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PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:

Strategies for Local Law Enforcement

Volume 6:
Partnering for Preparation and
Response to Critical Incidents



PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement

Volume 6: Partnering for Preparation and Response to Critical Incidents

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The opinions expressed reflect the general consensus of executive session attendees. However, not every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to particular participants.

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We also want to thank those who contributed to this paper by writing sidebar pieces: Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer of Seattle; Superintendent Antony Plowright of the London's Metropolitan Police Territorial Support Group; and Terrance Manning, Assistant Fire Chief, Bureau of Emergency Services, Los Angeles Fire Department.

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To those of you in the community and in law enforcement—at every level of government—who work to make our communities places where respect and dignity for all who live there are truly valued, and who keep us safe from crimes of hate and terror, we hope that this paper provides you with resources and information to assist you in your efforts.

Foreword



THOUGH SEVERAL YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE TRAGIC ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, local, state, tribal and federal agencies are still working to overcome the barriers to effective plans for responding to critical incidents. The guidelines contained in the National Response Plan are an important first step for many agencies. But making any plan work smoothly in practice requires cooperation and collaboration among many local agencies.

Representatives from various disciplines, regions and countries came to this executive session, to discuss the current barriers to forming partnerships and to devise new strategies for overcoming these barriers. Their open and honest discussions led to the list of guidelines and recommendations presented in this report.

This publication addresses the myriad issues that agencies must confront to create a robust response plan for critical incidents—from training, equipment and interoperability, to responsibilities, authority and inter-agency relations. It also provides a list of resources and models that law enforcement agencies can use in creating their own plans.

Successful partnerships are already in place in the United States. But through the session discussions, we learned much more about how to handle critical incidents from those who have, unfortunately, dealt with the threat of terrorism every day for many years. Participants from other countries, including Israel, spoke about their training programs and the lessons they had learned. The best practices that emerged from this discussion have also been captured in this publication.

More than anything, though, this executive session demonstrated that first responders could come together and work as a team on new solutions to the long-standing barriers that have prevented local agencies from working together in the past. All agreed that protecting the men and women who arrive first on the scene is essential, and to ensure this, agencies must act in advance to (1) establish information-sharing mechanisms and cooperative agreements, (2) purchase compatible equipment and (3) practice their predetermined chain-of-command structure.

PERF is pleased to present the guidelines, recommendations and models that came to light as a result of this executive session. It is our hope that this publication will assist local law enforcement in identifying resources and forging stronger relationships within the community—and with other first responder agencies—to create their own critical response plans.

Chuck Wexler
Executive Director, PERF

Introduction

MORE THAN FOUR YEARS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, STATE AND LOCAL entities responsible for the public safety are still working through how best to define, understand, and prepare for their new roles and responsibilities in responding to critical incidents. Government agencies in the United States and abroad are grappling with this same issue.

Coordination is fundamental to a successful response to any critical incident, whether manmade or natural (e.g., hurricanes, terrorist attacks, widespread fires, and/or major crime scenes). The extent of coordination—an essential element in a successful response—that will be needed is determined by the nature and magnitude of a particular incident.

The attacks of 9/11 showed that an event of that magnitude requires consideration of:

- timely awareness of the situation and the resources available for detection of it;
- what information will be needed for responding to the incident, and for follow-up during the subsequent recovery phase;
- the management of information technologies and the resources available for managing these technologies;
- appropriately trained personnel; and
- a host of additional disaster-mitigation equipment and resources.

In addition, sufficiently detailed policies and planning procedures (such as Memorandums of Understanding [MOUs]) governing all three phases—preparedness, response and recovery—must be developed. These will assist agencies in avoiding duplication of effort and in using their existing resources to full capacity. Thus, coordination is the cornerstone of a successful response plan.

Tensions among the various public safety agencies have affected working relationships for years, making effective coordination a considerable challenge. However, the need to solve the problems that result in poor coordination and, instead, apply recommendations such as those of the 9/11 Commission are bringing about significant progress. In the past, emergency responders have had a difficult time in persuading their diverse and functionally independent agencies to focus on the task of working together effectively. Building these relationships takes a tremendous amount of time and energy—both of which are often in short supply.

While the federal government has done its best to generate response guidelines and provide direction for coordinating resources in a

timely fashion,¹ many state and local emergency response agencies have introduced new initiatives for better coordination themselves. Informal and formal relationships alike have played a role in achieving closer coordination, across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. Some of these new communication links derive from a history of working together: learning what works, or does not, in a particular jurisdiction and applying those lessons to emergency response plans in other jurisdictions.

The Project

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),² with support from the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), held a series of five executive sessions for law enforcement chief executives, other policing professionals, government agency leaders and policymakers—to explore possibilities, debate pressing issues, and exchange information critical for responding to terrorist attacks.

These sessions provided law enforcement practitioners and homeland security personnel with opportunities to share information and perspectives and develop effective strategies for addressing terrorism, while continuing to enhance community policing. The discussions are captured in the previous white papers, and in this final report, are widely disseminated to law enforcement personnel and decision-makers at all levels of government.³ Previous executive ses-

sion discussions culminated in the white papers that compose the series, “Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement.” These sessions focused on the following topics:

- Local-Federal Partnerships
(November 2002, Washington, D.C.)
- Working with Diverse Communities
(June 2003, Chicago)
- Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism
(July 2003, Los Angeles)
- The Production and Sharing of Intelligence
(December 2003, Washington, D.C.)
- Partnerships to Promote Homeland Security
(March 2004, Washington, D.C.).

The sixth executive session was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and held in Chicago.

The Sixth Executive Session

In June 2004, representatives from police, fire, emergency medical services, emergency management, and public health agencies from several cities in the United States, England and Israel—chosen because of their extensive experience in planning and/or responding to critical incidents—shared their stories about how to promote coordination and partnerships designed to improve capabilities for an effective response.⁴

1. For example, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) “provides a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size or complexity of the incident.” The National Response Plan (NRP) uses NIMS and “is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan for the management of domestic incidents.” For more information, on these and other guidelines, see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/HSPD8_in_Context_041305.pdf.

2. PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals dedicated to advancing law enforcement services to all communities through experimentation and national leadership. Its members serve more than half the nation’s population and the organization provides training, technical assistance, research, publications and other services to its members and the profession. More information about PERF can be found at www.policeforum.org.

3. At the time of this writing, the first five white papers in the series are available as free downloads at www.policeforum.org and www.cops.usdoj.gov.

4. Participants were asked to focus on the prevention, preparedness and response phases of critical incident management. The recovery phase—while just as important and perhaps even more resource consuming—was not discussed at length during this Executive Session. For information on the recovery phase, see, for example, www.llis.gov or www.redcross.org.

Representatives from the United States federal government also attended the meeting, providing participants with a forum for discussing ambiguities, and reconciling their concerns, in regard to new federal initiatives such as NIMS. They also shared information on various approaches to assuming their new roles in preventing and responding to critical incidents, as well as the responsibilities and command practices in their organizations for dealing with these critical incidents.⁵

While the approaches presented by the participants were based on similar models, the specific structures they outlined varied greatly, based on the geographical location of the various jurisdictions and their history in dealing with critical incidents.

This White Paper

The sixth executive session was an insightful examination of the challenges involved in coordinating the response of multiple agencies with distinct, yet overlapping, responsibilities. Also highlighted during the executive session was the fact that there is no single ideal model for responding to critical incidents. However, there

are fundamental factors that must be considered, regardless of the size of the event. This document examines those factors, as discussed by the first responders who were assembled at the executive session.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents a snapshot of present efforts to coordinate prevention, preparedness and responses to critical incidents, as discussed by the attendees on the first day of the executive session, in June 2004. The rest of the chapter highlights the current state of the field in more detail, with participants' comments and recommendations drawn from their insights interspersed throughout the chapter. Chapter 3 presents the key elements of effective coordination in joint planning for preventing critical incidents—and how to deal with incidents when they do occur. The keys to coordinating responses to critical incidents (including awareness of the scene and assessment of it, and interoperability in equipment and communications) are provided in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 highlights some promising partnerships for implementing federal initiatives, and Appendix A lists the resources available that can help jurisdictions improve their coordination efforts.

5. See the appendix for the attendee list.

Chapter 2

A Snapshot of Coordinated Critical Incident Prevention, Preparedness and Response

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS), COORDINATION with other agencies is the cornerstone of all planning for critical incidents. No single entity can effectively respond to a critical incident on the scale of 9/11. The National Preparedness Goal (NPG)⁶ has designated “expanded regional collaboration” as one of its three overarching national priorities. Creating effective regional collaboration may be a daunting task, but it is essential to building a strong system for ensuring national homeland security. By requiring the development of statewide and urban area strategies, DHS promotes the development of coordinated homeland security planning. Many states are actively encouraging coordination, too. Some have mandated the formation of regional councils to develop plans, seek grant funds and develop capabilities to perform homeland security tasks. Encouraging, and even mandating, the use of coordinated strategies may not be sufficient, however, as individual agencies report that putting regionalism into action remains a significant challenge.

Effective training and coordination within disciplines other than law enforcement can provide a framework for:

- planning;
- encouraging the building of effective relationships before a critical incident occurs;
- establishing clear roles and responsibilities;
- enabling joint training and exercises;
- maximizing resources and thereby achieving economies of scale; and
- fostering the development of new capabilities.

Because law enforcement agencies are responsible for ensuring the availability of critical capabilities needed for preparedness, response, recovery and especially prevention, they are key participants in any coordinated strategy.

This chapter highlights participants’ experiences and insights on three phases of critical-incident management: prevention, preparedness and response. Participant discussions on the challenges to effective management of each of these phases are highlighted in this chapter. Recommendations for meeting these challenges are detailed in Chapters 3 and 4.

6. More information on the Interim National Preparedness Goal (“the Goal”) can be found at www.dhs.gov.

Challenges to Preparing for Potential Threats

Executive session participants discussed the challenges posed by the principle, “staying ahead of the threat.” According to Robert O’Toole, Deputy Superintendent of the Boston Police Department, “My biggest fear is that I’m painting a seascape, but I should be painting a landscape. The challenge is that we are preparing for the big unknown. And, whatever we are securing now, terrorists are moving on to another target.”

John Miller, Bureau Chief for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), described one obstacle a city may face in coordinating and sharing intelligence to promote awareness of potential threats. In the early days after September 11, during an orange alert, the LAPD held a classified briefing with the mayor on potential threats. The representative from the city’s fire department was asked to leave the meeting while sensitive intelligence information was discussed. Not surprisingly, when this representative returned to the meeting, he was upset. To him, it simply “didn’t make sense that the fire department wouldn’t need to know this important information.”

As a result of this and similar incidents, members of the Los Angeles Fire Department felt as if they were “in a vacuum” with regard to intelligence and that they could not afford to wait for law enforcement to come to them with the information. To remedy this, the fire department sought out, and was granted, weekly briefings with the counterterrorism bureau to obtain intelligence information directly. This sequence of events is described in more detail in Chapter 3.

The Challenge of Interjurisdictional Cooperation

As one participant noted, “We are responsible for isolating, identifying, mitigating, and terminating the event. We are challenged to know which one of us has which responsibilities and

authority for those tasks.” Emergency responders must develop and maintain good working relationships with other responding agencies; they also need to foster relationships with new partners. These partners—some of whom come from very distinct disciplines (e.g., public works, transportation)—are vital to the response and recovery phases of a critical incident.

Planning a regional approach is complicated; doing it in the post 9/11 world is even more complex. Jurisdictional boundaries among government and other sectors have become blurred. It may be unclear just which individuals are fully in charge—and yet many are involved, affected, or have partial responsibility to act. Developing a planning strategy is critical. Although many law enforcement agencies have planning capacity and experience individually, developing a coordinated response to a potential terrorist attack is a new undertaking for most local and state agencies.

Planning to Respond

Challenge: The Absence of a Shared Model

U.S. participants noted that, in the words of one, “We do not yet have a shared mental model and until we do, staffing, training, and equipping is a gauzy enterprise.” Commander Cathy Lanier, from the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, noted that, within the region, policies for response frequently vary among the many local and federal law enforcement agencies that all operate within the city, as well as the fire and emergency management departments. Given this situation, it has been difficult to develop a common regional model that can reconcile the differences among the critical-incident plans developed by these diverse agencies.

