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Victoria Police Investigation Services Resource Analysis



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Executive Summary

This study determined important benchmarks for Investigation Services to assist management in monitoring investigative performance and establish a basis for human resourcing of the Investigative division.

- Investigation Services should expect to handle a minimum of 1.8% of the most serious Criminal Code and drug investigations within the Victoria jurisdiction.
- Knowing average investigative times enables justifiable alerts to management of resource needs. The study found average times for files with charges (210 hours), investigations of offences with no charges (58 hours), and assistance or intelligence investigations (10 hours). These are conservative estimates from the data collected.
- Investigation Services needs adequate civilian support to ensure investigators are not tied to their desks and computers, and can devote at least 60% of their time to operational investigative tasks
- Investigation Services needs the capacity to conclude as many files assigned each year. Currently, only 72% of files are concluded, which eventually leads to a significant number of 'cold cases'.
- The number of 'cold cases' added each year must be minimized. The average of 31 cold cases carried over each year may make such investigations very costly.
- Victoria Police Investigation Services need to acquire seven additional investigator positions to handle the proportion of files assigned annually, and another two positions to investigate and process the backlog of files carried over annually.
- Comparisons with other municipal police and municipal RCMP detachments indicated that an average staffing level of 19% of the force is maintained as on-site detective investigators. This would mean 45 detectives for Victoria and did not include seconded or regional positions. However, only 12% of the Victoria Police complement is comprised of detective investigators (30 persons) on site. Adding nine detectives would bring Victoria's complement to 16%.
- The Crime Severity Index in Victoria reflects a high volume of serious offences. Victoria's crime severity rate is high among cities in BC. Only eight communities

in BC have a higher Crime Severity Index. This coupled with the lower percentage of detective investigators implies that consideration could be given to increasing the proportion of detective positions and mounting a Crime Reduction Strategy.

- It appears that only 52% of an investigator's time is spent carrying out actual investigative tasks. Fully 8.5% of their time is spent on court file preparation /disclosure activities. If two to four civilian support positions were added to relieve investigators of important, but repetitive tasks within the Disclosure process, investigator operational time or productivity could increase to about 60% to 65%.

Report Objectives

This report has three main objectives:¹

1. to examine the Investigation Services workload and productivity;
2. to determine the actual person hours deployed on investigations; and
3. to determine a baseline for the amount of time it takes to complete different tasks and types of investigations against which resource needs could be determined.

The Human Resource Problem

Since 1990, many Canadian police agencies, including the Federally-resourced Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), have experienced budgetary issues that require them do more with less. Organizationally, this has led to a delayering of ranks or a reduction in direct supervision to flatten organizations and reduce costs. In some Canadian cities, particularly in Ontario, the size of police departments was reduced as sworn personnel were laid off. Interestingly, at the time, the economy in British Columbia was relatively strong, populations were growing, and cities were largely spared from budget reductions. It is particularly noteworthy that this delayering and reduction in direct supervision occurred just ahead of retirements of police members who had been recruited in the 1960s and 1970s. This large exodus of officers, which is still underway, has cost police departments a lot of experience and has left a vacuum for rapid promotion of a generation of comparatively “lesser experienced” police supervisors and managers. Since the economic downturn of 2008, provinces and municipalities have once again become strapped for revenue. The result is the need to be able to protect resources in police departments across Canada if public safety is to be maintained.

Due to the Freedom of Information laws, in addition to spending restraints, police departments, like other public service agencies, are under the microscope in terms of justifying their operational decisions and use of resources. This requires the police to be able to demonstrate that

¹ This report considers the results of a review of investigative service and resource requirements for the Victoria Police Department’s Investigation Services Branch and its respective investigative sections. It does not include a review of the Forensic Services Section. While there has been limited research looking at the workload of criminal investigators, especially in terms of justifying the number of detectives required in a police organization, a number of references were consulted and those that were found to be of value to this report are listed in the references section. The analytical approach used by Arie Oosthoek, Police Planning and Research Services, in his reports on both the Langley RCMP’s General Investigation Section in 1999 and on the Abbotsford Police Department’s Criminal Investigation Branch in 2003, was fundamental to understanding the importance of the analysis of “time expended” for different tasks in order to properly account for the necessary resources for criminal investigations.

they are truly effective in all the services they provide. Before considering the Victoria Police Department specifically, a cursory review of a report out of England is instructive. England has had to reduce the budgets of the public sector and in policing that has meant, among other things, losing detectives. A brief report entitled, Losing Detectives: Views from the Front Line, was published by the Police Federation of England and Wales in 2008. The report found a “serious skills and experience deficit” that put untrained detectives in charge of major crime investigations. The loss of investigation expertise and reduced numbers had a very debilitating effect on the investigation of major crimes as many were not being properly detected or investigated. The study was based on 27 focus groups in nine police forces in England and Wales, and concluded that there were significant reductions in the number of detectives investigating major crimes.

The report also revealed:

- CID offices are now “typically operating with between a half and a third of their complement of detectives”
- Trainee detectives carry a full workload and are treated as fully-trained detectives, often left as the sole CID representative on night duty covering large parts of a county
- Positions remain vacant
- Police Chiefs are more concerned with focusing on “high yield” crimes and “quick win” sanctions, rather than protracted investigations
- Detectives are giving the public “a false sense of security that serious crime is being detected with increased effectiveness”
- Detectives “have traditionally been willing to work long hours, many of them are now refusing to do overtime”
- Senior Police Chiefs are blamed for “failing to understand how crimes are investigated”.

The report recommended that “Ministers should specify a minimum number of fully-trained detectives that each force should maintain as a proportion of its police officer complement.”

Due to the budget constraints, police in England concentrate on the offences that can be solved with a minimum amount of forensic investigation and detailed interviewing of witnesses. This focus conflicts with the focus of the English Prosecution Service, which has its own performance targets that call for a reduction in prosecutions that do not result in conviction. This requires police to present cases with strong, well-researched evidence, which are not usually those that can be solved with a minimum amount of police time. This is similar to the situation in BC

where there is also a conflict of sorts between police and Crown Counsel.

To subjectively test the concept of losing investigators, a sample of 13 members of the Victoria Police Department's Investigation Services, not including the senior NCO or Officer in Charge, were interviewed about the strength of their Investigation Services. Two specific questions were asked:

- If resources had to be cut from Investigation Services, where would be the first place you would decrease resources? and
- If more resources were available for Investigation Services, where would be the first place you would add resources?

The answers from the front line of Investigation Services were very instructive. Six of the members stated that if cuts had to be made, the first cuts could come from the Historical Crimes Unit. Two others said Financial Crimes could be eliminated as these were not violent crimes. Three respondents felt the first cuts could be in Major Crimes as it was the biggest unit, and there was the suggestion to eliminate the key units and pool resources if the strength was lowered. If resources were to be added, eight members cited Special Victims Unit as having the greatest need. Three members cited Fraud or Financial Crimes and two members cited that Historical Crimes could be bolstered so that other cold homicides could be dealt with. One member cited the need to add civilian staff due to the burden of disclosure tasks.

Comparisons to other BC Jurisdictions

To put the information into context, it is important to provide a comparison of the allocation of resources to criminal investigations in the Victoria Police Department and other jurisdictions in BC (see Table 1). To make these cities comparable, the number of detectives does not include investigators assigned to regional units, such as IHIT or VIIMCU, who often work outside the municipality, Computer Forensics, CISBC, or seconded intelligence-officers, nor any Inspector in Charge. Victoria's distribution of detectives in 2010 was: 8 in Major Crime; 4 in the Special Victim's Unit; 3 in Financial Crimes; 4 in the Street Crime Unit; and 9 on the Strike Force. While the numbers varied throughout the year, the overall total was 30 detectives.

As demonstrated in Table 1, Victoria has a smaller proportion of detectives and a much higher crime severity index than some other municipalities. The higher crime severity index indicates that Victoria has more serious offences relative to the other cities. Given this, in comparative terms, one could expect to see more personnel allocated to Investigative Services in Victoria. These statistics suggest that the Victoria Police Department is carrying a heavy investigative burden due to the volume of serious offences. Only eight jurisdictions in BC have a higher crime

severity index than Victoria; Merritt, Duncan, Langley, Fort St. John, Prince George, Prince Rupert, Quesnel, and Williams Lake.

TABLE 1: POLICE STRENGTHS, CRIME SEVERITY AND CLEARANCE RATES (2010)

	Police Strength	# of Detectives	% Detectives	Crime Severity Index	Weighted Clearance Rate
Abbotsford PD	210	46	21.9%	93.1	29.5
Campbell River RCMP	43	10	23.25%	122.1	48.3
Kamloops RCMP	124	22	17.7%	118.2	32.6
Kelowna RCMP	156	32	20.3%	133.2	34.4
Nanaimo RCMP	135	30	22.2%	124.2	41.5
New Westminster PD	108	20	18.5%	118.6	24.5
Saanich PD	152	31	20.4%	57.3	32.1
Victoria PD	243	30	12.3%	144.4	35.6
AVERAGE	146	27.6	18.9%	-	-

Figures above were taken from the Police Resources in Canada, 2011 report by Statistics Canada and from an email survey sent to each city to obtain the number of detectives they had in 2010.

Analytical Information

Establishing resource needs in criminal investigations is hampered by the absence of data that can be used to determine the actual investigative steps accomplished in each file (i.e. the true workload) and the actual time required for these steps.

For this project, available data from PRIME was used. The goal was to obtain and analyze four years of data to appreciate trends in investigation workload. However, determining the complete workload for Investigation Services from PRIME proved to be difficult. Essentially, using different tools in PRIME to gather what should have been the same or similar data gave different results. One known contributor to this problem is the existence of private or invisible files. If any occurrence files are marked as private by the investigating officer, the file will appear in a file browse, but no details can be viewed and no data will be extracted in a data dump. Files marked

invisible will also share this problem. This can make it challenging to obtain complete data, especially for more recent years where a higher proportion of files may still be under investigation and marked private or invisible. Also, if the primary unit field on the file is not updated when it is passed on to someone in Investigation Services, that file will not be included when searching for Investigation Services' files. As a result of both the limitations of the system itself and human error, the number of investigative files included in this analysis may vary slightly from that in various PRIME reports. For this particular project, the 2011 and 2010 data appeared to be somewhat lacking, while the 2009 and 2008 data seemed to be more complete.

