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As an expert in African policing and security, Professor Bruce Baker explores local forms of policing drawing lessons from Africa and the Pacific. The trend towards the pluralisation of policing concedes that state police no longer (nor should have) the monopoly in law enforcement, and that local institutions legitimately have a frontline role in the provision of security and policing services for citizens. In developed countries like Australia debate about plural policing is linked to outsourcing of policing responsibilities to the private security and corporate sectors. In Africa and the Pacific, as Baker points out, plural policing is not always a strategic policy decision to outsource policing and security, but rather is simply a reflection of local community initiative, borne of the limited capabilities of a poor and weak state. Localism, as the paper points out, brings many advantages including its complementarity with customary forms of justice and peace-building. It also has vulnerabilities (in common with public policing) to abuses of power and human rights violations. The paper applies a 'lessons to be learnt' format, through liberal use of boxed case-studies, with explicit articulation of the implications for international policing missions, as well as the priorities for AUSAID support for justice and law enforcement in the Pacific region.



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Supporting Local Forms of Policing and Justice: Lessons from Africa and The Pacific

Professor Bruce Baker

Overview

The focus of this policy brief is local policing, often referred to as non-state policing, and whether and how those engaged in it should be actively supported by their state governments and donor aid programmes. It aims to address many of the issues thought to be associated with such a programme and offers some guidelines as a way forward to supporting them. It does so against an increasing interest by policy think tanks and donors in the role of local policing in delivering safety and justice for the poor (see DFID, 2004; OECD, 2007; African Centre for Strategic Studies, US Ministry of Defense, 2010; Danish Institute For International Studies, 2010; UNDP (Wojkowska), 2006). The policy recommendations that I make are based on my own 12 years research into local policing in Africa (Baker, 2009a) and on dialogue with colleagues working in the Pacific at CEPS, the AFP, the University of Queensland and the Australian National University during the course of my research fellowship December 2010.

What is Local Policing?

Policing is not simply the activity of a state's police. As I understand it, policing is any organized activity that seeks to ensure the maintenance of communal order, safety and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, resolution and punishment. As such it can be authorised and provided by local communities and groups as well as the state. This local policing can be applied to a wide range of policing agencies.

Local everyday policing may be provided, amongst others, by:

- customary leaders
- ethnic associations
- youth groups
- work-based associations
- neighbourhood committees
- conflict resolution and mediation NGOs
- religious organizations
- commercial enterprises

Given their diversity, it is not surprising that they have their authorisation from a wide spectrum that includes: economic interests, residential communities, cultural

communities, religious authorities, individuals, and governments (national and local) themselves.

There is great variation in the nature and quality of service provision that local policing provides. Some are civic minded and offer positive contributions; some are inspired by greed and are little more than criminal protection rackets; and there is everything in between. What is certainly clear from Africa, although less so from the Pacific, is that the sector is much wider than customary chiefs.

Local Policing Examples

A Taxi Drivers' Association

The taxi drivers association of Uganda, (60,000 members; 10,000 minibuses) polices the bus parks which are noted crime hot spots. In Kampala it has a 100 strong traffic warden department that works with the police, and has responsibility for resolving disputes between drivers or between drivers and passengers, preventing pick pocketing and enforcing traffic regulations. Its Law Enforcement Department is trained by the police. It also assists the police in directing traffic at rush-hour (Baker, 2005).

A Peace Monitoring NGO

In Sierra Leone, some communities in the South have established mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The Bo Peace and Reconciliation Movement (BPRM) is a coalition of 11 community groups working on peacebuilding, reconciliation and crime prevention in the Bo district. Its 20 local Peace Monitors have resolved many conflicts such as family matters, fighting, land cases and leadership issues (they handled 255 cases in 2004). Their work has reduced community conflict and litigation in the local courts, and helped many ex-combatants reintegrate into the communities. BPRM's success has earned it the recognition of the provincial administration in Bo (Baker, 2005b).

Their Significance

The significance of local policing is only fully appreciated when it is understood that state police across the developing world are almost invariably too weak to provide protection from crime and investigation of crime for all citizens. They rarely have the resources for a nationwide, sustainable service monopoly. Their senior managers are commonly political appointees who may well be under-trained, possibly corrupt and are likely to see themselves as primarily regime protectors. And at the grassroots police officers are often unavailable, ineffective, corrupt and even violent (see multiple reports by human rights groups).

