Others have argued that local characteristics of a neighbourhood have less impact on attitudes toward immigration than the wider political context (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2013; Hopkins, 2011) (see Box 3.2). National political discourse and how immigrants are described by the mass media are seen as significant factors (Branton et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2011).

In general terms, immigration is often seen as a worrying and destabilizing phenomenon: "the perception of risk and anxiety is based on a perceived erosion of security and trust, and on the exposure to a society which has turned more anonymous and more globalised" (den Boer, 2008, p. 1). Terrorist attacks in the US, London and Madrid among others have contributed to an approach to security based on the concept of a *clash of civilizations* (Bazin, 2010; Fischer & Darley, 2010). In Australia, "genuine refugees" from humanitarian programmes have increasingly been differentiated from "illegals", "queue jumpers" and "unauthorized arrivals" (McAdam, 2013, p. 436). In Europe in particular, migration seems to be increasingly defined less as a question of social, economic or cultural concern, and more as a problem of public safety and security.[11] There is now a fear of a "migrant invasion" following the Arab Spring and the fall of totalitarian regimes in that region, in addition to the impacts of new member countries joining the European Union, and the movement of groups such as the Roma (Costi, 2010). These events have also contributed to the move to externalize migration control to the countries of origin and transition (Bazin, 2010; UNGA, 2012; MIGREUROP, 2011; see discussion below).

Box 3.2 **Factors associated with negative attitudes about immigrants**

- Attitudes to immigration closely correlate with people's perceptions about immigration's economic impact on the nation.
- Immigrants with no plans to work, or with more dependents and low occupational status are perceived of more negatively than others.
- Having more education is consistently correlated with less restrictive immigration views.
- Prejudice and ethnocentrism are consistently associated with more negative attitudes to immigration, but the mechanisms are not clear.
- Individuals who overestimate the presence of immigrants in their country have more negative attitudes.

Source: Hainmueller & Hopkins (2013).

Whatever their origins, negative and sometimes outwardly hostile attitudes have a profound impact on the lives of immigrants. Behind those attitudes are beliefs and prejudices that contribute to an atmosphere of suspicion, threat and risk for migrants. This is not just a matter of daily discrimination or problems related to integration, but it also affects their vulnerability to victimization, including from those required to protect them, such as governments, legislative systems and the police. Negative stereotypes have been used by some governments at times as an ideological justification for restrictive and exclusionary measures against migrants (Chacon, 2012). They are also associated with discrimination within the criminal justice system. In France, for example, "Maghrebis" and "Blacks" are subject to more frequent and longer terms of imprisonment (Jobard & Névanen, 2007).

All of this also has an impact on one of the most important relationships at the local level: that between the police and migrant communities. Police relations, collaboration and communication with immigrant communities are often poor, and among those communities the reporting and witnessing of crimes discouraged, for fear of deportation. Faced with victimization, an immigrant's position becomes more vulnerable, which in turn helps to increase the likelihood of racial profiling of migrant communities by the police (Davies & Fagan, 2012; Koper et al., 2013).

Most of the beliefs and myths concerning immigrants have been refuted by research, and there is increasing awareness that the positive contribution of immigrants to both their country of origin and of destination is crucial for development. As indicated earlier, at the global level, if the obstacles to economic migration were reduced, it is estimated that the global economy would grow by 50% to 150% of GNP, with developed countries benefiting from one fifth of the increase: an amount that significantly exceeds that which would result from opening up the world trade market (Clemens, 2011).

The benefits of immigration outweigh the costs

The contribution of migrants to their countries of origin

In terms of the contribution of migrants to their countries of origin, the economic benefits are very well-established, particularly in relation to remittances. Women in particular make an increasingly significant contribution to levels of remittances since they tend to be temporary migrants more likely to send money home (Beneria et al., 2012). The World Bank estimates that in 2013 remittances amounted to $414US billion: a sum that is key to managing the external debt of the countries concerned, and the growth of their GNP (World Bank, 2013a). Remittances are now nearly three times the size of official development assistance. The World Bank and the IMF among others have argued that remittances could be an alternative measure of development aid for poor countries (UN, IOM, & UNFPA, 2013; World Bank, 2013a). A resolution of the UNGA recognizes the importance of remittances, calling on member states to reduce the costs of transferring money between countries (UNGA, 2011b).

However, migrant contributions are much more than purely financial. At the social level, for example, they have helped to decrease poverty and social inequality, and improve healthcare and education in their countries of origin (Beneria et al., 2012; Ratha, Mohapatra & Scheja, 2011).

The contribution of migrants to their countries of destination

As suggested above, in the public debate on immigration in developed countries, two of the most sensitive topics are whether immigration negatively affects local workers in terms of jobs and salaries, especially with respect to less-qualified migrants, and whether the cost of immigrants to host societies is greater than the benefits they bring to those societies (Dadush, 2013; Dustmann & Frattini, 2013). According to a survey in five European countries[12] and the US, 34% of Europeans, (58% in the UK), and 57% of Americans were of the opinion that immigrants take jobs away from their citizens, while 53% and 63%, respectively regarded immigrants as a burden on their country's social services (see Figure 3.8).

Figure 3.8 **European & American perceptions of the impact of immigration on the economy (%)**



Source: Transatlantic Trends (2011, p. 15)

However, many contemporary studies contradict these ideas. In the UK, where this debate is particularly intense, migrants coming from the European Economic Area over the ten year period 2001-2011 contributed 34% more to the fiscal system than they took out (Dustmann & Frattini, 2013). In addition, immigrants from outside the European region paid in about 2% more than they took out. In both cases immigrants contributed more than the rest of the UK population, whose overall contribution was negative. It was also evident that the UK had been able to attract highly skilled and educated immigrants. A similar conclusion was reached by a UK government report which estimated that high immigration rates in the UK would increase future fiscal revenues and the GNP, without increasing expenses related to the ageing population (Office for Budget Responsibility, 2012).

Other studies similarly show that in both the short and the long term, migration contributes positively to the local economy. A study of the impact of migration between 1980 and 2005 in OECD countries shows that immigration increased employment in the destination countries, without migrants taking jobs away from citizens, or affecting the average salary (Ortega & Peri, 2009; Peri, 2009). In general the research literature agrees that highly qualified migrants increase the GNP of destination countries (Orefice, 2010). On the other hand, a decrease in immigration does not produce a tangible increase in the salaries of local workers (Van der Mensbrugghe & Roland-Holst, 2009). Other studies have shown that the impact of less-qualified migrants on the employment of local workers with a similar level of training is limited, and positive in relation to the employment and salaries of more highly skilled local workers (Cortes & Tessada, 2011). This can be explained by the fact that the economy absorbs newcomers by creating new work opportunities, and because workers from the host country are hired for jobs that require more highly skilled workers (specialization).

As a number of people have argued, limiting the discussion of the benefits of migration to employment is too narrow: immigration also benefits society in many other ways economically and socially. For example, less-qualified migrants help to reduce the cost of goods and services, such as food, homecare, gardening and construction (Cortes, 2008). This type of migration, in particular that of women, substitutes work in the home that is usually done by local women (for example, childcare and housework) and allows greater numbers of local women to join the labour market (Benería et al., 2012; Cortes & Tessada, 2011). It is also widely accepted that a younger migrant population brings an increase in the birth rate and vitality to increasingly aging populations, as well as contributing to pension funds which support that population (Ambrosetti & Giudici, 2013; UN DESA, 2001).

Migrants: A protective factor against criminality

> "A focus on crime is a distraction from the more important policy question of how to support the substantial social capital that immigrants bring to this country. Immigrants breathe new life into many areas where they have settled and often (not always) have reduced crime rates as an added bonus."[13]

As suggested above, another common public stereotype concerning migrants is that they are responsible for increasing levels of crime in their country of destination. This has been widely refuted by research which demonstrates, to the contrary, not only that migrants are not responsible for increasing crime rates but can, in fact, reduce them (Velez & Lyons, 2012; Zatz & Smith, 2012; Fassin, 2011; Martinez, Stowell, & Lee, 2010; Lee & Martinez, 2009; Sampson, 2008). Studies of the crime associated with large waves of immigration provide clear evidence that migrants contribute no more to criminal activity than the existing populations themselves, and in some cases much less (Baker et al., 2013; Solvietti, 2012; Bell & Machin, 2012; Bell, Fasani & Machin, 2010). Some authors have even suggested that in the US since 1990, immigration may have been the most important factor in the decrease in violent crime rates in the country, and represents a key protective factor against criminality (Sampson, 2008) (see Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9 **Immigration flows and homicide trends: US total, 1990-2004 (three-year averages)**



Source: Sampson (2008, p. 29)

For example, those US cities with a high concentration of immigrants have seen their homicide and violent crime rates decrease (Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; Zatz & Smith, 2012). This trend is more pronounced in American cities with the poorest neighbourhoods, and a longer history of immigration. This may be related to the fact that migrants are often received by relatives, or arrive in neighbourhoods where they already have connections, making social and economic integration easier. On the other hand, it may also be due to fear of deportation (Lyons, Velez, & Santoro, 2013; Velez & Lyons, 2012).

Overall, it is now recognized that immigration has a revitalizing and protective effect on neighbourhoods and cities (MacDonald, Hipp, & Gill, 2013) (see Box 3.3). When newcomers settle in a neighbourhood, they strengthen community relations and the local economy, and support the development or revitalization of community organizations such as churches, schools, and associations providing cultural and immigrant services. This helps to reinforce social controls in a neighbourhood. This is in contrast to the traditional view of classical criminology that associated the arrival of immigrants with social disorganization, and the disintegration of community controls (Koper et al., 2013; Lee & Martinez, 2009; Martinez et al., 2010).

This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the migrant paradox (Vaughn et al., 2013; Wright & Rodriguez, 2012). When migrants do become involved in crime, their rate of incarceration increases proportionally to their length of residence in the country. In the case of the US, as migrants become increasingly *Americanized,* there is a greater likelihood that they will end up in prison (Lee & Martinez, 2009). This effect might also explain why subsequent

Box 3.3 **Immigration revitalization theory**

According to a number of studies, the arrival of migrants in a neighbourhood in decline is associated with the revitalization of that neighbourhood, both on economic and social levels. The reduction of crime and violence is one of the most common features. This has been referred to as *immigration revitalization* theory (Koper et al., 2013; Lee & Martinez, 2009; Martinez et al., 2010). This can be explained by two factors: first, migrants help to strengthen social and community controls and organization; and second, they tend to settle in poorer neighbourhoods (Martinez, 2010).

generations have a greater likelihood of becoming involved in crime than their immigrant parents, in other words, when the inhibition factor of migration begins to decrease, the factors placing them at risk of crime increase (Bersani, 2014; Lee & Martinez, 2009; Mucchielli, 2003).

The development of social cohesion can be explained by the predominance of close ties within families and among neighbours, which helps to reinforce informal social control (Feldmeyer, 2009; Lyons et al., 2013). By reinforcing and expanding the neighbourhood's social organization and institutions which may have become weak, it becomes easier to control crime through the development and reinforcement of networks among residents, the presence of youth intervention programmes, and helps to attract outside investment in the community (Lyons et al., 2013; Lee & Martinez, 2009; Martinez et al., 2010).

The influx of migrants to disadvantaged neighbourhoods can lead to the revival of declining local economies, introducing new consumers and capital, help the development of new local businesses and jobs with higher salaries, as well as the redevelopment of deteriorating urban centres (Lyons et al., 2013; MacDonald et al., 2013).

The criminalization of migrants

> "The Special Rapporteur notes with concern that irregular entry and stay is considered a criminal offence in some countries. He wishes to stress that irregular entry or stay should never be considered criminal offences: they are not per se crimes against persons, property or national security. It is important to emphasize that irregular migrants are not criminals per se and should not be treated as such."[14]

There is a general consensus that since the end of the 1990s, migration has been increasingly criminalized, especially in developed countries (McAdam, 2013; Bigo, 2012; den Boer, 2008; Fassin, 2011; Mucchielli, 2003; Palidda, 2009). Many migrants find themselves guilty of status offences at the point of entry, or after a period of time in a country, of breaching administrative, civil or criminal codes. They become subject to administrative detention and sometimes criminal proceedings, with all the associated trappings (the use of handcuffs, interrogation, incarceration and prosecution) (Palidda, 2009, p. 11). Many refugees and asylum seekers are increasingly subject to controls and detention (McAdam, 2013; ECRE, 2013).

Irregular migration: From status offences to criminals subject to prosecution

Attempts to control irregular migration in particular have resulted in the progressive toughening of migration policies over the past twenty years, and in some cases the creation of criminal offences, including in countries which have a long tradition of immigration, such as France and the UK, or those, which have recently begun to regard immigration as a problem such as Italy and Greece (UNGA, 2012; Bazin, 2010). In France, for example, irregular entry as well as assisting irregular migrants is a punishable offence, and in the UK an individual can be prosecuted if he/she fails to produce an identification document during a meeting with an immigration official (Bazin, 2010, p. 27). Previously, irregular entry would have been considered to be an administrative error but not a criminal offence. Increasingly border and guards and customs officials, the police, and in some countries such as Austria and Malta the military, are involved in the detection of illegal migration (Darley, 2008; Fischer & Darley, 2010; La CIMADE, 2012). In the US, an increasing number of undocumented migrants are being sentenced to federal imprisonment or being deported (Light et al., 2014).

This has led the international community to refer to irregular migration as a new 'victimless crime', and the unjustified detention of migrants a breach of international human rights law (UNGA, 2012). The detention and incarceration of migrants is a major concern with high levels of incarceration, increasing length of detention, and very poor conditions frequently being reported (UNGA, 2012; La CIMADE, 2012). Migrants in administrative detention should not be kept in prisons, and as the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants notes they are frequently detained in unsuitable conditions (see Box 3.4). The benefits of recognizing the rights of undocumented migrants, including the provision

Box 3.4 **Places of detention of migrants**

- Prisons
- Police stations
- Dedicated immigration detention centres
- Unofficial migration detention centres
- Military bases
- Private security company compounds
- Abandoned warehouses
- Airports
- Ships etc.

Source: UNGA (2012, para. 34)

of services, are receiving increasing attention, and are considered later in the chapter. The contribution by Sarah Spencer *Granting access to services to undocumented migrants* at the end of this chapter examines developments in European cities.

The externalization of borders

The externalization of borders is another current aspect of migration control. It refers to the development of mechanisms by developed countries such as the US, Australia and in Europe to place greater responsibility for the management and monitoring of borders on countries of origin or transit, such as those in Asia, the Caribbean or Sub-Saharan Africa (McAdam, 2013; Audebert & Robin, 2009). This is not only a matter of transferring borders or responsibility. Those countries may have legislative frameworks which offer fewer protections to migrants than those in the North. They also reduce the fiscal and social costs to countries of intended destination (Audebert & Robin, 2009; Choplin, 2010; MIGREUROP, 2011).

Externalization takes place in three ways:

- Through the border control of zones with a special legislative framework on a country's border (waiting areas), or in national waters (on ships);
- By monitoring international waters and any external territories controlled by the destination country; and
- By instituting migration controls in the countries of origin and transit, which must accept the presence of agents from the destination countries, such as FRONTEX, for example.[15]

Externalization may be accompanied by the construction of detention, incarceration and interrogation centres intended even for individuals who have not yet attempted to migrate (Choplin, 2010; EPIM, 2011).

The criminalization of migrants may in the end be counterproductive, given that the benefits of migration are considerable. As discussed above, they include rebalancing the age range of countries (OECD, 2013; Ambrosetti and Guindici, 2013), helping the revitalization of communities and local economies, and in many cases reducing rates of crime. There are huge benefits to countries of origin through remittances, which are estimated to be three times the size of development assistance. Migration has been described by the World Bank's Chief Economist for Africa as a mechanism for structural transformation (Devarajan, 2013).

The importance of "open migration" policies and a focus on the human rights of migrants are increasingly stressed at the international level. The next section reviews international legal instruments which uphold the rights of migrants, and the final section reviews programmes and policies which promote the integration of migrants and their host communities, including at the local level.

International, regional and national developments

International norms and standards

While always a topic of concern, migration has received increasing international attention since 1990, with the adoption of the *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families* (Resolution 45/158) by the UNGA.[16] Subsequently a mandate for the *Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants* was created in 1999 by the Commission on Human Rights.[17] The 2000 *Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air* provides guidelines to combat and prevent the smuggling of 'human cargo', emphasizing that migration itself is not a crime, and that migrants may be victims in need of protection. Similarly, the 2000 *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children*, has implications for people who may become illegal migrant victims.

No single UN agency is responsible for safeguarding the legal framework on migration and this has been identified as a concern (Betts, 2011; Newland, 2010; UN, IOM & UNFPA, 2013). ILO, for example, is the only agency with a constitutional mandate to protect migrants, but only in relation to labour issues (UN, IOM & UNFPA, 2013). A growing number of UN agencies and international institutions now work on the issue, and developments have helped to advance discussion and cooperation across Member States. This has included reports, resolutions, international campaigns, efforts to collect and standardize data, a High-Level Dialogue mechanism, and commissions (see Box 3.5).

Box 3.5 **Some examples of international initiatives on migration**

- In 2003, the *Global Commission on International Migration* was launched by the UN Secretary-General to improve cooperation among UN and other international agencies, and to provide a comprehensive response to migration issues.
- In 2003, the IOM set up the *Geneva Migration Group* to bring together the heads of major UN agencies (i.e. ILO, UNCTAD, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNODC) to discuss ways of managing migration, share information on population movements, and facilitate policy discussion.
- In 2006, the first *High-Level Dialogue* of the UNGA was held to discuss how to maximize development benefits and minimize negative impacts on migrants. This led to the creation of the *Global Forum on Migration and Development* as a venue for governments to address international migration and development-related issues.
- In 2006, the *Global Migration Group* (GMG)[18] was established by the UN Secretary-General in response to a recommendation of the *Global Commission on International Migration* to ensure that high-level agencies are involved in migration-related activities.
- In 2013, the second *High-Level Dialogue* was held to strengthen collaborative efforts on the benefits of international migration for migrants and countries, and on its important link to development.

Key recommendations emerging from these initiatives underline that:

- International migration should be an integral part of the development agenda and national development strategies, since migrants make positive contributions to countries of origin and destination when their rights are protected;
- There is a need to reinforce the framework for the protection of migrants;[19] and
- There is a need to strengthen international, regional and local cooperation on international migration.

In 2011, the plight of migrant domestic workers, primarily women, was recognized with the adoption of the ILO *Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers*. It is the first multilateral instrument establishing global labour standards for domestic workers, guaranteeing them the same basic rights as other workers.

A number of UN resolutions relating to migration have recently been revised and adopted. They include *Protection of migrants* (Resolution 67/172); *Promoting efforts to eliminate violence against migrants, migrant workers and their families* (Resolution 67/185); and *International Migration and Development* (Resolution 67/219) (UNGA, 2013a, 2013c, 2013d). The revisions encourage Member States to protect migrants and their rights despite their status (regular or irregular), including the rights of the most vulnerable (e.g. women, children, the disabled, etc.). They urge them to protect migrants from violence and crime, as well as addressing issues of organized crime, smuggling and human trafficking. In addition, the *UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders* (the Bangkok Rules) adopted by the UN in 2010, include measures to ensure the protection of the rights of criminalized migrant women.[20]

UNPFA and other UN agencies are working to ensure that migration is given full consideration in the post-2015 agenda (UNFPA, 2013). The UN Secretary-General's 2013 report *Promotion and protection of human rights, including ways and means to promote the human rights of migrants,* for example, supports the integration of a human rights perspective on international migration in the post-2015 agenda.[21] In May 2014 the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice adopted a resolution on *Strengthening international cooperation and criminal justice responses to prevent and counter the smuggling of migrants* which urges states to increase their cooperation and capacities to prevent smuggling, while protecting the lives and safety of smuggled migrants.[22]

Regional developments

There are clear disparities across regions in terms of legislation and the prioritization of migration-related issues. Both the OAS and the European Union, for example, have been active in adopting and revising legislation. In Africa, however, few countries have institutional and legislative frameworks governing migration; at the most they amount to bilateral agreements between developed and African countries on 'combating' illegal migration.

Since 2010, the European Union has adopted several directives and regulations on human trafficking and asylum seekers.[23] They include directive 2011/36/EU (2011) defining minimum rules for human trafficking violations and sanctions; and directives and regulations standardising the definition of asylum seeker, their conditions of reception and acceptance across the EU, and improving their protections.[24] A significant development in 2010, was the adoption of the *Zaragoza Declaration* by EU ministers, on immigrant integration policy. This has led to the development of a number of core indicators in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship, to aid the monitoring and evaluation of integration policies.

In 2013, the OAS adopted two important conventions: the *Inter-American Convention Against Racism, Racial Discrimination and Related Intolerance*; and the *Inter-American Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination and Intolerance* (OAS, 2013a, 2013b). The first is a revised version of the UN's *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1965). It calls on Member States to prevent, eradicate, prohibit and punish all forms of racism, multiple or aggravated discrimination, and intolerance (Amnesty International France, 2013; OAS, 2013a, 2013b). Both conventions include migrants and refugees, and the second convention is seen as ground-breaking as the first international convention to condemn all forms of discrimination irrespective of migratory status.

National developments: Migrant regulation policies

In 2011, 87% of countries in the world had a policy concerning regular immigration (UN DESA, 2013d). Among them, 60% were concerned with maintaining levels of regular immigration, 16% with reducing it, and 11% with increasing it (see Figure 3.10). Since 1996 the percentage of countries concerned with reducing regular immigration has decreased significantly (from 40% in 1996 to 16% in 2011), while the percentage implementing policies to increase regular immigration has risen from 4% to 11% (UN DESA, 2013d).

Africa remains the region where the majority of countries do not have a clear immigration policy. Asia has the greatest number of countries with national policies favouring the reduction of immigration. In Europe countries such as France and the UK have policies to reduce immigration, however, one quarter, in particular the Eastern European countries, Finland and Sweden, have adopted policies that promote regular immigration.

Migrant integration policies and programmes

National migrant integration policies

As the first part of this chapter discussed, there are very strong arguments for promoting the integration of migrants. An increasing number of studies show the effectiveness of integration policies for both immigrants and their host countries, and since 2005, developed countries have increasingly adopted such policies. Currently, 91% of developed countries have migrant integration policies (UN DESA, 2013d).

Globally, however, in 2011 only 45% of all countries reported that they had a migrant integration policy (UN DESA, 2013c) (Figure 3.11). Further, 39% of Latin American and Caribbean countries, 36% of Asian countries and 20% of African countries were in a similar situation, (with many countries in Africa and Oceania providing no information). Considering the increase in South-South migration in recent years, the absence of policies promoting integration in developing countries is of concern.

Figure 3.10 **Global immigration policies (in percentages*)**



* Percentages roundedup & in some cares exceed 100%
** North America
*** Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: UNHCR (2013, p. 14)

Figure 3.11 **Migrant integration polices (in percentages*)**



* Percentages roundedup & in some cares exceed 100%
** North America
*** Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: UN DESA (2013c)

Components of integration policies

While the concept of the integration of migrants into society is much debated, and has been interpreted by national governments in different ways, the content of integration policies generally covers similar parameters (Strang & Ager, 2010; Ager and Strang, 2008; Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006).[25] A useful conceptual framework developed by Ager and Strang in the UK in 2008 defines the core integration domains as employment, housing, education and health, supported by mechanisms to increase social connections between communities and groups, and aided by facilitators including language and cultural knowledge, and safety and stability. All of these rest on the foundation of the rights and citizenship of migrants.

Other commentators have classified integration programmes in terms of *structural integration,* such as labour and migrant entrepreneurship policies, supports for education and training, housing and health, and the promotion of civic and political participation; *cultural integration* including language training, and support for immigrant cultures, religious practices and sporting activities; and *identificational integration* promoting multiculturalism and citizenship, and the recognition of immigrant associations (Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006; Butschek & Walter, 2013; Rinne, 2012). Overall, employment and language acquisition would appear to be the strongest predictors of successful integration, but they depend on good social interaction, and will fail to be effective if poverty, discrimination and social exclusion are not addressed, especially in disadvantaged areas where most migrants initially settle (Haque, 2010). Introductory courses on the host country's culture and customs, and language courses, appear to be the most commonly used integration programmes, often offered on arrival or in some cases prior to arrival (Perchinig, 2012; Rinne, 2012). Many integration policies and programmes are specifically designed to meet the needs of migrant populations, but some may be universal programmes such as job training or placement.

The evaluation of integration policies and programmes has been quite limited, but international reviews indicate that some types of policies and programmes have had some success in enabling migrants to prosper, and receiving communities to respond positively to their presence (Haque, 2010; Ager and Strang, 2008; Spencer, 2006). The kinds of approaches showing success include those targeting individual immigrants and families, or migrant communities; employers and organizations working with immigrants, or the general public; those developing bonds between individuals, groups or institutions; and developing multi-sector partnerships at the local level. Box 3.6 below provides a more detailed summary.

Some of the most effective programmes would appear to be labour market integration programmes – a major challenge for migrants – such as providing business subsidies and professional or vocational training (see Box 3.7).

Some migrant employment programmes may be mandatory. Finland's personalized integration plan for unemployed immigrants is a good example: "These plans consist of individualized sequences of training that a caseworker believes to be the most appropriate given the circumstances of each immigrant" (Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen, 2010, p. 2). Integration plans can include language skills assessment, preparatory and professional training courses, career counselling, rehabilitation, practical work experience etc. The plans end when the migrant gains full-time work or enrols as a student (Hämäläinen & Sarvimäki, 2008). The plans are compulsory, and failure to participate can result in the withdrawal of social

Box 3.6 **Integration interventions showing some evidence of success**[26]

A Interventions focused on migrants and migrant groups:

- Providing information to migrants before and after their arrival, on rights and responsibilities and where to get advice.
- Language training and support services.
- Structured assessment, induction and on-going support services, particularly in terms of language acquisition, training, jobs, health care, housing, etc.
- Capacity building for migrant community organizations, to help them develop relationships and build connections with larger social networks.

B Interventions focused on employers, agencies, or the public:

- Providing information and consulting with local communities, adults and schools to prepare them for new arrivals and listen to their concerns.
- Using myth-busting strategies especially providing information to the press to counteract misinformation.
- Providing information to front-line service providers on specific migrant needs, entitlements and cultural backgrounds.
- Adapting mainstream services to meet the particular needs of migrant groups.
- Training service providers in mainstream services.
- Appointment of specialist staff e.g. teachers, health visitors, interpreters.
- Appointment of staff from newly arrived communities.

C Interventions that build bridges between individuals, groups and institutions:

- Encouraging service providers to reach out to migrants.
- Encouraging service providers to introduce migrants to their neighbours and community.
- Support strategies such as mentoring, befriending and hosting programmes, in particular those supported by volunteers.
- Migrant volunteering.
- Using conflict prevention and resolution approaches.

D Interventions based on partnership working:

- Inclusive local partnerships between government agencies and local community organizations providing joined-up services from a common source, and with shared objectives. This approach has been found to enhance the capacity to deliver appropriate services.

Sources: Adapted from Spencer (2006); Ager & Strang (2008).

security benefits. An evaluation shows that the plans increase training opportunities and the migrant's chances of finding a job, and ultimately reduce their dependency on social benefits (Sarvimäki & Hämäläinen, 2010).

Migrant support strategies are also frequently used to aid individual and family integration and prevent exclusion (Vine, Holmes & Marra, 2012). Variously referred to as coaching, mentoring, tutoring, sponsorship, pairing or befriending programmes, they usually involve a volunteer working with a migrant or family, to facilitate integration into a community, workplace, school etc. (Boulard, 2012; Spencer, 2006).

Mentoring strategies have been successfully implemented in a number of countries, primarily in relation to integrating migrants into the labour market, but also accessing healthcare services and education (Bittmann, 2011; Haque, 2010; Sild Lönroth, 2007; Zalaquett & Lopez, 2006). An example is the *KVINFO Mentoring Programme for Women* in Denmark, set up in 2003 to address professional and social isolation among immigrant women.[27] The programme creates links between immigrant women and female volunteers born in Denmark with experience in domestic work (Haque, 2010). The programme helps women find suitable jobs, acquire relevant skills, and develop contacts. Some 3,200 mentoring arrangements have been completed, and the model has been adopted in several developing countries (KVINFO, 2014). Another example is the *Health Befriending Network* set up by the UK Refugee Council in 2011.[28] The project is a volunteer befriending system for refugees and asylum seekers to help them access health care and social services (Alimeta, 2012).

As discussed earlier, one of the most pressing problems is the vulnerability of migrants to victimization, and poor relations between migrants and the police. Some municipalities and police departments have developed initiatives to improve trust in migrant populations

Box 3.7 **Active Labour Market Programmes**

The poor participation of migrants in the labour market is a major concern which active labour market programmes attempt to respond to. These are intervention policies that aim to improve the chances of finding employment, particularly during a time of economic crisis. In most cases, they are global policies that target not only migrants, but the population as a whole. They may include training programmes, business employment subsidies, temporary and subsidized work in the public sector, and job search assistance programmes. In the short term, employment subsidy programmes for businesses appear to be the most effective, followed by assistance programmes and anonymous job applications. In the long term, training programmes appear to be effective, while temporary work programmes in the public service sector seem to have no effect on the integration of migrants in the labour market. However, these conclusions are still under discussion.

Sources: Rinne (2012); Card, Kluve, & Weber (2010).

Box 3.8 **Local policies to improve relations between the police and migrant communities**

Intercultural education for police officers:
There are several programmes designed to increase police sensitivity and intercultural skills including: courses teaching languages spoken by migrants; police-migrant discussion groups; and training of special police units that deal with intercultural issues. For example, the city of Frankfurt developed the Police and Migrants Engage in Dialogue programme, which offers workshops for both police and migrants and provides a space for exchange. In addition, police officers receive training on migrant cultures and are sensitized to migrant realities.

Information campaigns for migrants on police services:
These information campaigns focus on topics of concern to migrants, and provide information about the country's criminal and civil laws, and the crime prevention work of the police. The campaigns aim to reduce fear and prejudice towards the police within migrant communities.

Dialogue between the police and immigrant associations:
This type of strategy is intended to increase migrants' level of trust in the local government. An example is the Gwent Police BME Community Liaison meetings in Newport, Wales, which entails meetings between the police and community leaders from various neighbourhoods and of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. The goal is to build trust by providing a venue for communities to express concerns regarding policing.

Source: Lüken-Klaßen & Heckmann (2010)

(see Box 3.8). The New Zealand Police, for example, has developed an *Ethnic Strategy,* and recognizes that one of the principle challenges is language.[29] The New Zealand Police website is available in 11 languages, and the police provide interpretation into 39 languages for its telephone-based services (the Language Line). In addition, the police receive training on cultural and linguistic diversity, are involved in events promoting positive race relations, and have built networks with diverse communities. They hold regular meetings with different migrant communities to discuss policing approaches, discrimination, or specific incidents etc.

Overall, despite the benefits and success of certain types of integration programmes, it is argued that migrant integration is a very complex process which demands a comprehensive approach, and especially working in partnerships across sectors and with civil society:

> "While many initiatives have been introduced to address only one facet of integration, a holistic, joined-up approach, reflecting the reality of the integration experience, is likely to be most effective. Inter-agency co-operation and information sharing is commonly found to be significant in delivering better outcomes."[30]

It also requires a focus not just on the needs of migrants but also on the receiving communities – employers, public services, business communities, the media and general public. Integration is a two-way process, and while this has been emphasized by organizations such as the Council of Europe since 1998, there is still a tendency for national policies and the general public to see migrants as the principle target of integration (Strang & Ager, 2010).

Local government integration policies

> "It is at the local level that integration models meet reality and municipal authorities, within substantial constraints, develop their own approaches more nuanced than the national model would suggest."[31]

> "...the national government does not have to bother with the problems we have every day."[32]

Local governments are faced with the realities of migration on a daily basis in a way which national governments are not. They are also responsible for many aspects of local housing, health, employment, and for ensuring public safety and good community relations. The contribution on *Children's safety in migrant Johannesburg* at the end of the chapter describes some of the difficulties and challenges encountered in implementing an imaginative collaborative local plan to respond to the huge issues arising from undocumented migration in that city.

A growing number of initiatives support municipal migrant integration policies. They include networks such as CLIP in Europe,[33] the Canadian-based Cities of Migration, and the UK-based Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).[34] They offer a range of indices, guidelines and tools for local governments. For example, Cities of Migration highlights the lessons gained by local leaders on developing migration integration policies at the city level (see Box 3.9).

In Europe in 2008, the Council of Europe adopted the *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue*, which it defines as an: "open and respectful exchange of views between individuals, groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and respect" (Wood, 2009, p. 19). In the same year the *Intercultural Cities Programme* (ICC) was launched as a pilot to assess the impact of migration in European cities, and promote the benefits of diversity and its social and economic advantages (Wood, 2009).[35] Numerous cities have subsequently developed an Intercultural City Strategy based on the programme model.[36] The EU *Zaragoza Declaration* of 2010 which resulted in a pilot programme to develop common indicators of migrant integration initiated by Eurostat, similarly aids cities in assessing their progress.[37]

In developing integration policies cities require some level of political, legal and financial autonomy, so that they can meet the needs of specific migrant communities, and groups such as women, children or the disabled. They need flexibility in order to be responsive to particular problems and make changes in a timely fashion (Lüken-Klaßen & Heckmann, 2010; Quirico & Caponio, 2012; Bosswick & Heckmann, 2006). As cities grow in size, decentralization is increasingly taking place. In some countries, the decentralization of national integration policies has supported the development of city-level initiatives. In the UK, London is one example of a city where authority over migrant integration policy and programmes has been decentralized (see Box 3.10).

As discussed earlier in this chapter, immigration can reinvigorate local communities both economically and socially. It has been shown that cities which specifically support "favourable immigrant political opportunities" such as pro-immigrant legislation, or the election of minority councillors, also facilitate the process of neighbourhood revitalization, and a sense of attachment and ownership in communities (Lyons, Velez, & Santoro, 2013). They help to build trust between migrant communities and public officials.

Box 3.9 **Recommendations for local governments on migrant integration**

1. Recognize the important role that you play in immigrant integration.
2. Develop immigration and integration strategies that recognize your city is competing for immigrants.
3. Embed principles of diversity and equality in all city policies and activities. Put measures in place to hold yourself accountable.
4. Encourage the mayor to become a public champion for immigrant integration.
5. Ensure that immigrants, including non-citizens, can participate in democratic processes. Establish multiple ways for all residents to participate in city governance, and advocate for the right to vote for all city residents.
6. Replicate or adapt approaches that have proven successful in other cities, including new, smaller and emerging immigrant gateways.
7. Target initiatives to multiple demographic groups with similar needs and experiences.
8. Adopt good client service practices from the private and community sectors.
9. Provide city services in many languages.
10. Lead by example and set the new standard for inclusive hiring practices.
11. Use your procurement power to facilitate opportunities for immigrant business owners and immigrant-friendly businesses.
12. Promote immigrant entrepreneurship as a route to economic integration and to prosperity for all city residents.
13. Look to public spaces as facilitators and indicators of integration.
14. Set targets and measure the impact of your programmes and services, using international benchmarks where appropriate.

Source: Cities of Migration (2012, pp. 23-25)

Box 3.10 **Localization of migrant integration programmes in London**

A highly diverse city, London is home to about 40% of migrants in the UK. Due to its size, the city is considered a "region" and has considerable policy-making autonomy. In 2006, there was a transfer of migrant integration programmes from the national to the regional level, which prompted London to develop its own migrant integration strategy. The city put in place a multidimensional integration framework that includes language acquisition, housing, employment, healthcare, child welfare, and community development. It is much more complex than the national framework that primarily focuses on learning the English language.

London is made up of a number of boroughs each with unique and diverse migrant communities, so the city promotes localized policies that shift the responsibility to individual boroughs and communities, to enable them to develop their own approaches which respond to their context. Some boroughs have set up strategic partnerships which bring together municipal officials, the private sector, and migrant and other civil society groups to identify local concerns such as lack of housing for new migrants, and to find solutions to improve the quality of life for local people – both host and migrant communities.

Sources: Quirico & Caponio (2012); Phillimore (2012)

Services for undocumented migrants

It is important to note that many integration initiatives at the international, regional, national and local level exclude undocumented migrants. In recent years, cities have begun to develop migrant integration strategies irrespective of migrant status, in recognition of the substantial benefits of providing services to undocumented migrants, apart from human rights concerns.

In the US, a number of cities now specifically provide services for regular and irregular migrants. The city of New York, for example, has been particularly innovative, establishing the Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs with responsibility for all migrants (see Box 3.11). The city ended cooperation with the federal government over the requirement that local police notify immigration authorities about undocumented migrants. A series of progressive measures covering education, language acquisition, access to legal services and business subsidies, and the protection of victims of domestic violence are also available. The new mayor, elected in 2013, has promised to continue the existing policy and provide new protections such as a universal city identification card for all residents including undocumented migrants, allowing them to have a driver's license, and ensuring they have access to health care services. New York City has also been active in related initiatives such as the Blueprints for Immigrant Integration programme.[38] Established in 2013, the programme brings together 20 US cities

Box 3.11 **The Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs of New York**

The Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs is a New York City agency responsible for the integration of immigrants. Its mandate is to promote the welfare of immigrant communities by recommending public policy and programmes that facilitate the effective integration of immigrants in the civic, economic and cultural life of the city. It focuses primarily on access to municipal services for migrants, including those with irregular status.

The Office has four objectives:

- Guarantee and improve access to municipal services for New York's immigrants by implementing public education policies and by promoting the city's programmes and services. For example, the Office's confidentiality policy requires city officials to protect all information, including information regarding immigration status. In practice, that includes allowing irregular migrants access to public services.
- Establish strategic partnerships with immigrant communities to develop, maintain, and promote collaboration between municipal agencies and the immigrant community.
- Provide technical support by offering assistance and information to municipal agencies, community partners and local, national and international agencies, so that they can become key resources in the integration process. The city's Administration for Children's Services and its Office of Immigrant Affairs have developed a system to improve the identification of undocumented children in the family placement system, in order to assess their admissibility for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, which gives them access to benefits.
- Coordinate programmes celebrating the contributions of immigrants to the city and maintaining their heritage (e.g. in 2004, the Immigrant Heritage Week was established as an annual event).

Source: The Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs of New York website, see www.nyc.gov/html/imm/html/home/home.shtml to discuss best practices in immigrant integration. Open source tools and information about New York City and other cities' experiences have since been made available.

In Europe, it would appear that cities are often acting independently of national or regional policies on undocumented migrants, going beyond what they are required to provide in terms of access to services and programmes. This is on both humanitarian and human rights grounds, but also in terms of public health, recognizing that undocumented migrants like everyone else need access to health care. A new study of the granting of access to services to undocumented migrants by European cities is in its final stages. The contribution by Sarah Spencer at the end of this chapter *Granting access the services for undocumented migrants,* summarizes some of the findings.

Migrant integration involves daily interaction and takes place primarily in an urban and local context. It appears that there is growing recognition of the instrumental role that cities play in migrant integration where their responsiveness and receptiveness to migrants can foster social cohesion, trust in public institutions, and civic and political participation. There are also an increasing number of studies and tools that aim to guide local authorities in taking on this responsibility, and local-level migrant integration programmes and policies are gaining attention in certain regions. With growing interest in migrant integration, the growth of urban areas, and the ongoing phenomenon of migration, cities around the world will increasingly be at the fore-front in shaping the way migrant and host communities adapt to one another and co-exist.

Conclusion

The migration of people has become a defining aspect of the 21st century which challenges all countries to respond in a way which recognizes the benefits for all concerned. Both internal and international migration continues to increase the size of cities, and movement between countries in the South is now as common as that from the South to the North. The numbers of women and children migrating continues to rise, as do the numbers forced to flee their countries as refugees and asylum seekers as a result of conflict.

It is clear that there are considerable benefits to countries which receive migrants and to their countries of origin. Not least, in many developed countries, migrants are of crucial importance in helping to rejuvenate them and rebalance the range of ages. At the local level they help to revitalize the social, cultural and economic life of communities. In many cases they have been responsible for helping to reduce rates of crime and violence. Countries of origin, while experiencing a "brain drain", often benefit through remittances and the increased skills and education gained by migrants. It has been estimated that remittances amount to three times the amount of development assistance received by those countries. This is why migration has been characterized as a mechanism for structural transformation.