A potential impact of this, apart from this study, is that supervisors and managers in Investigation Services may not be able to rely on PRIME data in their supervision or performance evaluation of their members. Supervisors will have seen their members' work in follow-up reports they have approved, and can use the PRIME browse function to re-read files when doing performance assessments, but they certainly cannot utilize all the functions or benefits of PRIME if the data and information cannot easily be collated. For example, if the supervisor or manager has not been given privileges to access the private/invisible files of their members, they cannot review them. This implies the need to keep manual or spreadsheet performance logs outside of the PRIME system.

The chronology of investigative steps is rarely documented in PRIME and the time spent on each step is not tracked. Therefore, investigators had to be interviewed about the time required to complete each step. In addition to the small sample of data gathered in the interviews, shift schedule data for Investigation Services was also provided so an accurate record of total investigator hours available could be tabulated. The Investigation Services workload should be maintained at an appropriate share of all offences reported to the Victoria Police. As there is no departmental policy, the percentage share of files passed to Investigative Services over a four year period was examined to establish an average as a fair standard to commence with.

Investigative times may fluctuate due to the complexities of individual cases. It was found that the entire criminal investigation process and the preparation of case reports for Crown Counsel have significantly grown in complexity over the last ten years due to a number of factors, including advancements in interviewing and interrogating, the video and audio recording of all statements, and the more thorough and time consuming procedures for routine tasks, such as the use of photo lineups. However, changes in disclosure requirements have had the most significant impact on the investigation process. Both Federal and Provincial Crown Counsel require any file submitted for review to be disclosure ready. As a result, a complete report to Crown must now contain actual audio and transcribed copies of all statements, and copies of all documentary evidence, including the analysis of police drug expert witnesses for all drug cases. A typical report to Crown from Investigation Services consists of three or four binders accompanied by digital CDs or, at times, a computer hard drive of information that has been vetted and is sharable with defense counsel. This has led to a 15 page Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Crown and the police on how investigative files will be prepared for submission and the

standards thereof, as it is important to avoid rejection and duplication of effort. The time to prepare files for each and every case going forward is a marked change from the mere multiple page paper reports of the past.

If the work in progress is taxing Investigation Services' resources, the number of files accepted will decrease. In other words, there is some intake limit within Investigation Services. If there is no increase in available investigative time (resources), the average time available per file may be reduced. This has ramifications for the effectiveness and credibility of the Victoria Police with victims and other clients. It should be understood that the resources within Investigation Services need to be adjusted to maintain investigative capacity and to conclude the same number of files received annually by the Investigation Services Branch.

The file flow is routinely monitored through PRIME and with monthly diary dates. Managers can assess the size of file backlogs and the number of overdue files to alert the Department to the status of the adequacy of resources. For this purpose, the possibility of a separate file log, whether managed manually or via a spreadsheet, could provide details of cases referred to Investigation Services that were accepted or declined. It could also provide explicit information about the total caseload, the progress of files (i.e. awaiting assignment, under investigation, awaiting prosecution decision, in court), and the investigative backlog on a month-to-month and year-to-year basis. A file log could be considered for both ease of monitoring and providing valuable data to assess both processes and adequacy of resources. If there is a backlog of investigation files, Investigation Services will have an abundance of 'cold cases' that will be very costly to deal with in the future. As well, the existence of a backlog may contribute to a growth in occurrences as career criminals and others continue their nefarious deeds undeterred by the lack of detection. Therefore, an estimate of resources may be required to reduce any backlog to acceptable levels.

As indicated in Table 2 below, an average of 31 'cold cases' from at least two previous years were carried forward. In total, 39 'cold cases' were carried into 2011 from previous years, and 34 were carried in to 2012. Table 2 also presents the possible impacts of reduced resources assigned to active investigations because of the implementation of a 'cold case unit' reviewing just one file, as well as increased disclosure demands and responsibilities upon investigators. As more 'cold cases' and files from the previous year are carried forward, significantly less files were closed by Investigative Services (72%). Therefore, a higher number of incomplete or unsolved cases were carried over into 2012 (n = 168 files).

While complex investigations need and receive oversight to ensure progress and to maintain the possibility of detection, periodic investigative time data could be gathered and used to assess investigative time losses to other tasks and to corroborate changes in case preparation complexity due to demands of the courts and Crown. With the implementation of a new MOU with Crown, gathering time data could be an important step in assessing issues and problems complying with or meeting the standards of the MOU.

Demand for Service

The primary demand for service is the flow of case files to Investigation Services. The Branch also directs efforts to projects or target operations that result in similar investigative files. Project files reflect criminals identified through intelligence efforts or through information received and prioritized by operational plans. The volume of these files is a direct function of available resources, budget, intelligence information, and priorities of the Ops Council, a strategic operational committee.

The file loads for the Strike Force and Street Crimes Sections reflect work done, often as prioritized by the Ops Council, but not the amount of work that needs to be done. The full evaluation base for resources in these sections is found in intelligence information about all the legitimate targets that are not or cannot be addressed. Hence, while Investigation Services sections, such as Major Crimes, Special Victims, and Financial Crimes, resource requirements can be tied to file workload, other sections, namely Strike Force and Street Crimes, need to justify resources based on the strategy and focus of operational plans and reliable intelligence programs.

Based on the above considerations and the analytical issues discussed previously, it appears that Victoria Police could consider an enlarged crime reduction strategy to impact the consistent pattern of crimes in the Provincial capital by the use of directed activities of the Strike Force and Street Crimes Unit, but also augmented to a degree by other investigative units of Investigation Services, as well as other units (e.g. F.E.T., Patrol) in the Department. Moreover, the strength and the scheduling of Investigation Services resources should be sufficient to permit a contribution to the crime reduction strategy.

Workload Of Investigation Services

TABLE 2: WORKLOAD OF INVESTIGATION SERVICES (2008-2011)

<i>INVESTIGATION FILES</i>	2008	2009	2010	2011
VicPD TOTAL CRIMINAL CODE & DRUG FILES	14,646	14,113	12,949	12,552
INVESTIGATION SERVICES FILES OPENED	533	546	656	481
INVESTIGATION SERVICES <i>CURRENT</i> FILES CARRIED FORWARD	76	104	76	134
INVESTIGATION SERVICES 'COLD CASE' FILES CARRIED FORWARD	28	24	39	34
TOTAL INVESTIGATION FILES CARRIED FORWARD	104	128	115	168
PERCENT CLOSED BY YEAR END	86%	81%	82%	72%

The current file intake to Investigation Services consists not only of Criminal Code and drug occurrences that are passed on for follow-up investigation or that are initiated by Investigation Services, but also requests for follow-up investigations or assistance from police agencies outside of the Victoria Region, warrants the location and apprehension of offenders, and assistance request from other government agencies or members of the public. Investigation Services also generates intelligence files concerning particular suspects or known offenders, as well as for gathering information on types or patterns of offences. Hence, only a portion of the total files handled by Investigation Services are follow-ups to actual offences in Victoria. This difference is expressed in Table 3.

TABLE 3: CRIMES HANDLED BY INVESTIGATION SERVICES

<i>INVESTIGATION FILES</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2009</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>Average</i>
TOTAL VicPD CRIMINAL CODE & DRUGS FILES	14,646	14,113	12,949	12,552	13,565
TOTAL I.S. FILES	533	546	656	481	554
I.S. CRIMINAL CODE AND DRUG FILES	305	286	169	226	242.5
PERCENT OF VicPD CRIMINAL CODE & DRUG FILES	2.1%	2.0%	1.3%	1.8%	1.8%

Investigation Services handles, on average, 1.8% of Victoria’s total Criminal Code and drug offence files. In the absence of any other basis for a benchmark or standard, it is suggested that 1.8% be used as that benchmark. Mid-year in 2011, the Victoria Police Department reallocated resources from the Investigation Services Branch. The four member Street Crime section was moved under the command of the Community and Operations Support (Intelligence) Branch, and investigative resources were moved to a newly established Historical Crime Section, which will not be taking any current files. The suggested standard of 1.8% may be maintained with difficulty based on the reduced size of the Investigation Services Branch. Further annual reviews of this data should be carried out to determine if a new standard is warranted.

Workload of the Units within Investigative Services

The workload of each of the units within Investigation Services in terms of “general” investigation files (i.e. assistance, warrants, and intelligence) and “crimes in Victoria” investigation files is presented in Table 4. The two were separated because criminal code and drug investigation files traditionally take more time than general files. The data included in Table 4 is from PRIME and reflects a drop in file load in 2010 and 2011 from 2008 and 2009. In fact, a download of follow-up data shows the actual overall workload; however, the major “crimes in

Victoria” data cannot be pulled from these numbers. The total investigation files and follow-up reports are shown in the last row.

TABLE 4: UNIT WORKLOAD IN INVESTIGATION SERVICES ACCORDING TO PRIME VERSUS NUMBER OF FILES WITH INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES FOLLOW-UP REPORTS

UNIT	2008		2009		2010		2011	
	GENERAL	CRIMES	GENERAL	CRIMES	GENERAL	CRIMES	GENERAL	CRIMES
MANAG'T	25	34	17	28	42	43	32	35
MAJ. CRI	35	72	40	52	35	44	27	38
SPL VIC	9	31	27	37	31	27	23	43
FINANCIAL	14	58	21	60	2	12	3	17
STR CRIM	118	56	113	58	24	20	15	31
STRIKE FO	27	54	42	51	19	23	21	46
SUB-TOT	228	305	260	286	153	169	121	210
TOTALS	533		546		322		331	
Total Files from Follow-ups	514		538		656		481	

While Table 4 presents the volumes of general investigation and crime investigation files, to understand the impact of these volumes, it is necessary to determine the relative “cost” of each file. The “cost” can be approximated in terms of person-hours.

Initial Determination of Time Demands of Criminal Investigation Files

The demand for investigative services is indicated by the collection of criminal code and drug files that flow to Investigation Services, whose resources must then often re-confirm that a crime has been committed, and, if so, gather direct and indirect evidence to determine who perpetrated the crime(s). The human resources of Investigation Services must be maintained at a sufficient level to ensure that the inflow of files is approximately equal to the closure of files over the

course of a year.

The performance of Investigation Services can be judged by what they have done with their files. For target oriented operations, such as the Strike Force and Street Crime Unit, the priorities and what they actually carry in terms of files is determined by intelligence gathered or received, and by direction from the Ops Council. Regardless of direction, the Strike Force and Street Enforcement teams could routinely absorb more than their current resources without running out of available targets. The size of the Strike Force and any future increase in resources should be dictated by the team size required to optimally carry out surveillance operations. Determining the need for a change in resources for the Street Crime Unit or Strike Force requires information about potential targets offset by the cost of each investigation, in terms of person hours. This 'cost' increased in 2011 due to both increased disclosure requirements and advance documentation of police expert witness testimony required to demonstrate trafficking activity and profits; all required before charge approval.