Against this background it is perhaps not surprising that across the developing world local policing organizations are often the primary providers of protection; deterrence; investigation; resolution; and punishment. The OECD (2007, p. 17) says the evidence suggests that: 'in sub-Saharan Africa at least 80 per cent of justice services are delivered by non-state providers'. In Africa as a whole customary courts, often the dominant form of regulation and dispute resolution, are estimated to cover up to 90 per cent of the population (Chirayath et al., 2005, p. 3). Research in Liberia found that:

'even if the formal justice system were able to deliver affordable, timely and impartial results [which most Liberians doubt] it would still not be the forum of choice for many rural Liberians' (Isser, Lubkemann and S. N'Tow, 2009, p. 8).

Across the Pacific, reports give a similar picture, as one researcher noted:

'Citizens of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu have demonstrated a reluctance to rely on state police for their policing needs' (Dinnen and McLeod, 2009, p. 343).

A 2004 Community Crime Survey in Port Moresby, PNG, showed people preferred local rather than state systems for dealing with many crimes and

disputes, since the police were deemed inefficient, partial and even corrupt and violent. And in Timor-Leste 89 per cent of the population said that community leaders, elders and Suco chiefs had prime responsibility for law and order in their communities with few cases ever reaching the formal justice system (NRI, 2005, p. 48).

Likewise across Asia and Latin America it is the same pattern. 80-90 per cent of all criminal and civil disputes in Afghanistan are resolved through tribal courts (Asia Foundation, 2009). There are also accounts of the widespread use of local policing systems from Bangladesh, the Philippines, Colombia, Peru, and even China (Golub, 2003; Faundez, 2003; Jiao, 2004). The evidence is overwhelming that local policing is frequently the primary provider of everyday policing and very often the preferred provider of policing services across the developing world, which means of course for the majority of the world.

Usage of Local Policing in Nigeria

Data from the national crime victimization survey in Nigeria (CLEEN, 2005) shows that 50 per cent of Nigerians patronize the services of local policing systems for their protection from criminal attacks. Whilst other research from Nigeria shows that in four of its federal states, 'a total of 16 types of informal policing structures [have been identified] that were established in their communities to deal with crime'; in two of the four states, these networks were the population's preferred choice of delivery 88.9 and 62.5 per cent of the time; in one state where only 38.1 per cent of the population availed themselves of the services of these local justice networks, 94.7 per cent of the population approved of and supported their compatriots using their services (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2004).

Their Difficulties and Challenges

The main concerns associated with local policing are remarkably similar to those faced by state police services in the developed world, namely:

- bribe seeking
- use of coercive force for self interest
- discrimination e.g. against women, young people and the poor
- inhuman and degrading punishments
- susceptibility to manipulation by local elites
- limited accountability (to state institutions if not to users)
- unreliability because of dependency on volunteers

Vigilante Nightmare

Against a background of failure by the Nigeria Police to protect citizens from violent robberies, the Governor of Anambra State invited in 2000 a private vigilante group, the Bakassi Boys, to form the basis of a state vigilante service. Within a space of one year, armed robbery had been reduced to a minimum, but only through the group's use of counter-violence such as extra-judicial murders and their scant regard for the law or human rights. Over time they mutated into the governor's militia and then to little more than violent protection racket. Following public outcry they were closed down in 2002. However, a year later, the State Government established a new vigilante group, claiming (as it had done for the Bakassi Boys) that it would be run in collaboration with the Nigeria Police (Baker, 2002).

Yet the problems of local policing should not be exaggerated. First, by no means all local policing groups are violent criminal militias and vigilantes or tradition-bound male chauvinist chiefs, as is often portrayed. Second, most local groups would find it difficult to exist without some degree of local support and accountability. Indeed local policing

may be subject to election/de-selection as the work association committees and some chiefdoms in Africa. It is because they tend to be more 'people-centred' and 'locally owned' that they usually reflect dominant local values.

Full compliance with international human rights standards is indeed a real issue (as it is for state policing agencies as well), however, changing attitudes and values has to be by persuasion and this should allow time for progression. I would argue that only when there is no perceptible change over time should support be withdrawn. Reform programmes are not for those who are perfect. The key feature of any group that may be targeted for reform is whether they are open to reform. In the case of many local policing groups this is the case. Where they are not open to change and are clearly abusive, violent and predatory, then the policy has to be to close them down, not to support them.