Nevertheless, fears and prejudices about migration persist, and migrants are often subjected to discrimination, racism and exclusion in their new countries and communities. This affects women and men in different ways. Their migratory experiences, the kinds of work they undertake, and the risks to which they are subject or often quite different, and this requires data collection and policies and programmes which take account of their situations.

The international community has worked hard to establish international norms and standards on the human rights of migrants, regardless of how they come to arrive in a country. "Open migration" policies are seen as an important and rational response. At the national and the local level it has been argued that there is an urgent need – and an opportunity – to "change the conversation" – to show the benefits of well managed migration policies for cities, and to develop context related policies and programmes for men, women and children which promote integration and recognize and encourage host communities to take part in that process. Integration is a "two-way process" and involves much more than programmes targeting migrants alone. Many countries have implemented policies which foster economic integration as well as social and cultural diversification, to train service providers, and work with local communities to change attitudes and understanding. At the local level, where the impacts of migration are experienced on a daily basis, an increasing number of cities, as well as sub-regional governments, have demonstrated their willingness to develop plans which encourage migration and provide services to all migrants, including those who are undocumented.

Children's safety in migrant Johannesburg

Barbara Holtmann
and Emma Holtmann[39]

Contribution

Background

Johannesburg attracts migrants from all over South Africa and the rest of Africa. Data on migration of children is "poorly collected, weakly analyzed, and often misleading", because the movement is irregular and often unlawful, and because many children are undocumented in the country (Forced Migration Studies Programme, 2010, p. 2). International migration can be tracked through refugee status, work permits and deportations, but this does not account for the thousands of undocumented asylum seekers and migrants in the region. Research suggests that migration internally in South Africa contributes more to the presence of migrant children in Gauteng and Johannesburg than international migration, with the greatest corresponding decrease in population in the Eastern Cape (Forced Migration Studies Programme, 2010). Many migrant children born in South Africa do not qualify for permanent residence and so remain undocumented and excluded from formal support networks.

Infrastructure in the inner city, although less than 130 years old, is tired and over-burdened. Developed and evolved as a thriving business hub, the city centre is now home to an estimated more than 500,000 people, many undocumented (City of Johannesburg, 2011, p. 18). The population is multicultural and multi-lingual and there is little cohesion amongst immigrants from different countries (Simone, 2001; Murray, 2008). Locals are often hostile towards immigrants and children experience xenophobia in schools (Osman, 2009), with language a barrier to education and inclusion. Undocumented children are particularly vulnerable to neglect and abuse, without confidence in recourse to institutional support. Many formal businesses have moved out of the inner city; much of the business and trade conducted is informal and hard to regulate. Every day over 20,000 minibus taxis bring in at least another 500,000 people from surrounding townships and suburbs. Sanitation and waste management are under significant pressure and the city is congested and hard to navigate. The delivery of safety, social, education, development and health services in the inner city is a severe challenge (City of Johannesburg, 2007).

Jo'burg Child Welfare is a South African Non-Profit Organization (NPO) which responds to the needs of close to 70,000 vulnerable children in and around Johannesburg annually (Jo'burg Child Welfare, 2013, p. 8). The organization's social workers facilitate adoptions, foster care, counselling, relief from violence and poverty and skills development.[40] Thembalethu, a centre established by Jo'burg Child Welfare in 1996 to deliver skills development programmes to unemployed young women, is situated in the heart of the most degraded and unsafe area of the inner city: Joubert Park. The Old Drill Hall, the dilapidated Heritage Site that houses Thembalethu, is occupied by a loosely connected group of NPOs, delivering developmental children's services. The site experiences a high volume of road traffic. The Old Drill Hall site is not an environment conducive to the protection and support of children. The site is dirty, cluttered with litter, smells as a result of the lack of proper waste management and clean toilets and the often-unhygienic food preparation by informal traders on the streets outside. The garden has been appropriated by an informal business selling temporary parking, and is often inhabited by intoxicated people and by vehicles that hinder access. The buildings themselves suffer as a result of poor management and maintenance and fixtures are broken and walls and floors visibly filthy.

In 2012 Jo'burg Child Welfare commissioned a consultative planning process to build strategies to respond to the complexity of the systemic challenges in and around the Old Drill Hall and Thembalethu. This process included the participation of a multi-disciplinary range of stakeholders from a range of city departments, positioning the City as a primary partner in the consultative exercise. The Social Transformation System methodology prompts a shared vision based on partnerships with a wide range of stakeholders, to promote mutually supportive integrated interventions, and sustainable systemic transformation.[41]

The collective vision was articulated as "what it looks like when it's fixed" for a "best life for every child in the inner city" (Holtmann, 2011). It is systemic and comprises a diverse range of outcomes, including infrastructure, service delivery, a culture of caring in and for the environment, support networks, safe and reliable transport, regulation and management of informal traders, waste management, safe and clean toilets and much more. The systemic and complex nature of the vision necessitates collaboration between a range of partners to achieve sustainable outcomes. While some of the facets of the vision are within the mandate of Jo'burg Child Welfare, many are the sole mandate of local government. In response to the opportunity that Jo'burg Child Welfare represents to support the City in achieving a range of its mandates in partnership with civil society, the City engaged on a number of operational and strategic levels. The vision was aligned with the Roadmap for Inner City Transformation, a planning document to promote sustainable and systemic inner city development (City of Johannesburg, 2013).

The immediate recommendation that followed the initial consultative exercise was the establishment of three themed action forums, grouped according to shared interests and mandates of the diverse network of stakeholders. In a city with very low levels of trust, particularly between civil society and local government, stakeholders revealed a sense of isolation, each struggling alone with similar challenges. Relationships were characterized by blame, defensiveness and resentment. A stakeholder mapping process prompted opportunities for mutual support where partners shared objectives, and for transparency on objectives, to promote trust. A coordinator was appointed by Jo'burg Child Welfare to facilitate introspective engagements with each stakeholder to explore relationships with the vision and to answer the question "what do I bring that will take us closer to our vision?" The "Region F" operations centre for this part of the City appointed its stakeholder management office to liaise with the Jo'burg Child Welfare team, to procure City participation and facilitate communication between internal and external stakeholders where appropriate. During the 12 months that followed over 60 government and non-government stakeholders were mapped against the vision and as the database grew, opportunities for short, medium and long-term interventions presented themselves. From these, interventions were chosen for immediate implementation.

Current interventions

- The formation of an "Activities Club" at the Old Drill Hall. Key partners on this team include NPOs and local government departments;
- Taxi Drivers as Agents for Social Change, with key partners: Taxi Associations, and Local and Provincial Government departments;
- A Communications Opportunities task team working on messaging and branding for the programme;
- An effective referral network for health and wellbeing social service providers in the precinct;
- A gardening initiative at the Old Drill Hall providing gardening activities for children as learning and play, as well as generating food and beautifying the space;
- A management and maintenance committee comprising the occupants of the site;
- A residential recycling initiative;
- Precinct Plan: key partners include university architectural and planning practitioners and various local government departments;
- As the timelines on these projects are long, an "Island of Optimism" was planned for World Aids Day, the 1st December 2013, to celebrate the value of and potential in partnerships. This event mobilised over 30 of the government and non-government partners in the programme;
- Late in 2013, in an attempt to promote safety and cleanliness on the streets in the inner city, the office of the Mayor determined to remove illegal informal traders from the area, using the Metropolitan Police. Clashes between traders and police resulted in small outbursts of violence and vocal outrage from critical commentators in social media (Boundless City, 2013; City of Johannesburg, undated; Holdsworth, 2011). The traders took the City to court and were reinstated. This was a setback to the Best Life project. In a workshop some of the children who use Thembalethu regularly expressed their fears and resentment of the traders, who contribute to congestion and to the mess and unhygienic conditions of the neighbourhood. Proper regulation of trading on the streets is indicated for safety and hygiene reasons, but it is clear that a deeper consultation is required to facilitate a fair and sustainable solution.

Lessons learned

- Integrated implementation requires a significant investment of time and energy from all stakeholders and sustained, committed leadership. However much time is spent on establishing these relationships, more will always be required. In an environment where many people are operating outside of the formal grid, are undocumented and have no formal relationship with the city, trust is possibly the greatest asset in establishing sustainable and impactful collaborations, but is also the scarcest commodity.
- The transience of many stakeholders negatively impacts the stability and sustainability of partnerships; there is a need for constant recruitment and induction of new people in the environment.
- The value added by each stakeholder should not be measured in isolation, but rather in terms of the contribution made by connecting stakeholders. No one stakeholder is more important than any other.

- Local government urban management structures bring value in networking the various role players in an urban transformation programme of this nature, since it is their mandate to work with all stakeholders.
- Without a dedicated facilitator, who focuses not only on existing needs but also on recruitment of new partners, and on strategic engagements between partners, integrated interventions cannot sustain. The role of facilitator requires a significant time investment to embrace the complexity of the social setting and the stakeholder network.
- Following this comprehensive approach it is possible to generate integrated and sustainable strategic plans, based on consultative, systemic thinking.
- Integrated planning and interventions benefit all partners, who support one another through delivery against their own mandates, and who leverage one another's work to create deeper impact.
- Setbacks are part of the package; partners must expect them and try to deal with them in a mutually supportive way rather than apportioning blame.

Conclusion

To build spaces conducive to the delivery of services to vulnerable women and children requires programmes that are systemic and responsive to the particular challenges posed by an unpredictable migrant environment (United Nations Children's Fund, 2012). It is only in partnership with a multi-disciplinary range of local government departments as well as any and all local businesses and NGOs with vested interests that a transformative exercise can be sustained to promote the safety and well-being of children.

Granting access to services to undocumented migrants

Sarah Spencer[42]

The presence of resident, undocumented migrants can pose a dilemma for European governments when they find that the importance of detecting and removing these individuals and families is not the only policy imperative they have to take into account. In addition to human rights and humanitarian considerations for the individuals concerned, competing social and economic priorities relating to the public as a whole, from public health to the need for reliable population statistics, are at times trumping the imperatives of immigration control. The decision of the UK Government in 2012 to provide access to free treatment for HIV AIDS regardless of immigration status; that of the Swedish government to extend greater access to health care and education in 2013; and the long standing Spanish policy of including these residents in the municipal population register, are cases in point.

Our research[43] has mapped national legal entitlements to health care and education for undocumented migrants across the EU28[44] and continues to explore the reasons why governments have granted those and broader entitlements to services, while some cities and regional authorities go beyond what national law requires.

Estimates of the undocumented migrant population in the EU are imprecise. The most recent authoritative study in 2008 suggested that the number falls within the range 1.9 – 3.8 million (Clandestino, 2009). In most cases where national estimates are available, the undocumented are less than one percent of the total population with only Cyprus and Greece known to top two percent. More relevant for practice at the local level would be to know their significance among city populations but here estimates are ad hoc and, like the national figures, can only be taken as indicative: 442,000 in London, for instance (Gordon et al., 2009: 51), some 40 – 50,000 in Munich (HWWI, 2012). "Undocumented" moreover is not one homogenous legal status but a collective term for those whose residence status is irregular including refused asylum seekers, visa overstayers, those who entered without authorisation and in some instances children born within the EU but to undocumented parents.

Entitlements in national law

Our mapping of entitlements granted to those with irregular status, building on earlier work by the EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA, 2011), reveals a normality of entitlement at least to minimal health care provision (emergency care). A quarter of EU states go further in providing some access to primary and/or secondary (hospital) care and a greater number provide services such as maternity care and treatment for infectious diseases. In just more than half of EU states undocumented children are entitled to the same health care services as citizens, while all but two states allow these children to attend school; an entitlement extended in some instances to pre-school (as at the regional level in Italy) or to post school apprenticeships (as in the Netherlands).

Pressure to extend entitlements, or to remove a requirement on staff to report service users to the immigration authorities (as in Germany, for instance), has sometimes come from the local or regional level where the consequences of exclusion from services can be most keenly felt – an example of local experience driving change at the national level. As Barbara John, Berlin's former Commissioner for Foreigners, told the author:

> "Where the Länder have made provision for irregular migrants, for instance for children to go to school, it helps to shift the political argument at the Federal level because it shows that their approach works; that providing access does not prove to be an incentive to more illegal people to come, and the numbers involved are known. It changes the perception of politicians that it is not such a bad thing to do".[45]

We should note that what we are seeing here is not individual officials exercising their discretion to provide a service despite *the lack* of an entitlement, but official policy at local, regional or national level to provide it: the state, in effect, contradicting the logic of its own immigration enforcement policy (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas, 2012).

Those entitlements to health care and education persist regardless of whether irregular immigration status is criminalised or not. In five of the seven states which allow access to hospital care, for instance, irregular immigration status is a criminal offence, as it is in four of the eight states in which the entitlement to attend school is explicit in legislation (as opposed to that entitlement being for 'all' children to attend, without exception).

Reasons for service provision

That counter-intuitive finding and the provision of a broader range of services in some countries and cities, such as night shelters and emergency welfare payments, requires explanation. As we might expect, documentary evidence and interviews with policy makers reveal that European, constitutional and domestic legal obligations are part of the answer: obligations under the Council of Europe's Social Charter, European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Returns Directive through to domestic legal obligations on local government: like the *Grundrechte* in the Federal Constitution of Germany; or the duty in the UK, under S17 Children Act 1989, to "safeguard and promote the welfare of children in need". That obligation ensures a minimal safety net of accommodation and subsistence through which no child should fall, regardless of immigration status, the welfare of the child being the paramount concern.

Significantly, however, the reasons given for granting these entitlements extend beyond legal requirements and ethical considerations. Cities in particular cite the need to prevent and detect crime, maintain public order, foster cohesion, tackle street sleeping and prostitution; with a further set of reasons relating to the efficient management of services: cost effectiveness, maintenance of accurate data and service planning. It is at the local level that these competing imperatives, threatened by the exclusion of undocumented migrants, are most pressing and for which pragmatic solutions need to be found. As a Spanish regional official put it to the author, "We are very, very worried about their integration. We do not want them hidden in ghettoes, without connection with the majority of society because that ends up in divisions, the end of cohesion, and poverty. We don't want to be divided. We want a single society".[46]

Tension with law enforcement

Needing to provide services to undocumented migrants in order to address those issues can resonate with concerns in some national Ministries but can also put cities at odds with national government enforcement priorities. As one Dutch city official put it: "These people are here, some in desperate need, dying on the streets or involved in crime. The national government does not have to bother with the problems we have every day".[47]

The conflict between enforcement and inclusion at the local level is most problematic for the police where one part of the service may have responsibility for detection of undocumented migrants while another is most anxious to have access to the intelligence which these residents can provide – whether on immigration related offences such as human trafficking or simply for preventing and detecting crimes in the neighbourhoods in which they are living. Nevertheless, with the exception of formal procedures relating to the protection of victims of trafficking or, as in Spain, for victims of domestic violence, any 'policy' in local forces to overlook irregular immigration status in order to build trust and acquire information on more serious offences appears to operate only as an informal agreement. The absence of such a policy poses a risk to the individuals concerned. As a Greek city politician put it:

> "This is a big issue in relation to racist violence. There is no protection for them – they can't report attacks to the police because they will be arrested… it is essential that we make it possible for people to be able to report this kind of offence. It is an offence against public order, against democracy, whether the victim is an irregular migrant or not. Their status has nothing to do with the crime. That people should be protected from this is a value at the core of society. I think this applies to other serious crimes too".[48]

Need for debate

Recognition within a local administration of the need to address the consequences of exclusion does not necessarily make the decision any easier to take. Except where there is stark evidence of harm sufficient to galvanise a political consensus and secure public support, the decision to provide a service tends to be taken without fanfare or by funding an NGO to provide it at arm's length.

The lack of transparency reflects the political sensitivities but also precludes a reasoned discussion on the pros and cons of inclusion and where the line should be drawn on services which are necessary and those that are not. Recognition that the public good requires a level of service provision, beyond any concern for the individuals themselves, would enable the sharing of experiences between cities, governments and police forces on ways to respond to this particular challenge. Even getting to the point where that discussion can take place however may, for some authorities, prove a challenge too far.

Endnotes

1 According to the latest estimates by UN DESA, the total world population is just over 7 billion, of which close to 995 million people are migrants (UN DESA, 2013a).

2 IOM bases its estimates on data from UN DESA. The difference between the IOM and UN DESA report is the fact that IOM used 2012 as its reference year, while UN DESA used more up-to-date data. OECD maintains a Database on Immigrants in OECD countries based on national census and labour force information from member countries.

3 In some countries women represent over 60% of migrants e.g. in Nepal (68.3%) and the Republic of Mauritius (61%), in others they constitute barely 20%, and in particular in some of the Arab States such as Oman (19%) and Qatar (20.8%).

4 According to OECD (2013), 22% of married women from European Union countries, and 26% from other countries arrive in their country of destination before their spouse.

5 The economic crisis in developed countries appears to have had a greater impact on young people and less qualified workers, more so than on highly-skilled workers and women (OECD, 2013).

6 Among migrants, 45.2% of women have studied at the primary level compared to 42% of men, while 20.6% of women have higher education compared to 22.3% of men (Dumont et al., 2010). Proportionately, more highly educated women migrate more than men with the same level of education (OECD & UN DESA, 2013).

7 Someone seeking refugee status in another country because of persecution in their country of origin.

8 The Clandestino Project continues to maintain a database on irregular migration in the EU.

9 IOM (2013, p. 23)

10 Lyons et al. (2013, p. 624).

11 Correspondence with Professor Manon Jendly, University of Lausanne, February 2014.

12 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK.

13 Lee (2013, p. 277).

14 UNGA (2012, para.13).

15 The European Agency responsible for external border management for all Member States of the European Union.

16 See www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm. See also ICPC (2010) Chapter 2 for a summary of the international legal framework on migrant rights.

17 For more information, see www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/SRMigrants/Pages/SRMigrantsIndex.aspx

18 See www.globalmigrationgroup.org/

19 See UNGA (2011b, 2013a, 2013c, 2013d).

20 See UNGA (2011b).

21 See www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/292

22 ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Twenty-third session, Vienna 12-16th May 2014 E/CN.15/2014/L.2/Rev.1.

23 European Union Directive 2011/36/EU, 2011; European Union Directive 2011/95/EU, 2011; European Union Directive 2013/33/EU, 2013; European Union Regulation No 603/2013 of the European Parliament, 2013; European Union Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament, 2013.

24 European Union Directive 2011/95/EU, 2011; European Union Directive 2013/33/EU, 2013; European Union Regulation No 603/2013 of the European Parliament, 2013; European Union Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament, 2013.

25 This includes debates around the concepts of multiculturalism, assimilation, incorporation etc.

26 This draws on an analysis of programmes developed to support the integration of refugees and other migrants in the UK and elsewhere.

27 The Danish Centre for Information on Women and Gender, www.kvinfo.dk

28 See www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/hscvproject

29 More information is available at www.hrc.co.nz/race-relations/te-ngira-the-nz-diversity-action-programme/participants-2013/new-zealand-police/

30 Spencer (2006, p. 14).

31 Ireland (2004, p. 21) in Spencer (2006, p. 26).

32 A Dutch city official quoted in the Contribution by Sarah Spencer at the end of this chapter.

33 Founded in 2006 by the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the city of Stuttgart and Eurofound, the "European network of cities for local integration policies for migrants" (CLIP) is a network of 30 European cities. See www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clipabout.htm

34 Cities of Migration, http://citiesofmigration.ca/ezine_stories/recommendations-for-local-governments/Migration; MIPEX, www.mipex.eu/.

35 It was developed jointly by the European Commission and the Council of Europe.

36 For the model, see Wood (2009, p.17).

37 See Eurostat (2011). Indicators of Immigrant Integration: A Pilot Study. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-11-009/EN/KS-RA-11-009-EN.PDF

38 See www.nyc.gov/html/imm/bii/html/home/home.shtml

39 Social Transformation System, Parktown, Johannesburg, South Africa.

40 Kent (2014) Lauren Kent's Masters research is focused on children on and around the site.

41 The Social Transformation System is a methodology designed and developed by Dr Barbara Holtmann and recorded in her PhD in the Management of Technology and Innovation, Da Vinci Institute for Technology Management (Holtmann, 2010).

42 Open Society Fellow, COMPAS, University of Oxford sarah.spencer@compas.ox.ac.uk

43 Carried out at the Centre on Migration Policy and Society, University of Oxford with research assistance from Vanessa Hughes. The first report, *Outside and In: Legal Entitlements to Health Care and School Education for Migrants with Irregular Status* was published by COMPAS, Oxford in mid-2014. The research is supported by a grant from the Open Society Fellowship. www.compas.ox.ac.uk/?id=569

44 The 28 countries that are Member States of the European Union. Croatia was the most recent country to join, in July 2013.

45 Interviewed July 2013

46 Interviewed January 2013

47 Interviewed March 2013

48 Interviewed July 2013

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CHAPTER 3
Migration

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4

INDIGENOUS MIGRATION AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

Indigenous migration and local communities

4

Introduction

Urbanization and migration have come to be regarded as one of the most pressing population problems (UN, 2010). It is increasingly the case that indigenous peoples comprise a significant percentage of the internal and international migrant populations moving to urban areas, and currently more than half of the indigenous population in many countries reside in cities (UN-HABITAT, 2011; UN-HABITAT & OHCHR, 2010; Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008) (Figure 4.1).[1]

City life for indigenous peoples can be a difficult experience. Urban indigenous peoples often lack recognition of their status, tend to live in informal settlements, lack employment and income-generating activities, have lower wages on average than non-indigenous people, and lack job security.[2] On every continent it appears that indigenous peoples who are mobile are at a greater risk of impoverishment, exploitation, marginalization, disenfranchisement and discrimination that affects their access to stable assistance (Levi & Maybury-Lewis, 2012, p. 108).[3]

Indigenous women are particularly vulnerable in urban areas, where they may experience barriers to proper housing and employment, and are especially prone to unstable employment that can be exploitive such as human trafficking (UN-HABITAT, 2011). In terms of criminality and victimization, indigenous peoples are usually over-represented in the criminal justice sector as offenders, and a high proportion are victims of crime and violence. This is a global trend that demonstrates similarities in risk factors for indigenous peoples. It is generally accepted that colonization and the subjugation of indigenous peoples led to a loss of self-direction and disempowerment, resulting in discrimination, social dysfunction and dependency and the rise of risk factors such as family violence, child abuse, school failure, low literacy levels and unemployment/underemployment (Ministry of Justice New Zealand, 2011).

Figure 4.1 **Urban-based indigenous peoples as a percentage of their total population (selected countries)**

	Indigenous peoples as percentage of total country population	Percentage of indigenous peoples living in cities
NEW ZEALAND	14.9%	84%
AUSTRALIA	3.0%	60%
CANADA	4.3%	56%
US	2.0%	71%

Source: Statistics New Zealand (2013); Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011); Statistics Canada (2011); US Census Bureau (2010).

Overall there is an absence of data and studies about indigenous populations migrating to cities, and a significant lack of in-depth understanding of the issues at the local level. Further, little is being done to incorporate city-based health and police data, and to include urban indigenous peoples in city information collection processes. There is also a deficiency of local-level government safety policies and dialogue regarding rights, inclusion and governance of urban indigenous peoples. However, at the international level there has been considerable development in the past 15 years, including international declarations, guidelines and expert meetings on related topics. In addition, international institutions are increasingly the main sources of information contributing to an improved understanding of the issues, and encouraging States to implement policies that improve the well-being of their indigenous peoples. There is also an emerging indigenous middle class, notably in Canada, US, Australia and New Zealand, where the appropriation of the city by indigenous organizations and urban indigenous political bodies is enhancing access to services, as well as providing a unified voice for the urban-based population.

The safety of indigenous peoples has been a topic of interest for ICPC for several years. Much of ICPC's past work has focused on documenting developments and promising practices to improve the well-being of indigenous peoples. In recent years, ICPC has been working more closely with indigenous groups in cities to address the challenges of urban safety, integration and rights. This work has been inspired largely by the 1995 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Urban Crime that highlights the link between safer cities and equality and inclusion, and the recognition of citizens' rights and fundamental freedoms. The decision to include indigenous migration in this edition of the report recognizes the expanding nature of this complex phenomenon, and the need to share knowledge about new and positive developments taking place around the world.

This chapter builds on ICPC's work on urban indigenous peoples, and draws attention to the growing phenomenon of urban indigenous migration, the lack of data collection, and the challenges encountered by indigenous migrants. It outlines some of the positive developments at the international level, and the need for increased efforts at the local level, as increasing numbers of indigenous peoples come to know no other home than the city. The chapter underlines the importance of local actors addressing inclusion, recognition and access to services, and discusses some of the key debates about appropriate solutions.

Indigenous peoples

According to the UNPFII (2009), there are over 370 million indigenous peoples located across 70 countries worldwide. They are found in all regions of the world, and many indigenous groups live in more than one region. The development of the term *indigenous* was to some extent part of global movements to unite diverse populations facing similar realities, such as human rights violations. These movements have taken various forms, including the emergence of umbrella organizations, regional networks (e.g. WIMSA[4]) and transnational alliances (e.g. IWGIA), which have benefitted from electronic media to advance modern indigenous rights, discourses, and practices (Levi & Maybury-Lewis, 2012, p. 79).

Given the diversity of indigenous peoples around the world, no official definition of *indigenous* has been developed by any UN entity. The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169, adopted in 1989 by the ILO, provides the only legally binding definition (Hodgson, 2002, p. 138). This definition is similar to the one outlined in Box 4.1, which provides the most common definition. Other definitions exist at national levels, but the terms vary from country to country, reflecting different situations on the ground (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008, p. 14).

International norms, standards and developments

Over the past two decades, the international community has adopted some significant declarations that recognize the individual and collective rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples around the world. These initiatives encourage States to take the necessary steps to protect such rights, and to be more inclusive and egalitarian in the acknowledgement and treatment of indigenous populations. The most significant initiative historically was the adoption of the UN *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* in September 2007.[5] The Declaration recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples on a wide range of issues, provides a universal framework for the international community and States, and commits member states to protect the rights and resources of indigenous peoples within the state. The Declaration establishes a framework for discussions and dialogue between indigenous peoples and States. It provides a stronger case for States to recognize that: "indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law" (Article 1).

Box 4.1 **Defining indigenous peoples**

Indigenous, meaning *native or born within* refers to an ethnic group or community in a particular area seen as their traditional land. The legal term *Indigenous people* refers to culturally distinct groups affected by colonization (Blaser, Feit, & McRae, 2004, p. 53). The term *Indigenous peoples* is now used instead of *people* to suggest a group of persons united by a common culture or tradition, with a common language and beliefs.

Indigenous is an umbrella term employed by various groups to advance the recognition of their rights, including the right to self-determination. At the international level, they may be treated as one group in order to better advocate for their rights, such as at the United Nations General Assembly.

The following items define indigenous peoples:

- Self-identification as indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the community as their member;
- Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies;
- Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources;
- Distinct social, economic or political systems;
- Distinct language, culture and beliefs;
- Form non-dominant groups of society; and
- Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.

Source: Cobo (2009).

Box 4.2 **The International Expert Group Meeting on Urban Indigenous Peoples and Migration (2007)**

The Expert Group Meeting was organized by the UNHRP, and co-organized by UN-HABITAT, Secretariat of UNPFII, OHCHR, CELADE, ECLAC, and the IOM. The meeting aimed to facilitate a better understanding of living conditions and rights of indigenous peoples in urban areas through comprehensive research, and to develop practical approaches and policy recommendations for improving living conditions and human rights. The following recommendations were provided:

- Relevant authorities need to address the rights of indigenous peoples in urban areas as an integral part of actions to improve their living conditions.
- Public authorities need to understand the multiple identities of indigenous peoples within urban areas and their continuing relationship to their traditional lands and natural resources. Indigenous peoples should not be seen as divided between urban and rural, but rather as peoples with rights and a common cultural identity and facing similar challenges in adapting to changing circumstances and environments.
- States need to adopt sensitive policies based on the recognition of religious, political, social, cultural, and spiritual rights, including indigenous peoples' sacred sites.
- States must work in collaboration with various stakeholders to adopt policies that enable indigenous peoples to take full advantage of the opportunities that exist in urban areas.

Source: UNPFII (2007).

The adoption of the Declaration was due in part to the advocacy work of the UNPFII, which was established on July 28, 2000 by ECOSOC. UNPFII is mandated to discuss and advise on indigenous issues related to economic and social development, culture, the environment, education, health and human rights. It has hosted a series of important expert meetings on urban indigenous peoples:

- Urban Indigenous Peoples and Migration (2007) (see Box 4.2);
- Combating violence against indigenous women and girls (2012); and
- Indigenous youth (2013).

Other important developments at the international level include:

- The *Guidelines on indigenous peoples issues* (UNDG, 2009) which assist the United Nations system to mainstream and integrate indigenous peoples' issues in operational activities and programmes at the country level.
- The UNIPP (2011)[6] supports joint UN programmes at the country level to facilitate the implementation of the rights of indigenous peoples, in partnership with indigenous peoples.
- The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) forms part of the Human Rights Council. It provides thematic expertise on the rights of indigenous peoples to the Human Rights Council.[7]
- The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2001) is responsible for examining ways of overcoming obstacles to the full and effective protection of indigenous peoples' rights.

While major advancements have taken place at the international level, the development of regional, national and local policies protecting indigenous peoples' rights and the advancement of their well-being has been slow. The UNPFII suggests that this is due to: "insufficient reliable data available to the [UNPFII] in critical areas… [which] negatively impacts on the ability of the Forum and ECOSOC to evaluate progress made towards integrating indigenous peoples into broader United Nations goals and programmes such as the Millennium Development Goals" (UNPFII, 2009, p. 220). Data is crucial for understanding the issues and developing larger scale policies.

More recently, there has been an increase in the number of policies and programmes supported by international and regional bodies[8] and development agencies[9] in several countries. The World Bank

Box 4.3 **The World Bank Indigenous Peoples' Policy**[10]

The World Bank positions excluded groups, such as the indigenous peoples, at the centre of its development agenda. This includes:

- Strengthening the policy and institutional frameworks affecting indigenous peoples and their relations with other members of society;
- Building indigenous peoples' capacity for self-development, based upon their cultural heritage and knowledge;
- Demonstrating the important role that indigenous peoples can play in the management of fragile ecosystems and biodiversity conservation and in Climate Change Adaptation; and
- Disseminating experience and lessons learned from such indigenous development initiatives to national governments and the international donor community.

Indigenous Peoples' Policy is one example (see Box 4.3). This policy has stimulated demand for the recognition and advancement of indigenous peoples' rights in certain countries, and has been instrumental to the growth of indigenous-based projects at all levels of government.

At the country level, some national governments are working to improve the well-being of indigenous peoples. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have undertaken constitutional reforms recognizing some indigenous groups and their rights, including language, culture and traditions. The reforms also focus on the need for prior and informed consultation, regulating access to natural resources and land, and in some cases include the recognition of autonomy and self-governance (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Other initiatives include a bill on internal displacement that was passed in 2012 in Mexico by the Chiapas state congress, and Chile's 2007 indigenous affairs policy. The Mexican bill was drafted with the support of UN agencies and civil society representatives. It is the first law of its kind to be passed in Mexico providing support for those affected by displacement, and provides for prevention measures.

In Chile, the government unveiled several new measures designed to redefine the country's indigenous policies. As part of the reforms, the government created a new under-secretariat for indigenous affairs, and guaranteed seats in Chilean political organizations for indigenous community members. With regard to urban areas, the government put in place policies advancing multiculturalism and inclusion, and specific programmes for indigenous peoples. Further, five guidelines for action regarding indigenous peoples were proposed: strengthening indigenous communities' participation in the political and social arenas; recognition of and strengthening of their rights; improvement of their quality of life in urban areas; empowerment of women; and promoting their culture (IDB, 2012).

The Government of Australia has been especially active in addressing the disparities between the indigenous and non-indigenous population through the creation of large-scale initiatives. In 2008, the Council of Australian Governments, an intergovernmental forum in Australia, committed $4.6 billion in Indigenous specific funding over 10 years, to drive fundamental reforms in remote areas on housing, health, early childhood development, jobs and improvements in service delivery. This initiative was called the *Closing the Gap Strategy*,[11] and aims to link education, housing and health departments with a clear focus on overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. The *Integrated Strategy to Close the Gap in Indigenous Disadvantage* includes:

- Setting targets for life expectancy, child mortality, literacy and numeracy, early childhood education, employment and high-school attainment;
- Focusing on early childhood, schooling, health and 'healthy homes';
- Ensuring service delivery; and
- Setting up overarching Bilateral Indigenous Plans between the Commonwealth and each State and Territory to adopt reforms contributing to *Closing the Gap*.

There is also an *Indigenous Urban and Regional Strategy* that commits governments at various levels to coordinate, and to target the substantial funding provided under mainstream and Indigenous-specific programmes to address disadvantage in urban and regional locations.

Migration trends: Indigenous peoples

Insufficient demographic and statistical information has made it difficult to reach an overall figure of indigenous peoples migrating internationally and internally, as well as those residing in urban areas (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Poor data is in part attributed to the fact that many indigenous groups are not recognized, do not have equal rights, and tend to migrate to informal urban areas where they are not captured by censuses (Newhouse & Peters, 2003). A few groups do compile their own information on indigenous peoples, including UN country offices and UN DESA, The IWGIA gathers information from its extensive network of researchers and activists, and the IOM collects immigration data from National Statistics Offices.[12] In certain countries, indigenous peoples are usually recorded in the national census as one category and the diversity of indigenous groups is rarely taken into account. There has been some progress in advancing data collection and data disaggregation on indigenous peoples. This includes recommendations of expert meetings, the development of cooperation agreements to include indigenous peoples in data collection, and capacity building of indigenous organizations enabling them to collect and analyze data on their peoples.[13]

Inequality

Indigenous peoples migrating to cities face significant challenges in relation to inequality and discrimination, and they tend to be overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Documenting these issues can be challenging since there is a lack of information on indigenous peoples' offending and victimization rates at the local-level (i.e. in cities). This type of information is often only compiled by state or national-level correctional services (see Box 4.4). Very little analysis of city police data is undertaken, despite growing indigenous populations, and often it fails to record the identity (i.e. indigenous status or ethnic group) of the victim or offender. A few studies have documented the situation in pockets of cities, primarily drawing on observations from organizations, citizens, police services and city officials.

Migration trends

Migration, as discussed in Chapter 3, includes both international and internal movement. For indigenous peoples, it is often a very unique experience. Indigenous migration tends to be internal and transitory, and concepts of residence (such as urban) differ from those of non-indigenous people. In some cases, cities were built on indigenous territory and

Box 4.4 **Risk factors and crime and victimization (selected countries)**

US

American Indian or Alaska Natives[14] have an incarceration rate about 38 percent higher than the national rate and experience higher rates of rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault and simple assault than other races (OVC, 2013, p. 9). The rate of violent crime estimated from self-reported victimization for American Indians is higher than any other racial or ethnic group and is more than twice the national average (Truman, Langton & Planty, 2013).[15] Women are particularly vulnerable, and are 2.5 times more likely to be raped or sexually assaulted than non-indigenous women in the US (AOC, 2012, p. 4) and more than one-quarter reported rape victimization in their lifetimes (OVC, 2013, p. 31). For both men and women, risk factors associated with offending and victimization include exposure to family violence and child abuse, school drop-out and low literacy rates, substance abuse, and unemployment/underemployment.

Canada

Aboriginal people[16] make up 23.2 percent of the federal inmate population (women 33.6 percent) and they are overrepresented in Canada’s correctional system (Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2013). Since 2000-01, the federal Aboriginal inmate population has increased by 56.2 percent (Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2013). In 2009, 37 percent of Aboriginal people aged 15 years or older reported having been a victim of at least one of the eight offences[17] covered by the General Social Survey in the preceding 12 months compared to about one-quarter of non-Aboriginal people (Perreault, 2011). It has been shown that socio-demographic factors are associated with overall violent victimization, including age[18], drug use, activity limitations and people using or selling drugs in the neighbourhood, and these were considered major risk factors (Perreault, 2011). When all of these known risk factors are taken into account, the risk of victimization is 58 percent higher than that of non-Aboriginal people (Perreault, 2011).

New Zealand

The Māori[19] make up 51 percent of the prison population, and over 60 percent of the female prison population (Statistics New Zealand, 2012). Further, there is a disproportionately high rate of crime and victimization among the Māori who are more likely to experience a high level of crime than victims from European and Asian ethnic groups, and are more likely to be chronic victims of crime (Ministry of Justice New Zealand, 2011). The risk of victimization is particularly high for serious offences, including sexual violence and violence by partners. Among Māori women, the rate of sexual victimization is twice as high as the national rate for all women. The profile of those most at risk of victimization include young Māori, those who are unmarried, are more economically vulnerable, living in rented accommodation, living in more economically deprived areas, living in sole parent households or households comprised of roommates or “other” family combinations, and living in metropolitan cities (excluding Auckland) (Kiedrowski, 2013).

Australia

The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population[20] is 15 to 20 times more likely than non-Indigenous people to be charged with violent offences, and imprisonment rates are around 12 times those of the rest of the Australian population (Wundersitz, 2010). They make up 40 percent of those imprisoned for assault offences, and rates of over-representation are even higher in juvenile detention. In terms of victimization, rates are two to three times higher than rates among the non-indigenous population, and rise to four to six times higher in the case of family violence (Kiedrowski, 2013). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples experience similar risk factors for violence as either an offender or a victim. This includes the misuse of alcohol, socio-economic disadvantage, childhood exposure to violence and abuse, a younger age profile, previous involvement with the criminal justice system and psychological distress (Bryant & Willis, 2008).

in many countries indigenous communities border on cities. Migration to an urban area may be envisaged as returning to one's native lands, or transiting from one place to another. Further, indigenous peoples are highly mobile and often considered *boundary-spanners*: "those who divide their time in cities and on reserves" (Letkemann, 2004, p. 242). Internationally, several indigenous groups span borders[21] so the status of migrant cannot be understood in the same manner. This situation raises legal and rights-based issues, and challenges current notions of the delineation of territories and states. It also raises questions about the notion of citizenship since for many groups, their language, culture and traditions are not recognized under national constitutions. At the same time, there is no consensus on the indigenous propensity to migrate, characteristics of indigenous migrants, or the adaptation process at destination (Del Popolo et al., 2007, p. 35). Thus, indigenous migration is a complex phenomenon.

Despite the lack of a consensus on migration trends, the most common trend appears to be voluntary rural to urban migration, which explains the growing number of indigenous peoples in cities. The IOM (2008) identifies two distinct processes: *internal rural-urban migration* – the movement of indigenous peoples from places of origin to cities*;* and *urbanization* – the process of absorption of indigenous peoples into city life, and transformation of indigenous territories into urban centres within the country of origin (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008, p. 24). They also identify *internal and international rural-rural migration*[22]; *displacement and forced removal;* and *return migration*.

The best data on indigenous peoples' urban migration and mobility is at the country level.[23] For a few regions, such as Africa and Asia data is almost non-existent, in part due to the lack of formal recognition of indigenous groups. The only reliable regional data is from the Latin America census. In 2000 it was estimated that there were over 300 million indigenous peoples in the region, just under half (40 percent) of whom lived in cities (UN-HABITAT, 2010). The rate varies across the region, from 1 in 3 indigenous peoples living in cities in Mexico and Guatemala, to over half in Chile, Brazil and Bolivia (UN-HABITAT, 2010). One of the best regional studies of indigenous peoples' urban migration and mobility is by Del Popolo et al. (2007), exploring their distribution across Latin America, internal migration, and urban living conditions. In terms of country-based studies, Norris & Clatworthy's (2011) work on indigenous mobility and migration in Canadian urban areas provides an excellent overview. The most comprehensive country-level data comes from New Zealand, Canada, Australia, the US and Mexico (see Box 4.5).

