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Appendices

APPENDIX 1: GEOGRAPHIC REFERENCING OF RECORDS AND SANITISING GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES

1) Geographic referencing of records

Easting and Northing coordinates provide a means for referencing geographically data records in a geographical information system (GIS). Not all partner agencies are able to provide these geographic coordinates but can provide the address or location details of the offence. In these circumstances, if the agency to whom the data is being supplied has systems in place to determine the Easting and Northing coordinates from the address, then the full address or the full postcode should be provided in order for them to perform this operation. On completion of this operation the full address should be deleted or at least sanitised in order to ensure that the address cannot be used to identify an individual. In certain cases, an incident may relate to a non-addressable location, such as a park, car park or area of waste ground. In these cases the best attempt possible should be made to geographically reference the incident to this non-addressable location. The centre-point of this location is the best solution, or, if the incident relates to some sort of building or structure, for example, a park pavilion, then the geographic coordinates for this location should be used. Many police forces and local authorities maintain gazetteers that include geographic coordinates for both addressable and non-addressable locations, therefore helping to reference geographically many different types of address and location information.

2) Sanitising geographic information and geographic co-ordinates

Geographic coordinates that relate to an address can be disclosive even if the address information has been removed from the information. A process that can be used by CSPs to depersonalise the coordinates and the address string in a record is explained in the following steps. This process has been approved by the Information Commissioner's Office as being compliant with the Data Protection Act. This process is not required for data that have been geocoded to non-addressable locations because these types of locations do not refer in any way to persons.

In general the process involves sanitising the geographic coordinates that have been calculated for an address to the geographic coordinates of the address's postcode centroid (the centre of gravity of the geographic extent of the postcode). This effectively involves reassigning to the record the geographic coordinates of the postcode centroid. This is explained in the following example:

- A burglary record contains the address 5 Acacia Avenue SW1A 1AA. The geographic coordinates for this address are 654321, 123456
- The coordinates for the centroid of the postcode SW1A 1AA are 654312, 123465
- To sanitise the burglary record, the geographic coordinates are changed to those of the postcode centroid, replacing the property-precise coordinates with the coordinates 654312, 123465.

An additional condition that needs to be applied is that if the postcode contains fewer than four households then the sanitised geographic coordinates are those for the next nearest postcode that contains at least four households.

This process is illustrated with examples in Figure 4. Figures 4a and 4b show burglaries indicated as small squares – these are hypothetical burglaries for the purpose of this illustration, rather than showing


houses where actual burglaries have taken place. Map 4b includes the background map for context. The lines shown in 4a represent the boundaries of the postcodes. These burglaries are mapped to the exact locations where the burglaries took place.

Figures 4c and 4d show the postcode centroids as round dots. The process of sanitising the geographic coordinates for these burglaries involves reassigning each crime record with the geographic coordinates of its relevant postcode centroid (where there are at least four households within that postcode). For postcodes with fewer than four households, the records are moved to the next nearest postcode where there are at least four households. The geographic coordinates that are recorded for these records then need to be checked to ensure they reflect these repositioned locations. Any address information in the original record that identifies an individual location also needs to be sanitised. This requires the address string to be corrected so that it does not contain the house number, house name, or flat/apartment number, and for any postcode with less than four households to be deleted or corrected with the postcode to which the records have been repositioned.

The result of this process is the creation of a sanitised, geographically non-disclosive version of the original records.

Figure 4: Sanitising geographic coordinates by repositioning records to the postcode centroid, where the postcode contains at least four properties. (a) Burglaries shown at their exact location with postcode boundaries, (b) burglaries shown at their exact location with postcode boundaries and background street map, (c) burglaries shown with the postcode boundaries and the postcode centroids to which they have been moved, and (d) burglaries shown with the postcode boundaries and the postcode centroids to which they have been moved, with postcode boundaries and background street map.


a)



b)



c)



d)



APPENDIX 2: THE ROLE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP ANALYST FOR INFORMATION SHARING AND INFORMATION USE

We propose three key considerations for the role that the analyst should play in sharing and using information:

- The primary role of the partnership analyst should be to perform analysis, rather than process information and facilitate the information-sharing process.
- In areas where information-sharing tasks are significant, either a dedicated resource should be in place to support information-sharing tasks (i.e. in the form of an information officer) or these tasks should be contracted out (see Box 3 on p. 60 for an example of the latter).
- In areas where the information-sharing task is not too burdensome and resources are thin, the analyst may be in a position to take on some information-sharing tasks, but with each supplying agency also having a duty to ensure that information is delivered in such a way as to minimise the requirement for the analyst to perform any additional processing. The task of negotiating the sharing of data should primarily be the responsibility of the Designated Liaison Officers from each responsible authority, rather than the partnership analyst.