The Case Against Support

International donors are frequently wary of supporting local actors. Their doubts arise from four areas:

- **Ideological.** Policing is seen as a core state function and there may be a primary commitment to statebuilding
- **Practical.** The diversity of the local actors and lack of understanding of local policing on the ground, makes it problematic for programming
- **Political.** Support for certain groups disturbs the power balance and provokes political and professional resistance
- **Ethical.** There are serious concerns about human rights abuses

Even when local policing groups might be deemed suitable for support, there must be no assumption that they must be automatically supported. Other relevant questions must be:

- Do local people desire support for their policing?
- Are governments willing to support them or do they see them as undermining the state?

- Who would gain and who would lose; would competition and rivalries ensue if a group received outside support?
- Would local groups be overwhelmed or lose key distinctive features (e.g. autonomy; local trust) because of support?

In other words, before intervention to support local policing, it must be recognized that intervention itself is a political act that will have political repercussions and unforeseen consequences. Perhaps for these reasons customary structures in the past have often been left alone in the Pacific.

The Case For Support

Support might be problematic, but so in many instances is the *failure* to support. Many developing states have real problems providing policing services to all their citizens. For instance:

- State control of all the territory is weak and may be non-existent over large areas
- There are severe constraints on government financial and human resources
- Even current policing services aided by donors face sustainability issues
- The state police may face credibility and legitimacy problems that will take a long time to address
- There may well be, as in post-conflict environments, a rapid upsurge in crime that the police cannot handle and that is threatening stability and government legitimacy

Although the state may be weak and the police tied to the tarmac road, local policing is in place already doing policing in almost every community, rural or urban. For citizens this means, for the most part, it is within walking distance. By contrast, the average walking time to a police station in rural Liberia was found to be 3.5 hours and was up to 10-12 hours (Isser et al., 2009, p. 43). Again, 39 per cent of adults in Timor Leste have not heard of a state court, let alone had access to one (Asia Foundation, 2008, p. 14). Another advantage that local policing offers

is that it is understandable. It is in the user's own language and does not use formal legal language or procedures. Users of these services, therefore, rather than being disempowered, are able to understand and be understood, normally by the very people they live and work with. When, as with many local policing organisations, there is an emphasis on restoration more than apportioning blame, the proceedings do not threaten relationships. The manner in which local policing organisations are locally embedded also means that they tend to be effective and speedy, since they have local knowledge. And, they are cost effective: cheap to support and affordable (with the exception of commercial security) to end users. In contrast, police systems are rarely free in practice to the user and are expensive in terms of resources, hence their smallness and concentration in urban centres.

In other words local policing is not simply a potential poor safety net if the police are not available. They offer *positive* values in their approaches. They are commonly restorative (not punitive) in their justice; non-adversarial; focusing on reconciliation and social harmony; offering consultative and consensual decisions; holding a collective and not individual view of problems; holistic in approach rather than maintaining a strict division of criminal and civil matters; incorporating public participation (victim and accused); addressing root issues of the dispute and not just behavioural symptoms; and not being dominated by legal professionals. Far from being a poor substitute to the western formal system, they are frequently well suited to their contexts.

There is then a strong case for supporting (as well as the police) certain types of local policing. This is a way, at least in the short term, of extending policing to a larger range of people and enhancing social equity. As the OECD (2007, p. 17) argues: 'Security sector programmes must consider the need for a multi-layered or multi-stakeholder approach.'

Existing Links

The idea of support for local policing actors, whilst simultaneously engaged in support for state police services, may appear to bring irreconcilable partners under one programme. In fact, far from programmes always having to bring about unlikely partnerships, links already exist. Local and state police are often linked (informally, if not formally).

Formally states both in Africa and the Pacific frequently permit customary chiefs to handle civil and customary cases and even lesser criminal cases. Beyond that, police and local policing organisations undertake joint patrols, the sharing of intelligence and agree a division of labour. Likewise the delegation of cases from magistrate to local customary courts is frequent in places such as South Sudan, the Philippines and Timor-Leste. And in PNG the village courts system is a state-customary hybrid - the powers of the courts are defined by law but the courts are presided over by village leaders appointed on the basis of their local standing and have a broad mandate to 'ensure peace and harmony' and obtain 'amicable settlement of disputes' in accordance with 'local custom' (Dinnen 2006, p. 412).