To develop a standard model, everyone involved must work together. According to a Seattle participant, “Even though inter-jurisdictional cooperation is critical—even vital—we are naïve about how to achieve it.” This point is even

more important for grant funding: Cooperation is often a prerequisite for receiving DHS grants.

The DHS is working to disseminate its NPG, the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), all of which will go a long way toward developing a common model. Although U.S. participants agreed about the need for a common model, they stressed that such a model cannot be “handed down from on high.” The model must be (1) agreed upon; (2) created with input from local emergency responders; and (3) focused on the priority and primacy of first responders and the steps that follow the first response—for example, activating a pre-established media plan to keep the public informed.

In response to some of these concerns, Josh Filler, Director of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination at the DHS, stressed at the meeting that NIMS was not written solely by “a bunch of feds.” He noted that it had been created with both assistance and input from a working group composed of local first responders, with the intent that local systems would govern the management of incidents within their jurisdiction, while the federal government would be responsible for merging its initiatives with those of the local jurisdictions—and not vice versa.

Challenge: Conducting Exercises to Test and Modify Field Responses

In American cities, there have been few opportunities to practice different response strategies in actual incidents. Tragically, for some of the international participants, the opportunity to practice response plans in actual terrorist situations is commonplace. For example, Yosef Sedbon, Commander with the Tel Aviv Police District in Jerusalem, Israel, noted, “We sometimes don’t need training because we are exercising all the time with real experiences.” In addition to this real-world experience, though,

each district in Jerusalem conducts 10 to 12 field exercises each year.

In contrast, real-world experiences with terrorism in the United States have been relatively limited. Ron Huberman, Executive Director of Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management and Communications, noted the consequences of this fact: “We need to discover where our plan doesn’t work as well as it should, because no one has ever done it live. So much of this work is new. On paper, it should theoretically fit, but we need to test it. Where does policy not make sense?” Commander Cathy Lanier from Washington, D.C., shared this concern and commented, “MOUs might be giving us a false sense of security, particularly as front-line people might not know what these protocols are if they haven’t practiced them.” Further, several participants pointed out that it is very difficult for agencies to decide how to allocate their limited training dollars.

Participants were unanimous in their recommendations for meeting this challenge: “This aspect of preparedness can only happen through training and exercises,” stated Commander Lanier. As noted by Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer of the Seattle Police Department, preparedness can only be achieved by training at a range of levels, from the “most modest levels, where you sit down and think through the process, through full field exercises of potential scenarios.”

Responding to Critical Incidents

Challenge: Shared Awareness and Assessment

According to the DHS goals outlined in the Universal Task List of the National Response Plan, “awareness” is defined as the ability to “identify and understand threats, assess vulnerabilities, determine potential impacts and disseminate timely information to homeland security or emergency response partners and the American public.”⁷ Executive session participants emphasized

7. More information on the National Response Plan can be found at www.dhs.gov.

their need for training in assessing the information available at the scene of an incident, to determine whether additional resources are needed to establish security perimeters and, if possible, to set up some type of command structure. In addition, participants noted that understanding the precise nature of any event they encounter is essential. To do this, they should know how to recognize certain indicators of terrorist acts—including the signs of chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear (CBRN) agents or materials—to safeguard both the scene and themselves. Because law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical personnel are the primary first responders to all scenes, effective coordination and communication among these fields are the keys to successful response.

Challenge: Equipment Interoperability

Participants stated that having the proper equipment to respond effectively to an emergency is a significant concern for them. Equipment such as detection devices, respirators and/or personal protective equipment (PPE) must be available and functioning properly. While federal homeland security grants have made the purchase of this equipment much less difficult, grant funds are not always available when they are needed, and/or they may not be sufficient to allow a department to purchase devices for all of their personnel. One city, a participant said, purchased 9,000 PPE suits using its own funds, instead of waiting for DHS money, in case a critical incident occurred before the federal funding arrived. Another stated that in his city, the lack of detection devices, protective suits, and specially trained or adequately knowledgeable personnel, coupled with the nature of the call, prompts the 911 communications center to routinely dispatch only the most suitably equipped agency to lead the response at certain incidents.

Compatibility of equipment is another, equally significant issue. Equipment that ranges from radios to personal protective suits must be compatible, across and within agencies and jurisdictions. For example, Seattle and Chicago participants said that their various fire departments have hoses that cannot be joined.

Historically, first-response agencies have used communications systems that are not compatible with those of other agencies. Now, it is critical that emergency responders be able to communicate quickly and effectively. Seattle participants listed communications interoperability as a significant issue. Although Seattle has the bandwidth and capacity required for interoperability, radio interference from Canada and other technical issues compromise the capacity for intercommunication. Louisville participants agreed that their biggest challenge is radio communication, and they shared plans for implementing “MetroSafe,” which will consolidate communications for the city’s police, fire and rescue departments, local government radio and Louisville Metro Emergency Medical Services.

Conclusion

Information participants shared, early in the meeting, highlights the challenges they face for the prevention, preparedness and response phases of managing critical incidents. Coordination, the “cornerstone of homeland security,” is the solution for effective management of critical incidents, but it also poses the greatest challenge. In response to the “snapshots” of their current situation the participants presented, the following chapters will outline three keys to effective coordination: preparedness and prevention, exercise and training, and response. Departments must learn to work together, communicate, and share resources and information.

Chapter 3

Keys to Effective Coordination: Preparedness and Prevention

PARTICIPANTS DETAILED WHAT THEY HAD DONE IN THE PAST TO PREVENT and plan for critical incidents and what they planned to do in the future to increase their preparedness. The three constituencies (local government, federal government and international cities) addressed this issue in slightly different ways.

International participants described the lessons they had learned about responding to critical incidents, based on their many years of responding to terrorist attacks in their countries. U.S. local government representatives were focused on the actions needed, within the next 6 to 12 months, to improve their planning and response to critical incidents. Finally, the federal government representatives described their plans, for the ensuing 6- to 12-month period, to assist states and localities in preparing to respond to critical incidents.

What emerged from this discussion was a set of key policy considerations for preventing, planning for, and responding to critical incidents, which encompassed an understanding of the barriers that prevent communities from achieving these key elements, as well as strategies for

overcoming these barriers. The key areas specific to preparedness and prevention are presented in this chapter.

Key 1: Develop an Accurate Understanding of Potential Terrorist Threats⁸

While collecting and warehousing information is important, turning that information into something useful is essential to assessing and understanding potential threats. Participants discussed systems that assess target vulnerabilities, and ways to gather intelligence about threats on an ongoing basis. Participants also addressed the importance of sharing intelligence with other agencies, primarily fire departments.

8. On December 16 and 17, 2003 PERF, with the support of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, facilitated an executive session (*The Production and Sharing of Intelligence*) with federal, state and local representatives. Participants provided insight on issues such as how law enforcement executives develop intelligence functions within their departments, the difference between "information" and "intelligence," the move toward intelligence-led policing, and successful models that can be replicated across the country. The resulting white paper examines the challenges and concerns of the respective agencies as well as the progress they have made toward creating an integrated intelligence-sharing system. The full document may be accessed at <http://policeforum.mn-8.net/r.asp?a=5&id=41645>.

Identify and collect information about target vulnerabilities

The first step in “getting ahead of the threat” is to identify potential targets in the locality and gain as much information as possible about the vulnerabilities posed by those targets. For example, the Seattle Police Department has recognized that it must partner with the fire department and the United States Coast Guard to increase its capacity to respond to maritime incidents and its ability to detect maritime attacks and prepare for them. Participants also noted the area’s vulnerability to cyber attacks. As John Miller, Bureau Chief for the LAPD, stated, “Our ability to guard against or respond with like intelligence systems is in its infancy.”

In Dallas, buildings that measure more than 250,000 square feet are considered “targets and the police department stores scale models of these buildings in a database in two secure locations. Mike Dossett, Major with the Louisville Police Department, described how his department is working to reduce vulnerabilities to a “covert human biological vector” (i.e., a person who is willing to infect him/herself with smallpox and travel to the United States to infect others). Together with the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA), they have established the Medical Assistance and Tactical Team (MATT) and have prepared a video training package to address this vulnerability.

The focus on identification of targets and assessment of vulnerabilities in Louisville demonstrates the importance of preparedness in what might be considered “out-of-the-way” jurisdictions. For example, while Louisville may not be a city that immediately comes to mind in considering potential targets for terrorism, their efforts for preparedness began many years ago, when abortion clinics in the city received letters

claiming to contain anthrax. Also, the city hosts the Kentucky Derby, which is attended by approximately 150,000 people, and more than 20 million people watch the event on television.⁹ Recognizing the scope of the city’s vulnerability, the Louisville critical incident response group set up a formal Joint Operations Command (JOC) at Churchill Downs, which would be activated immediately in the event of a threat.

Participants from Seattle and Los Angeles underscored the importance of conducting regional vulnerability assessments of critical infrastructure. In the words of John Miller, Bureau Chief at the LAPD, “We must develop a regional plan because everyone in the region could be a first responder. We conduct threat assessments across the county, city and the world to determine what our most vulnerable issues will be.” In Seattle, “red teams” are used to conduct ongoing vulnerability assessments regionally to identify site-specific vulnerabilities.

Another area of concern for participants was the ability to conduct vulnerability assessments consistently. Several assessment protocols are available, but each uses a slightly different methodology, which may result in different or even conflicting assessments. In addition, a vulnerability assessment conducted by a city may yield results that differ from an assessment conducted by the state and/or the federal government. Participants stressed the need for greater consistency among the assessment models, and among the different levels of government that may conduct those assessments.

Share intelligence information with other emergency responders

As mentioned in Chapter 2, sharing information with other agencies involved in the response phase (particularly the fire department) is critical,

9. http://www.kentuckyderby.com/2004/derby_coverage/derby_news/derby_news_04282004.html

but, traditionally, has not been done. In these times of “law-enforcement sensitive” and “top secret” briefings, fire department and emergency management officials must be prepared to go through the same vetting process to get the same information as their law enforcement colleagues.

Another related challenge, mentioned by a DHS representative, is to understand how to take highly sensitive intelligence, filter it and make it accessible to local law enforcement rapidly.

A participant from the Los Angeles Fire Department commented that the flow of information should not be in one direction only, and explained that the department has trained one person from each battalion to serve as its “terrorism liaison officer.” These individuals are responsible for improving the flow of information into and within the fire department, and with law enforcement. For example, while emergency medical technicians (EMTs) may come across information relevant to law enforcement, they may not be able to get the information to the right individuals because they have no established mechanism to do so. However, these professionals might be more likely to notify the local liaison officer who is responsible for taking this information up the chain of command. Similarly, one of California’s four Regional Threat Assessment Centers (RTAC), which reviews intelligence and trends on an ongoing basis, now includes members from the fire department and the public health department, in addition to local law enforcement agencies.

From the perspective of one Seattle participant, under the scenarios discussed at this executive session, the fire department needs intelligence information just as much as the police department does. This information helps these agencies plan for operational needs, such as adequate staffing and equipment, and helps them determine how they can provide the most assistance to the police department. As William

Hepburn, Assistant Chief at the Seattle Fire Department, stated, “At the very least, the police department should give us this information—even if it is filtered.”

As described by Yosef Sedbon, Jerusalem has demonstrated that the way to prevent the next attack is through good intelligence. “There is wonderful intelligence,” Sedbon explained, “70 percent [of suicide bombers] are stopped on their way in. The bomber can get from the border to the city in two or three hours...you have only a short time to stop them.”

In London, firefighters apply intelligence information in order to gauge the extent of resources that will be needed. As one participant from London stated, “It is all about risk reduction—to [us] and the public. We have a limited amount of emergency resources. Information sharing allows us to take a more measured approach to what might be the problem.” Further, “Not everyone needs to have access to that information. There is a gold-level security-cleared officer and silver-level security cleared officers. Based on intelligence, they are able to change protocols and procedures without sharing all information with the front line.”

The sidebar on pages 12–14 illustrates how the Los Angeles Police and Fire Departments collaborate to share intelligence.

