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EDMONTON POLICE SERVICE



REPORT TO THE EDMONTON POLICE COMMISSION

DATE: 2010 Sep 08

SUBJECT: Criminal Flight Incident Analysis, 2009 Annual Report

RECOMMENDATION(S):

That this report be received for information.

INTRODUCTION:

This report will provide information on Criminal Flight Preventions and Criminal Flight Responses for 2009.

BACKGROUND:

Each year, as part of Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) requirements, an annual report is produced summarizing and analyzing the Criminal Flight events for the year.

COMMENTS/DISCUSSION:

Criminal flight occurs when an Edmonton Police Service officer believes that the driver of a motor vehicle is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing speed or by ignoring the police officer's audible or visual signals to stop. A criminal flight response occurs when an officer pursues someone in criminal flight.

This report examines relevant data collected from officers via an Edmonton Police Service Criminal Flight Response Report, and compares statistics between years.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ATTACHED:

- Attachment 1 – Criminal Flight Incident Analysis, 2009 Annual Report

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Date: *Sept 9, 2010*



Criminal Flight Analysis

Prepared for the Edmonton Police Commission

2009

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Executive Summary

Criminal flight occurs when an Edmonton Police Service officer believes that the driver of a motor vehicle is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing speed or by ignoring the police officer's audible or visual signals to stop. A criminal flight response occurs when an officer pursues someone in criminal flight.

This report examines relevant data collected from officers via an Edmonton Police Service Criminal Flight Response Report, and compares statistics between years.

Categories examined include the breakdown of incidents by time, day, and month, as well as the characteristics and results of the criminal flights. Some notable findings for 2009 are:

- In 2009, there were 133 reported criminal flight responses. This was down from 157 events in 2008 (decrease of 15.3%).
- Once a criminal flight is declared on the radio, a number of supervisors and senior officers monitor the flight to make sure EPS guidelines are followed.
- The most common reason for initiating a criminal flight response was a stolen auto (37.6%).
- The majority of events which involved a criminal flight lasted less than five minutes (88.8%) and traveled less than 5 km (88.7%).
- The number of events in which Air-1 was used decreased slightly (-8.8%). Weather conditions continue to be a major and unpredictable factor in the availability of Air 1.
- The proportion of criminal flight response incidents which ended with an arrest being made increased from 66% up to 76%. The remaining events concluded with the response being called off, or with the vehicle evading capture.
- One event resulted in a minor injury to an officer. Six events resulted in mostly minor injuries to civilians, and one resulted in a fatality.

The data and analysis found in this report can be used to gain further insight as to the causes, characteristics, and results of criminal flight in Edmonton. The ultimate goal of this report is to aid the Edmonton Police Service in maintaining a high level of safety for its officers and the citizens of Edmonton.

Introduction

Background

Criminal flight occurs when an Edmonton Police Service (EPS) officer believes that the driver of a motor vehicle is attempting to evade them and the driver is operating the vehicle unlawfully, or an officer attempts to direct the driver to stop and the driver is aware of the member's action but refuses to obey. A criminal flight response occurs when an officer chooses to follow someone in criminal flight. It is the policy of the EPS to respond to criminal flight only when all other alternatives are unavailable or unsatisfactory. Should a criminal flight response be initiated, the primary consideration shall be public safety.

The criminal flight data contained in this report has been compiled from the data obtained from an EPS Criminal Flight Response Report. These reports are forwarded to Traffic Section by EPS officers after they have engaged in a criminal flight. The following report contains an overview of the significant statistics, as well as comparisons of the 2009 statistics to 2008 data. Following the analytical portion of this report, there will be a discussion of the findings and recommendations for the future.

Reading this Report


In tables illustrating the change from 2008 to 2009, the Change (%) represents the increase or decrease as a percentage of the 2008 value. Where the "largest increase" or "largest decrease" is indicated, this refers to change in value (Change (#)), not the largest percentage change (unless specified).