State-Local Policing Linkages

Intelligence sharing. The informal local government structure introduced in Rwanda after the civil war has become the policing agency of first choice for everyday policing. Responsible for a small number of households, these informal structures have wide responsibility that includes recording strangers to the neighbourhood and reporting deviant behaviour to the state police and central authorities (as well as resolving disputes and organising night patrols).

Shared equipment and training. In Zinder, Niger, a local group established to protect local businesses was provided by the mayor with torch lights for night patrol and with a pair of handcuffs by the police commissioner. In Karachi, Pakistan, the business community

supports the police through The Citizen-Police Liaison Committee that offers financial and free technical assistance to develop and manage databases and conducting crime analyses.

Joint patrols and operations. The activities of the Community Police Forums in Monrovia, Liberia include 'watch teams' that patrol every night, sometimes with the police.

Enlisting others to undertake work or delegating work to them. Sierra Leone Police asked Community Police Forums to devise action plans to combat violence in schools in Freetown. In some instances delegation may occur outside the law. For example in South Sudan, police are often asked by customary courts to maintain order in the court house; and may carry out a sentence of the court by 'whipping' the convicted individual.

Who to Support

Commitment to the principle of supporting local policing still leaves unresolved the specifics of which actors to support. To begin with there needs to be a mapping of the policing agents in an area; an assessment of their characteristics; an evaluation by users; and a stakeholder analysis to determine potential winners and losers from any intervention. Following those processes an initial selection process might short-list groups that are:

- locally acceptable (to a majority of all sectors of the community)
- non-exclusionary (especially as regards minorities)
- not perceived by the local community as criminal/extortive
- open to dialogue about change

Mixed Ethnic Customary Courts

It is often assumed that customary policing must entail practices that are exclusionary and irreconcilable with those of other ethnic groups. This need not be the case, as the mixed

panels that are common in South Sudan cities demonstrate. In response to the increasing ethnic diversity following the long civil war, customary courts have responded by providing mixed panels. In Malakal, a case concerning 'fighting' between an 'Arab' and a 'southern' Sudanese was referred by the magistrate's court to the customary one because it was deemed politically controversial and one that potentially could cause a public disturbance. The customary court was deemed better equipped than the state court to resolve the case according to the values of the complainants and their communities, because the three chiefs of the customary court were Dinka, Shilluk and Arab judges (Baker, 2009b; cf. mixed chiefs councils in Vanuatu that handle civil disputes).

Support Strategies

Having identified possible local policing groups for support, the question arises as how this support should be offered. Below five possible support strategies are proposed.

Leadership development

In local policing leadership is a key to transformation since groups very often reflect the values and practices of their leaders. Literacy may be a vital skill for the Western-style policing of witness statements, reports, directives, guidelines and the like, but it is not so crucial in an oral tradition. Nor must the illiteracy of local policing leaders be read as inadequacy, for they may be excellent at negotiation, discernment, judgment, conflict resolution and the other social skills often associated with local policing. In other words, they may be very well educated in the local values and skills necessary for their role.

Examples of what leaders might be offered in terms of encouragement, example, practical assistance and training might include:

- A formal appreciation of their contribution and a recognition of their area of responsibility. This

can be constitutional and legal recognition e.g. chiefs' jurisdiction in many African countries is embedded in the constitution. Yet it may be informal - no more than an 'official' T-shirt, badge or sash. The important thing is that leaders are not taken for granted and that there is the removal of any illegality concerning their status.

- Making leaders aware of constitutional and legal requirements e.g. the proscription of violence (as done with the taxi drivers association of Uganda). Likewise, they (and their members) can be trained to provide legal information and guidance, or improving their mediation and conflict resolution skills for civil disputes (as has been done in Timor-Leste, PNG and Afghanistan).
- An accreditation process, either by an association of their own or by the police, with practical rewards for learning, achievement, signing an undertaking not to use violence, offering local community regular report back meetings and the like. A form of accreditation is practiced in Solomon Islands regarding elected community officers. In Malawi and Sierra Leone local paralegals are linked to and supervised by lawyers and monitored by community boards.
- Gathering together leaders to compare best practice, perhaps as part of their own association. Either way consistency, and the development and adaptation of local practice would be facilitated. (Something similar has been tried in Vanuatu and was once practiced by Dinka chiefs in South Sudan).
- Regular access to an oversight association of their own or to the police, whether by regular visits or phone hotline, for answering questions and providing further support. (Such access also provides a method of outside monitoring and the tracking of the degree of change and compliance to agreements).