Key 2: Establish a Shared Model

Participants stressed the need for a “common framework” that articulates clearly and concisely the role of each emergency response agency, so that jurisdictions can act on verified threats effectively. Antony Plowright, Superintendent for London’s Metropolitan Police Territorial Support Group, explained that it is essential to have “a shared, national concept of operations that goes across all emergency services.” In London, these principles are based on doctrine, three specifically delineated levels of planning and response

LAPD/LAFD: TEAMWORK IN ACTION
“FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE IS PREPARING FOR FAILURE”

By Terrance Manning,
Assistant Fire Chief, Bureau of Emergency Services, Los Angeles Fire Department

Intelligence is the product of multiple analyzed pieces of information that, together, present a clear picture, or educated estimate, of activities, projections, threats, or compositions. Since September 11, 2001, the term “intelligence” has taken on enormous meaning for all stakeholders in Homeland Security. Effective intelligence-gathering and intelligence-sharing capabilities, many people believe, constitute the panacea for combating the war on terror. Whether it is in fact a panacea or not, few would deny the importance of strengthening our nation’s intelligence capabilities. So, many new programs have been promoted to accomplish this objective.

Intelligence is essential to effective planning, training, and operations. Once received, intelligence can be further analyzed for devising plans to manage the consequences of activities, thereby providing a critical perspective on the various contingencies that can enhance officer and public safety.

At the local level, where intelligence is tremendously important, the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) recognizes the vital need to look beyond traditional methods of emergency planning and management. Now, the Department has new techniques for sharing intelligence. Realizing that most intelligence is compiled and analyzed by law enforcement agencies, LAFD has worked on coordination and communication with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and can now insert itself into the intelligence-sharing network.

Many events led to the close professional relationship now enjoyed by the LAFD and LAPD. Both departments have undergone

monumental changes in the services they provide, and progressive thinking has become a regular habit in finding new approaches to meeting today’s challenges. In many ways, the surrounding environment also lends a hand.

Los Angeles is unique in many ways. It is the nation’s second largest city and boasts an economy that rivals those of most countries. However, there are problems, too: the many earthquake faults that traverse its landscape, thousands of hillside homes set amid native and highly combustible brush, expansive valley areas vulnerable to flooding, and burgeoning drug and gang problems are but a few of the abundant ingredients for the typical Los Angeles recipe of natural and man-made disasters.

On a typical day, the LAPD logs nearly 6,000 incidents, and the LAFD logs nearly 1,500 incidents. Major events managed under a Unified Command model include the 1992 Civil Disturbance, the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, the 2000 Democratic National Convention, each year’s Grammy Awards and Academy Awards, the Los Angeles Marathon, and countless other significant, though smaller-scale, events and incidents. Because of what was learned during these events, the LAFD and LAPD can fine-tune their Incident and Unified Command doctrine into a science.

The first and most important step in doing so was to convince law enforcement that sharing intelligence data with the fire department was valuable to their group, too. Numerous examples were provided to illustrate why

any briefings about criminal activity that have potential public safety implications should, quite reasonably, involve sharing relevant information with the fire department.

The next step in ensuring regular intelligence sharing is to designate properly cleared fire department officers or chief officers who will participate in weekly or periodic intelligence briefings. These fire department officers should also take part in planning meetings whenever sensitive tactical operations are being prepared, and they should receive intelligence reports, as necessary. Because most criminal activity involves an element of threat to the public, keeping the fire department in the loop helps ensure a smooth transition from crisis management to consequence management, and thereby enhances officer and public safety.

As a critical duty, the fire department should take definitive steps to assure its law enforcement counterparts that any intelligence shared will be managed with utmost responsibility. Recognizing this—and the importance and sensitivity of intelligence—the LAFD created a section dedicated to collecting and managing intelligence: the Homeland Security Intelligence Section. Section staff works in conjunction with the LAPD, the Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW), and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. Assigned members acquire security clearances and receive training to understand the intelligence cycle as well as the legal, ethical, and privacy issues that pertain to criminal intelligence and their potential liability as intelligence collectors. Following new guidance, intelligence is properly handled and disseminated only through necessary and approved channels.


These members focus most specifically on terrorist trends, tactics, and procedures. But any intelligence and information that

hints of threats to the public safety should be shared with these officers. Examples include criminal or terrorist trends, tactics, and procedures; imminent or possible terrorist attacks; likely targets; threat assessments; infrastructure vulnerabilities; operations plans; advisories, alerts, and warnings; information regarding the illegal possession or movement of hazardous devices, fraudulent business document practices, sensitive tactical operations, disruption planning; and post-incident analysis.

The LAFD's Homeland Security Intelligence Section is another important conduit for upper-level managers, Mass Disaster Planning Section staff, Tactical Training staff, Arson Investigators, Fire Inspectors, and Hazardous Materials staff—each of which have unique needs for intelligence. The Homeland Security Intelligence Section categorizes and shares intelligence based on which parties have a need to know, which persons can be informed, to the minimal extent, to improve public safety, and which department members may become aware of additional information that can help them in investigations or in gathering intelligence. With increasing frequency, the city is relying on fire department resources to support sensitive law enforcement operations.

The Homeland Security Intelligence Section also oversees the Los Angeles Urban Area Fire Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program. TLOs are specially trained representatives from fire departments who are provided with intelligence and information regarding terrorist trends, tactics and procedures, and other critical criminal information. TLOs also receive detailed information on warning signs, indicators, and other suspicious activities that should prompt notifications to TLO Coordinators, the

>> *continued on page 14*



TEW, the FBI, or other law enforcement bodies. Appropriately edited information is shared with TLOs, greatly improving their ability to gather collective intelligence.

The close relationship enjoyed by the LAFD and LAPD serves as a model for the most essential element in effective intelligence sharing. The two organizations have come to enjoy collaboration so close it has been the subject of national attention.

Both the LAFD and the LAPD have continually reinvented themselves to meet the real-time needs of the community of Los Angeles. They have drawn upon each other's strengths, and the results are tangible. Effective intelligence sharing is only one example of these tangible results. At a time when many police and fire departments still tend to ignore each other's existence, Los Angeles has resolved the traditional rivalry that seems to be almost innate between these agencies.

The structures of the Incident Command System (ICS) and the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), both of which are native to California, accomplish much, but the face-to-face contact and friendships that develop from frequent interaction cement a much stronger bond. Each passing event and incident serves to strengthen this bond. There are regular joint training opportunities, such as the yearly Executive Retreat in Lake Arrowhead attended by LAFD and LAPD Command staff and Joint Unified Command Training and Enhanced Incident Management Unified Command courses that are attended by scores of LAFD Chief Officers and LAPD supervisors.

Individual police and fire officers must be willing to collaborate and think about new

ways to provide their services. Increasingly, individual sections and units within the LAFD work closely with LAPD sections and groups; these liaisons have benefited from the intelligence-sharing effort. Thanks to the state-of-the-art 911 system in Los Angeles, when 911 calls are received, police and fire dispatchers spend much of the time on the line together, interrogating the caller to ensure that the right information is gathered and the correct response is sent.

Furthermore, the LAFD and the LAPD have professional respect and admiration for each other. With few exceptions, they enjoy working together, from the rank-and-file to the upper-level managers who are called on to make critical management decisions every day. They respond jointly to calls and lend each other a helping hand whenever possible. Police officers even visit fire stations for coffee breaks and an occasional glimpse of football games. Firefighters and paramedics routinely fuel their vehicles at police stations and are welcome to step inside and use the copy machines.

These are but a few of the elements that have fostered effective intelligence sharing between the LAFD and the LAPD. During a February 2003 speech, President George W. Bush pledged to make information sharing an important tool in the nation's war on terror. Since the time when the President made his pledge, tremendous strides have been made in intelligence and information sharing, and many more initiatives are on the table. At the local level, the LAFD and the LAPD are doing their part to bolster effective intelligence sharing.

(strategic [gold], tactical [silver] and operational [bronze]), as well as a common vocabulary. That model is translated into a region-specific plan that includes all emergency services and security in specific detail. As one participant from London stated, “Although the emphasis will switch and different agencies will come to the fore in different situations, everyone understands what the model is.”

The London representatives stressed that this model has evolved over time, and was refined based on input from all of the agencies involved. Each discipline establishes its own command structure consistent with the model, and representatives from each discipline’s gold, silver and bronze levels are encouraged to meet on a regular basis. This coordination serves to minimize turf wars among agencies—each knows its primary responsibilities and recognizes that “working together, not against each other, is what has helped us achieve what we have so far.” The sidebar on page 16 explores this model in more detail.

In the United States, the NRP establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach to enhance the ability of emergency responders to manage domestic incidents. The plan incorporates best practices and procedures gleaned from the various disciplines involved in managing domestic incidents—homeland security, emergency management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, responder and recovery

worker health and safety, emergency medical services, and the private sector—and integrates them into a unified structure. The NRP forms the basis of the federal government’s strategy for coordination among state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, during incidents, and will serve as the foundation for the shared mental model in the United States.

Incorporate NIMS and NRP into emergency response plans

One recommendation made by the 9/11 Commission was to “make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach.” The DHS has incorporated this recommendation into the National Incident Management System (NIMS) minimum requirements, advising all federal, state, local and tribal agencies that “responders at all levels must be participating in and/or coordinating ICS-oriented exercises that involve responders from multi-disciplines and jurisdictions” by the end of FY 2006.¹⁰

NIMS was defined by Clark Kimerer, Deputy Chief at the Seattle Police Department, as “a species of incident command.” Except for its terminology, NIMS derives from the Incident Command System, which is a scalable system that establishes an incident commander and a unified command structure. Using NIMS, agencies can identify and assign divisions of responsibility to

10. The deadline for NIMS compliance is September 30, 2006, the end of FY 2006. However, full NIMS implementation is a dynamic process and changes should be expected to the NIMS as technical and policy issues are further refined at the national level. More information on this will be forthcoming. There are NIMS implementation requirements that need to be achieved by Sept. 30, 2005, the end of FY 2005. They are outlined in the Secretary’s letter to the Governors on the NIMS Web page, <http://www.fema.gov/nims>, under the NIMS Compliance section. NIMS implementation requirements for FY 2006 will be released later this year. The NIMS compliance deadlines have not been extended.

All federal preparedness grants became contingent upon NIMS compliance starting in FY 2006. This includes preparedness grants from the Department of Homeland Security along with all federal departments that award preparedness grants. This would not affect disaster assistance, as money awarded to aid jurisdictions that have suffered disasters is not classified as preparedness funds. Federal departments and agencies are currently identifying which of their grant programs are classified as preparedness grants and will subsequently require NIMS compliance.

THE PRECIOUS MATTER OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

***By Antony Plowright,
Superintendent, Metropolitan Police Territorial Support Group, London***

One key requirement for the emergency responders charged with managing critical incidents is the ability to work together. While each group has its own specific responsibilities, they are ultimately interdependent for successfully achieving them. This is a difficult task if there are no established systems of command and control.

In London, the emergency services (police, fire and ambulance) use the Gold, Silver, Bronze system as the template for command and control at critical incidents. An agreement for the use of this system has been defined in the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Procedure Manual. This manual outlines the roles of the emergency services and, importantly, identifies the police as the agency responsible for overall command and coordination.

So what do these precious-metal titles stand for? The Gold group is composed of overall command personnel, who establish a response strategy. Silver personnel will respond to the incident and are also responsible for formulating the tactics that will activate the strategy. The Bronze group controls the resources and implements the tactics as set by the Silver group. During an exercise or actual critical incident, the individuals who play specific roles wear a tabard that clearly identifies them.

These roles are not rank-specific. Therefore, at the outset of a response to a critical incident, the role of the Silver group will

probably be undertaken by one of the first managers to arrive at the scene. The different rank hierarchies and the inevitable variation in times when senior managers reach the incident require this approach. As the response expands and senior managers arrive, they will take over their previously assigned role and don the appropriate tabard.

Each of the emergency services establishes its own structure for command in this way; that is, each has its own Gold and Silver groups. Individuals from all groups are encouraged to seek each other out and meet on a regular basis. These meetings, known as coordinating groups, have been established to ensure that the strategies and tactical plans all converge for successful management of any critical incident. The meetings between the respective Golds and Silvers are critical for coordination. In addition, the complexity of the incident may require that strategy, the tactical plan, or both be adjusted.

