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Crime Prevention and Policing Study
Strategic Update
and
Policing Services Model Review

Part 1: Research and Statistical Analysis

Part 2: Community Perception and Strategy Development

Part 3: Policing Service Model Review

SUBMITTED TO THE
Mayor and Council
JUNE 30th 2011

perivale + taylor

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Red Deer Crime Prevention and Policing Review

The City of Red Deer Council provided direction that the Crime Prevention and Policing Study/Strategy Update and Policing Service Model Review be undertaken. The Review is intended to provide recommendations with respect to crime prevention and policing strategies and the most effective policing service model for Red Deer. This will assist Council in understanding trends and needs, and will provide a basis for an informed decision making process.

1 Introduction

Until the last quarter of the 20th century the public police usually were the main crime prevention practitioners. Today, it is recognized that the public police are but one of a continuum of agencies and organisations which can have impact on crime and public safety and buttress broad crime prevention initiatives. The genesis of crime and social disorder is now understood to be more complex than simply the acts of the antisocial few.

However, the public police remain the focus in gauging community response to crime and social disorder.

- the police possess significant power over civil liberties
- 'disorder', in its broadest sense, is viewed as a 'crime' issue and within the purview of the police
- the police are usually the only twenty-four hour response
- the police are seen as the agency of last resort when other forms of intervention fail
- police services usually consume a significant portion of municipal budgets.

In recognition of the changed nature of the role of police and other agencies, the Province led a reassignment of selected law enforcement functions to ensure that the full spectrum of community resources is used appropriately and efficiently. This continuum of law enforcement is supported by legislation: the *Police Act* and *Peace Officer Act*.¹ As exemplified in this initiative, and evidenced within policing and public safety across Canada and internationally, a division of labour is occurring which permits other differently trained and qualified public and private-industry personnel and community organizations to assume an important complementary and appropriate role in community safety and security.

Municipalities operate in an environment of fiscal restraint and competition between social, educational, health, and infrastructure priorities. Many councils are adopting a different perspective on crime and disorder and are developing a broader, more complex, multifaceted approach to the alleviation of core reasons for crime and the reduction of the opportunities to commit crime. A frequent approach is for local

¹ Revised Statutes of Alberta.

government to orchestrate an integrated response involving a range of available resources from, both the municipality and the community. An essential element in this reassessment is evaluating the nature and quality of the police service provided and examining alternative models and service providers. In addition, Councils expect their service providers to employ best practices in order to provide a cost efficient quality service which makes optimum use of all municipal resources. The lateral use of municipal resources is complemented by the best, hierarchical, use of provincial and federal resources. The pending contract renewals of Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) provincial and municipal policing agreements across the country in preparation for 2012 have added a new dimension to the examination of alternative policing services in Canada.

1.1 The Red Deer Context

The City of Red Deer (The City) has been experiencing increasing demands and pressures concerning crime which is impacting policing service delivery and the need for crime prevention strategies. Red Deer is the third largest city in Alberta and serves as Central Alberta's economic, cultural and social activity hub. The population of Red Deer has grown from 72,671 in 2003 to 89,891 in 2009, a growth rate of over 24% in six years.² The growth rate has been very rapid for a period of time and, more recently, slowed somewhat as a result of the economic downturn.

In 2009 the City land mass increased by 40% following the annexation of 47, primarily rural, quarter sections. It is also noted that the Red Deer County commercial area adjacent to the Queen Elizabeth II Highway (Highway 2), commonly known as Gasoline Alley,³ is geographically contiguous to the City corporate boundary.

Red Deer's site and situation⁴, located on the major thoroughfare between Calgary and Edmonton and acting as a regional growth pole, are viewed as causing criminal activity to gravitate to the area, more now than has been seen in the past.⁵ As noted in the previous 2005 *Crime Prevention and Policing Study*, Red Deer is not simply a waypoint between Edmonton and Calgary; it is clearly an urban/regional centre in its own right.⁶

² The 2010 Municipal Census Report (July 2010) placed Red Deer population at 90, 084.

³ Gasoline Alley, originally a collection of roadside restaurants, gas stations, RV dealerships and assorted travellers' diversions adjacent to the highway, now incorporates major chain stores and accommodations. The area is policed by RCMP Red Deer Rural Detachment, with the office currently located in the City of Red Deer and is scheduled to move to Blackfalds in 2011.

⁴ Site is the physical landscape a settlement is built on. Situation is the settlement location relative to the surrounding area.