Investigation Service Standards

Based on experience, an investigative supervisor would likely state that it is impossible to estimate resource implications of future criminal investigations because the complexity of investigations cannot be predicted. In many cases, human resource requirements are not clear even in the early stages of an investigation. Where sizable resources appear to be indicated due to file complexity and the nature of the investigation (e.g. kidnapping, homicide etc.), Investigation Service managers and supervisors implement the Major Case Management model led by a command triangle. There is not necessarily a specific policy to drive or guide this decision (see addendum to this report).

In the Langley RCMP Investigation Section study (1999), Oosthoek drew a useful analogy to another industry. He stated that if one entered an automotive repair shop, the staff would be able to immediately provide an accurate estimate of the cost of repair because they know their productivity and personnel requirements. If Investigation Services had a similar set of service standards, investigation managers could be in a better position to alert senior management to changing resource needs. In effect, the service standards Investigation Services could set benchmarks based on past performance and that of comparable investigation sections in other police departments. Based on this approach, in this study, investigators were interviewed about the time required to complete different aspects of recent investigations. The data from these interviews were collated, and although limited by the small numbers of interviews that could be completed while on-site, the data provided a basis to determine criminal investigation productivity standards for Investigation Services.

A technique called 'purposive sampling' was used to initially hone in on major case files to gather data on the full range of investigative tasks or steps in any given complex file, the costs of

these key steps in terms of investigative time, the costs of larger tasks, such as obtaining warrants, completing reports to Crown, or disclosure in such files, and to test our research instrument. In the long term, more data of this nature from either Victoria Police Investigation Services or from a sample of police investigative units would be required to determine reliable standards for different types of criminal investigations. Depending on the value of such data and support for such a project from police services across Canada, it is possible for further analyses to be accomplished by the University of the Fraser Valley to establish a more complete database of this nature. Appendix 1A of this report presents the detailed data collected from these interviews concerning times to accomplish different types of criminal investigations in different units of Investigation Services. This is summarized in Table 5.²

TABLE 5: SAMPLE TIMES FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATIONS BASED ON PURPOSIVE SAMPLE

Section	Crime	Preliminary Investigation	Follow-up Investigation	Total Hours
Major Crime	Murder*	166	134.75	300.75*
	Kidnapping	539	668	1207
	Robbery w. Firearm**	20	361	381
	Robbery w. Firearm	100	300	400
	Average Rob. with Firearm			390.5
	Robbery	57.6	106.5	164.1
	Robbery	114.75	50.25	165
	Average Robbery			164.55
	Assault Causing ***	531	1274.3	1805.3***
Special Vic	Sex Assault	25	13.5	38.5
	Sex Assault	34.5	22	56.5
	Sex Assault	35.6	167.25	202.85
	Sex Assault	40.62	71.5	112.12

² Murder* = is assigned to VIIMCU, however invariably Major Crimes is first on scene and assists for first two weeks or more. Robbery w. Firearm** = these are more major robberies such as home invasions, whereas “simple” robberies in Table 5.0 refer to e.g. Bank Robberies. Assault Causing*** was a cold file (2007) with new information developed, and hence lengthy Follow-up investigation required for “cold” files.

Section	Crime	Preliminary Investigation	Follow-up Investigation	Total Hours
	Average Sex Assault Time			102.5
	Sex Assault w. weapon	124	183	307
	Distr. Child Porn	348.5		348.5
Financial Crimes	Uttering & Theft Over	306	94.5	400.5
Street Crimes	Poss. for Purpose (<i>Project File</i>)			7251.5
Strike Force	Possess Restrict Weapon	24	20	44
	PPT (Cocaine)	452	29	481
	PPT (Cocaine)	490	174	664
	Average PPT			572.5
	Trafficking	1034	57	1091
	Buy&Bust Op	480	72	552

The above table shows that most of the files took in the ‘hundreds’ of hours, but there are a couple of exceptional files that took in the ‘thousands’ of hours. These were a kidnapping, an assault causing bodily harm that involved the re-opening of an old ‘cold case’, and a very major or lengthy project file. Similarly, smaller “project files” done by Strike Force on drug trafficking or annual “buy and bust” operations involved lengthier commitments of unit time.

For analysis purposes, if we regard the kidnapping as a special type of case, of which we only have one, and we only look at the investigation files handled by Major Crimes, Special Victims, and Financial Crimes, apart from the kidnapping, (i.e. the range of cases that take in the ‘hundreds’ of hours), an average time to investigate the range of typical crimes was as follows:

- Murder (Victoria Major Crimes participation and handover to VIIMCU) - 301 hours
- Robberies (all types) - 381, 400,165, and 164 hours respectively
- Sex Assaults (all types) - 203, 39, 307, 112, and 57 hours respectively
- Distributing Child Porn - 349 hours
- Uttering Forged Documents/Theft Over - 401 hours

In effect, the average time to investigate this sample of offences was 240 hours. In this analysis,

the offences in the above list that were handled by Major Crimes took, on average, 207 hours. Similarly when the files handled by Special Victims are considered, the average was 192 hours. However, when adding the fraud, uttering, or major theft type of file as handled by Financial Crimes, the average jumped to 240 hours.

For Strike Force, there were three sample drug trafficking cases and one possession of restricted concealed weapons case, and if the four 'Buy and Bust' operations conducted annually are exempted, the average of their investigation cases was 416 hours. It must be reiterated, that for research purposes, this was entirely too small a sample to necessarily provide reliable data. The data needs to be augmented with a far larger sample of cases and investigators, not only from Victoria Police, but enriched by the inclusion of other police agencies. Nonetheless, these times present a starting point for setting benchmarks to be able to determine investigator resource needs.

Corroboration of Time Demands of Criminal Investigation Files – The Systematic Sample

To be able to draw generalizations, the purposive sample described above must be corroborated by obtaining similar time data from a random sample of investigative files. A minimum random sample of 56 files is required (90% confidence, +/-10% Margin of Error). Investigators were further interviewed concerning data in a systematic sample of 56 files out of a population of 331 investigative files from 2011. The data collected is shown at Appendix 1B.³ The other significant advantage of the systematic sample is that it contains not only files with charges (the most time consuming files), but also provided sample times for investigations that did not result in charges, and for intelligence or assistance investigations carried out by Investigation Service members that may or may not involve actual crimes in Victoria.

The data collected provided similar results to the initial interviews, although because of the different mix of file types, there was more fluctuation in file times between the units. For example, for Major Crime files:

- files with charges filed by RTCC required an average of 242 hours, which was very similar to the 240 hours found with the first sample;
- investigations without charges averaged 31 hours;
- investigation files involving intelligence and/or assistance to other agencies averaged 15 hours;

³ The 56 systematic sample was reduced to 52 as four investigators whose files were pulled had either retired or were transferred and could not be interviewed by the researchers.

- for Special Victims and Financial Crimes files, similar times to the first sample were also determined;
- only three relatively straightforward Street Crimes files surfaced in the sample of files, which averaged 31 hours, but the three files were an insufficient sample. Other files for street crimes could not be examined due to the transfer of members during 2011; and
- Strike Force files also averaged similar times to the purposive sample:
 - Files with charges filed by RTCC averaged 385 hours
 - Investigations without charges averaged 80 hours
 - There were no intelligence/assist files for Strike Force in the sample.

For the 52 systematic sampled files, the average time required for files with RTCC was 224 hours or 210 hours if the Strike Force Buy Bust Operation was excluded, 58 hours for files without charges, and 10 hours for assistance or intelligence files. Table 6 presents the times from the systematic file sample and compares those times to the times obtained by combining the systematic and purposive files samples. This comprised a total of 69 file sample from the 331 file population, although for statistical reliability, the times from the systematic sample should be used.

TABLE 6.0: COMPARISON OF TIMES TO COMPLETE INVESTIGATIONS

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Times from Systematic Sample</i>	<i>Times from Total Sample</i>
Investigation files with charges	223.7	223.5
Investigations without charges	58	41
Assistance & Intelligence Files	10	10.5

Data Sources and Time Expenditures

The workload of Investigation Services is recorded in electronic files within the PRIME system. PRIME holds files transferred to Investigation Services after an initial response by patrol resources, as well as files referred directly to Investigation Services. As well, Strike Force maintains a case log for projects they are working on, and any assistance they provide to other operational units. This is linked to PRIME via file numbers. The bulk of criminal investigation file volume statistics were drawn from the PRIME system. The extraction of data is not without some difficulties as PRIME is intended as a real-time operational file system, not a research database. The questions or parameters around data extraction as a researcher are quite different

from the use of the system by an investigator seeking factual information or links among files or portions of files.

It can be assumed that there are omissions in the data, particularly when Investigation Services provide assistance to patrol or others, but have not taken over primary responsibility for the file. However, investigative follow-ups on PRIME would include cases where investigators have assisted other Divisions, such as patrol, and were required to submit a follow-up report, in addition to the majority of follow-up reports consisting of additional investigations completed on Investigation Services files. Therefore, it may be important to also tally follow-up work done by investigators.

In addition to gathering data from PRIME, two methods were used to acquire further information about the time expended by investigators. First, as described in the previous section, investigators were interviewed about recent files to compile accurate data on the length of time different steps in different types of criminal investigations took. Investigator information came from verbal reports by investigators while referring to their notebooks, the case file on PRIME, and, to some degree, the investigator's memory. Second, investigators were asked to maintain an Activity Log over a 15 calendar day period, logging each of their activities in each hour of their workday. This was an attempt to collect fresh data as work occurred to attempt to corroborate or validate the amount of time expended to do tasks. As well, the Activity Logs provided a picture of the other activities investigators were typically tasked with that may or may not directly contribute to crime detection, such as attendance at meetings and administrative overhead.