Urban migration – The reasons and impacts

Indigenous migration is increasingly voluntary (UN-HABITAT, 2010). Indigenous women appear to play an important part in the decision to migrate to cities which is often linked to accessing health-related services (Lindstrom & Hernández, 2006). Health is in fact one of the principal push/pull factors in the internal migration of indigenous peoples (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008, p. 47). This can be seen as a reflection of major deficiencies in health services in rural areas, and the higher incidence of preventable diseases in indigenous rural communities. Indigenous peoples may also migrate to urban areas for better employment, housing, education, political participation, social recognition and other benefits they lack in their territories (Carli, 2012). In Canada, indigenous agencies found that lack of housing is the primary reason for migration to cities (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2004, p. 38-41). In countries such as Mexico, underdevelopment and regional economic disparities are major driving factors for migration, with large income disparities between urban and rural areas.

The majority of the migrant indigenous population are young people and women, both of whom are vulnerable. Indigenous youth are often subjected to discrimination by the wider community and denied equal employment and education opportunities, and may have been forced into child care (Carli, 2012). Young girls in particular may be at risk of being trafficked into sexual slavery, and young boys may be forced to survive on the streets and engage in aggressive and risky behaviour, and illegal activities. In Peru, the sexual assault of female indigenous migrants is a major issue, as well as their vulnerability to trafficking and sexual exploitation (see the contribution by Olenka Ochoa Berreteaga *Urban violence and indigenous migrant populations: The case of Peru* at the end of the chapter). Further, in Canada, many indigenous women and girls, the majority under the age of 31, have gone missing or been murdered over the last 30 years, and often from urban areas (NWAC, 2013). The RCMP recently confirmed that over 1,000 indigenous women and girls have been murdered in that period, and some 225 are missing (RCMP, 2014). In general, indigenous women are at greater risk of victimization, poverty, and oppression than non-indigenous women (Bourassa, McKay-McNabb & Hampton, 2006).

At the same time, indigenous peoples may seek safety and refuge in urban areas, because of the exploitation or militarization of their lands, lack of water supplies, deterioration of traditional livelihoods, or environmental degradation. In a number of studies, indigenous migrants report that their economic and

Box 4.5 **Trends in Indigenous migration**

New Zealand

New Zealand has a large and growing indigenous population. One in seven people identified as being Māori in 2013, an increase of 5.9 percent since 2006 (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). The Māori population is young with a median age of 23 years in the 2013 Census, compared to 37 years for the non-indigenous population. Approximately 84 percent of Māori live in cities (Statistics New Zealand, 2013). Apart from increasing numbers, in the last 20 years Māori have become more mobile, partly because of improved economic conditions, employment opportunities and increasing inter-ethnic partnering (Statistics New Zealand, 2001). More than 60 percent of people of Māori ethnicity have moved at least once within New Zealand between 2001 and 2006. Over half of those migrants moved within or between the main urban areas. The majority of Māori migrants appear to be young adults with their children.

Canada

Canada has a growing Aboriginal population. They accounted for 4.3 percent of the total population of Canada in 2011, a 20.1 percent increase since 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2011). Over half (56 percent) of them reside in urban areas. Due to recent changes in data collection[24], information on the characteristics of those living in cities is limited, and dates from 2006. The 2006 Census reported that 28 percent of the urban Aboriginal population was less than 15 years of age, compared to 17 percent of the non-indigenous population. In addition, the urban Aboriginal population is very mobile – one in four living in a different residence one year prior to the 2006 Census, having moved within the same city, or from a different community.

US

The American Indian and Alaska Natives population made up 2 percent of the total US population in 2012 (US Census Bureau, 2012). This marked a 0.3 percent increase from 2010 and the population increased almost twice as fast as the total US population. The number of American Indians and Alaska Natives alone, or in combination with other races, residing in urban areas grew by 34 percent, amounting to almost 1 million people (US Census Bureau News, 2013). In terms of mobility, urban indigenous peoples in the US exhibit higher rates of mobility than non-indigenous people, both within the same county and moving from one to another (Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, 2008).

Australia

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (2011) estimates that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population represents about 3 percent of the total population of Australia, and as of June 2011 one third lived in major urban areas. An overall pattern of migration from more remote areas to less remote areas was observed between 2001 and 2006, with very remote areas having the greatest net loss of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and major cities the greatest net gain. Young Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people (aged 20–39 years) are more likely to move to urban areas than other age groups and change addresses frequently (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011). In 2006 the median age was 22 years, compared with 38 years for non-indigenous Australians (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2013).

Mexico

According to the INEGI (2011) Mexico has the largest indigenous population in Latin America, although they make up a smaller proportion of the total population (c. 10%).[25] Rural to urban migration in Mexico grew 182 percent from 1980 to 1994, and 352 percent between 1980 and 2002 (Acharya & Codina, 2012, p. 144-145). Around 80 percent of indigenous peoples are located in the southern part of the country, and nearly 15 percent live in central Mexico (Hall & Patrinos, 2006). Studies by Pérez Ruiz (2007) have shown that indigenous peoples migrate primarily to Mexico City, where they comprise 19 percent of the population. There is also a growing presence of indigenous peoples in northern cities. While Mexico does collect data, most of the information is based on estimates, and exact numbers and the place of origin of migrants remains largely unknown (see the contribution by Rodrigo Elizarraráz *Trends in internal indigenous migration in Mexico: The struggle to adapt to an urban context* at the end of this chapter).

social conditions improved in urban settings, without loss of their cultural identity (Pedersen & Nyseth, 2013; Durin & Sheridan, 2003; Environics Institute, 2010, p. 113). For the Sámi of Norway, the city represents an arena for revitalizing or redefining Sámi identity, providing a "form of freedom to construct your own identity", and as a place of opportunity with a growing modern Sámi middle class (Pedersen & Nyseth, 2013, p. 85-87).[26]

Overall, therefore, migration to cities can have both negative and positive impacts on indigenous peoples, their home communities, and host communities. As suggested above, unemployment and job insecurity, poor health, lack of access to healthcare, vulnerability to human trafficking and sexual exploitation, lack of rights and cultural and racial discrimination are all associated with indigenous and migrant status in urban settings. Lack of job skills and illiteracy may lead to participation in the informal economy, excluding entitlement to health or other social benefits (Carrillo, 2009, p. 538), or to illegal activities (UNPFII, 2013). Indigenous peoples tend to drop out of school early to look for work, they are economically marginalized, and family instability is common, with high proportions of female lone parents (OHCHR, 2006; Heritz, 2010).

In Mexico, studies of indigenous migrants have reported high levels of perceived discrimination attributed to their racial/cultural identities (e.g. skin colour, dress, language, etc.) (Farfán & Fernández, 2001; Dzib, 2003; Durin & Sheridan, 2003) (see Figure 4.2). Migrants report isolating and segregating themselves socially for fear of discrimination and violence. Urban indigenous peoples are often found on the fringes of society, living in poverty in overcrowded housing and limited access to services (see the contributions referred to above on *Trends in internal indigenous migration in Mexico: The struggle to adapt to an urban context* and *Urban violence and indigenous migrant populations: The case of Peru* at the end of this chapter). In some cases indigenous migrants feel compelled to conceal their identities and cut ties with their Indigenous languages and traditions (UN-HABITAT & OHCHR, 2010, p. 21-22).

While migrants moving to cities may hope to access better food and health care, this is not always forthcoming. Indigenous migrants often lack access to affordable and culturally appropriate healthcare, or to vaccinations (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008). They may face barriers to appropriate housing, often ending up in informal settlements in unhealthy living conditions. These areas also tend to be far from services. In many countries the absence of affordable land for social housing in cities exacerbates the growth of informal housing (Carillo, 2009, p. 539).

Figure 4.2 **Discrimination faced by indigenous migrants in Monterrey, Mexico**

Face discrimination

Yes	No
89.2%	10.8%

Reason for discrimination

91.2%	89.1%
Being a migrant	Skin colour
72.8%	66.5%
Dress pattern	Cultural difference
40.3%	
Not speaking Spanish	

Source: Acharya & Codina (2012, p. 147)

Indigenous women, especially domestic workers, face discrimination in cities (Farfán & Fernández, 2001; Dzib, 2003; Durin & Sheridan, 2003). For example, in Guatemala an estimated 65 percent of domestic workers are indigenous girls and adolescents sent to towns and cities by their impoverished families. They work an average of 14 hours per day and are often at risk of physical and psychological abuse and sexual harassment by employers and their family members – a situation made worse by the lack of commensurate remuneration and social security.[27]

The impact of indigenous migration is also felt by home and host urban communities. In terms of home communities, urban migration may result in a brain drain as individuals seek to build skills and access educational and economic opportunities. However, there are also positive impacts as certain groups have used migration to protect their culture and communities back home by sending remittances. They may also return with improved health and additional competencies and skills (e.g. management, finance, law, resource extraction, education and healthcare) to assist their community, and build local capacity.

For urban host communities, growing indigenous populations can result in an increasing demand for social programmes, which in turn puts a strain on government resources. This is especially the case in relation to internally displaced indigenous populations (IDPs), who compete with the urban poor for social programmes (Carrillo, 2009, p. 528). Some IDPs living in cities are unable to become self-reliant and meet their basic needs in a sustainable manner without permanent assistance from the government and humanitarian organizations. This situation has caused growing tensions between IDPs and residents as well as insecurity in urban areas.

Temporary indigenous mobility and lifestyle is problematic for health care and social service providers in urban centres. A study in South Australia found that the health and social services system is poorly set up to deal with short-term mobility and temporary indigenous visitors (e.g. visiting family and friends) (Kainz, Carson, & Carson, 2012). Providers have limited capacity to follow clients, due to rigid funding structures and a lack of inter-agency collaboration and service coordination. They are also not prepared for intercultural differences, and mobile lifestyles are incompatible with an inflexible and stationary service system.

Migration from rural to urban areas can impact on indigenous peoples' rights. For example, under the Indian Act of Canada the federal government defines its responsibilities in terms of indigenous peoples residing on reserves, where they are entitled to social services and health care.[28] When they move to a city, there is a six month transition period during which they experience a service void, with no financial support to access Health Canada services.[29] While some progress has been made, such regulatory and jurisdictional voids continue to aggravate the problems indigenous peoples already face in cities (Carli, 2012). In other countries, government policies can enforce the loss of Indigenous status once they emigrate from their traditional lands (UN-HABITAT, 2011). Issues of rights, combined with the increasing numbers of indigenous peoples in cities have led to debates on integration, and demands for self-determination and self-government.

Governance and the right to the city

> "Governance helps society to achieve its goals in solving difficult social problems, protecting indigenous cultures, managing lands and resources, building productive economies, constructing mutually beneficial relationships and promoting cooperation".[30]

"Good governance suggests…citizens must be willing, active participants in the effort to build societies that work, empowering them to build those societies in their own ways, and making them feel that the future, to a significant degree, is in their own hands".[31]

The urbanization of indigenous groups and their increased visibility in cities has led to demands for equal access and rights in several countries. In certain cases, indigenous groups have been able to achieve some level of equality and rights through new forms of urban governance that involve indigenous organizations and community-based semi-autonomous institutions (see Box 4.6). These entities provide a range of services to meet the diverse needs of their peoples (e.g. healthcare, social services, justice/legal, childcare, education, housing and shelter, employment) and can also act as parallel social and legal systems.

It has been suggested that despite the presence of urban indigenous governance structures, there is continued reliance on government funding, and crime and victimization rates among indigenous peoples continue to increase in urban areas. The ongoing disparities between indigenous and mainstream society have also been seen as a challenge

Box 4.6 **Examples of urban indigenous governance**

The National Centre of Indigenous Excellence, Sydney, Australia[32]
The Centre was officially set up in 2009 to provide opportunities and build the capacities of young Indigenous people through diverse programmes and facilities. The Centre's activities include workshops on job and life skills, sports and recreational activities, arts programmes, healthy lifestyles information sessions, and cultural activities.

Native American Youth and Family Center (NAYA), Portland, US[33]
NAYA was established in 1994 and serves self-identified American Indian/Alaskan Native youth and their families. The Center's activities are organized around the Relational Worldview Model that is a holistic approach to service provision (e.g. education, cultural arts programming, housing, economic development etc.) with the aim of reducing poverty.

Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto (ALST), Toronto, Canada[34]
ALST was founded in 1990 and provides assistance to indigenous peoples requiring access to legal resources, as well as information on the justice system and available options. ALST supports alternatives to the mainstream Canadian justice system as a means of preventing recidivism and dependency. ALST offers court workers, Gladue report[35] caseworkers, a legal clinic, information on victim rights, and at times intervenes in cases.

to social cohesion and the competitiveness of cities (Walker, 2005, p. 409).[36] There are divergent views on the reasons for continuing disparities, as well as on the solutions for improving indigenous peoples' lives, which are part of a larger debate on self-determination and assimilation versus integration. The following provides a brief summary of the two main approaches to the current debate:

1. The first approach argues that many aspects of indigenous culture are inconsistent with the laws and values of mainstream society, so integration amounts to assimilation and a loss of distinctiveness (Walker, 2005). Instead, it is argued that self-government and self-determination (see Box 4.7) will:
   - Address the disparities between indigenous peoples and mainstream society by having indigenous peoples design, deliver, and govern their own social and economic programmes;
   - Strengthen co-operation between indigenous peoples and mainstream society on socio-economic issues; and
   - Improve social cohesion.

2. The second approach argues that self-government and self-determination will create a parallel system that will further isolate indigenous peoples (Widdowson & Howard, 2008).[37] The focus should instead be on addressing the development gap:
   - Significant gaps in development and cultural evolution between indigenous peoples and mainstream society are the reason for the numerous social issues facing indigenous peoples, and their dependency on social assistance;
   - Failure to modernize indigenous traditional ways enlarges the development gap; and
   - Integration of indigenous peoples into modern society, and urban migration will prevent the physical isolation of indigenous peoples and will close the development gap.

It is important to note that this debate is mainly taking place between researchers and professionals, and that those opposing self-determination have tended to be marginalized. It is a debate that significantly influences the local level, yet it is rarely addressed. Further, dialogue is limited due to factors such as political indifference, fear of speaking up against self-determination, and lack of long-term vision, capacity or knowledge among local groups to address these issues.

Box 4.7 **Self-determination**

Self-determination is addressed as a right in Article 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: "the right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." It is also outlined in Article 4 of the Declaration that states that indigenous peoples have a right "to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs".

City officials and local organizations, particularly in Canada and Australia, struggle with demands from indigenous groups to provide indigenous-specific and culturally appropriate services, versus the need for integration and co-existence between groups living in the city. Indigenous organizations have spent years gathering evidence to show the need for indigenous-specific services and for parallel social and legal systems. Nevertheless this approach has been strongly countered, including by Hall & Patrinos (2012) who argue that, especially in Latin America, programmes targeted solely to indigenous peoples fail to reduce disparities. They tend to be poorly designed, do not adequately tackle the real issues, are usually poorly implemented, and do not reach the intended beneficiaries. They call for broad-based growth and poverty reduction programmes that target a wider population rather than indigenous-specific ones, such as those that have worked well in China and India (see the contribution by Harry Patrinos *Indigenous peoples, poverty and global development* at the end of this chapter).

These debates are currently being tested in Montreal, Canada through the Cabot Square Project as the case study *Strategy for Community Safety and Well-Being: The Cabot Square Project* at the end of this chapter illustrates. The project began following a request from indigenous organizations for more culturally-appropriate services in an unsafe area frequented by indigenous peoples. The project was initially criticized by non-indigenous organizations and city officials who wanted a more inclusive approach, taking all users of the area into consideration. The result was the development of a broader community safety strategy which is now being implemented. The strategy focuses on:

- Improving dialogue between city officials, the police and indigenous groups to find collaborative solutions for improving well-being and integration;
- Addressing the particular realities that indigenous peoples face in the city, as well as the needs of others who frequent the area, such as barriers to accessing healthcare, housing and the social service system.

The need for city-based strategies and policies

The growing trend in urbanization among indigenous groups, and ongoing disparities between the indigenous and non-indigenous population in cities are rarely addressed in local-level policies. They are primarily dealt with by non-governmental organizations with local projects focusing on e.g. employment, arts, culture or education. Such initiatives are usually poorly documented, and knowledge transfer is limited. Further, they often fail to attract government attention and influence public policy. In recent years the emergence of networks such as the World Indigenous Network[38] and the increasing use of social media have opened up opportunities for showcasing local projects and connecting indigenous groups. Such networks have mainly been set up by civil society organizations, but they play an important role in mobilizing city actors and putting pressure on governments. The examples from Montreal and Bogotá that appear later in the chapter highlight the importance of such networks.

Building partnerships with indigenous communities to encourage dialogue and debate should be the basis for developing city-based strategies.[39] Such strategies need to recognize indigenous peoples' diverse needs, and promote mechanisms for cohabitation and equal opportunity. The framework for such a strategy might include culturally appropriate capacity building and self-empowerment, using a resilience model that emphasizes well-being and confidence; a focus on youth, including encouraging their participation in city affairs and a sense of citizenship; and a focus on newly arrived indigenous populations, providing support services which help respect and preserve their identify and culture (UN-HABITAT & OHCHR, 2010).

Some of the key lessons of contemporary crime prevention practice can be useful in avoiding common challenges faced by governments, such as those discussed by Homel (2009) among others:

- Design a framework that involves a problem-oriented analysis and is outcome-focused.
- Involve multiple agencies and collaborative action, where integrated solutions to social problems are effective.
- Build partnerships that have a clear mission or purpose and joint outcomes, and include the sharing of information.
- Create clear lines of communication and accountability between central agencies and local delivery.
- Establish principles of inclusiveness, where certain activities and mandates of specific agencies may be exclusionary. This may demand systemic changes.

A few initiatives have influenced local governments to take action in relation to the growth of urban indigenous communities in their cities. They include the Edmonton *Urban Aboriginal Accord Initiative* (Canada); the *Public Policy for Indigenous Peoples* (Bogotá, Colombia); and the *Strategy for Community Safety and Well-Being* – the Cabot Square Project (Montreal, Canada) (see the case study at the end of the chapter). The fourth example, the *Proposal for the participatory development of an urban indigenous policy* in Chile, is a national initiative. The contribution *Indigenous peoples, poverty and global development* at the end of the chapter also discusses the success of the national *Oportunidades* programme in Mexico.

Edmonton Urban Aboriginal Accord Initiative (Canada)[40]

Edmonton is the capital of the Canadian province of Alberta. Between 2001 and 2006, the Aboriginal population in the city increased by more than 25 percent, a far higher growth rate than the non-Aboriginal population rate of 9 percent.[41] With a growing visible Aboriginal population and issues of lack of integration and inequality, Edmonton began discussions in 2003 about the role of the city. They partnered with the Edmonton Aboriginal Urban Affairs Committee to discuss how to foster a better future for Aboriginal people. The result was the establishment of the *Initiative* with the following objectives:

- Improved relationships between the City and the urban Aboriginal communities (i.e. a relationship agreement or an *Accord* between the City Administration and the urban Aboriginal communities).
- Improved hiring and retention of Aboriginal staff by the City.
- Improved City-mandated services for Aboriginal people.
- Facilitation of an inclusive process for action planning and stakeholder investment, based on priorities identified by urban Aboriginal communities.

As part of the Initiative, Edmonton set up its first Aboriginal office in 2004, to serve as a welcoming place for members of Aboriginal communities and a primary point of contact with the City on Aboriginal matters. In 2005, City Council approved an operating budget for the Initiative and a dialogue process was established with members of Edmonton's Aboriginal community. This led to the adoption of the declaration *Strengthening Relationships Between the City of Edmonton and Urban Aboriginal People*. It also led to the establishment of a principle-based relationship agreement (an Accord) between the City and Aboriginal communities, and a coordinated action plan to address their needs. The Accord is still in place, and other initiatives such as a welcome guide, a newsletter, and data collection all help to identify and monitor changes or improvements for the urban Aboriginal population.

Public Policy for Indigenous Peoples (Bogotá, Colombia)

Indigenous peoples represent 3.4 percent of Colombia's total population, and include 87 different groups.[42] Increasing armed conflict in rural areas resulted in the forced displacement of many indigenous groups to cities.[43] Currently, there are about 300,000 indigenous peoples living in cities in Colombia, with the highest concentration in Bogotá.[44] With an increasing urban population, indigenous networks and lobbies have developed in the city. These lobbies have helped bring about major changes such as the political recognition of the cultural diversity of 14 indigenous groups in the city, and the adoption of a public policy on indigenous peoples. The public policy stems from a series of initiatives, including the signing of Agreement 359 by the local government on February 5, 2009. The Agreement sets out guidelines for the policy on indigenous peoples in Bogotá, with a focus on affirmative action (Gobierno de Colombia, 2011):

- Strengthen cultural identity and the exercise of rights of indigenous peoples in Bogotá, and improve their living conditions.
- In collaboration with the national government, provide culturally appropriate, timely and comprehensive support services to the indigenous population facing forced displacement.
- Promote intercultural relations between the indigenous and non-indigenous population in Bogotá.
- Promote Bogotá as an inclusive, multi-ethnic and intercultural city that respects all cultural and social groups.
- Eliminate prejudice, stereotypes and practices of discrimination and inequality towards indigenous peoples.
- Recognize and support initiatives by indigenous peoples in relation to non-violent political action.
- Promote shared responsibility, transparency and trust between the local government and indigenous organizations.
- Support the functioning of indigenous lobby groups.

The *Public Policy for Indigenous Peoples* was developed through a participatory process with indigenous groups, peoples and organizations in Bogotá, and adopted in 2011.[45] It is being implemented over a 12-year period, and focuses on recognizing the particular needs of indigenous peoples, their cultural and historical legacy, and their place in the city and its development.

Proposal for the participatory development of an urban indigenous policy (Chile)

Indigenous peoples represent 4.6 percent[46] of Chile's total population.[47] The majority of them live in urban areas (67 percent), and just over 30 percent in rural areas. Those in cities frequently suffer from poverty and discrimination.[48] From 2006 to 2007, the Chilean government initiated a national public consultation on urban indigenous issues in major cities, which involved 2,000 indigenous leaders and 20 local and national meetings. The result was a *Proposal for the participatory development of an urban indigenous policy* drafted by the Advisory Commission on Urban Indigenous Policy. The proposal included the following objectives:

- Promote equal opportunity between indigenous and non-indigenous populations in cities while allowing indigenous peoples to preserve their identity.
- Integrate indigenous languages in schools.
- Create an institute of Indigenous culture.
- Set up Indigenous affairs offices at the municipal level.

In 2007 Michelle Bachelet the President of Chile announced a new urban indigenous policy (*Política Indígena Urbana)* including guidelines for government to: [49]

- Improve the quality of life of indigenous peoples (e.g. promoting entrepreneurship, housing and infrastructure, strengthening identity, health, sport, education, and cultural diversity), and promote indigenous peoples' rights as well as actions against discrimination.
- Develop an Indigenous Regional Bureau so that the policy is implemented in urban areas in each region.

The Policy was accompanied by a new Urban Indigenous Programme (*Programa Indígena Urbano*) under the responsibility of the Ministry of Planning which aims to:[50]

- Empower indigenous peoples in cities and support their active participation in society.
- Strengthen their cultural identity and practices.
- Promote inter-cultural health services.
- Promote entrepreneurship and innovative strategies to enhance indigenous peoples' productivity by channelling resources and technical assistance to urban indigenous programmes and projects.

Following the re-election of Michelle Bachelet in 2013, the President affirmed her continued support of the urban indigenous policy and programme that was set up in 2007. There will also be a consultation process with indigenous groups to ensure that the initiatives are effective and are implemented at the national level.

Conclusion

The migration of indigenous peoples to urban areas is a growing trend in most countries with such populations. Urban indigenous migration is often a very different experience from that of other migrant groups, given their distinct cultural heritage, and in general there is often a policy void in terms of responsibility for their well-being. Local governments often fail to understand their unique history, culture and traditions, and the particular challenges they face as migrants. Carefully tailored city policies can help to mediate the negative experiences of indigenous migrants, reduce their vulnerability to crime, exploitation and victimization, and promote safe and more equitable communities.[51]

In reality, policy development has been slow at the city level and the lack of local-level data has made it difficult to identify the issues. The good news is that a few cities offer concrete examples of how local government can engage with indigenous communities to find creative ways of advancing integration and adaptation to modern urban society, while protecting their indigenous rights, identity and culture. This chapter has provided a brief overview of indigenous migration trends and their impacts, and some of the debates surrounding urban indigenous responses. It has also highlighted some promising city and national initiatives which respond to the complex realities urban indigenous peoples face in cities, and their valuable role in the urban environment.

Contribution

Trends in internal indigenous migration in Mexico: The struggle to adapt to an urban context

Rodrigo Elizarrarás A.[52]

Historically indigenous migration in Mexico has been ignored. Although it has been an important trend since the 1970s, little is known about those who have migrated from rural to urban areas (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008). Indigenous people are very much present in Mexico City, Cancún and Acapulco, but apart from a few cases, little is known about them.

Estimating trends

Some 11.1 million people throughout Mexico, representing 9.9% of the total population, speak an indigenous language.[53] However, 75% of the indigenous population is concentrated in seven states: Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero, Puebla, Veracruz, Yucatán and Hidalgo.[54] For as long as records have been kept, a constant migration of indigenous populations across borders, primarily to the US, has taken place (Durand & Massey, 2004; Cornelius & Bustamante, 1989).

Mexico's national statistics agency (INEGI) has made efforts to measure the country's migrant population, but the exact number of indigenous migrants remains unknown. Based on the 2010 Census, INEGI estimates that 3.2 million people migrated within Mexico, from one state to another in 2010 (Figure 1). The States from which most migrants left include Veracruz, Puebla, Oaxaca and Guerrero (see Figure 2), but national migration statistics do not make specific reference to indigenous migration.[55] Information on the number of speakers of indigenous languages by state and municipality can be obtained from other sources, but information on their identity as locals or migrants is unknown.[56]

Figure 1 **Total interstate migrant population (1990-2010)**



Source: INEGI (2010)

Figure 2 **Population emigrating from states with a significant indigenous population (2010)**



Source: INEGI (2010)

To address the extent of indigenous migration, we made a simple estimate of the numbers of migrants moving from one state to another.[57] Figure 3 provides a selection of data on indigenous migration within Mexico.

As Figure 3 suggests, approximately 326,000 indigenous people migrated to another state within Mexico in 2010. It should be noted that these populations may fluctuate from one year to another depending on economic, political and social factors.

Migrating from rural areas to the city

Rural to urban migration is one of the oldest migration patterns in Mexico. It appears that all populations facing economic problems migrate from the south to the centre and north in search of work and improved living conditions (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008). Other migration patterns develop in response to violence and political and religious conflict.[58] Figure 4 below indicates the percentage of indigenous populations living in large cities.

Figure 3 **States with the largest indigenous populations and percentage of emigrant indigenous populations (2010)**

State	Indigenous population	Percentage of state population which is indigenous	Total emigrant population	Emigrant indigenous population
National	11,132,562	9.9%	3,292,310	326,268
Oaxaca	1,719,464	45.2%	103,085	46,621
Chiapas	1,511,015	31.5%	105,858	33,347
Veracruz	1,037,424	13.6%	236,542	32,106
Puebla	1,018,397	17.6%	135,568	23,887
México	985,690	6.5%	332,627	21,605
Yucatán	985,549	50.4%	37,932	19,117
Guerrero	635,620	18.8%	107,724	20,205
Hidalgo	575,161	21.6%	67,139	14,490

Source: Catálogo de Localidades Indígenas 2010 [2010 Indigenous City Index] (www.cdi.gob.mx) and 2010 statistics on internal migration (INEGI).

Horbath (2008) notes that 90% or more of the indigenous population in Mexico lives in poverty, whether in rural areas or cities (p. 20). In Mexico City, for example, migrant indigenous communities remain close-knit, yet they experience severe poverty and are often subject to marginalization and exclusion (Hall & Patrinos, 2005; Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008, p. 24). Horbath (2008) states that indigenous peoples migrating to cities, end up living in certain areas that become 'ghettos'. Their children attend school but suffer discrimination and abuse because they are indigenous and/or due to their lack of education and job skills.[59] Most discrimination is related to their identity, and physical traits or manner of speaking

Figure 4 **Large cities in Mexico and the percentage of indigenous populations (2010)**

Municipality, state	Total population	Indigenous population	Percentage of indigenous population
Benito Juárez, Quintana Roo	661,176	153,816	23.26%
Mérida, Yucatán	830,732	193,061	23.24%
Ensenada, Baja California	466,814	47,404	10.15%
Chimalhuacán, México	614,453	58,724	9.56%
Valle de Chalco-Solidaridad, México	357,645	28,863	8.07%
Toluca, México	819,561	65,156	7.95%
Pachuca, Hidalgo	267,862	20,112	7.51%
Puebla, Puebla	1,539,819	100,353	6.52%
Naucalpan, México	833,779	53,751	6.45%
Chilpancingo, Guerrero	241,717	13,218	5.47%
Chalco, México	310,130	16,472	5.31%
Los Cabos, Baja California Sur	238,487	9,124	3.83%
Acapulco, Guerrero	789,971	26,971	3.41%
Distrito Federal	8,851,080	300,138	3.41%

Source: Catálogo de Localidades Indígenas 2010 [2010 Indigenous City Index] (www.cdi.gob.mx)

(Durin, 2007). Further, urban indigenous peoples are usually employed in second-rate jobs, mainly as construction or domestic workers (Horbath, 2008). In terms of integration, while some manage to integrate in other ethnic communities in certain city neighbourhoods, most do not.

Safety and indigenous peoples

It is difficult to assess how many indigenous people are victims of crime in cities, given that criminal statistics do not record this information.[60] However, data on convictions of individuals speaking an indigenous language is available. In 2012, 1,137 people of indigenous origin were convicted of a crime, about 1.2% of the total of 95,000 convictions nationwide. In Oaxaca, Yucatán and Chiapas, conviction rates among indigenous populations were higher (15.3%, 5.5% and 4.9% respectively). Local organizations have also shown that a significant number of indigenous people are convicted simply because they do not have an interpreter at their trial. In the absence of data, only a handful of cases become public.

There are no urban-based, municipal-level programmes to address safety issues.[61] Federal authorities have likewise failed to consider the safety of indigenous peoples. The national crime prevention programme launched in 2013 pays no specific attention to the country's indigenous population. [62] On the one hand, indigenous communities living in major cities are small in number and excluded from social programmes because of their status as indigenous people and migrants.[63] On the other, under Mexico's legal system, ethnicity is not factored into policy development.

The only programmes focusing on indigenous peoples and safety tend to be situated in rural areas and initiated by external groups. One example dates from 2010, when UNESCO's field office in Mexico teamed up with the National Women's Institute (*Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres – INMUJERES*) to implement the first gender-based violence prevention programme to address human rights and intercultural ties.[64] Other partners include ECLAC, UNFPA, UNDP, UNICEF, local authorities and civil society organizations.[65] The programme targets rural areas and aims to: "increase and improve awareness on violence and prevention in indigenous communities, with a special focus on girls, boys and adolescents, in the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca". It has four main goals: promoting rights and providing a legal framework; advancing gender equality; developing gender-based protocols for institutional care; and developing a model for quantitative and qualitative programme assessment. Unfortunately, this has not resulted in the creation of similar programmes in other states or indigenous regions in Mexico.

Urban violence and indigenous migrant populations: The case of Peru

Olenka Ochoa Berreteaga[66]

This contribution builds on previous research regarding urban violence and its effects on indigenous migrant populations in Latin America, and specifically in Peru.

There are 522 indigenous groups in the Latin American region. Over 80% of this population lives in Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru and Colombia. In the case of Peru, 40% of the country's population is of indigenous origin. Over the centuries, indigenous Peruvians have identified themselves in terms of "rural communities". Recently, they have experienced major changes as they are increasingly migrating to cities and experiencing acculturation. According to the UNPFII, violence is an important issue; indigenous people are subject to acts of violence because of their identify and customs, which are considered backward and disruptive of the status-quo.[67]

In Peru, indigenous migrants living in cities are at even greater risk of discrimination, verbal abuse and psychological and physical violence that stems from disparaging attitudes towards different languages, races and appearance. Indigenous migrants' exposure to urban violence increases exponentially when combined with other factors such as ethnicity, gender and age.[68] Some argue that contemporary violence against indigenous peoples is the product of a history of domination where indigenous populations were killed and displaced, and their cultural traditions eradicated. Historically – in times of both peace and war – indigenous women in particular have faced systemic sexual violence which has largely gone unpunished.[69]

Poverty is one of the main factors determining the vulnerability of indigenous migrants. Many families have fled their communities to escape terrorism, drug-related violence, or to seek a better future.[70] They have settled in peripheral urban neighbourhoods that are poorly serviced and protected by the police, making these areas very dangerous. These neighbourhoods have some of the highest rates of violence, and include femicide, gang-related violence, child abuse, sexual assault, and youth violence including that in areas known as *barras bravas*. Young people are also involved in self-inflicted forms of violent behaviour such as suicide and alcohol and drug abuse.[71] Adding to the climate of insecurity is the fact that rural/urban migration may in some cases be controlled by organized crime groups involved in human trafficking through 'family channels'. In this case, indigenous youth are brought to the city by 'godparents' offering to care for them and educate them. Instead, they become servants, domestic workers and/or victims of sexual exploitation. Similarly, indigenous migrant men and women experience labour exploitation in cities, where there are countless reports of abuse in textile factories, in particular. Further, indigenous people in cities face discrimination as they are often refused entry to restaurants and other places.[72]

Impunity and a lack of protection against violence by state police and institutions have led to gang members filling in the gaps and providing security in many urban areas. Further, there is a growing stigma that poor indigenous migrants are dangerous and suspected of terrorism, or of being a gang member or a criminal. The stigmatization of a people who are already at-risk of victimization leads to the violation of their rights, and makes them victims of passive aggression by other citizens.

The Cantagallo Shipibo-Conibo community

The Amazon is home to many native communities living on ancestral land who speak their own language and practice their cultural traditions. These communities have undergone a slow process of integration. Many Amazonians in Peru have migrated to cities in the interior of the country; a few have ventured to the capital city, Lima. The Shipibo-Conibo people are a particularly interesting case. Since migrating to Lima they have maintained their communal structure as well as a sense of belonging and identity. They even created an urban settlement named *Cantagallo*.

To gain some first-hand information about their situation, we conducted an exploratory study in Barrio de Migrantes Cantagallo in December 2013, using in-depth interviews. In terms of violence, the migrants who were interviewed reported high rates of robbery

Picture 1[74]

Source: Olenka Ochoa Berreteaga

Picture 2

Source: Olenka Ochoa Berreteaga

and assault in the street and other public places and in taxis, assault and armed robbery in the home, and robbery of their artisanal crafts from their homes. They also reported having to endure discriminatory attitudes and behaviours because of their ethnicity, and forceful confiscation of their belongings by municipal security personnel. When asked about events involving family members or friends, community leaders reported cases of knife attacks by groups of people, attempted kidnappings, particular cases of the sexual assault of a teenage girl on public transport, the rape of a young girl in the community, the death of a young man in a dance club, attacks by youth in public places, child abuse and vehicle theft. To protect themselves and their families, the participants said they had organized themselves as a community, including coordinating with the National Police, adopting prevention programmes for children and young people, and increasing security measures in their homes among other things. For assistance to report crimes, most community members go to the *Comisaria* (the local branch of the National Police), others to community members and leaders, or to the *serenazgo* (the municipal police).

Personal accounts

Olinda Silvano, Secretary for Community Affairs for the Cantagallo community (Lima, Peru):
"When I lived in the Amazon, I never felt the fear and danger I feel living in Lima. When we first arrived, we rented a room in a bigger home. Thieves came in and tied me and my husband up. They were looking for the landlord's money, and in the end they took my television set and the only gas canister we had. After that, I wanted to move back home with my children, but we stayed for work".

Dmer Ramirez Munta, 36 years old, President of the Association, Cantagallo community (Lima, Peru):
She recalled one time when they were wearing traditional clothing that "we went to a restaurant in Lima and the waiters refused to serve us"… "To them we are not Limans, we're from another world, and the discrimination we often experience comes from a lack of understanding or recognition of the Shipiba identity…without an identity we are nothing".

Rosario Gutierrez, President of the Centro Mujeres Aymaras-CANDELARIA (CANDELARIA Aymaran Women's Centre) (Bolivia):
"Before, rural people were stared at, discriminated against and poorly treated by people in the city. City folk have always viewed rural people as *indigenas sucios* (dirty Indians) who are illiterate. They were never able to go to school, to have access to colleges or university…Since Evo Morales became President, there have been significant changes in the way rural people and migrants are treated. City residents loathe rural people but cannot say so openly – unlike before. In the 1950s, rural people were banned from the Plaza Murillo[73] and government offices."

Indigenous peoples, poverty and global development

Harry A. Patrinos[75]

Contribution

Many of the world's largest economic problems can be directly related to an analysis of the socio-economic situation of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities across the globe. Despite overall growth in recent decades, economic collapse still threatens many countries, and such an event would plunge us into conditions not seen for several decades.

To reach critical international development goals and promote widespread growth, the global development community must find ways to meet the key challenges of our time – including reducing global poverty, eradicating malnutrition, and creating quality learning opportunities for all. The development community cannot afford to ignore indigenous peoples, who make up 4 percent (over 300 million people) of the world's population, but an estimated 10 percent of the poor. We are fast approaching the end of the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People (2005-2015) as declared by the UNPFII,[76] which coincides with the end of the Millennium Development Goals decade, and unless we begin to focus on these populations we will be unable to eliminate extreme poverty.

In light of these issues we as economists with a focus on Latin America, initially set out to estimate poverty rates for indigenous peoples to compare with national rates, and discuss what policies might matter in reducing those poverty rates (Hall & Patrinos, 2006). Ultimately, we were advocating for more work on indigenous peoples, as well as on the impact of national policies for minorities. For cultures to survive, prosper, and develop on their own terms, they need to surpass a certain basic, minimum level of material well-being. It is for this reason, and not because we do not value alternative means of well-being, that we used traditional economic analyses and national poverty rates. We take for granted and accept the premise that people have the right to self-identify. In fact, self-identification is the starting point for our analysis. In Hall and Patrinos (2012) we document poverty systematically for the world's indigenous peoples in developing regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Our analysis is representative of 85 percent of the world's indigenous peoples. It draws on nationally representative data to compare trends in countries' poverty rates and other social indicators, with those for indigenous sub-populations, and provides comparable data for a wide range of countries all over the world. It estimates global poverty numbers and analyzes other important development indicators, such as schooling, health and social protection. Our analysis is motivated by two main factors: (1) there is a growing concern among poverty analysts worldwide that countries with significant vulnerable populations – such as indigenous peoples – may not meet the Millennium Development Goals, and thus there exists a consequent need for better data tracking conditions among these groups; and (2) there is a growing call by indigenous organizations, including the UNPFII, for solid, disaggregated data analyzing the size and causes of the *development gap*.

The experience of Indigenous peoples in Latin America shows that despite progress on many fronts – political, social, educational, services and so on – poverty is not declining. The gaps in poverty rates between indigenous and non-indigenous populations present in the mid-1990s have remained constant and in some cases, increased (Hall & Patrinos, 2012).

The challenges are clear (World Bank, 2011):

- The last of the excluded groups to be reached will be the most difficult to reach.
- They are likely to be vulnerable populations with tenuous connections to the modern economy.
- They are likely to come from ethnic groups and indigenous populations, and speak a different language from the economic majority population.

When we extended our analysis to the global indigenous (and ethnic minority[77]) population we expected to find:

- Higher poverty among indigenous peoples;
- But improved social indicators over time; and
- Little or no improvement in incomes or in the reduction of poverty rates.

We find that indigenous peoples are poorer than non-indigenous peoples – or minorities poorer than non-minorities – as the case may be. Overall, indigenous peoples are the poorest of the poor. In addition, we found some surprises as to where gains were made, which will be explained later.

We also expected to find less progress over time in terms of closing the gap. This is certainly the case in Latin America, where, despite significant gains in social benefits and political power, there is essentially no progress in terms of poverty reduction in almost all countries where indigenous peoples are a significant proportion of the population (except for Chile). Mexico fits this pattern well, though we do not yet know if the last few years mark the beginnings of a new trend (Hall & Patrinos, 2012). That is, are Indigenous peoples in Mexico doing a little better? Certainly the non-indigenous are losing ground in the last few years, perhaps due to the financial crisis and/ or declining remittances.