Inter-group dispute resolution mechanisms

Typically local policing providers operate in small areas. That means that disputes and crimes are likely to sometimes cross their borders and bring groups face to face with neighbouring providers. This is potentially dangerous as one community's perpetrator becomes another community's victim; one community's justice is another's discrimination. Given that policing groups have no fixed boundaries regarding geography or roles, conflict with other groups is a real possibility. The key is that there is a dispute resolution mechanism in place that can resolve disputes between individuals that cross boundaries or disputes between neighboring or competing policing groups. Such a mechanism would also help as a forum for exchange of information, standardization of procedures and screening of members.

Ethnically mixed panels have already been mentioned and councils of elders of the Pacific islands are another example to follow. Thus The Peace Committees established in Saraga, a Port Moresby settlement, have multi-ethnic leadership that offer, inter alia, mediation services.

State-local links as an entry point

Existing links may well be the best entry point for support since the link speaks of mutual recognition and respect and overcomes potential rivalry. It also addresses the point that neither state nor local should be expected to do everything and can benefit from the resources and skills of others. Encouraging state-local links also guards against that autonomy which allows agencies to misbehave and underperform. Hence assistance might well consider targeting the link between the Rwanda Police and the officially recognized local security organizers; or the Malawi Police with chiefs' courts; and of the Uganda Police with the taxi drivers association.

Working links

South Sudan

In South Sudan, the main Juba market has a general market association and one specifically geared to Ugandan traders who often experience discrimination and violence. For the latter, police officers are assigned as liaisons, whose sole responsibility is to assist the members on safety issues. Likewise a market association in Yei has an arrangement with the police whereby any arrested members are handed over to the association on request for the members to resolve the issues and report their resolution to the police. A taxi drivers' association in South Sudan has authorised the police to sit in its HQ to handle serious matters (Baker and Scheye, 2009).

Kenya

To curtail cattle rustling in Kenya two communities decided to form a joint security system. With the help of some NGOs and in collaboration with the local leaders, they selected a commandant and an assistant and resolved to hire five Kenya Police Reservists. Donors provided a jeep, uniforms, boots, radios and batteries, and even a small salary. The Kenya Police Reservists work alongside Rangers employed by large-scale ranchers to repel cattle raiding. Cattle raids have declined markedly. Because their welfare is well catered for, the Home Guards have not been tempted to use their arms to go raiding, but instead protect the community. The police also have a radio connection with the Home Guards and the government provides daily monitoring of the guns and ammunition issued to them.

Links might be strengthened by:

- Joint patrols
- Local groups could have a dedicated police officer as a link/mentor
- Successful policing groups could entertain members of other groups to demonstrate their methods
- Links would be more beneficial if local actors registered and recorded actions taken
- Providing a mechanism and right of

appeal to state actors (and possible vice versa) would counter potential abuse

- Alternatively, paralegal programmes could be introduced, as in Malawi and Sierra Leone, where local paralegals, linked to and supervised by lawyers and monitored by community boards, tackle legal issues by themselves or through working with customary chiefs.

Building policing networks

From strengthening links, the next step is to consider integration into an area security network that brings together the multiplicity of authorizers and providers of policing (and perhaps users) of a locality. They could share problems and solutions concerning crime/disorder and relationships between policing and justice actors. Given the experience of Community Police Forums in Africa, where police show a preference for dominating and not taking as credible recommendations from the public of crime priorities, it might be worth thinking carefully before allowing the police to chair such networks.

Central Cape Town – an integrated policing network

Cape Town Partnership is an organization established and controlled by the city council and the business community to provide policing in the central area. Private security guards patrol the area and secure public spaces. They maintain contact with the city police control room by radio and also supervise the area's closed circuit television. Though the example involves commercial security, it is possible to duplicate the principles across the non-commercial sector.

Integrating disparate groups into a single network is of course problematic because of issues to do with skills, roles, availability, authority, legality, legitimacy and coordinating processes. Everywhere in the world those who perceive themselves as the 'real cops' often treat with contempt the 'amateur' local/metropolitan police. The approach

to integrating multiple providers into a single network is to ask: Who does what (clarifying roles); and how (clarifying norms); and how are the layers linked (clarifying relationships)? There have been various attempts at answering this, but of course local context will shape all efforts.