The benefits of dealing with critical incidents according to this sort of procedure can be applied to the management of other non-emergency events, where the emergency services regularly work together (e.g., sporting events). Regular collaboration in planning and communication breeds familiarity with the concepts and agreements between agencies. Should the unfortunate day arrive when a critical incident compels the use of this system for command, control and joint coordination, emergency services will be able to respond efficiently and cohesively.

manage an incident. In the words of one meeting participant, “NIMS is functionally vital because it forces an incident commander to staff and fulfill essential roles, it enables mutual aid agencies to talk to one another, and it promotes a basic understanding of incident command.”

State- and territory-level efforts to implement the NIMS must include the following:

- incorporate NIMS into existing training programs and exercises;
- ensure that federal preparedness funding supports NIMS implementation by state, local and tribal entities;
- incorporate NIMS into emergency operations plans (EOPs);
- promote intrastate mutual-aid agreements;
- coordinate and provide NIMS technical assistance to local entities; and
- institutionalize the use of the Incident Command System.

Emergency-operations plans specify the roles and responsibilities for the various agencies in the event of a manmade or naturally occurring critical incident. Plans that mirror the NRP are broken into chapters (or “Emergency Support Functions” [ESFs]) in which one responding agency is typically designated as the “primary” agency.

Further, an emergency operations plan:

- assigns responsibility to organizations and individuals for carrying out specific actions at projected times and places in an emergency that exceeds the capability or routine responsibility of any one agency;
- sets forth lines of authority and organizational relationships and shows how all actions will be coordinated;

- describes how people and property will be protected in emergencies and disasters;
- identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies, and other resources available—within the jurisdiction or by agreement with other jurisdictions—for use during response and recovery operations; and
- identifies the steps needed to address concerns about mitigation while response and recovery activities are in progress.

It is important to note that the EOP complements an agency’s standard operations procedures; it is not meant to replace them. The EOP outlines each organization’s responsibilities, while standard operations procedures explain how each organization will accomplish its assigned tasks. Further, the EOP covers what happens in the Joint Operations Center, not the field.

Plans should mirror the National Response Plan and be organized as follows:

- **Base Plan:** Includes the Concept of Operations, Coordinating Structures, Roles and Responsibilities, Definitions, etc.;
- **Emergency Support Function Annexes:** Groups capabilities and resources into functions that are most likely to be needed during an incident (e.g., transportation, firefighting, mass care, etc.);
- **Support Annexes:** Describes common processes and specific administrative requirements (e.g., Public Affairs, Financial Management, Worker Safety & Health, etc.);
- **Incident Annexes:** Outlines core procedures, roles and responsibilities for specific contingencies (e.g., Bio, Radiological, Cyber, HAZMAT Spills); and

- Appendixes: Glossary, Acronyms, Authorities, and Compendium of National Interagency Plans.

FEMA approved the Seattle All-Hazards Mitigation Plan on March 1, 2004, the first plan approved of its kind for a major urban area. The Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Services is responsible for the county's emergency planning. This board has a working group composed of representatives from all county fire and police agencies, all small-city fire and police agencies and all emergency managers. The city's emergency operations plan incorporates the standardized emergency management system (their version of NIMS) and is patterned after the NRP.

Chicago is in the process of adopting NIMS. Representatives from primary and support agencies who have a role in responding to critical incidents are being trained in incident command.

Improve inter-jurisdictional cooperation

William Hepburn, Assistant Fire Chief in Seattle, asked, "How, during a terrorist event, do we deal with [partners] if we don't nurture relationships [with these entities] between incidents?" Again, given that the primary emergency responders at any critical incident will come from the police and the fire departments, the relationship between these two entities is particularly important for achieving a common framework.

Participants shared their experiences in improving inter-jurisdictional cooperation and enhancing working relationships with the full range of potential responders to a critical incident such as a terrorist attack. These professionals acknowledged that good working relationships are best developed through strong personal relationships. Consequently, they recommended

that agencies increase opportunities for individual responders at all levels to work together—as in joint planning, cross-training and participation in exercises—so they can develop key relationships.

The Los Angeles participants discussed several strategies for improving the working relationship between police and fire agencies. Police are meeting with the fire officers within their geographic area and conducting annual and semi-annual exercises together. In addition, the fire department recently reorganized the fire battalion boundaries to match the boundaries of the police. This reorganization makes it easier for relationships between both command structures to develop, because the individuals in these structures will interact on a more regular basis.

It is also important to coordinate disaster response plans with private ambulance companies, public health officials and local hospitals. Due to the nationwide shortage of health-care workers, a growing number of EMTs and paramedics have been recruited for part- and full-time employment in local hospitals. This results in what is referred to as the "two-hat syndrome," because when a critical incident occurs, EMTs and paramedics may be called to upon to perform both jobs.

To create a successful call-up strategy, emergency response agencies should identify which employees hold more than one public-safety position. Then, when an incident occurs, agencies know which individuals cannot be "called in," and counted on as part of the response team, because they will probably be at the scene already, although they may be working in a different capacity. For example, surveys of the Atlanta metro area found that among 16 fire departments, an average of 22.2 percent of employees hold two or more public safety positions.¹¹

11. Kareem, Juliette and Robyn Pang. *First to Arrive: State and Local Responses to Terrorism*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University: 2003.

These responders must determine ahead of time, with their employers, their “primary” position in the event of an emergency. Public agency officials should share this information with other agencies, to be sure that all parties have an accurate assessment of their response capability. Another way to manage this dilemma and formulate a reliable call-up plan is to build redundancy within the top ranks, so that officials can be called upon to perform dual roles.

The tasks involved in the response to a critical incident are varied and complex. To accomplish these tasks, and to ensure all responders know their roles and responsibilities, participants from Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Dallas spoke about the importance of building and expanding coalitions with numerous city departments and private agencies and establishing stronger relationships with those partners.

Participants from Seattle also noted the critical importance of integrating into planning, early in the process, the resources that are available in public health departments and hospitals. As agencies grapple with “nightmare scenarios involving quarantine and security contamination,” it becomes increasingly critical to build open relationships with medical partners and “expand the playbook of operations in the field to include them.”¹²

In Seattle, there is a cooperative agreement between hospitals and the emergency medical services that makes it possible to track the capacity of each regional hospital in the event of a critical incident. The agreement includes a real-time computer system that helps with triaging and planning region-wide ambulance transport. There is also an agreement whereby hospitals will discharge non-urgent patients to expand capacity for the critical cases. These

agreements are exercised during earthquakes, pandemic influenza drills and other disaster-related events.

Another advantage of working with support departments is a greater awareness of, and access to, important resources. For example, through such partnerships, agencies can learn about and gain access to important assets. In Washington, D.C., simply through phone contacts, the fire department has discovered assets that are not typically available to them. And, although “Normally there [will] be red tape,” Commander Cathy Lanier encouraged others to “reach out now, to develop these shortcut methods so they can utilize those assets.”

Key 3: Develop Business and Community Partnerships

In addition to partnerships with professionals in public health and medicine, several participants also endorsed the idea of expanded partnerships with non-emergency responders such as the business community, private citizens and private security companies. The private sector is on the front line of homeland security efforts and is crucial to identifying and locating terrorists, as well as disrupting terrorist networks. According to DHS, the private sector also oversees approximately 85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure.¹³ Its security personnel are integral partners in local law enforcement efforts to protect vulnerable targets. They are the guardians of many critical systems and dangerous materials. The private sector and its security forces also provide information essential to law enforcement's counterterrorism efforts. The benefits of collaboration are evident, but tools that would allow the private sector and the intelligence

12. These relationships are explored in more detail in the third monograph in this series on bioterrorism partnerships <http://policeforum.mn-8.net/r.asp?a=5&id=38408>

13. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect6.html>.

community to share information more easily, while also addressing privacy concerns, are still being developed or enhanced.

Likewise, strong relationships with communities are essential to preventing and preparing for a terrorism incident. Since the early 1980s, local law enforcement has worked hard to establish community-oriented and problem-solving policing across the country. Jurisdictions have widely adopted a proactive policing philosophy that draws on police-citizen partnerships to address the underlying problems that affect citizens' quality of life and generate repeat calls for police service. Executive session participants agreed that local law enforcement agencies committed to a community-policing philosophy will be more effective in working collaboratively to prepare for and prevent terrorism.

Business-community partnerships

In Seattle, the Business Emergency Network, tested in TOPOFF2, composed of individuals in the business community, receives information directly from the police in an emergency. Dallas, too, has worked closely to establish relationships with downtown businesses; law enforcement in Dallas invites business representatives into the emergency operations center during critical incidents. "If we have a critical incident in the central business district, the primary building manager will be part of the initial command post on site," noted Assistant Chief Daniel Garcia from the Dallas Police Department.

In Washington, D.C., the Metropolitan Police Department recently began asking business owners to assist in detecting and preventing terrorism through a program called Operation TIPP, the Terrorism Incident Prevention Program. Businesses that participate in the program receive customized information packets detailing the activities about which they should become more aware. For example, TIPP teaches business owners and their employees who work on or near

a marina (e.g., firms that sell, maintain, rent, or store boats) to be suspicious of certain activities: boats that appear inappropriately weighted down, dockside activity at an unusual time, requests for private charter tours by individuals who show a particular interest in non-tourist attractions, or moored boats for which the owner/lessee cannot be contacted over an extended period of time. The program provides a dedicated toll-free telephone number that employees can use to report suspicious behavior to the police.

The relationship between the police and business owners developed through this program has also helped the police department prepare for critical incidents. For example, in advance of the 2005 inauguration parade, the Metropolitan Police Department asked the owners of several parking garages and retail stores along the parade route to voluntarily close down, to reduce the chances that terrorists might target these buildings. Due to the relationship established with these downtown businesses through Operation TIPP, the police had no difficulty receiving cooperation with this plan, despite the fact that it resulted in lost revenues for these businesses.

In London, the business community is viewed as an important partner because, "The life blood of the country is the economy and we must keep businesses going," according to Superintendent Antony Plowright. The police department takes business owners' fears seriously and brings them into their "gold" strategy groups as independent advisers. In this way, the business community is included in the planning for response operations and participates in achieving security by working on strategies to prevent it.

Similarly, in Dallas, the emergency response team has included the commercial sector in its planning, by issuing perimeter passes to local businesses. While these passes do not guarantee entry into a restricted area, they do

allow businesses to continue to operate whenever possible.

Community partnerships

The executive session lunch speaker, Sue Mencer, Director of the Office of Domestic Preparedness within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, stressed the importance of community volunteers. She pointed out that volunteer groups are often the first on the scene—on 9/11 and in Oklahoma City, for example—and should be considered valuable “first responder” resources.

The role of volunteers is also illustrated in Seattle. As part of its Mitigation Readiness Program, staff from the Emergency Preparedness Bureau train community members on security awareness, focusing on opportunities to assist in the response phase. Furthermore, Seattle employs Disaster Aid and Response Teams (SDART). SDART members are trained, in groups of 25 to 30 households, about what they can do to help their neighbors in the aftermath of a disaster. Team members learn how to monitor amateur-radio bands, turn off natural-gas lines and take care of children and others in need of basic first aid.

In Los Angeles, the fire department developed and implemented the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) in 1985, to train volunteers from the community to assist emergency service personnel during major natural disasters. In the face of disaster, fire and police personnel have found that they cannot meet the demands of every citizen. Factors such as number of victims, communication failures, and road blockages will prevent people from accessing their communities’ emergency services. Since the creation of CERT, the LAFD’s Disaster and Preparedness Division has certified 40,000 citizens who participate in the program. More recently, a terror-awareness course has been added to the CERT curriculum. This

seven-session course is taught by the fire department and designed for citizens, as well as long-shoremen, high-rise building employees, workers at Los Angeles International Airport and the mayor’s staff. Many other cities across the country have implemented similar CERT programs.

Private security partnerships

Several participants also focused on the need to expand partnerships between local law enforcement and private security aimed at preventing, detecting and responding to terrorism. For example, in California, the relationship between the Orange County Sheriff’s Office and Disney World’s security staff has improved dramatically since the park first opened. A participant from the Sheriff’s Office noted that when Disney World first opened, security officers told the first uniformed deputy who responded to a call for service that he couldn’t bring his gun onto Disney property.

Since that time, the relationship between the two entities has “come a long way.” Disney now pays contracts with more than 20 sheriff’s deputies who patrol the property. Additional sheriff’s deputies also respond to calls for service on the property, and Disney has provided aerial photos and staging locations to prepare law enforcement agencies for responding to possible attacks or other critical incidents. The Sheriff’s Office has also trained with Disney’s private security force so that their efforts can “dovetail.”