Current Resources – Person Hours

Until approximately July 2011, Investigation Services was composed of several investigative sections, namely Major Crimes (10 person-years), Special Victims (5 person-years), Financial Crimes (3 person-years), Street Crimes (4 person-years), and Strike Force (9 person years). Several changes to the organization and resourcing were made about this time that may affect the ability of Investigation Services to continue to maintain the levels of investigation, as determined by our examination of the data for 2011 to October 1st. Specifically, the Street Crimes Unit was moved from Investigation Services to the Community and Operations Support Division. Although no longer under the management of Investigation Services, Street Crimes continued to perform a similar function in its new location. A new Historical Case Review Unit was created within Investigation Services to review and continue investigations on cold or unsolved homicide and missing person cases. This unit was created by removing two positions from Major Crimes, as well as from other locations, and was bolstered by assigning light duty members to case review work. Moreover, Victoria Police supply investigative resources to a regional Vancouver Island Integrated Major Crime Unit and a regional Vancouver Island Domestic Violence Unit. A local Domestic Violence Unit of one investigator was established to ensure case review and

follow-up to local domestic violence cases that did not merit the attention of the Regional unit, but to ensure no cases fell through the cracks and that victims were provided with protective intervention in all cases.

With the above re-organization in mind, the researcher gathered data on the expenditure of actual person hours in Investigation Services through the implementation of an Activity Log to be completed by each investigator and NCO in Major Crimes, Special Victims Unit, Financial Crimes, and the new Domestic Violence Unit. Investigators reported the time spent (in minutes) on each task done on each day noting the investigative file number, if applicable, and the nature of the activity conducted or the work done. The Activity Logs were then submitted for analysis (see Table 7). The researcher then reviewed the logs and classified each activity as either an OPERATION, A TRANSPORT (OR TRAVEL), an INSPECTION, a DECISION-MAKING STEP, a DELAY, a STORAGE STEP, or a purely ADMINISTRATIVE TASK.

In terms of their meaning,

- OPERATIONS included actual investigative steps or task, such as contacting and interviewing victims, witnesses, suspects, attending a crime scene, or doing a search for evidence.
- TRANSPORT was used to identify travel time for investigative purposes outside of the Victoria region.
- INSPECTIONS included any file reviews (not background investigation) that might be done by an investigator taking over a file or a supervisor reading a file, as well as any work that involved pure reading, such as email or responding to telephone messages.
- DECISION-MAKING was used to categorize time spent in necessary meetings with other investigators/police for the purpose of forwarding an investigation, or where the participant had a major role to play in the subject of the meeting, such as an NCO attending a Divisional Meeting. (Meetings with Crown Counsel were categorized as OPERATIONS, part of an investigation activity.)
- DELAY was used to categorize those activities recorded as necessary meal or refreshment breaks, or attendance at general meetings where the participant was not a key decision-maker and was there mainly to receive general information, such as a briefing by the Chief on the police contract with Esquimalt.
- STORAGE was used to refer to steps where information was gathered or collated from an

investigation file, such as the compilation of binders for Crown counsel, the copying of recorded statements to CD, or the scanning of documents. In effect, any activity related to or specifically for Disclosure, but not including proofing a transcript of a recorded statement, which was an OPERATION to ensure the accuracy of a transcript. STORAGE was found to include activities that could likely be done by a civilian employee assisting the investigator, but did not require significant knowledge of the law or investigative technique.

- ADMINISTRATION was used to categorize activities not related to an investigation, such as training activities on the use of force or firearms, or activities that were administrative, such as creating annual leave schedules or attending to organization functions, such as the Police Ball.

The key findings from Table 7 are that Major Crime Investigators who are developing the Disclosure Process to be used with Crown could only spend 49% of their time performing investigative tasks. Moreover, on average, 52% of investigator time is actually spent doing investigative tasks, or 56% of investigator time if meetings are included where decisions are made related to investigative tasks. This is important to recognize when determining needed investigative resources. Further, between 8.45% (total Investigation services average) and 15.79% of investigator time (Major Crime Unit's time) is currently spent on "Storage" activities that potentially could be performed by civilian employees. An arbitrary 15 calendar day period was used to collect this data, during which Major Crimes had the responsibility to prepare files for Court and Disclosure using Adobe software to accomplish digital disclosure, which will become the standard method, whereas other Units were using traditional hard copy methods of disclosure, in those particular two weeks. It would appear that civilian support services could reduce "wastage" of investigator time and free up valuable time for actual investigation work or targeted crime reduction activity.

Over two calendar weeks, 1,039 investigator hours were expended, and as little as 88 hours and potentially as much as 166 hours was consumed by Disclosure or "storage" activities (if every unit followed what will be a required Disclosure procedure and spent 15% of their time on Disclosure). This implies the need for 2 to 4 civilian staff in Investigation Services working full time (based on the 88 hours over 2 weeks) on Disclosure related activity for investigators. These included tasks such as downloading electronic files, burning audio files to CDs, scanning of documents, and the assembly of binders, all in addition to the transcription tasks done by the current civilian support staff. If, in fact, civilian staff had been available to assist with disclosure, thereby relieving investigators of "storage" activities, the amount of investigators' time available for active investigation tasks or targeted crime reduction activity would be for all of Investigation Services 60.5%, and, in Major Crimes, time for active investigation work could increase from

49% to 65%, a potentially significant increase in productivity.

Increasing civilian support provides both administrative and operational support to the investigators. Civilians can free investigators from administrative tasks, such as submission of forms or letters dictated by investigators, some expense account and overtime account submission and administration, taking meeting notes, and writing of reports. Operational support involves the transcribing of statements, downloading interview files, burning CDs, completion of some reports and forms, notes from operational meetings, perhaps with experience, searching operational databases, as well as the assembly of binders for RTCC cases and Disclosure documents, or the electronic assembly thereof. Adding civilian support frees investigators from routine investigative and administrative tasks, so that the operational time of investigators will go further and more files or proactive work can be taken on. The balance of investigator and civilian support staff may then improve efficiency.

The impact of each additional civilian is not the same. As civilians are added, there is a reduction of investigative impact because there is only so much a civilian can do. It is apparent from the analysis of the activity logs that Investigation Services could gain in the efficiency and effectiveness of investigators if additional civilian support staff were added to the division. Given the recent briefings/discussions and the MOU relating to the preparation of RTCC and disclosure documents for Crown Counsel, the potential role of civilian support gains added importance. For this purpose, an Investigative Assistant category of employee could be identified, and training could be provided to enable the handling of a number of routine investigative procedures.

TABLE 7: ANALYSIS OF 15 DAY – INVESTIGATOR ACTIVITY LOGS

Unit	Operations	Travel	Inspections	Decisions	Delay	Storage	Administrations	Total
Major Crime Minutes	15,699	630	3,910	1,645	2,640	5,060	2,455	32,039
Major Crime Hours	261.55	10.5	65.17	27.42	44	84.33	40.92	533.98
Major Crime Percent	49%	1.97%	12.2%	5.13%	8.24%	15.79%	7.66%	100%
Spec Victim Minutes	10,555	0	3,200	620	1,045	150	2,550	18,120
Spec Victim Hours	175.92	0	53.33	10.33	17.42	2.5	42.5	302
Spec Victim Percent	58.25%	0	17.66%	3.42%	5.77%	0.83%	14.07%	100%
Financial Crime Minutes	4,775	0	1,550	0	915	60	480	7,780
Financial Crime Hours	79.58	0	25.83	0	15.25	1	8	129.67
Financial Crime Percent	61.38%	0	19.92%	0	11.76%	0.77%	6.17%	100%
Domestic Violence Minutes	1,400	0	1,655	285	510	0	555	4,405
Domestic Violence Hours	23.33	0	27.58	4.75	8.5	0	9.25	73.42
Domestic Violence Percent	31.78%	0	37.57%	6.47%	11.58%	0	12.60%	100%

Unit	Operations	Travel	Inspections	Decisions	Delay	Storage	Administrations	Total
Inves Services Minutes	32,429	630	10,315	2,550	5,110	5,270	6,040	62,344
Inves Services Hours	540.48	10.5	171.92	42.5	85.17	87.83	100.67	1039.07
Inves Services Percent	52.02%	1.01%	16.55%	4.09%	8.20%	8.45%	9.69%	100%

Civilian Support Staff

Civilian Support Staff in Investigation Services currently consists of three positions and is used by Investigation Services for both administrative support and in direct support of investigations. Organizationally, the three positions consist of the Secretary to the Detective Division, the Secretary to the Financial Crimes Section, and an Administrative Assistant, Investigative Services. The priority and major workload of all three positions is the transcription from audio recordings of victim, witness, and suspect interviews, to provide hard copy of statements, which, once verified by investigators, are added to investigation files, court briefs to Crown, and links to the original audio digital file for court and disclosure purposes. This requires the maintenance of an audio and video register to track and account for transcription workload.

An examination of the annual transcription minutes reveals the transcription workload has grown linearly since 2002, when 7,099 minutes of transcription were completed, through to 2009 when 18,113 minutes of transcription were completed. In 2010, the transcription queue leveled somewhat as a reflection of the leveling of the numbers of crime files handled by Investigation Services. In 2010, 16,846 minutes of transcription were completed, and, in 2011, this decreased to 15,139 minutes. These statistics belie the complexities in transcription. Transcribing the conversations of police undercover operators in drug transactions provides an example of hundreds of minutes of transcription related to perhaps a single file in which rapid turnaround is required for investigators to be able to obtain warrants, make arrests, and put sufficient evidence before Crown. As well, statements taken in languages other than English require special and often expensive arrangements to be made for transcription.

At issue is which audio statements taken for investigation purposes need to be transcribed. Clearly, in addition to court cases, statements taken in the following cases need to be transcribed:

- statements needed in fatal motor vehicle accident investigations;
- statements related to internal investigations;

- statements that must be submitted to polygraph examiners or for statement analysis;
- victim and suspect statements submitted for ViCLAS entry; and
- where an accused is in custody, Crown should accept that transcribed statements will not likely be immediately available.

We recommend the consideration of an enhanced investigative assistant job description to account for increased disclosure and other responsibilities to be placed with civilian employees. If investigation assistant positions are developed, consideration could be given to assigning transcription workload through PRIME to allow members to see diary dates and the investigative assistant assigned. In addition, operations support is provided by these positions, who organize and keep track of major investigation files, compile and maintain minutes of investigative meetings, assist investigators to assemble binders, file documents for presentation to Crown, document conversion to digital format and electronic disclosure to Crown, help to coordinate information by liaison with other police forces, financial institutions, and justice agencies, enter and retrieve information on suspects in computer systems, such as CPIC and PRIME, initiate CAD reports and written occurrence reports, complete Requests for Analysis to the RCMP Forensic Laboratory, maintain a counterfeit currency log and process counterfeit currency received, initiate fraud alerts to financial institutions and merchants, help to arrange or coordinate interviews and appointments for the Inspector, Staff Sergeant, and investigators as may be necessary, compile monthly statistics, produce reports, and work schedules, leave sheets, vehicle fleet allocations, and the Division contact lists, perform clerical functions for investigators, such as faxing, photocopying, scanning and filing, and complete and maintain forms for reimbursement of investigator travel expenses and reconciling credit card expenses.

