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CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES

Defining Moments for Police Chiefs



POLICE EXECUTIVE
RESEARCH FORUM

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Defining Moments for Police Chiefs

February 2015



POLICE EXECUTIVE
RESEARCH FORUM

This publication was supported by the Motorola Solutions Foundation. The points of view expressed herein are the authors' and do not necessarily represent the opinions of the Motorola Solutions Foundation or all Police Executive Research Forum members.

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Contents

Acknowledgments	1
Introduction, by Chuck Wexler	3
Ferguson, Missouri: A National “Defining Moment” for Policing	5
Releasing the Name of an Officer and Other Critical Information	9
“Militarization” of the Police.....	17
De-Escalation of Incidents	24
<i>Sidebar by Toronto Chief William Blair: Shootings Are Often “Justified Under the Circumstances,” But We Should Look at What Led to the Circumstances.....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Sidebar by BJA Director Denise O’Donnell: We Are Looking to Provide Training As a Result of the Ferguson Events</i>	<i>30</i>
Defining Moments for Police Chiefs.....	31
Engaging the Community	31
Internal Issues	42
Working with the News Media	54
Conclusion.....	57
About PERF.....	61
About the Motorola Solutions Foundation	63
Appendix: Participants at the PERF Summit.....	64



Acknowledgments

THE CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES HAS produced much of PERF's best work on the leading edge of new issues facing police chiefs. In just the last few years, this series has produced groundbreaking reports on the heroin epidemic and marijuana legalization, the role of local police in preventing and investigating cybercrime, changes in how aggressively police respond to active shooter situations, federal civil rights investigations of local police, de-escalation of police encounters with mentally ill persons, remedies for weaknesses in police handling of sexual assaults, the wide variety of new technologies in policing, and more effective approaches to managing large political demonstrations and other major public events.

Whew!

But never has the Critical Issues Series taken on a more pressing and important issue, on very short notice, than in the report you are holding now. This "Defining Moments" report is about the various experiences of police chiefs in handling the incidents that they consider the toughest challenges they ever faced. This report is also about a national "defining moment" affecting police departments nationwide—namely, the police response to demonstrations and protests following the officer-involved shooting of Michael Brown on August 9, 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri.

As I write this, more than four months after that defining moment in Ferguson, large-scale demonstrations are continuing across the nation and around the world. The events in suburban St. Louis, along with more recent incidents in New York City, Cleveland, and other locations, have raised questions about public trust in the police, especially with regard to police use of force.

Only five weeks after the shooting in Ferguson, PERF President Chuck Ramsey convened our Critical Issues Summit in Chicago, where 180 police executives discussed the implications of Ferguson as

well as their own defining moments that tested their leadership skills. (Later, in December 2014, Commissioner Ramsey was chosen by President Obama to co-chair the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, along with former Assistant Attorney General Laurie Robinson. The Task Force's mission is to "identify best practices and otherwise make recommendations to the President on how policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust.")


Once again, I am deeply grateful to the Motorola Solutions Foundation for supporting the Critical Issues in Policing Series, and for giving PERF the flexibility to respond immediately to this emerging issue. I'm grateful to Motorola Solutions Chairman and CEO Greg Brown; to Mark Moon, Executive Vice President and President of Sales and Product Operations; Jack Molloy, Senior Vice President for Sales, North America; Gino Bonanotte, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer; Robert Hoffman, Corporate Vice President, Government Relations; Domingo Herraiz, Vice President, North American Government Affairs; Matt Blakely, Director of the Motorola Solutions Foundation; and Rick Neal, retired Vice President at Motorola Solutions and now President of the Government Strategies Advisory Group, for their continued support and advice.

Thanks also go to all of the police leaders who participated in our Summit in Chicago, telling the stories of their defining moments and sharing their wisdom about the lessons we all can take from the defining moment of Ferguson. The strength of the Critical Issues reports comes from the willingness of police chiefs and other experts to come together and discuss the issues, and to be quoted in these reports.

A number of PERF staffers also deserve recognition for this report. Chief of Staff Andrea Luna and Deputy Chief of Staff Shannon Branly

managed the Defining Moments project, with help from Research Associate Sunny Schnitzer, Research Assistants Matt Harman, Sarah Mostyn, and Chris Coghill and Membership Coordinator Balinda Cockrell. Once again, Communications Director Craig Fischer superbly organized and edited this

report, which is one of the most significant in the Critical Issues series. Communications Coordinator James McGinty took the photographs, and PERF's graphic designer, Dave Williams, brought his skill and attention to detail to designing this document.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Chuck Wexler". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum
Washington, D.C.

Introduction

By Chuck Wexler

THE POSITION OF POLICE CHIEF HAS ALWAYS been a demanding job. A police chief must know how to run a complex organization, in many cases a very large organization. Chiefs must have strong leadership skills and a vision for meeting the needs of the community. And the stakes are high, because police have unique power and authority over people. The consequences of a mistake by any member of the organization can be catastrophic. As a result, police departments undergo closer scrutiny than other types of organizations.

Since PERF's creation in 1976, one of our priorities has been to work with police chiefs to identify best practices and policies for meeting the challenges of the job. Our goal is to help police departments learn from each other about the critical issues they face.

And one thing we have seen is that even in a well-run department, a department with good policies, thorough training of officers, strong leaders, and solid management systems, things can go disastrously wrong at any moment. A single officer can make a bad decision in a split-second, or a natural disaster or large-scale criminal incident can overwhelm a department's capabilities.

A police chief who responds well in a crisis can mitigate the damage, and sometimes the storyline changes as a result. Instead of focusing on the disastrous incident, the community remembers how hard the police chief and the police department worked to handle it.

Unfortunately, in other cases, a slow or ill-considered response makes the situation worse.

In the summer of 2014, PERF decided to hold a national conference to address these issues. We decided to name the conference "Defining Moments for Police Chiefs." We wanted to ask leading police officials, "In your career, what was the one critical moment when you really felt tested? What did you do that worked well? And looking back, is there anything you wish you could do over and do differently?"

As we were planning the Defining Moments conference, the fatal shooting of Michael Brown by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri on August 9, and the large-scale protest marches and riots that followed, brought international attention to many of the issues we were addressing.

For example, a key issue for a police department in any critical incident is how effectively it shares information with the public and the news media. Traditionally, police have often held back on releasing information, believing that they should exercise caution until they are certain of all of the facts, or that they should never release information that might be used later in a criminal case or lawsuit.

At our Defining Moments conference, police chiefs told us they are finding that that approach is no longer viable, because a narrative is created within a few hours of a critical incident happening, and the narrative is written whether or not the police contribute any information to the story. Too much damage can be done if police miss their chance to explain what happened and correct wrong information that can spread in the immediate aftermath of an incident.

So today's police leaders try to get out in front of the story, rather than being dragged into it against their will. They provide preliminary information with a strong cautionary note that as more information becomes available, the story may very well change. Chief David Brown of Dallas talked about the importance of getting this preliminary information out in the first news cycle.

Another critical aspect of "defining moments" for police chiefs is whether they have a reservoir of trust in the community that can help everyone to get through the difficult situation. Police chiefs must develop personal relationships with community leaders and people from all parts of their jurisdiction, well before any incident takes place. The work of building these relationships of mutual respect must be done constantly, and especially during "non-crisis" times. A critical incident is not the time to hold your first meeting with community leaders.

Many police chiefs believe that the Ferguson incident was a defining moment for the entire policing profession. As PERF President and Philadelphia Police Commissioner Charles Ramsey said at PERF's Defining Moments conference, "All of us have been in this business for a while, and we all have had incidents that fundamentally changed how we think about things. And sometimes there are incidents that occur outside our own jurisdictions that affect all of us."

At the request of PERF's Board of Directors, we extended the Defining Moments conference from one day to two days, in order to include a full discussion of the Ferguson incident, while maintaining our original plans to discuss a wide range of other defining moments.

The bulk of this document consists of quotations from police chiefs and other leaders who participated in our conference, and who offered valuable guidance about these issues.

I'd like to highlight one key issue that seems new to me; I haven't heard this discussed in previous PERF meetings. That is the question of whether we need police officers to take on a fundamentally different role than they have had in the past.

One central theme that grew out of the conference was the importance of developing a culture of policing that recognizes when officers should step in and when they should step back from encounters with the public. For example, in active shooter situations, we now expect officers to make split-second, life-or-death decisions when lives hang in the balance. (This goes against the pre-Columbine thinking, when officers were taught not to rush in but to assess the situation and get additional help.)

On the other hand, when the stakes are not high, when police are dealing with a relatively minor situation, we want police officers to recognize that stepping back from a contentious encounter and getting assistance from other officers is a sign of strength, not weakness. In these situations, slowing down the encounter and using de-escalation and crisis intervention skills can help prevent a relatively minor incident from cascading into a bad result that no one expected or wanted.

So there are times when we expect police to "step up," and times when we expect them to "step back," and knowing the difference may be as important a lesson as we can teach officers.

I believe you will find these discussions useful and interesting. The final chapter of this report summarizes the lessons we learned in this project.

Ferguson, Missouri: A National “Defining Moment” for Policing

THE FIRST DAY OF PERF’S CONFERENCE ON *Defining Moments for Police Chiefs* was devoted largely to a discussion of the issues raised by the August 9, 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, and the handling of large-scale protests and riots that followed the shooting.

St. Louis County Police Chief Jon Belmar, whose department provided the bulk of the police officers responding to the incident, launched the discussion with a day-by-day summary of his thinking as he led the multi-agency response in the first few days of the protests.

Other chiefs then provided their analysis and perspectives.

St. Louis County Chief Jon Belmar:

We Had 11 Days of Serious Rioting Without a Serious Injury to a Protester

I felt like I was pretty well positioned to understand how to deal with something like Ferguson. I was in tactical operations as a commander, and I was a patrolman back in the early '90s. I have good contacts in the communities. I go to the churches; I talk to my community leaders; I am engaged. I was from North St. Louis County, where Ferguson is located.

But when this happened, you have no idea how bad it can be, and how it can spin out of control unless you have gone through something like this before.

Taking this day by day, the Michael Brown shooting was on Saturday, August 9, at 12:02 p.m., and I got a call from Ferguson Police Chief Tom



St. Louis County Chief Jon Belmar

Jackson at about 12:25. He said he had a fatal officer-involved shooting and asked me to investigate it. I called my chief of the Tactical Operations Unit, who was down in South County at one of our hospitals, dealing with an armed invasion. I told him we had an officer-involved shooting up in Ferguson, and that he needed to get up there. I didn't hear anything until about 4:45 or 5 that afternoon, when the captain from Tactical Operations told me, "Boss, we have had a bad afternoon up here. We almost didn't get this crime scene processed. We had a lot of gun shots and people surrounding the body." He also told me that it took 4 1/2 hours to process that crime scene.

I spent seven years as a lieutenant in robbery/homicide, and I believe that doing a crime scene

the right way is an absolute. I also believe that if I had this one to do over again, I would have at least thought about moving Mr. Brown faster. But I don't think we could have done it much faster. It's easy to say, "Remove the body and go." But it's also easy to imagine people asking me later, "Why didn't you do a comprehensive investigation of the crime scene?"

The next day, on Sunday, August 10, I called my TAC commander Bryan Ludwig, who asked me, "Chief, what do you want down there today?"

I said, "Let me explain what I *don't* want." I said, "I don't want any trucks, I don't want anything other than the uniform of the day. I don't want any armor; I don't want any fatigues. And I want you guys staged way offside. Perhaps we will have a problem; let's hope we don't."

I got a call about 8:25 Sunday night from Ludwig's boss, Lt. Colonel Michael Dierkes, who's in charge of special operations. He was in Ludwig's Tahoe and he said, "Boss, we got a problem down here; we may have to go to gas."

I said, "Please don't do that," and then I thought about it for a second and said, "Mike, I'm not there; use your best judgment." What I didn't know was that while he was talking to me, a piece of a cinderblock was skipping off the Tahoe and into the windshield.

In 35 minutes I stepped down onto West Florissant Avenue, and there were probably 200 police cars parked all over the place, and the crowd was angry.

We made a conscious decision not to go into the crowd with night sticks and start locking people up. There was a lot of looting going on, but there were so many people, we really didn't understand the breadth of what was happening.

I really only did two things that night. I talked to each one of my police officers and told them to maintain their bearing. And I tried to calm people down. I saw ministers I knew, government people, activists that I knew, and I was telling them, "At some point, we are going to have to insist that everybody leave." But they told me, "We have no control. These young people aren't going to listen to us."

So obviously we were thinking at this point that we had a problem.

On Monday, August 11, there was shooting going on and reports of police cars getting rocked, and we had to use tear gas in West Florissant to disperse the crowd, but we weren't making a lot of arrests. On Tuesday, August 12, there were a lot of people on the corridor, a lot of activity. We left them alone, they left us alone, and they were able to demonstrate. A woman was shot in the head at Highmont in West Florissant about 11. And there were about 200 people at West Florissant and Chambers. They started breaking out some windows, so we went down there but we decided not to use tear gas.

Wednesday, August 13, was a nightmare. At the end of the day, I went back to the command post and met with the St. Louis City police commanders, my commanders, the Highway Patrol commanders who had all been with me on this since Day One, and I said, "Ladies and gentlemen, we have got to do something different. We cannot sustain this night after night. We have to come up with a new strategy. Everybody go home tonight and I want you think about how we are going to do this differently tomorrow night."

But the next day, the Governor came in and relieved me, and put Captain Ron Johnson of the Highway Patrol in charge.

In the end, there were five shootings within the demonstration corridor over 11 days. But I would talk to the news media and ask, "Do you have any questions about the activity we are dealing with after nightfall?" But the media didn't want to talk what we were dealing with night after night. All they cared about was the criminal investigation into Mr. Brown's death, which I couldn't talk about.

I understand that the use of tear gas looks terrible on TV. My father is an 82-year-old Korean War veteran who loves his son, but on Day 4, he said to me, "Son, that tear gas didn't look good down there on West Florissant." I said, "Dad, I know, and it looks worse in person."

But I am unaware of a death attributed to CS tear gas in the United States. Police sometimes kill people with nightsticks, mace, police dogs, bullets, and everything else. But we didn't send anybody to the emergency room with a serious injury over 11 days of serious rioting.

St. Louis Chief Sam Dotson:

*Our Community Relationships Helped Us
When We Had an OIS
After the Brown Shooting*

Chief Dotson discussed a fatal officer-involved shooting in St. Louis on August 19, ten days after the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson and not far from where the Ferguson shooting occurred. In the St. Louis incident, officers shot Kajieme Powell, who was holding a knife and behaving erratically. The shooting was captured on video by a bystander.¹

We received a call about a person acting erratically with a knife who has just stolen some items from a convenience store. The young man went into the store, took a couple energy drinks and got no response from the clerks. A couple minutes later he went back in, stole a package of donuts, and it almost looked like he was looking for a response. He went outside and continued to pace around, talking to himself, until the shopkeeper finally came out and asked him to pay for the donuts. The officers arrived, and all they knew when they arrived was that a larceny had occurred and there was a subject armed with a knife.

When they stepped out of the car, the suspect immediately approached them with the knife, yelling, “Shoot me, kill me now.” First he moved towards the officer who had been driving, then he backed up and walked toward the officer who had been on the passenger side. By this time, the officers were out of the vehicle, had their weapons drawn, and were repeatedly giving the verbal commands, “Stop, put the knife down, police, stop, put the knife down.” The suspect was closing the distance between them, and both of the officers shot him.

This happened about a mile and a half from where the Michael Brown shooting happened, 10 days after that shooting. So no one would believe me if I said I wasn’t thinking about Ferguson as I drove to this scene.

One of the lessons I had learned from Ferguson was that it’s important to get your story out there

as soon as you can. So I made a statement to the media at the scene of the shooting. I made several mistakes through all of this, but the one I want to talk about most was that I didn’t put a large enough disclaimer in front of my comments in my initial briefing. I said something like, “This is what we know at this point; we’ll provide more information as soon as it’s available.” That statement should have been stronger, because we all know that some of the first information we get about a critical incident can later turn out to be wrong.

At the time of the news briefing, we didn’t know it, but there was a cell-phone video of the shooting. We found out about the video eight or nine hours later.

We had national media as well as local reporters at the briefing, and everyone was interested in linking the shooting to Ferguson. But there also was a sense of allowing us to tell the story, because we have some very strong relationships with the community, and we had two Aldermen with me there. In fact, one of the 911 callers was an Alderwoman who happened to be at the scene and had seen Kajieme Powell with the knife, so she called the police.

I found out about the cell phone video that evening. An attorney for the person who took the video was shopping it around and wouldn’t give us a copy until 9 the next morning. So we were ready



St. Louis Chief Sam Dotson

1. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sEuZiTcbGCg>



Philadelphia Commissioner
Chuck Ramsey

the next morning, and as soon as we received it, we reviewed it and decided that nobody could tell our story better than we could. So we put together the cell phone video, which caught the entire incident, and surveillance video from the convenience store, along with the 911 calls from the Alderwoman and the store owner, and the dispatch tapes, so everyone would know exactly what the officers knew as they were arriving on the scene.

Obviously if a man is walking up and down the street and says, “Shoot me now; kill me now,” there will be questions about mental illness, but I wanted the public to know that the officers arrived only with the information they were provided by the 911 callers and the dispatchers. And it was only 15 seconds from the time the first officer’s foot hits the pavement to the first shot that’s fired. In 15 seconds they had to make decisions about the course of action they were going to use.

One of the lessons we learned from the police shooting of Kajieme Powell was that it’s important to have your narrative heard. But in our rush to push information out, there were slight misstatements that were problematic. Witnesses told us that Mr. Powell made an overhand motion with the knife, and I repeated that to the media, but the video did not show that. So in retrospect, I should have made a larger disclaimer at the briefing, and said that this was just preliminary information that we received, and sometimes the early information turns out to be incorrect.

We were not completely without protests in St. Louis about the Powell shooting, but they were

smaller, they didn’t last as long, and the dynamic was different. We didn’t see a large group of out-of-town people, the anarchists and others like that. The protesters we saw were local people whom we knew and had relationships with. Our community outreach and our existing relationships with the community helped us.

Philadelphia Commissioner Chuck Ramsey:
Ferguson Brought Attention to Issues That We All Should Be Addressing

Thank you both for the presentations. It was very enlightening and you made us aware of a lot of things that we didn’t know about. What happened in Ferguson is the kind of incident that could have happened in many of our towns and cities in America. We can debate whether it would have had the same outcome, but it could have happened just about anywhere, I believe.

I hope we can focus on the larger issues that have surfaced as a result. For example, we’ve been hearing a lot about the “militarization” of police. As [Milwaukee Chief] Ed Flynn said, there is no real definition for it, but everybody visualizes for themselves what it means, and it’s usually not positive as far as how policing is viewed as a profession.

So we need to talk about that, because there is a legitimate argument about the kind of equipment that we are getting into our inventory, and more importantly, the policies that we have about the circumstances under which equipment should be deployed. Do all departments need the kind of equipment that we see—MRAPs and things of that nature? If you are going to have that kind of equipment available, especially in smaller jurisdictions, there should be a more regional approach, as opposed to individual agencies having all this equipment. I think that’s a legitimate discussion that we need to have.

Another issue coming out of Ferguson—use of force—is one that we talk about all the time. We need to consider use of force not only from the standpoint of what officers deal with on an everyday basis, but also with regard to handling large demonstrations that include some violent elements. And it gets more complicated when you have multiple jurisdictions that are coming together because of a major incident. We need to discuss issues like whose authority do they fall under? Which agency's use-of-force policies control the response? What kind of equipment do you want them to bring, and what you do *not* want them to bring.

Another issue that has changed things is social media. Nearly everybody has a cell phone camera, so whenever something happens, I tend to assume there is a video somewhere. But one problem with videos is that often they don't capture the beginning of an incident—the events that started the whole thing. The camera typically is turned on sometime after the point where a situation has started to go bad, so often there is a lack of context.