⁵ RFP: *Crime Prevention and Policing Study / Strategic Update and Policing Service Model Review (5/18)*, Background information.

⁶ Converge Consulting Group. *Phase 1: Crime Prevention and Policing in Red Deer*.

The City also observed⁷ that influences, stemming from changes in legislation and government policy, court decisions, technology, occupational health and safety, media influence, and societal expectations have increased pressure on crime prevention and policing services in Red Deer.

Additionally, the increasing complexity in crime patterns and the influences of the internet, combined with the wider diversity and changing social environment in Red Deer are viewed by the City as factors which impact workloads of the police and community agencies. These issues, along with others noted, are viewed as directly impacting perceptions, the type of crime in the community and the ability and need for all stakeholders to respond. In the course of the *Review*, it became apparent that perceptions of crime are derived from more than an individual's observation of criminal incidents. Further, one's 'perception of crime' impacts the methods (and funds) which are used to respond to crime(s). Consequently, these perceptions are examined to provide greater background to the 'calls for service' data.

In other municipalities across the province, similar environmental dynamics were noted. In response, the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) established a task force, comprised of elected and appointed officials from AUMA member municipalities and representatives of police commissions, policing committees, municipal police services, the RCMP, and Alberta Solicitor General and Public Security, to address three major areas: Civilian Oversight, the Continuum of Policing, and Funding of Policing. This review, which included survey input from the City of Red Deer and other AUMA members resulted in several AUMA position recommendations.⁸ These recommendations will be further discussed during the course of the *Review* reports.⁹

In 2003 – 2004, the City of Red Deer commenced the *Crime Prevention and Policing Study* which resulted in a comprehensive strategy and implementation plan for the future direction of the RCMP and crime prevention initiatives for the community. During the ensuing five years, work has been undertaken to implement the various strategies in the implementation plan. This has provided a road map for the RCMP as well as for crime prevention initiatives.

Currently, within an environment of increasing accountability and fiscal restraint, Council has determined a need to evaluate the existing police service model provided by the RCMP compared with establishing its own municipal police service or other alternative models. Service delivery expectations, cost comparisons and best practices are to be considered.

⁷ Ibid RFP

⁸ Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) Policing in Alberta, November 5, 2009.

⁹ A limited discussion regarding Civilian Oversight, the Continuum of Policing, and Funding of Policing are presented in this report; however, more detailed discussion will be provided in the Part 3 Report which focuses on the *Policing Service Model Review*.

Responding to the factors as noted above, the City of Red Deer Council provided direction that the *Crime Prevention and Policing Study/Strategy Update and Policing Service Model Review (the Review)* be undertaken. The *Review* is intended to provide recommendations with respect to crime prevention and policing strategies and the most effective policing service model for Red Deer. This will assist Council in understanding trends and needs, and will provide a basis for an informed decision making process.

The *Review* is in three parts with phased delivery dates¹⁰ for the submission of reports of each part:

Part 1: Research and Statistical Analysis – January 2011

Part 2: Community Perception and Strategy Development – May 2011

Part 3: Policing Service Model Review and Final Report of the *Review* – June 2011

This report, Part 1, with requirement details noted in Appendix 1, in summary provides a backdrop and foundation to the reports of subsequent parts of the *Review*. As the report of Part 1 is, largely, an analysis and reporting of the state of crime prevention and policing in the City of Red Deer there are no recommendations included. These will be provided, as appropriate, within the future deliverables report for Parts 2 and 3.

1.2 Goals of the *Review*

The overall *Review* is intended to provide recommendations with respect to crime prevention and policing strategies and the most effective policing service model for Red Deer. This will assist Council in understanding trends and needs, and will provide a basis for their decision making process. Additionally, the *Review* will provide for the development of a strategic framework¹¹ for crime prevention and policing in Red Deer for now and into the future, in keeping with The City of Red Deer Strategic Plan, Vision and Direction. The Strategic Framework is provisional and subject to discussion with Council. It may also be changed as a result of input from participants in subsequent phases of the *Review*. Given that the Strategic Framework is an objective for the City, it will form the backdrop to Parts 2 and 3 of the *Review*.

¹⁰ Completion dates for each part of the *Review* and the attending deliverables was established through consultation between the Consultant and the Steering Committee, project coordinator and project manager.

¹¹ In discussion with the *Review* project manager, the term 'Strategic Framework' was substituted for 'Guiding principles'. In discussion, it became apparent that the term 'Guiding Principles' was too limiting for the broad philosophy and practice which was being proposed.