In Jerusalem, private security is viewed as an extension of local law enforcement, and is consequently afforded substantial authority. All retail stores in Jerusalem have private security at the door, and as Yosef Sedbon stated, “If there is no private security guard at a restaurant, you probably don’t want to eat there.” Sedbon went on to explain that he could order private security in the shopping areas to close businesses if it was

required to ensure security. Because private security officers have been responsible for stopping terrorist attacks in Jerusalem, their role is viewed as central to the law enforcement mission.

In some localities, local law enforcement is working with building workers, including apartment doormen, maintenance workers and management companies. These individuals, who staff reception areas, hail taxis, open doors, fix appliances and manage rental properties, can identify suspicious activity for law enforcement. They must be aware of the threat of and response to suspicious packages, for example. They can also assist with evacuation plans and other efforts to support law enforcement.

For example, in New York City, an off-duty police detective has taught a class to the building workers' union.¹⁴ Each building worker's employer pays a nominal fee for an employee to attend the class. The building owners' greatest incentive is to develop a safer building with trained staff. The building workers learn, for instance, the potential for an exterminator's canister to be used for spraying chemical agents and appropriate precautionary steps. According to one estimate, it took over a year to train 28,000 residential building workers in

New York City. The number and pacing of classes were increased for workers near Madison Square Garden when the Republican National Convention was held at the end of August 2004. A \$1 million dollar training fund created by a contract between the union and real estate management companies, who represent owners and renters, paid for those classes.

Conclusion

It is crucial for emergency responders across the world to come to consensus about how best to handle critical incidents and share information, ideas and technologies. Focusing on the first key of effective coordination—preparedness and prevention—the meeting participants shared stories and experiences, and were able to agree on strategies for preparing and preventing a terrorist incident. By developing an accurate understanding of potential terrorist threats, establishing a “common framework” and developing business and community partners, emergency responders will be better prepared to respond to a terrorist incident and will also lay the groundwork for subsequent keys to effective coordination.

14. For an example of how New York City is working with doormen, see Martha T. Moore (July 11, 2004). “Doormen Out Front in the War on Terrorism,” *USA Today*.

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Keys to Effective Coordination: Exercises and Training

WHILE THE PREVIOUS KEY TO CRITICAL INCIDENT PREVENTION AND PLANNING focused on the importance of developing a common framework and improving inter-jurisdictional partnerships, this key addresses the necessity of ensuring that critical incident operations plans are practical and will be effective in the field. According to several meeting participants, while many critical-incident response plans are available, they have yet to be operationalized, tested and evaluated. In the words of one participant, “On paper it should theoretically fit, but we need to test it where the rubber meets the road.” As Ron Huberman, Executive Director of Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management and Communication, put it, “The exercises don’t need to be monstrous; you can become prepared by doing a smaller number of more in-depth exercises as well.”

Participants discussed a variety of training mechanisms and shared lessons they had learned through practice drills. Michael Sellitto, Deputy Chief of the Washington, D.C., Fire Department, described a three-step approach to making the most of training: First, ensure that all agencies in one jurisdiction take a regional approach to designing a scenario that tests their plan. Next, all agencies should “take a slow walk through the scenario and see where it will not work.” It might be helpful to bring in a team of unbiased observers trained in evaluating such exercises to highlight good performance as well as areas that need more attention. The critical third step involves rewriting the plan to reflect the lessons learned during practice.

The following recommendations were offered as guidance to jurisdictions working to develop critical incident response training and after-action assessments.

Key 1: Conduct Exercises to Test and Modify Field Operations

Learn from the best practices established by other agencies

The Lessons Learned Information System (LLIS) is an on-line, national network of promising practices and lessons learned for emergency response providers and homeland security officials.¹⁵ All users are verified emergency response

15. Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) is password protected and requires registering with the site prior to gaining access.

providers and homeland security officials at the local, state, and federal levels. All content is peer-validated. The site contains an extensive catalog of after-action reports from exercises and actual incidents, as well as an updated list of homeland security exercises, events, and conferences. Information is grouped by discipline (e.g., law enforcement, emergency communications, fire, HAZMAT, mental health) and by emergency function, as described in the NRP (e.g., transportation, IT and technology, agriculture, and energy).

Participants pointed out that it is also useful to learn from natural disaster planning and response: Certain areas of the country are quite qualified to offer emergency management guidance. Participants in the Seattle area extrapolate from earthquake preparedness, for example, to assist in terrorism preparedness—particularly as it relates to building collapses. In addition, professionals in states in the Pacific Northwest who have experienced large-scale forest fires have already developed models for multi-jurisdictional responses that can be modified to fit the needs of response to terrorism.

Learn from training exercises and drills

Meeting participants emphasized the extraordinary value of conducting full-field exercises and drills. As Yosef Sedbon noted, “You must practice all the time—not only around the table but also in the field—partly because commanders change places all the time. This practice must include the rescue team, fire department, medical team and all of the people who could react for the event.”

In December 2003, Congress mandated a national exercise program through Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. The

series of exercises was developed in recognition of the critical need for practice drills and exercises, and was intended to involve the top public safety officials (hence, the name “TOPOFF”). This biennial program establishes a framework for an exercise schedule, design and evaluation—whose purpose is to test the response capabilities of the federal, state, local and tribal governments involved. Many representatives from law enforcement, fire and public health who participated in the second of these TOPOFF exercises (TOPOFF2¹⁶) attended this executive session, and shared their experiences and lessons learned from the experience. TOPOFF2 was designed as a full-field, limited-notice exercise. The exercise involved “simulated attacks” in the Chicago and Seattle metropolitan areas. Seattle responded to a hypothetical explosion containing radioactive material, and Chicago responded to a covert release of a biological agent. Participants commented that the exercise provided a unique opportunity to build relationships with key partners and to resolve potential conflicts. In the words of Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer: “Participating in TOPOFF established relationships that had been nonexistent or hazy. Now these agencies are bedfellows.”

Participants from Chicago expressed similar enthusiasm for TOPOFF2 exercises. One participant from Chicago believed his city “nailed every milestone.” He was gratified to see that TOPOFF2 demonstrated that the mayor’s vision to create the Office of Emergency Management and Communications was a valuable investment of resources. Chicago participants noted that the most important lesson learned was about communications planning.

16. The goals of TOPOFF2 were “to improve the nation’s capacity to manage extreme events; create broader frameworks for the operation of expert crisis and consequence management systems; validate authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, and protocols; and build a sustainable, systematic national exercise program to support the national strategy for homeland security.” (For more information on TOPOFF2 see www.topoff2media.net.)

WHAT IF A CRITICAL EVENT REALLY HAPPENED?

**By Clark Kimerer,
Deputy Chief of Operations, Seattle Police Department**

At high noon on Monday, May 12th 2003, the City of Seattle was rocked by the detonation of a dirty bomb, which had been placed in the core of the city by international terrorist operatives. There were multiple casualties, and a plume of radioactive debris enshrouded much of the downtown area. During the next 36 hours, more than 3,700 first responders and other professionals from Seattle, King County, Washington State, Canada, FEMA, the FBI, DHS and myriad others worked together to treat and rescue the injured, contain the incident, investigate the crime scene, and reassure a shaken public.

Of course, what was just described was in fact the TOPOFF2 full-field exercise. The terrorist cell did not actually penetrate the nation's defenses; no one was hurt or killed; and at the conclusion of the exercise, officials were focused on the invaluable enterprise of analysis and revision of their response plan, rather than the tragedy of mourning.

Homeland security exercises—from the monumental (e.g., TOPOFF), to the focused and specific (e.g., a 4-hour table-top)—are inestimably important. Among the lessons learned from TOPOFF2, however, is that their ultimate value is determined by adhering to several key principles.


First, the value of an exercise is proportionate to the degree to which it is based on the essential systems of first response at the local level. Specifically, ensuring public safety requires exercises that unify local and regional first responders in applying the Incident Command System. At the heart of this principle is an important assumption: Our nation

defines itself by local, community-based governance, particularly in regard to public safety. While it is tempting to look inside the Beltway for decisions that affect Seattle, Chicago or Austin, we must never lose sight of the fact that for most Americans, their “homeland” is defined by where they live and work, raise their kids, and enjoy their friends, family and freedoms.

Second, exercise planners should focus on contributing to the clarity and iterative changes in doctrine, policies and plans. It is one thing to develop a vision of incident management as a matter of academic abstraction; it is quite another to test doctrine and policies in real-time, allowing for accurate time task estimates by observing the actual workflow of emergency responders on the ground. Because of TOPOFF2, doctrines have become better defined, and at the same time, these exercises have illuminated the fact that substantial work remains for achieving complete multi-jurisdictional coordination. While the phenomenon known as “jurisdictional creep” was not as dramatic as had been anticipated, differentiation between lead and support roles was occasionally blurred.

Other key lessons from TOPOFF2 include the need for further integration of local and regional intelligence systems; engagement with private sector leaders and resources; confirmation of continuing interoperability and system redundancy in communications; and for elected leaders to provide clear, timely and accurate information and direction to their communities.

>> *continued on page 26*



Third, the TOPOFF2 exercise provided a crucial opportunity for developing practical technical skills and expertise. It is particularly encouraging to reflect on the fact that many of the participants in the exercise were just beginning their public safety careers. Imagine the potential for technical proficiency when professionals are exposed to progressively more difficult and complex scenarios, over a long tenure in emergency services, and with appropriate opportunity for reflection and improvement. This is the gold standard for any training regimen.

Fourth and finally, exercises like TOPOFF build relationships and open up new lines of communication. The exact dimensions of the importance of this principle cannot be quantified; suffice to say, this is one of the profound benefits of committing to any multi-jurisdictional exercise. There is a direct correlation between building capacity and competency, and building relationships. In the end, this may be what an exercise like TOPOFF2 is all about.

Additionally, TOPOFF2 helped agencies determine whether they have the necessary resources in place for each type of emergency. For example, participants gained insight into their response practices, including the need for more support infrastructure—such as shelter space for evacuees and/or victims—and additional technology at a scene, such as teleconferencing capabilities among various disciplines. Ultimately, it was agreed, participating in TOPOFF2 helped participants become more confident about their cities' capacities to handle a range of possible emergency scenarios.

Participants stressed the value of planning for TOPOFF2, in addition to participating in the exercise itself. For example, response planning resulted in fuller adoption of incident-command structures and engagement of the public health infrastructure. Planning for TOPOFF2 also revealed the importance of including a section on public health surveillance in incident command plans.

TOPOFF2 also posed challenges, most notably for the agencies involved, in determining how far they could extend staff and structural

resources beyond their known capacities. Because the exercise lasted 36 hours, it engendered a good deal of stress and anxiety; participating cities confronted the “pure exhaustion factor,” as resources were stretched to sustain the response. The exercise also tested intelligence and analytical capabilities, and sites noted difficulties in managing analytical assets on the federal side.

A main concern of TOPOFF2 participants was that the recovery phase of the incident was not included in the exercise. The exercise ended when the last patient was delivered to the hospital; cities' recovery capabilities (which some executive session participants found more valuable than preparation and responses) were not tested. Commissioner Cortez Trotter of the Chicago Fire Department noted that, “Once the last patient was delivered to the hospital or the scene, everything was cleaned up. If you don't test streets and sanitation availability...it is not truly a holistic exercise. We should not just be presenting them at the door of the emergency department. It is not helpful if you don't critique all of that, too.” Further, this participant stated,

“The thing we lose sight of is that an event takes place over hours or days, but the recovery will take months. We cannot know how long it will take to improve public confidence to take public transportation, for example. And, if we don’t deal with that, I don’t care how many lives you have saved, your local government will go down in flames economically.”

The specter of a post-exercise headline that reads “City Unprepared for Terrorist Attack” is often what keeps agencies from conducting large-scale public exercises and drills. Indeed, the agencies that participated in TOPOFF2 were subject to a good deal of criticism after the events. Deputy Chief Clark Kimerer from Seattle noted that, “Everyone should expect (regardless of what you undertake) that those who review it will later come back and ‘bayonet the wounded.’” A Chicago participant added that, “TOPOFF2 proved the tendency for others to come out with a scathing report, outlining everything that went wrong—perhaps to justify spending \$16 million.” On the other hand, participants stressed that, “if we didn’t do it, yes, there wouldn’t be criticisms, but we also wouldn’t learn the lessons.”