We cannot ignore the fact that we have not achieved legitimacy in some of our more challenged neighborhoods. We have to go back the drawing board and come up with different strategies to reach folks in these challenged neighborhoods. We can pat ourselves on the back and talk about how far we have come in reducing crime and establishing community policing, but we haven't come far enough. Ferguson isn't just about the shooting. It is about the tension and the issues that have been in existence for decades, and the reality of things that have happened to people over the years, some of which police have been very much responsible for.

So we have to recognize that and deal with it. We have got to take community policing to a different level. It's not one-size-fits-all; we must find a different way of reaching poor communities, communities of color, communities that are more challenged than others, if we really want to make progress.

It is not as simple as merely having diversity. When I was in chief in DC, the MPD had 63 percent African-American police officers, but we still

had tension and issues in our more challenged neighborhoods. Diversity is important, don't get me wrong, but we have to dig deeper. Having officers who look like the folks in the community in itself is not enough. We need to take a different look at community policing and what are we trying to achieve, or we will continue to have these incidents.

Releasing the Name of an Officer and Other Critical Information

Participants at PERF's Summit discussed several controversial issues that emerged from the Ferguson incident: whether police should publicly release the name of an officer involved in a shooting or other critical incident; how quickly an officer's name can be released; considerations regarding the officer's safety; and releasing information about the officer's record with respect to citizen complaints, prior uses of force, or other information.

Three months after PERF's Summit, on Dec. 20, 2014, these issues came together tragically when New York City police officers Rafael Ramos and Wenjian Liu were assassinated as they sat in their patrol car in Brooklyn. The killer, who had a history of mental illness, violence, and gun crimes, including shooting his girlfriend shortly before killing the NYPD officers, had posted a statement on social media threatening to kill officers randomly as retaliation for officer-involved shootings.

Fresno, CA Chief Jerry Dyer:

Under California Law, Officers' Names Are Released Unless There is a Threat

We've gone back and forth in California in terms of the laws on releasing officers' names. In essence, today we are required to provide that name unless there is a credible threat against that officer. And so we have an internal policy that says that we will release the name of the officer after seven days if it's requested by the media or anyone else, but only if there are not any credible threats. We wait seven days to provide a bit of a cooling-off period.

RIGHT:
Fresno Chief
Jerry Dyer

FAR RIGHT:
Houston Chief
Charles McClelland



Wexler: Do you think Ferguson will change your standard?

Chief Dyer: I don't believe we have a choice because of what the California law is. However, I think it's going to cause police chiefs to think twice about what they do. I think Ferguson has changed policing forever. Quite frankly, I think we all are going to live with some of the things that occurred there for many years.

Houston Chief Charles McClelland:

I Didn't Wait Months to Comment on What Was Clearly an Egregious Use of Force

Chief McClelland discussed his response to a 2010 incident in which officers beat and kicked 15-year-old burglary suspect Chad Holley. The incident, which was captured by surveillance cameras, resulted in the firing of seven officers and prosecution of four. Chief McClelland testified at the trial of Officer Drew Ryser.

We had an egregious use of force nine days after I was sworn in as chief of police. We had a new mayor come in, and part of our mandate was to create more openness and transparency in HPD. There had been an outcry from minority community leaders and others about allegations of excessive force, high numbers of officer-involved shootings, police not properly investigating internal affairs complaints, all of these issues.

So on the ninth day after I was sworn in as police chief I had this video dropped on my desk. Holley was part of a group of prolific burglars who had broken into 20 or 30 homes. One of our tactical teams had been conducting surveillance for a couple of weeks trying to catch these individuals. These officers caught the group of kids as they fled a burglary, and they decided to extract a little street justice, in my opinion.

Wexler: So this videotape is dropped on your desk? What did you do?

Chief McClelland: A captain gave me the video on a Friday afternoon and said it had come from employees of a store who had noticed that a fence around their parking lot was damaged. They checked their video recordings to see how the fence got damaged, and saw the beating of Holley.

As I watched the video, I knew that people would later ask, "The minute Chuck McClelland saw that videotape, what did he do with it?" So I immediately told the captain to find out who those officers were and relieve them of duty. I called the county prosecutor and told her what I had and that I was going to make a copy and send someone over to her office with the videotape. And because there had been a lot of complaints in the community about the police, I believed that we should have an independent investigation, so I called the Special Agent in Charge of the local FBI Office and sent



Dallas Chief
David Brown

him a copy of the video. I also talked to my legal counsel and the city attorney and showed them the videotape.

Finally, after all those other calls, I called the mayor. I wanted all of the legal decisions and notifications done first, so there would be no accusations of anything political going on in how we responded to this.

Wexler: And at what point did you make the public aware of this?

Chief McClelland: Well, I was handed the video on a Friday afternoon, and I started to make contact with community leaders that day, and I held meetings with them over the weekend. I knew that it was going to go public once I relieved the officers of duty. I was hoping that I would have a little breathing room until Monday, and it worked out that way. But I told the community members what was on the tape and how bad it was. I didn't show them the tape in advance of making it public, but I told them that as soon as the officers were identified and they were relieved of duty, that I was going to go public with the video.

Wexler: Did you release the names of the officers?

Chief McClelland: Yes, I did. They didn't like it, but that tape was so graphic, I decided that I wasn't going to stand up there and read the usual script,

that "We are conducting an investigation and have to wait for the outcome before we say anything."

I said that what I saw on this videotape was very disturbing, and that I believed that some of the things on the video violated our training, our policy, and may have violated the law. That's what I said at my first press conference.

Wexler: Didn't you put yourself at risk and open to accusations that you jumped to conclusions?

Chief McClelland: Yes, it was a calculated risk, but there is no way that I could stand up there in good faith and say what I saw on that videotape wasn't a possible violation of department policy and the law, because I believed that it was. And the community supported me. They gave me the benefit of the doubt that we would have a fair and thorough investigation. And my city didn't burn; we didn't use tear gas. I fired seven officers; four were charged criminally, and three were convicted.

I also saw this as an opportunity to make changes in the department. There were things I wanted to do, and without that video I would have gotten tremendous pushback and probably wouldn't have been able to do it.

Dallas Chief David Brown:

You Need to Get Your Story Out To the Public as Soon as You Can

Chief Brown described a 2012 incident in which an officer fatally shot James Harper. The incident began when police received a 911 call saying that a tied-up man was being dragged into a house that was known locally as a "drug house."

We had a 911 call of a kidnapping, and two officers responded to the scene. People ran out of the house and separated, and the officers gave chase. One officer captured her suspect very quickly, but the second chased his suspect over three fences.

And there were three different fights at each fence. They ended up in a horse barn fighting each other to the point of exhaustion, and the officer fatally shot the suspect.

A very elderly woman was watching this fight and called 911 to say that an officer was fighting a suspect and they were about to kill each other.

This is in the context of a historically black community, and I need to preface what I am going to say next. I am a fourth-generation Dallasite, so people in this community know my parents, they know my grandparents. I came up through the ranks and I've got about 30 years in the Dallas Police Department. Because I know this area real well through my grandparents and my parents, I know that through the Jim Crow era, through the Civil Rights movement, this area was treated more harshly by police than other areas during the fifties and sixties. And so they have got three generations of storytelling of how the police abuse black people. It is the only community in Dallas that rioted after the Rodney King trial.

Rumors immediately began to surface that Harper was shot in the back while running away. It was similar to what happened in Ferguson. Hundreds of people descended on that community, and all of our media outlets brought their cameras down to see what was happening.

At this point we were about three hours before the 10 o'clock news. I scheduled a press conference and we told the media we would be at police headquarters—not at the scene—at 9:30, or 30 minutes before the first news cycle starts.

And we essentially fast-tracked our criminal investigation in those couple hours that we had. We sent officers out to hold the crime scene while we sent all of our investigative units out to canvass and interview witnesses and record the interviews. We followed up on the 911 calls, all the way through from the initial call to the call that the elderly lady made. We searched the house with a search warrant. Crack-cocaine, he was a drug dealer. We backtracked the initial 911 call, and found that it was a bogus call from another drug dealer who had just purchased the phone from MetroPCS [a prepaid cell phone company]. We got video from MetroPCS

and identified the guy who made the bogus 911 call as a way of harassing a competing drug dealer. We rolled back both their criminal histories, and knew that they had had interactions as members of rival gangs. And we got the ME out there and asked him, “There is a shot-in-the-back narrative; can you give us a preliminary look at entrance and exit wounds?”

So by 9:30, we are able to tell a complete story of how this started and how this ended.

Wexler: Did you release the officer's name?

Chief Brown: Yes. We always do. It's not written in our policy, but it's the department practice from my whole career. We've always released the officer's name on officer-involved shootings. And once the next of kin is notified, we also release the suspect's name and criminal history.

And the reason we release the officer's name is that from the citizens' perspective, it's not about the officer's name; it's about the officer's *history*. Citizens protest if the officer's name is not released because they think the officer is a bad officer and his history will show that, so that's what we are protecting when we don't release the officer's name. That is the story line.

People want to know, does the officer have use-of-force problems, or complaints of racial profiling? Has he shot anybody else?

So if there are police departments that cannot release an officer's name because of “police officer bill of rights” legislation or other legal barriers, I would suggest seeing whether you can talk about the officer's history, without releasing the name. In some places it may be the same legal challenge, but that is the issue.

We ended up not arresting a single person at the protests, not firing a single shot, no tear gas, and we didn't order SWAT.

The grand jury convened a year later. I sat the officer down for that whole year at a desk duty assignment, and he hated it.

The officer was no-billed. Harper wasn't shot in the back; he was shot in the front, just like the witnesses said, just like the officer said. But the epilogue to this story is that the officer was disillusioned. We sent him to a different neighborhood once he got off

Austin, TX Chief
Art Acevedo



desk duty, but he was so disillusioned he quit and went to work for another police department.

You get one news cycle to get your narrative out there. You have the 12:00 news, the 4:00 or 5:00 news, and the 10:00 news. If you don't take advantage of those news cycles, there is no chance to catch up. Whatever the narrative that goes out is, there is no chance to catch up.

Austin, TX Chief Art Acevedo:

Information Will Start to Flow Immediately, Whether or Not Police Release It

Wexler: Art, what are your thoughts about releasing information about officers following a shooting or other critical incident? You come from California, where you were with the Highway Patrol, and now you're in Texas. Is the California police culture different from the Texas culture?

Chief Acevedo: I think that the challenge that California has is *Copley vs. San Diego*, which is a case about the Peace Officer Bill of Rights. Some agencies have taken that to the umpteenth degree in terms of not giving out any information about officer disciplinary proceedings, including whether an officer is suspended and what the findings are.

In Texas we can be transparent and release officers' names. Secondly, in Texas if you have a suspension, demotion, or firing, it is a public record, and our media has a standing public records request for any memo for a day or above. We release the names, usually within the first 12 hours.

One of the things that we have to understand is that when you are dealing with communities of color, our officers are being judged not just through the prism of the present, but the prism of the past, the prism of history. So I think that transparency is very important.

Wexler: Do you have a set of policies or practices in place to deal with these situations, including

incidents where the officer has been the subject of threats?

Chief Acevedo: We do. If they live in the city, we do close patrol of the officer's residence, and if the officer lives outside of the city, we contact the agency where he lives, especially if it's a controversial shooting.

Our intelligence center also monitors the social media to stay aware of any threats or comments. We tell the officer right away that their name is going to be released, so they can tighten their settings on Facebook and Twitter and whatever else they might have on the Internet.

I think one of the biggest challenges we have is that some departments don't like to release information. Information is going to flow immediately, and the problem is that with the radicalization of our communities through social media, you will lose the narrative right away. So we choose to put out information. If we make a mistake, we fix it right away.

New York Chief of Patrol James O'Neill:

We Decide on a Case-by-Case Basis, But The Media Usually Learn the Name Quickly

Wexler: Jim, what is the NYPD's position on releasing an officer's name following an officer-involved shooting? Is there a standard policy?

Chief O'Neill: In this day and age with

technology and social media platforms, the media will have their sources and conduct their own investigation to determine the name of the officer involved. In New York City, we may confirm or release the officer's identification, but it's still on a case-by-case basis.

Wexler: If it's on a case-by-case basis, what are the factors that you consider?

Chief O'Neill: Safety plays a huge role in firearms discharges. We have a Threat Assessment Unit. If an officer is involved in a controversial shooting, before we release identifying information, we have to consider the safety of everyone involved. We can never be completely sure, but once we have done everything we can, we will release the identity and the assignment of the officer.

We are fortunate to have tremendous resources in the NYPD. If we need to provide resources to protect an officer, we will definitely do that. We have over 35,000 uniformed members of the service.

Cincinnati Chief Jeffrey Blackwell:

*If Your Message Is Delayed,
You Might as Well Not Bother With It*

When a major event or crisis happens, you can't wait days or weeks to tell the news media and the public what you know. If your message isn't timely, it's not going to be viewed as authentic. If it's not authentic, you might as well not say it.

By and large in Cincinnati, if we have a critical event, we have a press conference within two to four hours, and we put everything out that we have. We explain that it's preliminary, but we give it to them so that they know exactly what we know.

Sparks, NV Chief Brian Allen:

*We Provide Transparency by Releasing
The Entire Report of an Investigation*

Wexler: Brian, do you release the name of the officer in OIS cases?

Chief Allen: The name of the officer normally is not released until the District Attorney has issued his opinion at the conclusion of the case, which could be several months down the line. Once the District Attorney releases his opinion, that document itself is a public record and then all the officers' names are released.

Wexler: Do you think the standard on releasing information in Sparks will change because of what happened in Missouri?

Chief Allen: No, we have different demographics, and we have a good working relationship with our minority groups and don't have the level of racial tension that you find in other places. For us, the goal of transparency comes on the back end. Once the investigation is complete, we release the

RIGHT:
New York Chief of
Patrol James O'Neill

FAR RIGHT:
Cincinnati Chief
Jeffrey Blackwell



full 1,300 pages of the investigation or whatever it is, and we say, “Look through the entire record yourself.” Our news media have done that and they don’t come back and say that we have a problem with transparency.

Boston Commissioner William Evans:

We Decide Each Case Individually Based on Whether There’s a Threat to the Officer

Wexler: Billy, what is the policy in Boston on releasing officers’ names?

Commissioner Evans: It depends on the circumstances. If there is any danger to the officer, we don’t release it. We had a fatal officer-involved shooting about four months ago. Fortunately, we have some good relationships with the community members and clergy right at the scene. We were on the phone calling all the clergy and explaining what happened right away, so we were able to get out in front of it before it could blow up on us.

Wexler: You have a very strong union in Boston. Are you contractually prohibited from releasing the officer’s name?

Billy Evans: No, not at all, and they don’t fight us on that. And as someone said, usually the media will get it one way or another. But we’re not prohibited at all. It all comes down to officers’ safety.

Philadelphia Commissioner Chuck Ramsey:

We Need to Carefully Review Use of Force Even If There’s No Outcry From the Community

Wexler: Chuck Ramsey, you’ll have the last word on this. You’ve worked in Philadelphia; Washington, DC; and Chicago. Have these departments handled this differently on releasing officers’ names?

Commissioner Ramsey: When I was in Chicago, the union contract did not allow you to put names out. In Philadelphia we do usually release names—after the officer’s family is notified, so they don’t hear it on the air.

After Ferguson, we had a police-involved shooting where an officer was shot; he had a graze wound to the head and fired and killed the suspect. We got it out within a relatively short period of time. His whole family was at the hospital; we told them what we were going to do; and everybody was okay with it.

We may have gotten the information out a little quicker because of the sensitivity around what was going on in Ferguson at the time.

As David Brown said, it’s the history of the officer that people want to know about—if he had several previous incidents, if complaints have been lodged and sustained, and so forth. So we go through the history that we are aware of through internal affairs, and that’s also made public.



FAR LEFT:
Sparks, NV Chief
Brian Allen

LEFT:
Boston Police
Commissioner
William Evans



Minneapolis Chief
Janeé Harteau

Wexler: And what happens if the history shows that the officer has a long record of complaints or uses of force?

Commissioner Ramsey: Well, you know we have officers who work in high-crime areas, and they may have more complaints because their job is more intensive than in a low-crime neighborhood. I think we need to carefully evaluate things like having a use-of-force review board, to make sure we don't have people out there who are unnecessarily resorting to deadly force. And rather than making this a judgment about whether or not there is a big outcry from the community, I think we have to look at it closely ourselves.

I also think that we fall short in training officers to tactically retreat in some situations. Many cops don't feel like they can ever have a tactical retreat; they have to meet everything head-on. But sometimes stepping back is the better option that you have available to you.

So I think we need to look at our training as well as our policies to make sure we keep our officers safe, but at the same time recognize the sanctity of life and the fact that taking a human life must always be the last resort.

Wexler: When you took over the MPD in Washington, the headline in the Washington Post was that DC had the deadliest police force in the country, right? And you undertook a massive training program to reverse that. You said there's a

difference between “could” and “should.”

Commissioner Ramsey: Terry Gainer and I were there at the time and we had this discussion. That was a big part of our training: “Just because you *can* doesn't mean you *should*.” In other words, you may be legally justified technically, but is a situation at a point where you *have* to use deadly force?

And I have been in a couple of these situations, and they evolve fairly rapidly. At a given moment in time, deadly force can be a legitimate option, but two seconds, five seconds later, maybe not.

And so I think we need to spend more time with scenario-based training and training our officers on what is appropriate. And it's not just from the standpoint of the department and the controversy it creates. You've got to live with this yourself afterwards, and taking a life is not an easy thing.

So I think we need to really focus more on the training and also have very objective reviews of these shootings and call them as they are. Not every police shooting is a justifiable shooting. That's just the fact. Yet the reality is: How many are actually judged that way?

Minneapolis Chief Janeé Harteau:

Sometimes You Need to Ignore Advice From Lawyers to Say Nothing

Chief Harteau described her handling of an incident in which two off-duty Minneapolis officers were involved in an altercation with a group of men

outside a bar in Green Bay, Wisconsin. When Green Bay police arrived, a dash cam captured the officers using racial slurs and other epithets. Chief Harteau fired the officers, a decision that was upheld by the Minneapolis Civil Service Commission.

This Green Bay video that many of you have probably seen involved repeated racial slurs. I had attorneys telling me I couldn't talk about it because it was an open investigation. But the whole world could see the video, and it was giving our entire department a black eye. So I told my attorneys, "You know what? I can watch this video as a private citizen and hear what they said, and I should be able to make some comments about it." Because these officers were military veterans, and Minnesota provides a preference for veterans, I couldn't fire them without going through a process that took nine months. So imagine the damage that could be done if I had to stay silent for nine months and couldn't denounce what I heard.

So I came out very strong and said to my community, "This is not who we are. This is who those officers are, but it is not who *we* are as an organization."

Wexler: This is an interesting issue, because new chiefs will turn to their legal counsel, and the lawyers tend to take the most cautious approach, so their advice is "Don't say anything." But the lawyers don't have to go out and face the community; the chief does.

Isn't that a big problem?

Chief Harteau: Absolutely, and my argument was that we end up paying for our decisions one way or another, so the best course of action is to do what you believe to be the right thing. I needed to say the things that my community needed to hear, and that my officers needed to hear. I had a lot of cops who were very upset by the Green Bay incident because of the damage it did to our profession. And I have to live with myself at the end of the day, so frankly I didn't even care if I lost my job over it. If I can't do what I think is right, then I'd just as soon not be chief.

"Militarization" of the Police

During the protests and rioting in Ferguson, there was a great deal of discussion of whether the police response was too heavy-handed, infringing on community members' First Amendment right to protest and on news media reporters' First Amendment right to cover the protests.

There also was a widely held perception that the live television coverage of the protests, night after night, depicted police forces that were too militaristic in appearance. One distinction that emerged at the PERF Defining Moments conference was that equipment used by police need not be Defense Department surplus to be considered "militaristic."

Much of the equipment used by police in Ferguson and across the country that appears to be military equipment in fact was not obtained through the Defense Department's "1033" program, an initiative that dates to 1990 in which DOD excess property is shared with local police for counter-drug activities. However, the distinction between surplus DOD equipment and military-style equipment purchased by local police often is lost on community members.