The tables and charts are organized in descending order by 2009 numbers, with the exception of some categories where organizing the data by category is more appropriate (e.g. chronological order for months, days, and time, etc.) Although the percentages presented in the tables are rounded to one decimal place, it is their precise values which are summed; therefore, all tables total exactly 100.0%.

General Information

Number of Incidents

In 2009, there were 133 reported criminal flight responses.




Criminal Flight Responses, 2008 and 2009 Comparison				
Category	2008	2009	Change	
			#	%
Criminal Flight Responses	157	133	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: This represents a decrease of 15.3% from 2008, during which 157 incidents were reported.

Time of Day

In 2009, the largest number of criminal flight responses (39) occurred between the hours of 00:01 and 03:00 hrs, representing 29.3% of instances. This was followed by: 21:01 to 00:00 hrs (29; 21.8%), 03:01 to 06:00 hrs (17; 12.8%), 18:01 to 21:00 hrs (17; 12.8%), 15:01 to 18:00 hrs (15; 11.3%), 09:01 to 12:00 hrs (7; 5.3%), 12:01 to 15:00 hrs (6; 4.5%), and 06:01 to 09:00 hrs (3; 2.3%).




Incidents by Time of Day						
Category	2008		2009		Change	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
00:01 to 03:00 hrs	51	32.5%	39	29.3%	-12	-23.5%
03:01 to 06:00 hrs	18	11.5%	17	12.8%	-1	-5.6%
06:01 to 09:00 hrs	5	3.2%	3	2.3%	-2	-40.0%
09:01 to 12:00 hrs	8	5.1%	7	5.3%	-1	-12.5%
12:01 to 15:00 hrs	13	8.3%	6	4.5%	-7	-53.8%
15:01 to 18:00 hrs	17	10.8%	15	11.3%	-2	-11.8%
18:01 to 21:00 hrs	11	7.0%	17	12.8%	6	54.5%
21:01 to 00:00 hrs	34	21.7%	29	21.8%	-5	-14.7%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase was for the category of 18:01 to 21:00 hrs, up 6 events (+54.5%). The largest decrease was between 00:01 and 03:00 hrs, down 12 events (-23.5%), although it remained the most common time period for a criminal flight.

Day of Week

In 2009, the most criminal flight responses occurred on a Monday, with 23 incidents (17.3%). This was followed by: Saturday (21; 15.8%), Thursday (20; 15.0%), Friday (20; 15.0%), Sunday (19; 14.3%), Wednesday (18; 13.5%), and Tuesday (12; 9.0%).




Incidents by Day of Week						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Monday	30	19.1%	23	17.3%	-7	-23.3%
Tuesday	19	12.1%	12	9.0%	-7	-36.8%
Wednesday	18	11.5%	18	13.5%	0	0.0%
Thursday	26	16.6%	20	15.0%	-6	-23.1%
Friday	12	7.6%	20	15.0%	8	66.7%
Saturday	30	19.1%	21	15.8%	-9	-30.0%
Sunday	22	14.0%	19	14.3%	-3	-13.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase from 2008 to 2009 was the number of incidents which occurred on a Friday, up 8 incidents (+66.7%). The largest decrease was for Saturday, down 9 incidents (-30.0%).

Month

The highest number of criminal flight responses in 2009 occurred in April, with 18 incidents (13.5%). This was followed by: May (16; 12.0%), November (15; 11.3%), August (12; 9.0%), September (11; 8.3%), October (11; 8.3%), June (10; 7.5%), December (10; 7.5%), July (9; 6.8%), January (8; 6.0%), March (7; 5.3%), and February (6; 4.5%).