In discussing ways to minimize the number of negative articles in the press, after an exercise, one participant emphasized the need to involve elected city officials (such as council members) as observers, who can then present a coordinated media message. He recommended that the police agency should address the media very quickly after the exercise and take a positive stance. They should say that the exercise was valuable in that it identified strengths and weaknesses that could not have been learned otherwise.

Conduct thorough self-assessment after exercises

Several participants stressed that agencies must assess the exercises with “honesty” and “reality,” after their completion, in preparing after-action

reports. Then, as was described by participants from Chicago and Washington, D.C., agencies must reassess their EOPS based on the gaps that were revealed by the drills. “Only then can the agency know what equipment and hardware we need, and what the right command structure is,” one participant commented. In Chicago, this process is ongoing. The Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) in Chicago holds exercises regularly and updates its EOP to reflect lessons learned during the exercises. In Los Angeles, the strengths and weaknesses revealed during fire/police training retreats are presented in after-action reports, which are then reviewed during command retreats to determine needed policy changes.

Include elected officials and residents in the exercises

Participants stressed that relationships among all agencies with a role in response are crucial to improving coordination within jurisdictions. Inviting elected officials and community members to take part in exercises will help them understand what their roles and responsibilities would consist of during critical incidents. As Barbara McDonald, Deputy Superintendent from the Chicago Police Department, noted, “The four different configurations of alert are tremendously confusing. We need to articulate in simple terms what their (the community’s) response should be at every level.”

Key 2: Conduct Training

Executive session participants discussed the training opportunities and resources available for law enforcement, as well as the need to do a better job in sharing information about what types of training are effective, identifying the gaps in training and how to fill them, and determining how to pay for taking officers and other personnel away from their duties while in training, as

well as other associated costs. In addition to training provided by DHS, the Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group¹⁷ convened by the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Justice Programs examined tools (e.g., training, information-sharing databases, funding sources) available to law enforcement and other first responders and recommended the establishment of a central website. These resources will help law enforcement decision makers develop strategic plans for training and local emergency response. Executive session participants recommended that agencies' personnel browse the Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement Web site, which includes lists of training opportunities, related materials and Web site links to the relevant federal government, private and nonprofit organizations.¹⁸

Focus training on area-specific target hazards

Los Angeles focuses its resources on training exercises for specific target hazards such as large shopping malls and the airport, and on "dark cloud" scenarios involving chemical attacks. This jurisdiction has practiced building evacuations during a business day, and was able to evacuate a 62-story building in 21 minutes. As part of this exercise, the police department used a fleet of helicopters to remove people from the roof of the building. Future exercises will take what was learned and focus on evacuating multiple buildings, such as the entire civic center. This agency has also held exercises for approximately

700 to 800 officers, who responded to a simulated chemical attack in a shopping mall.¹⁹

Integrate counter-terrorism training in existing training

Lack of federal funding for overtime and the enormity of the training task (for example, Los Angeles must train 9,211 officers on mask and PPE suit procedures, while Seattle plans to train and equip 400 first responders to work with the fire department in a hot zone) has inspired agencies to develop creative methods to conduct training exercises. For example, Los Angeles conducts exercises on straight time, typically on Sunday nights, which has the lowest call volume. By doing so, they are able to conduct major downtown drills "without a minute of overtime."

In a twist on the dual-use concept, participants described ways in which they have integrated counter-terrorism awareness and training in other aspects of agency training. For example, agencies have devised crime reduction training that includes topics on preparedness for terrorism. In most urban areas, the emphasis in day-to-day law enforcement and safeguarding public safety is not on terrorism—it is on violence, gang activity and the reduction of the murder rate. The need to reduce violent crime has not only exhausted the patrol division; it has also resulted in limited resources for additional training. To overcome this, some participants stress that officials must remember that the principles for preventing and responding to traditional crime and terrorism remain the same.

17. Working group participants include the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office of Justice Programs, the Office of the Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the U.S. Army Military Police School, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Labor. Working group membership will expand to include other federal agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations that represent affected constituencies.

18. See www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/.

19. See http://www.lacity.org/mayor/oldpresss/mayormyrpress27413042_08012003.pdf for more information.

Train members from various disciplines simultaneously

In Chicago, representatives from all primary and support agencies who have a role in responding to critical incidents are being trained in incident command. Classes can be composed of representatives from the police and fire department, utility companies, public health departments and the like. Dallas and Los Angeles conduct combined training for members of both the police and fire departments who are matched by rank. Semiannually, Los Angeles agencies organize weekend training retreats during which operational police and fire incident commanders (lieutenants, captains, commissioners, assistant chiefs, and the chief) from the same geographic area meet in small groups to work on table-top exercises using scenarios based on incidents with weapons of mass destruction. The training retreats are held at the California State Training Institute facilities. In Washington, D.C., exercises involve the investigative phase of the response as well as the initial emergency response, and they include epidemiological teams in the exercises. In London, the interagency liaison officers from the fire department carry out CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) and firearms training with police officers. As explained by one participant, this training procedure allows for “commonality amongst terminology and risk reduction strategies.”

Conclusion

After establishing a common framework and inter-jurisdictional partnerships, emergency responders will have the tools they need to create critical incident operation plans that are both practical and effective in the field. Participants stressed that successful coordination is about more than just designing plans—it must include operationalizing, testing and evaluating them as well. Consequently, exercises and training are two keys to effective coordination. When conducting exercises, it is important to include nontraditional partners such as elected officials and members of the business community. Additionally, participants stressed the importance of thorough and honest self-assessment after the exercise is over. Hand in hand with extensive and comprehensive exercises is the creation and implementation of effective training. This training should focus on specific target hazards and, like exercises, should include members of the various disciplines invested in, and dedicated to, security. While counterterrorism exercises and training should be integrated into existing protocol, they also create new challenges for creative thinking. Once training and exercises are established and “rehearsed,” emergency responders can tackle the third and final key to coordination, response.

Chapter 5

Keys to Effective Coordination: Response

AN INDIVIDUAL DISCIPLINE'S PERSPECTIVE ON ITS ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES during the response phase depends largely on the historical relationships among agencies, as well as their experience in dealing with critical incidents requiring coordination. Other factors, such as the size of the jurisdiction, number of entities available to respond to an incident, size and type of specialized response units, existing response structures, and nature of the incident can affect the response and the extent of cooperation. Several keys and recommendations related to the response phase emerged from the participants' discussions.

Key I: Protect First Responders at the Scene

When responding to a call involving suspicion of a biological threat or an explosion with mass casualties and the potential for a biological threat, every precaution must be taken to protect the lives of the first responders before they enter the scene. Many first responders are accustomed to attending to victims immediately, often disregarding the possibility of danger to them. Acting without the knowledge that an incident scene is safe can lead to first responder casualties, potentially reducing the number of resources and personnel that are available for an effective response.

While training and experience are valuable in these situations, these types of decisions frequently are, at best, a judgment call. Whether the first on-scene responders are from law enforcement, fire or emergency medical services, protocols exist that direct those individuals to

utilize detection devices, don PPE, and/or pull out of an area and establish a security perimeter and staging area. It is essential that responders not only know such protocols, but, more important, know the limitations of the equipment and the importance of limiting one's exposure to potential dangers.

Furnish PPE and ensure it meets national standards.

Session participants stressed the importance of ensuring that first responders are protected and equipped for assessing scenes during the initial response phase of a critical incident. The first topic they discussed was the use of PPE.

In Los Angeles, whenever law enforcement or fire services enter an uncertain environment, they are required to wear full respirator protection. Law enforcement officers are also issued Level C suits,²⁰ which must be stored in

20. The Environmental Protection Agency has designated four levels of protection to assist in determining which combinations of respiratory protection and protective clothing should be employed in emergency response. For more information see <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/er/hazsubs/equip.htm>.

patrol cars at all times. In addition to protective suits, all fire department units have detection monitors on board their vehicles. All procedures governing incident response—including scenes potentially involving hazardous materials—are covered in an intensive CBRN training program/curriculum.

In Chicago, all of the HAZMAT-designated fire companies and the majority of fire personnel are equipped with both PPE and CBRN equipment. Departmental policy states that until all fire personnel possess this equipment, first responders are not to enter a scene that is considered suspect unless they are accompanied by a HAZMAT member or other team with appropriate detection devices.

Washington, D.C., in consultation with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, has rewritten its policies on biological incidents. All first responders have been issued PPE and are instructed to respond to an explosion under the assumption that it may include a dispersion device. Response protocol is strictly followed, regardless of the size, or perceived risk, of the specific incident. As one executive session participant noted, smaller explosions are not any less dangerous. In fact, they are more likely to be accompanied by dispersion devices that multiply the damage. In Washington, D.C., approximately one in 30 patrol officers has been assigned a decimeter,²¹ and radiological pagers have been assigned to one in every four to six supervisors.

Furnish interoperable communications and other equipment

Participants discussed another critical need: the ability to communicate with the “right” people at the “right” time. This is not simply a function

of radio interoperability; it is also a function of the interoperability of data systems. In London, there are nationally agreed-upon equipment standards that define what the outputs of the equipment should be. The Police Scientific Development Branch of the Home Office in the United Kingdom Department of Science and Technology scientists determine everything from what ammunition is used to the weapon detection systems they employ.

In the United States, the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) provides the responder community with the Standardized Equipment List (SEL) on a biannual basis.²² The SEL contains a list of generic equipment (about 200 items) recommended by the IAB to local, state, and federal government organizations in preparing for and responding to WMD events. The SEL promotes interoperability and standardization across the response community by offering a standard reference and a common terminology. However, the IAB stresses that the SEL is only a guideline, and its use is voluntary.

The SEL also includes approximately 30 items of suggested “Interoperable Communications Equipment,” (including cell phones, pagers, two-way radios and PCMCIA cards) as well as “User Levels” and “Probable User Locations.” The purpose of this information is to provide functionality, connectivity, and interoperability between local and other interagency organizations. The equipment mentioned serves to improve situational awareness and better coordinate response operations for CBRN terrorism and homeland security operations.

In 2005, changes were made to SEL to better align it with the Authorized Equipment List (AEL) produced by the DHS Office of State

21. A tool that measures radiation.

22. For more information, see <http://www.iab.gov/Download/IAB%202005%20SEL.pdf> and <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99151.pdf>

and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. Originally a subset of the Standardized Equipment List, the Authorized Equipment List offers equipment purchase grant guidance for a number of major grant programs. Users can refer to both lists to obtain the most comprehensive and current equipment information. In addition, government organizations may suggest changes to the SEL at any time for consideration.

Key 2: Isolate the scene

Isolation of the scene is the first step to securing an incident, both to ensure preservation of evidence and to minimize the spread of harmful biological or chemical hazards. While rescue operations to save lives must undoubtedly take priority, law enforcement officers should work with rescue personnel to protect as much of the evidence at the scene as possible.

Work together to establish zones and staging areas

In the case of a potential biological or chemical hazard, there is also a need to stem contamination. First responders must work together to immediately establish an exclusion or “hot” zone, a decontamination or “warm” zone, and a staging and support area or “cold” zone. The staging area should always be located upwind from the actual incident, maintained by trained personnel, and protected by a secure crowd control line.

Consider factors prior to ordering evacuations

First responders must also be able to make informed decisions about evacuation, and, in doing so, should consider several factors: the potential existence of secondary devices, structural safety, biological and chemical exposure and decontamination issues, as well as general logistical concerns related to the movement of

large groups of people. For example, during the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, emergency personnel did not evacuate people from adjacent buildings because of the potential danger of falling debris.

Yosef Sedbon, from Tel Aviv, Israel, noted that his agency employs a specialized unit that prevents responders from entering or evacuating a building until its structural integrity is assured. They also will not evacuate a scene until the threat of secondary devices is investigated. These same participants stressed that their vast experience with terrorism has taught them that this policy works. They used the scene of a car bomb as an example, and explained that without knowing whether the suspect(s) had planted secondary devices, responders could be endangering more lives by evacuating the scene. By directing people to a supposed “safe” area, authorities could in fact be leading more victims into a new danger. The Israeli approach is to first close the area, seek out other devices, and then quickly communicate their assessment of the situation to the responders.