Former St. Louis County Chief Timothy Fitch

What People Saw in Ferguson Actually Was Not Military Equipment

One of the things that most people don't know is that no military surplus equipment was on the scene in Ferguson. We obtained everything that was on the scene through grants or with drug asset money, most of it during my tenure. And that first night of the riots, none of that protective equipment was out there.

Wexler: So what was the equipment that people were seeing on TV?

Chief Fitch: It was an armored vehicle, a BearCat. And the officers had protective knee pads, they had helmets, they had things which you would normally use when you are getting bricks and bottles and urine thrown at you.

RIGHT:
Former St. Louis
County Chief
Timothy Fitch

FAR RIGHT:
Santa Monica Chief
Jacqueline Seabrooks



Wexler: What about the officer that was seen on top of a truck with a rifle and scope?

Chief Fitch: Basically he was using the scope as binoculars looking into the crowd. They had a lot of intelligence information about armed people buried in the crowd, mixing with the peaceful protestors, and so they were looking out over the crowd. And I think most of us will agree that did look bad.

Chief Jon Belmar: I was standing on West Florissant in Ferguson when I looked up at the BearCat and saw I had a sniper up there glassing, and I said, “What’s he doing up there on the top of the truck glassing these guys?” So they checked and the officer said there was a guy out there with a gun. I asked if the guy with a gun was still out there, and the officer said no, that he had disappeared into the crowd. So I said, “Take the rifle down, put the binoculars up.”

Wexler: Tim, do you have anything else you want to say here? You must feel that St. Louis County is being unfairly characterized with this militarization issue.

Chief Fitch: Well I think as Jon mentioned earlier, we had a very difficult time of getting our side of the story out there. There was a widely circulated photo of a guy with his hands up and about four SWAT guys with guns pointed at him. But the reports didn’t mention that he had just thrown a Molotov cocktail at those officers.

Austin, TX Chief Art Acevedo:

*Keep Explaining What You Are Doing,
So the Community Will Not Misunderstand It*

I think that ongoing situation reports to the media can help, where you explain your tactics and exactly what you are going to do. I remember when Occupy hit Austin, and we had about 4,000 people on the first day, which for us was a big crowd. And we had SWAT guys with binoculars serving as spotters, to avoid a situation where an anarchist gets in the middle of a peaceful group and starts throwing things.

People were angry and thought our SWAT officers were soldiers, so we explained that what we were trying to do was avoid having to use tear gas. I think my takeaway was that if we can give that explanation on a regular basis every couple of hours, it helps people to understand what’s happening.

Santa Monica Chief Jacqueline Seabrooks:

*We Sometimes Need Heavy Equipment
For Mass Shootings and Other Incidents*

Santa Monica is generally considered a politically liberal city, so there is certainly a concern within our community about this idea of police militarization. But I think that we police chiefs are remiss if we don’t take the opportunity to explain to our communities the history of militarization and local police that resulted post-September 11.



FAR LEFT:
Nassau County, NY
Chief Thomas
Krumpter

LEFT:
Elk Grove, CA Chief
Robert Lehner

It’s also important that we clarify that police departments are paramilitary entities and how this enables us to keep the peace even as we work to address issues of crime and disorder. While it is true that we use tools and tactics similar to those used by the military, where we should rightly focus our attention and concerns is on the mis-deployments or misuse of those tools and tactics; that’s where the true issues and concerns rest.

I have to say that I found those military-like tools and tactics to be quite valuable for us last year as we resolved a spree shooting in which the suspect killed five people before he was killed by responding officers. Mass shootings, like ours, the one at Sandy Hook Elementary, and a myriad of others, absolutely demonstrate the need for the police to be properly equipped.

Nassau County, NY Chief Thomas Krumpter:

We Can’t Ignore How the Public Perceives Our Military-Style Equipment and Weapons

There have been people talking about militarization of police for 10 to 15 years, but with Ferguson it seems to have gained a lot of momentum. We’ve all had to face these questions like “What do you use this equipment for? Why do you have it?” We have a lot of heavy equipment and weapons, and going forward, I think the question we have to focus on is how we use that equipment. We can’t ignore the missteps and the impressions we leave with the public.

Elk Grove, CA Chief Robert Lehner:

The More We Look Like Soldiers, The More We Will Be Criticized

This debate that’s going on about “militarization” of policing is not about equipment, it’s about appearance. It isn’t just the fact that you are marching in a line down the road carrying weaponry. We have to understand that we are not talking about tactics, but about how all this *looks*.

If you’re an urban police department and your purpose is camouflage, you probably ought to be wearing business suits, not jungle camouflage. If our purpose is to have clothing that is comfortable and that will protect us and will allow us to hang all sorts of equipment on our belt, why not have a police-specific tactical uniform that is recognized as civilian police uniform?

The more we look like soldiers, the more we will get this criticism, especially in certain communities.

Cincinnati Chief Jeffrey Blackwell:

It’s Not Only What We Do, It’s How We Look Doing It

I agree wholeheartedly with Chief Lehner. It’s not only what we do, what our departments do, it’s how we look doing it. And so when you wear black gloves in July, and you have that aggressive stance and those dark glasses on and there is a MRAP behind you with a sniper on the roof, and then you are talking about engaging the community in dialogue, it just doesn’t make sense.

ABOVE: Chicago Superintendent Garry McCarthy
BELOW: COPS Office Director Ronald Davis

Chicago Superintendent Garry McCarthy:
*Tear Gas Does Not Help to Control
A Large-Scale Demonstration*

Before the NATO Summit in 2012, we made it clear that we were going to come out in a soft look, and we would ratchet up our responses only if necessary. Most of the officers were wearing their regular checkerboard crown caps and light blue shirts.

We did have a big confrontation one day of the Summit, because we had information out of the crowd that the anarchists were about to try and break through the lines. When we got the information that they were going to start throwing rocks and bottles, we went to helmets. And then when we got the information that they were going to try and break through the line, that's when we went to the turtle suits and the riot gear. We did extractions of violent individuals, and the cops who went in and did the extractions were our mobile field forces. They were in the turtle gear.

The other thing I did before the Summit was change the use-of-force continuum so that only I could authorize the use of tear gas.

I remember being at a community meeting and a woman asked me if I was going to use tear gas to control the crowd.

And I said, "Well, only if you can explain to me how tear gas controls a crowd."

COPS Office Director Ron Davis:

*We Need National Standards
For Policing in a Democratic Society*

One of the strengths of American policing is that we have so many diverse agencies. But there are some areas where we are not going to be able to maintain the luxury of agency-specific practices. This is one of them. This has to be reconciled, because our communities are not looking at the issue in terms of policies at 16,000 or 17,000 separate police agencies.



They are looking at this as a single issue of policing in a democratic society.

From a law enforcement point of view, I hope we will be able to reconcile these differences, so that wherever I travel, if I attend a political demonstration, if I go to protest, I can have certain expectations with what I'm going to be met with by the police.

To give an example, one image that is jarring to me is a police dog at a demonstration. I don't think this can be justified. You can't explain that image away.

MCCA Executive Director Darrel Stephens:

*Only 26 Percent of Americans Support
Use of Military Equipment by Police*

Ron hit the nail on the head discussing the challenge we face because policing is so diverse. And the perception of militarization is real. The New York



ABOVE: Major Cities Chiefs Executive Director Darrel Stephens

BELOW: South Bend, IN Chief Ronald Teachman



I never envisioned in my career that we would ever put armor in a civil disturbance. And in fact we didn't. We put armor inside criminal activity that spun out of a civil disturbance.

South Bend, IN Chief Ronald Teachman:

Rules on a Hiring Preference for Veterans May Not Give Us the Mix of Officers We Need

Wexler: Ron, I'm told that you raised an interesting question in a conversation with a PERF staff member as we prepared for this meeting...

Chief Teachman: When we talk about the militarization of our departments, is it all about the equipment that we acquire and deploy, or is it also about the personnel that staff our organizations? In my former position in New Bedford, Massachusetts, we were a civil service department. Although we were trying to hire to reflect the community we serve—not just racially but also in consideration of gender, sexual orientation, language skills, education, etc., to meet the demands on a police department in the 21st Century—we were limited by civil service guidelines that said you must give absolute preference to veterans.

Times did a poll, and only 26 percent of the people in the country said that local police should have military weapons and vehicles.² So we have an enormous educational challenge facing us to convince people that that equipment we have is appropriate for use in policing.

Wexler: But we're hearing that Ferguson did *not* have surplus military equipment.

Darrel Stephens: It *looks* like military equipment and it's portrayed in the media as military equipment, so people accept that. That's the educational process we have to go through.

Chief Jon Belmar: The other thing that I think is notable, and we shouldn't lose sight of it, is that I can show you pictures of bullet marks on our BearCats. There were people inside of those at the time.

I know this is a controversial area to wade into. Our returning veterans need to be given the medical and the psychological care they deserve for serving our country, and the education and job skills training to work in the field of their choice. Maybe we shouldn't be shoehorning veterans into public safety jobs. Police chiefs have been getting the message, whether it's through the Vets to Cops hiring program or state agencies that guide them on their recruitment and hiring, to militarize their ranks. So I question whether an absolute veterans' preference allows us to achieve the right mix in the people we

2. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/21/us/ferguson-poll.html>



LEFT: Raleigh, NC Chief Cassandra Deck-Brown

RIGHT: More than 2,500 people at a “Moral Mondays” rally outside the North Carolina Legislative Building.
PHOTO USED WITH PERMISSION FROM RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER

hire, and how that militarization of our ranks affects decisions regarding the procurement and deployment of the surplus gear, as we’ve discussed today.

Raleigh, NC Chief Cassandra Deck-Brown:
Working with “Moral Mondays” Protest Leaders Helped Us Manage Demonstrations Peacefully

The North Carolina NAACP is the largest of the organization’s Southern chapters, and for the past two years it led “Moral Mondays” protests, which sort of followed on the heels of the Occupy movement.³ During 2014, thousands of Moral Mondays demonstrators gathered at various locations in North Carolina on a weekly basis to speak out concerning a variety of social and political issues. Many of those demonstrations took place at the Legislative Building in Raleigh, and more than 1,000 people were arrested there without incident.

The volume of arrests made it impossible for the General Assembly’s small police force to handle the situations on its own, and assistance was provided by members of the Raleigh Police Department’s tactical teams. Our SWAT officers did not wear BDU [battle dress utility] uniforms during these

assignments; instead, they were in the Class A uniforms they share with patrol officers.

Our partnerships and communication with protest leaders on the front end allowed us to accurately predict the number of demonstrators who were going to elect to be arrested each Monday night from the overall group. There were occasions in which a small segment of the crowd was vocal in terms of trying to confront law enforcement officers; however, Rev. William Barber, the head of the NAACP chapter and leader of the protests, very quickly and publicly said, “This is not about law enforcement; they are our partners.” That message resounded throughout the protest community as a whole, and it made a huge positive difference in our city’s ability to peacefully manage these protests.

Milwaukee Chief Edward A. Flynn:
Congress Defunded Community Policing And Pushed Military Equipment, and Now Is “Shocked” that Police Have Military Equipment

I was the Secretary of Public Safety in Massachusetts back in 2003, when all the money started going to Homeland Security. Part of that job was

3. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/06/24/2985465_first-wave-of-moral-monday-protesters.html?rh=1

administering COPS grants and the DHS grants, and I watched Homeland Security become the monster that ate criminal justice. Most of the community policing funding disappeared, and the money went to first response equipment and command vehicles and all the “toys.”

I remember having these discussions and telling the feds that the best thing that they could fund for us was community policing, because community policing is all about developing information at the local level.

But the retired generals and admirals told us, “No, no, no, take this stuff instead.”

So now, 10 years later, the Senate is shocked, shocked to find out there is “militarization of the police,” whatever that means.

I got a call from Senator McCaskill’s people about this issue, and these staffers are so young, they don’t know any of the history of these grants. So I told them about it, and I said, “If Congress is going to make any more interventions into local law enforcement, will you please talk to us first?”

We end up with these kneejerk reactions to a current event, and an instant solution that matches the next news cycle. And then months or years later, we have the wringing of hands, because look what happened—the unintended consequences of what we demanded the police to do.



We lost a generation of innovation in community policing because the money went to the toys. And now it’s somehow our fault that we’ve got the toys.

Fargo, ND Chief Keith Ternes:

After 9/11, Fargo Did What the Feds Asked, And Prepared for Homeland Security

A few weeks ago, Sen. Rand Paul from Kentucky was on one of the Sunday morning talk shows and put Fargo on the map for something other than the wood chipper. [laughter] He asked why DHS gave money to Fargo to fight terrorism, and said, “If the terrorists get to Fargo, we might as well give up.”

But it’s like Chief Flynn said. In the aftermath of 9/11, Fargo did what the federal government asked us to do, namely to recognize that the whole concept of homeland security starts with local communities. Fargo is a middle-America community of approximately 115,000 people. We did not take advantage of the 1033 DOD Excess Property program. The armored SWAT vehicle or “BearCat” that Senator Paul referred to in his commentary and other emergency response equipment that Fargo has obtained that he and others might see as a waste of taxpayers’ money, have come by way of federal



Fargo, ND Chief
Keith Ternes

funding or seized asset forfeiture money. And yes, we don't have a lot of violent crime, and al-Qaeda is not going to knock on our door anytime soon, but we did what the federal government asked us to do, and that is to be as prepared as possible to deal with the whole concept of homeland security.

Our biggest concern in Fargo is homegrown terrorism. In the upper Midwest we have a fair amount of anti-government "tax protestor" type of individuals. If you are from the federal government, you are very wary of just showing up on somebody's farmstead if there is a foreclosure or something like that occurring.

So I don't think Fargo has done anything differently than a lot of small Midwestern communities. We took the federal government's message to heart, and tried to prepare for the homeland security issues to the best of our ability.

Philadelphia Commissioner Chuck Ramsey:

We Need to Take a Hard Look At "Militarization" and Other Issues

One, I couldn't agree more about how we came to receive some of this equipment. Politicians have short memories when it's to their advantage to have a short memory. A little selective amnesia always helps when you are trying to make a point.

But whether it's surplus DOD equipment or just "military-like" equipment, you have to remember that the American public has been looking at images of war for the last 13 years, since 9/11. And then they look at us, and we've got big vehicles and we have people in camouflage and guys sitting on top of a vehicle—and it doesn't matter if it's an MRAP or a BearCat, sitting there with a tripod and assault rifle looking down a scope, that's just flat-out wrong. You just don't do that. You're never going to fire in a crowd anyway.

So we have to acknowledge that we are in a very touchy situation right now, and if we want this equipment, we need to make sure that we can clearly explain why we need it. We must have training and policies in place on when, where, and how it can be used.

And we have to deal with everything from day-to-day community policing type activities to critical incidents like active shooters, as Chief Seabrooks said. Local police departments go from one extreme to another, and we need to have the training with the equipment and the tools to be able to deal with everything that is thrown at us.

I don't think we've done a good job of explaining all this, and we've let the narrative get away from us with this whole issue of "militarization." So this is a good discussion we are having, and we need to follow it up with meaningful discussions about policy and training.

We also need to ask, who actually needs this stuff? Because I don't think we necessarily need everything the military has. There is this tendency sometimes to buy toys because they're available and cheap, and not providing the rationale of why our department needs it.

I think we if we can make these arguments, we'll be on more solid ground than we are right now, because with politicians, it's an either-or proposition. They may eliminate everything, including UASI grants and the programs that help us buy the kind of equipment we really need. Instead, we've kind of let this get to a point where the military-industrial complex is force-feeding police this stuff, and the image that results depicts police turning it on the very people we are sworn to protect. That's the image that's out there, and we've got to change that pretty quickly.

We need to make sure that we don't have officers using equipment inappropriately, and we need to take an honest look at ourselves and say maybe we did go a little too far in some areas, and maybe we need to pull back a little bit. I think we need to really take a real hard look. All the criticism is not wrong. Some of it is legitimate.

De-Escalation of Incidents

Participants at PERF's summit noted that the events in Ferguson have prompted a national discussion

of ways in which police should work to de-escalate encounters when possible. PERF has conducted extensive research on de-escalation strategies.⁴

The Defining Moments Summit included discussion of whether officers should receive new training based on the concept that in certain situations that do not involve a serious crime or a dangerous suspect, the best strategy for officers may be to disengage and leave the scene. In some cases, no further action may be necessary. In other situations, police may take additional action later. For example, if a suspect's identity is known, it may be safer to arrest the suspect later at his home, rather than engaging in a potentially dangerous foot chase or vehicle pursuit.

Dallas Chief David Brown:

We Should Train Officers to Understand That Backing Down Is Sometimes the Best Option

With regard to use of force, sometimes it seems like our young officers want to get into an athletic event with people they want to arrest. They have a “don't retreat” mentality. They feel like they're warriors, and they can't back down when someone is running from them, no matter how minor the underlying crime is.

But often there are reasonable alternatives. For example, if your partner already caught one of the other bad guys, that one will probably give up the other folks. Often there's a way to arrest the suspect later in a safer way.

San Leandro, CA Captain Ed Tracey:

Let's Not Forget that the Profession Has Made Great Advances in De-Escalation

I would argue that as a profession, we're doing a much better job of de-escalation and handling encounters with persons who have mental illness. If you look at our SWAT tactics, for example,

“surround and call out” versus “dynamic entry.” We have made adjustments in many areas to lessen the need to utilize lethal force.

I think these issues are more prominent now because police are always on someone's video camera, and the video is spread nationwide through social media. So we need to make sure that our officers continue to get this type of training and improve as a profession, but I think we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that we are way better than we were 10 or 20 years ago in terms of SWAT, de-escalation of force, and interacting with the mentally ill.

**Former Chief Terry Gainer,
U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms:**

We Need to Train Officers to Realize It's Sometimes OK to Let an Offender Go, Especially the Nonviolent Offender

Wexler: Terry Gainer, you worked with Chuck Ramsey when we talked about this whole issue of Washington D.C. being the deadliest police department in the country. What were the things that were obvious to you when you two were coming in from outside, what you had to change about D.C.'s use of force policy?

continued on page 28



San Leandro, CA Captain Ed Tracey

4. See, for example, *An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force*. 2012. http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/an%20integrated%20approach%20to%20de-escalation%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%20force%202012.pdf

Toronto Chief William Blair:

Shootings Are Often “Justified Under the Circumstances,” But We Should Look at What Led to the Circumstances

Chief Blair offered his perspective on the July 2013 fatal shooting of Sammy Yatim by Toronto police. Yatim had been behaving strangely on a streetcar and had threatened passengers with a knife, but the passengers had escaped and Yatim was alone on the bus when he was approached and shot eight times by a Toronto officer.



We often take a very legalistic approach to these incidents where a police officer takes the life of an individual, particularly when it involves a person in crisis, somebody suffering from a mental illness.

I can't tell you the number of reports that I have received over the years that said a use of force was “justified under the circumstances,” but which didn't review the circumstances that led to the use of force.

I believe that our training of officers should bring not just the legal element, but a moral element, to the decision to use deadly force. We have had discussions about this moral element, and it has helped to produce some significant improvements in our organization, because now our officers look to see if there is an opportunity to disengage, to deescalate, to step back.

In active shooter situations, our officers immediately go to the location of the shooting because we have a duty to preserve life. We're making a choice: If you don't go in, more people are going to lose their lives, so you go in.

But most of these use-of-force situations don't involve those circumstances where you need to rush in, or else more people will lose their lives.

We had an incident last summer. A young man, 18 years old, was on one of our streetcars, and he had a knife in his hand. He had threatened the people on the streetcar, and all of them had run off.

This young man was clearly in emotional disturbance. There was a strong indication he was suffering from mental illness, and it turned out he was also high on drugs, which wasn't known to the police when they arrived.

The first officer on the scene was standing in front of the streetcar, engaged with the fellow. The streetcar doors were open, but everybody was off the streetcar except the man with the knife. After just a few moments of verbal interaction between

them, the officer fired three times, and the young man dropped to the ground. After a pause of six seconds, the officer fired six more rounds into the individual as he was lying there.