1) A model for organising and managing the role of the analyst

Figure 5 shows a conceptual model referred to as the 3i Model (Ratcliffe, 2004). This model offers a useful mechanism for organising and managing the role of analysis.

In this model the criminal environment is assumed as a permanent feature, though the boundaries are fluid and dynamic, requiring continual analysis and observation. The ‘criminal environment’ can relate to any community safety problem that needs to be tackled.

In the first instance the criminal environment needs to be understood for any CSP action to be effective. The first stage requires this criminal environment to be interpreted and relies on a range of information sources being available. The arrow in the figure goes from the analysis unit to the criminal environment, signifying the need for active information gathering. In this first stage the analyst should identify the information that is required by considering what questions the information needs to answer and what hypotheses need to be tested, as set out in Step 1 in Section 4.2 on processing information-sharing requirements. Often it is the decision-makers as defined in the model that are very well placed to pose the questions and hypotheses that need to be tested. These decision-makers could be of any operational and leadership rank, although practice tends to suggest that those best placed are the ones who will make use of the resulting intelligence, such as those who brief patrols and decide on the tactics and strategies for crime reduction and policing.

The interpretation of the criminal environment needs to be more than just a descriptive presentation; it should be explanatory in its content. That is, rather than just describing the problem using maps, charts, tables and statistics, the analysis should explain why the problem persists. This is important in order for the intelligence that is generated to be fit for purpose for the second stage in the model: the second stage requires the intelligence to influence the decision-makers. Intelligence that is general, descriptive and lacks analytical substance is unlikely to tell them anything they did not already know. In addition, analysis that lacks specificity about the problem will not identify the small details that matter and the reasons behind the problem, and will result in the problem being poorly understood, or even misunderstood.

The final stage involves the decision-makers using their skills and knowledge to consider how best to intervene and reduce crime by targeting resources that have a positive impact on the criminal environment.

If the problem is not effectively interpreted and understood at the outset, and draws only from a limited range of partner agency information then it is likely that the intelligence that is generated will have little influence or could wrongly influence decision-makers because the information fails to represent the criminal environment accurately. In turn, this may have an impact on poor decision-making, with the wrong types of response being deployed, limiting the opportunities for these resources to impact on the criminal environment.




Figure 5 The 3i Model. The model contains three structures (criminal environment, intelligence/analysis unit, and decision-makers) and three processes (interpret, influence, and impact). Source: Ratcliffe, 2004.

Viewing the structures and processes that are involved in policing and crime reduction in this manner helps to identify the key role that analysis should play in CSP intelligence development and the importance of information for helping to interpret the criminal environment effectively. Analysis should be able to interpret the criminal environment, and its outputs should form a major part of the intelligence used to influence the actions of the decision-maker, who then brings about a positive impact on the criminal environment. It is difficult to think of any community safety problem that can be interpreted using only one source of information, which underlines the need for information to be shared between partner agencies in order for good intelligence to be developed, which in turn can help to identify more accurately the types of responses that may work best to tackle a community safety problem.

2) Making use of analysis – overcoming institutional, organisational and management barriers in the use of intelligence products

No matter how good the intelligence products, there may still be difficulties in getting the products and recommendations that come from analyses to be used and actioned proactively. Poor management of analysis use, a police patrolling culture that questions the legitimacy of being told by desk-bound staff what is happening on the streets, organisational fragmentation, a reactionary rather than a proactive stance on policing and tackling crime, and failure to support innovation, all inhibit the effective use of analysis and intelligence products. Cope (2004: p. 197) captures these sentiments from an analyst:

“We make suggestions, we make suggestions strongly, if we believe them to be important. But...[they] organise their resources how they see fit...there’s nothing we can do about it. Overall, I would suggest that very few of our recommendations are actioned...and that is very frustrating”

Making use of analysis and intelligence products within a CSP requires overcoming a number of obstacles. This section suggests ways in which these institutional, organisational and management barriers can be overcome. These relate to:

- educating the users of intelligence products;
- clearly defining the role of the analyst across the CSP;
- educating the analyst;
- data quality; and
- feedback.