Clarifying roles

Minimalist policing

The state police have been taking on more and more roles within the community (e.g. problem solving, mediation) to the point where the skills required of them multiply. A 'minimalist policing' approach (Marks et al., 2009) calls for the police to only intervene when there is criminal (or perhaps only serious criminal) activity and then to do so using their legal powers and the criminal justice system. In other words, confining police to what they are trained and resourced to do (and want to do). The rest can be outsourced. The focus of this approach is clarifying roles according to skills so that all in the network are clear about what they can individually contribute and what they can realistically expect from others.

Two principles

Herbert Wulf's (2007) approach to networks is to hold fast to two principles, namely subsidiarity for practice and supremacy for norms.

The **subsidiarity principle** means that for any task, the lowest level should be the starting point. Only when that level is not capable or suitable should a higher state level undertake the task.

Concerning **supremacy in norm setting**, it should be top-down, so that norms of a higher level prevail over those of a lower level.

Creating oversight frameworks

A degree of predictable and uniform practice could be achieved through establishing universal standards of policing practice, with oversight to see these standards are upheld. It is important to develop an overarching framework

of policing and justice standards to guide the performance, procedures, jurisdictions and interventions of local actors. There needs to be a shared model of regulation and accountability. Only as both local and state raise their standards will both sides increase their respect and trust of one another and gain the support of the people.

Accredited local groups that sign up to a framework of standards could also be held accountable by city-wide structures. Across an area/city a central policing and justice authority could play a supervisory and coordinating role. It would receive reports of threatening activity, request a response from the most suitable/available policing group and monitor it to see if the response is proving adequate or whether there is a need for a more specialist response that the state police might be able to offer.

The Challenge of International Policing Missions

In post-conflict countries the priority is to stabilize security. After that international peacekeeping missions with their police component usually withdraw.

Yet stability is not the end of international policing programmes aided by donors. Continuing programmes focus on restructuring, modernizing, professionalizing and democratizing the state police. With the reform it is hoped will come a legitimacy and efficiency which the state police may never have known before. Beyond that is the aim of creating a self-sustaining system of policing. Yet there are increasing doubts concerning the standard international policing package, particularly questions concerning:

- How well implemented are the training courses?
- How sustainable are the new management systems?
- How are the majority of citizens going to benefit from the focus on strengthening primarily the state police?
- How rapidly can police culture and practices be expected to change?

Both donors and governments recognize that developing states often face particular problems of their own that make policing reform difficult to achieve. For instance:

- Severe shortages of human skills and training facilities and a lack of the basic infrastructure (physical, constitutional, legal, and administrative)
- State finances are over committed and dependent on uncertain revenue streams, both of which threaten present services and make sustainability unlikely
- Local cultural value systems and historical legacies may be incompatible with reform programmes
- The state may have weak legitimacy
- The state may have only partial territorial penetration
- Heterogeneous populations, and privatized and personalized structures, where traditional notions of kinship, religion and community matter more than ideas of citizenship and nationality

Policing reform that is promoted by donors too often miscalculates the resources available to the developing state. The question of what to do when a state is unable in the foreseeable future to provide an adequate policing service, cannot be avoided. In this context local policing offers possible alternatives that must be examined by state and international policy makers.

African-Pacific Contrasts

International programmes for policing are the concern of donors and international organizations that work on a global level. It is common to find across Africa and the Pacific policing advisors from Europe, Australasia and North America. As this paper has argued, there are common principles, but it is worth remembering the regional contexts can also be very different.

The similarities of Africa and the Pacific include:

- Rapid urbanization
- Widespread respect for customary leaders

- Widespread alternative values defining crime and punishment
- Widespread support for communal rights, especially concerning land
- Strong sympathies for restorative justice
- Male-dominated societies

Differences between the two regions might include:

- Small territorial states (Pacific); large territorial states (Africa)
- Customary policing dominant (Pacific); a wide spectrum of policing (Africa)
- Internal conflict relatively rare (Pacific); Internal conflict common (Africa)

Conclusion

My argument is that it is time to move on from pondering whether to engage with local policing in Africa and the Pacific, and to seriously address the question of how to engage. There is little to lose from acknowledging the reality of plural policing and the limits of the state police. Rather than ignoring local policing, it is better to define the desired relationship between state and local structures. There has to be both a respect for local structures where they have local support and legitimacy; and a recognition of the value of many of their principles. The relationship has to be defined in terms of what cases each should handle; how each is to handle cases; and ensuring that each has the capacity to handle those cases. Only by state and local actors working together can Africa and the Pacific see all their citizens receiving the policing and justice services that they deserve.

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