I received a phone call about 15 minutes after this event took place from my duty officer, saying, “Chief, we've just shot a guy.” And when I asked what happened, he said, “The best way for me to describe it is just to tell you to go on YouTube now and watch it.”

There were 17 individuals who had held up their cell phones and videotaped the incident. There were four cameras on the streetcar, and one on a building, so we had 22 video recordings of this event.⁵

The shooting was highly questionable. The first three rounds I think we could have discussed from a legal standpoint, but not the six rounds that followed.

And so we had a very quickly evolving crisis. As Chief McClelland and Chief Brown said, you have the news cycle, and you have to respond quickly. This was a national and international incident. The video was compelling, and there was lots of it. In the previous 18 months, we had shot and killed three other mentally ill people with edge weapons. In all of those cases there was video of the event, and there was a great

5. See, for example: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IG6OTyzAgg>

deal of public discussion and concern about our interactions and use of force in dealing with persons in crisis.

Within about three hours, I was doing a press conference, and I was compelled to do a number of extraordinary things. I suspended the officer, although that is not our normal procedure, and we identified the officer.

The next day, I met with the young man's family and their lawyers. We did not make that a media event, but the media was aware that I was meeting with the family. The young man was Syrian, so I met with representatives of the Canadian Arab Federation and the Syrian community, and then with representatives of the mental health community. Fortunately, we have longstanding relationships with all of those organizations, so we were able to make those arrangements quickly.

Fortunately, in my jurisdiction we have an independent investigative body that looks at all incidents involving police and deadly use of force. They would conduct the investigation.

I have a statutory responsibility to look at policies, procedures, training, and equipment as an administrative review in the aftermath of these incidents. And I had done this many times, but it was apparent to me in this set of circumstances that that wasn't going to be good enough.

So in the press conference, I expressed publicly my sympathies to the family for their loss. I did not acknowledge liability in that discussion, but I offered our condolences to the family for the loss of their son. I acknowledged the concern that the community was expressing about the shooting. I said I had some of the same concerns, that the shooting would be thoroughly investigated, and the results of that entire investigation would be made public.

I also approached a recently retired justice of our Supreme Court in Canada, and I commissioned him to conduct an international search of best practices and to make recommendations to me about police encounters with people in crisis and about use of force. I also asked him to look at the mental health and psychological well-being of my officers in these circumstances and to make recommendations to us.

And now we have completed the investigation, and the officer has been charged with second-degree murder. And the report from our Supreme Court justice has been released, with recommendations on police encounters with people on crisis.⁶

So this was a bit of a defining moment for me, because frankly I think we had reached a point where we were losing public confidence. It is a reality for our officers, and I suspect across North America, that the police have become the only frontline mental health workers left in society. Our officers are being thrust into a role for which they are not particularly well trained or equipped. I think we have to be able to demonstrate in these circumstances our willingness to be open, to be transparent, to be objective and thorough, and to look critically at what we were doing.

I think that looking critically at what we are doing begins with noting that we have found in countless circumstances that we were able to say that a use of force was “justified under the circumstances.” But when we went beyond that, headed a little bit upstream and looked at the circumstances that had put us in that situation in the first place, there was a great deal more that we could and should be doing.

I'm not asking my officers to jump on a grenade. The truth is that police officers put themselves between the risk and the people who we're sworn to serve every day, in every one of our jurisdictions. That's what cops do. And that's what we expect of our cops. We don't expect them to toss their lives away, but we expect them to live with a certain amount of risk. And part of managing that risk is having the training and permission so you know that when circumstances allow, if you don't need to go in and use deadly force in order to preserve a life, you can back off and contain that situation and take your time.

I think we all have a responsibility here, and if we can demonstrate that we are acting morally and ethically, that is a better standard than merely acting “within the rule of law.”

If I can define that for my officers and for the community, it puts those events where we do take a life in a different context. And I think that helps to engender trust among the people about how and why we use force and when it is necessary.

6. “Police Encounters with People in Crisis: An Independent Review Conducted by the Honourable Frank Iacobucci for Chief of Police William Blair, Toronto Police Service.” July 2014. <http://www.tpsreview.ca/>

Chief Gainer: It was obvious that we had a problem simply from the large numbers of officer-involved shootings, and the number of bullets fired in those shootings. We had one where a single officer shot 44 times at someone who was trying to escape in a car. You've got to reload a lot to shoot that many times. But the main issue was that we had not trained our officers correctly. We did not give them alternatives; we did not emphasize de-escalation.

Wexler: What about the training did you do differently?

Chief Gainer: A lot of it was simple things. We had many shootings where the officer would stop a car for a simple traffic violation, and the driver would refuse to provide his driver's license. So the officer would reach into the car to grab the keys. The car would start moving, and suddenly you have a deadly force incident over a traffic violation.

Or a car would be coming at the officer, and rather than stepping out of the way, the officer would try to shoot the driver.

We had a case of a person who clearly needed some mental health care, barricaded in a basement and holding a knife. We had a K-9 there that was trained to disarm people. But instead of turning the dog loose, they shot this guy about 30 times. And so we asked why they didn't use the dog, and they said they didn't want the dog to get hurt. So we had a real problem of organizational culture if they would shoot someone rather than try a lesser use of force.

Our training academy wasn't teaching those things. We did not have a good use-of-force policy; the training was not realistic; and as a result, the officers were ill-prepared to avoid escalation or how to de-escalate tense situations, while still being effective.

Wexler: Terry, I've heard you talk about the emphasis on officers going home safe at night.

Chief Gainer: I'm from a long police family. I have a son in the D.C. Police Department, a son-in-law in the Chicago PD, and a son who's an FBI agent. And we sit and talk about a lot of things, and I've heard them talk about roll calls where the sergeant tells them, "Your first priority is to go home safe."

And that is right to an extent, but we want everyone to go home safe, not just the officers, and no one feels this more personally than I do with my own sons.

Bad things can result when you combine (1) that officer safety is the first priority, (2) that the police can never retreat, and (3) that immediate arrest is the only solution. That's how you get these situations where police end up using deadly force over a minor incident that never should have reached that level.

I don't know how many times I hear police officers say, "I would rather be judged by 12 than carried home by six." Which is all well and good, as long as you aren't being judged by 12 for using deadly force in a situation in which there were alternatives, very reasonable alternatives to avoid the use of that deadly force.

Raleigh, NC Chief Cassandra Deck-Brown:

Reality-Based Training Is Effective In Showing Officers How to Make Decisions

I think we get a big bang for the bucks spent on reality-based training. As a form of in-service



Former Chief Terry Gainer,
U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms



Brookline, MA Chief
Daniel O'Leary

training, it gives us the opportunity to put officers in scenarios that are highly realistic. Some situations are escalated; others are de-escalated. Immediately afterwards, there is an opportunity to debrief and analyze what a recruit or an officer did and whether it was the right thing to do.

Reality-based training is used at other times when officers are put through remedial exercises because of some action they took on the street. It can help teach them how to think more carefully about what to do in a five- or ten-second window that culminates with them facing a life-or-death situation.

We often hear words like, “Stand your ground; stay in the fight.” It’s the warrior mentality, and we are teaching our officers to do that. But we need to also let them know that there are times when they need to retreat or need to call for backup.

I think that reality-based training is a huge benefit. If you don’t have it, find an agency that you can partner with to receive it.

Brookline, MA Chief Daniel O’Leary:
*We Successfully Changed Policy
And Culture on Vehicle Pursuits*

We’re talking about changing the police culture, and it’s a very difficult thing to do. But it is not without precedent. We have done this before.

The big example that comes to mind is vehicle pursuits. I think every area of the country has had a bad experience with pursuits. And we try to get our officers not to participate in them.

In Brookline we did it. We said there will be no more pursuits; supervisors are going to call them off.

The important thing is that we followed it up with a lot of training. We told our officers the reasons why we were making this change, and we also began requiring our detectives to do a follow-up investigation the next day, with the intent of arresting whoever was driving that car that we decided not to chase.

And we have found through the last five or six years that the vast majority of drivers who have fled have been apprehended by us later, because the officer usually gets enough information about the driver, the vehicle, the tag to support a follow-up investigation.

So it wasn’t without a fight, and it wasn’t without breaking down a real tough culture that police have. But it can be done. It can be thought out and it can be done.

BJA Director Denise O'Donnell: *We Are Looking to Provide Training As a Result of the Ferguson Events*

I'd like to take this opportunity to give a plug for a publication we have produced with IACP that provides a model policy for safeguarding children of arrested parents. We hope every police department will adopt this policy about what you do with the kids when you make an arrest... who has responsibility for the children? We had involvement from an advocacy group, the Osborne Society in New York City that works with families of incarcerated individuals.

This policy is available on the BJA website at <https://www.bja.gov/Publications/IACP-SafeguardingChildren.pdf>. It has struck such a chord that Deputy Attorney General James Cole sent a letter to all of the federal investigative agencies asking them to



implement the policy. So this is something really worthwhile.

We are going to be doing some training as a result of the Ferguson events. It's going to be required training for the Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. **We are planning to produce a short "roll call" video that law enforcement agencies can use on topics such as safeguarding First Amendment rights and when to deploy certain kinds of specialized equipment.**

Yesterday Ron Davis challenged us to see if we can speak with one mind on this issue. So if you know experts who can help us get this right, and you know the kind of training you want for your officers, BJA would appreciate your input.

Defining Moments for Police Chiefs

AFTER THE DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATIONS of Ferguson for policing, participants at PERF's meeting in Chicago told stories about their own individual "defining moments" as police chiefs, and the lessons that they took from these moments.

The defining moments were in three general categories: engaging the community; internal issues, such as working with police union leaders; and working with the news media.

Engaging the Community

Philadelphia Commissioner Chuck Ramsey:

*"Warrior" vs. "Guardian"—
Defining What We Want from Officers*

Commissioner Ramsey began his policing career in Chicago, where he was instrumental in designing and implementing the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), which became a national model of community policing.

When we started implementing community policing in Chicago, we were way behind the curve. A lot of cities had already made significant progress. I was one of those officers coming up who had always worked in operational units, where your activity was measured by indicators like the number of arrests you made. So I didn't have a lot of exposure to community policing and relationship-building. I always believed in treating people respectfully, and I was taught that way when I came on the job.

But it was not something I spent a lot of time thinking about.

So when I was put in charge of the CAPS program, I had to get up to speed quickly. And I had my concerns and doubts as to whether or not it was a viable strategy in a city like Chicago, which had significant crime problems and gang issues.

We put together a community policing strategy, and we made a mistake at first in being a little too philosophical in terms of how we were training our police officers to do community policing. After one of our training sessions, an officer came up and said, "Hey, this is nice and all that. But why don't you try just telling us what you want us to do?"

And I thought that was a good point, so from then on, we focused exactly on how an officer's day would be different after community policing was implemented.

Believe it or not, we had an easier "sell" with older officers than with younger officers. Older officers had come on the job at a time when we still engaged in foot patrol. We had "beat integrity," as we called it, where you had to stay on your assigned beat. As a consequence, officers got to know people. You worked the same area every day, and sometimes that beat was only two blocks by four blocks—a very small area. So you couldn't help but get to know the community.

The bottom line is that community policing has to happen at the ground level. It is not about the chief and the deputies and the bosses understanding what it's all about; it's about how the officers do their jobs.

Wexler: At first you had some reservations about it, didn't you?

Ramsey: Oh, I did, and it was quite a challenge. But it was one of my defining moments, because it changed my career path. It changed the way I view policing and our relationship with community. I became a strong believer. And you know that nothing is perfect, but it does boil down to police officers really working closely with the community and interacting with community members.

Often community policing is about learning that not everybody is a criminal. In Philadelphia now, all of our rookie cops start off on foot patrol in some of the most challenged neighborhoods we have, where we have a lot of crime occurring in open space. But they learn very quickly that not everybody in that community is a criminal. There are more decent, law-abiding citizens living there than there are criminals. And I think that the earlier you learn that lesson, the better off you are going to be as a police officer.

Moving up to 2014, we have done a lot with community policing, but I don't think we have done all we can. When a problem arises, that's when the tension resurfaces and there is more work that has to be done.

Look at training. We spend most of our training time teaching policemen the technical aspects of the job—how you make an arrest, how you approach a felony suspect, how you make out a report for each type of crime.

We don't spend much time helping the police officers understand their role in a democratic society. And if we want officers to get this concept of police as guardians versus police as warriors, we need to educate them in a way that is consistent with that mentality.

Right now, we don't do that. We send conflicting messages.

We have training videos that show a 90-year-old woman pull out a gun and shoot a policeman. Well, let me tell you something: I am not going to approach a 90-year-old with my gun drawn. I am sorry, if she shoots me, I am just dead. That is not the norm that we should train to.

And yet we almost train officers to think that everyone is out to get us. I don't mean that we should be silly or careless, but we need to understand the uniqueness of our role in society. I don't think we spend any time really doing that as a profession.

And then we wonder why we have problems, why officers have the “warrior” mentality, why officers act in a certain way. It's because we have trained them to act that way. Once they put all that military-style gear on, they want to fight, they want to do something. We expect them to put on all that gear and then sit back and relax? We send mixed messages. We have got to stop that and rethink our training, our policies, and the messages we send.

Wexler: I have heard you make a point about de-escalating the police response as a situation changes.

Ramsey: Escalation is the easy part. De-escalation is the hard part. Somebody has to be the adult in the room, the one to de-escalate the tensions as much as possible. And it has to be the police officer.

When I was a young policeman, we didn't have portable radios. All the radios were in the cars. So for example, you'd respond to a domestic violence call on a third floor rear of an apartment, and it's just you and your partner. If things start going south, one of you has to slip back to the car, get on the radio, summon help, run back upstairs, and hope your partner didn't get his butt kicked in the time you were gone. So what did you learn? You learned how to talk to people and keep the situation from getting out of hand, because the cavalry was not right around the corner.

But when we got portable radios, all we had to do in a tense situation was make a quick call, and help was on the way. That effort to try to keep things calm started to shift a little bit, because reinforcements arrived much faster. We forgot how to talk to people. This doesn't apply to everybody, but many police officers don't know how to talk to folks in a way that helps to ease the situation and calm it down.

Wexler: Is this the younger generation? They don't talk on the phone, they text you.

Ramsey: It's not only the younger officers; you can see it elsewhere too. And this is not an indictment of all police officers. But as chiefs I think we need to take action and not turn a blind eye to these issues.

For example, go to an awards ceremony. In many police departments, the way to get an award is to jump over 10 fences and arrest an armed robber. We don't give awards to people for just doing a solid job in a community, for making a fundamental difference in the quality of life of the individuals who live there.

So if you want people to engage in both the traditional heroic behavior and the routine solid jobs that improve the quality of life—and we need both—then we have to equally recognize those efforts. There needs to be a balance there, and I know that in many departments, including my own, it's not as balanced as it should be.

Minneapolis Chief Janeé Harteau:

We Need to Show Officers that Making Connections Is Part of the Job

I couldn't agree more on the need to reward people for what we want them to do. I try to push for a greater emphasis on the quality of police work, as opposed to quantity. We really do not track community engagement. If all we do is track arrest stats, we are not getting the officers to do what we need them to do. It's about getting cops out of the cars, and connecting with community members when they are *not* in crisis. That is how you build trust. You can't wait for a crisis and then try to build trust; it has to happen before that.

In Minneapolis we have the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood, home to the largest Somali population in the country. This is a group of folks who just innately do not trust police, for obvious reasons. I think that if we can find a way to create procedural justice and a sense of police legitimacy in that community, we can do it across the board anywhere.

We have spent an enormous amount of time teaming up with the Cedar-Riverside community and with PERF on a program to give the community a voice, to have some consistent practices on

how our officers respond and how they communicate with people, and to ensure that the community can be comfortable knowing that officers are going to be fair in their response. We also have to educate people about how the larger criminal justice system works.

Wexler: As part of this project, you have officers on bicycles going into the neighborhood....

Chief Harteau: Yes, the Bike Cops for Kids. Our cops see kids riding bikes without helmets, so we have gotten a lot of donations, and the cops give away bike helmets. I led a community bike ride a few weeks ago with a couple hundred people. We rode through the most violent hot spots of crime in the city, and we gave away bike helmets, talked to residents, and I even stopped and took "selfies" with people. It's a way to have them see us and connect with us in a non-confrontational, non-crisis situation. Next summer we expect to have a larger turnout and most likely multiple rides.

Wexler: You also have five Somali police officers, two that work the Cedar Riverside area.

Chief Harteau: Yes, they have been a valuable asset and I am proud to say one of them was just promoted to sergeant. I believe he is the first Somali sergeant in the country.

Wexler: And your challenge is how to get the other police officers to be accepted by the Somali population the way these Somali officers are accepted, right? This isn't easy. How do you make that happen?

Chief Harteau: I think part of it is providing direction from the top down. You define what you want your officers to do and expect them to do, and then you give them the okay to do it.

This is a balancing act, because I am short of officers like everybody else. My cops run from call to call. But I need them to spend some *time* on calls too. I'm telling the officers, "I don't want you to just have numbers; I want you to make connections." We need to ensure that we are encouraging them to know that community engagement is part of the job,

and we are going start to track community engagement. So when you get out of your car and are connecting with people, you are doing something, and that is also part of your stats.

Frankly, it is trying to bring a “suburban” feel to an urban department, and it’s not an easy task, but I believe it’s a necessary one.

Chicago Superintendent Garry McCarthy:

Community Policing Helps Us Reduce Crime, And Reduce Arrests at the Same Time

Wexler: Garry, you came to Chicago from New York City and Newark, and in Chicago there was this issue of specialized units. In the past, if you wanted to get ahead in the Chicago PD, you went to the specialized units. But you dismantled them and put the cops in the districts. And today, you get graded by how you do as a district commander; that’s the prestigious job in the Chicago Police Department. The center of gravity is different in Chicago today; the power is in the districts and not up in headquarters, is that right?

Superintendent McCarthy: Yes, that is correct. I was listening to Chuck Ramsey speak about creating the CAPS community policing program in the 1990s, but unfortunately, by the time I got here three and a half years ago, CAPS was only a program, it wasn’t a philosophy.

It’s not just Chicago; I think that American policing has moved away from community policing, towards metrics-driven policing. We always talk about reducing crime. You run into one of your colleagues and say, “How are you?” And even if they just found out they have cancer, the first thing they tell you is, “My murders are up and my robberies are down.”

And I think that that dynamic of focusing on metrics drove overspecialization, certainly here in Chicago, because it is easy to get specialty units to go out and achieve numbers.

I know this sounds ironic coming from me, because I ran the CompStat system in New York for seven years. But I think this is about a misunderstanding of Compstat. Compstat is supposed to be about outcomes, not about outputs, right?

The outcome of reduced crime, not the output of increased arrests.

And the goal of crime reduction is zero crime, and zero arrests. As crime comes down, arrests should come down with it. We can reduce crime and do community policing, by putting cops in beat cars, putting them in the same exact beats every single day, and holding them accountable for what’s happening.

But to do that, you have to shift the center of gravity, as you say, from the special units to the districts, because the special units don’t have any connection with the local communities. Every one of us in this room has been to community meetings where the first question you get is, “Why you are stopping my son? He hasn’t done anything wrong. And you drive right past the criminals.” In the overspecialized model, we didn’t know who the criminals were.

So we started putting people into districts and we made it a rite of passage for executive development to go through district command. It is the hardest, most important job in the Chicago Police Department.

And the result is that crime keeps going down. We are at a 1963 murder rate in the city right now. There is about a third less crime over the last three years in this city, and complaints against cops are down at the same time as *arrests* are down.

So I think the metrics we used to look at, like making more arrests, were the wrong “wants.” Now we are looking for fewer arrests, more crime reduction, and fewer complaints against our officers.

Brookline, MA Chief Daniel O’Leary:

Sharing Information and Soliciting Input Result in a Supportive Community

I think it’s important that the community knows what you are doing and has a say in what you do. In Brookline this goes back 20 years. I had some ideas about what I wanted to do to improve the department, and one of the major issues was that I thought we weren’t engaging the community enough. We also were having allegations of racial profiling by officers.