2.i) Educate the users of intelligence products

A vital component in designing intelligence products is to identify their audience and the purpose they will serve. The audience also needs to appreciate, and if necessary, be educated, that analysis is not about creating products that merely describe and summarise the nature of current persistent problems, but that these should include forecasting, predicting and evaluating future crime issues. In other words, analysts should not simply provide management with statistics, charts and maps, but with a real narrative of community safety problems and direction in tackling them. Analysts can become very frustrated if their job merely involves producing descriptive statistics for the weekly management report, and fails to offer the freedom to carry out research that would significantly enhance the production of intelligence content.

Criticism over the quality of analysis for failing to offer operational officers anything they did not already know is occasionally warranted, but may also stem from a limited knowledge of the role and function of analysis, and of the associated information technology and its capability. It is important that officers in the CSP, particularly regular users of intelligence products, are trained effectively in how to interpret these products and in the types of analysis that can be performed, in order to ensure that these officers have the ability to ask meaningful, proactive questions of the analyst.

2.ii) Clearly define the role of the analyst

The lack of any consistency in the definition of an analyst’s role can often lead to confusion about their duties. Because analysts typically have basic IT skills they can often be tasked with acting as the key providers of management and administrative data from the agency’s information systems, required to respond to ad hoc requests because they have access to certain software or data (e.g. responding to requests to create a spreadsheet for someone), or in some cases act as a source of IT technical support. The requirements of an analyst may vary according to the size of the agency, requiring those working in smaller agencies to multi-task. This can be reasonable if proportionate time is also given for analysis, however, such requests should be challenged if they restrict the production of analysis. Analysts can become easily frustrated if all they ever seem to do is produce random pieces of information in response to requests, especially if these requests are rarely in support of the main community safety aims of the CSP. Providing clarity and structure to the definition of an analyst’s role, and offering clear guidance across the partnership on their role and the tasks they should perform are important if they are to be used effectively.

2.iii) Educating the analyst

It is important for an analyst to have the opportunity and freedom to learn new techniques, theoretical concepts and develop communication channels with their colleagues. Eck (1998) noted that the lack of theory incorporated into intelligence products, such as failing to describe why hotspots were persistent in certain areas (rather than just describing the fact that a hotspot existed in an area), meant that analysis products often lacked substance and tended to be merely descriptive. Additionally, analysts typically do not have a policing or applied crime reduction background. It is vital for analysts to understand policing approaches and practical opportunities for reducing crime so that any products or recommendations they develop are created in the context of how they can impact on the criminal environment.

Analysts should develop their products and recommendations in consultation with CSP officers. This helps to bring legitimacy to their analysis products. Some officers may be sceptical about analysis and find it uncomfortable to accept recommendations from analysts, particularly when the recommendations that they receive fail to appreciate the practicalities of policing or targeted crime reduction initiatives. An analyst should be encouraged to develop communication channels with their operational colleagues to help them legitimise the intelligence products they develop. Several CSPs operate 'panels of experts' that provide a forum for consultation during the production of intelligence products. This can help the analyst to draw on the skills and expertise of their peers and consequently improve the content and quality of intelligence products.

2.iv) Data quality

All intelligence products require good quality data as these data are key to the quality of information and intelligence that can be generated. Poor quality data undermine analysis.

Those that are sceptical about analysis are often also the same people that know, or at least have a perception, that data entered into their intelligence and information systems are poor. This knowledge merely increases their scepticism in regard to the value of intelligence.

Many agencies working with community safety data perform data cleaning processes after data entry to help improve its quality. Yet if operational officers are not aware that these cleaning tasks occur then they may continue to question the viability of crime analysis products. *"Nobody trusts the analysts' stuff because they get their information from the [computer systems] and officers know they put crap on the system"* was the comment from a criminal intelligence database supervisor quoted by Cope (2004: p. 193). Data entry requires careful management. It is important to raise the awareness of those who enter data of the extent to which these data are relied on, and the importance of being consistent in how details are entered. Often this is a relatively simple matter of reinforcing how data should be entered in a certain format or by using standards or templates for entering such details.