Chile, the exception mentioned above, has experienced significant declines in poverty, demonstrating that good public policies can lead to economic growth. This growth tends to improve the situation for all, including Indigenous peoples. Over the last few decades, Chile opened its economy, curtailed inflation, and became one of the few Latin American countries with any recorded growth, especially during the 1980s when no other country in Latin America grew. Chile topped the growth charts in the 1990s (Kharas et al., 2008).

Quality policies that benefit the whole country reduce the risk of unbalanced growth, social turmoil, and lagging progress for indigenous peoples and minorities. Indigenous peoples are generally not part of the market or national economy. Therefore, national events, including shocks, downturns and the like, do not affect them in the same way. During a downturn they do not suffer as much, but during an upturn, they do not benefit as much either (see, for example, Dang (2012) on Vietnam, and Larrea & Montenegro Torres (2006) on Ecuador). Over time this contributes to stagnation, which leads indigenous peoples to fall further behind.

China has also benefitted from good policy (Hannum & Wang, 2012). In fact, no country did as well as China in terms of positive performance of the minority population (see Figure 1). India has also seen rapid reduction in poverty and healthy economic growth; this has benefited the Scheduled Tribes, but not at the same rate (Das et al., 2012).

Why China and not Latin America? We argue that programmes targeted solely to indigenous peoples, which is often the mechanism used in Latin America, oddly enough do not work very well. These programmes tend to be poorly designed, fail to adequately tackle the real issue, and are usually poorly implemented. They do not reach the intended beneficiaries or experiencing significant leakage. In most cases, such programmes are poorly documented or evaluated. There is no overwhelming evidence that programmes specifically targeting the indigenous population will substantially erase the gap between groups, especially in the absence of broad-based growth and poverty reduction. In Latin America we only found evidence of poorly performing targeted programmes, and even in cases where programmes could help – such as bilingual education – they were poorly implemented. In Guatemala, four of the five major school based nutrition programmes only slightly favour indigenous children, and the fifth favors non-indigenous children. None of these programmes is strongly progressive, and in some cases there is high incidence of receipt by better off people. In Peru only one major school programme reaches more indigenous than non-indigenous children, the rest favour the non-indigenous (Hall & Patrinos, 2012).

Figure 1 **Annual change in poverty headcount rate, 1983-2006 (in percentages)**



Source: Hall and Patrinos (2012).

The best known exceptions in Latin America might be *Oportunidades*, the conditional cash transfer programme in Mexico, and the general economic policy in Chile. *Oportunidades* promotes equal opportunities. Its objective is to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty, by building human capital through education, health and nutrition programmes. The programme assists 6.5 million families in every state in the country and covers 100 percent of the country's municipalities. Its design combines the issuance of conditioned cash transfers with coordinated interventions in health, nutrition and education. *Oportunidades* is not targeted to those who are indigenous, but rather to those who are poor. However, since indigenous peoples are more likely to be poor, they are well represented in *Oportunidades*, and in fact are overrepresented. Thus, a programme that is not targeted to those who are indigenous still benefits them. Moreover, *Oportunidades* is effective at improving access to education, health and nutrition services, and reducing poverty (Gertler, 2004; Fiszbein & Schady, 2009; Schultz, 2004). It is also effective at improving indigenous peoples' outcomes (Bando et al., 2005).

China, by contrast, uses regional targeting, benefitting the poor areas and, therefore, poor minorities. This has been a key characteristic of national poverty alleviation efforts there (Hannum and Wang, 2012). China targets using information about overlapping dimensions of advantage and disadvantage. It also pairs poverty alleviation efforts, targeted at individuals in poor communities, with community development initiatives. However, without general economic growth, poverty reduction would not have been possible in China (Wang, 2004). China produced pro-poor growth through market-led economic growth. At the outset of the reform process China removed distortions and ensured relatively low inequality in access to the opportunities created (Ravallion, 2011).

Lessons from this work:

1. Targeting only indigenous peoples will not reduce poverty; one needs to target other characteristics such as poverty status, region, and ensure that there is a viable development policy.
2. Targeting disadvantaged populations and/or regions (in combination with individual incentives) does help to reduce poverty. Since invariably indigenous peoples are overrepresented among the disadvantaged, such well-targeted programmes 'work' (cf. regional economic development programmes that promote opportunities and access to markets).
3. Indigenous peoples can move out of poverty if they are given the opportunities to build human capital and if development policy ensures they benefit from such programmes in the labor market.
4. We need real economic development programmes and programmes to extend opportunities for indigenous peoples. We cannot make progress on global poverty without considering the needs of the world's indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities.

In conclusion, we need more work on indigenous peoples/ethnic minorities, and we need more data and specific examples of what works, so that policy officials can utilize that information to inform their decision-making.

Strategy for Community Safety and Well-Being: The Cabot Square Project (Montreal, Canada)

Vivien Carli, Allison Reid
and Marla Williams[78]

Case study

The Aboriginal population in Montreal has grown steadily since the 1980s, especially in the decade 2001 to 2011 with a 42% increase (from 11,160 to 26,285 people) (Statistics Canada, 2011; Environics Institute, 2011). In 2006 Aboriginal people in Montreal were the fastest growing group among eleven major cities (Figure 1).

The "average" Aboriginal person living in Montreal is female, between the ages of 25 and 44, has a high school or college qualification, an average household income of $10,000 to $30,000, and lives in a rented apartment or house (Environics Institute, 2011).

Aboriginal people often move to Montreal for economic and educational opportunities (Montreal Urban Aboriginal Community Strategy Network, 2012). While many of them thrive in the city, a considerable number face hardships on arrival, including poverty, isolation, homelessness, socio-economic challenges and a lack of opportunities (Lévesque & Cloutier, 2010). These factors, coupled with a high incidence of mental health problems and substance abuse, often lead to increased marginalization, which in turn increases levels of offending and victimization (Regroupement des centres d'amitié autochtones du Québec, 2008).

Cabot Square is in an area of the city that has attracted many Aboriginal people facing these kinds of challenges. A park situated to the west of Montreal's downtown area, it is has long been known for its issues of homelessness and crime, including fraud, car theft, possession of stolen goods and crimes against the person. Cabot Square has been an important "gathering place" for Aboriginal people over the last 20 years (Peter-McGill Community Council, 2009).

In 2010, the Montreal Urban Aboriginal Community Strategy Network (NETWORK)[79] identified a number of concerns in Cabot Square and its surrounding area:

- Gentrification and future redevelopment plans for the park that might displace the vulnerable population using it.
- Increased police presence and repressive action against park users, leading to a displacement of the population.
- Poor communication between community groups and the police.
- Growing homelessness among new Aboriginal arrivals, and a lack of integration.

Figure 1 **Aboriginal population and proportion of census metropolitan areas (CMAs), with population increase, 2001-2006**

	Aboriginal population 2006	Proportion of CMA 2006	Change 2001-2006
Halifax	5,320	1.4%	+51%
Ottawa-Gatineau	20,590	1.8%	+52%
Montreal	17,865	0.5%	+60%
Toronto	26,575	0.5%	+31%
Thunder Bay	10,055	8.3%	+23%
Winnipeg	68,385	10.0%	+22%
Regina	17,105	8.9%	+9%
Saskatoon	21,535	9.3%	+6%
Calgary	26,575	2.5%	+26%
Edmonton	52,100	5.1%	+27%
Vancouver	40,310	1.9%	+9%

Source: Statistics Canada (2006)

The NETWORK began discussions with the federal and provincial governments, Aboriginal institutions, and the City of Montreal on how to prevent the situation from deteriorating further. Initial project proposals for more culturally sensitive services were rejected. In 2012 the NETWORK presented a new proposal to the city – a Strategy for Community Safety and Wellbeing – focusing especially on the Aboriginal population in Cabot Square, and reducing the impacts of current and future displacement. The Strategy aims to situate Montreal as a model city that fosters local coordination, promotes social inclusion and co-existence, and provides efficient services to improve well-being and safety.

From January to May 2013, the project team mobilized over 40 organizations that work directly or indirectly with the vulnerable Cabot Square population, to develop and implement the Strategy. To create a complete portrait of Cabot Square and the surrounding area, surveys were conducted with the vulnerable population, service providers, community and governmental groups, and the general public. More than 38 groups participated in working meetings to help identify solutions.[80] More than 70 recommendations resulted, from supporting front-line services, increasing the size of the gathering spaces for the target population (such as day centres and outdoor spaces), improving health, housing and cultural services, increasing communication between all stakeholders, to prompting cohabitation between all users of the space. The Strategy presented in July 2013 included the following objectives:

- Targeting a broad population: indigenous and non-indigenous peoples accessing a specific public space of the city and who are considered to be "vulnerable" or "at-risk" of being victimized or committing a crime;
- Providing additional services to improve well-being – beyond those provided by the social service and healthcare system – including mainstream and indigenous cultural services;
- Addressing barriers to accessing housing and social services;
- Improving co-habitation between the indigenous and non-indigenous population, including residents and business owners in the borough; and
- Building partnerships between indigenous and non-indigenous organizations to share expertise on front-line services for the target population.

Implementation of the Strategy began in September 2013, and is expected to continue for 18 months or more, depending on progress. Three committees were set up on front-line issues, health and housing, to identify gaps in services and facilitate access. Among their activities they have met with local clinics, identified training needs of front line workers, conducted surveys to identify existing services and barriers, undertaken a housing mapping exercise, developed specific housing and health action plans, and developed a map of emergency services for new arrivals. A safety committee with the city, police and front-line organizations has been established to directly address issues of improving communication, and reducing crime and violence. Two front-line workers from an indigenous and a non-indigenous organization have been hired to centralize front-line work in the Cabot Square area, and a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system is being put in place. Future initiatives include training sessions for front-line workers; the expansion of hours and services at a local day centre; the relocation of existing services; and implementation of plans to improve cohabitation in the Square.

The Cabot Square Project highlights the vital role that local networks can play in mobilizing city officials and services and developing creative solutions. It is important to note that the project team has accomplished a significant amount of work in a short period of time, mainly due to the strength of the existing network, but also the city's openness. They have been willing to improve communication with civil society and a re-balancing of power, by sharing information and allowing local groups to take control of the project.

Endnotes

1 The Maori peoples of New Zealand have experienced the fastest urbanization of any national indigenous or non-indigenous group, followed by the Mapuche in Chile, the Maasai in Tanzania, the Embera in Colombia and the Inuit in Canada (Yescas Angeles Trujano, 2008, p. 26).

2 For example, in Toronto, Canada, urban Aboriginal people make up 25 percent of the homeless population, but only 2% of the city's population.

3 Mobility takes various forms including nomadic, seminomadic, transhumant, semi-sedentary, etc.

4 WIMSA sets up councils to lobby on behalf of indigenous peoples living in Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and Angola.

5 See UNGA (2007).

6 www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/UNIPPartnership.aspx

7 The main human rights body of the UN.

8 E.g. World Bank, Asian Development Bank, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, IDB, European Union

9 E.g. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; Danish International Development Assistance.

10 See The World Bank's website: www.worldbank.org/en/topic/indigenouspeoples/overview; and http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:2553653~menuPK:4564185~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html

11 www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/indigenous-australians/programs-services/closing-the-gap/closing-the-gap-national-urban-and-regional-service-delivery-strategy-for-indigenous-australians

12 IOM data is usually compiled from administrative registers, border statistics and/or household-based surveys.

13 E.g. Indigenous peoples' data collection cooperation agreement between the Secretariat of the UNPFII with UN DESA; draft Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses to include indigenous peoples as a separate topic, and ECLAC and CELADE – Population Division have provided technical assistance for indigenous organizations groups to produce socio-demographic data.

14 This category includes people who indicate their race(s) as "American Indian or Alaska Native" or report an enrolled or principal tribe, such as Navajo, Blackfeet, Inupiat, Yup'ik, or Central American Indian groups or South American Indian groups.

15 In 2010, the rate of aggravated assault reported by victims against American Indian or Alaska Natives was 19.5 per 1,000 people.

16 There are three main indigenous groups in Canada (First Nations, Inuit and Métis). Indigenous peoples living in Canada are considered as Aboriginal (the term used by the Government of Canada for indigenous peoples).

17 Sexual assault, robbery, physical assault, theft of personal property, breaking and entering, motor vehicle/parts theft, theft of household property and vandalism.

18 Age is the most noted factor. Those aged 15 to 24 years are 6.2 times more likely than those aged 55 and over to be victimised. The risk of victimization among separated/divorced or single persons is, respectively, 1.8 and 1.5 times higher than the risk for married persons.

19 The indigenous Polynesian people of New Zealand.

20 Considered the first peoples of Australia.

21 For example, the Sami peoples of Norway, Finland, Sweden, Kola Peninsula of Russia, First Nations of Canada and the US, and countless groups in Asia, Africa and South America.

22 Internal rural-rural migration can involve settled or nomadic indigenous peoples, for reasons of cultural and spatial proximity. This type of migration is the least disruptive to indigenous peoples' lives; it tends to be seasonal and short-term. It is also associated with *transborder migration,* which can often be dangerous, resulting in arrest, abuse and deportation.

23 While country-level data provides good information, lack of standardized data collection limits comparison across countries.

24 The Census has undergone changes and recently a voluntary survey (i.e. National Household Survey) has replaced the mandatory long-form questionnaire.

25 The National Institute of Statistics and Geography, Mexico (INEGI).

26 The Sami are the indigenous Finno-Ugric people inhabiting part of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula of Russia.

27 www.unfpa.org/webdav/site/global/shared/documents/publications/2013/VAIWG_FINAL.pdf.

28 A reserve is specified by the Indian Act as a tract of land, with legal title vested in Her Majesty, and set apart for the use and benefit of a band (i.e. First Nations group).

29 The federal department in Canada responsible for health.

30 Cornell, Curtis & Jorgensen (2004, p. 10).

31 Cornell, Jorgensen, & Kalt (2002, p.17).

32 See www.ncie.org.au/

33 See www.nayapdx.org/

34 See www.aboriginallegal.ca/

35 A Gladue report is a pre-sentencing and bail hearing report that a court can request when considering sentencing someone of Aboriginal background, under Section 718.2(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code.

36 Five different conceptions of social cohesion have been suggested: common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities; social cohesion as social networks and social capital; and social cohesion as place attachment and identity (Beauvais & Jenson, 2002).

37 The authors refer mainly to Canada, but have made claims in regards to other parts of the world. They argue that the gap between 'traditional' cultural ways of indigenous peoples and modern society has widened, making it more difficult for certain groups to participate in society.

38 www.worldindigenousnetwork.net/

39 Partnership building is a principle of the 2002 UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime, and a major focus of the Program of Action of the Second International Decade of the World's Indigenous People.

40 See www.edmonton.ca/city_government/documents/PDF/backgrounder.pdf

41 See Census 2006.

42 See 2005 Census, www.dane.gov.co/index.php/poblacion-y-demografia/censos

43 Colombia's Constitutional Court claims that at least 27 indigenous groups are now considered to be at risk of extinction as a result of armed conflict.

44 See 2005 Census, www.dane.gov.co/index.php/poblacion-y-demografia/censos

45 District Decree 543 (Article 9): "Whereby a Public Policy for Indigenous Peoples will be adopted in Bogotá, DC" (Secretaría General de la Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., 2013). The policy is associated with *Affirmative Action Plans* developed in 2008 as part of the constitution.

46 Self-identified as indigenous peoples.

47 See Instituto Nacional de Estadística www.ine.es/en/welcome_en.htm

48 See Instituto Nacional de Estadística www.ine.es/en/welcome_en.htm

49 CONADI, Ministerio de Planificación. www.plasmadg.com/prueba_/index.php/programa-indigena-urbano

50 Asuntos indígenas en los Programas Presidenciales 2013, see www.politicaindigena.org/adjuntos/ima_2534.pdf.

51 A recommendation of the 2013 International Expert Group Meeting on urban indigenous peoples and migration (UNPFII, 2013).

52 Special thanks to Leslie Solis and Néstor de Buen for their assistance with the preparation of this article. Rodrigo Elizarrarás A. is the Coordinator for the *Programa de Seguridad y Justicia* [Security and Justice Program] *of México Evalúa: Centro de Análisis de Políticas Públicas* [Centre for Public Policy Analysis].

53 Based on data from the 2010 Census.

54 The number of indigenous people may be higher than indicated. As a result of migration from their home region to urban areas some may have lost their native language, but maintain certain traditions and beliefs which can be considered indigenous. For more information on the criteria used to identify indigenous populations in Latin American censuses, see Resano (1999).

55 Yescas Angeles Trujano (2008) points out that this is common in a number of developing countries.

56 The *Comisión de Desarrollo Indígena* (Indigenous Development Commission) publishes data on indigenous populations as a percentage of the general population in each municipality. While it does not provide detailed information on place of origin or the indigenous language spoken, it helps identify a region of origin.

57 Calculations are based on comparing indigenous population percentages in each state against the state's total migrant population.

58 In recent years, violence among organized crime groups has influenced migration patterns, albeit ones which primarily affect upper and middle classes moving to less violent cities. This phenomenon does not directly concern the indigenous population, except perhaps the Tarahumara in Chihuahua and those living in certain regions of Michoacán.

59 A few cases have received media attention such as the bullying of a 16 year-old Mixtec girl by her classmates with no measures taken by school authorities (see www.eluniversal.com.mx/ciudad-metropoli/2013/procuraduria-cita-rendir-declaracion-caso-ninia-969562.html, in Spanish) and the discriminatory treatment of a five year-old Mazatec boy by his teachers (see http://elmanana.com.mx/noticia/23540/Paquito-nio-mazateco-que-fue-discriminado-en-su-escuela.html).

60 In Mexico it is estimated that up to 92% of all crimes committed go unreported (INEGI, 2012).

61 See Chapa, L., Fernández, L. & Ley, S. (2014).

62 See www.gobernacion.gob.mx/archivosPortal/pdf/Bases120213.pdf (in Spanish). Centro Nacional de Prevención del Delito y Participación Ciudadana (2011). *Nuevas perspectivas para el ejercicio 2012 en materia de prevención social de las violencias con participación ciudadana.* (In Spanish)

63 See INEGI (2009).

64 (2012). *Programa conjunto: Construcción y evaluación de un modelo integral para prevenir la violencia de género en poblaciones indígenas en México desde un enfoque intercultural.* Ventana Oaxaca: Cooperación para el Desarrollo, 6. Retrieved from www.oaxaca.gob.mx. (In Spanish)

65 See www.onu.org.mx/proyectos.html

66 Expert in Security/Local Development/Intercultural and Indigenous Policies, FEMUM ALC Council Board Member (Latin American & Caribbean Federation of Women & Municipalities).

67 See *Violencias y Mujeres Indígenas* (Violence and Indigenous Women), *Enlace Continental de Mujeres Indígenas de las Américas – ECMIA* (Continental Network of Indigenous Women of the Americas) and CHIRAPAQ (Centre for Indigenous Cultures of Peru), First edition, Lima, July 2013.

68 A cross-cutting approach – which comprehensively examines factors like ethnic origin, race, gender, age and economic status to assess the vulnerability of indigenous populations and particularly girls – can provide insight into how violence occurs and is perpetuated.

69 CHIRAPAQ

70 In the case of the northern VRAEM region, where narco-trafficking and armed groups are present.

71 With the support of the Canadian government, we undertook a study in San Juan de Lurigancho, the country's largest and most heavily populated settlement, looking at gender-based violence among women and in schools regarding child abuse, and the impact of terrorism on women's lives. Thousands had fled to this settlement in order to escape local violence. With funding and support from the World Bank, we also carried out an assessment of youth violence as part of the *Defensores de la Paz (*Defenders of the Peace) project, and in partnership with INCAFAM, a non-governmental organization.

72 CHIRAPAQ.

73 The main square in La Paz, Bolivia where the presidential palace is located.

74 Picture 1 & 2 were taken while during field research, in the comunity Cantagallo, Lima, Peru, for this contribution.

75 Manager, Education, World Bank, Washington DC. The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank Group. The excellent research assistance of Jessica Cross is gratefully acknowledged.

76 See http://undesadspd.org/IndigenousPeoples.aspx

77 We use sources that are external to justify inclusion and extend our analysis to "ethnic minorities" that exhibit the characteristics usually ascribed to indigenous peoples. Thus, we study indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities (and Scheduled Tribes) for the countries with the largest indigenous/ethnic minority populations, namely India and China.

78 Respectively Senior Analyst at ICPC, and former Supervisor of the Cabot Square Project; Coordinator of the Cabot Square Project; and former Project Officer of the Cabot Square Project.

79 See www.reseaumtlnetwork.com/eng/Home.aspx

80 Participants included governmental bodies, community organizations, health providers, shelters, day centres and other service providers.

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CHAPTER 4
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5

THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING

The prevention of human trafficking

5

Introduction

As suggested in the introduction to this report, human trafficking – often referred to as modern slavery – continues to be a major concern within countries and internationally. It is an immensely complex problem involving the acquisition of people by force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting them for gain. It affects women and men, young people and children, primarily for labour or sexual exploitation, with a much smaller proportion of cases involving trafficking for human organs or for marriage purposes. It is not a new phenomenon, but since the adoption of the *UN Protocol against Trafficking in Persons*, as part of the *Transnational Convention against Organized Crime* of 2000, there has been extensive activity to enact legislation to criminalize human trafficking, to improve data collection to track patterns of activity, to identify and prosecute offenders, and to develop protection and support services for victims. As with other issues examined in this report, gender and age are very significant factors.

At the same time in the course of the fourteen years since the adoption of the Protocol, the extent of trafficking appears to have increased, and shows little sign of slowing down. It is seen as one of the world's largest and fastest growing criminal activities (IOM, 2013, p. 37). It is highly lucrative. It is estimated that global profits for sexual exploitation are in the range of $99US billion and for labour exploitation $51US billion (ILO, 2014). It is also very costly to individuals and countries. Traffickers have benefited from rapid changes in communications technology, from the increased demand for the services of trafficked persons in countries of destination, and the seemingly ceaseless supply of people anxious to improve their lives and who become trafficked victims. It remains a crime which is very difficult to detect and prosecute, and the number of successful prosecutions in most countries remains extremely low relative to the amount of attention the issue has received. The Protocol has also resulted in a large amount of funding for research and project development in many countries, much of which has helped to increase knowledge about the difficulties of responding to trafficking, as well as the benefits and disadvantages of policies initiated.[1]

ICPC's 2012 International Report looked at trends in human trafficking, at the growth in national legislation criminalizing human trafficking and at national action plans to combat and prevent it. It reported that in 2011, 140 countries out of 193 had enacted some form of national legislation relating to trafficking in persons, and that some 42% of countries had a related national action plan. The impact of international norms and standards on countries is clear, since the great majority of national activity has occurred in the decade following the adoption of the Protocol. The extent to which such legislation and plans are implemented is never easy to assess, but they are important steps in recognizing the problem. The 2012 ICPC report also noted that the majority of national action plans included some element of prevention. In 2010-11 ICPC co-organized international and national expert meetings and reviewed promising initiatives on the prevention of human trafficking, to inform the development of a prevention strategy in Canada (Barrett & Shaw, 2011; ICCLR, 2011; Dandurand, 2012).[2]

This current chapter looks in more detail at some of the recent trends in human trafficking for labour and sexual purposes, both internally and across-borders. It examines the differential impacts on men, women and children, and some of the challenges in developing prevention policies for actions which are not always well understood and recognized. The chapter does not address many of the issues concerning legislation and the prosecution of traffickers, or the provision of services to victims – both of which are key components of trafficking strategies – but focuses on the factors which should shape prevention strategies. In particular it looks at developments at the local level where such exploitation takes place, as well as promising prevention practices being developed in places or countries where traffickers recruit.

International norms to support the prevention of human trafficking

The UN *Protocol against trafficking in persons, especially women and children* was initially adopted in 2000 and became operational in 2003.[3] It focuses on what are known as the three P's: prosecution, protection and prevention. A fourth p 'partnerships' was subsequently added in 2008, recognizing the importance of working in partnerships across sectors in order to tackle this complex issue. The Protocol outlines three basic elements of trafficking routinely referred to as:

- The act – the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person.
- The means – the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, including abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability, and also includes "giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person".
- The purpose – the exploitation, which is widely regarded as the "crux" of the crime.

Apart from the explicit emphasis on women in the Protocol, the exploitation of children under 18 years of age by any means is defined as trafficking (Article 3c).

In relation to prevention, the Protocol requires States to take measures to reduce risk factors such as poverty, underdevelopment or lack of opportunity, and to take or strengthen measures to reduce demand. Other international conventions relevant to human trafficking include the:

- Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 (CEDAW) Article 6: States must take appropriate measures to suppress trafficking in women and the exploitation of prostitution of women;
- ILO Convention 182, 1999, on Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour;
- UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, and the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography 2000; and
- UN OHCHR Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking 2002.

The guidelines developed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2002 on anti-human trafficking policies include a number of principles relevant to prevention:

- Principle 3: "do no harm" – anti-trafficking policies should not adversely impact human rights and dignity, particularly of the victim.
- Principle 4: prevention strategies shall address demand as a root cause of trafficking.
- Principle 5: states and intergovernmental organizations shall ensure that interventions address vulnerability factors, including inequality, poverty and all forms of discrimination.
- Principle 6: states shall eradicate public-sector involvement or complicity in trafficking.

In addition, Guideline 7 among other things encourages states to create policies to reduce demand for exploitative commercial sexual services, as well as to develop programmes that offer livelihood options, especially for women and other traditionally disadvantaged groups.

At the regional level a number of legislative initiatives have been adopted. In Europe, OSCE outlined an *Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings* in 2003.[4] The Council of Europe adopted a *Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings* which came into force in 2008, a Regional Anti-Trafficking Rapporteur was created in 2010, and an EU Strategy in 2012. In 2013, Eurostat published its first statistical report on trafficking in human beings in the region. Since its adoption, country progress in implementing the 2008 Council of Europe Convention has been monitored by the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, known as GRETA. By February 2014, GRETA had evaluated action in almost 30 European countries (COE, 2013).

In additional to criminal codes, many countries also use immigration and refugee legislation to control trafficking and protect victims, such as the 2004 *Asylum and Immigration Act* in the UK, which covers all forms of human trafficking, and the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* in Canada, initially enacted in 2001, with subsequent amendments.

In terms of action on the Protocol against trafficking in persons since 2003, three trends have been evident. As is often the case in response to criminal activity, countries have given greater attention to the use of the criminal law to prosecute and deter trafficking, and more recently, to the protection of victims, than to the development of prevention strategies and programmes. Prevention has been primarily restricted to broad public awareness programmes, with a few more targeted awareness and information projects. Secondly, much of the focus has been on trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation. Labour trafficking, which may involve much larger numbers of people, has received less attention. For example, people entering a country under a legal workers programme, such as seasonal agricultural workers, or construction workers, may not be aware of their rights to fair wages and working conditions, or recognize when their exploitation amounts to trafficking. Thirdly, transnational trafficking tends to receive far more public attention than that which takes place within the borders of a country. Within Canada, for example, it is very likely that the number of people trafficked internally, especially for sexual exploitation, greatly exceeds the number trafficked from outside the country.

It is also important to note that the contexts – in terms of countries and cities – in which trafficking takes place vary enormously. Patterns of human trafficking are strongly affected by a country's political, economic, social and cultural history, as well as current circumstances and pressures. Low and middle-income countries are often countries of origin for trafficking, and high-income countries destinations. The geography of a country or city also affects its vulnerability to trafficking. The expansion of the European Union has resulted in some dramatic changes in migration patterns and facilitated trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation from poorer countries and regions, but the ease of access has also exacerbated the problems. Tensions between controlling borders to keep out trafficked migrants versus recognizing the need to provide supports to trafficking victims have been one result. The contribution by Vincenzo Castelli at the end of this chapter on *Human Trafficking in Italy* illustrates some of these issues.

National, and in some cases, provincial or state prevention strategies are extremely important in furthering the prevention of human trafficking and supporting victims. A number of countries including Canada and many in Europe now have national action plans with a strong prevention component, as well as national information coordination systems, or rapporteur mechanisms to oversee policy on human trafficking. Both the Netherlands and Finland for example, have National Rapporteurs on Human Trafficking. Action at the local level is less prevalent, although a range of tools which can be used by cities and local governments is emerging. They include local coordination partnerships, the use of local safety audits to guide the development of prevention strategies adapted to the local context, and local protocols such as those involving business communities, hotel owners and staff.

The lack of data on human trafficking

As Chapter 3 has discussed, the links between migration, the smuggling of migrants, and human trafficking are intricate and intimate. They form part of a continuum with similar motivations and contributing causes. A number of observers have suggested that trafficking cannot be addressed unless migration is also addressed (Rao & Presenti, 2012). Human trafficking forms a very small proportion of overall migration, which was estimated to amount to some 232 million people in 2013 (UN DESA, 2013). Together with migrant smuggling, trafficking forms part of the irregular migrant population globally. In some cases people who have been smuggled into a country with their own consent, may become victims of trafficking when the smugglers demand additional payments, take their documents, or require them to undertake forced labour to pay their "debts".

Given its clandestine nature, international estimates of the incidence and prevalence of human trafficking are a major challenge, and seriously underestimate the extent and patterns of the problem. Traffickers are very quick to change their routes and methods in response to tightened security or changes in legislation, making detection extremely difficult. In some regions, especially Africa, in the absence of anti-trafficking legislation there is little information (Njoh & Ayuk-Etang, 2013; US Department of State, 2013). Even in countries which have legislation, police reports of trafficking cases are unlikely to provide an accurate picture. As with other forms of crime, the extent of police resources given to detecting trafficking will impact the numbers of cases discovered, and many countries lack capacity. Moreover, trafficking victims are usually very reluctant to talk to the police for fear of reprisals from their traffickers, against themselves or people close to them, or fear of deportation. Many victims may not even be aware that they are victims of trafficking with attendant rights. The general public's awareness of trafficking activities and their willingness to report them is often limited.

In addition, in countries where legislation exists, data on prosecuted cases seriously underrepresents trafficking activity since it is common for traffickers to be charged with crimes other than trafficking, such as pimping or procuring, for which it is easier to obtain a conviction. Trafficking cases end up, therefore, not being recorded as such.

Globally UNODC, ILO and IOM all maintain databases on human trafficking, but rely on different sources of data. For example, UNODC estimates of trafficking victims and perpetrators are based on officially detected cases provided by Member States, but do not enable estimates of the total number of victims to be made (UNODC, 2012). Between 2007 and 2010 they identified some 43,000 victims, representing 136 nationalities detected in 118 countries (UNODC, 2012). The ILO focuses primarily on forced labour exploitation using open sources, and estimates the number of cases at 20.9 million people globally, but the proportion that is trafficked is not known. IOM maintains a global database on victims of trafficking to whom it gives assistance, and by 2010 it contained over 20,000 names. The annual US Department of State *Trafficking in Persons Report* focuses on victim identification. Their recent estimates suggest that some 27 million men, women and children are trafficked globally at any one time, although they identified only 40,000 victims in 2012 (US Department of State, 2013, p. 7).

Figure 5.1 **Gender and age profile of victims detected globally, 2009**



Source: UNODC (2012, p. 25).

Apart from their interest in seeking a better life, trafficking victims often tend to be young, poor, predominately female, socially or culturally excluded, undereducated, and from difficult family or institutional backgrounds (Larson, 2010; Albanese, 2011; Jokinen et al., 2011; Sikka, 2009a).

Recent trends

Based on detected victims for whom they had age and gender information (29,000), UNODC estimated that the overwhelming majority of victims of trafficking in 2009 were female (76%), 59% of them women and 17% girls, while 24% were men and boys (UNODC, 2012) (Figure 5.1). They also report an increase in detected cases of child victims from previous years, but with wide regional variations. Children under 18 years of age accounted for some 27% of trafficking victims globally, and they were likely to be detected in Africa and the Middle East, where they accounted for 68% of victims.

In terms of the origins of trafficked victims, UNODC estimated that 27% of victims globally are trafficked within the same country, 24% transnationally, and the majority (45%) across borders within the same region (Figure 5.2).

UNODC also estimated that 58% of detected victims were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, 36% for labour, and 8% for other purposes, including illegal adoptions, forced marriage and organs (the latter primarily in Africa and the Middle East). They noted the rapid increase in detected cases of labour exploitation in recent years, reflecting improved

Figure 5.2 **Shares of detected victims who were trafficked within or from outside the region, 2007-2010**

As percentage of the total number of detected victims in each sub-region


68.4% 31.6%
North America, Central America and the Caribbean
68.1% 31.9%
Western and Central Europe
99.8% 0.2%
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
100% 0%
South Asia
99.5% 0.5%
East Asia and the Pacific
30.2% 69.8%
North Africa and the Middle East
89.4% 10.6%
South America
97.9% 2.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa
Within the region or the country
From outside the region
Countries not covered

Source: UNODC (2012, p. 42).

awareness and legislation, and detection capacities. Again there are wide regional differences, with higher proportions of labour trafficking detected in Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia and the Pacific, and more sexual exploitation in Europe, Central Asia and North and South America. Women are predominantly the victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, and two out of three child victims are female.

In relation to trafficking perpetrators, the great majority of known cases are men. Two thirds of cases prosecuted or convicted between 2007 and 2010 were male, and one third female (UNODC, 2012). The involvement of women varies considerably between regions, ranging from 21% in Africa and the Middle East, to 77% of convicted trafficking cases in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. UNODC (2012) suggests that women have a higher rate of involvement in trafficking, especially for sexual purposes, than in other types of crime, and they are associated especially with the trafficking of girls. They report qualitative research which suggests that women tend to be involved in low-level positions within trafficking hierarchies, are often themselves former trafficked victims, and are more vulnerable to detection as well as recruitment than men (UNODC, 2012, p. 29-30; Barberet, 2014; Siegel & de Blank, 2010; Aronowitz, 2009).

Regional trends

Within the European Union, the first regional statistical report on human trafficking found an 18% increase in identified and presumed victims between 2008 to 2010 (Eurostat, 2013). Women and girls far outnumbered men and boys (68% and 12%, compared with 17% and 3%) so that females represented 80% of victims. The majority of victims (61%) were trafficked within the region from EU Member States, notably Romania and Bulgaria, but the percentage of non-EU victims increased over the period (from 18% to 39% for females and 12% to 37% for males). Around two thirds of the victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation, a quarter for labour and the remainder (14%) for organ removal, begging and criminal activities, and child selling.

The rapidity of changing trafficking patterns has been noted in France where a parliamentary committee estimated that in the 1990's 80% of prostitutes in France were French-born, but by 2011 90% were foreign-born (Bousquet & Geoffroy, 2011). Similar changes in the origins of those working in the sex trade have been noted in the Netherlands and other European countries (Barnett et al., 2011).

Overall, the costs of human trafficking to both victims of trafficking and their families, and to countries themselves, are very high, and help to underline the importance of preventing it. In 2009, ILO estimated that some $2.5US billion were lost to victims in terms of fees they were forced to pay, and underpayment of wages. Other costs include justice, legal and medical costs, and intangible costs such as pain and suffering. The contribution by Nicole Barrett at the end of this chapter on *The Economic Costs of Sex Trafficking: Building the Case for Prevention* discusses attempts to estimate some of these costs.

Developing a prevention strategy for the complex problem of human trafficking

> "Widespread understanding of human trafficking is often clouded by stereotype, bias and sensational media reports".[5]

In developing prevention strategies, governments at all levels face a number of problems in addition to inadequate data. They include:

- Media biases which add to misconceptions about who trafficked victims include, and where they might be found;
- The lack of awareness on the part of service professions and people likely to come in contact with traffickers or victims;
- Difficulties of distinguishing between exploitation, forced labour and poor working conditions;
- The tendency to focus on international cases at the expense of domestic trafficking; and
- Different perspectives on social and moral issues such as prostitution, sex work and exploitation.

Given the strong focus on the use of the criminal law to respond to trafficking, a number of observers have suggested that there has been an overemphasis on the prosecution of traffickers, and that this has militated against the protection of the human rights of victims and the development of appropriate victim support and prevention strategies (Smith, 2011; Huijsmans & Baker, 2012; Copic & Simeunovic-Paric, 2011; Dandurand, 2011).

At the same time the proportion of trafficking cases prosecuted in many countries remains extremely small (UNODC, 2012; Farrell et al., 2013; Eurostat, 2013). In Canada, for example, by March 2013 there had been only 35 human trafficking convictions since the Criminal Code was amended in 2005 (Public Safety Canada, 2013b). Australia convicted 15 offenders out of 346 investigations of human trafficking, slavery and slavery-like offences between 2004 and 2012 (Simmons et al., 2013). In the US in 2011-12, the Department of Justice convicted 138 traffickers (US Department of State, 2013). UNODC reported that of 132 countries that have criminalized trafficking, 16% had no convictions at all between 2007 and

2010 (UNODC, 2012). This underlines the limitations of relying on the criminal law alone to prevent trafficking.

In terms of victim "protection", trafficking policies usually include three main components: assistance and support services for victims; the provision of temporary visas or "reflection periods" to enable them to stay in the country to which they are trafficked; and full residence permits. Countries vary considerably in the extent to which their legislation and its implementation emphasizes border security and prosecution, over victim assistance and support (Winterdyk, Perrin & Reichel, 2011; Munro, 2006). In a number of countries, victim assistance or residence visas are often dependent on the victim's willingness to collaborate in prosecutions and act as witnesses (Copic & Simeunovic-Paric, 2011; Dandurand, 2011). In other countries, such as Italy, victim support is less tied to collaboration with the police (Winterdyk et al., 2011; Castelli, 2012).

A study of media reports on human trafficking in the UK well illustrates the distorted picture which emerges in the public domain (Dugan, 2013). An analysis of 2,270 media articles on trafficking and forced labour in 2012 identified a total of 263 victims. Of these, 85 were victims of labour exploitation and 172 of sexual exploitation. This was far lower than the official figure of 1,186 potential cases identified by the UK Human Trafficking Centre's National Referral Mechanism, and much lower than the 7,000 cases estimated for the UK by ILO methods. Media articles were much more likely to focus on sexual trafficking of young girls, than of adults, or on male labour cases, and least likely to focus on female domestic servitude. The study suggests that greater public education is required to highlight the range of trafficking situations and exploitation, especially of labour victims. A Scottish study found that only 18% of people surveyed associated organized crime with human trafficking, suggesting they underestimated its role (Ipsos MORI Scotland, 2013). In general, public sympathies tend to be greater for international trafficking victims than for domestic ones.

In Canada, a study in Calgary reported that stakeholders and front-line workers felt that awareness and public information campaigns often sensationalized human trafficking, and reinforced an image of sexual exploitation to the detriment of other forms of human trafficking (Quarterman et al., 2012). And while public sympathies may be more attuned to international than domestic victims, it has also been suggested that government and public sympathy tends to be greater for trafficked victims than for migrants, to the detriment of the latter (Rao & Presenti, 2012).

A number of people have argued in recent years that human trafficking has become a "rescue industry" with a strong emphasis on a dichotomous view of poor helpless (female) victims and evil traffickers, when the reality is much more complex (Barberet, 2014; Chesney-Lind, 2014).[6] This is especially the case in relation to trafficking for sexual exploitation where not all women may be or see themselves only as victims. Others have argued that in relation to children, an anti-trafficking perspective has blurred the lines between the many reasons for child migration, and interventions have in some cases made the lives of children who want to migrate worse (Huijsmans & Baker, 2012).