As we thought about how to address these issues, people in the community were asking for statistics. So we started releasing race and gender statistics on all of the people we stopped in motor vehicles, on field interrogations, and on arrests, and also data on the race and sex of officers who were named in complaints and the race and sex of the complainants. And we've been doing that consistently since 1997,⁷ and that went a long way to get us over the hump on being transparent.

I think our officers saw the value of sharing information. And it's something that doesn't really require a lot of work. All we have to do is put the data in a report and release it to the public.

Often before we do something like deploy a new technology, we'll bring it to a public meeting and get public input. We usually write a policy based on the public input before we start implementing anything. That can involve a lot of work, because the people in our community don't want to give up their privacy rights, for example. But in the end, we get a lot of support in the community for the policies we end up adopting, because we are transparent.

For example, if we have a spike in robberies or car break-ins, we no longer throw overtime after overtime at something like that. Instead we charge our supervisors with coming up with a plan for using their on-duty personnel. How are you going to go after the criminals? How are you going to end the problem? And it is proven very successful over the last five years. You really see the officers take a lot of ownership if you charge them with fixing a problem.

At one point the union said we were stripping the town and putting people at risk. So I went to a public meeting and told the community what we were doing and why we were doing it. We showed the results, and we have not had any complaints. They know how we operate; our overtime is down; our crime rate is down; and our arrests are getting made quicker.

With regard to rewarding the kinds of behavior that you want see more of, we give commendations

to the officers and also the supervisors, because they are the ones we ask to develop a plan and make sure it gets followed.

I think it is simple to be transparent, but sometimes you are not as transparent as you could be and you get slapped down, and that has happened to me on a number of occasions. But if you remember that you work for the community and you work for your officers and you tell the story, people will appreciate it.

Boston Commissioner William Evans:

With Occupy Protests and Sports Events, We Aim to Have a Soft Approach

The Occupy protest was a 70-day movement in Boston and I was pretty lucky because I grew up in the city, so I know the neighborhoods. The Occupy event was about a mile from where I live, so I was able to drop by several times a day and establish relationships with some of the protesters. Some of those relationships continue today; two weeks ago I had coffee with one of the kids and I wrote a recommendation for him to get into graduate school.

I was watching what was going on other cities, and when there were ugly incidents in other places, I noticed that it ratcheted up the tensions in Boston. A lot of people were bad-mouthing the Occupy movement and calling the protesters names, but we were in there, talking to them. I had two kids in college at the time of the Occupy protests, and I told them, "Yeah, we are part of the 99 percent." And we set the philosophy with that. I gave the leaders my cell phone number, and I made sure we had the right cops there who could handle it well.

And you know, I was always a city kid. My parents died when I was young, so I was brought up by my brothers, and there were times when the cops used to chase me off the corner. So I always say that there are no bad kids, that everyone deserves a shot.

We went right down there, led the protesters on marches, and every time we went near that camp, we never had a helmet, never had a nightstick.

7. "Brookline Police Department, Racial/Gender Breakdown of Police/Community Interactions." <http://www.brooklinepolice.com/Archive.aspx?AMID=39>

Kalamazoo, MI Chief
Jeff Hadley



Everybody went just with their soft equipment, and we talked our way in and out. **If you go in soft, people are less apt to give you a fight. If you go in looking for a fight, you'll probably get one.** We have learned from handling some of the sports victories that coming in with the helmets and sticks is not the way to go.

There is a time and place for tactical equipment, though. After the Marathon bombings, I was helping to lead the charge in Watertown when we were searching for the suspect, and that was scary. We were going from house to house, clearing houses, and I could see the fear on people's faces as they were being led out of their homes. We were glad to have heavy equipment then.

Kalamazoo, MI Chief Jeff Hadley:

Outside Assistance Can Help You Get Ahead of Difficult Issues

We undertook a proactive study of whether there is racial profiling by the police in Kalamazoo. This issue was on the table when I became chief in 2008, and so we went about a process to really answer the question.

Internally you get some pushback from officers, who ask, "Why would you do a study like this? We don't profile anyone. We're just out there doing the job that you ask us to do."

But I felt that it was a reasonable question to answer. So we found a consultant to do the study, Dr. John Lamberth, who was recommended by Chief Harry Dolan, former Chief of Raleigh and Grand Rapids, Michigan. Dr. Lamberth's methodology had been accepted by federal courts, so I felt comfortable with the manner in which his firm would do the analysis.

It took a year to collect the data on traffic stops and "post-stop activity" such as whether the motorist is given a citation, is asked to exit the vehicle, is handcuffed, is searched, is arrested, etc. We had to build some internal infrastructure to collect the data. And as we were collecting the data, we had multiple public meetings with different parts of our community to talk about the study, the methodology, what the results might turn out to be or might not be, and how we were going to discuss the results, however they turned out. We also involved officers along the way to keep them dialed in to the whole process.

In September 2013 we released the results of the study,⁸ which showed significant racially disparate impact in our traffic stops at all of our locations throughout the city. Whether it was predominantly African-American or predominantly Caucasian parts of the community, all of the data sets were above the odds ratio that Dr. Lamberth had set.

The community took the results of the study well. The community's response seemed to be, "Thank you for undertaking the study and telling the truth, and how can we help solve the problem?" Nobody rioted or carried picket signs.

However, the officers initially were unhappy. They felt that I had hung them out to dry, and that people were pointing at them and calling them

8. Lamberth Consulting. "Traffic Stop Data Analysis Project: The City of Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety." September 2013. http://media.mlive.com/kzgazette_impact/other/KDPS%20Racial%20Profiling%20Study.pdf

racist. No one was doing that, but that is how they felt. It took some time for the sting to dissipate.

As we thought about how to respond to the results and the recommendations that Dr. Lamberth set forth, we aimed to narrow the focus in terms of our operational directives—to answer the question that Chuck Ramsey talked about, when officers say, “Just tell me what you want me to do.”

We adopted some new policies and procedures about “consent-to-search” practices. I reached out across the country for help on that. Chief Art Acevedo from Austin and Chief Ed Flynn from Milwaukee helped me with their consent-to-search policies.

In addition, Dr. Lorie Fridell trained our whole department on implicit bias. Her training program helps officers to understand that this is not about blaming them; it’s about learning how our minds work and what we all can do to understand and manage our human biases. And so now some of the initial pushback is lessening, as the officers see that we are doing some good here.

Tallahassee, FL Chief Michael DeLeo:

Relationships with Community Leaders Help During a Crisis

Wexler: Mike, you’re a fairly new chief in Tallahassee; you came on in December 2013 after having been Deputy Chief in Plantation, Florida, which is about half the size of Tallahassee. And you had a number of incidents in close succession after you became chief, is that right? Can you tell us about your experience as a new chief?

Chief DeLeo: One of the reasons I came to Tallahassee was that there was a change in administration because of a use-of-force incident that involved officers injuring a woman on a DUI arrest. The city also had had the sexual assault investigation of the Heisman-winning quarterback Jameis Winston, and there was a lot of criticism of the police and

Florida State University. So it was clear that Tallahassee has had a lot of public trust issues.

Other chiefs here have been talking about the need for chiefs to build relationships with the community during non-crisis times. I did a lot of that in my first few months in Tallahassee, going to all the different churches and community meetings.

Then, in a span of six weeks starting in May, we had four officer-involved shootings. The first one involved six officers and a running gun battle that started at the FSU campus and went through several neighborhoods. Two suspects were shot, one fatally. Two weeks later on May 29, officers responded to a call of shots fired at a nightclub parking lot, and shot at a car and killed an 18-year-old man fleeing the scene. About two weeks after that, there was another shooting outside of a club. A 25-year-old man cranked off some rounds in the parking lot; the officers approached him on foot, he fled on foot, he turned, and an officer fired and shot him.

After that third shooting, a minister from one of the small African-American churches called me. I had been in contact with a lot of the different ministers and had been working proactively with the Urban League and NAACP, and had already had lot of meetings and conversations. This minister said he wanted to have a town hall meeting and asked if I would come, and I told him absolutely yes.

And on the day the meeting was scheduled for, I got the phone call at 3 a.m. telling me we just had our fourth officer-involved shooting, and it was a block from the church.



Tallahassee Chief
Michael DeLeo

Now in all of the four shootings, the suspects had firearms, and in three of the shootings, they had fired at somebody else or at the police first. But there was a lot of concern about all of these shootings occurring one after another.

So I went to the church, and there were about 300 people packed in there. People were frustrated.

When it was my turn to talk, I started outlining each of the cases, including details that hadn't been released before. And people asked me questions, like "Does it matter that the suspect had a gun?" And I explained why it does matter. And I said, "I have no issue with anybody questioning what we do and how we do it. That is what we are here for. We answer to you, on any questions."

I also asked why the community was giving itself a pass on all the other shootings in the city. Tallahassee averages five to seven shootings a *week*, and it's been like that for the last five to 10 years, and it seems that nobody has done much to stop that.

I think the public received that message well. And I think it helped that I had spent some time in my first months building relationships before there was a crisis, because at one point in the meeting, one of the ministers put his hand on my shoulder and said, "The chief called me at 7 o'clock in the morning, the morning of one of these shootings, to tell me what happened and to say, 'If you ever have any questions, call me.' What else do you expect from the man? He is telling us what is going on, he is keeping us informed, he is here to answer our questions. Give him a chance."

And I have never said "no comment" to the media over any subject. I have answered every question, or if it was a question I couldn't answer because it could jeopardize a prosecution, I explained that. And I tell the media all the time that I don't want to provide bad information. My information has to be accurate. I told them flat out, "If I tell you somebody was shot five times and later I find out it was seven times, then I lied to you or I misled you. I'd rather make sure I give you the accurate information, because it is just so harmful to provide early information that turns out to be wrong."

I think something else that helped is that I had already started discussions with PERF to come in and review some of our policies, including use of

force and citizen complaint processes, so that was already public. Being proactive and trying to identify the issues goes a long way, versus waiting for someone else to point out your warts.

Wexler: You're a new chief, but everything you just said indicates to me that you intuitively knew what to do. Where did you learn how to make these gestures that generate support in the community?

Chief DeLeo: Family. My father was a police officer. He retired as chief of Miami Beach Police Department. My grandfather was an officer, my great-grandfather was an NYPD officer. So there's a tradition, and the way I was raised, and a certain belief about what the position of police officer is about.

My Dad used to tell stories, and the stories weren't about a foot chase or getting into a fight. He would come home and talk about helping an old lady whose hot water heater blew up at 2 in the morning. And as kids we'd say, "But you're a cop!" And he would say, "People call 911 because they need help and they don't know where else to turn—not because they want you there. Nobody wants police cars parked in front of their house for the whole neighborhood to see."

So the way we grew up, and my philosophy, and what I expect from my officers, is that when people call us because they need help and they don't know where else to go, it is our job to find them help and resolve the crisis, or if we are not the ones to resolve it, to point them in the right direction.

Santa Monica Chief Jacqueline Seabrooks:

I Worked with the Community and DOJ To Implement Reforms in Inglewood, CA

Chief Seabrooks joined the Santa Monica Police Department in 1982, rose through the ranks to captain, and served for a time as Interim Chief before being chosen in 2007 to serve as Chief of Police in nearby Inglewood, CA, approximately 10 miles from Santa Monica.

Chief Seabrooks was a "change agent" in Inglewood, where she improved police systems, reduced crime rates to 1970s levels, and built police-community

relationships. After serving as chief in Inglewood for nearly five years, she returned to the Santa Monica Police Department in 2012 to serve as chief there.

Chief Seabrooks: Like Chief DeLeo, when I went to Inglewood, I took over a police department that was troubled. Three days into the job, I had my first officer-involved shooting; from that point, the Department continued to experience an officer-involved shooting on average about once every three to four months until 2008, when there were six officer-involved shootings in a four-and-a-half month period.

And unlike Tallahassee, some of the shootings in Inglewood did not involve suspects with guns but rather suspects who were believed to be armed. The circumstances of all of these incidents were what I term “lawful but awful.” The shootings were legally justifiable despite terrible fact patterns. The city paid significantly, both financially and in terms of the community’s perception and sentiment.

It was necessary to engage in substantial levels of community outreach. I met with clergy members and other stakeholders in the community. I listened and heard anger, passion, hyperbole, sadness, and distrust more than I heard support. But I continued to listen. I knew there was truth to be heard. I also knew that there were truths about hard workers and committed personnel within the Police Department and these truths were not being heard or spoken either.

We had to engage in a series of very open dialogues about the issues, concerns and truths about the operation of the Police Department. Initially, to assist in identifying and responding to an array of concerns, I brought in an outside and independent review entity, the Office of Independent Review, which operated under the auspices of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.

I made initial inquiries with the U.S. Justice Department as well. Even as I was looking at our hiring practices, our internal affairs process, and other internal systems, it was clear that we had some deep-rooted challenges.

Like Chief DeLeo, in reaching out to the clergy, I spent time sharing the challenges of policing in a

community where gangs and the attendant violence were prevalent. We discussed how as a 9-square mile community, Inglewood had experienced as many as 55 murders a year, unrelated to any police action. We had to talk about the community’s absolute and stunning silence about those deaths.

But, notwithstanding the violence in the community at the time, there were also problems in the department. Budget reductions and other decisions resulted in the officers receiving training on an inconsistent basis; there were significant equipment needs; hiring and promotional standards were lagging; the organization had become somewhat insular.

As I spoke with community leaders, I challenged them to get involved to assist with developing viable solutions. And as a result, several members of the clergy and other interested people stepped up and met the challenge. Their involvement entailed working with the Department to receive and share information about the improvements happening in the Police Department, to call attention to the violence occurring in the community, and to work with other community groups in an affirmative effort to reduce the violence.

We opened the doors to the department even wider. We expanded our Community Academy offerings, increased the opportunities for positive police-community interactions by taking actions such as Chats with the Chief, Coffee with a Cop, Public Safety Day, and expanding the scope of the National Night Out celebration; we improved our relationship with our Police Oversight Commission. We created opportunities to include members of the community in important decisions affecting the department.

For example, we began to include a community member on promotional panels. The union initially objected; however, we pressed on because it was important for the community to be involved, to have an in-depth visual into how the organization was moving forward. It was also important to let the community know that despite our challenges, we did have the ability to self-monitor and self-police. The community was kept informed

about the manner in which we addressed some of the more publicly known incidences of misconduct, particularly when the concerned employees were terminated from service.

Wexler: Chief, how did you know how to do all this? Was there a play book? What were you drawing upon?

Chief Seabrooks: No, there's no play book. Some of the solutions came intuitively and were the result of my experience, other decisions were less intuitive. I often talked with my peers, other professionals, and people in the community. As a resident of the community, I certainly did not suspend my expectations of professionalism; my position as a resident tended to further fuel my resolve.

Wexler: Getting community leaders involved in the promotional process must have been controversial. How did you sell that internally?

Chief Seabrooks: Absolutely it was controversial. I didn't sugarcoat it. And admittedly, I didn't seek consensus around the issue either. It was a different thing to do. It gave the community an ability to participate in an important process and for the troops, it foreshadowed a different sense of accountability. On the other hand, by this time, the U.S. Justice Department was already in the agency; the investigative group they sent was looking at and evaluating everything we were doing.

Wexler: What were they looking at?

Chief Seabrooks: They looked at everything: hiring practices, promotional practices, the internal affairs/disciplinary system, policies, training, equipment, police-community relations, police oversight, litigation history, you name it. They examined internal review processes relating to officer-involved shootings, use-of-force reporting, police pursuits. They talked to people in different facets of the community. They probed the department to determine the ease of filing a complaint against staff. They questioned internal staff regarding policies, practices, etc. They examined equipment and the use of

that equipment. When we conducted K-9 training, they observed and commented.

Wexler: Did the Justice Department come in because you invited them, or would they have come in anyhow?

Chief Seabrooks: I believe they would have come no matter what. Although I did call to make a preliminary inquiry and there was a community conversation about the Justice Department, I think it was convenient on both sides when they did so. The department did seem to have a history of concerning issues. Among the concerns was an incident in 2002 where a 16-year-old boy was injured as a result of police action during a detention; there were two officers whom the community identified as being troubled who were perceived as being allowed to run roughshod throughout the community; there were allegations of officers visiting massage parlors for sexual favors while on duty; and there were two officers being investigated by the FBI for criminal sexual misconduct. And then there was the ongoing concern regarding the number of officer-involved shootings, some of which had been occurring before my arrival. The community was outraged, to put it mildly. I understood from my inquiry that the DOJ had been receiving complaints and was paying attention. These facts were made all the more poignant when Congresswoman Maxine Waters and then-Mayor Roosevelt Dorn made a televised request asking the DOJ to come in. Based on all of this, it's fair to say that the Police Department was on the Justice Department's radar screen.

Wexler: By the way, what is the composition of this Justice Department team? It's not all Justice Department people, is it?

Chief Seabrooks: No, it is not. There were Justice Department attorneys, former/retired police chiefs and sheriffs' officials, and interested others. When the Justice Department arrived, it was clear they were there with an agenda and they were not hesitant to directly and indirectly communicate the import of that agenda, sometimes in ways that were uncomfortable. But on the whole, the Justice

Department was responsive to us as well. During the initial conversations after we were served notice that an investigative team would be on site, I asked them to make sure that within their on-site response team, they had someone familiar with Southern California law enforcement. They were responsive to that request.

Wexler: So some of the people judging you are from very small departments or they have backgrounds that are so different from your agency—you wonder how they are going to understand the complexities.

Chief Seabrooks: Yes, absolutely; that was a concern. To be frank, there are regional differences among the counties and cities in California. My experience told me that the potential for even greater differences might exist if all of the DOJ's representatives were from areas other than California. So, with that in mind, it was my preference that there be a California, specifically a southern California, representative who could appropriately contextualize some of the department's approaches and actions.

Wexler: But here is the thing that I have learned, and you probably know this better than I do. Working with DOJ is much better than working against them, right?

Chief Seabrooks: Yes, of course. When we were reaching out to DOJ, I spoke with Tom Streicher about his experience as chief in Cincinnati when they were investigated. And he was very helpful in providing insights about the appropriate tone to take with them. After all, no chief, irrespective of experience and tenure, is entirely comfortable with the process. Your agency is under a microscope and the investigative outcome could result in a consent decree, the implications of which are far reaching and have the potential to be financially crushing, depending on the fiscal positioning of the community.

In my conversations with the DOJ team, I wanted them to know that the Police Department was going to cooperate, even as we continued on our clear and unequivocal mission to fix our operational

deficits and challenges. I was committed to putting the agency in a better place; the city's administration was certainly cognizant of the issues and committed to spending the money needed to acquire essential police equipment, conduct comprehensive training, facilitate additional community outreach, and undertake other needed actions to improve the department's standing.

And it worked out as I had hoped. In 2009 the city and the Police Department received a "technical assistance letter" from the DOJ. In addition to complimenting the department for its commitment and ongoing efforts to enhance service delivery, the letter contained a number of recommendations for organizational strengthening. These recommendations were implemented in large part, and no consent decree resulted.

Austin, TX Chief Art Acevedo:

If You See that Changes Are Needed, Move Forward on Them ASAP

I think that the key to these issues is to spend a lot of time as a chief building emotional capital. And by that I mean being out in the community engaging, engaging, engaging. Second is the transparency piece.

And third, always be brutally honest with everybody you speak to. One of the things that I think people appreciate about our department is that we don't worry about political correctness; we speak the truth. Even if some people don't agree with you, if they know that you are constantly on point, are speaking what you believe to be the truth, and are acting with a good heart, they are going to give you a lot of room to operate. And you know that sometimes you're going to agree, sometimes you won't.

Don't be afraid to bring in outside folks to take a look at your operation, like Jeff Hadley did. When I became chief in Austin in July 2007, I inherited a DOJ investigation that was initiated in May. I embraced it, and it was closed four years later. But the advice I got from the attorneys, as a brand new chief, was "Don't change a thing yet; wait until the Department of Justice identifies all the issues."