Incidents by Month						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
January	23	14.6%	8	6.0%	-15	-65.2%
February	6	3.8%	6	4.5%	0	0.0%
March	16	10.2%	7	5.3%	-9	-56.3%
April	11	7.0%	18	13.5%	7	63.6%
May	12	7.6%	16	12.0%	4	33.3%
June	12	7.6%	10	7.5%	-2	-16.7%
July	10	6.4%	9	6.8%	-1	-10.0%
August	18	11.5%	12	9.0%	-6	-33.3%
September	10	6.4%	11	8.3%	1	10.0%
October	12	7.6%	11	8.3%	-1	-8.3%
November	16	10.2%	15	11.3%	-1	-6.3%
December	11	7.0%	10	7.5%	-1	-9.1%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase from 2008 to 2009 was during April, which saw an increase of 7 events (+63.6%). The month with the largest decrease was January, with 15 fewer incidents (-65.2%).

Division at Initiation

The EPS divides the city into five operational divisions. In 2009, the division where the most criminal flight responses were initiated was West Division, with 35 events (26.3%). This was followed by: North (34; 25.6%), Downtown (27; 20.3%), Southeast (22; 16.5%), and Southwest (15; 11.3%).




Division at Initiation						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
West	43	27.4%	35	26.3%	-8	-18.6%
North	32	20.4%	34	25.6%	2	6.3%
Downtown	30	19.1%	27	20.3%	-3	-10.0%
Southeast	27	17.2%	22	16.5%	-5	-18.5%
Southwest	25	15.9%	15	11.3%	-10	-40.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase was in criminal flight responses initiated in North Division, up 2 events (+6.3%). The largest decrease was for Southwest Division, down 10 criminal flight responses (-40.0%).

Officer Involvement

Officer Assignment

In 2009, West Division officers initiated the largest number of criminal flight responses with 29 (21.8%). This was followed by: North (28; 21.1%), Downtown (24; 18.0%), Southeast (20; 15.0%), Southwest (14; 10.5%), Tactical/Canine (11; 8.3%), Other (3, 2.3%), Traffic (3; 2.3%), and Tactical Response to Auto theft Prevention (TRAP)¹ (1; 0.8%).



Category	Originating Officer Assignment					
	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
West	33	21.0%	29	21.8%	-4	-12.1%
North	28	17.8%	28	21.1%	0	0.0%
Downtown	21	13.4%	24	18.0%	3	14.3%
Southeast	23	14.6%	20	15.0%	-3	-13.0%
Southwest	21	13.4%	14	10.5%	-7	-33.3%
Tactical / Canine	24	15.3%	11	8.3%	-13	-54.2%
Other	2	1.3%	3	2.3%	1	50.0%
Traffic	5	3.2%	3	2.3%	-2	-40.0%
TRAP*	0	0.0%	1	0.8%	1	n/a
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%


*TRAP = Tactical Response to Auto theft Prevention

Change from 2008: The largest increase was seen in criminal flight responses involving Downtown Division officers, with an increase of 3 events (+14.3%). The largest decrease was with Tactical/Canine officers, with 13 fewer events (-54.2%).

¹ Tactical Response to Auto theft Prevention (TRAP) is an initiative that was discontinued early in 2009. The new Prolific Offender Suppression Teams (POST) target prolific offenders of all types, including (but not limited to) Auto Theft offenders.

Primary Police Vehicle Type

In 2009, the primary police vehicle was a marked unit in the majority of cases (117; 88.0%). It was unmarked in 16 incidents (12.0%).




Primary Police Vehicle Type						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Marked	142	90.4%	117	88.0%	-25	-17.6%
Unmarked	15	9.6%	16	12.0%	1	6.7%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of incidents with marked vehicles as the primary police vehicle type decreased by 25 (-17.6%). The number for unmarked vehicles increased by 1 incident (+6.7%).

Event Summary

Reason Criminal Flight Response Initiated

The most common reason for a criminal flight response was Stolen Auto (50; 37.6%). This was followed by: Crime Related (30; 22.6%), Traffic Violation (29; 21.8%), Impaired (21; 15.8%), and Other (3; 2.3%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Stolen Auto	65	41.4%	50	37.6%	-15	-23.1%
Crime Related	46	29.3%	30	22.6%	-16	-34.8%
Traffic Violation	25	15.9%	29	21.8%	4	16.0%
Impaired	19	12.1%	21	15.8%	2	10.5%
Other	2	1.3%	3	2.3%	1	50.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase was in the number of criminal flight responses initiated as the result of a traffic violation, up 4 (+16.0%). The largest decrease was for crime related reasons, with 16 fewer events (-34.8%).