Through 2011, investigators, particularly in Major Crimes, have been developing the most effective process for electronic disclosure to Crown themselves, and, as was shown by the data collected via the Activity Logs over 15 days, investigators in Major Crimes were operational in the sense of actually doing investigative tasks 49% of the time. Civilian support staff still assists in the scanning of documents, largely using a photocopier that scans/converts hard copy documents into electronic PDF files, which enables large documents to be attached to PRIME files and RTCC. Until this process is solidified, disclosure is simultaneously being done for Financial Crimes and Special Victims Unit by the civilian support staff that prepares the binders for submission to Crown. Only with adequate civilian support staff, able to take over the electronic disclosure process, will the operational time of investigators be increased to between 60% to 65%, as estimated from the Activity Log 15 day sample compiled by investigators.

Adequacy of Investigative Services Resources

Using data from the previous tables, we can determine the adequacy of resources based on the volumes of files assigned to Investigative Services, and the time each type of file requires. If the

input hours equal or are close to the output required hours, resources in Investigative Services are about right. Conversely, if the output required hours are less than the input hours available, additional investigators would be required to accomplish the workload. If the input hours are greater than the output hours required, a reduction in resources might be feasible (see Table 8).

TABLE 8: 2011 DATA - INVESTIGATOR HOURS AVAILABLE VERSUS REQUIRED INVESTIGATION HOURS - CONCLUDED FILES

* 210 hours is the most conservative “average” time for investigations with charges, and this figure was derived by omitting intelligence-driven project files from the sample, which are discretionary based on available resources.

<i>Section</i>	<i>Person Hours @ 52%</i>	<i># of Files with Charges by Hour</i>	<i># of Files without Charges by Hour</i>	<i>Hours Per Remaining Files</i>	<i>Total Hours</i>	<i>Ht</i>
MAJOR CRIME	6,471.4	29 FILES @ 210 HRS* = 6,090	31 FILE X 58 HRS = 1,798	50 FILES @ 10 HRS = 500	8,388	1,917
SPECIAL VICTIMS	3,557	18 FILES = 3,780	34 FILES = 1,972	21 FILES = 210	5,962	2,405
FINANCIAL CRIMES	1,902	6 FILES = 1,260	28 FILES = 1,624	14 FILES = 140	3,024	1,122
REACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS	11,930.6	53 FILES = 11,130	93 FILES = 5,394	85 FILES = 850	17,374	5,443
STREET CRIMES**	3,238	19 FILES = 3,990	24 FILES = 1,392	12 FILES = 120	5,502	2,264
STRIKE FORCE	7,784.4	32 FILES = 6,720	32 FILES = 1,856	25 FILES = 250	8,826	1,042
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES***	21,368.6	104 FILES = 21,840	149 FILES = 8,642	122 FILES = 1,220	31,702	10,333

** Street Crimes Unit transferred in June 2011 to Community & Ops Support Division. The estimate of annual hours was based on 1,556.57 hours/person and total caseload for 2011, as shown, to demonstrate estimated annual shortfall of hours for resourcing purposes.

*** Actual Total Hours tabulated from weekly Shift Schedule for 2011 was 41,093.5 hours and this is used to tabulate the actual total resource shortfall. Hours Short per Unit are shown to

provide indication of suggested deployment of additional required members.

Based on the tally of completed files, according to PRIME for 2011 for Investigation Services, of the 41,093.5 investigator hours on duty, 52% of these hours were available for investigation or 21,368.62 hours. Based on the time data obtained in the file sample, Investigation Services required 31,702 hours to complete these files. Therefore, there is a shortfall of 10,333.6 hours. Each person year in 2011 represented 1556.57 hours suggesting that Investigation Services was short 6.64 person years to complete just the new investigations assigned in 2011.⁴

Carry-Over Files

Resources are currently assigned to Investigative Services such that the average file backlog over a 12- month period is 12.4 files per month, or 149 files annually. In fact the backlog in 2011 was 168 files, to be carried over into 2012.

In the preceding section of this report, the calculation of resource needs for 2011 files did not account for investigations carried over from the previous year. In 2011, 115 files from previous years were carried into 2011. How long did it take to complete each of the carry over files, which may be investigations of substance and hence be time consuming? An analysis of the carry-over files from previous years is presented in Tables 9 and 10. Unfortunately, the data extracted from PRIME does not include the file classification (UCR code) or the type of file, such as an investigation with charges (the carry over could for example be for court preparation), continuing unsolved investigations, or continuing intelligence or assistance files, such as trying to locate a fugitive believed to have ties to Victoria. Hence, a different approach was used to appreciate the workload involved in these carry-over files.

⁴ If two additional civilian disclosure assistants were added, operational time for investigators should rise to 60% or 24,656 hours. Given this, the shortage of hours would be 7,046 hours requiring 4.5 or 5 additional investigators, instead of 6.6 or 7 additional investigators.

TABLE 9: NUMBERS OF FOLLOW-UP REPORTS FOR CARRY-OVER INVESTIGATION FILES FROM PREVIOUS YEARS 1969 - 2009⁵

<i>Carry-Over Investigations</i>	<i>Number of Files</i>
Number of files with ONE Follow-up	17
Number of files with TWO Follow-ups	10
Number of files with THREE Follow-ups	8
Number of files with FOUR Follow-ups	1
Number of files with FIVE Follow-ups	2
Number of files with SEVEN Follow-ups	1
Total Number of Follow-up Files	39

TABLE 10: NUMBERS OF FOLLOW-UP REPORTS PER FILE FOR 2010 FILES CARRIED OVER INTO 2011

<i>2010 Carry-Over Investigations</i>	<i>Number of Files</i>
Number of files with ONE Follow-up	52
Number of files with TWO Follow-ups	12
Number of files with THREE Follow-ups	6
Number of files with FOUR Follow-ups	4
Number of files with FIVE Follow-ups	0
Number of files with SEVEN FOLLOW-UPS	1

⁵ For the purposes of this research, files 2 years old or older were termed ‘cold cases’. Table 10 presents on-going ‘cold cases’ carried into 2011.

<i>2010 Carry-Over Investigations</i>	<i>Number of Files</i>
Number of files with THIRTEEN Follow-ups	1
Total Number of Follow-up Files	76

We may estimate that, potentially, Follow-up files with seven or more Follow-up investigations could equate to an ‘investigation with charges’, which take 210 hours. Follow-up Files with 3 to 6 Follow-up investigations may roughly equate to completing investigations without charges at 58 hours per file, and investigations with only one or two Follow-up equate roughly to simple intelligence or assistance files at 10 hours per file.

Based on this guide, the total number of investigator hours to complete the carryover files from previous years in the year 2011 was:

- Files with one – two follow-ups = 910 hours
- Files with three – six follow ups = 1,218 hours
- Files with seven or more follow-ups = 630 hours

In effect, this equates to 2½ additional investigators just to accomplish the work carried over into the next year. This means that Investigation Services requires additional investigator resources. Specifically, seven more investigators were required for 2011 investigations. Further, two more person years could be justified to be able to accomplish just the investigations carried over from previous years. Such additional resources could substantially reduce or perhaps avoid the current accepted necessity of carrying over 100 investigations into the following year, and the subsequent creation of and carrying over of ‘cold cases’.

This need for a minimum of 9 additional investigators is based on both the person hours actually fielded in 2011 and the nature of all the tasks now required of investigators, including the new disclosure requirements for Crown and Courts implemented in 2011. This total member requirement may be offset by as much as two investigators by hiring at least two additional civilian investigative assistants to take some, if not most, of the disclosure requirements away from criminal investigators. This would also have the benefit of increasing investigator operational time to at least 60%. Further, by adding these resources, the bulk of carryover and cold case files could be substantially reduced. Any further reviews of investigator resourcing, however, should also take into account the Crime Reduction goals of the Department, the Crime Reduction contribution by Investigative Services, and not just the file analysis accomplished heretofore.

Key Issue Affecting the Resource Allocation

A key issue in Investigation Services was the practice, through at least part of 2011, of the Division failing to notate or change the specific unit the primary investigator belonged to in PRIME. This affected the volume of files shown within PRIME as being assigned to Investigation Services. This discrepancy is presented in Table 7 above. Hence, we have only been able to determine the total workload for Investigative Services from a download of Follow-ups, which provided the actual number of files worked on in 2010 and 2011, but we did not have access to the details of the types of files that take different amounts of time. In other words, we did not know which files resulted in charges, the number of investigations without charges, and the number of assistance or intelligence files.

In 2011, the time consuming process of completing the Report to Crown Counsel (RTCC) changed somewhat in that Crown insisted that the full disclosure package must accompany the RTCC in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, *R. vs. Stinchcomb*, and an MOU to this effect was completed between Victoria Police and Crown. This particularly affects those investigation files where charges are recommended, the most time consuming type of file. Hence, it was imperative to determine required resources for 2011 as this will be the basis for subsequent years.

Resource Optimization – Detective Assignment and Scheduling

To the extent that major incidents and crimes occur frequently and some incidents are becoming more frequent, such as home invasion style robberies, it is imperative that Investigative Services retain investigative expertise, but also an appropriate level of resources. This factor affects the turnover of Investigative Services members and related policies and practices. However, Victoria Police are to be commended for retaining their policy concerning the rotation of personnel to and through Investigation Services, so that a significant number of qualified members have not only the opportunity to serve in Investigation Services, but also to carry their acquired investigative skills back to Patrol or other assignments when rotated out of Investigative Services.

Although Investigation Services is organized into different specialty Sections, frequently, there are optimal uses of resources. If any Section is overloaded or catches a major crime file, resources of other sections are pooled as may be necessary, particularly for the early stages of major criminal investigations. With reference to Financial Crimes, frequent optimizing by Major Crimes members of Financial Crimes investigators, has had three effects:

- Financial Crimes investigators are frequently drawn away from labour intensive and often complex fraud files to aid major crime investigators, particularly with the necessity of rapid response to a recently committed crime;

- Fraud members are only able to handle a lesser volume of files than other investigators because of the complexities associated to fraud files; and
- Financial Crime members gain the impression that their fraud files are of lower priority than major crime files, in spite of the significant financial losses associated to these files and the repetitive victimization by these criminals.

Perhaps Investigation Services should group Financial Crimes investigators separately to allow them to more easily focus of their work.