I knew that things were broken in Austin. So I said, “Look, your only chance to not end up in a consent decree is for the new police chief to show that he has a grasp of the issues and is willing to address them.” It takes DOJ a while to gather all the information, and even though they debrief you weekly, it takes them time to get rolling. So I was making all the changes, and they were validating what I was saying to my officers internally, and to the community externally, namely, that a lot of things needed to change.

So, if you are a new chief in an organization that needs work and is being studied by DOJ, I would say embrace it, because they can help you create the support you need to make the tough changes that have to be made. That worked out for us.

Internal Issues

Participants at PERF’s Summit discussed defining moments they have experienced with respect to their relationships with union leaders, winning support from officers to implement new policies or reforms, officer morale during times of economic cutbacks, matters of discipline, and officer well-being.

Camden, NJ Chief Scott Thomson:

Quick and Firm Response To a Total “Blue Flu”

Changing the culture of a department is an extreme challenge. In 2008, during my first six months as the chief of the Camden City Police Department, more than 100 grievances and several lawsuits were filed against every change that deviated from the status quo. We still aggressively forged ahead with changes that were necessary for public safety. In less than two years, we experienced a 33-percent drop in murders and shootings. Even with the success

of crime reduction and safer streets, the resistance didn’t relent and there were still many who wished to return to the days of lesser accountability and easier work schedules.

Then due to the global economic downturn, in the fall of 2010 notices for layoffs and demotions were sent throughout the organization. Every sworn officer with 14 years of experience or less was going to be laid off from the department on January 18, 2011. Additionally, 70% of the remaining supervisory/command staff were to be demoted—some as many as three ranks lower. You can imagine the level of tension and anxiety in a work environment that was already extremely challenging with crime, disorder and poverty.

We were three days away from the 46-percent staff reduction layoff date when Chuck Wexler arranged a meeting for advice and counsel with brilliant and experienced police leaders, such as Chuck Ramsey, Garry McCarthy, Terry Gainer, Charlie Deane, John Lewis, and John Gallagher. These men spoke, and I took copious notes trying to best map a course for uncharted waters.

When I returned to my office, I was advised that the entire shift of 35 officers who were scheduled to work that night—every single one of them—had called in sick. And the trend was beginning to follow suit for the following shift as well.

I immediately called my county prosecutor, Warren Faulk. We conferred and determined this was an act of collusion that was criminal in nature,



Camden County, NJ
Chief Scott Thomson

which jeopardized the lives of people in the city and the officers who were at work.

With that, I called in the union leaders, sat them down at the table in my conference room, and showed them the list of officers who all simultaneously were reporting to be sick. They were put on notice that such action was a crime, and an investigation was immediately being launched. Their choice was simple: either condemn the actions and assist us with getting the officers to report for work, or condone it and they could soon find themselves in handcuffs. They eagerly began to make phone calls.

So we contacted every single officer and gave them a direct order. They were to immediately report to our local hospital's emergency room with their uniforms and duty equipment and meet the internal affairs commander who would be on-site. The emergency room doctor would then evaluate them. If they failed to show or did not answer their phone, they would be immediately suspended without pay and terminated for a litany of offenses.

We knew most of them were going to be laid off in a couple of days, but what they needed to realize was that this wasn't the end of the line for them. They still needed to get a job somewhere else, or return back to work. Neither would ever happen with such significant, unresolved charges looming. And we wished good luck to them trying to explain during their appeal to an administrative judge two years later that the timing of their illness was merely an unfortunate coincidence with nearly three dozen other officers.

All 35 officers reported as ordered at the hospital and were examined by a physician. Thirty-three were put in uniform and returned to work. One was sent home sick, and one was actually admitted to the hospital for a legitimate illness. I'm not sure if it was induced by the stress of the moment.

Not surprisingly, the officers who had called in sick for the subsequent shift re-called and changed their status to healthy and reported for work as scheduled.

This created a template response for controlling situational sick abuses, as we proceed through some very challenging days as an organization.

Rockford, IL Chief Chet Epperson:

My Union Is Fighting Me Because I Intervened to De-Escalate a Tense Situation

Last October I received a phone call from the local NAACP President, Lloyd Johnston, at about 10:30 at night. I have known him for a couple of years. He is very engaged with our police department. I call him if we have an officer-involved shooting.



When he called, I could tell that there was something wrong by the way he was speaking. He said there were some police officers at his house, that they wanted to kick in his door, and that they were threatening him. I told him, "If you don't want to let them in, don't let them in. I'll send a supervisor."

What occurred that evening was that he and his ex-wife were having an argument. She lives in New York, and he lives in Rockford. She had called 911 and said that he was having a problem with his son, who is in his 20s. Everything turned out okay, and there were no arrests. But the union didn't like that I was called, and so they filed a complaint against me—for "interfering" as chief of the police in order to de-escalate the situation.

Wexler: You must have been thinking about the arrest of Professor Henry Louis Gates in Cambridge. Did that come to mind?

Chief Epperson: Not only that, but we had a shooting in 2009 where the supervisor didn't respond and a young black male was killed, and that raised the tension in our city. I wanted to avoid an unnecessary incident of the NAACP President having his door kicked in by police.

Wexler: What does the future look like in your city? Do you have a union that is impossible to deal with?

Chief Epperson: It's the union board. They're very militant, and it's been this way for about eight and a half years.

Wexler: How long have you been chief?

Chief Epperson: Eight and a half years.
[Laughter]

Nashville Chief Steve Anderson:

It's Sometimes Necessary to Reassure the Officers Following a Controversial Disciplinary Action

Wexler: Steve, can you tell the story about the officer who showed up for work inebriated, and how you handled it?

Chief Anderson: Yes. About 5 o'clock on a Saturday morning, I get up and as I'm checking my email, I see a message from the overnight supervisor, a captain, who says that an officer reported to work about midnight drinking, and they took him home. The overnight supervisor has my authority and responsibility; he is in command of the entire department during those hours.

So I sent him an email and asked, "Was he arrested?" He says, "I'm not sure." So I'm already thinking that's a problem, that he doesn't know what's going on.

What I found was that the officer came in late for roll call on the midnight shift. The sergeant detected that he was intoxicated, and called the supervisor. The sergeant had already planned to decommission the intoxicated officer and drive him home. The captain agreed with that plan.

I immediately called the acting deputy chief, who went to the officer's home and charged him

with driving under the influence and carrying a weapon while intoxicated.

The officer resigned, and the sergeant was suspended for 15 days. I told the captain that I would demote him, and he resigned.

Wexler: The part of the story that I thought was especially interesting was that you realized that people in your department were misinterpreting the situation, so you sent an email to everyone.

Chief Anderson: Yes, I sent an email to all 1,900 members of the department. I was hearing that there was some concern, especially among supervisors, that they would lose their jobs if they made a mistake.

My email made clear that this was not a simple mistake, but rather a total abandonment of the responsibilities expected of a supervisor. And I addressed each of the explanations that were offered for the failure to take appropriate action.

First, it was said that there was "only a slight smell of alcohol on the officer's breath." In fact, the officer registered more than three times the legal limit of 0.08 percent.

The supervisors said "he didn't appear to be that drunk." So in my email I asked, "Is there some degree of drunkenness we should find acceptable in a police officer, in uniform, carrying a firearm and driving a vehicle?"

It was said that "no one saw him driving a vehicle." So I pointed out that there was video of the officer driving through the gate at the precinct into the locked compound. And there was another patrol officer following him through the gate, so someone did see him driving.

The supervisors said that they had determined that it would be best handled, administratively, on Monday. I pointed out that this was just another way of saying "let someone else deal with the problem."

I acknowledged that a fair question has been raised—how to handle a situation that can be seen



Nashville Chief
Steve Anderson

Charleston, SC Chief
Greg Mullen



either from a criminal offense standpoint or an administrative standpoint. I said in the email that this is an area that cannot be clearly defined, but a good test is that if an officer has done something that you would immediately arrest a non-officer for, then it should be considered from a criminal standpoint. And in this case, driving and carrying a gun while intoxicated clearly met that test, and the supervisors' failure to respond properly was not a minor oversight.

I also pointed out that sometimes, when faced with situations such as this, we often forget everything we know about circumstantial evidence and how we obtain criminal convictions on far less evidence than was available to the supervisors on that night.

I believe that the email helped to put the fears to rest within the department. While I don't usually comment on disciplinary matters, in this case I thought it was necessary to discuss the gravity of the situation.

I also released information to the media immediately. We have a saying regarding media releases: "If it is good news, get it out fast. If it is bad news, get it out faster." And the feedback we got was generally favorable; people seemed to understand that in an organization of 1,900 people, people are going to make mistakes, violate policy, and sometimes violate the law. What the public does not understand, and will not tolerate, is a law enforcement agency that does not address misconduct by its employees in an appropriate manner.

Charleston, SC Chief Greg Mullen:

*I Followed a Well-Known Chief
And Found a Department With
Opportunities for Enhancement*

Wexler: Greg, you've been chief in Charleston since 2006, and before that, you were in the Air Force and you were the deputy chief in Virginia Beach. And

you faced some challenges in Charleston, because you not only came from outside the department, but you also followed a very famous chief, Reuben Greenberg, who was perhaps the only African-American Jewish police chief in the country, and who had received an extraordinary amount of news media coverage.

Chief Mullen: Going in, it was challenging, because as you said, many people were comparing me to Reuben. But one of the first things I shared with the mayor when we interviewed was that I was not Reuben Greenberg, and my philosophy, personality, and the way that I do things in many cases would be different.

I think one of the principal challenges was that there was significant separation within the department. There were officers who were loyal to Chief Greenberg and those who were not; there was internal group conflict and opportunities to improve group cohesion; and those that were just not performing well and were not being held accountable.

So we had to work together to instill consistency and accountability throughout our organization, and make sure that everyone understood that going forward, everybody was going to have an opportunity to perform and succeed. Additionally, we were going to do things fairly and in a way that promoted professionalism and openness.

As an outsider joining the organization, not knowing anyone and not bringing anybody with me at that time, it took some time for me to determine

whom I could depend on. For most of the first year, I found myself having to say “no” a lot, not only to people inside the department, but also to members of the community. Within that first year we started to show the community that we were going to provide excellent and impartial service to everyone based on need. It was difficult for a while, but I tried to get out in the community as much as I could, talking with people and letting them know my philosophy. As I heard another chief say earlier, one of my mantras is that “you might not like what I say to you, but I’m always going to tell you the truth.” That has resonated with the community, and over the past eight years we have done a good job of creating valuable relationships.

Today, the vast majority of my command staff and many of the supervisors throughout the department are those that I have promoted. As with many organizations, some staff members left the organization because they did not like the new philosophy, vision, and the way the department was changing. This new vision gave us the opportunity to recreate the department, which had fallen behind in some areas, such as technology and data related programs.

One vital aspect of this transition was having the support of Mayor [Joseph] Riley, who has been the mayor of Charleston for almost 40 years and has continuously been a very strong supporter of public safety. He allowed me the opportunity to come in and make the changes that needed to be made, and has been supportive throughout the challenges. So while certainly challenges existed, in many ways I have been very fortunate throughout the last 8 years as I became a member of the community and our department.

Corpus Christi, TX Chief Floyd Simpson:

As an Outsider, I Sought Buy-In For New Policies from the Bottom Up

Wexler: Floyd, you were an Assistant Chief in Dallas, and you became Chief in Corpus Christi in March 2012. Corpus Christi is about one-fourth the size of Dallas. Do you take the Dallas model and implement it in Corpus Christi, or do you do

something different? As a chief coming from outside the department, how do you figure the place out?

Chief Simpson: Professionally, I grew up in Dallas, therefore my experiences and thought processes are derived from the Dallas model. So some of the things that we did in Dallas will naturally follow me to Corpus Christi. However, Dallas is different from Corpus Christi in many ways. As you know, Dallas is a very large metropolitan area and is connected by way of a series of smaller cities to Fort Worth, which is a large metropolitan area in itself. That alone brings its own set of challenges. On the other hand, Corpus Christi is located in rural south Texas. It is the fifth largest port city in the country and home to a military base, with very large oil refineries, and is a popular pass-through for drug runners and human traffickers. Those are just a few of the issues that make my Corpus Christi experience different from my experiences in Dallas.



In regard to “figuring the place out,” I first needed to determine the energy level of the organization, ask questions, and more importantly, listen. I needed to listen to things that were said as well as pay attention to things left unspoken. I quickly determined that I had extraordinarily talented people, some of whom were in the wrong seat on the bus. Therefore meaningful restructuring was in order. Further, I determined that I had inherited a department that had outdated technology. We had a rules manual and SOPs that hadn’t been updated in quite some time.

In short, it appeared that the department had lost its connection to the policing industry and suffered from a lack of direction. Despite the lack of focus, officers and civilian staff members continued to work hard. After the restructure and putting my team in place, we set on a path towards success. So in a sense, we had to recreate the police department; and we needed to do it slowly in order to get buy-in from the very bottom of the organization.

Today I think we are a different department than we were three years ago. We're very transparent; new technology is being incorporated; and we're very engaged in the community. We have much work to do, but at least the pathway is set.

San Bernardino Chief Jarrod Burguan:

*Financial Cuts Have Taken a Toll
On Officers' Faith in Their Job Security*

Wexler: Jarrod, San Bernadino is one of the California cities that has been hit hard financially. You have lost about a third of your police force, and the city is in bankruptcy, is that right?

Chief Burguan: Yes, we are one of four cities in California that have declared bankruptcy, and there's a few more throughout the country. But listening to some of the stories around this room, certainly the Camden story—even though we are in bankruptcy, it hasn't necessarily been as extreme. We did lose a third of our force, but not half of the force like in Camden. And in San Bernardino, it happened over the course of several years. We started our budget-cutting back in 2008-09, and it has never stopped. The city finally declared bankruptcy about a year and a half ago.



The biggest impact on the organization was the uncertainty that it created for the troops. We needed to downsize, so it wasn't necessarily a bad thing when the initial wave of folks left and found employment in other departments. The problem is that it never really stopped after that. We got down to staffing numbers that were acceptable, numbers that we could afford, but we continue to lose officers, because they are concerned about their retirement, benefits, pay, and job security. So it's a constant process of talking with the members of the organization and reiterating that it's going to be okay and we are going to survive this.

The final impact is yet to be known. The Police Officers Association has continued contract

negotiations with the city, and any agreement, if reached, will have to be accepted by the bankruptcy court, so that becomes an added layer to negotiations that most places do not deal with. The final plan of adjustment is yet to be determined, and the final image of what the department will look like in the end is yet to be determined.

Chicago Superintendent Garry McCarthy:

*Think About Long-Term Results
As You Implement Institutional Reforms*

Wexler: Garry, you spent the lion's share of your career in the NYPD, and then you were chief in Newark, and now you're in Chicago. In New York, you were in a department that had all sorts of resources at its disposal. Did you find that going to Newark or Chicago that you had to make a shift in your thinking?

Superintendent McCarthy: As far as the resources go, honestly, Chuck, I didn't change too much of my thought process. Even though the Newark Police Department is one-tenth the size of the Chicago Police Department, which is one-third the size of the NYPD, Newark is up there in terms of officers-per-capita, as we are here in Chicago. So it is all about the scale. And I've never been one to complain about resources; I'd rather play the hand I'm dealt, and that includes the number of personnel and the actual personnel themselves.

Going to Newark, I brought only two guys with me. One was my chief of staff, and for the other one, we recreated the position that I held for seven years in the NYPD, deputy commissioner of operations. When I came here to Chicago, I did the same thing again, brought two people with me. My thought process has always been to create change from within, not change from without, and that's why I did not bring a lot of people with me.

The organizational change that I am trying to implement in Chicago is different from Newark. I was police director in Newark from 2006 to 2011, when I came to Chicago. And unfortunately, I jokingly say that the Newark PD was back to October '06 by the time my plane landed at O'Hare in

Chicago. Everything in Newark snapped back to how it was before, whether or not we had created successful approaches during my time there.

Here in Chicago, I'm playing a long game, with changes in the promotions process and setting up a career path based on merit. I am three-and-a-half years into this change, and I don't have to drive the way I used to drive. I'm starting to see that you don't have to hold it so hard, and that's a tribute to these men and women here who are who are carrying it out. **Nothing succeeds like success. When people see the internal legitimacy, when they see that the internal politics are being removed, and when people see how well we're doing, they buy into it.**

Toronto Chief William Blair:

Prompt Discipline for Officers Who Removed Name Tags Helped Restore Our Credibility

Wexler: Bill, you had a big demonstration in Toronto and some police officers covered up their ID badges. And you took disciplinary action.

Chief Blair: Yes, it was a G20 Summit, and we'd had a considerable amount of rioting, and issues were arising with respect to that. We have a policy that requires officers to wear a name tag. It's on a Velcro strip on their uniform, and it's very visible and readable. Unfortunately, a number of our officers thought it would be a good idea to remove their tags. About 98 percent of my people kept their name tags on and did their job exceptionally well, but about 2 percent removed their ID.

I assigned a team to investigate, and we had many thousands of photographs to go through, as well as videos from this event, because we were being videotaped from every direction. We identified about 120 officers who had removed their name tags. Because it was publically known that they had done that, in effect those officers indicted all of the officers by their action, because it looked like we were trying to cover things up.

I wasn't in a position to dismiss all those officers at the time, so I imposed a penalty on all of them, and said that anyone who didn't accept the penalty would be dismissed. I have a pretty good

relationship with my union, and they went along with this, and even told us about some additional officers who we hadn't identified, who came in and confessed. They all took the rip. I was able to do that within about 24 hours, from when the officers were identified to announcing that the penalty had been imposed. And that helped a great deal with our credibility with the public.

Camden, NJ Chief Scott Thomson:

Sending a Clear Message about An Officer's Use of a Racist Epithet

We had a brutal carjacking one night in which a woman was dragged out of her vehicle and beaten by a suspect. We had a good description, so within a matter of minutes, the vehicle was located, which led officers on a high-speed pursuit into a housing project.

The vehicle crashed, and the suspect got out and ran into a courtyard. He was armed, and a violent struggle ensued with the officers. The commotion caused residents to come out of their homes and begin watching events unfold.

Now, Camden's population is 95 percent minority. The vast majority of the officers involved in this chase were African-American and Hispanic, and the suspect was African-American. In the midst of the arrest, a senior officer who was Caucasian stated to a K-9 handler on scene, "Let the dog bite the [racist epithet]."

The suspect was ultimately taken into custody without significant injury to any party other than the expected scrapes and bruises cops incur when someone resists arrest. Several of the arresting officers confronted the offending cop on the scene of his comment made during the incident. The offending cop immediately apologized to everyone on scene and later to the rest of his squad. He was a very popular guy who had been around for years and was universally well-liked.

We immediately launched an investigation into the matter, in which the officer took full responsibility for his actions. Ironically, the leadership of the labor organization, which was predominantly minority officers, requested leniency for him.



Pinellas County, FL Sheriff
Bob Gualtieri

There are a few lines in the sand that you just can't cross in our job, nor should you get a second bite at the apple when you lie, steal, use illegal drugs or when your actions are detrimental to another person and motivated by race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.

Although this officer had strong support from many of his minority colleagues, I could not chalk it up to the “heat of the battle.” I lost sleep thinking, “What if a young kid had heard or witnessed this incident?” Or “What if we do the popular thing and the prejudicial behavior becomes a potential factor in a use-of-force incident?” This was a warning sign that we were not going to ignore. It is difficult enough attempting to detect and alter the implicit biases of cops, so flagrant biases must be handled with absolute certainty. As a leader, it was imperative to send a loud, clear message that there is absolutely zero tolerance for this type of behavior, period.

The officer was immediately suspended without pay and terminated.

Pinellas County, FL Sheriff Bob Gualtieri:

Sheriffs Face the Same Issues as Police Chiefs, But the Job Is More Overtly Political

Wexler: Sheriff, we've been talking to a lot of police chiefs about their defining moments. Are the issues the same for sheriffs, or are there differences? First, how big is your department?