2 Methodology

Although the three parts of the *Review* are subject to three reports, the methodology, and resulting data gathering, is cumulative in nature and was designed such that information gathered benefits all three parts. The bulk of the data gathering is conducted in the early phase, Part 1, of the *Review*. Early data gathering maximized the opportunity for accurate findings in the Part 1 report. The qualitative and quantitative data gathered will provide a valuable backdrop and foundation to subsequent parts of the *Review*.

2.1 Research and Statistical Analysis

Purpose¹²

- To undertake detailed comparative research to provide an accurate picture and clearly articulate crime and social disorder issues in Red Deer.
- To compare and contrast the present Red Deer situation, with benchmark data identified in *Phase 1: Crime Prevention and Policing in Red Deer*.
- To identify and detail the inclusive community stakeholder response to crime and social disorder issues in Red Deer.
- To provide a literature review of leading crime prevention and policing practices from other communities.
- To create benchmark data for comparative analysis in later parts of the *Review*.

2.2 Interviews

An initial sample of representatives of key management and stakeholders from the City of Red Deer, the RCMP (Divisional and detachment), and community agencies/organizations, was developed for interviews. Ongoing interviews obtained further contacts for clarification or additional lines of inquiry which buttressed the project requirements. Interviews were based upon a structured open-ended interview schedule. The degree of flexibility and focus was largely determined by the expertise, experience and employment position of the interviewee. Over 100 contacts and interviews were conducted in support of Part 1. A list of contacts and interviewees is included in Appendix 2.

In August 2010, a one-day workshop was conducted with City Council. This interactive process provided a foundation for the development of guiding principles for crime prevention and policing and to determine

¹² The Purposes from the RFP for Part 1 have been summarized into point form for brevity. The *Review* report will include the purposes as articulated in the RFP. The specific RFP Deliverables, for each part of the *Review* are detailed in Appendix 1.

and establish the long-term strategic priorities of Council in addition to the more immediate and tactical issues.

2.3 Literature review

A comprehensive review of articles, documents and other related information was conducted to extract information regarding:

- management and operational issues.
- approaches to projecting operational and capital needs.
- outcomes of initiatives undertaken to enhance organisational efficiency and operational effectiveness, and
- leading crime prevention and policing practices from other communities, to be used as benchmark data for comparative purposes.

The literature review focused on approaches undertaken in Canadian, Commonwealth and American policing environments that are similar and applicable to that being experienced within Red Deer.

Other documents and statistics were requested from the Project Manager, City staff and the RCMP, as the need was identified during the course of the *Review*. Other quantitative statistical and financial data was obtained from comparator municipalities

A bibliography of works cited and consulted is included in the Appendix.

2.3.1 Predicted crime rates and cost of policing

A review of demographic information was conducted to consider the characteristics of crime perpetrators (e.g. age, education, place of residence) and to consider how demographic variables might affect how crime occurs and how it is reported, compared, and viewed within the City.

The *perivale + taylor* NORM¹³ analysis was employed, providing a theoretical baseline from which the current actual policing costs and actual crime rates can be viewed.

2.3.2 Data analysis, Comparison Data and Comparator Sites

Analyses of operational and management workloads was undertaken through the review of data, as available. Data included: calls for service; response times; aggregated incident reports; caseloads; and

¹³ NORM National Operational Resource Model. *copyright perivale + taylor consulting Inc. 1997*

crime data indicating growth or reduction of crime based upon Uniform Crime Reports (from Statistics Canada); Computer Integrated Information and Dispatch System (CIDDS); Police Reporting and Occurrence System (PROS); and RCMP reports at detachment and divisional levels.¹⁴

Policing costs, in support of the Part 3 *Policing Service Model Review*, were examined for the City of Red Deer. This included: total policing-related costs (salaries and benefits, training costs, capital expenditures, cost recovery opportunities); and costs compared to population density, crime rate, demographic profiles, and other relevant factors. This analysis also includes an estimate of the costs of dispatch, communications, and records management. Analyses and comparisons were made between Red Deer and other similar sized Canadian cities in relation to selected crime trends, community safety and policing issues, and crime prevention strategies.

Research included a representative sample of national comparator sites of communities (population 70,000 - 110,000) policed by RCMP under contract, provincial police (Ontario Provincial Police), and municipal police agencies. A cost comparison of selected national sites was impeded by a policy change announced by Statistics Canada in December 2010.