Duration

The majority of criminal flight responses were of short duration. The most common durations were 1 Min or Shorter and 2 – 5 Min, each with 59 events (44.4% each). This was followed by: 6 to 10 Min (12; 9.0%), 11 to 15 Min (1; 0.8%), 16 to 20 Min (1; 0.8%), and 21 Min or Longer (1; 0.8%).




Incidents by Duration of Criminal Flight						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
1 Min or Shorter	64	40.8%	59	44.4%	-5	-7.8%
2 - 5 Min	68	43.3%	59	44.4%	-9	-13.2%
6 - 10 Min	14	8.9%	12	9.0%	-2	-14.3%
11 - 15 Min	9	5.7%	1	0.8%	-8	-88.9%
16 to 20 Min	1	0.6%	1	0.8%	0	0.0%
21 Min or Longer	1	0.6%	1	0.8%	0	0.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: None of the categories in this field increased from 2008 to 2009. The largest decrease was in the number of criminal flights lasting between 2 – 5 Min, down 9 events (-13.2%), although this duration is still tied with 1 Min or Shorter for having the most criminal flights. There was also a relatively large decrease in events lasting 11 – 15 minutes, down 8 events (-88.9%).

Distance

The majority of criminal flights were also of short distance. The most common distance in this field was 1 km or Less, with 67 events (50.4%). This was followed by: 2 to 5 kms (51; 38.3%), 6 to 10 kms (11; 8.3%), 11 to 15 kms (2; 1.5%), and 21 kms or More (2; 1.5%). There were no events which traveled 16 to 20 kms.




Incidents by Distance Traveled during Criminal Flight						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
1 km or Less	75	47.8%	67	50.4%	-8	-10.7%
2 to 5 kms	56	35.7%	51	38.3%	-5	-8.9%
6 to 10 kms	16	10.2%	11	8.3%	-5	-31.3%
11 to 15 kms	7	4.5%	2	1.5%	-5	-71.4%
16 to 20 kms	2	1.3%	0	0.0%	-2	-100.0%
21 kms or More	1	0.6%	2	1.5%	1	100.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The only increase in this field was for events traveling 21 km or more, up 1 incident (+100.0%). The largest decrease was of 8 events in the 1 km or less range (-10.7%).

Maximum Speeds

Suspect Vehicle Speed

The maximum speed of the suspect vehicle was most often in the range of 51 to 100 km/h, with 70 events (52.6%). This was followed by: 101 to 150 km/h (43; 32.3%), 26 to 50 km/h (11; 8.3%), 151 to 200 km/h (6; 4.5%), and Less than 25 km/h (3; 2.3%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Less than 25 km/h	1	0.6%	3	2.3%	2	200.0%
26 to 50 km/h	10	6.4%	11	8.3%	1	10.0%
51 to 100 km/h	89	56.7%	70	52.6%	-19	-21.3%
101 to 150 km/h	50	31.8%	43	32.3%	-7	-14.0%
151 to 200 km/h	7	4.5%	6	4.5%	-1	-14.3%
More than 201 km/h	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase for this field was in the number of events with a maximum suspect vehicle speed of less than 25 km/h, up 2 events (+200.0%). The largest decrease was for a maximum speed of 51 to 100 km/h, down 19 events (-21.3%), but remaining the most common top speed reached.

Service Vehicle Speed

The maximum speed of the service vehicle was most often in the range of 51 to 100 km/h, with 83 events (62.4%). This was followed by: 101 to 150 km/h (32; 24.1%), 26 to 50 km/h (13; 9.8%), Less than 25 km/h (3; 2.3%), and 151 to 200 km/h (2; 1.5%). There were no events with a service vehicle traveling faster than 201 km/h.