2.v) Feedback

A vital part in the production of analysis products is gathering feedback from the audience using the product. Feedback should be gathered on whether the analysis was used, how it was used, in what way the information was useful (e.g. did it reveal something different that was not known?), whether its content and tone was pitched correctly (e.g. was the content level sufficient and timely?) and whether the analysis helped to achieve some success.

Analysts should not become too defensive if constructive criticism is offered on their work: fulfilling the expectations of all can be difficult, and the presentation of information does require practice. Evaluating the use and effectiveness of intelligence products will help to improve and legitimise their content.


3) Managing and organising the production of intelligence products

Analysis needs to be managed and organised to be integrated into the day-to-day operational delivery of CSP services as well as the CSP's strategic direction. Analysis needs to be viewed as an essential part of an intelligence-led process, so its products are not overlooked or ignored or just act as wallpaper. The 3i Model described helps to provide a framework for identifying the role that analysis should play in intelligence development. Approaching analysis in this way means that it is easier to identify requests that fit under the function of analysis and those that do not. The need for this type of structure and direction in analysis is important because the CSP hierarchy can be an intimidating environment to work in. Requests may come from many directions and because the person who asks for information from an analyst may look, sound or be important, the analyst may end up taking on inappropriate requests.

The organisation of analysis and its use needs to be proactive and supportive of the intelligence process. Approaching the management and organisation of analysis functions in this way helps to weight responsibilities for meeting ad hoc requests and discourages analysis being used solely as an after-thought to try to justify any actions that have been decided. Box 4 describes the commissioning process for intelligence products operated in Greater Manchester. This helps to manage the requests for intelligence that analysts receive as well as supporting them in the process of generating intelligence products.

Box 4 The importance of management to support crime analysis – experiences from Greater Manchester

The Greater Manchester Against Crime (GMAC) Partnership Business Model provides a standard method for organising and managing a work programme that is focused on addressing the key partnership priorities. The Model is used both at CSP level (of which there are ten across Greater Manchester) and the Greater Manchester conurbation level. The GMAC Partnership Business Model is supported by at least 15 Strategic Analytical Co-ordinators trained and equipped to a common standard.



The Greater Manchester Against Crime Partnership Business Model

Particular importance is placed on a commissioning approach for the development and delivery of analytical products. The commissioning approach helps to ensure the focus for analytical requests is based around the Partnerships’ core business functions. Partnership Business Groups are the bodies that commission analytical products, with the aim of meeting operational and strategic outcomes. Support is also offered to analysts and members of the partnerships from a panel of experts, enabling a depth and diversity of skills, knowledge and research to be tapped across GMAC.

The commissioning of work requests through Partnership Business Groups has several purposes:

- it helps to ensure that focus is maintained on partnership priorities;
- it ensures that careful and deliberate thought is given to identifying the questions that require answering from analysis;
- it provides direction: the analyst is clear on what information is required;
- it identifies which analytical resource is most appropriate to answer the question, or part of the question; and
- commissioning helps to manage the workload of analysts.

From an analyst's viewpoint, commissioning also enables an analyst to identify and collect relevant data and information, identify relevant support from the panel of experts, identify the limitations of data and adopt alternative methods of collating information.

Organising a work programme that focuses on core business functions helps to ensure that the questions asked by the commissioning group are relevant. For example, these could include:

- reducing opportunities for crime – this requires questions to be tailored towards understanding where, when and how crimes are occurring, to whom and why. Once this is understood the knowledge can be applied to vulnerable people and places to reduce the likelihood of crime.
- reducing offending – this requires an understanding of who is committing offences and tackling these people in the most effective way. It is also important to use knowledge of when, where, why and how offenders act to reduce the opportunities for crime.
- supporting communities – this requires an understanding of the context of communities in which crime occurs in order to protect them against the fragmentation and division caused by crime, disorder and tension. A key issue in addressing community cohesion is to identify and address issues of disproportionate criminality, victimisation and tension.
- managing the fear of crime – this requires an understanding of communities, their fears and concerns, and recognising that certain members of a community have different fears and perspectives on crime and disorder.