*The table "Police operating expenditures in municipal police services", which was presented in previous years, is no longer included in this report because of comparability issues. Due to the different ways that individual police services report expenditure information, comparisons at the municipal level are problematic.*¹⁵

The *Review* will utilize alternative sources to continue the comparative studies.

The Consultant also examined the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders in addressing crime prevention and policing within the context of the continuum of law enforcement and public safety.

The Consultant contacted representatives of police agencies, government departments, and private companies that have implemented programs and processes which are potentially applicable, obtained descriptions and assessments of initiatives undertaken, statistical and organizational reviews and, where possible, copies of specific documentation from the relevant areas to facilitate the benchmarking process.

The findings of Part 1 are also based upon an analysis of community and best practices approaches related to education, prevention, roles of social support agencies, crime prevention organisations initiatives/approaches, the role of citizens, and the identification and explanation of leading practices.

¹⁴ Consistent with the Red Deer Strategic Plan 2009-2011, INN 1: Ensure basic service delivery is sustainable and meeting the changing needs of our community; and especially 1.3 Develop a common understanding of basic services,

¹⁵ Marta Burczykca, *Police Resources in Canada, 2010*. Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Catalogue number 85-225-XWE, December 15, 2010.

2.4 Focus groups

Focus groups were conducted with representatives of crime prevention and policing stakeholder groups and community agencies to identify issues and concerns related to effectiveness and efficiency, service, and challenges and potential solutions. The results were organized around the major themes emerging from the *Review* and incorporated into the analysis of the options for the delivery of police services and enhancements to crime prevention and policing services.

2.5 Review Surveys

The *Review*, in addition to conducting individual interviews and undertaking the focus groups utilized three surveys to foster and facilitate broad community input.

2.5.1 Website Survey

The Consultant developed a web-based notification designed to inform the public of the *Review* and to solicit responses to set questions from the community.¹⁶ The website was designed to capture a ‘snapshot’ of individual perceptions, assist interested parties to be aware of the *Review*, enable citizens to put forward *Review* related ideas and opinions, and to provide for community feedback. The website was linked to the City of Red Deer website. It was noted that another private sector site also provided links back to the City site, thereby facilitating the potential for additional public input.¹⁷

The web-based questions focused on potential strategies and actions with respect to crime prevention and police response. Open-ended questions were formulated to solicit input from the participants regarding:

- Changing the crime prevention and policing system,
- Organisation of policing,
- Crime prevention initiatives, and the
- Justice system.

The website provides a convenient vehicle for members of the public to submit their ideas to the *Review*. However, an additional audience for the website and focus groups are persons and organizations involved with policing and public safety issues, both directly or indirectly through the nature of their mandate or client base. The Consultant forwarded emails to community organizations and agencies inviting the staff, and ideally their clients, to complete the survey on line.

¹⁶ www.reddeer.ca/Residents/Crime+Prevention/default.htm

¹⁷ For example, Targetcrime.ca, the website of SeCure Consulting Solutions Inc, a Red Deer-based crime prevention through environmental design practitioner provided a link to the Red Deer City site

The responses were collated and grouped thematically to provide benchmark information for use in all parts the *Review*. As the data gathering is cumulative, the web based survey was maintained in operation until March 15, 2011.

2.5.2 Print Survey

The format of the web survey was replicated in printed form for distribution at civic sites. Participants were provided the opportunity to complete the printed survey and return it to the Consultant by either mail, fax or by depositing it at the Red Deer City, Community Services office.

The printed survey was also translated into Spanish and Tagalog languages to provide an opportunity for inclusion of the new immigrant population in the *Review* process.¹⁸

As with the web survey, the responses were collated and grouped thematically to provide benchmark information for use in all parts the *Review*.

2.5.3 Telephone survey

A telephone survey, conducted in April 2011, provided a broader and statistically valid understanding of the perspective of members of the public regarding crime prevention and policing in Red Deer.

2.6 Organization of the report

This report addresses Part 1 of a broad and comprehensive review of crime prevention and policing issues in Red Deer. The full mandate of the *Review* and the issues to be addressed in Parts 2 and 3 are delineated in Appendix 1. This, Part 1, report is primarily reportage regarding the current state of crime and disorder in the city along with a, primarily, quantitative reporting of the responses from police.