Incidents by Maximum Service Vehicle Speed						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Less than 25 km/h	2	1.3%	3	2.3%	1	50.0%
26 to 50 km/h	12	7.6%	13	9.8%	1	8.3%
51 to 100 km/h	105	66.9%	83	62.4%	-22	-21.0%
101 to 150 km/h	36	22.9%	32	24.1%	-4	-11.1%
151 to 200 km/h	2	1.3%	2	1.5%	0	0.0%
More than 201 km/h	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The only increases were for events where the service vehicle reached Less than 25 km/h and 26 to 50 km/h, both up 1 incident (+50.0% and +8.3%, respectively). The largest decrease was for 51 to 100 km/h, down 22 incidents (-21.0%), but remaining the most common top speed reached.

Environmental Conditions

Vehicular Traffic

The most common level of vehicular traffic was None, with 63 events (47.4%). This was followed by: Light (44; 33.1%), Moderate (18; 13.5%), and Heavy (8; 6.0%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
None	75	47.8%	63	47.4%	-12	-16.0%
Light	53	33.8%	44	33.1%	-9	-17.0%
Moderate	27	17.2%	18	13.5%	-9	-33.3%
Heavy	2	1.3%	8	6.0%	6	300.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase in this field was in the number of events with heavy vehicular traffic, up 6 events (+300.0%). The largest decrease was for events with no traffic, which decreased by 12 events (-16.0%).

Pedestrian Traffic

In most instances (111 events; 83.5%) there was no pedestrian traffic. This was followed by: Light (17; 12.8%), Heavy (3; 2.3%), and Moderate (2; 1.5%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
None	136	86.6%	111	83.5%	-25	-18.4%
Light	12	7.6%	17	12.8%	5	41.7%
Moderate	7	4.5%	2	1.5%	-5	-71.4%
Heavy	2	1.3%	3	2.3%	1	50.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase in this field was for events occurring with light pedestrian traffic, with an increase of 5 events (+41.7%). The largest decrease was for events with no pedestrian traffic, down by 25 events (-18.4%), though this was still the most common category.

Roadway Conditions

The roadway conditions were most commonly Dry, in 97 events (72.9%). This was followed by: Snow / Ice (25; 18.8%), and Wet (11; 8.3%).




Incidents by Roadway Conditions						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Dry	115	73.2%	97	72.9%	-18	-15.7%
Snow/Ice	32	20.4%	25	18.8%	-7	-21.9%
Wet	10	6.4%	11	8.3%	1	10.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The only increase in this category was for criminal flight responses occurring in wet conditions, up 1 event (+10.0%). The largest decrease was for flights in dry conditions, down 18 events (-15.7%). Despite these changes, the proportions in each category changed very little between 2008 and 2009.

Light Conditions

The light conditions during the criminal flight events were most often Artificial Light (49; 36.8%). This was followed by: Daylight (44; 33.1%), and Dark (40; 30.1%).




Incidents by Light Conditions						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Artificial Light	48	30.6%	49	36.8%	1	2.1%
Daylight	47	29.9%	44	33.1%	-3	-6.4%
Dark	62	39.5%	40	30.1%	-22	-35.5%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The only increase in this field was for incidents occurring in artificial light, up 1 incident (+2.1%). The largest decrease was in the number of events occurring in dark conditions, down 22 events (-35.5%).

Air 1 Utilization

In 2009, Air-1 was not used in 102 events (76.7%). Air-1 was used in 31 criminal flight responses (23.3%). One factor in the proportion of events utilizing Air-1 is the short duration of many of the events (see *Duration*), which does not provide an opportunity for Air-1 to get into a monitoring position.




Incidents by Air-1 Utilization						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Not Used	123	78.3%	102	76.7%	-21	-17.1%
Used	34	21.7%	31	23.3%	-3	-8.8%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of incidents utilizing Air-1 decreased by 3 (-8.8%). The number of incidents not involving Air-1 also decreased, down 21 incidents (-17.1%).