Sheriff Gualtieri: We are about 3,000 employees, 1,500 sworn. We're on the West Coast of Florida, Tampa-St. Petersburg. We have a \$250 million annual budget. We are also a very densely populated county; it's all urban policing. We have 280 square miles and a million people who live there, plus millions of tourists every year.

One major difference is that I've got to reapply for my job every four years, so the politics of it are different. I don't work for anybody other than the people who I ask to elect me every four years. I don't answer to the county commission, the county administrator, or the governor.

And so it is a different dynamic in that respect. You have to be out and you have to be political. One of the good parts about being a sheriff is that you get to make all the decisions. And the bad part is you get to make all the decisions. It's all on you; there's no saying that anybody else told you what to do, or that you have to go to anybody else to get agreement on what you want to do. So that is an interesting dynamic. I worked as a city cop back in the 1980s, so I know city policing as well and it's different in that respect.

In other ways, the problems that chiefs face are the same problems that I face. The personnel problems, the policing issues are no different.

Wexler: What are some of the internal issues you have? Do you have use-of-force issues, officer-involved shootings, issues about how your officers are performing?

Sheriff Gualtieri: Absolutely, all of the above. **We have 450 deputies in patrol, and 55 percent of them have less than two years on, and that includes academy time and FTO time.** Those are the things that keep you up at night.

As I tell our managers and supervisors, when you have a situation and you have three deputies on the scene, don't assume that their collective four months of experience is going to get it right. It's



Bellevue, WA Interim Chief
Jim Montgomery

not. Sometimes they are going to mess it up unless you're there to guide them.

We went through a bad situation a couple of years ago, and our lesson learned was that when somebody makes a complaint, you need to take it seriously and investigate it. If you have an internal affairs unit that dismisses things, it is going to come back to bite you.

We had a criminal defense lawyer and a defendant who said that the cops were conducting illegal searches, jumping fences, Fourth Amendment violations, and it was all just summarily dismissed. "We don't do that, our cops don't do that, that doesn't happen." Well, guess what? It did happen, and I ended up firing eight people. Every day it was a headline, and this went on for a long time.

At the same time, we had group of deputies who were rogue, who were not doing their jobs on the midnight shifts. In about a year-and-a-half period, I fired about 16 people.

You need to change the culture, and you have to send a strong message in order to get that community support, because again, for me, if I don't have the community support, they fire me when the election comes up. Accountability is paramount, being hands-on is paramount, knowing your organization is paramount. If you are not engaged and you don't listen to the people who are out there doing the job every day, you're going to have problems.

One more thing: Take advice from people, but don't necessarily do what they tell you; do what you

know to be the right thing. I can say this because I'm a lawyer. I listen to the lawyers, but most of the time I discard it, because in dealing with the community, it's not the advice you need.

Bellevue, WA Interim Chief Jim Montgomery:

Make a Sincere Effort to Solicit Views from All Levels of the Department

I've "been there, done that" to some extent with a lot of different issues during my career, whether you're talking about a dysfunctional promotional process, a poor relationship with the news media, staffing issues, or an ugly relationship with a labor union.

I have found that it helps to have a willingness to listen, and not just to your deputy chiefs or union leaders, but to everyone in the department. Communicate with them and ask, "What can we *collectively* do to make this organization better?" And of course you'll get a lot of varying opinions, and it often requires a little patience. However, it's important to mean it sincerely when you say you want everyone's input.

It may feel like you're taking two steps forward, one step back, but more often than not, I have been able to prevail with help from all these people who know the culture of the organization and have ideas to contribute. It also helps to have sense enough to know when it's time to get out and let somebody else take a department to the next level.

Fresno, CA Chief Jerry Dyer:

A Good Relationship with the Officers And Union Leaders is Essential

I have had the good fortune of being the police chief in Fresno now for 13 years, and our Police Officers' Association president has been there for 10 years. We have a good relationship, but that wasn't always the case. We had to find some common interests

along the way that allowed us to have a relationship away from the job, to find some neutral territory and common ground. We both have Harley-Davidsons; we play golf together; we go out to dinner and our wives come along with us.

Because we have this relationship, we trust each other. There are times when he comes to me and says he needs a “win” for his members, and I’ll give him that win. And there are times when I tell him I need a certain policy change, and he’ll try to be accommodating. He has people on his executive board who try to push him into a fight with me, and I have staff members who do the same, but we have agreed not to let that happen.

I also have made it a point over the years to work closely with the news media in order to maintain the community support, and not for the sake of my own popularity. If the union becomes more popular than the chief, then you have issues come up like no-confidence votes, and before long the union starts running the department.

I think the number one key for me over the years has been demonstrating publicly my support for the officers. When there is a critical incident, it’s important to be the first one out there defending the officers when they need defending. Or if an officer gets injured, be the first one at the hospital with them and their families. Over the years, the unions come to realize that I care as much or more about the officers as the union does.

When you have that relationship and reputation, when you try to implement a controversial policy like mandatory use of seat belts and vests, or body cameras, or a tattoo visibility policy, it makes those things easier because the officers trust that you are making the right decision for the department.

Fargo, ND Chief Keith Ternes:

A Lieutenant’s Suicide Shook Our Department to Its Core

Fargo is a community of 115,000 people. If you count the surrounding communities, there’s about 200,000 people in what we call our metropolitan area. We have 153 sworn officers, so we’re one of those mid-sized agencies that’s small enough where

we still know each other on a personal basis.

We have a very strong sense of accountability within our organization. In March of this year, one of my lieutenants, a 25-year veteran officer of the department and a well-respected individual, came in to work a night shift so he could spend time with the officers who are assigned to his district and that he’s responsible for. He went to the shift briefing and then decided that he would get in line with the rest of his officers and spark-test his Taser.

All of the other officers had gone out onto the street when the lieutenant went to spark-test his Taser. He neglected to take the cartridge off and accidentally discharged it. I’m sure that has happened in a lot of agencies; it’s not the first time it’s ever happened in our department. But for some reason the lieutenant decided to try to hide what happened.

It didn’t take long for one of the sergeants to discover that somebody in the building had accidentally discharged their Taser. As that sergeant was trying to determine who it was and how it occurred, the lieutenant stepped forward and said, “I’ll find out, we’ll start by questioning the officers,” knowing full well that he was the person who had done it.

After about 48 hours, I think the lieutenant’s conscience got the best of him, and he stepped forward and acknowledged that he was the person who accidentally discharged his Taser. As you might imagine, the officers who had been questioned were irritated that the lieutenant would question them when he was the person responsible for the Taser discharge. We launched an internal investigation to capture all of the factors in this incident, including the dishonesty by the lieutenant.

I placed the lieutenant on paid administrative leave until we finished our review. As we were getting close to sustaining the complaint and trying to determine what disciplinary measure to impose, I think the lieutenant knew that the outcome was going to be at least some form of suspension from duty, if not termination of employment, because of his dishonesty. And as a result, he drove just outside the city limits and killed himself.

Our organization has never experienced a line-of-duty death, so this suicide has shaken our

Chicago First Deputy
Superintendent Al Wysinger



organization to the core. In my 28 years with the department, I think this is the one incident that my department has had the most difficulty dealing with. And to magnify this matter further, last Wednesday the lieutenant's widow wrote a scathing editorial to the newspaper saying how I'm responsible for her husband's suicide.

Wexler: The newspaper published that?

Chief Ternes: The newspaper placed the editorial on the front page. So what started out as the most innocent of mistakes, something as simple as accidentally discharging a Taser within our police facility, has evolved into what is arguably the biggest internal crisis our organization has ever dealt with.

Raleigh, NC Chief Cassandra Deck-Brown:

Officer Suicide Is the Elephant in the Room, And We Must Use the Resources We Have

I have had the opportunity to serve on the Human Resources Committee of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and each year that committee is tasked with writing a white paper on an issue. Several years ago, the paper dealt with the mental health and wellness of law enforcement personnel. We challenged police chiefs and agency leaders to not ignore the issue of officer suicides. It is a reality now more than ever. Not only do officers see so much trauma in their day-to-day activities, many have also served in the military and have been deployed multiple times to war zones.

I remember an MCC meeting when someone asked, "How many of you have experienced one or more officer suicides in the last three to five years?" So many hands went up in the room. The Human Resource Committee's white paper focused on making sure that police officials are aware of all the resources that are available to them. One of the things I took the time to do as a new chief was to hold meetings that allowed me to speak to everyone

in my department and drive home that point of taking advantage of all available resources.

I think of Randy Pausch's book, *The Last Lecture*, in which he says, "When there's an elephant in the room, introduce him." In other words, don't ignore a problem. For police agencies, officer suicide is an elephant in the room.

**Chicago First Deputy Superintendent
Al Wysinger:**

We Have Programs to Assist Officers, But Getting Them to Seek Help Is Difficult

We've put mechanisms in place to help officers cope with stress, and the most recent is an organization called the Survivors Group. This is a group of officers (active and retired) who have been involved in shootings, or who have been shot, have taken a life or have been involved in a catastrophic accident. These are people who have walked the walk, so they can talk about these issues from the perspective of knowing what it feels like to be hit by a bullet or having been catastrophically injured. This organization is funded by the Chicago Police Memorial Foundation, which gives them the resources necessary to be there for our officers.

I think that in policing it's like trying to peel back an onion, to get our men and women to open up and to seek out help when they need it. I think the job hardens us to the point where we can feel as though we're invincible, and we don't always reach



Springboro, OH Chief
Jeff Kruithoff

out and take the help that is available to us. We have numerous counseling agencies within the Chicago Police Department—our Employee Assistance Program, Peer Support, the Chaplains Unit and now the Survivors’ Group. We also do Crisis Intervention Training with our officers, which teaches them how to deal with fellow officers who are facing the stresses of the job.

The hard part is to get our officers to seek out the resources that are available. We do have a policy making it mandatory after police-involved shootings that they seek professional counseling within 24 hours. That’s one way to get them in and to break that stigma of it being considered weak to seek assistance. I think agencies across the country have this challenge.

Springboro, OH Chief Jeff Kruithoff:

Sometimes a Unique Event Defines You In a Way You Never Expected

I had a strange situation when I became chief in Springboro that ended up defining who I was as a chief.

Springboro is a northern Cincinnati suburb. I came to Springboro in 2002 after retiring from 29 years in policing in Michigan. About a week before I started, I met for coffee with Springboro’s acting chief, Jim Barton. And during our conversation he told me that his wife had been the victim of a homicide about 10 years prior to that. Through the

course of my first four or five months on the job, he told me more and more about his wife’s homicide.

It occurred to me that this was a solvable case, because there was DNA. So I reached out to my friend Dan Weston, who was the chief of Kalamazoo at the time, because I knew that Kalamazoo had a very capable cold case team.

I got some commitments from other chiefs in the Springboro area who were interested in creating a cold case capability, and Dan sent his entire cold case team to do some training with us. So about eight months after I started in Springboro, we formed an eight-person cold case team to investigate this homicide. My intent was to give this family peace. Barton was a person who, through his career in the department, had been the “Dad” of everybody in this small agency. He was the guy who had hired these officers; he had been born and raised in that community; he was well loved. And you can imagine what that type of small community did for him when his wife died as a result of the vicious murder.

About four months after the cold case team was formed, they called a meeting with me and they said, “Jeff, it’s not looking good. Jim Barton is forming as the prime suspect in putting these wheels in motion.” Barton had not been suspected of committing the murder, because he accounted for his actions the day his wife was killed. But he was indicted, convicted, and sent to prison in Lucasville for complicity in her murder. The jury found that Barton had hired people to burglarize his house in order to frighten his wife, because he wanted to move from their farm to the city of Springboro. But the burglary ended in murder.

Because this story was featured on TV shows and the media, even now people tell me, “Hey, I just saw this whole thing about Jim Barton.” To that extent it has defined my 12-year tenure with the city of Springboro.

So as you come to a new community as a police chief, you want to take all the lessons you learned

in your career, form an administration, and build a reputation based on who you are and what you achieve in the new department that you're running. But sometimes an incident just happens that defines you in that community.

Working with the News Media

In the last segment of the Defining Moments conference, participants focused on issues pertaining to police agencies' relationships with the news media. PERF Executive Director Chuck Wexler urged participants not to recount incidents in which they felt they had been treated unfairly by the news media, but rather to discuss approaches that they have found effective in working with traditional news media, as well as police use of social media such as Facebook and Twitter to disseminate news and information to the public.

Bellevue, WA Interim Chief Jim Montgomery:

Getting into a War with the Media Is Pointless; Get Yourself on the Air and Tell Your Story

As a general rule, I have found that it helps to engage the news media, even if you think they are being unfair, rather than ignoring them.

This was the case upon my arrival as interim police chief. Things had not gone well with the relationship of the previous chief and the local news media. The department had a couple of embarrassing stories, so the chief started to be less available to the news media. The less the chief was willing to speak with the media, the more the media publicly complained. It spiraled into a very unpleasant situation in which no one was satisfied.

There was one particular news media outlet that had really been on the department's case. My PIO had a little bit of a relationship with them, so I asked her to tell them that I wanted to come down into the studio and meet with the producers and the on-air personalities who had been so critical of the department.

They said, "Gee, are you sure you really want to come down here?" I told them absolutely, and so the next day we had a very frank, straightforward conversation.

I felt pretty good about it—until the next afternoon, when I was on the way home and heard them on the radio going after us again on an unrelated matter, concerning an issue that was just wrong.

So again I asked my PIO to call and say, "Would you like for the chief to come on the air with you and chat? He would like to dialogue with you a bit."

They said yes, and we had about a 12 or 14-minute chat on air. I was very sure of the facts, and much to their credit, they acknowledged on the air that they had been wrong, and said, "We've had our problems with the former chief, but maybe this chief is different." I think that effort paid off for the department in a significant way.

I've found over the years that first, you should always tell the whole truth relevant to the issue at hand (stopping short of the point of jeopardizing an investigation), and not shrink back from it.

Second, it's important to understand that news organizations are a business. They're not necessarily "out to get you"; their motivation is more about getting ratings or selling newsprint. As long as you understand that that's really the relationship, you can work to get your story into the medium that they've got, rather than putting up a wall and walking away from it.

Dallas Chief David Brown:

We Are Using Social Media To Disseminate Information Directly

Wexler: David, yesterday when you said, "If you miss that first news cycle, then you've missed your chance to get your story out," I thought, "Here's a chief who really understands the media." Dallas is a big media market, and you know what it's like to be on offense and on defense. How did you develop your skills in working with the media?

Chief Brown: Well, my predecessor, David Kunkle, was very good at working with the media, and I was his second-in-command for six years, so I was able to watch him do it.

And when I was selected as the new chief, I thought I would inherit some of his good relationship with the media.

But it was just the opposite. I had a horrible first few months with a particular reporter at our one newspaper, the Dallas Morning News. And the paper owned the number-one rated news channel, so I would get it from both ends, and it was just horrible. But I had to admit, this reporter was really good at what she was doing, and I learned from that.

It started me thinking about getting a message out through social media, because what print media struggles with is digital. They struggle on the digital side of the news.

As we started a social media campaign, I began hiring people who were experts in this area, and I started learning about the news cycles and competition in the news business. I would give exclusive interviews to reporters who I believed were not beating us up unfairly.

We also started recording every interview we did, every press conference we did, and posting them ourselves in their entirety. That created a little bit of tough relationships with the traditional media, because reporters want exclusives, but we would put it out before they could. Pretty soon we developed our own blog, and we looked at Seattle and Milwaukee, because they are doing some really good things with their blogs.

We want the narrative to be the facts, so we put out short little video clips of facts about what is happening, through our blog, through Twitter, through Facebook. We have built our followership up to several hundred thousand, and it's a pretty powerful thing if you're able to use it the right way.

We're continuing to learn about communicating with the public directly, and not just being subject to whatever the traditional media want to say about you.

Tallahassee Chief Michael DeLeo:

A Journalism Student is Helping Us To Expand Our Use of Social Media

Wexler: Mike, you took over as Chief in Tallahassee

in December 2013, and you inherited a department with a lot of issues, so you needed to improve it and establish credibility with the press. How do you approach that?

Chief DeLeo: As some other people have said, I think the previous administration did not have a good relationship with the media. There were a lot of “no comments,” and it was very combative. And like most cities, there's only one major newspaper, so there's no competition or balance.

I'm also aware that—let's be honest—newspapers are a struggling industry, and they are desperate to do whatever they can to survive. So they are looking for bad news or dramatic headlines to get readers clicking on the stories.

Since I've been in Tallahassee, I have had an “open house” media day, where I met with all the outlets in town. And I have tried to establish more of a social media presence. We had no Twitter account before I got there. I just started an internship program with Florida A and M University's College of Journalism. One of their students is spending about 30 hours a week helping us develop our social media presence. I figured I need a 20- or 22-year-old to help us with this and reach out to our younger demographics. Tallahassee has two universities and a large community college, with about 50,000 students between the three of them. So we're trying to be creative and build bridges with the universities, and create some other partnerships, so we can get our information out.

Austin, TX Chief Art Acevedo:

You Need a Relationship with the Media In Order to Have Any Input with Them

Wexler: Art, when you arrived in Austin, the department had had a series of use of force cases and was being looked at the by Justice Department, so you had some issues. But you seem to have a good relationship with the media. What has been your strategy?

Chief Acevedo: I think if you don't “feed the beast,” you're in trouble. I inherited a PIO team that was called the Public No Information Office.

The department didn't like to be transparent. They'd have officer-involved shootings and not say anything; it was a mess.

The relationship with the media starts with the police chief. If the police chief doesn't have a relationship, there's nothing to say. And there's nothing that's a bigger carrot for them than when they get to interview the chief in their studio.

So I'm very accessible to them. I try to frame our message instead of letting them frame it for us. If you don't engage the media, they have nothing to lose. If you do engage the media, they do have something to lose if they aren't fair with you.

Wexler: Do you give the local press your cell phone number?

Chief Acevedo: Yes, I do. They all have my cell phone number. Another tip is that you can get burned if you are normally on the record with reporters. So once in a while you say, "This is off the record," but they might forget. So I have a standing rule that "We are always off the record, unless we specifically go on the record." In seven and a half years, I have yet to have a problem with that approach.

And don't be afraid to call reporters and tell them when you think they did a good job, as well as when they get something wrong. And if you think they're being unfair, call the editor.

The worst culprits are the headline writers for the newspaper. They will write a headline that makes it sound like the police department has lost all control or that some horrific thing happened. And then you read the article, and it doesn't support what the headline says at all. If you have a relationship, you

can call and maybe get the headline changed.

The key is that if you don't have a relationship with the media, you have zero control. With a relationship, you get some input.

Fresno, CA Chief Jerry Dyer:

*Be Accessible, Tell the Truth,
And Try to Tell As Much as You Can*

Number one is being accessible to the media. I make myself accessible whether I'm on duty, off duty, at night, weekends. Every single reporter has my cell phone number. I'm responsive to their text messages. I'll do live shots with them when they request it.

Second, I've always been honest and I try to be transparent. I've told reporters that unless information will compromise an investigation or compromise the safety of an officer, I'm going to provide them with that information. I've tried really hard to make that the culture within our organization.

Boston Police Commissioner William Evans:

*It Isn't Always Easy, But It's Important
To Try to Remain Available*

I stay close with the media. I have coffee with the editor of the Boston Globe at least once a month, to go over some issues. Same with the Herald. I have some great relationships, and they have my phone number. The only issue with the phone numbers is when there is something you can't talk about, and they're digging at you with text messages and asking about it. So it can be a fine line to walk, but I try to be accessible.

Conclusion

FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE LESSONS that emerged from the stories told by police chiefs at PERF's Defining Moments Summit:

Lessons for American policing from the events in Ferguson

Try to release information as quickly as possible:

If a police department is not part of the narrative that is written by traditional news media and social media in the first hours and days of a critical event, it will lose the opportunity to present its perspective on the story, and probably will never regain that opportunity.

As a police executive, you often will receive advice from lawyers in your department or local government to be cautious and release information only when necessary. This advice is designed to minimize legal risks, but it often does not account for the damage that can be done to police-community relationships if police do not answer questions during a crisis.