Trafficking for sexual exploitation – The continuum between sex work and trafficking

> "The various countries which we visited told us that France has a major responsibility to make Europe aware that it is no longer possible to condemn trafficking in human beings at the same time as tolerating prostitution."[7]

As in the case of migration, there exists a continuum between trafficking and forms of labour exploitation which do not meet the standards of exploitation under trafficking legislation. In relation to sexual exploitation, there are close ties with prostitution, since that is the industry where trafficked women and girls are primarily forced to work. The links between trafficking for sexual exploitation and prostitution date back many decades. The Palermo Protocol was preceded by the 1949 *UN Convention for the suppression of traffic in persons and of the exploitation of the prostitution of others*. The Protocol itself specifically refers to exploitation for prostitution in its definition of trafficking (Article 3a):

> "The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs…"

The sex industry in many countries is extremely extensive and lucrative. A recent study of the commercial sex industry in eight towns in the US, for example, estimated that pimps and traffickers took home between $5,000US and $32,000US a week (Dank et al., 2014). Child sexual exploitation through the Internet is also of increasing concern as suggested in Chapter 2.

In most countries the exploitation of trafficked victims takes place in a range of venues including street prostitution, brothels, massage parlours, nail salons, adult entertainment strip bars and clubs, escort agencies, hotels and private homes. The venues may be legal or illegal, depending on the country or city. Increasingly, however, the sex industry is moving away from the street to private spaces, and communicating through the Internet and mobile phones, making it much more difficult to detect trafficking cases. This appears to be the case in many developed countries including the US, Ireland, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand (Barnett et al., 2011; Barrett & Shaw, 2014).

The overlap between trafficking in persons and their exploitation in the legitimate labour market raises a number of issues. The majority of trafficked victims in Australia, for example, are reported to be women and girls brought from South East Asia to work in the sex industry, some coming voluntarily, but ending up in debt bondage and sexual servitude (NSW, 2012). Many other people may work in forced labour conditions which infringe labour laws, but do not meet trafficking exploitation standards (Skrivankova, 2010; Jokinen et al., 2011). Many of those trafficked for sexual and labour purposes may work in legal occupations, but not be aware of their rights. In the State of Victoria, Australia, a parliamentary report noted in 2010 that all prosecuted cases of trafficking or sexual servitude involved trafficked victims in legal premises (Parliament of Victoria, 2010). Lack of knowledge and awareness about trafficking by front-line service workers such as the police, customs officials, border guards and other professionals is a further problem.

The agency of women is often overlooked in discussions about trafficking for sexual exploitation. In many countries, there are strong support and advocacy groups for women who work in the sex industry, and governments have legislated to give them the same rights and protections as other workers, and to ensure safe working conditions. Such women do not see themselves as victims of exploitation (van de Meulen et al., 2013; Barberet, 2014). In recent years, for example, countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand and some states in Australia have shifted their focus away from prostitution as a "public nuisance" to focusing on improving the health and safety conditions of sex workers, and on their right to be treated like other professions. The contribution by Rosemary Barberet at the end of this chapter *Sex work, Prostitution and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: Implications for Crime Prevention* discusses some of these issues.

Box 5.1 **Fluctuations in prostitution policy in the Netherlands**

- Tolerated in the Middle Ages.
- First regulated and then suppressed in 16th century.
- Laissez-faire approach in 17th century.
- Controlled in 18th century because of moral concerns among the growing middle class
- Regulated in 19th century to protect soldiers in the Napoleonic army (health checks and work permits required of women in prostitution).
- Tolerated and then legalized in 20th century.
- Increasing regulation in 21st century: including reductions in size of Amsterdam's red light district due to an influx of organized crime and human trafficking from 2009.

Source: Adapted from Barrett & Shaw (2014).

Beyond these problems, as discussed above, the lines between victim and perpetrator are often blurred in the case of women who have been trafficked for sexual exploitation, and subsequently become involved in recruitment and victim control (Aronowicz, 2009; Barberet, 2014).

Perhaps most significantly – as a moral and social issue – countries have frequently shifted their attitudes towards prostitution over time (see for example the case of the Netherlands, Box 5.1). Current legislative responses to prostitution range from making it illegal for both sex sellers and sex buyers (e.g. most states in the US), making it legal for sellers, but illegal for buyers (e.g. Sweden), creating limited to full legality via regulation and licensing (e.g. the Netherlands), and decriminalizing the entire industry (e.g. New Zealand) (Barnett et al., 2011). In the past decade it is evident that countries and cities have continued to struggle with the "best way" to control prostitution and prevent trafficking for sexual exploitation, as they respond to the UN Protocol, and in the face of changing migration patterns, and organized criminal involvement in the sex trade.

Labour trafficking

Labour trafficking includes a wide range of people who are trafficked illegally into a country, including those under false pretences for non-existent jobs or forced labour; those smuggled across a border but forced to work to pay debts (debt bondage); as well as those entering a country under a legal work programme such as seasonal agricultural labour programmes, or temporary foreign worker programmes (Figure 5.3). As suggested earlier, people entering a country under work visas may not be aware of their

Figure 5.3 **Trafficking in human beings, forced labour and the exploitation of (migrant) labour.**



Source: Ollus et al. (2013, p. 13).

rights to fair wages and working conditions, or recognize when they are being exploited. In some cases they may be trafficked within a country.

Trafficking for forced labour is likely to be found in a wide range of unskilled jobs, ranging from agriculture, construction and manufacturing industries, in remote sites for mining or logging, food processing, and the food service and hotel industries, as well as in private homes among domestic workers (US Department of State, 2013; Scott, Craig, & Geddes, 2012; Centre for Social Justice, 2013; Jokinen et al., 2011; RCMP, 2010). However, it is evident that far fewer labour trafficking cases are recognized by authorities or the general public than sex trafficking. In a detailed study of a sample of trafficking cases identified by authorities in the US, it was found that only 11% involved in labour trafficking and 89% in sex trafficking (Farrell et al., 2013; McGough, 2013). This was in spite of the fact that the US government has itself assisted a far greater number of labour than sex trafficking victims. The authors conclude that two of the main barriers to victim identification are unfamiliarity with labour laws and regulations on the part of police and prosecutors, and the fact that most trafficking expertise is located in vice or morality divisions within police and prosecution services (Farrell et al., 2013)

Box 5.2 **ILO Indicators of labour trafficking**

Strong indicator of exploitation:

- Excessive working days or hours

Medium indicators of exploitation:

- Bad living conditions
- Hazardous work
- Low or no salary
- No respect of labour laws or contract signed
- No social protection (contract, social insurance etc.)
- Very bad working conditions
- Wage manipulation

Low indicator of exploitation:

- No access to education

Source: ILO (2009).

A number of countries have begun to give greater attention to labour trafficking. The Australian government has funded a series of research programmes on human trafficking, including detailed studies of labour trafficking (David, 2010; Larsen, 2010). The European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI) in Finland has similarly undertaken a number of studies on labour trafficking in Baltic countries (Ollus et al., 2013; Jokinen et al., 2011). As with sexual exploitation, exploited migrant workers are often very reluctant to seek help or leave abusive situations for fear of deportation, or because residence or work permits are often tied to specific employment, while unscrupulous employees take advantage of their vulnerability and ignorance (Ollus et al., 2013). In Canada, it is suggested that cases come to official attention primarily through breaches of employment standards, building codes, occupational health and safety or labour rights, rather than because of clear breaches of criminal or immigration laws (Sikka, 2013). The involvement of organized crime is not always evident. Many of the identified cases involve third party agencies, such as recruiting, placement and "labour leasing" agencies in countries of origin or destination, which fail to provide accurate information, or knowingly deceive applicants, as well as exploitative businesses and employers (RCMP, 2010).

Indicators to provide guidance on identifying trafficking for forced labour, as well as sexual exploitation, were developed by ILO in 2009. There are six dimensions, each with a series of indicators: deceptive recruitment or transportation; coercive recruitment or transportation; recruitment by abuse of vulnerability; exploitative work conditions; coercion at destination; and abuse of vulnerability at destination (see Box 5.2 for indicators of labour trafficking) (ILO, 2009).

International versus domestic trafficking

Trafficking people within their own country is found in all regions, and in a number of countries including China, the Philippines, Canada and the US, where much of the trafficking is domestic rather than international.

UNODC noted an increasing global trend in domestic trafficking between 2007 and 2010, from 19% to 31% of all reported victims (UNODC, 2012). In some countries this relates to children trafficked from rural areas for labour exploitation. In some European countries and North America, it is more likely to involve the grooming of young women by "boyfriends" and gang members for sexual exploitation.

In Canada, for example, the majority of trafficking for sexual exploitation would appear to involve domestic victims. While some young men are also involved, they are usually young women and girls, recruited as young as 12-14, and often with a history of state welfare care, childhood sexual or physical abuse, are runaways or homeless, undereducated, and primarily Aboriginal (Sikka, 2009a & b). A 2007 government report stated that Aboriginal girls and women were at the greatest risk of becoming victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation in Canada (Status of Women Canada, 2007). The report noted that some 40% of them live in poverty, more than half of those over the age of 15 are unemployed, and more than half of those living in single-parent households needed housing. In some Canadian provinces, such as Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia with large Aboriginal populations, the proportion of Aboriginal women and girls involved in street prostitution far outnumbers non-Aboriginals.

In the US, it is evident that the majority of sex trafficking victims dealt with by prosecutors are US citizens (Farrell et al., 2013). American Indian or Alaska Native women in the US in particular are at high risk of being trafficked for sexual exploitation (Farley et al., 2011).

National and state/provincial prevention policy

International conventions and declarations underline that the complexity of human trafficking requires a multi-layered and comprehensive response: tackling some of the causal factors, incorporating a gender perspective, and upholding the human rights of those involved. This applies to the development of prevention policies as much as to those concerned with prosecution and victim protection and support.

In 2011 the Canadian government initiated an international review of current practices and expertise on the prevention of human trafficking, and the factors which need to be taken into account in developing a national strategy (ICCLR, 2011; Dandurand, 2012).[8] It was concluded that apart from being based on international principles, a national strategy must be backed by strong leadership and support from national government. It needs to facilitate partnerships between relevant services, such as the police and border services, with lower levels of government and victim and other services, and with civil society organizations. It should take account of both labour and sex trafficking, and domestic and transnational forms, and include strategies which target the demand for, as well as the supply of, trafficked persons (see Box 5.3).

Box 5.3 **Factors to consider in developing a framework for the prevention of human trafficking**

1. Target exploitation, the crux of the crime.
2. Focus on trafficking for both sexual and labour purposes.
3. Focus on domestic trafficking as well as international trafficking.
4. Focus on both supply and demand.
5. Develop national government leadership to ensure a comprehensive prevention framework.
6. Build on existing structures as far as possible.
7. Develop partnerships and coordination mechanisms.
8. Develop a good evidence base and build on existing data and sources.
9. Monitor and evaluate initiatives.
10. Build capacity and community resilience.

Source: ICCLR (2011).

Canada's *National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking* was launched in 2012 and includes strategies for prevention, improving protection and assistance of victims, detection, investigation and prosecution of traffickers, and for increasing partnerships and knowledge (Public Safety Canada, 2012). The prevention component includes five broad areas:

- In Canada – training of front-line services workers;
- Development of new awareness campaigns;
- Development of tools to help local communities identify people and places at risk of trafficking;
- Internationally – the distribution of awareness literature through Canadian missions globally; and
- Targeted aid programmes to protect children and youth from labour and sexual exploitation.

In its first year of operation, Canadian aid programmes have included the development of programmes for children at risk of sexual tourism in Cartagena, Colombia; the mapping of sex tourism at-risk locations in Costa Rica, and support to local families and communities; and in China, life skills and information projects on labour trafficking with children, school students and women (Public Safety Canada, 2013b).

As ICPC's 2012 International Report notes, many national governments now have anti-trafficking action plans. Countries such as Germany, Belgium and the UK have developed national referral mechanisms which ensure close partnerships working across departments and regions, and with civil society organizations, especially to strengthen victim support. Portugal established a national observatory to monitor trafficking in human beings in 2008, for example (COE, 2013). In countries such as the Netherlands and Finland the National Rapporteurs raise the profile of trafficking issues, and enable services and procedures to be regularly monitored. This helps to ensure that policies take account of changing trafficking patterns and needs. In the US, apart from the annual report on trafficking in persons, since 2004 the Department of Justice has provided $64US million to fund local multi-agency task forces and police training on human trafficking. Currently there are around 40 multi-agency teams, bringing together relevant agencies. The Department of Homeland Security's *Blue Campaign* combines human trafficking enforcement with training, public awareness, and victim protection and assistance.[9]

In relation to labour trafficking, the use of legislation or regulation backed up by inspection and enforcement mechanisms are important tools for prevention. There is considerable agreement that a combination of labour regulation/enforcement and criminal justice should be used to identify trafficking cases, while protecting the human and labour rights of migrant workers (Ollus et al., 2013; Skrivankova, 2010). On the basis of detailed studies in four Baltic countries, it is concluded that the effective prevention of trafficking for forced labour requires countries to promote equality of labour rights for *all* workers, rather than targeting only the most serious cases of exploitation (Ollus et al., 2013). The role of labour inspections, employers' associations and trade unions is thus very important, as well as self-regulation by businesses, through the use of ethical guidelines and codes of conduct.

In the UK, *The Gangmaster's Licensing Authority* (GLA) provides an example of a national initiative to prevent forced labour and trafficking, and is regarded as a good practice by ILO.[10] The Licensing Authority was established in 2005 with strong powers to regulate and inspect domestic and other labour recruitment and work situations, especially in the agricultural, forestry, horticultural, shellfish gathering, food processing and packaging industries.[11] Its mission is to safeguard the welfare and interests of workers and to prevent their exploitation, particularly by debt bondage and forced labour. All those hiring, or acting as recruitment agencies, are required to have a GLA license which can be revoked if inspections indicate that a range of work, accommodation, treatment, pay, health and safety standards are not being adhered to. The authority has both civil and criminal powers to ensure effective investigation and compliance.

The regional initiative *Adstringo* is also concerned with the prevention of labour trafficking and exploitation.[12] Coordinated by HEUNI in Finland, it builds on its recent research on labour trafficking in the Baltic region. The objective of the project is to prevent labour trafficking by enhancing national and regional partnerships, and increasing understanding of the mechanisms which facilitate migrant labour exploitation in the region. The project includes the development of a dialogue mechanism between key national stakeholders, regional awareness raising campaigns targeting government and with private sector personnel in the Baltic region, and further research on recruitment agencies and employers and their practices. It is also developing guidelines for recruitment agencies and employers on the prevention of exploitation, and creating greater political awareness and dialogue nationally and regionally. The participating countries include Estonia, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden. A parallel project is being implemented in Poland and the Russian Federation.

In federal countries, many state or provincial governments have enacted their own legislation or developed action plans. In the US, New York State passed a comprehensive human sex trafficking law in 2007.[13] The law considers sex trafficking as the most severe form of prostitution promotion (Barrett & Shaw, 2014). It includes a focus on the demand for sex purchasing, establishing that sex tourism is illegal, even in places where prostitution is legal, and increases the severity of a possible prison sentence. New York also passed a *Safe Harbor for Exploited Children Act* in 2010, which regards juveniles charged with prostitution as trafficking victims rather than criminals, in part to focus prosecution on traffickers rather than exploited youth.

In addition, the state has created a state-wide system of specialized *Human Trafficking Intervention Courts* to handle prostitution and sex trafficking cases.[14] They will be able to refer defendants to services such as drug treatment, temporary housing, immigration assistance, health care, education and job training, and help them exit trafficking situations. The courts are modeled on specialized domestic violence or drug courts, which try to address the broader context and causes of the problems (Barrett & Shaw, 2014).

In Canada, British Columbia launched its Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking in 2013. It established an Office to Combat Trafficking in Persons (OCTIP) in 2007, which coordinates victim support and prevention activities, and has developed a series of on-line awareness and training tools for front-line workers, the police and others.[15] The Province of Manitoba in Canada enacted the *Worker Recruitment and*

Protection Act (WRAPA) in 2008, which specifically regulates foreign worker recruitment. All employers must register with the province, and third parties must apply for a license before recruiting internationally. They are all subject to inspection. In addition, recruiting agencies are not allowed to charge the workers fees, which has been a common practice used to exploit those arriving. Manitoba also passed legislation on child sexual exploitation in 2012 and has a series of action plans to combat sexual exploitation and domestic trafficking since 2002 (Barrett & Shaw, 2014).[16]

A number of other regulation and legislative options for trafficking prevention are used at provincial/state levels. For example, in some Canadian provinces, existing child welfare and child protection legislation has been used to provide safety to young women who have been sexually exploited or are at risk of being trafficked. Community safety legislation, highways and traffic acts, the legislation and licensing of health services, and liquor control legislation has similarly all been used to limit trafficking opportunities and activities.

Developing prevention strategies at the local level

Human trafficking has very specific implications for local communities. Exploitation takes place in local streets and neighbourhoods. Young women and girls are sexually exploited on the street or in local bars, businesses and hotels. Victims of labour trafficking can be found among domestic workers in private homes, in local industries and restaurants, fast food outlets or construction sites.

At the local government level there is considerable scope for improving communication between key people involved, as well as public awareness and training (Quarterman et al., 2012). This can be achieved through developing a local plan to guide the development of policies and interventions, based on a careful analysis of the local context. One of the key requirements for developing such a local strategy is to establish a local task force or forum to establish good communication between stakeholders, and to collect information and data which helps identify risky places, and populations at risk of trafficking and exploitation. A local safety audit guide on human trafficking was developed by EFUS in 2007 (EFUS, 2007).[17] More recently, the Canadian government published a *Local Safety Audit Guide: To Prevent Trafficking in Persons and Related Sexual Exploitation,* with the aim of assisting cities and municipalities in developing good trafficking prevention strategies (Public Safety Canada, 2013a).[18]

Among the tools which can be used at the local level, in addition to national or provincial/state legislation, are local by-laws such as planning and zoning laws regulating the use of streets, residential areas and public spaces, the licensing of liquor, bars, adult entertainment and businesses, and the regulation of work places and working conditions. Regulation and licensing have been used extensively by the city of Amsterdam, for example, to control the sex trade and prevent the involvement of trafficking and organized crime (Barrett & Shaw, 2011). Licencing and by-laws, however, need to be enforced with regular inspections.

Other prevention initiatives involve the development of protocols, for example, with local hotels, travel agents and businesses, on their willingness and responsibilities to ensure that human trafficking and exploitation does not take place, and is not enabled. Training and education on trafficking are also important tools. Local awareness campaigns and media education about trafficking to alert local communities to the kinds of labour and sexual trafficking and exploitation which can take place are valuable, so long as they avoid stereotypical and unbalanced reporting and images. Finally, developing targeted awareness and education with populations most at risk, and providing hotlines and information on support services are all valuable initiatives. Box 5.4 below taken from the Canadian *Local Safety Audit Guide* summarizes the key components of a local prevention strategy for human trafficking for sexual and labour exploitation purposes (Public Safety Canada, 2013a).

The following section looks at some current examples of promising prevention projects and initiatives which can form part of an overall strategy.

Good prevention practices

A range of useful tools and compilations of good practices have been produced by international organizations such as UNODC and UNGIFT, many of them focusing on improving legislation, training and criminal justice responses to trafficking.[19] The *Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking* – UNGIFT – which was created in 2007 by ILO, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNODC, IOM and OSCE, has been especially active in the dissemination of knowledge and tools. IOM carries out public education campaigns and provides technical assistance to countries in developing monitoring and information systems. They have also published handbooks and other tools especially on victim services and supports. As part of its monitoring role in Europe, the Council of Europe's GRETA mechanism publishes regular reports on country evaluations, and highlights good practices (COE, 2013). EFUS also has a database of international and European trafficking prevention projects.[20]

Box 5.4 **Continuum of prevention options for trafficking and related exploitation**

	Practice	Sexual exploitation	Labour exploitation
Legislation	Provincial legislation	Inspection of work places	Inspection of work places and conditions including private employers
Governance	Establish permanent local task force or forum; mechanisms to coordinate information and action		
	Local regulation and enforcement	Regulation of bars, massage, body rub, beauty salons etc. Regular inspection and enforcement	Regulation of work place and employment situations; inspection and enforcement
	Local/provincial/territorial protocols	E.g. Protocols between police/ municipality and social services; with business sector; NGO's etc.	Protocols between municipality and industrial work sites, factories etc.
Situational prevention	Patrolling and surveillance of hot spots		
General awareness raising	Public education and awareness raising	Local media, posters, leaflets	Local media, posters, leaflets
	User awareness campaigns	Who are the users, what are the impacts of demand	Who are the users, what are the impacts of demand
	Hotlines and public numbers for reporting, advice and help		Leaflets and information where migrant and temporary workers meet, regularly go
	Media awareness raising	Information sessions with provincial and local media	Information sessions with provincial and local media
	Internet awareness	With parents, schools, youth groups	
Targeted awareness raising	Education and awareness raising	Schools, youth clubs, Aboriginal families/ communities, foster parent groups	Industry staff and workers; hotel industry; agricultural associations
Community and neighbourhood prevention	Local campaigns	Inclusive projects which support at risk populations, invite discussions with business sector, alert residents to how they can help	Projects to support migrant workers, local agricultural workers
	Projects to provide support and services	Drop-in centres, outreach work, education and skills training; supported housing	
Interventions	Interventions with high risk groups, reintegration for post care or custody groups	Children in care, coming out of care; Street children; youth gangs; women in disadvantaged circumstances (drug, alcohol use, homeless, working in sex trade etc.)	Work with third party agencies to provide information about rights and conditions

Source: Public Safety Canada (2013, p. 21)

Initiatives which encourage the private sector to work proactively to prevent trafficking and exploitation in their area include the *Athens Ethical Principles.*[21] These were first adopted by business leaders in 2006, and include a zero-tolerance policy for working with any entity that benefits from human trafficking. The principles have now been signed by over 12,000 organizations either individually or through their industry federations (OSCE, 2010). In the US, the State of California's *Supply Chains Transparency Act* requires large businesses with a turnover of more than $100US million to disclose their actions to prevent trafficking and exploitation in their chain of suppliers. This is one of several examples highlighted in *Good Practices to Prevent and Combat Human Trafficking* (UNGIFT, 2010).

Education and awareness projects which involve far more than posters or brief media campaigns, include those which work with survivors of trafficking. Two Canadian examples include *Les Survivantes* in Montreal, Quebec, developed by the Montreal police, and *Walk With Me,* an NGO founded by a woman who had been trafficked from Europe, and which works closely with the Peel Regional Police in Ontario (see Box 5.5).

Box 5.5 **Police, survivor and service provider partnerships**

Les Survivantes, Montreal, Quebec, Canada[22]

The title of this project refers to a group of women who are survivors of human trafficking – especially sexual exploitation, and who work in partnership with a special team from the city police in Montreal (SPVM – Service de Police de la Ville de Montréal). The project was created in 2012 by the "Morality" section of the SPVM. The police officers work together with the survivors (*survivantes*). They conduct training and education sessions, and work with individual victims of trafficking, and those at risk, who have been identified by the police, social agencies, or in some cases their families. The training and education sessions take several hours, but vary in length depending on the audience. They include detailed information and training on human trafficking and sexual exploitation and its local manifestations, and powerful personal presentations given by one of the women survivors. Sessions are given to police officers, front-line and other social and health workers, and vulnerable groups. Presentations are not given to the general public or schools. So far over 100 presentations have been made, and over 1000 police officers have received training. In some cases the project supports victims in making complaints to the police – something which they are often fearful of doing – and puts them in touch with prosecutors if they decide to make a formal complaint. In all such cases the project ensures their safety and protection. The project works closely with local NGO's including victim support groups, as well as youth justice institutions such as the Youth Centre (*Centre de Jeunesse*). The latter alert the project to young women and girls who are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse. A survivor meets with individual young women or girls for one-on-one sessions. In cases where parents ask for help, the project works with their daughters if they are under the age of 18.

The group of survivors are exceptional women who made formal complaints to the police, and whose cases have been completed. It usually includes 5 or 6 women at a time, and they receive support from the police service and others to further their own education and training when they move on from working with the project. They come from all types of backgrounds, including those who initially began working as exotic dancers or as "hostesses" or escorts, and in some cases to pay university fees, before being trafficked and exploited. The majority, however, are from disadvantaged backgrounds.

***Walk With Me* Canada Victim Services**[23]

Founded by a survivor of human trafficking – Timea Nagy – in 2009, *Walk With Me* began working with the Peel Regional Police in Ontario, Canada to provide advice on trafficking and victim support, and developing training for the police, victim organizations and other agencies. The organization now works with police services and organizations across the country. It provides a crisis line, and delivers and coordinates shelter and support services for victims of trafficking. It is involved on an expert witness basis in labour and sex trafficking cases before the courts.

Walk With Me undertakes public education to raise awareness about trafficking, through public speaking and media resources including videos and public service announcements. It has developed a number of education and training resources. They include Timea Nagy's own story, and series of books for police officers such as *The Mindset of a Human Trafficked Victim*, and a manual for police officers on domestic sex trafficking *The Game – your daughters shouldn't play.*

In relation to child pornography and sex tourism, the UN has launched an on-line initiative to create greater awareness, and encourage travellers to be responsible tourists by not encouraging human trafficking, and reporting suspected cases.[24]

In Sweden, an anti-child exploitation and trafficking awareness campaign *Don't look away* targets tourists and travellers. It was developed in 2010 by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, in collaboration with the national police and ECPAT. The campaign was inspired by similar ones in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and included a publicity film shown at airports and stations, to travel businesses and during flights, and distributes literature including information on contacting the police.

In the US, a national resource developed by an NGO is the National Human Trafficking Resource Centre (NHTRC) – called the *Polaris Project*. It works exclusively on human trafficking and slavery issues.[25] It has established a national 24-hour toll-free hotline for phone calls or texts, and maintains detailed maps of anti-trafficking services and information for all states, as well as undertaking training and technical assistance. Among other tools it has developed an educational explanatory "power and control wheel" to explain the links between the use of power and control over individuals in relation to trafficking for sex and labour purposes.[26]

Examples of city-based coalitions and partnerships include the *Houston Rescue and Restore Coalition* (HRRC) in Texas in the US. This is a coalition of Houston-area non-profit and faith-based organizations, and government and law enforcement agencies. The HRRC was established in 2005 in response to growing concern about the prevalence of human trafficking in the Greater Houston Metropolitan area. It provides front-line professional training with tailored programmes for health care workers and law enforcement, and on under-age domestic trafficking victims. Two separate prevention programmes have been developed for girls and for boys. In terms of community awareness, as well as providing resources and technical assistance, it offers presentations to local organizations, churches and clubs, including in Spanish, has designated a "human trafficking awareness month", and developed a multilingual media campaign and a travelling art show. The coalition runs a volunteer programme, and is developing fair-trade awareness to educate the public on labour exploitation issues.[27]

PACT Ottawa, in Ontario, Canada, is an NGO founded in 2004 to respond to trafficking issues. It has developed a number of anti-trafficking awareness projects and events, and itself founded the Ottawa Coalition against Human Trafficking, which brings together local and federal partners.[28] Among its trafficking initiatives, *Project Protect* funded by the Province of Ontario, included the appointment of a Youth Coordinator to develop age-appropriate school presentations for children in grades 7-8 and 9-12. They focus on such topics as trafficker recruitment and the grooming of potential victims, and help students to protect themselves and recognize if their peers may be at risk. They illustrate how their choices as consumers influence trafficking on a global scale. PACT has also developed the *Truck Stop Awareness Campaign*, specifically targeting the places and industry (the trucking industry) well placed to look for evidence of trafficking and exploitation. The campaign has engaged with local communities across the Province of Ontario, and shared its resource material with other provinces and internationally.

A current PACT trafficking prevention initiative *Project imPACT* is being funded by the Federal Ministry for the Status of Women over two years. The project is piloting the local safety audit guide on human trafficking and sexual exploitation, with the aim of developing a strategic plan with a range of initiatives to prevent and reduce the trafficking and exploitation of women and girls in the city. The project includes working in close collaboration with Crime Prevention Ottawa – the city's prevention initiative – the Ottawa Police Service, and a women's centre among other partners.

In Sweden, a task force on human trafficking developed the public awareness *Safe Trip Campaign* with the support of the Stockholm country administration board in the Stockholm region. It targets women at risk of sexual exploitation who work in Sweden.[29] The campaign is translated into many languages, including English, Romanian, Russian, Spanish and Thai. A 24-hour emergency line has also been created in partnership with an organization for women victims of violence, and aid is offered to women who wish to exit exploitative situations. Since 2010 the campaign has been diffused in local and international transport hubs.

Other prevention programmes which are specifically targeted to young people to prevent child sexual exploitation include the *My Dangerous Loverboy* campaign in the UK.[30] The campaign aims to raise awareness of the sexual exploitation and trafficking of young people, including domestic trafficking, through school-based sessions using high quality film and educational resources. It was developed by the UK Human Trafficking Coalition and partners specifically concerned with domestic child exploitation. Resources include a website, a video, and educational packs for schools, which have been used by government and NGO partners across the UK. The campaign is currently being evaluated.

In the Netherlands, the government initiated a prevention plan targeting *loverboys* as part of its 2011 national action plan on trafficking, to prevent the exploitation of children coming out of care or transition houses. They are especially vulnerable to recruitment and grooming because of their isolation and lack of close family supports. The initiative was developed by the Ministries of Security and Justice, Health, Social Welfare and Sport, and municipalities. It used social media sites such as Twitter and internet sites, conducted education campaigns in secondary schools, and developed a guide for the police on working with presumed loverboys and their victims. Information for parents, schools, potential victims, and a film have also been produced.[31]

A number of non-government organizations combine service provision to victims of trafficking, with public education and advocacy. The organization *Liberty Asia,* established in 2011, comprises a group of professionals from various industries who aim to develop coordinated responses to slavery in the corporate sector, and provide support to NGOs working on these issues.[32] Where possible they work with existing organizations to avoid duplication and to ensure resources are used efficiently. While there are many anti-trafficking organizations working in Asia, very few work collaboratively, and they often lack resources. Liberty Asia helps to coordinate activities, particularly across-borders, and to share information, expertise, and operations. It provides a regional point of contact for victims. It has also created a number of school-based education and awareness programmes and campaigns, to broaden knowledge of slavery across Asia. Its on-line school curriculum includes five interactive modules for students and teachers. There is an anti-slavery club manual for schools, and video material.

In Colombia, the NGO *Corporación Espacios de Mujer* founded in 2003 in the city of Medellin and Valle de Aburrá, assists women working in prostitution, those at risk of exploitation, and victims of human trafficking.[33] It supports their human rights, including to be treated fairly and without discrimination or exploitation, provides services, and promotes their empowerment. It has developed a number of trafficking education and awareness projects, including in the local communities, to help create social change, and runs the Athena School. This is a 15-week education programme for vulnerable women to strengthen their knowledge of citizenship and their rights, and encourage harm reduction, self-care and self-protection. The organization collates information on human trafficking in the region and publishes reports on human trafficking within Colombia and in neighbouring countries, as well as outside the region.

The development of "social/cultural mediators" has been pioneered in Europe. These are people who make direct contact with vulnerable people of the same cultural background. This enables them, as a first point of contact, to establish some degree of trust, and gain their confidence without problems of language or cultural difference. Many initiatives using cultural mediators have been developed in Bulgaria, France and Italy (Danish Red Cross, 2005). The organization *On the Road* in Italy has made specific use of cultural mediators since 2004. As an umbrella organization which focuses on the places, rather than the populations of most risk, *On the Road* employs mobile street workers on the streets, in railway stations and airports, and other public places where exploited trafficking victims work or are recruited; places which are likely to be well frequented but anonymous (see the contribution by Vincenzo Castelli at the end of this chapter and Castelli, 2012).[34] The cultural mediators are usually social workers from the same geographic and linguistic area as presumed victims. After making contact, they assist the street workers in offering information to victims and asking about their health and social or economic needs or concerns, in a non-judgemental way. They help them communicate with social, health and other services. *On the Road* also runs Reception Centres where women wanting to leave prostitution can meet with social workers and street mediators, get information on social and legal problems, health care, career advice, and participate in workshops.

Conclusion

Global concern about human trafficking has grown – along with its incidence – in the fourteen years since the adoption of the UN *Protocol on trafficking in persons, especially women and children*. As countries continue to legislate against it, adopt national plans of action, and improve their data collection, the numbers of detected cases and victims continues to increase. Demand for the services of trafficked victims shows little sign of a decline, nor does the willingness of people to leave their countries, or the ability of traffickers to exploit and avoid detection.

The close links between trafficking, smuggling and migration patterns are evident. Services to victims have increased, but in many countries are still inadequate, and their rights are not always protected as they should be under international conventions. Nevertheless, prosecutions for trafficking remain very low, and its costs to countries and victims are high. Relying on the deterrent powers of the law, while fundamental to anti-trafficking action, is not an effective way to prevent trafficking, and to change the attitudes which condone, enable or ignore it. The prevention of human trafficking and exploitation has been receiving greater attention in recent years, and interventions have become more focused and informed by regional and country trends and experience.

Greater attention is now being given by governments to labour exploitation and trafficking, rather than trafficking for sexual purposes alone. There is more attention to the pathways of children and adolescents into exploitation and trafficking. Domestic trafficking, which in some countries far exceeds international trafficking, is receiving more attention.

More detailed knowledge and research on the contexts of different forms of trafficking and exploitation is emerging with the increase in funds from national governments. This has helped to underline that it is a complex phenomenon in which gender plays a significant role. The involvement of men and women as perpetrators and victims varies, and policies which treat all women as victims and all men as perpetrators fail to recognize the broader contexts in which exploitation takes place.

This chapter has highlighted some of the policies and good practices being implemented in a number of countries and regions, tailored to their particular trafficking concerns. What is evident is that they need to take account of the different experiences of men and boys, and women and girls in developing responses.

Human trafficking in Italy

Vincenzo Castelli[35]

Human trafficking is a well-established and organized system of exploitation in Italy. While forced street prostitution remains the most well-known and visible destination for trafficked victims, the last decade has seen an increase in the number of identified cases of trafficking for exploitation in other contexts such as agriculture, sheep farming, construction, manufacturing and domestic work. The economic crisis and, above all, a precarious, unregulated and flexible labour market are high risk factors that provide fertile ground for exploitation and trafficking. The past few years have seen the appearance of "new" forms of trafficking, with the coercion of victims into illegal activities and multiple forms of exploitation affecting both men and women. Apart from prostitution they include forced begging, drug dealing, and being forced to sell goods.

In Italy, official data on trafficking victims only includes those identified and assisted by social protection agencies provided by the Department for Equal Opportunities[36] and by local authorities, under human trafficking and immigration legislation (Articles 13[37] and 18[38]). Between 2006 and 2012, 166 interventions have been carried out under Article 13, assisting a total of 3,770 people. Between 1999 and 2012, 665 interventions have been funded under Article 18. The Department for Equal Opportunities and local authorities have been able to reach more than 65,000 people, all of whom were offered assistance such as information, psychological counselling, legal aid, health and social care. Of those, 21,378 people agreed to enter a protection and social assistance programme in order to obtain a "temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons", which is valid for six months. This is renewable for up to 18 months, and can be replaced by a residence permit for work, study or otherwise, providing the necessary requirements are met.[39]

A national survey conducted in 2013 by Bianchini et al. (2013) offers insight into the trafficking phenomenon in Italy. This study is the first nation-wide attempt to document trafficking in persons and exploitation. The study found that in 2012 street units[40] made contact with a total of 23,878 victims: 21,491 women and girls, 781 men and boys and 1,606 transgender people. The majority of cases involved forced prostitution, and the rest agricultural labour exploitation and begging. In terms of the geographical distribution of these cases, 61% were in the north of the country, 25% in the centre and 14% in the south and in the islands off the coast. In terms of age, young people between the ages of 18 and 25 were mainly exploited through prostitution (more than 50%). In terms of their origins, most trafficking victims came from Nigeria and Romania, however, there have been increasing numbers of victims from Brazil, Morocco, Albania and China.

The main factors that appear to drive people to migrate and, in some cases, to fall victim to trafficking, include poverty, unemployment, gender discrimination, discrimination against ethnic minorities, inadequate social welfare and development policies, failed or non-existent migration policies, and regional conflicts, while the demand for unskilled labour is a pull factor. These factors have been exacerbated by the persisting global economic crisis. In most cases, the migratory path starts with a voluntary decision to leave the country of origin, less frequently migration is the result of coercion. The organization of criminal networks and individuals has changed over the years, as have their methods of recruitment, control and exploitation. Increasingly these are criminal groups with deep roots in countries of destination and with transnational links. These groups have an ability to link trafficking and exploitation to other activities, both illegal (e.g. smuggling of migrants, drugs and weapons) and legal (e.g. money laundering through regular business activities).

The routes into Italy are numerous and constantly subject to change because of border controls. They differ according to the type of exploitation, the place of origin of the victims, and the organizational needs of the criminal groups involved. In terms of sexual exploitation, the main routes are through Eastern Europe, the Maghreb, into Sicily and European countries within the Schengen area. The two main routes used for labour trafficking are through Eastern Europe and the Maghreb to Sicily, while trafficking for forced begging is almost exclusively through Eastern Europe.

The places of exploitation have multiplied exponentially over the past decade. Those forced into prostitution are no longer found only in certain streets, apartments, hotels, and night clubs, but more often in areas of high human density (including underground and railway stations, bus terminals, shopping malls, areas in the vicinity of hospitals or places where legal immigrant labour is recruited). Those forced into begging operate mostly on the street, but are increasingly found around shopping centres and on public transport, where there is a constant flow of pedestrian traffic. The Internet is also becoming a meeting point for the supply and demand for sexual services, as well as seasonal jobs in agriculture, nursing or other sectors. The place of exploitation has become normalized, both in terms of its integration in everyday activities (e.g. shopping, commuting, using the internet) and type of exploitation, it is visible but not often recognised as such (e.g. construction workers, caregivers, peddlers in the street).

The following are among some of the critical issues:

- Political and institutional: Inadequate attention is being given to the phenomenon of trafficking in persons in Italy. This is evident in the absence of a national anti-trafficking programme or a *National Rapporteur*. It is hoped that following the EC Directive 36/11 on human trafficking,[41] and the recent approval of a Law Decree, there will be more coordination between different ministries and their public policies, and harmonization of anti-trafficking interventions by public authorities (such as the judiciary, police, inspection bodies, local authorities and NGOs).
- Programmatic and operational: The uncertainty, scarcity and progressive cuts in funding allocated to programmes covered by Articles 13 and 18 is affecting anti-trafficking interventions and victim protection. Other ongoing challenges include complex procedures for acquiring funds, and the difficulties of implementing long-term strategies.

To respond to some of these problems, it is recommended that local multi-agency networks be established. These networks could be made up of representatives of public and private anti-trafficking bodies, coordinated by local authorities, and governed by memoranda of understanding where roles, responsibilities and standard operating procedures are well defined. This would need to be supplemented by tools and methodology.

Providing assistance to victims of trafficking – Association On the Road (NOVA Consortium)

The Association On the Road is a non-profit organization and part of a National Consortium of Social Organizations (NOVA), founded in 1998. On The Road assists all victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation by providing services such as preventive health care and access to health services; harm reduction; hygiene kits; access to treatment programmes; professional training; legal advice; and information on the availability of local services. The Association has help-desks in the form of drop-in centres for trafficked persons. The help-desks offer advice and assistance on legal matters, professional training, employment, and housing. They also manage any dealings with the justice system, the police, immigration authorities and lawyers. The Association also provides emergency shelters for victims and long-term housing (for 6-8 months) for victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation (mainly women and children), victims of labour exploitation (mainly men), and trafficking victims who are asylum seekers. The Association works closely with local organizations and countries of origin of trafficking victims (e.g. Nigeria, Albania, Romania, etc.) to carry out its work.

The economic costs of sex trafficking: Building the case for prevention

Nicole Barrett[42]

Contribution

It is well known that human trafficking, and sex trafficking in particular, is very profitable for traffickers. In 2014, the ILO released estimates of the "startling" profits traffickers receive from forced sexual exploitation: $80,000US per year per victim in developed economies, with an average of $21,800US profit per year per victim worldwide (ILO, 2014, p. 15, 27).[43] Little work has been done, however, to quantify the significant economic costs of sex trafficking on individuals and societies.