Air-1 Took Over

Air-1 did not take over in the majority of incidents (105; 78.9%). Air-1 did take over in 28 incidents (21.1%).



Incidents by Whether Air-1 Took Over						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No	130	82.8%	105	78.9%	-25	-19.2%
Yes	27	17.2%	28	21.1%	1	3.7%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%


Change from 2008: The number of events in which Air-1 did take over increased by 1 (+3.7%). The number of events in which Air-1 did not take over decreased by 25 (-19.2%).

Results of Criminal Flight

Criminal Flight Response Termination

Ground Units Terminated

The ground units were terminated in 83 criminal flight responses (62.4%). They were not terminated in 50 events (37.6%).




Incidents by Ground Units Terminated						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Yes	86	54.8%	83	62.4%	-3	-3.5%
No	71	45.2%	50	37.6%	-21	-29.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of events where the ground units were terminated decreased by 3 events (-3.5%). The number of events where the ground units were not terminated also decreased, by 21 events (-29.6%).

Terminating Authority

Most frequently, the terminating authority was the Investigator, with 30 events (22.6%). This was followed by: On-Street Monitor (OSM) (19; 14.3%), Air-1 (18; 13.5%), Watch Commander (10; 7.5%), Duty Officer (5; 3.8%), and Communications (1; 0.8%). As outlined in the previous category (*Ground Units Terminated*), the ground units were not terminated in 50 events (37.6%). All of the above-mentioned supervisory roles can be involved in the monitoring and management of criminal flight responses, ensuring that policy and procedure are properly adhered to as the incident occurs.




*OSM = On-Street Monitor

Incidents by Terminating Authority						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Investigator	29	18.5%	30	22.6%	1	3.4%
On-Street Monitor (OSM)	33	21.0%	19	14.3%	-14	-42.4%
Air - 1	9	5.7%	18	13.5%	9	100.0%
Watch Commander	9	5.7%	10	7.5%	1	11.1%
Duty Officer	6	3.8%	5	3.8%	-1	-16.7%
Communications	0	0.0%	1	0.8%	1	n/a
Not Terminated	71	45.2%	50	37.6%	-21	-29.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase in this field was for incidents terminated by Air-1, with an increase of 9 events (+100.0%). The largest decrease in terminating authorities was the number of events which were terminated by the On-Street Monitor (OSM), down 14 events (-42.4%).

Event Conclusion

The most common conclusion of a criminal flight response was Suspect Fled on Foot (46; 34.6%). This was followed by: Police Lost Vehicle (34; 25.6%), Collision (21; 15.8%), Suspect Surrendered (21; 15.8%), Other (8; 6.0%), and Mechanical Problem (Suspect) (3; 2.3%).




Incidents by Reason Discontinued						
Category	2008		2009		Change	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Suspect Fled on Foot	43	27.4%	46	34.6%	3	7.0%
Police Lost Vehicle	52	33.1%	34	25.6%	-18	-34.6%
Collision	26	16.6%	21	15.8%	-5	-19.2%
Suspect Surrendered	17	10.8%	21	15.8%	4	23.5%
Other	16	10.2%	8	6.0%	-8	-50.0%
Mechanical Problem (Suspect)	2	1.3%	3	2.3%	1	50.0%
RCMP Took Over	1	0.6%	0	0.0%	-1	-100.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase was in criminal flights where the suspect surrendered, up 4 events (+23.5%). The largest decrease was for events where police lost the suspect vehicle, down 18 incidents (-34.6%).

Collision

Collision Occurred

In the majority of criminal flight responses, a collision did not occur, with 88 events (66.2%). A collision did occur in 45 events (33.8%).




Incidents by Whether Collision Occurred						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No	113	72.0%	88	66.2%	-25	-22.1%
Yes	44	28.0%	45	33.8%	1	2.3%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of events with no collision decreased by 25 (-22.1%). The number of events in which a collision occurred increased by 1 (+2.3%).