In London, participants stated, self-evacuation often occurs because residents and organizations are expected to assume responsibility for their own safety by devising a plan of action. Although authorities have a substantial amount of experience with evacuation procedures, they will not themselves evacuate before investigating and assessing the incident and associated threats. Again, the reasoning behind this procedure is that authorities may be evacuating people into an area where they might be at even greater risk. Based on the circumstances, participants from London stated that “invacuation” (or sheltering in place) should always be a consideration. Invacuation is the process of getting people into a safer area of a building, such as a basement or interior offices. Authorities move individuals to predetermined “safe” areas and do

not allow them to evacuate until a scene has been fully assessed and authorities have given the “okay” for evacuation or return to normal business.

Key 3: Implement the Plan

First responders must be able to describe the comprehensive nature of the incident to request and inform the appropriate backup personnel. At the scene of a critical incident, personnel will begin to follow their agencies’ pre-established emergency response plans for establishing incident command. As previously stated, the nature of emergency response plans varies, yet whether by their own design or as a result of new federal-level planning efforts by DHS, every jurisdiction should—and most likely does—have a system for establishing a hierarchy of command.

For example, some jurisdictions have established standing bureaus, composed of personnel from various disciplines, who are responsible for overseeing the response phase. In areas with a higher perceived threat level, specialized response units have been created, while smaller jurisdictions—which are typically faced with lower perceived threat levels—have set up inter-agency task forces. Different agencies may take the lead in response activities, depending on the size of the jurisdiction and the type of incident.

According to Deputy Chief Kimerer of Seattle, calls that require a major response are directed to the personnel at the fire department communications desk, because “they are the most important eyes and minds” when it comes to major incident response. Based on the first responders’ account of the nature of the event, the appropriate additional personnel are dispatched to “make sense of the scene.” A unified command

post²³ will be set up on-site, but operational authority will flow from an established incident command structure. For instance, in Seattle, because the fire services are solely responsible for emergency medical services, the fire department is the primary response agency when there are injured persons or other victims on the ground. The police department would handle all other aspects of preserving public safety, including security of the scene and evacuation.

In Los Angeles, the police department responds to the critical incident and immediately begins deploying people to the general vicinity of the incident. The EOC then has one hour to become fully mobilized, and the police department shifts its staff to a 12-hour work schedule. Some officers stop responding to non-emergency calls if they are filling a critical role in the emergency response. The community is made aware of the situation through the police department as well.

One participant asked whether it is wise to fully activate response plans for all incidents. Based on experiences in New York City and in studying Los Angeles’ history in responding to critical incidents, John Miller, director of LAPD’s Counterterrorism Bureau, believes, “You don’t want to be behind the power curve in your response to an incident,” and he recommends full response and deployment of resources in all situations. In his opinion, it is better to go overboard in the extent of response early on than be compelled to catch up later (e.g., in the case of a terrorist attack involving multiple devices). He believes that if a jurisdiction has over-responded, it is adequately prepared.

Chicago participants concurred; one acknowledged that while all responses are incident-specific, activating the channels of communication

23. Unified command is utilized for a single incident when there is more than one responding department and/or the incident crosses political jurisdictions. It allows incident commanders to share command of an incident, assess and meet each others response needs, share intelligence, and work together on incident planning and decision-making.

between police, fire, EMS, and the Office of Emergency Management and Communications is a necessity, regardless of the nature of the incident or threat. Whether it is a full terrorist threat or a porch collapsing, the Chicago officials stressed that they can fully activate two or three times a day, but not move to a unified command structure unless necessary. Importantly, because they react fully every time, they are always prepared to activate incident command.

Conclusion

While individual roles and responsibilities vary among the different teams and disciplines represented, participants' comments and suggestions could be combined to reveal the most important aspects of a successfully coordinated response:

one that is safe, efficient and effective. Participants agreed that one of the key components to response is to prepare first responders at the scene by providing them with proper information and up-to-date equipment. Preparing the first responders will go a long way toward protecting the potential victims at the scene of the terrorist act. First responders also need to isolate the scene, ensure preservation of evidence and minimize the spread of harmful biological or chemical hazards. Upon securing the area and protecting themselves, emergency responders implement the plan designed by their jurisdiction. When properly trained and exercised, the professionals charged with implementation of the plan round out the keys necessary for an effective response, and, ultimately, ensure that the necessary components are in place for achieving coordination.

Recommendations

COORDINATION, THE EXECUTIVE-SESSION PARTICIPANTS CONCURRED, IS AN essential prerequisite for a swift and effective response to major incidents, whether natural or man-made. Historically, however, emergency responders have had difficulty focusing their diverse and functionally independent agencies on the task of working together effectively.

The federal government has done its best to generate guidelines for response, including direction about how to coordinate resources quickly. But, many state and local emergency response agencies, feeling an urgent need for agreed-upon standards for coordination among agencies, have initiated the coordination process themselves. What they have accomplished may serve as a model for other agencies' coordination efforts.

This executive session provided a forum for exploring, debating, and exchanging information about the similarities, and important differences, in new efforts to link together the various agencies needed for responding to incidents. The recommendations that emerged from this these discussions are outlined below.

Coordination

- Local law enforcement should use community-policing principles²⁴ to help them meet

the demands of homeland security. Forging partnerships with other emergency service disciplines, working with neighboring law enforcement agencies, reducing fear, educating citizens about emergency preparedness, and strengthening relationships with minority populations are all strategies of community policing that can help meet the challenges posed by the critical requirements for ensuring homeland security.

- Local law enforcement agencies should expand their partnerships with emergency service providers, such as fire, emergency management, public health agencies and hospitals to build multidisciplinary teams that are capable of preparing for and responding to the full spectrum of possible terrorist incidents. To the extent possible, police and other emergency responders should work together, through joint training and reorganization of command and deployment structures.

24. For more information on community policing, visit the Office of Community Oriented Policing's website at: www.cops.usdoj.gov/.

- Local law enforcement agencies must work with neighboring jurisdictions to build regional capacities for responding to terrorist incidents. This includes developing mutual aid agreements, and joint policies, procedures, plans and training.
- Local law enforcement agencies must develop relationships with private sector interests, to develop a comprehensive program for protecting critical infrastructure, preparing for and responding to terrorist incidents. Information sharing with the private sector and the use of private sector databases must consider privacy issues and include a public education effort that will communicate clearly how the information will be used, the limitations on its use and any impact on civil liberties.
- Law enforcement agencies should develop partnerships with businesses (e.g., Business Emergency Preparedness Networks) and citizens (e.g., CERT training).
- Local agencies should continue to develop partnerships with, and training, for business leaders, facility owners and security and emergency management staff to support counterterrorism work. The partnerships could include target-hardening through environmental design and other guidance-and-response procedures to ensure effective preparedness, prevention and response functions.
- Transportation security protocols should be applied to rail and bus systems, ports and cargo protection. Rail and bus transit systems often cut across jurisdictional and state lines and present special challenges in coordinating protection and response efforts. Participants stressed the need for greater security measures, multidisciplinary exercises and training, funding and technology resources to better safeguard these systems.

Preparedness and Prevention

- Agencies have much to learn by studying the best practices of other agencies. Lessons learned and after-action reports from other agencies are available through the LLIS, and offer valuable guidance for policy, training and operations. Emergency responders should broaden the scope of their review to include natural disasters, which provide opportunities to learn how well responders work together in a variety of emergencies.
- Local law enforcement should identify and collect information about target vulnerabilities. The first step in “getting ahead of the threat” is to identify potential targets in the locality and gain as much information about the vulnerabilities posed by those targets as possible.
- Cities and counties should conduct vulnerability assessments and gather information about potential targets, and then share those results with neighboring jurisdictions for the purpose of developing a region-wide understanding of risks and threats.
- The FBI and local law enforcement should share intelligence information with other emergency service providers, such as fire and emergency management officials. Sharing information with other agencies involved in the response phase is critical, but has not been done traditionally.
- Local law enforcement and other emergency responders must incorporate NIMS into their Emergency Response Plans.
- Local emergency operations plans should mirror the National Response Plan, and ensure that their plan is applicable to all types of critical incidents.

- All emergency responders, including law enforcement, must continually strive to improve inter-jurisdictional cooperation. Since the primary emergency responders at any critical incident will be the police and the fire departments, the relationship between these two entities is particularly important for achieving a shared mental model.
- Train members from various disciplines simultaneously. Classes may be composed of representatives from the police and fire department, utility companies, public health and the like.

Exercises and Training

- Conduct training exercises and drills. Meeting participants emphasized the extraordinary value of conducting full-field exercises and drills.
- Conduct honest self-assessment after exercises and revise operations policy based on the lessons learned. Several participants stressed that agencies must assess the relative success of the exercises, upon completion of them, with “honesty” and “reality” in preparing after-action reports. Then, agencies must reassess their emergency operation plans based on the gaps revealed by training.
- Include elected officials and residents in the exercises. Inviting elected officials and community members to participate in exercises will help them understand what their roles and responsibilities would be during critical incidents.
- Focus training on area-specific target hazards. Exercises should be structured to deal with the most likely threats to a community.
- Integrate counterterrorism training in agencies’ current training regimen. Many agencies have developed creative methods for conducting training exercises that can serve as an example for others. Officials should remember that the principles for preventing and responding to traditional crimes and terrorism are the same.
- Local law enforcement needs training at all levels—from line officers to command-level to the chief executive level. Training should address street-level indicators of terrorism, the nexus between traditional crime and terrorism, information analysis, targeting and profiling issues, privacy concerns and other important concepts.
- Local emergency responders need additional technical assistance and guidance for implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The National Integration Center should provide clear direction for local law enforcement as well as answers to ongoing implementation questions.
- DHS should solicit law enforcement guidance when making decisions about training programs. There must be an ongoing analysis of training needs to identify where there are gaps and redundancies. Consideration should be given to problems in covering travel or other costs associated with sending personnel to training and to assess effectiveness. Ongoing needs assessments must be made for local law enforcement-specific resources/equipment shortages as well.
- DHS and local agencies must work together to improve awareness of DHS training resources and opportunities. DHS should better promote its training programs, and local agencies should regularly browse the DHS Web site and the Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement Web site to find sources for training and related material for their jurisdiction.

Response

- Furnish PPE to all personnel and ensure it meets national standards. First responders must be protected and equipped to assess scenes during the initial response phase of a critical incident.
- Furnish interoperable communications and other equipment and ensure it meets national standards. This is not simply a function of radio interoperability; it is a function of data systems' interoperability as well.
- Communications interoperability (bandwidth and capacity) should focus more on the actual breadth and scope of our capacity, including communications media such as: satellite, video, radio, and cell on wheels (self-contained cellular phone capability), need redundancy and secured frequency.
- Work together to establish zones and staging areas. In the case of a potential biological or chemical hazard, agencies should focus on tactics for stemming contamination. First responders must work together immediately to establish an exclusion or "hot" zone, a decontamination or "warm" zone, and a staging and support area or "cold" zone. The staging area should always be located upwind from the actual incident, maintained by

trained personnel, and protected by a secure crowd control line.

- Consider what factors might subsequently affect outcome prior to ordering evacuations. By directing people to a supposed "safe" area, authorities could in fact be leading more victims into a new danger.
- Emergency responders should be prepared to over-respond, and then peel back, rather than under-react, and then be compelled to ramp up too quickly.
- Responding entities should be aware of the scope of their capabilities and allow incident commanders to direct the application of those skills and resources, as necessary.

Conclusion

Any critical incident creates enormous challenges for law enforcement agencies. Critical incidents that require the response of several emergency response agencies increase the challenges. Working together within a common framework, developing emergency operations plans and exercising against those plans will not eliminate all the challenges, but will place law enforcement agencies in a position to anticipate and manage the challenges.

Appendix A

Resources

A. Incident Response Planning

1. The National Incident Management System (NIMS), contained in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5), “provides a consistent framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size or complexity of the incident.” The National Response Plan (NRP) uses NIMS and “is an all-discipline, all-hazards plan for the management of domestic incidents.” For more information, on these and other guidelines, see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/HSPD8_in_Context_041305.pdf.
2. All federal preparedness grants will be contingent upon NIMS compliance beginning FY 2006. For more information on NIMS and its benefits, see: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0363.xml
3. More information on the Interim National Preparedness Goal (“the Goal”) and the National Response Plan (NRP) can be found at: www.dhs.gov.