The report is organized based, roughly, on the ordering of topics in the *Review* mandate established by Council. The main body of the report is preceded (see above), by an explanation of the methodology which was used to collect quantitative and qualitative data. Each aspect of the report in Part 1 and prospective Parts 2 and 3 is based upon a broad base of a variety of data. However, the emphasis in

¹⁸ As noted in the October 29, 2010 Red Deer Advocate news article, *Spanish, Tagalog languages growing in Red Deer*, Statistics Canada statistics from 1991 to 2006, identified Spanish and Chinese as the two most popular non-official languages spoken at home in Red Deer until 2006, when Tagalog emerged in second spot behind Spanish.

Part 1 is a statistical analysis to provide an understanding of the incidents which are occurring in the city and the volume and nature of the police responses.

On occasion, there is a change in the order of topics to facilitate a better understanding of issues in discussion or to ensure that the reader is afforded an understanding of the background prior to reading the detail. An example of this is *calls for service*. Although a large portion of this report addresses statistical analysis, the report also provides background to this reporting. The reasons for, and opportunities for, reporting incidents to the police are complex. As indeed are the methods by which the police respond. Consequently, the report briefly describes 'perceptions of crime' to provide greater depth to the statistical report.

Only one aspect of the Part 1 report required synthesis of available data and the construct of a conclusion. The mandate required the development of *guiding principles for crime prevention in the city*. As with every aspect of data collection and reporting in this *Review* this is a cumulative process. An initial process for the *Review* was a workshop with Council to provide a foundation for the development of these *Guiding Principles*. Subsequent interviews and focus groups along with documentary examination added to and refined these *Principles*. The process of refinement continued in later phases of the *Review* as more information was gathered. An important aspect of this refinement was the public telephone survey which was conducted in April 2011. Given the importance of the *Principles* the draft version was discussed with Council and further refinements made. Ultimately, the early iterations of the *Guiding Principles* evolved into the Strategic Framework document, discussed later in Chapter 10 of this report.

3 Demographic Analysis

3.1 Predicting Crime

A number of theories have been offered to explain criminal activity. Some of these theories focus on individual characteristics, such as family background, while others focus on structural characteristics such as the type and nature of opportunities available to those who live in particular communities. The data available for this analysis focuses on the latter – more structural aspects of urban centres that may play a role in supporting or undermining criminal activity. Rather than measure individual characteristics of particular perpetrators (and victims), the factors focused on in this analysis describe characteristics of environments.

3.1.1 Age Proportions and Median Age

The age-crime curve is a well-known criminological phenomenon: criminal activity peaks in the late teens to early twenties, and tends to decrease thereafter.¹⁹ Communities that have larger proportions of their residents in the “criminogenic” age range are, therefore, more likely to have higher crime rates. Similarly, median age is a measure of respective age distribution as well, with the lower the overall median age, the greater the likelihood of higher levels of crime.

3.1.2 Immigration

Immigration into a community reflects a certain degree of change.²⁰ In the short-term, high immigration may be associated with some degree of alienation and purposelessness, with individuals who are new to an area potentially finding less social support and fewer opportunities for legitimate work than in communities where there is less change and potentially more established social networks. With less social support, high immigration may translate to higher rates of criminal activity. At the same time, immigration may also involve individuals (who through family or culture) may be coming together into particular geographical areas and, therefore, find support with an associated reduction in crime. The relationship between immigration and crime levels is not consistent in the criminological literature. Some research has found that higher levels of immigration may be associated with urban revitalization.²¹

¹⁹ See, Steffensmeier, Darrell J.; Allan, Emilie Andersen; Harer, Miles David; Streifel, Cathy. 1989. Age and the Distribution of Crime. *American Journal of Sociology*, 94, 4: 803-831.

²⁰ 'Immigration' refers to people moving to Red Deer from outside of the Country.

²¹ Reid, Lesley Williams; Weiss, Harald E.; Adelman, Robert M.; Jaret, Charles. 2005. The Immigration-Crime Relationship: Evidence across US Metropolitan Areas. *Social Science Research*, 34, 4: 757-780.

3.1.3 Marital Status

When marital status is considered, those who are “partnered” may be less willing to risk their relationship on the consequences of getting caught were they to commit crime. Those who are “unattached” are less likely to have the same stake in conformity compared to others who are “partnered”. It is expected, therefore, that the greater the proportion of those who are married, the lower the crime rate. Conversely, the greater the proportion of those who are unmarried, the greater the crime rate.

3.1.4 Education

It has generally been found that the higher the levels of education, the lower the criminal activity. Those who are more educated tend to be less willing to face the consequences of getting caught for criminal activity, including the impact of the perceived status that comes with higher education levels.