Collision Involvement

The most common involvement in a collision was Only Suspect Vehicle, with 29 events (21.8%). This was followed by Both EPS & Suspect Vehicle Involved (16; 12.0%). There were no collisions for Only Police Vehicle Involved. As outlined in the previous category (*Collision Occurred*), there was no collision in 88 events (66.2%).




Incidents by Collision Involvement						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Only Suspect Vehicle Involved	37	23.6%	29	21.8%	-8	-21.6%
Both Police & Suspect Vehicle Involved	6	3.8%	16	12.0%	10	166.7%
Only Police Vehicle Involved	1	0.6%	0	0.0%	-1	-100.0%
No Collision	113	72.0%	88	66.2%	-25	-22.1%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The only increase was for collisions involving both a police and a suspect vehicle, up 10 incidents (+166.7%). In incidents where a collision occurred, the largest decrease was for collisions involving only a suspect vehicle, down 8 incidents (-21.6%).

Collision Severity

The most common severity of collision was Property Damage, with 39 events (29.3%). This was followed by Injury (5; 3.8%), and Fatal (1; 0.8%). There was no collision in 88 events (66.2%).




Incidents by Collision Severity						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Property Damage	38	24.2%	39	29.3%	1	2.6%
Injury	5	3.2%	5	3.8%	0	0.0%
Fatal	1	0.6%	1	0.8%	0	0.0%
No Collision	113	72.0%	88	66.2%	-25	-22.1%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The only change in collisions by severity was for property damage collisions, up 1 incident (+2.6%).

Injuries

Officer Injuries

There were no officer injuries in 132 events (99.2%). There were member injuries in 1 event (0.8%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No	155	98.7%	132	99.2%	-23	-14.8%
Yes	2	1.3%	1	0.8%	-1	-50.0%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of events where an officer was injured decreased by 1 event (-50.0%). The number of events where an officer was not injured decreased by 23 events (-14.8%).

Civilian Injuries

There were no civilian injuries in 127 events (95.5%). There were civilian injuries in 6 events (4.5%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
No	150	95.5%	127	95.5%	-23	-15.3%
Yes	7	4.5%	6	4.5%	-1	-14.3%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of events where a civilian was injured decreased by 1 event (-14.3%). The number of events where a civilian was not injured decreased by 23 events (-15.3%). The proportion in each category remained the same between 2008 and 2009.

Arrests

Suspects Arrested

In over three quarters of the criminal flight responses, an arrest was made (101; 75.9%). No arrest was made in 32 events (24.1%).




Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
	Yes	104	66.2%	101	75.9%	-3
No	53	33.8%	32	24.1%	-21	-39.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of incidents in which an arrest was made decreased by 3 (-2.9%). The number in which no arrest was made decreased by 21 (-39.6%). Proportionally, the number of events in which an arrest was made increased from 2008 to 2009 from 66.2% of incidents to 75.9% of incidents.

Suspect Information

Gender

The suspect was Male in 93 events (69.9%) and Female in 8 (6.0%). This field was not recorded for the 32 incidents in which no arrest was made (24.1%).




Gender	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
	Male	101	64.3%	93	69.9%	-8
Female	3	1.9%	8	6.0%	5	166.7%
Not Arrested	53	33.8%	32	24.1%	-21	-39.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of events in which the suspect driver was female increased by 5 (+166.7%). The number of events in which the suspect driver was male decreased by 8 (-7.9%).

Suspect Age

The most common age range of the suspect driver was between 16 and 25 yrs (46; 34.6%). This was followed by: 26 – 35 yrs (30; 22.6%), 36 – 45 yrs (15; 11.3%), 46 – 55 yrs (6; 4.5%), 15 yrs and Younger (2; 1.5%), and Over 55 yrs (2; 1.5%). This was not recorded for the 32 events in which a suspect was not arrested (24.1%).