B. Community Planning

1. The Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) Program educates people about disaster preparedness for hazards that may have

an impact on their area and trains them in basic disaster response skills:

<https://www.citizencorps.gov/cert/>

2. The Los Angeles Fire Department provides disaster preparedness training through its LAFD Disaster Preparedness Unit: <http://www.lafd.org/cert.htm>
3. Citizen Corps asks you to assume your personal responsibility to be prepared; to get training in first aid and emergency skills; and to volunteer to support local emergency responders, disaster relief, and community safety. This website provides information on the Citizen Council in your area: <http://www.citizencorps.gov/>
4. The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) maintains a list of links related to community preparedness topics: <http://www.mipt.org/What-You-Can-Do.asp?RecordType=Links&DisplayDesc=>

C. Partnering with the Private Sector

1. According to DHS, the private sector also oversees approximately 85 percent of our nation's critical infrastructure. See: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect6.html>

2. For an example of how New York City is working with doormen, see Martha T. Moore (July 11, 2004). "Doormen Out Front in the War on Terrorism," *USA Today*.
3. The following is an article detailing the importance of private citizen and business groups such as Highway Watch, America's Waterway Watch, and Airport Watch. The ATA launched the Highway Watch program in 1998 and added an anti-terrorism component after 9/11. With a \$19.3 million grant from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the ATA hopes to train 300,000 to 400,000 more drivers by December.
<http://csmonitor.com/2004/0813/p01s02-ussc.html>
4. "The Role of the Private Security in Combating Terrorism." A presentation given at the Major Cities Chiefs/National Executive Institute's Annual Conference 2003:
<http://www.neiassociates.org/privatesecurity.htm>
5. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and a broad-based group of private sector/law enforcement professionals, released a comprehensive report entitled: *Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and Public Disorder*. For more information go to:
<http://www.cpi-ontario.com/cgi-bin/myarticle.cgi?p=221&s=newsletter>
6. The First Precinct Community Council Financial Area's (Inc.) mission is to "bridge the gap" between the private sector and law enforcement by working together for a common goal. For more information see:
<http://www.firstprecinctcc.org/pages/599191/index.htm>

D. Training

1. Executive session participants recommended agencies browse the Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement website that includes training listings, related materials and website links to the relevant federal government, private and nonprofit organizations. See:
www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/.
2. The goals of TOPOFF2 were "to improve the nation's capacity to manage extreme events; create broader frameworks for the operation of expert crisis and consequence management systems; validate authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, and protocols; and build a sustainable, systematic national exercise program to support the national strategy for homeland security." For more information on TOPOFF2, see:
www.topoff2media.net
3. Additional TOPOFF2 information and articles:
http://www.redcross.org/article/0,1072,0_332_1159,00.html
4. Information on National Guard table-top software training, Automated Exercise and Assessment System (AEAS):
<http://www.ngb.army.mil/onguard/33/09/article.asp?aid=1398>
5. Los Angeles focuses its resources on training exercises. For information on these see:
http://www.lacity.org/mayor/oldpress/mayormyrpress27413042_08012003.pdf
6. The Lessons Learned Information Sharing Web site hosts additional publications and best practices, as well as after-action reports. First-time visitors must register for a password:
<http://www.llis.gov>

E. Equipment

1. In the United States, the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) provides the responder community with the Standardized Equipment List (SEL) on a biannual basis. For more information, see:
<http://www.iag.gov/Download/IAB%202005%20SEL.pdf>
and
<http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99151.pdf>
2. The Department of Homeland Security offers a list of resources concerning standards for equipment at the following link:
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0420.xml
3. The Environmental Protection Agency has designated four levels of protection to assist in determining which combinations of respiratory protection and protective clothing should be employed in emergency response. For more information, see:
<http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/er/hazsubs/equip.htm>

F. Recovery

1. Participants were asked to focus on the prevention, preparedness and response phases of critical incident management. The recovery phase—while just as important and perhaps even more resource consuming—was not discussed at length during this Executive Session. For information on the recovery phase, see, for example:
www.llis.gov
or
www.redcross.org.

G. Intelligence Sharing

1. On December 16 and 17, 2003, PERF, with the support of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, facilitated an executive session (The Production and Sharing of Intelligence) with federal, state and local representatives. Participants provided insight on issues such as how law enforcement executives develop intelligence functions within their departments, the difference between “information” and “intelligence,” the move toward intelligence-led policing, and successful models that can be replicated across the country. The resulting white paper examines the challenges and concerns of the respective agencies as well as the progress they have made toward creating an integrated intelligence-sharing system. The full document may be accessed at:
<http://policeforum.mn-8.net/r.asp?a=5&id=41645>.

H. Miscellaneous Resources

1. *NIJ Annual Report 2003: Counterterrorism Research and Development*
<http://www.cpi-ontario.com/cgi-bin/myarticle.cgi?p=221&s=newsletter>
2. The following DHS Web page offers numerous resource links for first responders:
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0454.xml
3. EMAP is an independent, nonprofit organization that has established a voluntary assessment and accreditation process for state and local government programs responsible for coordinating prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activities for human-caused and natural disasters. Assessment tools and information can be found at:
www.emaponline.org

Appendix B

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Appendix C

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Corina Solé Brito is a Senior Associate with PERF with more than fifteen years experience in criminal justice and public health research, training, and technical assistance. She has developed and administered surveys, coordinated and facilitated focus groups and developed curricula for and administered and coordinated training.

She currently oversees a project examining promising practices regarding law enforcement pandemic preparation and planning. She is also working with several large city agencies across the country to develop a communications tool that would allow them to share live information about preparing for and responding to critical incidents. She recently finished overseeing an update of the City of Chicago's Emergency Operations Plan which required her to convene many meetings with representatives from over 40 agencies to help update their individual plans. She also helped bring the plan into compliance with NIMS standards. Ms. Solé Brito is also in the process of finalizing PERF's *Improving the Response to Elder Abuse* training curriculum for law enforcement agencies and has recently worked on community problem solving projects with two local agencies. She also served as PERF's Community Policing Consortium Management Team representative for several years and helped deliver problem-solving training and technical assistance across the country.

As a Senior Program Manager with the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation, she: managed data collection and presentation for a document entitled "Costs and Consequences of Substance Use"; oversaw a statewide impaired driving and media effort; and trained law enforcement representatives in electronic sobriety checkpoint data collection.

Corina has been published in various media, including monographs, textbooks, training curricula and conference proceedings. She has a Master's Degree in Criminology from the University of Maryland at College Park.

Jessica I. Toliver, M.P.P.

Jessica Ingenito Toliver joined PERF as a Research Associate in April 2005. Ms. Toliver's work experience includes criminal justice and homeland security research, analysis, and technical assistance. Since arriving at PERF, she has been a contributing author for the *Police Management of Mass Demonstration* publication and the *Improving the Response to Elder Abuse* training curriculum for law enforcement agencies. Currently, she manages the "Meth 360" program, a methamphetamine demand reduction strategy created by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, sponsored by the COPS office. Ms. Toliver also contributes to projects examining development and coordination of state and local intelligence fusion centers.

Prior to joining PERF, she served as a Policy Analyst in the Homeland Security &

Technology Division at the National Governors Association. There she developed, executed and publicized the Anniversary Survey project; managed homeland security grant programs; and organized policy academies to provide technical assistance to state teams. Ms. Toliver also completed a fellowship for Governor Jennifer M. Granholm's office in 2003, in which she conducted a cost/benefit analysis of the Michigan State Police's DNA forensic labs and issued a report recommending organizational and funding changes to enhance efficiency.

Ms. Toliver received her Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and Journalism from the University of Richmond and her Master's Degree in Public Policy from the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan.

Gerard Murphy, M.A.

Gerard Murphy serves as the Director of Homeland Security and Development and oversees all PERF homeland security-related projects. In this capacity he manages a variety of research, management and technical assistance projects focusing on law enforcement and homeland security. In addition, he oversees the development of new project ideas for PERF. Previously, Mr. Murphy was Director of the Homeland Security and Technology Division at the National Governors

Association, where he provided assistance and resources to Governors, their policy advisors and state homeland security directors on issues such as emergency response to terrorism and natural disasters, managing homeland security grant programs and information analysis and sharing.

In his combined 12 years at PERF, Mr. Murphy has held a number of positions including Deputy Director of Research, Senior Research Associate and Research Associate. He has directed a variety of research and technical assistance projects and has authored and co-authored numerous PERF publications. His most recent publication is *Managing a Multi-jurisdictional Case: Identifying the Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation*. Mr. Murphy also spent 12 years with the Baltimore County Police Department, holding the positions of Assistant to the Chief and Director of Planning and Research. One of his responsibilities in this position included developing and implementing the department's strategic plan. In addition, during his tenure at the department, he was executive director of the Baltimore County Police Foundation.

Mr. Murphy holds a Master's Degree in Policy Sciences, has completed extensive work towards his Doctorate in Policy Sciences, and is a graduate of the Federal Executive Institute.

Appendix D

About the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice

NIJ IS THE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVALUATION AGENCY OF THE U.S. Department of Justice and is dedicated to researching crime control and justice issues. NIJ provides objective, independent, evidence-based knowledge and tools to meet the challenges of crime and justice, particularly at the State and local levels. NIJ's principal authorities are derived from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (see 42 USC § 3721-3723) and Title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

NIJ has seven strategic goals:

1. Partner with State and local practitioners and policymakers to identify social science research and technology needs.
2. Create scientific, relevant, and reliable knowledge—with a particular emphasis on terrorism, violent crime, drugs and crime, cost-effectiveness, and community-based efforts—to enhance the administration of justice and public safety.
3. Develop affordable and effective tools and technologies to enhance the administration of justice and public safety.
4. Disseminate relevant knowledge and information to practitioners and policy makers in an understandable, timely, and concise manner.
5. Act as an honest broker to identify the information, tools, and technologies that respond to the needs of stakeholders.
6. Practice fairness and openness in the research and development process.
7. Ensure professionalism, excellence, accountability, cost-effectiveness, and integrity in the management and conduct of NIJ activities and programs.

To address these strategic challenges, the Institute has established the following program areas: crime control and prevention, including policing; drugs and crime; justice systems and offender behavior, including corrections; violence and victimization; communications and information technologies; critical incident response; investigative and forensic sciences, including DNA; less lethal technologies; officer protection; education and training technologies; testing and standards; technology assistance to law enforcement and corrections agencies; field testing of promising programs; and international crime control. In addition to sponsoring research and development and technology assistance, NIJ evaluates programs, policies, and technologies. NIJ communicates its research and evaluation findings through conferences and print and electronic media.

Appendix E

About the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) IS A NATIONAL ORGANIZATION of progressive law enforcement chief executives from city, county and state agencies who collectively serve more than half of the country's population. Established in 1976 by ten prominent police chiefs, PERF has evolved into one of the leading police think tanks. With membership from many of the largest police departments in the country and around the globe, PERF has pioneered studies in such fields as community and problem-oriented policing, racially biased policing, Multijurisdictional investigations, domestic violence, the police response to people with mental illnesses, homeland security, management concerns, use of force, and crime-reduction approaches.

PERF's success is built on the active involvement of its members: police chiefs, superintendents, sheriffs, and other law enforcement leaders. PERF also has different types of memberships that allow the organization to benefit from the diverse views of criminal justice researchers, law enforcement of all ranks and others committed to advancing policing services to all communities. As a nonprofit organization, PERF is committed to the application of research in policing and to promoting innovation that will enhance the quality of life in our communities. PERF's objective is to improve the delivery of police services and the effectiveness of crime control through the exercise of strong national leadership, the public debate of criminal justice issues, the development of a body of research about policing and the provision of vital management services to all police agencies.

In addition to PERF's cutting-edge police and criminal justice research, the organization provides a wide variety of management and technical assistance programs to police agencies throughout the world. The organization also continues to work toward increased professionalism and excellence in the field through its training, leadership and publications programs. For example, PERF sponsors the Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP), conducts searches for communities seeking police chief executives, and publishes some of the leading literature in the law enforcement field that addresses the difficult issues that challenge today's police leaders. PERF publications are used for training, promotion exams, and to inform police professional about innovative approaches to community problems. The hallmark of the program is translating the latest research and thinking about a topic into police practices that can be tailored to the unique needs of a jurisdiction.

To learn more about PERF visit www.policeforum.org.

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