Releasing an officer's name: When there is a controversial officer-involved shooting, community members and the news media often want to know the identity of the officer, because they want to know if the officer has any history of prior uses of deadly force, citizen complaints, or other issues. Police agencies have different policies and practices on releasing officers' names. Some chiefs reported having a strong tradition of releasing officers' names

as soon as the officer has had time to tell his family about the incident. Some police executives said the decision is not difficult, because usually the name of the officer is quickly leaked to the news media in any case. Some agencies said they are careful about releasing a name if credible threats have been made against the officer. Others said that if measures can be taken to protect the officer and his or her family, there is a public interest in releasing information sooner rather than later.

Build strong relationships with community leaders during non-crisis times:

A crisis can erupt at any time. The police response will benefit immeasurably if police leaders and officers have a strong relationship of trust with the communities they serve. If a critical incident casts doubt on a police department's credibility, it will help if there are community leaders who have met and worked with police officials, and who thus have a basis for knowing what to expect from the police and whether they can trust what they are told. These relationships must be built on an everyday basis.

"Militarization" of the police: A distinction can be made between police equipment that is actually surplus gear from the Department of Defense, and equipment that merely has a military-like appearance. This includes vehicles, weapons, officer clothing, and other equipment.

However, the distinction between "military" and "military-like" matters little if community members believe that their police department is too militaristic in appearance.

A number of police chiefs noted that police agencies have a legitimate need for certain types of heavy equipment that can be critically important in responding to natural disasters, terrorist acts, or large-scale criminal incidents. What is important, several chiefs said, is how the equipment is used, and whether there is an appearance that heavy equipment is used appropriately. Police agencies should have policy guidelines defining the circumstances under which various types of equipment can be used.

De-escalation of incidents and knowing when to disengage: Many police have worked for decades on policies and training of officers to reduce the use of force, deploy less-lethal force options, and de-escalate encounters with persons who behave erratically and dangerously because of mental illness, mental disabilities, or drug abuse.

PERF has published a number of reports in recent years outlining strategies for reducing use of force, including the following:⁹

- *An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force*
- *2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines*
- *Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned*
- *Comparing Safety Outcomes in Police Use-of-Force Cases for Law Enforcement Agencies that Have Deployed Conducted Energy Devices and a Matched Comparison Group that Have Not: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation*
- *Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force*
- *U.S. Customs and Border Protection Use of Force Review: Cases and Policies*

At the Defining Moments Summit, a number of chiefs discussed a relatively new concept: evaluating officers' conduct in terms of de-escalation

strategies. When there is a controversial use of force by police, the incident is typically reviewed in terms of whether the officer's conduct was "justified by the circumstances." But a number of police leaders are saying that the inquiry should also include a review of whether the officer missed opportunities to de-escalate or disengage from the incident before it reached the point where a use of force was justifiable.

Police officers traditionally have been trained never to back down from a confrontation, but police leaders increasingly are seeing a need to train officers to recognize that sometimes, it is safer for everyone if the officer steps back. In some minor cases, the officer may completely disengage and do nothing more. In other cases, the officer may decide that further action at a later time is a better option. For example, in the case of a suspect whose identity is known to police, if the person flees from a confrontation and is not considered a threat, police can consider whether to arrest the person later at his home, rather than engaging in a potentially dangerous pursuit.

Or if a group of suspects at a scene all flee at once but at least one is apprehended, in some cases it may not be necessary to pursue the others, because the suspect in custody can be questioned about the others' identities.

"Reality-based" or "scenario" training exercises that involve role playing by officers in dynamic situations are effective in teaching officers about de-escalation skills and making decisions about whether to remain in a situation, disengage from a minor confrontation, or defer action for a later time.

Learning from incidents is not "second-guessing": In the aftermath of a controversial shooting by an officer, it is not unusual to hear police say, "The officer had to make a split-second decision; we shouldn't second-guess that decision." And it is true that police often must respond quickly to complex situations. However, it is not "second-guessing" to learn from tragic incidents in order to prevent the next incident from happening. This is how police

9. All reports available online at <http://www.policeforum.org/free-online-documents>.

departments learn, develop new policies and tactics, and take lessons from each other.

Lessons from Police Chiefs’ “Defining Moments”

Community Engagement

Deciding what we want officers to do, and evaluating them accordingly: Leading police officials sometimes speak of different concepts for the role of police officers. For example, officers sometimes are seen as “warriors” (enforcing laws and arresting dangerous persons) and at other times are seen as “guardians” (helping community members to solve problems and improve the quality of their lives). In many communities, police officers have multiple roles that can change minute by minute.

However, some police chiefs note that there is often a disconnect between what we expect of officers and how we measure their performance. Traditionally, officers have been evaluated by metrics like how many arrests they make or citations they issue. In many agencies officers are not evaluated according to their effectiveness in community policing and developing strong relationships of trust with community members.

In fact, some chiefs note that their goal is to reduce crime, which is not the same thing as making arrests. Making arrests is only one way to deter and prevent crime. Ideally, a police department aims to reduce crime and reduce the number of arrests simultaneously.

Similarly, officers often are given awards for achievements like heroism in arresting a dangerous person, but awards are less often made for solid everyday work in promoting good relationships in the community.

Because “you get what you measure,” police agencies should ensure that the criteria in performance measurement systems reflect the philosophy of the department and the full range of activities that they want officers to perform.

Soliciting input from the public results in a community that supports the police: Police who listen and respond to what the community wants, and who solicit public opinions about issues such as whether to deploy a new technology, tend to enjoy greater support from the community than agencies with an autocratic approach.

Seek assistance from other agencies: There are 18,000 police agencies in the United States, and police chiefs often can find colleagues who have experienced a given problem and can offer guidance about handling it.

Internal Issues

A union environment can be more challenging for a police chief: Police agencies with a unionized workforce can be more complex for a police chief to lead. In addition to issues of employee salaries and benefits, unions may raise legitimate questions about policy changes. Chiefs in unionized departments report that it is essential to seek a good relationship with union leaders and find common ground. Some chiefs have found that it helps to develop personal connections with top union leaders outside the office, such as a mutual interest in a sport or recreational activity, in order to build feelings of trust and respect.

Sometimes a chief must draw a line in the sand: Several chiefs noted that there are times when they need to establish clear lines that cannot be crossed—such as disciplining officers who damage the department’s credibility.

Communicating directly with employees can be useful: Police chiefs often find that when there is turmoil or confusion among officers, for example, regarding the disciplining of an employee, it can help for the chief to send an email or speak to all employees, to clarify the situation and dispel rumors.

Be careful not to shade the truth for different audiences: A number of chiefs said that as they take on various issues with employees, it is important to speak honestly and to say the same thing regardless of the audience. Not everyone will agree with the chief all the time, but it becomes impossible to move forward if people think they can't trust what the chief says.

Try to ensure that reforms will outlast your tenure as chief: It is not enough to implement better policies and practices; a chief also needs to develop support for the policies so they will remain in effect after the chief leaves the department. The best chiefs devote attention to developing the next generation of leaders. And employees are more likely to support reforms and better practices if they feel that there is "procedural justice" for employees within the department; i.e, if they believe they are treated fairly and even-handedly and are given opportunities to voice their concerns, and that their views are given real consideration by the department's managers and leaders.

The News Media and Social Media

Avoid getting into disputes with the media: There is broad consensus that even when police chiefs believe that one or more news media outlets are unfairly critical or factually incorrect in their stories, it is pointless to stonewall or ignore the media. No one can "control" the media, but chiefs who actively engage the media can usually achieve some success in getting their views included in stories.

Make yourself available to news media reporters: Many police chiefs report that they share their cell phone numbers with reporters. Local television news programs and newspapers often are glad to invite police chiefs to their studios or offices for exclusive interviews.

Social media are changing the entire landscape: Most police departments in medium-size and large cities have been experimenting with social

media, such as Facebook and Twitter, for some time. Social media offer police agencies opportunities to disseminate information efficiently to community members or anyone else who has an interest in the police. In fact, even the traditional news media now receive a great deal of their information about the police from the police agencies' social media platforms.

It is a good idea for all police departments to develop a familiarity with social media, because the public increasingly looks to social media for timely information in the midst of a natural disaster or other major crisis or incident. Twitter is often the preferred medium for police departments and other organizations to disseminate minute-by-minute updates about an unfolding situation, such as a major demonstration, a natural disaster, or an active shooter situation. Thousands of people who are interested in the situation simply monitor the police department's tweets and easily obtain the continuous updates with no delay. This can be much more efficient than trying to disseminate information via radio or television news operations.

Some police departments with the most active social media programs have hundreds of thousands of followers. Thus, social media can serve as a significant channel for police to share information.

Police departments increasingly are developing multiple social media accounts, such as separate Facebook or Twitter accounts for the chief of police, for precinct commanders, for the public information office, and other units. In this way, information can be tailored to subgroups, such as residents of a certain neighborhood.

As a general rule, young people seem to be more likely than older generations to be familiar with social media, so some police departments are seeking assistance from local university students as they expand their presence on social media.

The flow of information goes in both directions. During times of crisis as well as on an everyday basis, police can learn a lot by following the postings of journalists, community leaders, elected officials, and others on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media.

About the Police Executive Research Forum

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) is an independent research organization that focuses on critical issues in policing. Since its founding in 1976, PERF has identified best practices on fundamental issues such as reducing police use of force; developing community policing and problem-oriented policing; using technologies to deliver police services to the community; and developing and assessing crime reduction strategies.

PERF strives to advance professionalism in policing and to improve the delivery of police services through the exercise of strong national leadership; public debate of police and criminal justice issues; and research and policy development.

The nature of PERF's work can be seen in the titles of a sample of PERF's reports over the last decade. Most PERF reports are available without charge online at <http://www.policeforum.org/free-online-documents>.

- *Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned* (2014)
- *Local Police Perspectives on State Immigration Policies* (2014)
- *New Challenges for Police: A Heroin Epidemic and Changing Attitudes Toward Marijuana* (2014)
- *The Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Preventing and Investigating Cybercrime* (2014)
- *The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents* (2014)
- *Future Trends in Policing* (2014)
- *Legitimacy and Procedural Justice: A New Element of Police Leadership* (2014)
- *Social Media and Tactical Considerations for Law Enforcement* (2013)
- *Compstat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law Enforcement Agencies* (2013)
- *Civil Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned* (2013)
- *A National Survey of Eyewitness Identification Procedures in Law Enforcement Agencies* (2013)
- *An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force* (2012)
- *Improving the Police Response to Sexual Assault* (2012)
- *How Are Innovations in Technology Transforming Policing?* (2012)
- *Voices from Across the Country: Local Law Enforcement Officials Discuss the Challenges of Immigration Enforcement* (2012)
- *2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines* (2011)
- *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field* (2011)
- *It's More Complex than You Think: A Chief's Guide to DNA* (2010)
- *Guns and Crime: Breaking New Ground By Focusing on the Local Impact* (2010)
- *Gang Violence: The Police Role in Developing Community-Wide Solutions* (2010)
- *The Stop Snitching Phenomenon: Breaking the Code of Silence* (2009)
- *Violent Crime in America: What We Know About Hot Spots Enforcement* (2008)
- *Promoting Effective Homicide Investigations* (2007)

- *“Good to Great” Policing: Application of Business Management Principles in the Public Sector (2007)*
- *Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches (2006)*
- *Strategies for Intervening with Officers through Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Front-Line Supervisors (2006)*
- *Managing a Multi-Jurisdiction Case: Identifying Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation (2004)*
- *Community Policing: The Past, Present and Future (2004)*
- *Racially Biased Policing: A Principled Response (2001)*

In addition to conducting research and publishing reports on our findings, PERF conducts management studies of individual law enforcement agencies; educates hundreds of police officials each year in the Senior Management Institute for Police,

a three-week executive development program; and provides executive search services to governments that wish to conduct national searches for their next police chief.

All of PERF’s work benefits from PERF’s status as a membership organization of police officials, who share information and open their agencies to research and study. PERF members also include academics, federal government leaders, and others with an interest in policing and criminal justice.

All PERF members must have a four-year college degree and must subscribe to a set of founding principles, emphasizing the importance of research and public debate in policing, adherence to the Constitution and the highest standards of ethics and integrity, and accountability to the communities that police agencies serve.

PERF is governed by a member-elected President and Board of Directors and a Board-appointed Executive Director.

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

About Motorola Solutions and the Motorola Solutions Foundation

MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS IS A LEADING PROVIDER of mission-critical communication products and services for enterprise and government customers. Through leading-edge innovation and communications technology, it is a global leader that enables its customers to be their best in the moments that matter.

Motorola Solutions serves both enterprise and government customers with core markets in public safety government agencies and commercial enterprises. Our leadership in these areas includes public safety communications from infrastructure to applications and devices such as radios as well as task specific mobile computing devices for enterprises. We produce advanced data capture devices such as barcode scanners and RFID (radio-frequency identification) products for business. We make professional and commercial two-way radios for a variety of markets, and we also bring unlicensed wireless broadband capabilities and wireless local area networks—or WLAN—to retail enterprises.

The Motorola Solutions Foundation is the charitable and philanthropic arm of Motorola Solutions. With employees located around the globe, Motorola Solutions seeks to benefit the communities where it operates. We achieve this by making strategic grants, forging strong community partnerships, and fostering innovation. The Motorola Solutions Foundation focuses its funding on public safety, disaster relief, employee programs and education, especially science, technology, engineering and math programming.

Motorola Solutions is a company of engineers and scientists, with employees who are eager to encourage the next generation of inventors. Hundreds of employees volunteer as robotics club mentors, science fair judges and math tutors. Our “Innovators” employee volunteer program pairs a Motorola Solutions employee with each of the non-profits receiving Innovation Generation grants, providing ongoing support for grantees beyond simply funding their projects.

For more information on Motorola Solutions Corporate and Foundation giving, visit www.motorolasolutions.com/giving.

For more information on Motorola Solutions, visit www.motorolasolutions.com.

APPENDIX

Participants at the PERF Summit “Defining Moments for Police Chiefs”

September 16–17, 2014, Chicago, IL

Chief Art Acevedo AUSTIN, TX POLICE DEPARTMENT	Lieutenant John Blake ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Chief Eric Carter CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Hassan Aden GREENVILLE, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT	Professor Stacy Blake-Beard SIMMONS COLLEGE	Lieutenant Patricia Casey CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Brian Allen SPARKS, NV POLICE DEPARTMENT	Lieutenant Rodney Blisset CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT	David Chipman SST, INC.
Captain Joseph Allio FAIRFIELD, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT	Chief Jim Blocker BATTLE CREEK, MI POLICE DEPARTMENT	Chief Michael Chitwood DAYTONA BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Michael Anderson METROPOLITAN NASHVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT	Lieutenant David Bowen GREENVILLE, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Chief Ann Clancey DULUTH, MN POLICE DEPARTMENT
Captain Anthony Ashy LAFAYETTE PARISH, LA SHERIFF'S OFFICE	Policy Analyst Melissa Bradley COPS OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE	Chief Demitrous Cook GLENWOOD, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT
Major Paul Baggett POLK COUNTY, FL SHERIFF'S OFFICE	Chief David Brown DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Chief Brendan Cox ALBANY, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT
First Assistant General Counsel William Bazarek CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Police Chief Allwyn Brown RICHMOND, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT	Program Director Elycia Daniel-Roberson TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
Chief Jon Belmar ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT	Lieutenant Joe Browning GREENVILLE, SC POLICE DEPARTMENT	Commissioner Ed Davis (Retired) BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Brian Benton JOLIET, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT	Chief Jarrod Burguan SAN BERNARDINO, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Chief Pamela Davis ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MD POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief Jeffrey Blackwell CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Chief Keith Calloway CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT	Director Ronald Davis COPS OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
Chief Wes Blair CAPE GIRARDEAU, MO POLICE DEPARTMENT	Deputy Chief Humbert Cardounel HENRICO COUNTY, VA DIVISION OF POLICE	Captain David De La Espriella MIAMI BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT
Chief William Blair TORONTO POLICE SERVICE	Commissioner Patrick Carroll NEW ROCHELLE, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT	Chief Charlie Deane (Retired) PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY, VA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Titles reflect participants' positions at the time of the meeting in September 2014.

Chief Cassandra Deck-Brown
RALEIGH, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Michael DeLeo
TALLAHASSEE POLICE DEPARTMENT

**Superintendent
Mario Di Tommaso**
TORONTO POLICE SERVICE

Chief Kim Dine
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Chief D. Samuel Dotson
ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Thomas Duffy
BURLINGTON, MA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Daniel Dugan Jr.
AMTRAK POLICE DEPARTMENT

Assistant Chief Jason Dusterhoft
AUSTIN, TX POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Jerry Dyer
FRESNO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Richard Eddington
EVANSTON, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Chet Epperson
ROCKFORD, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Commissioner William Evans
BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Robert Ferullo, Jr.
WOBBURN, MA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Timothy Fitch (Retired)
ST. LOUIS COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Edward Flynn
MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Heather Fong (Retired)
SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sergeant Rusty Fritz
THOMASVILLE, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Sheriff Richard Fuller
KALAMAZOO COUNTY, MI SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Chief Terrance Gainer (Retired)
U.S. SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS

Deputy Chief Steve Georgas
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

**Detective Lieutenant
Sean Gleason**
COOK COUNTY, IL SHERIFF'S
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Remon Green
TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY
POLICE DEPARTMENT

David Green
NORTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL

Sheriff Bob Gualtieri
PINELLAS COUNTY, FL SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Chief Jeff Hadley
KALAMAZOO, MI DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Chief Garry Hamilton
FORT WAYNE, IN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Charles Hank
LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Cynthia Harris
BERKELEY, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Janeé Harteau
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Vice President Domingo Herraiz
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS

Terry Hillard
HILLARD HEINTZE, LLC

Chief Daniel Hoffman
CAMPTON HILLS, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Thomas Hongso
LENEXA, KS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Monty Houk
KNOXVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Clarence Hunter
HENRICO COUNTY, VA DIVISION OF POLICE

Chief Wade Ingram (Retired)
GARY, IN POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Jeffrey Insley
THOMASVILLE, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Michael Isbrandt
CHEEKTOWAGA, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain David Ivey
GREENVILLE, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Timothy Janowick
MOUNT PROSPECT, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Wayne Jerman
CEDAR RAPIDS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Phillip Johnson
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Chief Will Johnson
ARLINGTON, TX POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mark Jones
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO CRIME LAB

Lieutenant Richard Kaiser
SALISBURY, MD POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Frank Kaminski
PARK RIDGE, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Michael Kent
BURLINGTON, MA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Ms. Tracy Kimbo
MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS

Chief Steven Krokoff
ALBANY, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Jeffrey Kruthoff
SPRINGBORO, OH POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Thomas Krumpter
NASSAU COUNTY, NY POLICE DEPARTMENT

**Chief Operating Officer
Jeff Kukowski**
TASER

Chief Shaun LaDue
WEST DES MOINES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Bruce Lawver
CANTON, OH POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Michael Lay
VILLA PARK, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Major Art LeBreton
LAFAYETTE PARISH, LA SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Chief Robert Lehner
ELK GROVE, CA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Assistant Chief Kurt Leibold
MILWAUKEE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Thomas Lemmer
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Deputy Chief Joseph Leonas
BARTLETT, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Jack Lightfoot
LAFAYETTE PARISH, LA SHERIFF'S OFFICE

Chief Jose Lopez
DURHAM, NC POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain James Mallery
KALAMAZOO, MI DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Chief Robert Marshall
NAPERVILLE, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Timothy McCarthy
ORLAND PARK, IL POLICE DEPARTMENT

Superintendent Garry McCarthy
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Charles McClelland
HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

Assistant Chief Darryl McSwain
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD
POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Gary Mikulec
ANKENY, IA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Captain Kenneth Miller
KNOXVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Ronald Miller (Retired)
TOPEKA POLICE DEPARTMENT

Lieutenant Colonel Sean Miller
BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Chief Jim Montgomery
BELLEVUE, WA POLICE DEPARTMENT

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