The concept of a panel of experts is not to identify a fixed group of people to support the analyst, but to ensure that the right people with the relevant knowledge and skills are involved as consultants during the development of the information. During the commissioning process it may be appropriate to identify the right people to be involved. The strategic analyst will recommend members to this panel whilst drawing up the aim, purpose and scope of the product.

(Continued)

It is critical that decision-makers have confidence in the information presented to them, the information's provenance, and that they understand this information and how it can be used to help deliver the desired outcomes. It would be wrong to place the responsibility for delivering recommendations that impact on these outcomes solely on the shoulders of analysts, no matter how skilled they are.

All documents produced by analysts aim to present key findings or judgments, make sound and evidence-based recommendations, and identify knowledge gaps. All three aspects are equally important and complementary. For example, the identification of knowledge gaps drives activity for further research. For this reason it is important that the questions asked by the commissioning group are not restricted to the data available. The GMAC Partnerships also recognise that analysts are a valuable and scarce resource. The GMAC approach is to support them with active and responsible management, while helping them in the organisation of their analysis duties.

Dave Flitcroft, Greater Manchester Police and Safer Bolton.

APPENDIX 3: GLOSSARY

Census of Population – a census is a count of all people and households in the country. It provides population statistics from a national to neighbourhood level for government, local authorities, business and communities. The Census is carried out every 10 years, with the next one due to take place on 27 March 2011.

CESG – The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is the British intelligence agency responsible for providing signals intelligence and information assurance to the UK government and armed forces. CESG (originally Communications-Electronics Security Group) is the branch of GCHQ which works to secure the communications and information systems of the government and critical parts of UK national infrastructure.

Comma delimited format (also referred to as comma separated value) – used for the digital storage of data structured in a table. Each line in the file corresponds to a row in the table. Within a line, fields are separated by commas, each field belonging to one table column. This type of file usually has the file extension ‘csv’.

Community Safety Partnership (CSP) – a multi-agency group set up under section 6 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to tackle crime, drugs and anti-social behaviour throughout a defined geographic area of responsibility, usually coterminous with a local authority area.

CSP Co-ordinator – the person who usually heads, and co-ordinates the activities of the Partnership, often given the job title ‘Community Safety Manager’

Dataset – a collection of data records, or description of a collection of data records that are stored electronically, for example, data records on police incidents of disorder can be collectively referred to as a dataset of recorded police incidents of disorder.

Datafield – a specific field within a data record e.g. the date when an offence was committed, recorded in a police crime record, can be referred to as the ‘date’ datafield.

DIRWeb – the internet-based system on to which Drugs Intervention Records are entered, and on which these records can be collectively reviewed.

FIPS 140-2 – The ‘Federal Information Processing Standard’ (FIPS) Publication 140-2, FIPS PUB 140-2, is a US government computer security standard used to accredit cryptographic modules. It is also used in the UK as a standard for accrediting encryption processes.

Geographical information system (GIS) – a computer system used to store, manipulate, analyse and present data that is geographically referenced to the Earth. A GIS is commonly used in CSPs to assist in the analysis of crime, disorder, ASB and other community safety data.

Hypothesis – a proposed explanation for an observable phenomenon, which in analysis terms, can be tested to see if it is true or false.

ICT (Information and communication technologies) – an umbrella term that covers all technical means for processing and communicating information.

Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) – the UK's independent public body set up to promote access to official information and protect personal information by promoting good practice, ruling on eligible complaints, providing information to individuals and organisations, and taking appropriate action when the law is broken.

Information hub – a central repository containing a data storage facility that allows for the uploading and extraction of information, in the form of data records or as electronic documents (for example, strategic assessments) and other electronic files (e.g. Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, GIS files).

iQuanta – Internet quantitative analysis tool used for community safety performance monitoring at force, local authority and basic command unit level.

Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs) – MAPPAs support the assessment and management of the most serious sexual and violent offenders. MAPPAs bring together the Police, Probation and Prison Services (the MAPPAs responsible authorities) with other agencies that are under a duty to co-operate with the responsible authorities. These include local councils (e.g. social care, housing and education services) and health services.

Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) – a forum where multiple agencies get together to provide a co-ordinated response for those at the highest risk of domestic abuse.

National Indicators (NIs) – indicators used by central government in England for measuring the performance of local government. NIs cover services delivered by local authorities alone and in partnership with other organisations such as the police and health services.

Neighbourhood Statistics Service (NeSS) – established in 2001 by the Office for National Statistics and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit to provide good quality small area data to support the Government's Neighbourhood Renewal agenda. NeSS now provides a powerful platform through which an ever increasing range of high quality small area data are disseminated. It provides relevant and comprehensive information, allowing users to paint a picture of life in communities.

Office for National Statistics – the executive office of the UK Statistics Authority, a non-ministerial department which reports directly to Parliament. It is charged with the collection and publication of statistics related to the economy, population and society of the UK at national and local levels.

Partnership plan – sets out the CSP priorities and how it plans to deliver against these priorities in order to improve community safety.

Public Health Observatories (PHOs) – a network of public health projects that provide objectivity in measuring wellbeing in terms of environmental health, diet, recreation, outdoor education, exercise and other matters of public health. There is a PHO for each of the nine regions in England; there are also health observatories in Wales, Scotland and Ireland.

Public Service Agreements (PSAs) – PSAs set out the key priority outcomes the Government wants to achieve during the course of a three-year period (e.g. 2008–2011). These agreements also describe how targets will be achieved and how performance against these targets will be measured. The agreement may consist of a departmental aim, a set of objectives and targets, and details of who is responsible for delivery.

Problem profile – an intelligence product that should be designed to document the results of analysis that identifies, understands and explains the problem it refers to, such as a problem associated with criminal damage and anti-social behaviour on a housing estate.

Prolific and other priority offenders (PPOs) – a strategy that typically operates at the local level as a scheme providing end-to-end management for offenders who are classified as being prolific in their criminal behaviour or otherwise warrant prioritised attention.

Strategic assessment (sometimes referred to as a strategic intelligence assessment) – an intelligence product that identifies the key crime, disorder, anti-social behaviour, and misuse of drugs and alcohol issues that affect the area covered by a CSP and records progress against the performance targets that were set in its previous partnership plan. The strategic assessment should also consider what needs to be achieved to help improve community safety, including how the local community can feel reassured and confident that their concerns and fears are being addressed.

Tactical assessment – an intelligence product that should enable the CSP to continually monitor its progress against its strategic priorities, plans and targets, and identifies any new or emerging issues that require attention.

APPENDIX 4: ABBREVIATIONS

Not all of these abbreviations appear in this guidance, but they may be useful when referring to a range of partnership documents.

A

- ABC – Acceptable Behaviour Contract
- AC – Audit Commission
- ACPO – Association of Chief Police Officers
- ALMO – Arm’s Length Management Organisation
- APA – Association of Police Authorities
- ASB – Anti Social Behaviour
- ATP – Adult Treatment Plan

B

- BCU – Basic Command Unit
- BCS – Basic Custodial Screening
- BCS – British Crime Survey
- BVPI – Best Value Performance Indicators

C

- CAA – Comprehensive Area Assessment
- CAF – Common Assessment Framework
- CDA – Crime and Disorder Act
- CJIT – Criminal Justice Integrated Team
- CJS – Criminal Justice System
- CLG – Communities and Local Government
- CPS – Crown Prosecution Service
- CRB – Criminal Records Bureau
- CSM/O – Community Safety Manager/Officer
- CSP – Community Safety Partnership
- CST – Community Safety Team
- CT – Counter Terrorism
- CYPP – Children and Young People’s Partnership/Plan

D

- DA – Domestic Abuse
- DAT/DAAT – Drug Action Team/Drug and Alcohol Action Team
- DCSF – Department for Children, Schools and Families
- DDA – Disability Discrimination Act
- DfT – Department for Transport
- DIP – Drug Interventions Programme
- DLO – Designated Liaison Officer
- DoH – Department of Health
- DOM – Director of Offender Management
- DPA – Data Protection Act
- DRR – Drug Rehabilitation Requirement
- DV – Domestic Violence
- DWP – Department for Work and Pensions
- DYO – Deter Young Offender