As of October 1, 2011, the Branch was managed by an Inspector and Staff Sergeant, as second-in-charge, with 32 Detective NCOs and investigators. Of the 32, two Sergeants supervised Major Crime Section teams, 1 Sergeant supervised Special Victims Unit, 1 Sergeant supervised the Strike Force, and a Staff Sergeant and Sergeant were assigned to the Historical Crime Section. In Major Crimes, Special Victims Unit, and Strike Force, the Sergeants take on investigation files and, therefore, participate in the caseload, especially in major cases. In Special Victims, the Sergeant takes fewer files, or ones likely to be of shorter duration, due to his supervision responsibilities. As senior NCOs, these Sergeants have a major time commitment to provide guidance and supervision to other members, and, in the absence of the Branch Staff Sergeant, will move to his office to maintain the flow of completed Reports to Crown Counsel and file flow and management for the Branch on PRIME. So, by necessity, there is a lesser participation in the caseload.

Of the 32 member Investigation Services, one member is currently assigned to review and advise on Domestic Violence files, and, apart from occasional major file involvement, this position does not participate in the investigation caseload. Similarly, the 5 member Historical Case Review Section is solely assigned to a very major ‘cold case’ investigation, and does not participate in the caseload of Investigation Services. Hence, 26 active investigators, including the “part time” investigator NCOs, now carry the investigative caseload of Investigation Services. This is a reduction from the former 38 members prior to the reduction of Major Crime Section and removal of the Street Crimes Unit, and, most recently, the move of Strike Force to the Intelligence and Operations Support Division.

It is anticipated, therefore, with fewer overall hours in 2012, and fewer units to call upon directly, the primary unit objectives in Investigation Services are and will continue to be difficult to maintain. There is considerable multi-tasking as units frequently pull resources or combine resources to deal with particular major crimes that occur or for urgent operations. All of this places a premium on adequate resourcing of Investigation Services. If the major investigation functions are under-resourced (e.g. Major Crimes, Financial Crimes, or Special Victims), there will be a greater tendency to co-opt Strike Force into major investigations. The outcome will be that important target objectives will be lost. There will be less crime reduction accomplished and,

in the long term, repetitive reactive investigations.

Investigative work is carried out at various times throughout the week depending on the needs of each investigative file (e.g. for possible surveillance, execution of search warrants, or interviews). Moreover, investigators in the 'reactive' investigation units (Major Crimes, Financial Crimes, and Special Victims) are routinely assigned to 10-hour day shifts and vary their hours individually or in teams depending on the demands of each investigation file. There is a high degree of flexibility in working hours as dictated by the needs of each case or the particular targeted criminal suspect. The dictates of each investigative file, particularly major files, impedes the ability to effectively extend detective coverage to other than day shifts. There are, therefore, few insights to improve the efficiency of shift schedules. However, as crimes can occur at any time, there is always a team of investigators on standby for possible callout. The question is whether there could be a reduction in salary costs for standby time if the standby team worked a week of 'late' afternoon shifts, such as 5:00 pm to 3:00 am, reducing their on-call time and making them more available for rapid deployment, as well as for plainclothes crime reduction activity during the evening hours to at least bar closing and shortly thereafter. It is submitted that this could put Investigators in closer support of Patrol and F.E.T. members working afternoon and evening times throughout the community.

Crime reduction strategies are mentioned elsewhere, as well as in the complementary report on Victoria Police done by the University of the Fraser Valley. Subject to gaining the full additional resources identified in this report, consideration could be given to placing the standby team on late afternoon shifts for a lengthy trial period, with directed crime reduction objectives, in addition to the investigative file Follow-up work that can be accomplished on afternoon shifts. Investigation Services has a meaningful role in crime reduction by helping target persistent offenders, crime problem solving, targeted surveillance and similar operations, and the generation of reliable informants. The evaluation of these shifts could include the positive or negative impact on in-progress investigations, the generation of coded informants, and the attainment of any crime reduction objectives determined for the Division. Depending on the results of an evaluation, consideration could be given to increasing Investigation Services to a full 19% of Department strength to enable coverage of both day and late afternoon shifts on a rotational schedule, to tackle pro-actively those crime problems affecting Victoria's high Crime Severity Index, and to maintain the crime reduction strategies and emphasis.

Investigation Services maintain a weekly shift schedule that records all absences from duty resulting from vacation, illness, court attendance, training requirements, etc... From a detailed review of the shift schedule, the absences are similar to those of all police departments in British Columbia and elsewhere. As the Shift Schedule for 2011 and prior years were complete and accurate, they allowed for a determination of the actual amount of person hours available for investigations, as well as time lost to other functions. This is critical to estimating the average investigation time per file, which is necessary to estimate personnel requirements. Continued maintenance of these records and an accurate file log could enable improved determination of the

actual time costs of types of investigation files, enable improved work estimates for different types of criminal investigations, and easier and more profound recommendations and decisions concerning the resourcing of Investigative Services.

Conclusion

This Report commenced with a hypothesis proposed by a study in the U.K. that a certain proportion of a police force should be criminal investigators. An examination of the proportion of investigators in a small sample of B.C. municipalities showed that, on average, 19% of police departments in BC were on-site criminal investigators. However, Victoria had only 12% on-site investigators. The study then examined whether having a lower proportion of investigators was detrimental. It was found that Victoria Police Investigation Services was significantly overtaxed, especially because investigative procedures have become more time consuming, complex, and exacting over the last ten years. As well, onerous expectations from the Court and Crown counsel have added especially to the documentation requirements. Victoria's investigators were not able to complete the number of investigations assigned each year, resulting not only in investigations being carried forward, but also in long term 'cold cases', most of which could not be followed up on in a timely fashion.

It was determined that the direction and management of Investigation Services could be improved if five standards were adopted, and it appears there is validity to the original hypothesis that a certain percentage of investigators is required. Further, it was determined that Victoria Investigation Services need an additional 7 positions to handle the assigned investigations each year, and an additional 2½ investigators to handle the carry-over files and cold cases. Adding these nine positions would raise Investigation Services to 16% of the Victoria Police Department. Finally, knowing the costs of investigations, in terms of time and needed resources, will help to make the Department and Division budget more defensible.

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Appendix 1A - Deriving Investigative Productivity Measures Purposive and Systematic Sample File Data

APPENDIX 1A		DERIVING INVESTIGATION PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES - HOURS REQUIRED PER TYPE OF CRIME FILE									
VIC/PD		OVERALL INVESTIGATION ANALYSIS					INVESTIGATOR HOURS				
SECTION	NUMBER OF CHARGES	NUMBER TYPE OF CRIME	SECONDARY OFFENCE	FILE NUMBER	PRELIMINARY INV HOURS	FOLLOW-UP HOURS	TOTAL HOURS	OVERTIME	REMARKS		
MAJOR CRIME		1/MURDER		11-9418	166	134.75	300.75	159	WIMCU file but VicPd is involved as initially an agg assault.		
		2/KIDNAPPING		10-40392	539	668	1207	256			
		3/ASSAULT CAUSING		07-23243	531	1274.3	1805.3	0	Old unsolved taken over, untypical in that no search warrants and no overtime worked.		
		4/ROBBERY W/ FIREARM	FORCIBLE CONFINEMENT	09-60029	20	361	361	0	0.16.8% OF TIME (64HRS) for PRIME, RTCC, Disclosure		
		5/ROBBERY W/ FIREARM	B&E	11-1626	100	300	400	188			
		6/ROBBERY W/ FIREARM	PROHIB WEAPON	11-41652	52.5	118.6	171.1	0			
		7/ROBBERY (Bank x 2)		11-17507	114.75	50.25	165	12.75	ROBBERY OF 711 MARKET		
		8/ROBBERY (Bank)		10-29043	57.6	106.5	164.1	0			
		9/ROBBERY (HOME INV)	ASSAULT CAUSING	11-32445	100.5	256	356.5	0			
		10/DISCHARGE FIREARM	CARELESS USE	11-33993	494	105	599	0			
		11 B&E (COMMERCIAL)	B&E WITH INTENT	11-26312	96.5	53.5	150	0			
		12/Utter Threats	Shoplifting	11-5808	99	70	169	0			
		13/POSSESS COCAINE	(XREF ROBBERY FILE)	11-5375	4.5	3.5	8	0	308.75		
MAJOR CRIME AVERAGE (LESS MURDER KIDNAPPING)					113.955	142.44	256.37	50.19			
AV. TIME ROBBERIES					182.72	269.34	452.06	87.96			
MAJOR CRIME		INVS			74.23	198.73	272.95	50.19			
		14/SUDDEN DEATH	MISSING PERSON	11-42688	38.25	43.00	81.25	0			
		15/HARRASSMENT	THREATS TO PERSON	11-2445	5.50	1.50	7.00	0			
		16/THREATS	OBSTRUCT JUSTICE	11-19889	10.00	10.00	20.00	0			
		17/ATT. SUICIDE (CELLS)	INTERNAL INVS	11-34376	10.00	7.00	17.00	0			
MAJOR CRIME AVERAGE					15.94	15.38	31.31	0	125.25		
MAJOR CRIME		ASSIST & INTELL FILES									
		18/ASSIST AGENCY - MICCF (KIDNAPPING)		11-3389	75	14	89	0			
		19/ASSIST SAANICH PD (SUSP PERSON)		11-37752	3.75	1.75	5.5	0			
		20/ASSIST EDMONTON SHOOTING		11-8505	1.25	1	2.25	0			
		21/ASSIST CALGARY INTELL MURDER		11-6988	4	4.5	8.5	0			
		22/ASSIST STONEY PLAIN MURDER		11-14707	0.5	0.5	1.5	0			
		23/ASSIST RCMP 'E' SUSPICIOUS PERSON		11-18257	7.5	1	8.5	0			
		24/INTELL ON POSSIBLE RIOT		11-23219	3.5	0.5	4	0			
		25/INTELL		11-20517	1	1	2	0			
MAJOR CR ASSIST AVERAGE					12.13	3.03	15.16	0	121.25		
INVESTIGATIONS WITH SPECIAL VICTIMS		NUMBER TYPE OF CRIME	SECONDARY OFFENCE	FILE NUMBER	PRELIMINARY INV HOURS	FOLLOW-UP HOURS	TOTAL HOURS	OVERTIME	REMARKS		
		26/SEX ASS W/ WEAPON	FORCIBLE CONFINEMENT	11-31847	124	183	307	86			
		27/SEX ASSAULT	DISGUISE W/ INTENT	10-13608	40.62	71.5	112.12	18			
		28/SEX ASSAULT		11-13530	34.5	22	56.5	0			
		29/SEX ASSAULT		11-28842	35.6	167.25	202.85	14	1.4 HRS OT to prepare RTCC in timely manner		
		30/SEX ASSAULT		11-2325	25	13.5	38.5	0			
		31/SEXUAL INTERFERENCE		11-13723	12	16	28	0			
		32/BREACH SEX OFF REG #	FAIL TO REPORT	11-3217	1.5	2.5	4	0	ASS BY 16 YR OLD ON 11 YR OLD		
		33/BREACH SEX OFF REG ACT		11-44533	1	1.5	2.5	0	751.47		
AV. TIME SEX ASSAULT					34.28	59.66	93.93	23.60			
SEX CRIME INVS		34/DISTR. CHILD PORN	POSSESS CHILD PORN	11-5978	348.5	348.5	348.5	348.5			
		35/INDECENT ACT		11-11155	8	12	20	0			
		36/INDECENT ACT		11-14735	3	2	5	0			
		37/SEX ASSAULT		11-13530	20.5	25	45.5	0			
AV. TIME SEX ASS NO CHARGE					10.5	13	23.5	0	70.5		
PENDING FILE		S.U.I. 38 POSSESS CHILD PORN	2 SUSPECTS	11-41292	4.5	4.5	9	0			
PENDING FILE		S.U.I. 39 POSSESS CHILD PORN		11-29496	3.5	2	5.5	0			
PENDING FILE		S.U.I. 40 POSSESS CHILD PORN	S.U.I. -PIPEDA REQUES	11-37834	2	1.5	3.5	0			
SEX CRIME INTELL		ASSIST41									
		42/PROSTITUTION INTELL	PROCURING	11-5851	1	0	1	0			
AV. TIME PENDING&ASSIST		43/ASSIST SAANICH/CE	LURING / CHILD PORN	11-17225	5.5	0.5	6	0			
					3.3	1.7	5	0	25		

INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES	NUMBER TYPE OF CRIME	SECONDARY OFFENSE	FILE NUMBER	PREMIARY INV HOURS	FOLLOW-UP HOURS	TOTAL HOURS	OVERTIME	REMARKS
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES								
FINANCIAL CRIMES								
44 LUTTERING		THEFT OVER	09-51602	306	94.5	400.5		0 Maj frauds rec'd 2x monthly, e.g. credit card skim or investment frauds, no MCM used
45 CRIM BREACH TRUST		THEFT X 29	11-39883	337	169	506		
46 THEFT OVER		UTTER FORGED DOC	11-51602	306	94.5	400.5		
47 FRAUD		ATT FRAUD OVER	11-37943	388	117	505		
48 FRAUD (CHQ) OVER			11-46033	11.5	40	51.5		1863.5
AVERAGE TIME				269.7	103	372.7		
FINANCIAL CRIME								
49 UTTER COUNTERFEIT			11-19815	1.5	0.5	2		
PENDING FILE		(COMPUTER FORENSIC	11-40532	6.25	3	9.75		
AVERAGE TIME NO CHARGE/PENDING				4.125	1.75	5.875		11.75
SECTION								
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES								
STREET CRIMES								
51 POSS FOR PURPOSE T		(PROJECT FILE)	10-42718	11.5	3.25	14.75		Intell based project file undertaken once annually, investigative hours only
52 POSS STOLEN PPTY		(PAWN SHOP HIT)	11-39628	20	28	48		
53 POSSESS REST. FIREARM			11-38108					
STREET CRIME INVES								
54 POSS FIREARM		BREACH CONDITIONS	11-13137	28	2.5	30.5		
AVERAGE TIME STREET CRIMES				19.83	11.25	31.08		62.75
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES								
STRIKE FORCE								
55 TRAFFICKING CONTROL		PPT X 2	11-17110	1034	57	1091	16	
56 PPT (COCAINE)			11-23916	452	29	481		0 Typical Dial-a-Dope file RTCC still being completed
57 PPT (COCAINE)			11-37939	490	174	639		1111 HOWEVER S.U.J. AND RTCC STILL TO BE DONE (ESTIMATE 25 HRS INCL. IN F.U.)
58 PPT COCAINE/HEROIN		3 ACCUSED	11-5950	577.25	173	750.25		
59 TRAFFICKING CRACK			11-38568	155.5	26.5	182		
60 PPT COCAINE			11-23916	496.5	34.5	531		
61 SET TRAPS		PPT	11-20834	295	201	496		
62 TRAFFICK MARIJUANA		(PART OF MASTER FILE	11-44534	12	8	20		
63 TRAFFICK COCAINE		(PART OF MASTER FILE	11-38570	136.5	20	156.5		
* (20) TRAFFICKING		BUY&BUST ASSIST F.E.	4 OPS YEARLY	480	72	552		0 EXAMPLE OF TYPICAL BUY/BUST PERSON HOURS DONE 4 TIMES ANNUALLY
AVERAGE TIME STRIKE FORCE CHARGED FILES				412.88	79.50	489.88		4898.75
AVERAGE TIME STRIKE FORCE W/O BUY BUST				405.42	80.33	482.97		
STRIKE FORCE INVES								
64 TRAFFICK HEROIN		(UNFOUNDED)	11-15555	1.5	8	9.5		
65 PPT CRYSTAL METH		(UNFOUNDED)	11-2152	6	9.5	15.5		
66 POSS FIREARM		(UNFOUNDED)	11-30609	224	5	229		
67 PPT COCAINE		(UNFOUNDED)	11-11376	36	0.25	36.25		
68 TRAFFICK COCAINE		(UNFOUNDED)	11-20776	26.5	15.5	42		
STRIKE FORCE INTELL		ASSIST						
69 PPT & OBSTRUCT PO		ASSIST NANAIMO	11-1770	10.5	98.5	109		
AVERAGE TIME STRIKE FORCE NO CHARGE FILES				50.75	22.79	73.54		441.25
AVERAGE TIMES FOR RTCC FILES								
AVERAGE TIMES FOR FILES W/O CHARGES								
AVERAGE TIMES FOR ASSIST FILES								

223.50

AVERAGE TIMES FOR RTCC FILES

41.16

AVERAGE TIMES FOR FILES W/O CHARGES

10.53

AVERAGE TIMES FOR ASSIST FILES

Appendix 1B – Systematic File Sample Data

APPENDIX 1B DERIVING INVESTIGATION PRODUCTIVITY MEASURES - HOURS REQUIRED PER TYPE OF CRIME FILE

VIC-PC		OVERALL INVESTIGATION ANALYSIS			INVESTIGATOR HOURS		SYSTEMATIC RANDOM SAMPLE FILES ONLY			
SECTION	NUMBER	TYPE OF CRIME	SECONDARY OFFENCE	FILE NUMBER	PREMINARY	FOLLOW-UP	TOTAL HOURS	OVERTIME	REMARKS	UNIT TOTAL HOURS
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES										
MAJOR CRIME	1	ROBBERY W. FIREARM	PROHIB WEAPON	11-41652	52.5	118.6	171.1			
	2	ROBBERY(HOME INV)	ASSAULT CAUSING	11-32445	100.5	256	356.5			
	3	DISCHARGE FIREARM	CARELESS USE	11-33993	494	105	599			
	4	B&E (COMMERCIAL)	B&E WITH INTENT	11-25312	96.5	53.5	150			
	5	Utter Threats	Shoplifting	11-5808	99	70	169			
	6	POSSESS COCAINE	(XREF ROBBERY FILE)	11-5375	4.5	3.5	8			
MAJOR CRIME AVERAGE					141.17	101.10	242.27			1453.6
INVESTIGATIONS NO CHARGES										
	7	SUDDEN DEATH	MISSING PERSON	11-42688	38.25	43.00	81.25			
	8	HARRASSMENT	THREATS TO PERSON	11-2445	5.50	1.50	7.00			
	9	THREATS	OBSTRUCT JUSTICE	11-19889	10.00	10.00	20.00			
	10	ATT. SUICIDE (CELLS)	INTERNAL INVES	11-34376	10.00	7.00	17.00			
MAJOR CRIME AVERAGE(NO CHARGE)					15.94	15.38	31.31			125.25
ASSIST INVESTIGATIONS & INTELL FILES										
	11	ASSIST AGENCY - MCCF	(KIDNAPPING)	11-3389	75	14	89			
	12	ASSIST SAANICH PD	(SUSP PERSON)	11-37752	3.75	1.75	5.5			
	13	ASSIST EDMONTON	SHOOTING	11-8505	1.25	1	2.25			
	14	ASSIST CALGARY	INTELL MURDER	11-6988	4	4.5	8.5			
	15	ASSIST STONEY PLAIN	MURDER	11-14707	1	0.5	1.5			
	16	ASSIST RCMP 'E'	SUSPICIOUS PERSON	11-18257	7.5	1	8.5			
	17	INTELL ON POSSIBLE	RIOT	11-23219	3.5	0.5	4			
	18	INTELL		11-20517	1	1	2			
MAJOR CR ASSIST AVERAGE					12.13	3.03	15.16			121.25
SPECIAL VICTIMS										
INVESTIGATIONS OF SEX CRIMES										
	19	SEX ASSAULT		11-13530	31	20	51	0		
	20	SEXUAL INTERFERENCE		11-13723	12	16	28		14 HRS OT to prepare RTCC in timely manner	
	21	BREACH SEX OFF REG ACT	FAIL TO REPORT	11-3217	1.5	2.5	4			
	22	BREACH SEX OFF REG ACT		11-44533	1	1.5	2.5		ASS BY 16 YR OLD ON 11 YR OLD	
	23	INDECENT ACT		11-14735	3	2	5		MCM used in Master File (serial offender)	
	24	INDECENT ACT		11-11155	8	12	20		Serial offender - Action in Master File (unsolved)	
SEX CRIME AVERAGE TIME					9.42	9.00	18.42	0.00		110.5
SEX CRIME INTELL/ASSIST FILES										
PENDING FILE	25	POSSESS CHILD PORN	2 SUSPECTS	11-41292	4.5	4.5	9			
PENDING FILE	26	POSSESS CHILD PORN		11-29496	3.5	2	5.5			
PENDING FILE	27	POSSESS CHILD PORN	S.U.I. -PIPEDA REQUES	11-37834	2	1.5	3.5			
	28	PROSTITUTION INTELL	PROCURING	11-5851	1	0	1			
	29	ASSIST SAANICH/ICE	LURING / CHILD PORN	11-17225	5.5	0.5	6			
	30	INTELLIGENCE FILE		11-20517	1	1	2			
AV.TIME PENDING&ASSIST					2.92	1.58	4.5			27
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES										
FINANCIAL CRIM	33	UTTERING	THEFT OVER	09-51602	306	94.5	400.5	0	(SUBSTUTED FILE COMPLETED IN 2011	ABSENT INVESTIGATOR)
	34	CRIM BREACH TRUST	THEFT X 29	11-39883	337	169	506			
	35	FRAUD	ATT FRAUD OVER	11-37943	388	117	505			
	36	FRAUD (CHQ) OVER		11-46033	11.5	40	51.5			
AVERAGE TIME FINANCIAL CRIM/INVES					260.63	105.125	365.75			1463
INTELL	37	UTTER COUNTERFEIT		11-19815	1.5	0.5	2		NO INVESTIGATION ON COUNTERFEITS SUBMITTED TO RCMP	
PENDING FILE	38	MISCHIEF TO DATA	(COMPUTER FORENSIC	11-40532	6.75	3	9.75			
AVERAGE TIME NO CHARGE/PENDING					4.125	1.75	5.875			11.75
SECTION NUMBER TYPE OF CRIME SECONDARY OFFENCE FILE NUMBER PREMINARY FOLLOW-UP TOTAL HOURS OVERTIME										
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES										
STREET CRIMES	39	POSS STOLEN PPTY	(PAWN SHOP HIT)	11-39628	11.5	3.25	14.75		REMARKS	
	40	POSSESS REST. FIREARM		11-38108	20	28	48			
	41	POSS FIREARM	BREACH CONDITIONS	11-13137	28	2.5	30.5			
AVERAGE TIME STREET CRIMES					19.83	11.25	31.08			93.25
INVESTIGATIONS WITH CHARGES										
STRIKE FORCE	42	PPT COCAINE/HEROIN	3 ACCUSED	11-5950	577.25	173	750.25	111		
	43	TRAFFICKING CRACK		11-38568	155.5	26.5	182			
	44	PPT COCAINE		11-23916	496.5	42.5	539			
	45	SET TRAPS	PPT	11-20834	295	201	496			
	46	TRAFFICK MARIJUANA	(PART OF MASTER FILE	11-44534	12	8	20		Typical Dial-a-Dope file	RTCC still being completed
	47	TRAFFICK COCAINE	(PART OF MASTER FILE	11-38570	136.5	20	156.5			
	*(20)	TRAFFICKING	BUY&BUST ASSIST F.E.	14 OPS YEARL	480	72	552		EXAMPLE OF TYPICAL BUY/BUST PERSON HOURS DONE 4 TIMES ANNUALLY	
STRIKE FORCE AVERAGE WITH CHARGES (INCL. BUY BUST OP)					307.54	77.57	385.11	0		2695.75
STRIKE FORCE AVERAGE WITH CHARGES (EXCLUDE BUY BUST OP)					278.79	78.50	357.29			2143.75
INVESTIGATIONS NO CHARGES										
STRIKE FORCE	48	TRAFFICK HEROIN	(UNFOUNDED)	11-15555	1.5	8	9.5			
	49	PPT CRYSTAL METH	(UNFOUNDED)	11-2132	6	9.5	15.5			
	50	POSS FIREARM	(UNFOUNDED)	11-30609	224	5	229			
	51	PPT COCAINE	(UNFOUNDED)	11-11376	36	0.25	36.25			
	52	PPT & OBSTRUCT PO	ASSIST NANAIMO	11-1770	10.5	98.5	109			
AVERAGE TIME STRIKE FORCE NO CHARGES					55.6	24.25	79.85			399.25