In order to calculate these costs, we have developed a framework that itemizes the numerous costs of sex trafficking to both the trafficked individual and to society (Barrett, 2014).[44] The framework, summarized in Figure 1 below, considers both direct and indirect costs of the crime. It was developed based on information from formerly trafficked individuals, court awards made to sex trafficking victims, and existing studies from various countries on human trafficking, domestic violence, prostitution, sexual abuse, child abuse, migrant workers and exploited labourers. With further specific information from formerly trafficked individuals, this framework can be used to compute the total cost of sex trafficking in a particular country. The resulting cost information will be highly relevant for those creating anti-human trafficking policy, particularly as the cost is likely to be so substantial that human trafficking prevention programmes and policies will be shown to be well worth a country's investment. Relevant Canadian studies, discussed below, highlight the extent of these potential savings for one country.

The six major sex trafficking cost categories in the framework are worth highlighting, beginning with four direct costs, and moving to two indirect costs.

Pain and suffering

The most significant costs incurred during an individual's trafficking experience are the substantial psychological costs. Not only are trafficked individuals frequently exposed to numerous forms of violence, they are also isolated from their families and communities and experience shame and psychological damage resulting from trafficking. While these intangible costs are difficult to quantify, they are not any less real than the cost of visiting the emergency room. Based on recent UK court awards to sex trafficking victims, and applying the concept of diminishing marginal utility, where the first month of victimization induces more pain and suffering than the second month, the approximate average cost of pain and suffering for two years of being trafficked for sexual purposes has been found to be approximately $552,964US.

Medical costs

The medical costs of a human trafficking victim are typically quite substantial. A 2003 five-country study interviewed individuals trafficked into Europe and found that nearly half of the women interviewed had been confined, raped, or beaten during the journey to their new location (Zimmerman, et al. 2003).[45] Extreme cases of abuse during trafficking can lead to immediate health care expenditures, such as ambulance and emergency unit use. Increased rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and HIV/AIDs due to sex trafficking also result in substantial health care costs: the lifetime cost for a single person with HIV/AIDs is estimated to be $181,129US. Even where there is no initial abuse, long-term health conditions often result with associated future medical expenses, such as drug and alcohol addiction, depression, anxiety and hostility. Social services to care for sex trafficking victims are also extremely costly.

Legal costs

The law enforcement and judicial costs associated with human trafficking are also unusually large. Human trafficking cases can require long, complex investigations that can involve many networked individuals or organized criminal groups. International human trafficking cases may require international cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies to gain information, interview witnesses and assist with evidence collection. In addition, translators may be needed throughout the investigation and prosecution for victims and/or witnesses who cannot speak the local language. If a case proceeds to trial, these

Figure 1 **Required cost categories for a full assessment of the cost of one sex trafficking victim**

	Sex trafficking direct costs	**Sex trafficking indirect costs**

Victim costs (Borne by victim)	▪ Pain and suffering (intangible)
	▪ Transport costs (particularly in international cases)
	▪ Leaving/exit fees
	▪ Legal services (immigration, guardianship, reunification, civil suits)
	▪ Dental services
	▪ Fraction of medical/therapist fees (co-pays)*
		▪ Lost earnings, due to:
		  ▪ lost educational opportunity
		  ▪ lost experience
		  ▪ lost years of labour
		  ▪ reduced capacity to function
		  ▪ foregone marriage opportunities

Third-party costs (Borne by society)	▪ **Medical costs:***
	  ▪ Emergency room visits
	  ▪ Acute hospitalization
	  ▪ Physician visits
	  ▪ STI treatment
	  ▪ Addiction services
	  ▪ Therapist/s
	▪ **Justice system costs:**
	  ▪ Investigation costs
	    ▪ complex victim management
	    ▪ possible international cooperation
	    ▪ possible translation
	  ▪ Prosecution costs
	    ▪ complex victim management
	    ▪ possible international cooperation
	    ▪ possible translation
	    ▪ possible immigration services (e.g., temporary residence permit costs)
	  ▪ Corrections costs
	    ▪ incarceration
	    ▪ monitoring
	    ▪ probation
	  ▪ Legal aid
	  ▪ Enforcement of civil protection orders against traffickers
	▪ **Additional burden on:**
	  ▪ Shelters
	  ▪ Transition homes
	  ▪ Long-term public housing
	  ▪ Job training programmes
		▪ Social support (welfare)
		▪ Additional burden on child protection systems
		  ▪ group homes
		  ▪ foster homes
		  ▪ institutional care
		▪ Lost taxes (due to lost earnings)
		▪ Intergenerational costs

* This chart assumes a national health care system. In countries without such a system, these third-party medical costs would be borne, instead, by the victim. Individual co-pays may also apply in certain nationalized health care systems.

translation costs can amount to tens of thousands of dollars in developed countries. High witness management costs may be incurred, as victims are frequently reluctant to testify against their trafficker, may not consider themselves crime victims, and may continue to be coerced by their trafficker. In cases where there are ongoing coercion or threats, witness protection may be necessary, which again adds substantial costs.

Further, trafficked persons, particularly those who are internationally trafficked, often have a range of legal needs that have nothing to do with the prosecution of their case. These needs can include immigration status issues, family reunification, identity theft, criminal defence for crimes committed under coercion, tax issues and civil litigation seeking monetary damages from their trafficker.

Transportation and leaving fees

International human trafficking victims often pay a fee to their traffickers to gain entrance to a country and a job that promises a better life. Although these same costs are not borne by those trafficked domestically, domestic victims are often isolated from their communities and may acquire significant costs in the process of relocation. Traffickers may also require trafficked individuals to pay "leaving fees" once they arrive at their destination in order to gain their freedom. These fees are often difficult to pay, as victims frequently do not keep the majority of their earnings.

Opportunity costs: Lost income and taxes

In addition to the direct costs of sex trafficking mentioned above, opportunity costs must be calculated. Opportunity costs are a significant indirect cost that considers what the victim would have been doing during the time they were trafficked and afterwards had they not been trafficked. These costs include, for example, earning money in the labour market or attending school. The most basic economic model of lifetime earnings includes a period of human capital accumulation, typically associated with schooling, and eventually followed by a period of wage employment, asset accumulation and eventual retirement. Greater human capital translates into higher future wages and, once in the labour force, every year of work experience also translates into higher future wages. If an individual becomes a victim of sex trafficking, this typical life course is interrupted. Specifically, each year trafficked equals either a year lost in school, which translates into future losses in earnings, or a year lost in the labour force. This loss of income and possible employability often also leads to higher welfare and social assistance usage. Finally, the costs of foregone marriage opportunities must be considered, which leads an individual to lose the possible economic benefits of having a spouse.

Intergenerational costs

Finally, it is crucial to consider the intergenerational costs of sex trafficking. The economic disadvantage of productivity losses and foregone education frequently carries forward into the next generation. There is a substantial body of economic literature from different countries that demonstrates the significant intergenerational correlation between education and income: lost income and education for one generation can mean lost income for the next as well.

In addition, studies on child maltreatment suggest intergenerational transmission of abuse. If an individual suffers abuse at the hands of a trafficker at a young age, they have a higher probability of subsequently mistreating their own children. A child does not need to be directly physically or sexually maltreated for the costs to be notable. Neglect or witnessing intimate partner violence can result in substantial educational and behavioural problems for a child, including long-lasting effects on mental health, drug and alcohol problems, risky sexual behaviour, obesity, and criminal behaviour. One study found the economic costs of child abuse in a developed country of 35 million people, to be over $15US billion, estimating the average annual earnings losses for a victim of physical abuse to be $4,131US.[46]

Once the costs in the above framework are calculated, three further steps are needed to arrive at an overall cost estimate of human trafficking on society. First, a comparator group must be developed, based on interviews with a reasonably large sample of trafficked or formerly trafficked individuals to determine their "counterfactual lives." This determination would be rooted in an assessment of the individual's socio-economic background in order to estimate what their life would have looked like if they had not been trafficked. Second, values from existing data sets can then be used to build this counterfactual-lives comparator group. From this comparator group, a relatively precise estimate of the cost of sex trafficking per individual could be calculated. Finally, the resulting number can be scaled by the best estimate of the number of sex trafficking victims in the country.[47] The results will most likely underscore the cost-effectiveness of many human trafficking prevention programs.

Two Canadian economic studies on the costs of exiting prostitution provide a conservative baseline idea of the costs of sex trafficking for one country (DeRiviere, 2006; DeRiviere, 2005). Although sex trafficking is legally distinct from prostitution in Canada, as it is in most countries, the study's sample group is composed of individuals engaged in the same activities as those trafficked for sexual purposes: commercial sex acts. The costs of supporting and treating these individuals will, thus, be similar. The net personal cost to the individual of selling sex in Canada is substantial: $205,739US. The social costs of a young sex seller on society, which look at the utilization of public resources, such as social services, medical services and costs on the justice system, are even more significant: $553,265US per individual. Thus, the total fiscal, labour market and personal costs for one young person involved in the Canadian sex industry equal $759,004US. Multiplying this individual cost by the number of calls (n=79) in one year to one front-line human trafficking service provider in Ontario, Canada, the total is just under $60US million.[48] Multiplying the individual cost by the number of confirmed domestic sex trafficking cases in Canada between 2007 and April 2013 (n=132), the total is over $100US million (RCMP, 2013).

Although these estimates sound substantial, they likely underestimate the costs of sex trafficking, as it is not clear how many in the study's sample group were voluntarily in prostitution. The costs resulting from involuntary sex selling would likely be even higher, as profits would partially or entirely go to the trafficker, resulting in increased costs for the individual. Medical costs for trafficked persons would also likely be higher than for those in consensual prostitution, as the rate of sexually transmitted infections is greater for trafficked victims as a result of serving more clients per week (Gupta et al., 2011). Further, the psychological impacts of being trafficked for sexual purposes are likely to be more extreme than someone who initially "chose" to sell their bodies, resulting in increased therapeutic costs and lost individual earnings, as detailed in the framework above.

In sum, the significant costs of sex trafficking, which can be calculated using the framework above, quickly make human trafficking prevention programmes appear to be not only wise and humane, but also cost-saving investments.

Sex work, prostitution and trafficking for sexual exploitation: Implications for crime prevention[49]

Rosemary Barberet[50]

Contribution

In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of forces converged to create a global movement against trafficking in persons, which culminated in international and national efforts to redefine the exploitation of others for sex or labour as human trafficking. This change was so successful, uniting forces from the political left and right, that not only have laws and policies been changed to now focus on human trafficking, but a whole literature in social science has developed around this 'new' phenomenon. This paradigm shift has not occurred without heavy, even acidic debate, which continues to this day. It has brought virtually every discipline (law, criminology, economics, international relations, women's and gender studies, anthropology and health) to bear on an issue that, heretofore, was dealt with by only a handful of scholars and activists.

The global feminist movement's view of women´s rights as human rights came down on the abolitionist side of prostitution. Human trafficking came to be linked to organized crime, illegal migration, and national security. Some types of prostitutes and labourers became defined as victims, not offenders. A conceptual split between smuggling (which involves smugglers and undocumented migrants, who violate immigration laws) and trafficking (which involves traffickers as offenders and the trafficked as victims) was made. Thus, both activism within prostitution abolitionist camps, as well as the linking of discourse to other powerful discourses of crime and security, resulted in international and national efforts to criminalize 'human trafficking'.

The creation of terms, the meaning of terms, the choice as to their use, and what the ramifications are of using certain terms are part of the social construction of a social problem. At different points in time, terms regarding the selling of sex have been claimed by different groups to have good or bad connotations.

Advocates for the rights of sex workers complain that due to human trafficking definitions, a 'migrant sex worker' will have trouble crossing borders without being confused with a victim of human trafficking for sexual exploitation, and is thus denied his or her human rights to migrate. Similarly, the ramifications of the definition of human trafficking mean that some sex workers are offenders under local law, whereas others are victims. Those who are offenders are subject to deportation, punishment or restrictions. Those who are victims, receive protection and services. Empirically and legally, these distinctions are problematic.

Yet feminists are divided as to whether, just because in heterosexual sex sales, women tend to sell sex, and men tend to be the ones buying it, the nature of sex work is akin to violence against women and should thus be abolished. There is room for much opinion and much ideology, and the most important question – do prostitutes really work on their own volition or are they forced – is really not an empirical question.

Feminist abolitionists believe that all sex work is harmful to women and epitomizes the negative consequences of gender inequality. Prostitution dehumanizes and commodifies women. It is another form of violence against women. Indeed, UN texts on women´s human rights generally refer to forced prostitution and trafficking as violence against women, even before the 2000 Human Trafficking Protocol. The 1993 Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women includes "trafficking in women and forced prostitution" in its definition of violence against women. CEDAW Article 6 states, "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women."

Yet there is another contingent of feminists who see the selling of sex by women as women´s right to do as they please with their bodies, and a product of women´s free will and choice. From their point of view, women sell sexual services the same way they sell other bodily services, and should not be judged as immoral or depraved for doing so. Because of the inequalities involved in how society views sex work, including the social stigma applied to it, sex workers need rights and guarantees, not rescue. This latter group is wary of regulation, because regulation often tends to serve the needs of male clients, or the masculinized State. It is not in favor of abolition. Often, this contingent is in favor of harm reduction techniques. So, the social structure should be reformed so that entry into prostitution is a true choice, sex work should be practiced safely and with dignity, stigma should be removed from sex work, and exit should be facilitated for those sex workers who wish to stop or retire.

As important as ideological assumptions are to the debates about prostitution and trafficking as harmful to women, so is the empirical debate about the nature of sex work. Scholars of sex work argue that the claims of abolitionists about the nature of sex work, and the definition of sex trafficking, are out of touch with the empirical evidence on sex work. Scholars who have researched sex work argue for the importance of a continuum, including 'softer' forms of force such as manipulation, and a continuum between smuggling and sex trafficking (Kelly, 2005). Still others argue that the current definition of human trafficking lumps women in with children as vulnerable populations, thus infantilizing them, reifying their passive victimization and denying them their agency.

The growth in funding, as previously mentioned, has changed the landscape for how anything resembling human trafficking is viewed and dealt with by authorities and the service industry, what Agustín and others now call the "rescue industry" (2007), at least in countries that have healthy budgets to apply to their domestic and international commitments to fight human trafficking.

Given the gendered nature of human trafficking and sex work, gendered explanations are very relevant. The linking of women and children, and the emphasis on their vulnerability, is a feature of the Palermo Protocol. The Council of Europe´s Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) more expressly mentions gender inequality than the UN Trafficking Protocol. Article 17 of Chapter 1 of the Protocol ('Purposes, scope, non-discrimination principle and definitions') notes, "Each Party shall, in applying measures referred to in this chapter, aim to promote gender equality and use gender mainstreaming in the development, implementation and assessment of the measures." Neither of these two legal instruments links other oppressions with gender.

What, then do we know about gender and the multiple oppression of women who are trafficked? The field of human trafficking research nurtures itself on generalizations combined with anonymous case vignettes, or studies with convenience samples, and anecdotal evidence. Strangely, a gender perspective has been lost in the research on human trafficking as a social construction, a crime, a business. Feminists have spent a great deal of effort denying human trafficking or reifying its most stereotypical aspects. Women and gender are evident only in stereotypes about vulnerable female victims. But the complexity of women´s lives, their interactions with criminal justice authorities, their experiences as survivors, have been relatively unexplored through a gender lens in the social science literature on human trafficking.

In contrast, much sex work research has sought to show the complexity of the lives and choices of sex workers and attempted to theorize about choice and consent, force and exploitation, risk and violence, stigma and exit. These are all related to the occupational hazards of sex work. This body of work serves to question the issue of force, coercion and deception, as a means for exploitation, by showing the continuum of force and coercion throughout sex work. It always shows women´s agency in negotiating risk and violence, not only at the hands of managers or pimps, but also at the hands of clients.

The problematization of vulnerability and force is even greater when we expand our gaze internationally. Scholars have identified important contextual differences in sex work. These include the social class context of where sex work occurs; the nature of sex work as a survival strategy; the drift of women between trafficking and the migrant sex work industry, and in and out of selling sex in general; the commodified nature of many relationships between men and women; and transitions to sex work from other exploitative occupations,

Kelly (2003) argues that human trafficking is at the extreme of a continuum of violence within sex work, and does exist. She argues that feminists cannot deny its existence and cannot deny the fact that forced prostitution is violence against women. But she also argues that force cannot be the determining factor. What is more at stake is the conceptualization that women are not victims if they display any agency at all. Agustín (2005) agrees, arguing that "Because an infinite array of relationships is possible between migrant and entrepreneur, boyfriend, sugar daddy, and "trafficker," presenting all women involved as passive and ignorant erases important differences among them."

These debates have important implications for policy and institutional responses. The first important debate about policies and responses is about equity and fairness. To prioritize sex workers who are victims of human trafficking over other sex workers – and other victims of exploitation – ignores the structural and interpersonal violence experienced by many sex workers. It also perverts justice systems by obliging sex workers to construct scenarios as victims to receive services or avoid deportation.

The responses to human trafficking generally include prevention, protection of victims, and prosecution of traffickers. Trafficking victims need a broader range of services than those provided to other crime victims such as legal advocacy, shelter, transitional housing, medical and dental care, counselling services, language acquisition and job training. These services should be gender-sensitive and empowering. Many service organizations tend to pathologize trafficking victims, and victims often buy into that self-concept. This tends to create services that are limiting of victims' agency. In most countries, law enforcement and service providers do not have enough language skills or knowledge of other cultural contexts to respond well to victims of human trafficking.

Prevention is key, particularly because prosecution appears to be so challenging. Prevention means reducing the push factors in origin countries and expanding opportunities for women, as well as debunking myths about what are false job offers abroad, especially in times of crisis and post-conflict. It also means taking a gendered look at the global sex industry and analyzing the demand in greater detail for motivation, recruitment, and modus operandi. Attention needs to be paid to the continuum of violence affecting all sex workers, since indeed it sets the stage as a precursor to the brutality and exploitation of trafficking; women´s agency needs to be acknowledged and fostered, as opposed to their passivity as victims; multiple oppressions should be acknowledged in international context and guide service provision; and structural violence in communities of origin needs to be addressed within a framework of development.

Endnotes

1 Recent special journal editions on human trafficking include the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* March 2014, *653*(1) which includes empirical studies on labour and sex trafficking in a number of countries; and *Crime, Law and Social Change*, March 2014, *61*(1) which examines the under-performance of anti-trafficking campaigns in the US and elsewhere.

2 The 2010-11 study was conducted for Public Safety Canada, in partnership with ICCLR.

3 The Protocol against trafficking in persons, especially women and children, is one of three protocols which form part of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime adopted in 2000. The other Protocols are Smuggling of Migrants by Land Sea or Air, and Trafficking in Firearms.

4 OSCE Decision No. 557 24th July 2003.

5 RCMP (2010).

6 In the US, a recent operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 76 cities targeted child prostitution, and announced that it has "rescued" 105 young women and girls aged 13-17, and arrested 150 pimps, all of whom would likely be charged under prostitution legislation. No clients were arrested. It is suggested that many of those rescued are from foster care or dysfunctional family backgrounds and use street prostitution as a survival strategy. They have not been helped by heavy cuts to juvenile justice and family support services (Chesney-Lind, 2013).

7 "Les divers pays que nous avons visités nous ont dit que la France avait une responsibilité majeure pour faire prende conscience à l'Europe qu'il n'est plus possible de condemner la traite des etres humans tout en tolérant la prostitution." Geoffrey, G. (2013, janvier 24) *Comptes rendus de la delegation aux droits des femmes*. Bousquet, D. & Geoffroy, G. (2011) sur Prostitution, www.senate.fr/comte-redu-commissions/20130121/femmes.htm

8 The study was undertaken by ICCLR and ICPC on behalf of Public Safety Canada.

9 www.dhs.gov/end-human-trafficking

10 ILO maintains a database on good practices on a range of issues including migrant workers. See www.gla.defra.gov.uk

11 It was established following the drowning deaths of 24 Chinese workers recruited to collect cockles on a sea estuary in the north of England in 2004.

12 See HEUNI's website for more information on Adstringo. www.heuni.fi

13 New York Penal Law 230.34.

14 Rashbaum, W. (2013, September 13). With Special Court, State Aims to Steer Women Away from Sex Trade. *New York Times*.

15 www.pssg.gov.bc/octip

16 For more information see www.manitoba.ca

17 It was based on and accompanied the *Guidance on Local Safety Audits: A Compendium of International Practice* also published by EFUS in 2007.

18 The Guide is currently being piloted in several municipalities in Canada, see PACT Ottawa later in this chapter.

19 E.g. UNODC (2010). *Needs Assessment Toolkit on the Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking*. Vienna: UNODC. See also www.ungift.org

20 http://efus.eu/files/fileadmin/efus/secutopics/EFUS_Trafficking_e_WEB.pdf

21 End Human Trafficking Now! Campaign. (2006) *The Athens Ethical Principles*, www.ungift.org/docs/ungift/pdf/Athens_principles.pdf.

22 www.spvm.qc.ca

23 www.walk-with-me.org

24 www.bearesponsibletraveller.org The campaign is a collaboration between UNODC, UNESCO and UNTWO.

25 www.polarisproject.org

26 The wheel is adapted from material developed by the Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Program.

27 www.houstonrr.org/about-us/current-projects-activities/

28 www.pact-ottawa.org

29 http://safetrip.se/en/

30 http://mydangerousloverboy.com

31 *Response of the Netherlands to the Questionnaire for the evaluation of the implementation of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by the parties*. Ministry of Security and Justice. (2012, May) p. 23.

32 http://libertyasia.org

33 www.espaciosdemujer.org

34 www.ontheroadonlus.it

35 Vincenzo Castelli is responsible for projects in the Consorzio NOVA (a consortium of Italian social organizations), and Adviser and Supervisor on Security Projects and Marginal Groups in Latin America for Italian Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

36 The Department for Equal Opportunities is responsible for national coordination of relevant trafficking and immigration policy. It monitors and assesses all relevant projects funded under trafficking and immigration laws, and runs the national Toll-Free Number 800 290 290 against Trafficking.

37 Law 228/2003 relates to human trafficking. This article refers to interventions on the uncovering and identification of victims of trafficking.

38 Law Decree n. 286/98 relates to immigration. This article grants victims of trafficking the opportunity to access a range of services and activities, based on an individual care plan developed according to their specific needs. This can include residential care, psychological counselling, legal aid, linguistic and cultural mediation, health and social care, vocational training, work placement, job search support and work experience.

39 Department for Equal Opportunities, see www.pariopportunita.gov.it

40 Street units are teams of social workers who provide assistance to individuals involved in prostitution. This includes accompanying them to social and health care services, providing legal assistance, intercultural mediation, etc.

41 Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims.

42 Nicole Barrett is Director of the International Justice and Human Rights Clinic, University of British Columbia and Osgoode Hall Law Schools. This analysis was done in collaboration with Donna Feir, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Victoria.

43 The report estimates forced sexual exploitation results in $99US billion of profit per year, which is six times more profitable than all other forms of forced labour. This extreme profitability is due to the high demand for sexual services, high prices paid, low capital investments and low operating costs.

44 Amounts cited are in 2012 dollars.

45 Based on interviews in Albania, Italy, the Netherlands, Thailand, and the UK.

46 Bowlus, A. et al. (2003). *Report to the Law Commission of Canada* (inflated from 1998 dollars to 2012 dollars).

47 The ILO's 2012 methodology in its forced labour report is one scaling approach that could be used. See also Eurostat (2013) – estimating 9528 victims of human trafficking in the EU Member States, 62%, or 5907, of whom are thought to be sex trafficking victims.

48 Walk With Me Annual Report (2011). Figure only includes domestically trafficked victims.

49 This contribution is drawn from Barberet, R. (2014). *Women, Crime and Criminal Justice: A Global Enquiry*. Routledge, www.routledge.com/9780415856362

50 Professor & Director Master of Arts Degree Program in International Crime & Justice, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York.

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CHAPTER 5
The prevention of human trafficking

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6

INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Intimate partner violence against women

6

Introduction

Violence against women (VAW) has become a major public concern since the 1970s in many countries around the world. The advancement of women's rights has brought increased awareness of gender inequalities, and recognition of forms of violence which disproportionately affect women.[1] A shift in mentalities has occurred especially in relation to domestic or intimate partner violence against women (IPV). The violence experienced by women in their homes and at the hands of intimate partners is now recognized as a breach of criminal law, and no longer considered a minor or private social issue (see Box 6.1).

Greater attention has also been given to the violence disproportionately experienced by women in public spaces by virtue of their gender – ranging from sexual harassment and violence, to rape – and the responsibility of society to promote the safety of women, rather than blame them for inappropriate actions or behaviour. Significant legislation and policies to address both IPV and women's insecurity and risk of violence in public spaces, have been developed in many countries. Further, there has been recognition of a wide range of other forms of VAW globally, from the use of rape as a weapon of war, to female infanticide and genital mutilation (UNGA, 2012a).

However, while major advancements have been made over the past 30 or more years, progress towards the elimination of VAW, whether in private or public, has been uneven, and many challenges remain. Much of the activity has focused on responding to VAW and IPV through the criminal justice system or services for victims, both of which are essential – but such systems can only respond after an event has occurred. Less concerted attention has been given to establishing robust prevention initiatives to reduce the incidence of VAW in the first place.

IPV is one of the most common and persistent forms of VAW across countries. While some men and same-sex couples also experience IPV and sexual violence, women are by far the greatest recipients of such violence, and at the hands of men. Global estimates indicate that 30% of women who have been in a relationship have experienced some form of physical or sexual violence by a current or former partner, and as many as 38% of murders of women are committed by an intimate partner (WHO, 2013a). Despite a general decrease in violent crimes since the 1990s, as Chapter 2 has indicated, some countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have alarmingly high rates of female intimate partner homicide, and it also accounts for the great majority of intentional female homicides in regions with low homicides rates, such as Europe (UNODC, 2014; SAS, 2013).

Although a range of international surveys and indicators have been developed to systematically document and monitor the incidence of VAW across countries, getting accurate data on IPV remains difficult. It is violence which most often occurs in private and is unwitnessed; it is rarely reported to the police or other authorities. Frequently the acts may not even be recognized as violence. IPV is also complex since it involves several types of abuse, including physical, sexual, emotional and economic violence and control, and can occur over time, including after an intimate relationship has ended. It is also strongly influenced by the social, cultural and political environment in which it occurs.

IPV is now viewed as a form of gender-based violence. Indeed, evidence suggests that gender inequalities increase the risk of acts of violence by men against women, and hinder the ability of women to leave abusive situations or seek support (WHO, 2010). Because of their sex (physical attributes) and their gender (sociocultural attributes, and the roles, attitudes and behaviours that ensue), women and girls are particularly affected by this form of violence that reflects the social norms allowing men power and control over them.

The promotion of gender equality is, therefore, a critical component of the prevention of IPV and other forms of VAW. From a public health perspective, for example, IPV impacts individual women and their families, infringes the rights of women to full participation in society, and imposes high health and social costs on society. Recent international agreements have emphasized the importance of developing a gender-sensitive framework for action, as well as a coordinated response at the local level to address IPV, but also to influence attitudes and behaviours in the many communities where it occurs.

ICPC's previous work on VAW has focused primarily on women's safety in public spaces. This has included a comparative international report in 2004 (ICPC, 2004) and a chapter on women's safety in the first International Report 2008 (ICPC, 2008a). *Women's Safety: A Shared Global Concern* was also the theme of ICPC's Colloquium in Queretaro, Mexico in 2008, which was accompanied by a compendium of related practices and policies (ICPC, 2008b). ICPC's work has also been inspired by its sister organization Women in Cities International (WICI) which has developed the use of participatory women's safety audit methodology and community-based action to create safer environments for women. The contribution at the end of this chapter by Kathryn Travers *Women's Safety in Public Spaces* outlines some of the achievements of this work. Women's safety in public spaces continues to be a significant problem and the prevention of IPV cannot be achieved without also paying attention to such violence. Both need to be strong components of policies to reduce VAW at the national and local level.

Nevertheless, the burden of IPV, and the increasing concern among international organizations, countries and cities about its pervasiveness and persistence, indicates that there is a need to examine it specifically in this chapter. After more than 30 years of changes in policies and practices concerning VAW, it is pertinent to review current knowledge on the prevalence of IPV and its measurement, and the specific risks for women and girls; to consider progress by countries in implementing international norms in legislation and prevention strategies; and to highlight promising and effective approaches, especially at the local level. These include early intervention with young people, and the involvement of men and boys as positive actors for change. Several innovative strategies have

Box 6.1 **Defining Violence against Women and Intimate Partner Violence**

Article I of the 1993 *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women* defines VAW as follows:

"Violence against women means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life" (UNGA, 1993).

Many terms have been used to describe VAW occurring in intimate relationships, including intimate personal violence, family violence, spousal violence, and most commonly, domestic violence. Domestic violence is still the preferred term in some countries, although the distinction between domestic and family violence, which includes victims of all ages and relationships to the perpetrator (i.e. partners, children, other family members and domestic workers) is not always clear.

More recently, IPV has become the preferred term internationally. It refers to any behaviour that causes physical, psychological or sexual harm expressly within an intimate relationship (WHO & PAHO, 2012). It may involve current or former spouses, partners or dating relationships. While the majority of IPV is perpetrated by men against women, it also includes violence by women against men and between same-sex partners.

IPV is most often expressed in a wide range of acts, such as: slapping, hitting, kicking, and beating; forced sexual intercourse and other forms of sexual coercion; humiliation and intimidation; monitoring one's movements and restricting access to financial resources, employment, education or medical care; and threats of harm including against children.

"Battering" specifically refers to an escalating pattern characterized by multiple forms of abuse, terrorization and threats, and increasingly possessive and controlling behaviour on the part of the abuser, placing the victim at high risk for severe violence.

Various terms such as femicide, feminicide, honour killings, and crimes of passion have been used to describe intentional female homicides committed by an intimate partner or a family member, or in the case of femicide/feminicide, also by a stranger. Despite debates surrounding the notions of femicide versus feminicide, it is argued that they are useful in highlighting the gendered nature of female killings, as well as helping to hold governments and institutions accountable.

Sources: UNGA (1993); WHO & PAHO (2012).

also emerged to respond to changing populations and contexts, such as those which take account of the specific needs of victims and vulnerable groups, notably migrant and indigenous women.

Progress in measuring the extent of IPV

Wide regional variations

A growing number of population studies have been conducted nationally and internationally to assess the incidence and prevalence of VAW, most of them with a major focus on IPV. With international support, new methods of data collection, and technical assistance to developing countries, a number of comparative cross-national studies have been carried out (Johnson, 2013).[2] These have been influenced by feminist research on sexual violence and IPV, which showed that dedicated victimization surveys of VAW provide much higher estimates of its extent than police reports or administrative data. The national Violence Against Women Survey developed in Canada in 1993, incorporated multiple behaviourally-specific questions about physical and sexual violence, as well as acts of emotional abuse and control by intimate partners. It was pioneering in its methodology, ensuring that women who responded were able to do so in safety and with follow-on support if necessary. This model was subsequently adopted for the International Violence Against Women Survey (IVAWS) which has been conducted in eleven countries, and by national VAW surveys, as well as Demographic and Health Surveys (DSH).[3] Other international surveys using a similar methodology have been undertaken by WHO and PAHO.

Over 90 countries have now undertaken victimization surveys on VAW or IPV at the national level, or in regions or cities, the majority focusing on IPV rather than non-intimate sexual violence (Johnson, 2013). Although comparison across countries remains far from perfect because of differences, for example, in definitions, sample selection methods, counting, and reference periods, these surveys take into account the methodological and ethical principles for sound information on VAW, and enable estimates of its prevalence to be made, as well as putting national police data into perspective. See Box 6.2 on recent developments to support improved data collection.

A recent systematic review of much of the survey data so far collated on VAW provides estimates of the global prevalence of IPV against women, and reveals wide regional variations (Devries et al., 2013). Based on studies with representative samples at national or subnational levels and global surveys, data from 81 countries is used to estimate women's lifetime prevalence of IPV. The results show that globally, in 2010, 30% of women aged 15 and over had experienced physical and/or sexual IPV in their lifetime. Estimates were modeled for 21 global regions, with the lowest rates observed in East Asia (16%) and in Western Europe (19%), and the highest rates in Andean Latin America (41%), in South Asia (42%), in West Sub-Saharan Africa (42%), and in Central Sub-Saharan Africa (66%) (Figure 6.1).

An earlier review suggests that IPV during pregnancy is similarly more pronounced in some regions than others. Based on studies from 19 countries, it found rates ranging between 2% to 13.5% (Devries et al.,

Box 6.2 **Indicators on gender and IPV**

Over the past ten years, considerable progress has been made at the international level to aid countries in measuring VAW and assessing their progress to reduce it. In particular, the lack of data collection on VAW or data which is disaggregated in terms of sex or relationships etc. has made it difficult to measure its extent in many countries. The UN Statistics Division has now established a minimum set of gender indicators (UN ECOSOC, 2014). These include three indicators specifically concerned with IPV under the domain "Human rights of women and girl children": the rate of partnered women subjected to physical violence in the last 12 months by an intimate partner; the rate of partnered women subjected to sexual violence in the last 12 months by an intimate partner; and the percentage of women aged 20-24 years old who were married or in a union before age 18.

In 2013 UN Statistics Division published *Guidelines for Producing Statistics on Violence against Women*. The core topics include: physical violence, sexual violence, psychological violence, and economic violence as well as severity of violence, relationship of victim to perpetrator, marital/relationship status, and age (UNSD, 2013a). A new *Gender Statistics Manual* to support the Guidelines has also been published (UNSD, 2013b). Optional topics include attitudes towards VAW, reporting to authorities/seeking help, and personal characteristics of respondents and intimate partners, measures of social tolerance, state responses, access to justice, victim protection, prevention, and training (UN ECOSOC, 2013).

In 2013, 40% of countries were producing gender statistics on VAW regularly and 31% irregularly, while 27% were not producing any (UN ECOSOC, 2013).

Figure 6.1 **Prevalence of IPV by region**



Source: Devries et al. (2013)

2010). Younger women and girls (aged 15–35) were most at risk of IPV during pregnancy. The prevalence was higher in African and Latin American countries relative to the European and Asian countries surveyed. A few facility-based studies have found much higher rates in some settings. A systematic review of African studies found the prevalence of IPV against pregnant women to be as high as 40% (Shamu et al., 2011).

The continuing occurrence of IPV in many countries, even those which have long criminalized it and actively developed interventions to reduce its incidence, is illustrated by recent figures from the US (see Box 6.3). While there has been an overall decline in IPV in that country, it is still regarded as being at “staggeringly” high levels.

Recent advances in the measurement of IPV

In reviewing advancements in the measurement of IPV, Holly Johnson notes an increased demand for greater detail and specification concerning specific target populations and groups, as well as the use of more sophisticated methodologies and new technologies (Johnson, 2013).

Box 6.3 **The prevalence and incidence of domestic violence in the US**

“Recent data suggest that more than one third of women in the US (35.6%, or approximately 42.4 million) have experienced rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner at some point in their lifetime. One in three women (32.9%) has experienced physical violence by an intimate partner, and nearly 1 in 10 (9.4%) has been raped by an intimate partner in her lifetime. Approximately 5.9%, or almost 7.0 million women in the US, reported experiencing these forms of violence by an intimate partner in the 12 months prior to being surveyed (Black et al., 2011). Despite funding a variety of targeted programs under the VAWA, the statistics on the prevalence and incidence of domestic violence remain staggering and indicate a need for continued interventions as well as the systematic study of the impact of these interventions and the underlying causes and contexts of these crimes.”

Source: Auchter & Backes (2013, p. 714).

The US National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey (NISVS) launched by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is one such initiative. This survey collects data annually, and incorporates a number of important advancements on previous US studies. They include a sample design to enable national and state levels of partner violence to be estimated, and separate samples of female military personnel, female spouses of military, and people of American Indian and Alaska Native origin (Johnson, 2013; Black et al., 2011). The methodology includes landlines and mobiles telephones, and uses incentives to reduce sample bias. Findings from the first year of the survey conducted in 2010 confirmed that women are disproportionately impacted by IPV compared with men: in particular, 1 in 4 women (25%) had experienced severe physical IPV, compared to 1 in 7 men. Female victims also experience multiple forms of violence, while male victims most often experience only physical violence.

Another innovative example is a PAHO study of VAW in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is the first report to present a comparative analysis of nationally representative data on VAW in the region, based on data from twelve countries (PAHO, 2012). Thirteen surveys and standardized indicators were developed to maximize comparability of the data gathered. The results indicate that IPV against women is widespread in every country where the surveys were conducted, confirming that Latin America is one of the high prevalence regions. Between one-fourth and one-half of women reported experiencing IPV in their lifetime in most of the countries surveyed. A majority of the women who had experienced physical violence reported severe acts, such as being hit with a fist, threatened or wounded with a knife or other weapon, as well as emotional abuse ranging from 61% to 93% of respondents.

The most recent and ground-breaking multi-country study on VAW is that conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Covering 28 European countries, the survey was conducted in 2011-2012 (FRA, 2014). It included women's "everyday" experiences of violence by current and former partners in the past 12 months, since the age of 15, and before the age of 15. The survey looked in particular at the frequency and severity of violence, taking into account experiences in different settings, such as the home or workplace. It also asked about forms of violence and harassment using new communication technologies, such as text messaging or internet-based networking sites. In total, 22% of the respondents reported having experienced physical and/or sexual violence by a partner since the age of 15, and 43% psychological violence by an intimate partner. The contribution by the FRA at the end of this chapter *Violence Against Women in the European Union* summarizes some of the main findings and recommendations of the survey.

Surveying men

One of the most innovative recent developments has been surveying men about their attitudes to and experiences of using IPV. Notably, the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES) developed a survey on men's attitudes and practices – along with women's opinions and reports of men's practices. It covers a wide variety of topics related to gender equality, including gender-based violence (Barker et al., 2011). From 2009 to 2010, household surveys were administered in six countries in different regions: Brazil, Chile, Croatia, India, Mexico, and Rwanda. An initial comparative analysis of results from the men's questionnaires found that they reported lifetime rates of perpetration of physical IPV ranging from 25% to 40%, with women reporting slightly higher rates. Men's reports of perpetration of sexual violence against women and girls ranged from 6% to 29%, the majority of the acts reported in India and Mexico were against a current or former partner. Some of the significant factors associated with men's use of violence were rigid gender attitudes, work stress, experiences of violence in childhood, and alcohol use. Men who owned firearms or carried out other violence or criminal behaviour were also more likely to report having used IPV.

Similarly, the *UN Multi-country Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific* aimed to generate knowledge on how masculinities relate to men's perceptions and perpetration of VAW (Fulu et al., 2013). The interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2013 with men aged 18-49 and women in nine sites over six countries, using same sex interviewers respectively.[4] The quantitative component of the study indicated that men's use of violence against intimate female partners was pervasive across the Asia-Pacific region, but that prevalence varied across sites. Overall nearly half of the ever-partnered men interviewed reported using physical and/or sexual violence against a female partner, ranging from 26% to 80% (between 30% to 57% in most sites). From 16% to 57% also reported economically abusive acts against a female intimate partner in their lifetime, and from 41% to 83% for at least one emotionally abusive act. Results showed that IPV was driven by factors related in particular to gender inequality, childhood experiences of abuse, alcohol abuse problems, depression, and low socio-economic status.

The costly personal and social impacts of IPV

More attention is now being been paid to the high health, social, and economic impacts of IPV. Most studies incorporate questions related to the health consequences for the women affected by IPV, including long-term effects. It is estimated that 42% of women who experience IPV report an injury as a result of such violence (WHO, 2013a). Women who have experienced partner violence are almost twice as likely to experience depression and alcohol abuse problems, and, in some regions, are 1.5 times more likely to acquire HIV than women who have not. Other health issues include unintended pregnancies, gynecological problems, other sexually transmitted infections, sleep difficulties, eating disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, and ailments referred to as "stress-related conditions" such as various chronic pain syndromes and fibromyalgia (WHO & PAHO, 2012). In particular, IPV in pregnancy increases the risk for miscarriage, stillbirth, pre-term delivery, fetal injury, and low birth weight, and it has been associated with higher rates of infant and child mortality and morbidity.