F

- FRS – Fire and Rescue Service

G

- GO – Government Office

H

- HIP – Health Improvement Plan
- HMCS – Her Majesty's Court Service
- HMIC – Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
- HOCTiW – Home Office Crime Team in Wales
- HORDD – Home Office Regional Deputy Director

I

- IDeA – Improvement and Development Agency
- IDVA – Independent Domestic Violence Advisor
- IOM – Integrated Offender Management
- ISA – Independent Safeguarding Authority
- ISP – Information Sharing Protocol
- ISVA – Independent Sexual Violence Advisor

J

- JAG – Joint Action Group
- JSG – Joint Strategic Group
- JSNA – Joint Strategic Needs Assessment

K

- KSI – Killed, Serious Injury

L

- LA – Local Authority
- LAA – Local Area Agreement
- LAG – Local Action Groups
- LCJB – Local Criminal Justice Board
- LDO – Learning and Development Officer
- LEA – Local Education Authority
- LGA – Local Government Association
- LHB – Local Health Board
- LISARRT – Local Initial Screening and Reducing Reoffending Tool
- LIT – Local Immigration Team
- LSB – Local Service Board
- LSCB – Local Safeguarding Children’s Board
- LSP – Local Strategic Partnership
- LTO – Link to Offending

M

- MAPPA – Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements
- MARAC – Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference
- MoJ – Ministry of Justice
- MSG – Most Similar Group (previously Most Similar Family)

N

- NAG – Neighbourhood Action Group
- NCJB – National Criminal Justice Board
- NCSN – National Community Safety Network
- NCSP – National Community Safety Plan

- NHS – National Health Service
- NHW – Neighbourhood Watch
- NI – National Indicator
- NIM – National Intelligence Model
- NIMNW – ‘Not in My Neighbourhood’ Week
- NIS – National Indicator Set
- NM – Neighbourhood Manager
- NOMS – National Offender Management Service
- NPIA – National Policing Improvement Agency
- NSF – National Support Framework
- NTDW – National Tackling Drugs Week
- NTE – Night Time Economy

O

- OASys – Offender Assessment System
- OBTJ – Offences Brought to Justice
- OCJR – Office for Criminal Justice Reform
- OM – Offender Management
- OPG – Operational Performance Group
- OSC – Overview and Scrutiny Committee
- OTS – Office of the Third Sector

P

- PACT – Police and Communities Together
- PAT – Problem Analysis Triangle
- PB – Participatory Budgeting
- PCT – Primary Care Trust
- PHIT – Public Health Information Team
- PIs – Performance Indicators
- PMF – Performance Management Frameworks
- PNC – Police National Computer
- POP – Problem Oriented Partnership
- PP – Partnership Plan
- PPO – Prolific and other Priority Offender

- PPSG – Partnership Performance Steering Group
- PS – Problem Solving
- PSA – Public Service Agreement
- PSM/O – Partnership Support Manager/Officer

Q

- QDM – Quarterly Delivery Meeting

R

- RA – Responsible Authority
- RAG – Responsible Authority Group
- RAT – Routine Activity Theory
- RIEP – Regional Improvement and Efficiency Partnership
- RJ – Restorative Justice
- RRDP – Regional Reducing Reoffending Delivery Plan
- RSL – Registered Social Landlord
- RV – Repeat Victimisation

S

- SA – Strategic Assessment
- SAC – Serious Acquisitive Crime
- SARA – Scanning/Analysis/Response/Assessment
- SARC – Sexual Assault Referral Centre
- SMAT – Substance Misuse Action Team
- SNT – Safer Neighbourhood Team
- SOCA – Serious Organised Crime Agency

T

- TCG – Tasking and Co-ordination Group
- TIC – Taken Into Consideration
- TKAP – Tackling Knives Action Programme
- TWOC – Taken Without Consent

U

- UKBA – UK Border Agency

V

- VCS – Voluntary and Community Sector
- VOL – Victim, Offender, Location
- VS – Voluntary Sector

W

- WAG – Welsh Assembly Government
- WCC – World Class Commissioning

Y

- YCAP – Youth Crime Action Plan
- YOT – Youth Offending Team
- YJB – Youth Justice Board
- YJMIS – Youth Justice Management Information System
- YOT – Youth Offending Team
- YTP – Young Persons Treatment Plan

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