INVESTIGATION SERVICES DIVISION AVERAGES FROM RANDOM SAMPLE

AVERAGE TIME FOR CHARGED CASES	(25 FILES SAMPLED)	210 HOURS	210.56	223.70 HOURS (including Buy&Bust OP)
AVERAGE TIME INVESTIGATIONS NO CHARGES	(11 FILES AMPLED)	58 HOURS	58.28	
AVERAGE TIME FOR ASSIST/PENDING/INTELL CASES	(14 FILES SAMPLED)	10 HOURS	10.00	

Addendum: Possible Opportunities

MAJOR INVESTIGATIONS: POLICY TO GUIDE THE INVOKING OF MAJOR CASE MANAGEMENT*

From the file review conducted, it appeared that the invoking of the Major Case Management Model and the inherent Command Triangle rests with the senior investigator on scene, usually in collaboration with a senior Investigation Services Manager. It may be beneficial to formalize this process, to raise the visibility of the decision, and for clarity to all investigators. The following is a suggested practice that tightens the process, but may be worthy of consideration as a Department or Division policy.

Generally crimes of a serious nature (e.g. robbery, serious assault, sexual assault, officer involved shooting, etc.) will be investigated by Detectives in Investigation Services and overseen by Detective Sergeants.

For murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rapes by unidentified suspects, attempted murder, arson where life was endangered, or intended to be endangered, and very serious robberies with violence by unknown suspects, the Investigation Services Staff Sergeant or Inspector, or in their absence the Department's on-call Duty Officer shall be contacted. The officer contacted will take the role of Senior Investigating Officer, and shall make an assessment of the scale of the investigation. S/he shall ensure that the investigation and its documentation is entirely auditable, searchable, and may be linked to other incidents within BC or elsewhere, as well as ensuring that any outside agency can investigate and/or review the decisions taken, especially if a police firearms response is involved. S/he shall decide to manage the investigation in one of two ways:

1. By establishing a Major Case Management Room and a number of roles will be assigned in accordance with the Major Case Management Model, to ensure appropriate command and control of the investigation. The roles may include (and may be combined), but are not limited to:
 - Deputy Senior Investigating Officer
 - Office Manager and Resource Scheduler
 - Receiver of Tips and Action Allocator
 - File Coordinator whether using PRIME or other Major Case Management software
 - File Index staff (may be civilian staff)
 - Exhibit officers
2. A smaller scale investigation may be established, but shall be managed in such a way that it can be up-scaled to the above Major Case Management system, should the

investigation escalate, so that it can be back-recorded in any required Major Case Management software or manual system, and especially so that it is auditable by any outside agency.

The decision how to manage the investigation, how many officers to deploy and in what roles, shall rest with the Senior Investigating Officer, who may make bids to Senior Department Management for additional resources to staff the investigation.

*Reference: Based in part on an exchange of information with Detective Superintendent Andrew Slattery, C.I.D., Cumbria Police, U.K. who was contacted through his Chief Constable Stuart Hyde, Cumbria Police, in view of their handling of the so-called BIRD shootings, wherein 12 people were murdered and 11 wounded in a one person shooting rampage, that was essentially a murder-suicide. Nonetheless with no fewer than 30 simultaneous crimes scenes, this case exemplified Major Case Management. For an outline of the case, see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cumbria_shootings

SUCCESS IN CRIME REDUCTION

There are at least *seven key points*, based on the experience of other agencies, that may be critical to the success of crime reduction strategies. The KEY is to take a broad problem solving approach to crime, BUT with an attitude that there simply should not be ANY crimes. Victoria Police may wish to review this list when considering strategies and their implementation to tackle crime reduction and take particular aim at the high weighted crime index for the Capitol.

1. CRIME ANALYSTS AND PROBLEM SOLVING CRIME REDUCTION

STRATEGIES HAVE BEEN KEY IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE U.K., which has seen really staggering crime reduction. These are now been duplicated in some areas of Canada and BC. ***CRIME ANALYSTS must be working with ALL Branches of the Department, and not just for the Community and Operations Support Division nor in support of Senior Executive.***

2. This may mean prioritizing the acquisition of additional analyst capability.

- It is CRITICAL that ***an analyst be geographically located in the Department where they are accessible to the majority of members*** (e.g. first floor in the patrol area); where in effect members cannot help but trip over the analyst. Likewise the analyst must be motivated to tolerate frequent interruptions and queries by such members,

and to make themselves very much a part of the team, by for example attending as many watch briefings daily as possible, to share information, be a right arm to constables wrestling with crime or social problems by proposing strategies and targets, and fielding questions concerning PROBLEM SOLVING.

- It may be meaningful to have at least one analyst undertake training at or with the Jill Dando Institute, University College of London. (See general web page here: www.ucl.ac.uk/jdi and short course for problem solving crime analysts web page: www.ucl.ac.uk/jdi/short-courses/strat-analysis)

3. The analyst and members need access to CORNET (Corrections Canada)/JUSTIN/INFOPOL to ensure they have COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION ON THE PERSISTENT OFFENDERS they are tracking.

4. SHARING OF INFORMATION is critical through the use of documented STREET CHECKS, emails, bulletins such as Victoria's ESPIKE, and phone calls.

5. PARTNERSHIPS AND NETWORKING has proved critical to success in problem solving, and especially to not only get persistent offenders off the street, but also to have the means to get them to turn their lives around, which should be part of the goals of a broad crime reduction strategy.

- Partnerships and networking could include at a minimum the local Health Authority, Mental Health and Addictions, outside groups offering housing (such as John Howard Society), in addition to Probation, Parole, Provincial Jails, Provincial and Federal Crown Counsel (who if possible should be co-opted into the crime reduction strategy), By-Law enforcement, and of course the local municipalities.
- The above function must become part of the process of PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION and KEY STAKEHOLDERS to partner with on any issue.

6. CURFEW CHECKS AND STREET CHECKS to ensure offenders most likely to re-offend are checked DAILY to ensure their compliance with court orders. While this may increase breach charges (hence the need for Crown counsel to be on side), it ensures a reduction in the number of new offences against property or persons.

- STREET CHECKS provide a number of pieces of information such as:
 - Information on offenders in areas where offences are known to occur, are identifiable through street checks.
 - new offenders to Victoria are identified more quickly
 - last known checks and clothing of those in high risk lifestyles in case they go missing, as well as identification of persons and what they were wearing in the event of a suspect description surfacing when crimes occur
 - deterrence of new offences by virtue of the person being checked by police

7. TRACKING OFFENDERS by knowing where they are, and when they are released, making a point of greeting them as they re-enter the community, so they are aware that the police know they are back!

Reference: Enlarged, but based on comments by Ms. Sarah Palmer, Crime Analyst, Kamloops RCMP, and D/Chief Len Goerke, Abbotsford Police, at a meeting on Police Capacity, UFV, Dec 19/20, 2011