The wider social and economic costs of IPV are also clearly established. Women victims may suffer from isolation, inability to work, loss of wages, lack of participation in social and civic activities, and limited ability to care for themselves and their children (WHO, 2013a). Furthermore, children who witness IPV may suffer from a range of emotional and behavioural disorders. Many studies have shown negative health and social consequences including anxiety, depression, poor school performance, and negative health outcomes in school-age children (WHO & PAHO, 2012), while emotional stress can harm the brain development of infants and small children and impair their cognitive and sensory growth (UNICEF, 2006). Risky behaviour such as substance abuse, sexual risk behaviour, and criminal activity, and experiences of violence as a perpetrator and/or victim in later life, are also associated with witnessing IPV against a mother as a child. More specifically, exposure to domestic violence[5] is the single best predictor of becoming a perpetrator or a victim of such violence later in life (UNICEF, 2006). In addition, a number of studies have indicated an association between IPV and child abuse within the same household (Holt, Buckley & Whelan, 2008).

A study in Latin America and the Caribbean using health survey data estimates some of the intangible costs of IPV (Agüero, 2013). The results showed that physical VAW increased separation or divorce rates, and that women who had experienced IPV were more likely to work. This could be explained by changes in their marital status or by the reaction of husbands to their entry into the workforce with increased employment opportunities for women. Violence was negatively linked with women's health and affected important short-term health outcomes for children. Pregnant mothers who experienced physical violence were less likely to make required prenatal visits, and their babies tended to have lower weight and height than others. A case study in Peru, using data from the *Centros Emergencia Mujer* which provides services to women experiencing domestic violence, confirmed a causal relationship between violence and negative health outcomes for women and their children – the next generation – although there was some evidence to suggest that the mother's education and age tended to buffer the negative effects of IPV.

Although not always easy to measure, some studies have attempted to quantify some of these tangible and intangible costs more precisely. The PAHO study found that 49% to 68% of female victims of IPV in the previous 12 months reported anxiety or depression so severe that they could not complete their work or other obligations (PAHO, 2012). The percentage who reported having to miss or stop money-earning work as a result ranged from 16% to 20%. In the US, the CDC's assessment of health-related costs of domestic violence exceeds $5.8US billion annually, including $4.1US billion for direct mental and health services, and $1.8US billion for indirect costs of lost productivity or wages (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2003). It has been estimated that victims of IPV lose almost 8 million days of paid work, and 5.6 million days of household productivity, as a result of this violence each year. The costs would add up to $10US billion annually, taking into account police and court, shelter and foster care costs (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2000).

Similarly, in Canada, a conservative estimate of the total economic impact of spousal violence in 2009 was $7.3CAN billion, including $6.0CAN billion (80%) for victim costs such as medical attention, lost wages, damages, pain and suffering; $889.9CAN million (12%) for third party costs such as social service operation costs and losses to employers; and $545.2CAN million (7%) for justice system costs (Zhang et al., 2012).

The significant economic costs of IPV in terms of expenditures on service provision, lost income, decreased productivity, and negative impacts on future human capital formation continue to be of major concern including in low and middle-income countries. A recent study based on data from 9 countries (Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Morocco, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Uganda, UK, US) found that costs ranged from 1.2% to 2% of GDP (Duvvury et al., 2013). These included out of pocket expenditure for accessing services, loss of income for missing work and productivity loss, cost of pain, suffering, and lost quality of life. While criteria and methodologies vary between countries, the authors estimate that the total amount nearly equals government spending on primary education as a proportion of GDP, illustrating the particularly significant costs in low- and middle-income countries relative to key development expenditures. It is noted that more analysis is needed to estimate the true scale of the impact of IPV on economic growth and economic development, for example, how education and health conditions, or women's economic activity interact with the prevalence of IPV over time.

Risks and vulnerabilities

Knowledge about the factors which place women and girls at risk of VAW including IPV has grown enormously over the years. Extensive research has established the major correlates which are strongly associated with IPV. They include (Johnson, 2013, p. 106):

- Age – younger men and women and early marriage.
- Having multiple children.
- Male partner substance abuse.
- Indigenous status.
- Disability – women with mental and physical disabilities.
- Family history of violence between parents.
- Childhood experiences of violence.
- Gender inequality in marital relationships.
- Using violence in other contexts – such as outside the home.

The evidence for other contributing factors such as poverty, unemployment and rural residence, while often associated, is less strong and appears to vary across contexts and countries.[6] Recent research has identified a range of types of IPV which appear useful in the development of a better understanding of IPV and in the development of prevention strategies. They include "coercive and controlling" IPV which is primarily male-perpetrated, "situational couple violence", "violent resistance" and "separation-instigated violence" (Ansara & Hindin, 2010; Johnson & Dawson, 2011).

Intimate partner homicide

> "At least one in seven homicides globally and more than a third of female homicides are perpetrated by an intimate partner."[7]

The ultimate and most serious consequence of IPV is death, and women are at much higher risk as intimate partners than men. As suggested earlier, IPV accounts for the majority of intentional female homicides in many countries, ranging from 40-70% (UNODC, 2011a). In 2013 it was estimated that 47% (43,600) of all female homicide victims were killed by intimate partners or family members (UNODC, 2014).[8] Overwhelmingly, women are the main victims of IPV homicide. Among 18 primarily European countries, 79% of IPV homicide victims were female, and 21% male.

At the regional level, based on data from 51 countries, rates of intimate partner/family-related homicide range from 0.6 to 1.7 per 100,000 people, with higher rates in Africa and the Americas, where other types of homicide are also more prevalent (UNODC, 2014). Nevertheless, intimate partner/family-related homicides account for a larger share of total homicide victims in Asia, Europe and Oceania than other regions. Since intimate partner/family-related homicide levels tend to remain fairly stable over time, the share of this type of homicide tends to increase in countries with very low (and decreasing) homicide rates. Women victims of IPV, therefore, become more prominent among homicide victims in countries with low homicide rates.

A systematic review on the prevalence of intimate partner homicide concluded that it is the leading cause of homicides of women globally (Stöckl et al., 2013). Estimates obtained for 66 countries indicated that at least one in seven homicides globally, and more than a third of female homicides are perpetrated by an intimate partner. The overall estimates of intimate partner homicide worldwide were 13.5% of all homicides, the proportion being six times higher for female (39%) compared to male homicides (6%). The median percentages of intimate partner homicides among murdered women were notably higher in high income countries, but the regional differences observed may result from lack of data in low-income countries, especially in Asia and Africa. This review stresses the scarcity of information about intimate partner homicide in many regions, and the large amount of missing information about the victim–offender relationship, even in countries with advanced homicide monitoring data systems.

The Small Arms Survey looks at the significant role of firearms in intimate partner homicides, injury, and intimidation (Shaw, 2013). Data from 111 countries and territories indicates that more women than men are killed, injured or intimidated by firearms in the context of IPV, and around one in three intentional female homicides are committed with a firearm. The risk of lethal IPV is increased by the presence of guns in the home, including work-related guns (most gun owners and workers in professions using guns, are men). Women are at high risk in countries and regions with high levels of firearm violence, such as South Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, firearms are also implicated in IPV deaths in countries with low homicides rates.

In addition to the murder of women by intimate partners, the great majority of murder-suicide[9] events involve IPV. They are almost all committed by men, and usually with firearms (Shaw, 2013). In Canada, for example, homicide data covering more than 40 years found that 75% of all murder-suicides involved a family member, and of those committed by a spouse, 97% involved women killed by their husband, who then committed suicide. Firearms were the most common method (Statistics Canada, 2005). Similarly, while firearms are less commonly used in Europe than in the Americas, a comparative study of seven European countries found that guns were the predominant weapon in IPV murder–suicide incidents between 1990 and 2005, especially in countries with higher rates of guns kept in the home, such as Switzerland, Germany and Finland (Liem & Oberwittler, 2012; Liem et al., 2011). This research and other studies in a number of countries including South Africa, European countries and the US, has led to the conclusion that the presence of firearms in the home is a major risk factor for women who experience IPV (Shaw, 2013).

Vulnerable groups: Young, indigenous, and migrant women and girls

While women are generally at greater risk of IPV than men, certain groups are especially likely to be exposed to it. Besides community and societal factors (including poverty and low status) and relationship factors (e.g. a history of marital conflict and significant interpersonal disparities in economic, educational or employment status), some individual factors have been consistently identified (UNGA, 2006a; WHO and PAHO, 2012). These include witnessing or experiencing violence as a child, harmful use of alcohol and drugs, and membership in marginalized and excluded communities. All these factors may vary across and between countries in relation to specific contexts, such as rural and urban settings.

Age is one of the main risk factors for IPV, and an increasing number of studies have begun to explore the risks facing young women and girls. Adolescent girls and young women are at greater risk of IPV than older women, with those aged 15–24 are at the greatest risk (UN DESA, 2010a). In adolescence, IPV affects girls in dating relationships, as well as in cultural settings where girls marry young (WHO and PAHO, 2012). In the case of girls married at a young age, the frequent age difference from their partner, and forced nature of the union, in a context of gender inequality, increases the risks for spousal abuse.

Dating violence appears to be very pervasive in a number of cultural contexts. For example, a study in South Africa found that 42% of females aged 13-24 years reported ever experiencing physical dating violence (Swart et al., 2002), and a survey of male college students in Ethiopia found that 16% reported perpetrating acts of physical abuse and sexual violence (Philpart et al., 2009). In the US, one study indicated that approximately 20% of female high school students reported being physically and/or sexually abused by a dating partner, and 19% of college females reported experiencing some form of dating violence (Silverman et al., 2001). A more recent survey, the College Dating Violence and Abuse Poll, revealed that one in five college women (22%) reported actual physical or sexual abuse or threats of physical violence (Knowledge Networks, 2011).[10] In Quebec, Canada, a study of high school students (*Enquête sur les parcours amoureux des jeunes*) found that 16% of females had experienced at least one episode of physical violence from a partner in the past 12 months, and 20% experienced at least one episode of sexual violence (Hébert et al., 2014).

Indigenous women are also disproportionately affected by VAW, including IPV (see Chapter 4). While IPV has been observed globally, it is even less well documented in relation to indigenous populations. In Canada, victimization data from the General Social Survey (GSS) showed that Aboriginal women were more likely than non-Aboriginal women to have been the victim of spousal violence, and to have been injured as a result of their victimization (Brennan, 2011). Fifteen percent of the Aboriginal women who had a current or former spouse reported being victimized in the five years preceding the survey, compared with 6% of non-Aboriginal women. In addition, Aboriginal victims were more likely than non-Aboriginal victims to state that they feared for their lives as a result of the violence. Similar findings were presented in the Australian Component of the IVAWS. Aboriginal women were reported to be almost forty times more likely to be victims of family violence than non-Aboriginal women, and to account for 15% of homicides, although they represent only 2.2% of the population (Mouzos & Makkai, 2004).

As a result of migration, the increasing numbers of ethno-cultural minority populations living in new settings has also focused attention on the risks of IPV for women and girls in their communities. They include predominantly rural populations migrating to cities in their own or in foreign countries, as well as displaced and refugee populations, often with very different cultural practices and gender relations from the countries to which they emigrate (see Chapter 3). New or relatively recent women migrants often face a number of barriers in terms of knowledge of their rights and the criminal law in relation to IPV, cultural practices which discourage help-seeking, and limited knowledge of how to access services and advice, apart from language barriers. They may also be vulnerable because of their legal or political status which discourages them from seeking help for fear of deportation. Honour killings, and practices such as forced or early marriage, which can be used to gain legal entry to host countries and to maintain ties with communities of origin, are also of increasing concern in a number of countries (Samad and Eade, 2002; Timmerman, 2006). Johnson suggests that there are important gaps in the study of VAW among minority and migrant populations (Johnson, 2013, p. 108). In particular, it is important to document the experiences of women and girls before and after their arrival (e.g. sexual violence, forced pregnancy and abortion, and various forms of financial abuse and control) in order to understand their needs and the barriers to assistance.

Recent international, regional, and national developments

Increasing international activity

IPV and other forms of VAW have received increasing attention internationally over the past decade. The 2006 UN Secretary General's *In-depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women* highlighted the persistence of all forms of VAW across the world, and the need to strengthen political commitment and joint efforts to prevent and eliminate it. Between 2006 and 2009, the UN General Assembly adopted annual resolutions on the *Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women*. In 2011 a resolution on *Strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice responses to violence against women* was accompanied by the *Updated Model Strategies and Practical Measures on the Elimination of VAW in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,* first published in 1997. These guidelines emphasize the importance of adopting a systematic, comprehensive, coordinated, multi-sectorial, and sustained approach. The 2012 resolution on the *Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women* encourages States to develop comprehensive integrated national plans on VAW.

These resolutions highlight the vulnerability of women and girls in armed conflict, and the higher risk of IPV for women belonging to minority groups, indigenous, refugee and internally displaced women, migrant women, women living in rural or remote communities, and destitute women (UNGA, 2012b). They underline the importance of the prevention of VAW by strengthening women's empowerment and access to education, health and social services, and the links between education, health, poverty, marginalization, food security, and peace and security. The creation of UN Women in 2010 raised the profile of the UN's work in relation to women, and one of the main objectives of the new entity is to strengthen and consolidate action to eliminate VAW.[11]

A significant number of global initiatives have supported these resolutions. Notably the UN Secretary General's *UNiTE to End Violence against Women* campaign launched in 2008, and UN WOMEN's *Say No to Violence Against Women Campaign*[12] begun in 2009, both aim to raise public awareness and increase political will and resources for preventing and ending all forms of VAW. To improve information on practices and programmes, the *UN Secretary General's Database on VAW* was launched in 2009, and the *UN Trust Fund* supports the consolidation of knowledge, project development and evaluation on VAW. Funding and other resources, including model legislation, indicators and guides (discussed above), and handbooks such as UNODC's *Handbook on Effective Police Responses to Violence against Women,* all support improved legislation, data collection, policy development and practice (UN DESA, 2010b; UN Women, 2012; UNODC, 2010). A *Handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women* was published in 2012 (UN Women, 2012). One of the first initiatives of the newly created UN Women was the launch of the *Safe Cities Free of Violence Against Women and Girls Global Programme 2010-2017* (see Chapter 2 and the contribution on *Women's safety in public spaces* at the end of this chapter).

WHO regards VAW as a public health issue, and part of its wider violence prevention programme. Recent valuable resources on the prevention of IPV include *Violence prevention: the evidence* (WHO, 2010), which reviews the effectiveness of IPV and sexual violence prevention programmes, and clinical and policy guidelines for practitioners on evidence-based clinical interventions, emotional support, and reporting (WHO & LSHTM, 2010; WHO, 2013b).

Regional developments

In the Americas the *Convention of Belém do Pará* (Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women), was adopted in 1994 by the Organization of American States (OAS).[13] Now in its twentieth year, a number of initiatives to mark the anniversary are taking place, including translation into 13 indigenous languages, a review of regional strategies, and the publication of good practices. In 2009, ECLAC launched the Observatory on Gender in Latin America and the Caribbean in partnership with UN agencies, and domestic violence prevention is one of the key objectives of IDB's Citizen Security framework which has been developed over the past decade (Abizanda et al., 2012).

In Africa, the *Maputo Protocol* (*Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*) was adopted by the African Union in July 2003. As of 2010, 46 of the 53 member countries had signed it, but no follow up has been initiated, in part due to the unstable political situation in several countries. An assessment of 11 countries' policies and laws indicated that most offered a comprehensive definition of gender-based violence, and several acknowledged the need to address social norms to advance gender equality (Sonke et al., 2013). However, marital rape was not criminalized in seven of the countries evaluated, and few plans were in place to engage men and boys as actors of change.

In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) re-affirmed its 2004 treaty in the *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women and Elimination of Violence against Children* in 2013. It acknowledged the importance of intensifying the efforts of member states to promote the rights of women and children, notably by modifying social and cultural patterns. The Declaration calls for the integration of legislation, policies and measures in national plans, and strengthening capacity and partnerships between stakeholders.

A major development in Europe is the *Istanbul Convention* (*Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence*). Initially adopted in 2011, it came into force on 1st August 2014.[14]

> "This is a defining moment for women in Europe for whom the home is a place of danger… This treaty will oblige governments to take concrete steps to help women and girls facing violent acts."[15]

The Convention establishes minimum standards for prevention, protection, prosecution and the provision of services, such a hotlines, shelters, medical and counselling services, and legal aid. It includes a specific monitoring mechanism (GREVIO) to ensure effective implementation of its provisions by countries. An earlier resolution adopted in 2009 recognized the particular risk of domestic violence faced by migrant women by migrant women, encouraging member states to develop strategies for the protection and rehabilitation of victims from migrant communities (COE, 2009).

National legislation and action plans

At the national level, UN DESA reported in 2011 that 93% of 193 countries for which they had data had adopted legal measures or policies to prevent domestic violence (UN DESA, 2011). Among developed countries 96% had both, compared to 65% of developing countries. Legal provisions to prevent domestic violence ranged from 38% of countries in Oceania, 64% in Asia and 73% in Africa, to more than 95% in Europe, Northern America, and Latin America and the Caribbean. In spite of the challenges of implementing legislation, some innovative national initiatives are worth noting.

In Sweden an important landmark was the *Swedish Act on Violence against Women* (1998), since it recognized the long term nature of IPV, and its cumulative effects. The act requires each instance of violence and abuse experienced by a woman to be assessed. An evaluation of the legislation in 2009 found that in the majority of prosecutions, violence in close relationships was viewed cumulatively, and this was reflected in the severity of sentences (Sweden, 2011).

In Brazil, the *Maria da Penha Law on Domestic and Family Violence* enacted in 2006 also marked a significant change in responses to VAW. It increased the penalties for domestic violence offences, established special courts to hear cases, and increased the number of women's police stations, and prevention and support services, including women's shelters, in cities with over 60,000 inhabitants (UN Women, 2011). The Maria da Penha Observatory was established to monitor the implementation of the law and state-level activities, and to help inform national policy on VAW.

Colombia enacted legislation in 2008 on the *Prevention and punishment of violence and discrimination against women* (Wecker, 2012). In 2012, new legislation empowers any witness of domestic violence to report it to the police, rather than only the victim, and requires the implementation of a range of measures such as removing perpetrators from the home, teaching children about domestic violence, and requiring medical professionals to report suspected cases.

In Italy recent national legislation includes a 2013 decree setting stricter penalties for perpetrators of domestic abuse, sexual violence, and stalking, and expands protection for vulnerable women, including immigrants without residency permits (McRobie, 2013). Similar developments are under way in other European countries. A new law in Denmark, for example, based on a Norwegian model, grants residency to non-Danish women who leave their partners because of abuse (Copenhagen Post, 2013).

Groundbreaking legislation has recently been passed in Turkey. The *Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women* was passed in 2012 to improve protection and enhance support services for victims. The law applies to all women, regardless of their marital status. It gives the police authority to use protection orders and to seize any weapons possessed by the perpetrator, to relocate the victim if she requests it, and to arrest the perpetrator for any violation of a protection or restraining order (Zedlin, 2012). Saudi Arabia adopted the *Protection from*

Abuse Law in 2013 which aims to protect women, children, and domestic workers against all forms of domestic abuse, and provide for shelter and social, psychological, and medical aid (Al Jazeera, 2013). Notably, the law gives those who report abuse the right to remain anonymous, and women are no longer required to be accompanied by a male relative to file a complaint.

Many countries have developed and implemented national actions plans on VAW, or specifically on IPV, over the years, but not all are updated or evaluated on a regular basis. In fact the FRA has detected "action plan fatigue" among some countries in the region (see the contribution by the FRA at the end of the chapter). UN Women's *Handbook for National Action Plans on VAW* provides very comprehensive coverage of the components of such plans (UN Women, 2012).

The UK provides a good example of a country which has made changes to its national policies (and legislation) in the light of emerging concerns around VAW. It published the strategy paper *Call to end violence against women and girls* in 2010, which became the basis of its 2011 action plan. This was updated in 2013 and 2014, in particular in relation to domestic and sexual violence, with a focus on earlier intervention to change attitudes and behaviours, and increased support for women and girls with particular vulnerabilities.[16] A *Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act* was also adopted in 2007, and a Forced Marriage Unit established to provide information and support services.[17] In addition, the UK has developed initiatives targeting potential migrants in their countries of origin, such as an education campaign commissioned by the British High Commission in Islamabad on domestic abuse and "honour" killings in the context of forced marriages. In March 2014 the government widened the definition of domestic violence to include young people aged 16-17; and extended *Domestic Violence Protection Orders* and the *Domestic Violence Disclosure Scheme*[18] nationally, following successful pilots (UK, 2014). Protection orders were found to be effective in reducing rates of re-victimization, especially for chronic cases (Kelly et al., 2013). Legislation to make domestic violence a specific offence, and allow sentences to reflect a pattern of abusive behaviour is also being considered (Doward, 2013).

The Finnish Government re-introduced its *Action plan to reduce violence against women (2010-2015)*, in connection with its *Action Plan for Gender Equality (2008-2011)* (Finland, 2008, 2010). The renewed plan focuses in particular on changing attitudes and behaviours relating to VAW, methods for identifying and intervening with vulnerable groups, and building capacities among authorities and service providers, all areas which previous action plans have not included. In France, the *Third inter-ministerial plan to combat VAW (2011-2013)* similarly focuses on meeting emerging challenges, with the establishment of more shelters across the country for victims and their children, initial training and continuing education for professionals, and information and awareness campaigns, notably in schools and among migrant girls and women. The plan also funded a research programme to improve understanding of VAW, and evaluate the effectiveness of policies (France, 2011).

Sweden implemented and evaluated a comprehensive *Action Plan to combat male violence against women, violence in the name of honour and violence in same-sex relationships* (2007-2010), and a major subsequent innovation was the appointment of a *Swedish Domestic Violence Coordinator* in 2012. Her role is to increase the effectiveness, quality, and sustainability of IPV prevention, by improving collaboration between agencies and organizations. To increase knowledge, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention has been tasked with developing a national survey of domestic violence, and the National Board of Health and Welfare with developing programmes for non-custodial violent abusers (Sweden, 2012).

More recently, the Norwegian government launched an updated *Action Plan against Domestic Violence (2014-2017*) (Norway, 2014). Based on a review of the previous 2008-2011 action plans, which included one against forced marriages (Norway, 2008), the priorities are to improve collaboration between agencies and services, and develop measures to reach vulnerable groups. The action plan covers prevention and awareness-raising, the development of knowledge and competence, enhanced services for all groups of victims, criminal prosecution, and coordination of services. In addition, the Regional Centres for Violence, Traumatic Stress and Suicide Prevention are mandated to assist municipalities that wish to develop local action plans, based on standards established with the Norwegian Centre for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies. By 2011, 25 municipalities had adopted such a plan (Saur et al., 2011).

In the Asia-Pacific region Australia's *National Plan to reduce violence against women and their children (2010-2022)* focuses on domestic and family violence and sexual assault. Measures are centred on primary prevention, services improvement, building the evidence base, and prosecution, with special attention to the situation of Indigenous women (Australia, 2010). The overall plan is being implemented through a series of three-year action plans.

Honour violence has also received national attention in Canada, especially following the murder of three female members of a family. The federal government has funded a series of prevention and intervention strategies, under the *Working Together: Engaging*

Communities to End Violence Against Women and Girls programme (Status of Women Canada, 2012). At the provincial level in Canada, Quebec's renewed action plan on domestic violence 2012-2017, aims to ensure the safety and protection of victims and their children, to provide help for perpetrators of violence, and to meet the needs of First Nations, Inuit, and others vulnerable to domestic violence, including women in migrant and minority communities (Quebec, 2012). A recent report on honour crimes recommended the adoption of an action plan, inspired by the example of the UK, to focus on training, risk evaluation, prevention of forced marriage, and awareness-raising (Quebec, 2013).

In the US, while much of the focus of the work of the National Institute of Justice over the past eighteen years has been on criminal justice and victim responses to violence against women, rather than primary prevention, the evaluation research funded by the Institute should be recognized for its valuable contribution. Since 1994 funding of research and evaluation on criminal justice responses, and on the specific issues of domestic violence, teen dating violence, and violence against American Indian and Alaskan Native women has dramatically advanced knowledge about the issues, the effectiveness of responses, and the challenges faced (Auchter & Backes, 2013; Auchter & Moore, 2013).[19]

The importance of action at the local level

Strategic action plans in cities

Intimate partner violence by definition takes place in the home – in a local context – and its impacts (especially in fatal cases) are felt very directly by neighbours and local communities. The development of local strategies to prevent IPV; to ensure the safety of women and girls outside the home; and to provide support and services to those affected by violence is, therefore, very important. A number of cities worldwide have developed such action plans, and some recent examples are discussed later in this chapter.

The City of Brno in the Czech Republic, made a public commitment to prevent domestic violence in 2006 and developed an integrated plan to change attitudes and behaviour, and strengthen community and social structures and supports (EUCPN, 2014). The municipal health department created a team of 25 people from relevant organizations, responsible for cooperation, capacity building, and knowledge exchange. It established a comprehensive information system to provide short-term immediate support to domestic violence victims, support medium-term changes in practices, and long-term enhancement of prevention and general public awareness. The collaboration system has been modified each year in accordance with emerging priorities, and it involves a growing number of media partners in its awareness campaigns.

Similarly, a *Violence Reduction Action Plan* was launched in 2011 by the City of Edmonton, Canada and REACH Edmonton, the city's Council for Safe Communities. It forms part of its overall local crime prevention policy. One of its components is the Mayor's Initiative on Family Violence which aims to increase awareness of the impacts of domestic violence in the business community. An education programme is being developed with the Alberta Council of Women's Shelters to engage corporations, as well as a public education campaign in conjunction with service providers and businesses (REACH Edmonton & the City of Edmonton (2011).

In Paris, France, local security contracts are used to coordinate civil society actors, administrative directions, and institutional partners to fight VAW. The policy focuses on housing and support for victims, support for community organizations, awareness campaigns, training of professionals, and youth prevention, with a specific programme since 2005 regarding forced marriage. In the UK, the City of Leeds has updated its domestic violence action plan since 2004 under the *Safer Leeds Strategy* (Safer Leeds, 2013).[20] In 2011, this plan led to the pooling of all community based services in a consortium, Leeds Domestic Violence Services, with a unique helpline. The latest priorities defined for 2013-2014 are prevention through early intervention, and changing attitudes towards the use of IPV; improvement of the provision of services through commissioning activities, citywide and local partnerships; workforce development and developing programmes for perpetrators.

Other examples in the US include the creation of an inter-government task force in Chicago in 2013 to address domestic violence. The task force is a partnership between the Mayor's Office, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office, the Chicago Police Department, and the Department of Family and Support Services, with three goals: to develop state-of-the-art training for police officers; a more proactive law enforcement response to high-risk domestic violence incidents; and increase services for domestic violence victims and their families (Chicago, 2013).

More far-reaching neighbourhood prevention approaches have also been effective in reducing IPV. In the metropolitan region of Medellin, Colombia, the city's public policy to promote human security and prevent crime and violence has impacted levels of IPV.

The PREVIVA programme (*Prevención de conductas de riesgo para la vida*) includes large-scale urban and social transformation in the northeast of the city.[21] Over a four year period between 2004 and 2008, a 66% reduction in rates of violence overall was achieved, while rates of physical IPV were reduced by 50% (from 17.5% to 8.5%) (Cerdá et al., 2012; Duque, 2010; Perez, 2011).[22] Following this experience, in 2007 committees of "civic coexistence and security" were created in all the Medellin Metropolitan Area municipalities, with support from PREVIVA to adapt or design the projects chosen. Some projects target the prevention of IPV in families of former members of illegal armed groups, others include the prevention of domestic and family violence in the general population.

The components of national and city level strategies include a variety of prevention, prosecution and victim support services, and developments in relation to prevention approaches are discussed in the following section.

Preventing IPV

Criminal justice interventions, holistic approaches and risk assessments

Local level planning on IPV often encompasses multi-agency criminal justice interventions, in particular to enhance victim support and prevent re-offending by abusers. One example is the *Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs* (DAIP) – widely known as "the Duluth Model" from the northern Minnesota city where it originated. The Duluth Model was one of the first examples of an integrated approach to VAW bringing together all the components of prosecution, legal aid, victim support services and treatment programmes, creating community-wide interventions to reduce domestic violence. Interventions include advocacy and education groups for women, non-violence classes for men, supervision of family visits, and coordinated community responses (DAIP, 2014). Evaluation of the model showed a significantly lower recidivism rate after the project was fully operational, and this has also been found in other settings which have implemented the model, such as Spartanburg, South Carolina (Babcock et al., 2004).

Other criminal justice interventions which have received extensive attention over the years include the use of one-stop crisis centres, domestic violence courts, court-ordered interventions, perpetrator programmes, and the use of women only police stations in countries such as Brazil, Nicaragua and India. Several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, have established one-stop crisis centers offering a range of integrated services to facilitate access by victims and provide an enhanced response (Willman and Makisaka, 2010). While there are indications of increased satisfaction regarding victims' experience, it is not always clear whether this type of approach also increases participation in counselling or in legal proceedings, as a recent evaluation of two Swedish projects suggests (Bogestam, 2013).

The establishment of specialized domestic violence courts in a number of countries continues to increase. They bring together investigation and legal proceedings, as well as related support services, enabling domestic violence incidents to be responded to in a holistic way, and by professionals who fully understand the risks and impacts of IPV. The contribution by Carmen Gill at the end of the chapter *Specialized domestic violence courts in Canada* reviews the expansion of such courts in one country, and their benefits over traditional court processes.

In parallel with the growth of specialized courts, interventions with male perpetrators (both voluntary and court mandated) have been a major topic of action research and evaluation for many years, but their effectiveness in preventing re-offending has often been questioned (Johnson, 2013; Auchter & Backes, 2013). There have been extensive trials of "batterer" programmes and other police and justice system interventions to reduce IPV and re-offending, especially in the US. It has, however, been argued that there is little convincing evidence of the effectiveness of batterer programmes in reducing recidivism, or of some other court mandated approaches, in part because of the complexities of evaluating complex programmes (Heise, 2011; Auchter & Moore, 2013; Auchter & Backes, 2013). It is suggested that interventions for the perpetrators of IPV need to be carefully adapted to individuals and contexts, rather than assuming that a broad programme will "work" for everyone (Auchter & Backes, 2013).

There is still a continuing need for such programmes, and evaluation needs to be built in. Recent examples include programmes such as *Changing Ways*[23] and *Pro-gam inc.*[24] in Canada, *Men Ending Domestic Abuse* (MEND)[25] in Ireland, and *Dialogue Against Domestic Violence* in Denmark, which provide services for men including one-to-one and group sessions, and for their partners or former partners to support them and enhance their safety.

Many police services have developed specific action plans to respond to IPV in partnership with local services and organizations. In Canada, for example, the Fredericton Police Department in New Brunswick recently created an IPV Coordinator position under the department's Neighbourhood Action Team, to improve collaborative work on domestic violence cases in the city, and reduce the risks of re-offending.[26]

The Montreal police service (SPVM) in Quebec, has had specific response plans for domestic and family violence since 2010, in consultation with a range of local partners. Priorities identified for 2013-2017 are greater continuity of services between stakeholders on joint interventions, and consolidation of the "community of practice" model,[27] extending access to all vulnerable groups, and improving police practices and training (SPVM, 2013; ICPC, 2010). The SPVM plays a coordination role on the city's roundtable on domestic violence.

An EU handbook of best police practices on overcoming attrition in domestic violence cases highlights data collection/monitoring systems, investigation training and support, specialization of services, victimless investigations and prosecutions, and coordinated community responses (COE, 2012). The elements of success identified are the multi-agency principle and a balance between victims' needs and criminal justice system's goals.

One innovative development in recent years has been the growing use of risk assessment tools to assess the danger of future violence for women in IPV cases. The extensive work of Campbell among others has established screening tools using key questions about current relationships and violence experiences (Campbell, 2005; Campbell et al., 2009; Olive, 2007). The predictive validity of these risk assessment tools has been well established, and they are being used increasingly by interveners and courts to identify cases at high risk of future homicide or serious injury. They enable a risk management process to be put in place, including legal measures, safety planning, support services, supervision, and monitoring. This includes restrictions on the use of guns or their confiscation in some cases (Shaw, 2013).

The European Commission recently published a *European Manual on Risk Assessment* (E-MARIA).[28] The on-line resource underlines the multiple consequences of domestic violence/IPV, and is concerned with assessing a much wider range of risks than risk of homicide alone (Albuquerque et al., 2013). They include poverty, homelessness, suicide, and social isolation, in other words not just the risks of physical abuse alone. The manual provides an assessment tool to enable professionals to view the problem in a holistic way, and identifies a number of risk assessment tools currently in use in different countries (Albuquerque et al., 2013, p. 48). It also provides guidelines to address contested issues such as information sharing, data protection, and confidentiality in a multi-agency response (within agreed limits and with the victim's consent). Examples of such practices include the client centred organization of police, justice, and social services (CO3 Project)[29] in the Province of Antwerp, Belgium, and initiatives putting emphasis on the possibility for victims to stay at home, such as *Making Safe* in the UK[30] and *Staying Home Leaving Violence*[31] in New South Wales (NSW), Australia.

Gendered IPV prevention programmes and evaluation issues

> "…partner violence is a strategic entry point for efforts to reduce violence more broadly – because the family, where the vast majority of violent acts occur, is also where habits and behaviours are formed for successive generations."[32]

Apart from prevention initiatives focused around the criminal justice system and victim services, which act largely through deterrence and treatment – and after the fact – an increasingly wide range of programmes have been developed to prevent and reduce the incidence of IPV in the first place. They range from early childhood interventions, those targeting young people in school and neighbourhood contexts, empowerment and participatory approaches, and general and targeted education and awareness programmes (WHO & LSHTM, 2010). What has changed from earlier decades is the greater focus on gender equality, and the development of programmes targeted to specific groups. These include initiatives to change gendered and culturally influenced attitudes, increasing women's own power through community programmes promoting employment and awareness of their rights; a greater focus on young people, with strategies to prevent IPV among girls and young women, including among students at colleges and universities; and a much greater focus on engaging men and boys to generate change, such as through programmes which work to change cultural attitudes to the use of violence against women and girls.

In a useful review of strategies to prevent IPV and sexual violence against women by WHO, it is argued that evaluation–based prevention is "still in its early days" (WHO & LSHTM, 2010, p. 1). Based on the WHO ecological model of the causal factors placing women and girls at risk of violence (from individual and family and relational factors, to community and wider societal ones), they examine evidence-based studies to reduce the risk factors for IPV and sexual violence from infancy to adulthood. They conclude that while many show promise, only one strategy – the use of school-based programmes to prevent violence in dating relationships – meets their very stringent criteria of effectiveness. Those with some emerging evidence of effectiveness include "micro-finance programmes for women combined with gender—equality education; efforts to reduce access to and harmful use of alcohol; and changing social and cultural gender norms" (p.1). Many others are seen as having potential, but have not been systematically implemented or evaluated.

In a subsequent review of empirical evidence of "what works" to prevent IPV, Heise concludes that most of the evidence comes from high-income countries, and that there is a scarcity of programmes in low- and middle-income countries, as well as a lack of funding for their evaluation (Heise, 2011). Her review examines evaluated interventions only, and does not cover all types of intervention. She similarly uses the WHO ecological model and selects six main areas of interest with strong links to IPV: gender-related norms, including masculinity and female subordination; exposure to violence in childhood; male alcohol abuse; women's economic empowerment; and legal and justice system interventions, reviewing the evidence for their effectiveness. Again she concludes that programmes in many of these areas show some promise, especially in high-income countries. Parenting programmes in particular appear to be especially effective in reducing child aggression and antisocial behaviour, known to be precursors to partner violence.

Community level initiatives, especially those increasing connections to school and family, are seen as entry points to violence prevention, and appear to be especially important in reducing risk levels (Willman & Makisaka, 2010). One notable shift in recent years is the much greater emphasis being put on participatory processes and community ownership of initiatives.

School-based programmes have long been a major component of prevention strategies to increase knowledge about VAW and IPV and to change gender stereotypes and attitudes (WHO & LSHTM, 2010). Generally, gender-based and dating violence are discussed in reproductive health class, incorporated with other health risks such as sexually transmitted diseases, or in specific educational sessions, with male and female youth together. Evaluations suggest that these interventions can increase knowledge about dating violence and improve attitudes towards it. They may be effective at reducing levels of actual abuse towards females, although studies have largely focused on short-term outcomes. Strong positive results have been observed in the long-term e.g. with the *Safe Dates* prevention programme in the US and the *Youth Relationship Project* in Canada, which are both community-based.[33] Since there is some evidence that programmes presented to all-male groups may be more effective in changing attitudes than mixed male and female groups, a number of initiatives work solely with male peers (Brecklin & Forde, 2001). One example is the *Men of Strength (MOST) Club*[34] in the US, a youth development programme for mobilizing young men to prevent sexual and dating violence.

Community interventions are being used to address gender norms and attitudes, particularly in developing countries. They aim to empower women by strengthening their economic position and their participation in community decision-making processes (Willman and Makisaka, 2010). Evidence shows that well-trained facilitators, community ownership, and men's involvement increase the effectiveness of these programmes. This helps to counteract the fact that some activities to raise women's economic power and social status may increase violence by their partners. This is especially the case in countries with rigid gender roles (WHO & LSHTM, 2010; and see Box 6.4 below). One successful microfinance programme is the *Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE)* in Limpopo Province, South Africa, which targets women in poor rural villages. It combines financial services with training and skills-building sessions (*Sisters for Life*) in the wider community.[35] Another successful intervention is the *Stepping Stones*[36] programme, implemented in Africa and Asia, which offers life-skills training with women and men in separate and mixed-groups, as well as in community meetings (WHO & LSHTM, 2010).

An increasing number of programmes designed for male peer groups to address attitudes to VAW and engage men in violence prevention now exist. They include *Men As Partners* in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the US, *Program H* in Brazil and India, and initiatives run by the organizations Sonke across Africa and Sahayog in India.[37] All have resulted in promising changes in attitudes, but require more rigorous evaluations (WHO & LSHTM, 2010). A multi-country project by the Instituto Promundo and partners, with a range of activities including educational workshops with men on gender equity, and training programmes on prevention, have shown positive results (Instituto Promundo et al., 2012).

Public awareness campaigns using television, radio, newspapers, social media, and other print and digital materials have become a major prevention resource for changing attitudes towards gender norms (WHO and LSHTM, 2010; and see Box 6.4). The most successful seem to be those which target a specific audience and engage with its members to develop content. It is difficult, however, to measure the extent to which changes in levels of violence directly result from such campaigns. One of the first such campaigns is *Soul City* in South Africa, which produced a series of radio and television episodes about IPV, date rape, and sexual harassment, accompanied by cartoon books and information booklets.[38] Similar projects in other countries such as the *Abused Goddesses* campaign developed in India by the NGO *Save Our Sisters*, portrayed deities with bruises and wounds, to illustrate the contradictions about the treatment of women in India.[39] In the UK the government campaign *This is Abuse* uses web videos specifically targeting teenagers.[40] It underlines that they are potential victims or perpetrators of controlling behaviour and abuse, and provides information on referral services.

Box 6.4 **Public campaigns to change attitudes to VAW – The Nicaraguan experience**

Nicaragua has pioneered a number of initiatives since 2000 to address VAW and IPV. These have included a network of police stations for women (*Comisaria de la Mujer*), a Ministry of Family Affairs (*Mi Familia*) to oversee, among other responsibilities, the availability of shelters, and reform of the national reproductive health programme to address gender and sexual abuse (WHO & LSHTM, 2010).

Following the Sandinista revolution, civil society groups have continued to campaign to promote women's rights and to empower them to oppose domestic abuse. Notably, the organization *Puntos de encuentro*[43] has used mass communication to change attitudes. Their *Somos Diferentes, Somos Iguales* initiative (We are different, We are equal), which included a television series, a radio talk show for youth, and community activities, resulted in positive changes towards gender equity among youth exposed to the programmes (Solórzano et al., 2008). The organization uses capacity building and builds alliances with communities in Nicaragua and other Latin American countries, to promote social change and achieve long-term results. It now conducts awareness tours, produces a new television series and a youth radio programme, and publishes a feminist magazine (La Boletina) with a large national circulation.