Incidents by Suspect Age						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
15 yrs or Younger	1	0.6%	2	1.5%	1	100.0%
16-25 yrs	34	21.7%	46	34.6%	12	35.3%
26-35 yrs	41	26.1%	30	22.6%	-11	-26.8%
36-45 yrs	22	14.0%	15	11.3%	-7	-31.8%
46-55 yrs	5	3.2%	6	4.5%	1	20.0%
Over 55 yrs	1	0.6%	2	1.5%	1	100.0%
Not Arrested	53	33.8%	32	24.1%	-21	-39.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The largest increase was where the suspect driver was in the 16 – 25 yrs age range, up 12 events (+35.3%). The largest decrease was between the ages of 26 – 35 yrs, down 11 events (-26.8%).

Impairment

The driver was not impaired in 78 events (58.6%). The driver was impaired by alcohol in 19 events (14.3%), and impaired by drugs in 4 events (3.0%). The suspect was not arrested in 32 events (24.1%).



Incidents by Driver Impairment						
Category	2008		2009		Difference	
	#	%	#	%	#	%
Not Impaired	73	46.5%	78	58.6%	5	6.8%
Alcohol	28	17.8%	19	14.3%	-9	-32.1%
Drugs	3	1.9%	4	3.0%	1	33.3%
Not Arrested	53	33.8%	32	24.1%	-21	-39.6%
Total	157	100.0%	133	100.0%	-24	-15.3%

Change from 2008: The number of suspects impaired by alcohol decreased by 9 (-32.1%) from 2008 to 2009, but the number of suspects impaired by drugs increased by 1 (+33.3%). The number of suspects who were not impaired increased by 5 (+6.8%).

Discussion / Recommendations

Based on the information contained in the 2008 Criminal Flight Incident Analysis report, the main themes of Training, Data Collection, and a strong link to auto theft emerged. These issues remain at the forefront for the prevention and reduction of criminal flights in Edmonton.

Training

Currently, all officers receive specific training in criminal flight prevention and response, which has no doubt improved Edmonton Police Service ability to deter criminal flight incidents and successfully manage any which should occur. In 2009, there was a lower number of criminal flight responses initiated (down 15.3%) as well as a higher proportion of suspects arrested (up 10%). Also, the proportion of events wherein the ground units were terminated increased slightly, by 7%. Taken together, these figures suggest that officers are using caution when becoming involved in potential criminal flight situations, maintaining public safety as a primary concern, and utilizing alternative strategies available to them in order to still achieve the arrest.

Data Collection

The data collection process for criminal flight responses is continually being reassessed and improved upon. This year, improvements included modifying some categories and their response options for some categories to ensure clarity. These changes increase the compatibility of the data from year to year and allow more pertinent comparisons between years. Increased clarification will also streamline the process and increase ease of use. With continuous improvement each year to better modify the data collection and maintenance procedures, the better the data accurately portrays the whole of the events. This in turn improves the quality of the analysis.

Stolen Autos

Each year, there is a strong relationship between stolen autos and criminal flights. In 2009, the Edmonton Police Service implemented a new targeted offender program named Prolific Offender Suppression Team (POST), which handles not only prolific auto thieves but habitual offenders of all genres. This is in addition to the work currently undertaken by the Priority Prolific Offender Program (PPOP) and the EPS Targeted Offender Section. Any officers involved in such initiatives must be aware of the high risk of criminal flight and it should be ensured that these members in particular have a high level of training in flight preventions and response.

Conclusion

Recent years have seen an increased focus on the understanding and prevention of criminal flight responses. Overall, in 2009, the number of criminal flight events decreased. Additional training and an emphasis on prevention techniques has proved beneficial, but any number of criminal flights still poses risks to Edmonton Police Service members and the citizens of Edmonton. Therefore this topic continues to be an important consideration for risk management and public safety.

The analysis, discussion, and recommendations in this report are geared towards enabling a better understanding of the factors which contribute to criminal flight events and the subsequent results. Ultimately, this information is referred to when making decisions regarding policies, training, and techniques. The results and recommendations found within are ultimately aimed at helping the Edmonton Police Service to increase safety on the streets of Edmonton.