Between 2003 and 2004 the number of acts of domestic and sexual violence against women reported to the *Comisaria de la Mujer* increased dramatically (WHO & LSHTM, 2010). This has been attributed to greater awareness among women that such domestic violence is prohibited by Nicaraguan and international law, and thus greater willingness to report, but may also have resulted from increased domestic conflict because of women's greater assertiveness. These findings reinforce the importance of focusing IPV prevention strategies on men too, to prevent such a backlash, and not just on women.

Sources: adapted from WHO & LSHTM (2010, Box 5, p. 56) and Solórzano et al. (2008).

Other projects targeting men and boys include the work of the International White Ribbon campaign[41], and a number of projects to tackle dating and sexual violence among young people. In Canada, Crime Prevention Ottawa (CPO) which works in close partnership with the city, the police and other local services, initiated a *Don't Be That Guy* campaign concerned with issues of sexual consent.[42]

Targeting vulnerable populations

A growing number of programmes in many countries aim to improve awareness and interventions among migrant and indigenous communities, given the significant barriers they often face in accessing information and services. As discussed above, in a number of countries legislation concerning forced marriage has been put in place as well as targeted education and awareness programmes.

Although available literature on the subject is limited, it appears that IPV is not more prevalent in migrant and refugee population groups, but that they face particular challenges concerning their legal status, language, and knowledge of the legal and social systems in their new country of residence (Yoshihama, 2009). Further, as with some indigenous populations, victims of IPV may fear discriminatory or insensitive attitudes from mainstream organizations, and stigmatization of their communities, where there may be strong pressure to remain silent about it.

The challenge is, therefore, to reach potential or actual victims and gain their trust, as well as to promote long-term prevention and community-change strategies, without creating a negative reaction or reinforcing racist assumptions. A number of organizations provide an array of services (e.g. language classes, education, employment assistance, social activities etc.) to create environments where women feel comfortable enough to report abuse. This can also empower them and serve a prevention purpose (Runner et al., 2009). However, these organizations may avoid openly identifying themselves as engaged in IPV intervention, and are limited to raising community awareness and engaging with leaders.

A number of programmes adapted to specific social and cultural communities have been developed in recent years and are able to take a more direct approach. Denmark's national campaign "Break the Silence" represents a successful example of involving ethnic minority community networks. It offers a wide range of communication tools, advertises a 24-hour hotline and handy cards with information on finding help locally.[44] In Canada, the *Muslim Resource Centre for Social Support and Integration* (MRCSSI) in Ontario has built on research and partnership work to set up the *Family Safety Programme* and the *Family Honour Project*, which provide family violence prevention and intervention services in collaboration with government agencies.[45] Another Canadian organization, the *Shield of Athena Family Services* in Quebec,[46] developed a strategy to inform cultural communities about gender-based violence, including honour crimes, and provide training to liaison workers. A similar resource, the *Immigrant Women's Domestic Violence Service* (IWDVS) in Victoria, Australia, provides services across the state and puts an emphasis on building networks among immigrant and refugee women, and within their local communities and services.[47]

Following the same principles, the *Aboriginal Family Violence Prevention and Legal Service Victoria* (FVPLS Victoria), also active in this Australian State, provides holistic assistance to victims of those communities, as well as community education and awareness programmes.[48] In the US, the *Native Health Domestic Violence Project* was launched by the National Health Resource Center on Domestic Violence in 2002, in partnership with more than 100 Indian, Tribal and Urban health care facilities to improve responses, in particular for primary prevention and early identification (Futures Without Violence, 2014).

Additionally, the accessibility of culturally appropriate services for migrant and indigenous men has been raised in a number of settings. It appears to be an essential element in addressing their experience of changing gender dynamics, as well as their social and economic conditions, and that of their communities (Flood, 2013). One example is the *Non-Violence Awareness Campaign For Aboriginal Men* launched by Quebec Native Women Inc., including a resource guide (Aboriginal Approach to Family Violence) which takes into account the historical and current contexts of their lives and draws on indigenous cultures to develop programmes which include both the family and the community in a comprehensive healing process.[49]

Conclusion

IPV is a pervasive phenomenon which persists despite declining rates of violence globally. While efforts by international organizations to prevent it have intensified in recent years, it requires political commitment and comprehensive action by countries. It also requires local authorities to recognize their crucial role by working in partnership with local services and community-based organizations, and to develop strategies which combine programmes to prevent both IPV and violence against women by non-intimates. Both are deeply rooted in attitudes and cultures which legitimize such treatment of women and girls, and require local governments to work to increase the safety of women and girls in all contexts.

In prevention terms, the strong emphasis on criminal justice approaches to prevent IPV, through deterrence and recidivism reduction, is now balanced by greater numbers of prevention programmes targeting risk factors and vulnerable populations.

IPV needs to be addressed on multiple levels to change legal and sociocultural norms. It needs a gender-sensitive approach to influence attitudes and behaviours, and to reinforce protection and assistance for victims. A number of promising initiatives have been discussed in this chapter, and they are indicative of the progress which has been made in recent years, but IPV persists in many countries at high levels, and there still exist wide regional variations revealing critical situations in some settings. Furthermore, war and post-conflict situations, as well as issues of development, also affect the risks of IPV against women, and need far more attention.

The evaluation of different types of prevention approaches targeting the risk factors for intimate partner violence is still relatively scarce, and few approaches have demonstrated strong positive reductions in IPV over time and in different contexts. Nevertheless, a variety of initiatives to promote gender equality and prevent violence are seen as promising. These include laws concerning women's social and economic rights (such as in marriage, divorce, property ownership, inheritance, and child custody and support), neighbourhood interventions (including improvements to urban environments and social relationships, and access to services), parenting interventions to foster healthy child development, school-based programmes to reduce dating violence, and gun control policies. Multi-sector criminal justice interventions including the development of specialized police and courts systems and civil procedures have achieved mixed results in terms of reducing re-offending. Risk assessments tools to reduce future violence appear to be increasingly used. Beyond raising public awareness about the prevalence of IPV and its impacts and costs to society, assisting and empowering women and girls, targeting youths, and engaging men and boys in their communities are all recognized as essential components of prevention strategies.

Development, globalization, and migration are major issues which often affect the status of women and girls and men and boys in quite different ways. The interactions between host cities and communities of origin, and the particular risks for migrant and indigenous communities are now receiving greater attention, and need to be carefully assessed in collaboration with those communities, to help tailor prevention programmes and services appropriately. Finally, improvements in data collection and monitoring and evaluation on IPV are crucial for assessing the impacts of policies and programmes, and adapting to new challenges and changing contexts.

Women's safety in public spaces

Kathryn Travers[50]

Contribution

Violence against women and girls (VAWG) is omnipresent, affecting them in every community and city in the world, and manifests itself in different ways, including "physical, sexual, psychological and economic – both within and outside the home"(UN DESA, 2010). This violence or the threat of such violence permeates the different spaces women and girls use, including the home, the school, the workplace, streets, parks, and public transport. Lack of a sense of safety affects their mobility, restricting their movements and ability to benefit from urban opportunities including education and employment.

> "A safe city is one in which both the government and civil society guarantee women's rights in all spheres. A safe city is one that promotes the elimination of gender-based violence, while at the same time promoting equal opportunities for men and women in all the spheres of social, economic, cultural and political life (access to employment, education, political participation, resources and leisure, etc.)."[51]

Over the past decades, there has been much work done to address, prevent and respond to intimate partner violence inside the home. It is only in recent years that the same attention has been paid to violence against women and girls in public spaces. However, much work remains to fully understand the scope and breadth of each. VAWG, in its many forms, remains chronically underreported, with "only 14 % of women reported their most serious incident of intimate partner violence to the police, and 13 % reported their most serious incident of non-partner violence to the police" (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2014). Recent studies about women's and girls' experiences of street harassment in cities have shaken one of the long-held beliefs about VAWG, that it is much more present in private than in public spaces. With more people living in cities than not, and with the current 'feminization of urbanization' trend, it is more critical than ever that we invest in understanding women's experiences of safety (or lack thereof) in urban public spaces and transit systems.

The prevalence and pertinence of women's (un)safety in public spaces

Street surveys as part of the Gender Inclusive Cities Programme (2009-2012) revealed that women in Rosario, Argentina; Petrozavodsk, Russia; Delhi, India; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania identified gender as the number one personal-identity related factor that contributes to their lack of safety (WICI, 2010a).

The violence and threat of violence that women and girls face is a violation of their human rights and an obstacle to achieving gender equality. It limits their freedom of movement and capacity to participate fully and freely as citizens thereby denying them the ability to assert their rights to the city (Moser, 2012). For example, if a woman does not feel safe using public transportation, her ability to access employment and gain economic independence is threatened. Women's daily tasks and opportunities are shaped by concern for their personal safety as they negotiate the urban environment. This is a direct violation of women's rights, as established by the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Results from a 2011 Gallup Poll point to a "safety gender gap", meaning that men and women in the same places at the same times experience safety differently. Further, the findings highlight that this is more prevalent in high-income countries that average a 23% gap, than in low-income countries that average an 8% gap (see Figure 1). If this data were not disaggregated, we might conclude that 49% of Algerians feel safe walking alone in their neighbourhoods at night. However, this is completely misleading since it is a country with one of the greatest safety gender gaps – only 32% of women feel safe walking alone at night in their neighbourhood versus 66% of men (Crabtree et al., 2012). Unfortunately, many cities and countries are still not collecting sex-differentiated data.

The normalization of sexual harassment and violence against young women and girls is so pervasive that girls learn to expect these behaviours on buses and

Figure 1 **In the city or area where you live, do you feel safe walking alone at night, or not?**

Percentage "yes, feel safe" among women and men in each country

	WOMEN	MEN	GAP
New Zealand	50%	85%	-35
Algeria	32%	66%	-34
Malta	48%	82%	-34
Cyprus	57%	85%	-28
Italy	40%	68%	-28
Albania	54%	81%	-27
France	51%	78%	-27
Australia	51%	78%	-27
United States	62%	89%	-27
Finland	66%	92%	-26
Sweden	65%	91%	-26
Ireland	58%	83%	-25
Portugal	51%	76%	-25
Yemen	56%	80%	-24
Belgium	52%	76%	-24
Malaysia	34%	58%	-24
Japan	57%	81%	-24
Estonia	46%	69%	-23
Czech Republic	48%	71%	-23
Slovakia	48%	70%	-22
Netherlands	69%	91%	-22
Latvia	39%	60%	-21
Moldova	40%	61%	-21
Germany	67%	88%	-21
United Kingdom	62%	82%	-20
Taiwan	54%	74%	-20
Poland	50%	70%	-20

Source: Crabtree et al. (2012)

when walking in the street, accepting them as daily fixtures in urban life (Hlavka, 2014). In Kampala, 80% of adolescent girls said that they did not feel safe in the public spaces of their city (Plan International et al., 2013).

Investment in understanding the prevalence of street harassment is relatively recent and much work remains to be done. Early findings do point to the shocking frequency with which this occurs. For example, a 2013 UN Women study revealed that 99.3% of Egyptian women have experienced some form of sexual harassment. The study found that "96.5% of women in their survey said that sexual harassment came in the form of touching, which was the most common manifestation of sexual harassment. Verbal sexual harassment had the second-highest rate experienced by women with 95.5% of women reporting cases" (Basil El-Dabh, 2013). On May 8, 2014, the UK-based Everyday Sexism project encouraged people to share their experiences of unwanted touching on Twitter using the hashtag #Grabbed. According to the International Business Times, the hashtag had been used more than 6,000 times, and was the top trending topic in the UK by that evening.[52] Both of these examples demonstrate that the street harassment which women and girls face is often physical.

Public transit consistently emerges as a key place where women and girls experience harassment, intimidation and fear (WICI, 2010a). In a recent study of over 1,000 adolescent girls in Cairo, Delhi, Hanoi, Lima and Kampala, it was found that across all cities, girls reported feeling uncomfortable, unsafe and disrespected when travelling on buses. For many girls, bystander apathy was a key factor affecting their insecurity. In fact, only 2.2% of girls from Lima reported "always feeling safe" when using public transportation (Plan International et al., 2013). Sexual harassment in public transit is so rampant that the American cities of Boston, Washington and Philadelphia launched anti-harassment campaigns in their transit systems to address the issue, and encourage people to report and support in the event of harassment. More recently, the British Transport Police launched "Project Guardian" which aims to "reduce sexual assault and unwanted sexual behaviour on public transport in London."[53]

What is being done to increase women's safety in public spaces

In spite of these daunting and depressing figures, increasing numbers of creative and innovative efforts are underway in cities around the world to challenge the culture and systems that allow VAWG to flourish in urban environments. Building on much of the work that began in Canadian cities in the late 1980s and 90s, initiatives led by UN-HABITAT's Safer Cities Programme, Women in Cities International and the Women and Habitat Network of Latin America, began exploring questions around urban safety from a gender perspective in cities around the world. They worked to adapt and develop new tools and methodologies to actively engage local women in diagnosing the security issues they face in their communities, and proposing recommendations for improving their perceived and real safety in their cities. These projects recognized the key role of municipal governments and worked to engage the women in the process. A tipping point was recently reached when different UN agencies (UN Women, UNICEF) and large international NGOs (ActionAid, 2013) launched their own safe cities for women and girls programming, building on the knowledge and success of the previous work. By the time of the Third International Conference on Women's Safety in Delhi, 2010, this was being referred to as a "global movement for safer cities for women and girls".

While the bigger groups, mentioned above, continue to work on these issues, young women and grassroots leaders in cities around the world have recently championed many new initiatives that are gaining traction and media attention, and helping to put the issue of women's and girls' safety in urban public spaces on the agenda.

Art and awareness campaigns

Naming and recognizing the problem is one of the first steps to being able to mobilize key stakeholders to invest in preventing and reducing incidents of VAWG in public spaces. This awareness-raising is often done using art, and when groups are more organized, campaigns are introduced to address issues. For example, an unexpected outcome of the Arab Spring was that the media gave global acknowledgement to the harassment women face in Egypt, particularly in Cairo. The Women on Walls project was born with local women artists using graffiti and street art to focus on women's empowerment.[54] Many of the pieces denounce the sexual harassment and assault Egyptian women experience. Another example is Brooklyn-based artist Tatyana Fazlalizadeh's "Stop Telling Women to Smile" art series. It features a series of drawn portraits of women placed in public spaces with "captions that speak directly to offenders" (e.g. Don't call me baby; My outfit is not an invitation).[55] The artist is planning to expand and scale up the series to represent women in different cities.

Technology and crowd sourcing

With the increasing availability, affordability and accessibility of smart phones, the power of the Internet and mobile technology to report incidences of sexual harassment and assault has been harnessed through the development of mobile applications (apps). Mobile apps and websites, such as iHollaback, Stop Street Harassment, HarrassMap, Everyday Sexism Project, and the Harassment on Translink blog, allow users to report and share their stories anonymously. These have become virtual 'safe spaces' and have generated huge amounts of data about unreported incidents of VAWG in urban public spaces. Much of this data is geo-tagged, which provides important information for targeted prevention in 'hot spots' throughout the city. Another important mobile app for women's safety is "Safetipin".[56] This app, developed in Delhi, essentially digitized the women's safety audit tool, allowing users to do safety audits of their city using their phones. The information is geo-tagged and is shown on a map-based platform. Since it was launched in November 2013, more than 6,000 safety audits have been completed using the app.

Urban planning for women's safety

The women's safety audits largely focus on documenting the factors in the built environment that hinder a woman's sense of safety. These are based around principles of design for women's safety, focusing on such issues as lighting, informal and formal surveillance, and maintenance. While subsequent responses to the problematic issues documented can be long-term and expensive (e.g. a park in Gatineau, Canada was redesigned following the recommendations of a group of elderly women), solutions can also be short-term and inexpensive, and have an impact. For example, women in an informal settlement in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania determined that they would feel safer if their streets had names (WICI, 2010b). The women therefore painted names on pieces of wood and placed them throughout their community. The municipal government subsequently formalized the names given to the streets by the women (WICI, 2012).

Improving urban services

A final category of work being undertaken to improve women's and girls' safety and inclusion in cities, focuses on providing training to people delivering urban public services. For example, the Delhi-based NGO Jagori has trained bus drivers about the safety of female passengers. The training focuses on grounding sexual harassment in the broader context of gender discrimination, seeking to breakdown gender stereotypes and assumptions. Located on city buses and using role-plays, bus drivers learn to recognized sexual harassment, and brainstorm different ways of responding. Almost 4,000 drivers have participated in the training.[57] In Latin America, Red Mujer y Habitat is leading a regional programme aimed at promoting women's rights to live in cities free of VAWG. They are working to strengthen collaboration between women's organizations and the police, and are providing training to police institutions about gender equality, and about how to handle cases of VAWG. The hope is that this will transform police practices to better promote women's safety in the city.[58]

Conclusion and future orientations

As our cities continue to expand, we have a responsibility to understand and respond to women's and girls' needs, ensuring that the physical infrastructure and built environment is gender inclusive. Urban policies and programmes that create space for women's meaningful participation in shaping urban development and governance must be introduced. We have only just begun to understand the expansive scope of the sexual harassment women and girls face as they navigate the urban environment. Greater resources must be put into understanding not only the scope of the problem, but the actual impact of proposed solutions. UN Women's *Global Programme Safe Cities Free of Violence against Women and Girls* aims to begin to fill this gap through a comprehensive impact evaluation (UN Women, 2013). Further investment is also required to understand how issues of gender exclusion and VAWG interact with other urban issues such as basic services. While WICI and Jagori, and ActionAid have done some work in this area, much more needs to be done. As with any successful urban prevention initiative, multi-level, multi-sectorial and multi-stakeholder engagement is essential for success. As more and more safe cities for women and girls initiatives are developed and introduced around the world, it is essential that they continue to build on the lessons and experience of what has been accomplished so far.

> "Making cities and communities safe for women and girls can expand their full social, economic, cultural and political participation as equal citizens. Cities and communities that are safe and free from violence against women help to create equal opportunities for men and women. When they are safe and comfortable, public spaces in cities and communities offer countless possibilities for the participation of women and girls in the areas of work, education, politics, and recreation. The creation of safe cities and communities for women and girls depends on the elimination of the violence and insecurity that prevent women and girls from using public spaces freely as citizens with equal human rights to opportunity and safety."[59]

Violence against women in the European Union – Results of a 28-country survey

The European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights[60]

Contribution

While the European Union (EU) does not have legislation for its 28 Member States[61] that would comprehensively address violence against women, there have been a number of EU-level policy measures and laws which focus on various aspects of the phenomenon. These include the provision of funding to research initiatives (e.g. through the DAPHNE funding programme) as well as legislation on sexual harassment (Gender Equality Directive (recast)[62]), the European protection order[63] and a regulation on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters[64], and a directive concerning the rights of victims of crime in the EU (EU Victims' Directive[65]). Alongside these developments within the EU, in 2011 the Council of Europe adopted the *Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and domestic violence* (Istanbul Convention) [66], which is the first legally binding instrument in this area in Europe. Despite these developments, policy makers have faced a lack of comparable data on women's experience of violence and details on the extent, nature and consequences of such acts. As a result, the European Parliament asked the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights in November 2009 to collect, for the first time, comparable and reliable data on violence against women in the EU – a request that was later echoed by the EU Member States in the Council of the European Union.

In the last 20 years many EU Member States have seen national surveys on violence against women – however, these surveys have not been done in all Member States, and it has not been possible to have an overview of the extent and nature of various forms of violence due to lack of harmonisation in question formulation, target population and research methods. In contrast to crime victimization surveys, in only a few countries have violence against women surveys been integrated as a part of the national system of victimization data collection, which would have allowed these surveys to be repeated – as a result many violence against women surveys have not been repeated, and the available data is not up to date.

FRA took great care in developing the survey in a process that took over two years, consulting a variety of stakeholders and a group of survey experts to ensure that the survey is able to respond to the needs of policy makers for reliable and comparable evidence-based advice. In each of the 28 EU Member States the survey interviewed a representative, random sample of women (ages 18-74) – summing up to a total of 42,000 face-to-face interviews in the EU. The interviewers tasked to collect this data underwent a two-day training programme, building on top of their extensive interview experience, to prepare them for the topic and to ensure that the interviews take place in a confidential and sensitive manner.

The survey addressed a number of forms of violence against women, in some respects going beyond existing national surveys. In addition to physical, sexual and psychological violence, the survey asked questions on women's experiences of sexual harassment (including sexual cyberharassment), stalking (including cyberstalking), victimization in childhood (before the age of 15) and questions on fear of victimization and rights awareness. FRA published the detailed survey results in March 2014, together with a technical report and the survey questionnaire.[67]

Extent of the problem

The results of the survey show that an estimated 13 million women in the EU have experienced physical violence in the course of 12 months before the survey interviews, and some 3.7 million women in the EU have experienced sexual violence in the course of 12 months prior to the survey. Many more women have been victims of physical and/or sexual violence over their lifetime, as one in three women (33%) has experienced physical and/or sexual violence since the age of 15, including incidents by partners as well as non-partners.

One third of victims of partner violence (33%) and one quarter of victims of non-partner violence (26 %) contacted either the police or some other organization or service – such as a health care service provider or victim support organization – following the most serious incident of violence. Specifically, victims reported the most serious incident of partner violence to the police in 14 % of cases and the most serious incident of non-partner violence in 13% of cases. For about a quarter of victims, feeling ashamed or embarrassed about what had happened was the reason for not reporting the most serious incident of sexual violence by a partner or a non-partner to the police or any other organization. When asked which type of help would have been useful, women indicate that, as a result of the most serious incident of violence, first and foremost they wanted to have someone to talk to and support them (33% – 54% depending on the type of violence and perpetrator), followed by protection (12% – 25%) and other practical help (13% – 21%).

In the EU-28, 18% of women have experienced stalking since the age of 15, and 5% of women have experienced it in the 12 months before the survey interview. This corresponds to about 9 million women in the EU-28 experiencing stalking within a period of 12 months. The most common forms of stalking involve repeated, offensive and threatening communications – for example, some 14% of women have received offensive or threatening messages or phone calls repeatedly from the same person, while 8% have been followed around or experienced somebody loitering outside their home or workplace.

One in ten women (9%) has been stalked by her previous partner. Out of all women victims of stalking, one in five (21%) has experienced stalking that lasted more than two years. Cyberstalking – stalking by means of email, text messages or the internet – concerns young women in particular. Of all 18- to 29-year-old women, 4% have experienced cyberstalking in the 12 months before the survey interview, compared with 0.3% of women who are 60 years old or older.

All in all, 55% of women in the EU-28 have experienced one or more forms of sexual harassment since the age of 15, and one in five women (21%) have experienced it in the 12 months before the survey interview. Among women who have experienced sexual harassment at least once since the age of 15, 32% indicated somebody from the employment context – such as a colleague, a boss or a customer – as a perpetrator.

The risk of young women aged between 18 and 29 years becoming a target of threatening and offensive advances on the internet is twice as high as the risk for women aged between 40 and 49 years, and more than three times as high as the risk for women aged between 50 and 59 years. Sexual harassment is more commonly experienced by women with a university degree and by women in the highest occupational groups: 75% of women in the top management category and 74% of those in the professional occupational category have experienced sexual harassment in their lifetime.

On average, 33% of women have experienced physical or sexual violence by an adult in childhood – that is, before they were 15 years of age. Some 12% of women indicate that they experienced some form of sexual violence by an adult before the age of 15, which corresponds to about 21 million women in the EU. Perpetrators of physical violence in childhood mainly came from within the family. More than half of the women who experienced some form of physical violence before the age of 15 identify their father as a perpetrator (55%), and almost half of women name the mother as a perpetrator (46%) (in the survey women, based on their experiences, could indicate one or more perpetrators). Almost all (97%) perpetrators of sexual violence against girls are men. Every second woman who was a victim of sexual violence in childhood states that the perpetrator was a man she did not know before.

From survey results to action

Based on the mandate of FRA, the Agency includes in its reports opinions to advise EU institutions and Member States on possible courses for action in view of the evidence collected and presented in the Agency's expert capacity.

EU Member States are encouraged to use the results from the survey in the process of signing and ratifying the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and domestic violence, which is the first legally binding instrument of its kind in Europe. The survey results document the particular needs of, and challenges in providing services for, women victims of sexual violence, and therefore the EU Member States should pay attention to meeting these needs when implementing the EU Victims' Directive. The Directive recognises the heightened needs of various groups of vulnerable victims, including victims of gender-based violence, in addition to setting a number of other goals concerning crime victims' access to support services and preventing 'secondary victimization' during the criminal justice proceedings.

Taking into consideration the scale of the problem – with physical and sexual violence affecting one woman in three since the age of 15 in the EU – policy actions which follow the EU's Stockholm Programme[68] should ensure that violence against women is addressed as an abuse of fundamental rights. Involvement of the private sector would be essential in many ways, from addressing violence and sexual harassment in the work place to having social media platforms and other online service providers taking a more proactive role in helping victims report the abuse taking place through these services.

While it may be possible to detect a form of “action plan fatigue” in some EU Member States, where action plans to combat violence against women have expired without being renewed and refocused, the results indicated that violence takes place every day and everywhere, and this calls out for effective multi-agency cooperation. Actions to combat violence against women need to include measures that address the education, health as well as information and communication technology sectors, to name just few.

Further attention needs to be devoted to the way violence against women is addressed and discussed, and it should be dealt with as a public matter rather than a private one – in terms of the way incidents of violence are prosecuted, but also by encouraging women to speak openly about their experiences, and by involving men in this process. Criminal justice system and other service providers should ensure that they collect data on violence against women and that they publish this data in a sex-disaggregated way, so that violence against women does not stay hidden, and it is possible to examine the volume of and trends in recorded incidents.

Domestic violence specialized courts in Canada

Carmen Gill[69]

Over the past thirty years, the criminal justice system in Canada has assumed a pro-active and interventionist role in response to domestic violence, such as developing new law enforcement policies and legislation (Federal-Provincial-Territorial Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence, 2013; Gill & Thériault, 2010; Johnson & Dawson, 2011; Ursel et al., 2008b). One major innovation in criminal justice responses has been the creation of specialized courts dedicated to domestic violence cases. Specialized courts have also been established in countries such as Australia (Stewart, 2011), New Zealand (Knaggs et al., 2008), the UK (Cook et al., 2004) and several states in the US (Labriola et al., 2008) as an alternative to traditional adjudicative approaches that were not responding adequately to the complexity of the issue.

Domestic violence cases are clearly recognizable and identifiable in specialized courts. Research has shown the difficulty of identifying such offences in non-specialized courts, since they are often not recorded as domestic violence (Gill & Ruff, 2010). For example, domestic violence crimes can encompass various forms of violent crime such as assault, criminal harassment, firearms use etc.; property crimes such as breaking and entering, theft, stealing; and other Criminal Code offences such as administration of justice violations, disturbance of the peace, counterfeiting, etc. Under specialized courts, every possible offence related to domestic violence is processed as a domestic violence crime.

Specialized courts were developed to address challenges faced through traditional procedures in domestic violence situations. Concerns about traditional justice include the re-victimization of the victim during the judicial process; frequent occurrence of victim statement recants and victims declining to testify; lack of protection and counselling for victims and witnesses before, during, and after sentencing; and long delays in court proceedings, etc.

The term specialized court is used for a broad range of specialized processes including investigation, charging, prosecution, and the court process itself. It encompasses various related services (community programmes, services for victims, and treatment agencies for offenders) that support and work with courts (Busby, Koshan & Wiegers, 2008). Compared to traditional processes, specialized processes have a more holistic approach that can help respond to domestic violence situations (Elley, 2005). They bring together trained professionals who understand the issues, monitor sentencing conditions, support positive outcomes for victims, establish a responsive system that encourages and supports offender accountability, and promote a coordinated approach across police units, prosecutors, victim services, and probation officers (Dawson & Dinovitzer, 2001; Gill & Tutty, 2005; Ursel, 2002). The goal is to reduce the number of domestic violence cases by working with key community partners to ensure timely access to support services for victims and intervention programmes for offenders.

In general, specialized courts have been shown to increase court-mandated specialized treatment for first-time offenders, and have resulted in higher incarceration rates for repeat offenders (Moyer and Associates, 2000). Re-offending has also been shown to decrease under specialized court systems (Hoffart & Clark, 2004). Indeed, specialization shows a more expedient court process for domestic violence cases when compared to non-specialized processes (Gill & Ruff, 2010). A timely and appropriate court process is seen to increase the safety of the victim, and to decrease the likelihood of victim statement recants. By providing a coordinated response and a prosecution team that is attentive to the unique reality of domestic violence, some specialized courts have in effect redefined the measures of success in a justice response to domestic violence cases, and have been more successful than the conventional system in meeting the diverse needs of victims (Ursel, 2002). Shorter wait time for court process, support for the victim, assessment of risk of re-offending of the accused and safety of the victim, available intervention programmes, court or probation monitoring, and court-mandated treatment of offenders, are among the factors that improve victim safety and offender accountability under specialized courts.

The development and implementation of domestic violence specialized courts falls under provincial and territorial jurisdictions in Canada, but applies the federal Criminal Code. Some jurisdictions have created courts that handle only domestic violence cases; others have changed court processes to ensure more effective processing of domestic violence matters; some handle an array of family violence issues; yet others have specialized staff that provide support to victims (Weber, 2000, and see Box 1). There is no universal model for domestic violence specialized courts and they generally pursue one of the following three models: early intervention models, therapeutic court models, and vigorous prosecution for high-risk offenders (FPT Ad Hoc Working Group on Family Violence, 2013).

The first Domestic Violence Specialized Court in Canada was established in Winnipeg, Manitoba, in 1990. The entire court process is specialized, including police, victim services, crown prosecutors, judges, court and corrections (Ursel et al., 2008a). More recently, Nova Scotia implemented a Domestic Violence Court Program Pilot in 2012, while a Domestic Violence Treatment Option Court was established in Behchoko in the Northwest Territories in 2013. As of today, domestic violence specialized courts or specialized processes are in place in the following provinces and territories (Jackson et al., 2013):

As mentioned above, while there are a number of different domestic violence specialized court models in Canada, very few have been evaluated, and few reports have been published or are accessible to the public (Hoffart & Clark, 2004; Ursel et al., 2008b). Further, very few comparative studies of domestic violence cases under specialization and non-specialization have been conducted in Canada (Gill & Ruff, 2010).

A comparative study conducted in New Brunswick led researchers to look closely at information gathered about domestic violence cases in specialized (Moncton) and non-specialized (Fredericton) courts (Gill & Thériault, 2010). The results clearly demonstrate that it is very hard to identify which accused in non-specialized courts are involved in domestic violence, because offences are not explicitly connected to domestic violence situations. With a court dedicated to domestic violence cases it is possible to capture the complexity of the issue. In the first year of the establishment of the domestic violence court in Moncton in 2007, the province of New Brunswick witnessed a significant impact on recorded domestic violence crimes. The number of domestic violence cases appeared to increase in Moncton compared to other regions in the province, reflecting a more accurate recording of cases due to a change in the court process. This is not unique to New Brunswick and applies as well to other jurisdictions across the country

Box 1 **Specialized courts and court processes in Canada**[70]

British Columbia	British Columbia hosts at least two ad hoc domestic violence courts on Vancouver Island in Duncan and Nanaimo. There are several additional specialized domestic violence court processes in the province being led by the judiciary.
Alberta	Alberta hosts domestic violence courts in Calgary, Edmonton, Lethbridge, Red Deer, Grande Prairie, Fort McMurray, Airdrie (circuit court), and Medicine Hat.
Saskatchewan	Saskatchewan offers a Domestic Violence Treatment Option Court in Regina and the Battlefords, and a full service court in Saskatoon that includes a treatment option.
Manitoba	Manitoba maintains a Family Violence Court in Winnipeg from bail to trials at both the Provincial and Superior Court Levels. Components of specialization include: Specialized crowns and victim service workers in Winnipeg, 4 circuit courts handled out of Winnipeg by specialized crowns and victim service workers as well as half a dozen communities outside of Winnipeg, including Northern Manitoba.
Ontario	Ontario offers a Domestic Violence Court Programme.
Quebec	Montreal has a specific courtroom dedicated to domestic violence cases and offers a service for psycho-social evaluations, information, support and referrals.
New Brunswick	Provincial Court Domestic Violence (Moncton Jurisdiction).
Nova Scotia	Domestic Violence Court Programme Pilot (in action since June 2012).
Nunavut	Rankin Inlet: Court-based abusive partner programme.
Northwest Territories	Domestic Violence Treatment Option Court in Yellowknife effective March 2011 and in Behchoko effective April 2013.
Yukon	Domestic Violence Treatment Option Court and Community Wellness Court (not specialized in DV but accepts DV cases).

(Ursel et al., 2008a). Further, a comparison of specialized and non-specialized courts shows that length of incarceration and probation conditions were longer and more specific under specialization, compared to regular court processes. Probation conditions of no contact with the victim, abstaining from alcohol consumption, and no firearms were more common in specialized than non-specialized courts. Thus it is essential to identify domestic violence cases early in the court process in order to understand how they relate to offending patterns, and can be dealt with in the criminal justice system.

Specialized courts are among promising practices that provide better court processing time and more appropriate sentencing for domestic violence related offences. In this sense, continued reviews of court cases are needed, and can help to provide a better understanding of the role domestic violence specialized courts play in responding to and preventing future violence.

Endnotes

1 See Box 6.1 for definitions of VAW and IPV and an explanation of related terms.

2 Holly Johnson (2013) provides a valuable review of the development of surveys on VAW over the past 30 years, and this section draws extensively on her analysis.

3 Household surveys of large nationally representative samples carried out primarily in low- and middle-income countries.

4 The countries were Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea.

5 The term *domestic violence* rather than IPV is used when it is the term used in the source cited.

6 For a review of the impact of neighbourhood environments on IPV see Beyer et al. (2013).

7 Stöckl et al. (2013, p. 859).

8 Women are much more likely to be killed by partners than by other family members.

9 Murder–suicides are generally defined as violent events in which the perpetrator kills one or more people and subsequently commits suicide within a short period of time (Shaw, 2013, p. 26).

10 Teen dating violence prevention forms part of the US National Institute of Justice programme on VAW (Auchter & Moore, 2013).

11 This was the main topic of the meetings of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 2013.

12 http://saynotoviolence.org/

13 It has been ratified by 32 of the 35 member states. While many countries initially enacted legislation to make domestic violence a crime, a review of progress up to 2008 found a lack of enforcement, resources and training, with many programmes being provided by non-government organizations rather than being supported by governments (OAS-ICM, 2008).

14 At least 10 countries are required to ratify the treaty for it to come into force. Denmark became the 11th such country in April 2014. Twenty five others have signed the Convention.

15 Gauri van Gulik, global women's rights advocate for Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/24/Europe-treaty-violence-against-women-take-effect

16 The underlying principles of prevention, provision of services, partnership working, justice outcomes, and risk reduction remain part of the action plan.

17 The act aims to protect victims without criminalizing the family, and provides for injunctions and sanctions in case of non-compliance.

18 Under Clare's Law, the police are allowed to disclose details about a partner's previous history of domestic violence or violent acts to individuals.

19 These articles appear in a special issue of the journal *Violence Against Women* devoted to "The Violence Against Women Research and Evaluation Program" funded by the National Institute of Justice over a period of 18 years.

20 *Safer Leeds* is the Community Safety Partnership for the city, set up following the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998.

21 This includes a new transportation system to the centre of the city (*Metrocable*), the construction of libraries, public spaces and other services, improvements to commerce and banking services, and the decentralization of municipal entities.

22 Based on surveys of victimization and violence conducted by PREVIVA in the communities involved in the initiative.

23 www.changingways.on.ca/

24 www.pro-gam.ca/pages/fr/accueil.php

25 www.mend.ie/

26 The police have worked in collaboration with the Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for Family Violence Research (CBC, 2014).

27 See the Contribution by Marc Parent in ICPC's 2010 *International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety*, Chapter 8.

28 E-maria.eu

29 www.provant.be/welzijn/zorg_en_hulp/geweld_en_slachtofferbeleid/co_3_project/

30 www.idas.org.uk/interagency_making_safe.html

31 www.community.nsw.gov.au/docs_menu/for_agencies_that_work_with_us/our_funding_programs/shlv.html

32 Heise (2011, p. v).

33 Prevention programme for dating abuse www.hazelden.org/web/go/safedates; Youth Relationship Project www.youthrelationships.org/index.html

34 www.mencanstoprape.org/The-Men-of-Strength-Club/

35 *Sisters for Life* is a participatory learning and action curriculum developed by the Rural AIDS and Development Action Research Program (RADAR) on HIV/AIDS, gender norms, cultural beliefs, communication, and IPV.

36 Stepping Stones www.steppingstonesfeedback.org/

37 Men as partners www.engenderhealth.org/our-work/gender/men-as-partners.php; Program H. www.promundo.org.br/en/activities/activities-posts/program-h/; Sonke, et al. 2013; Sahayog, www.sahayogindia.org

38 Soul City Institute for Health & Development Communication www.soulcity.org.za

39 www.buzzfeed.com/regajha/indias-incredibly-powerful-abused-goddesses-campaign-condemn

40 http://thisisabuse.direct.gov.uk/

41 www.whiteribbon.ca/

42 www.crimepreventionottawa.ca/en/initiatives/violence-against-women

43 www.puntos.org.ni/index.php/es/

44 www.voldmodkvinder.dk/

45 http://mrcssi.com/

46 http://shieldofathena.com/

47 www.iwdvs.org.au/

48 www.fvpls.org/

49 www.faq-qnw.org/dossiers/non-violence-awareness-campaign-for-men

50 Executive Director, Women in Cities International, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

51 UN Women Virtual Knowledge Centre to End Violence against Women and Girls, Safe Cities Module, developed by Women in Cities International and Red Mujer y Habitat. www.endvawnow.org/en/modules/view/12-safe-cities.html

52 Bates, L. (2013, May 16). "Too many women are touched, grabbed and groped without consent." *The Guardian*.

53 British Transport Police: www.btp.police.uk/advice_and_information/how_we_tackle_crime/project_guardian.aspx

54 http://womenonwalls.com/

55 http://stoptellingwomentosmile.com/About

56 www.safetipin.com

57 Jagori Safe Delhi Campaign, official website: http://safedelhi.jagori.org/news/gender-trainings-with-dtc-our-experiences/

58 Red Mujey y Habitat: www.redmujer.org.ar/programas.html

59 www.endvawnow.org

60 The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) is one of the EU's decentralised agencies. These agencies are set up to provide expert advice to the institutions of the EU (Council, Parliament and Commission) and the Member States. FRA helps to ensure that the fundamental rights of people living in the EU are protected. For more information see http://fra.europa.eu.

61 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

62 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ 2006 L 204.

63 Directive 2011/99/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on the European protection order, OJ 2011 L 338.

64 Regulation 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 on mutual recognition of protection measures in civil matters, OJ 2013 L 181.

65 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA, OJ 2012 L 315.

66 For more information see www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/convention-violence/about_en.asp.

67 The full survey findings are presented in FRA (2014). *Violence against women: An EU-wide survey*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU. This report, along with a summary report (in English, French and German), a factsheet (in 22 EU languages), a technical report and the survey questionnaire are available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2014/vaw-survey-main-results. Interactive data explorer can also be used to browse the results in further detail, particularly at the level of each Member State: http://fra.europa.eu/DVS/DVT/vaw.php.

68 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:FULL:EN:PDF.

69 Carmen Gill, Director, Muriel McQueen Fergusson Centre for Family Violence Research, University of New Brunswick.

70 This table presents a combination of specialized courts and some court processes from across the country. Court processes indicate that there would be special days or parts of the day set aside to deal only with domestic violence cases and/or specialized procedures and/or collaboration with services for victims or offenders.

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CHAPTER 6
Intimate partner violence against women

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International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC)
465, rue Saint-Jean, bureau 803
Montréal (Québec) H2Y 2R6
CANADA

+1 514 288-6731
cipc@cipc-icpc.org
www.cipc-icpc.org