3.1.5 Population Density

Generally, it is expected that there is a positive relationship between population density and criminal activity – as density increases, criminal activity increases.²² The reason is that it is expected with more people in a particular area, there will be more opportunities for crime – more people have more property, for example, which may provide heightened opportunities for crime.²³ If populations are somewhat heterogeneous, the expectation may be that police will intervene in a more formal capacity (which increases the reported crime rate), rather than having citizens address crime more informally.

3.1.6 Employment

Another measure of stability (or instability) associated with communities is employability. Participation rate, for example, provides a measure of involvement in mainstream activity. Those who are employed have less opportunity to commit crime as well as have a greater stake in conformity. Unemployment rates tell a similar, yet converse, story: the greater the unemployment rate, the higher the crime rate. Those who are unemployed may have less commitment to conformity than those who are employed.

²² Lester, David. 1999. A Comment on “Urbanism and Crime”. *Cross-Cultural Studies*, 33 (1): 26-29.

²³ As per routine activities theory, see Cohen, L. and Felson, M. 1979. Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review* 44, 588–608.

3.1.7 Residential Structure and Schools

Other measures of stability (or instability) associated with specific areas are the proportions of residents within an area who reside in particular types of private dwellings. Private dwellings may include, for example, single detached homes or rental accommodation such as apartment buildings. Larger proportions of single-detached homes, often owned by their residents, may reflect greater stability and greater overall commitment to one's geographic region, as well as reflect higher incomes.²⁴ In contrast, rental accommodation may be indicative of transience and less commitment by residents to particular communities.

The meaning that may be attributed to schools is not as straightforward. On the one hand, the presence of schools reflects the demographic characteristics of a particular area – schools tend to reflect the presence of school-aged children and families. To some degree, the presence of children (as evidenced by schools) may also be indicative of stability, with schools presumably built in areas where the likelihood of the continued presence of children is greatest. On the other hand, the types of schools that communities house may also increase the likelihood of particular types of activities – certain high schools, for example, may attract drug activity or vandalism. As well, schools vary substantially in terms of the types of students enrolled, with the location of the school itself potentially not being an accurate reflection of the demographics of the immediate area – especially in cases where children are bussed to school.

3.1.8 Family Structure

A final variable to be considered is family structure. There are many structural configurations of families involving various combinations of parents and children, as well as extended family. The family structure that has tended to be associated with less criminal behaviour is the family with two married parents and their children. This is not to suggest that other forms of families are in some way “criminogenic”. One would, therefore, expect that the greater the proportion of two-parent married families found within a region, the less criminal activity. According to social disorganization theory, greater proportions of one-parent families would be associated with greater instability in a particular area.

²⁴ Sampson, Robert J. 2002. *Transcending Tradition: New Directions in Community Research*, Chicago Style -- The American Society of Criminology 2001 Sutherland Address. *Criminology*, 40, 2: 213-230.

3.2 Costs of Policing and Crime Rate (NORM Analysis)

In this portion of the analysis, models have been generated to predict theoretical *per capita* costs of policing and crime rate.²⁵ Taken together, cost *per capita* and crime rate provide a sense of how Red Deer compares on these dimensions using data from other municipalities to provide meaningful contextual and analytic data.

The policing data for this analysis is from the Statistics Canada publication, *Police Resources in Canada, 2007*,²⁶ and the demographic variables data was retrieved from the Statistics Canada Community Profiles website.²⁷ The census data is from the 2006 census.²⁸ The dataset includes 46 census metropolitan areas (CMAs) with representation from each of the provinces that have cities (or conglomerates) with populations of over 75,000, including Red Deer (see Appendix 3 for a list of locations). Cities with populations over 75,000 were selected based on the assumption that centres with somewhat larger populations are likely to have similar policing issues compared to those that are smaller, though Red Deer is one of the smaller centres of the selection under consideration.

Cities such as Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver are likely to have different issues from the less populated cities. At the same time, Red Deer may also experience certain 'big city issues' in light of the fact that it is the largest urban centre between Calgary and Edmonton, serving as a central Alberta hub of activity and drawing the rural population into this larger urban center on a daily basis.

The initial examination of data included a number of demographic and policing variables. Given the relatively low number of cases (cities) and the high potential number of variables for inclusion in our models, the analysis is conducted in stages. Categories of variables were selected that reflect common theoretical understandings, as discussed previously, of the relationships between crimes and particular demographic variables. As well variables were examined that reflect the types of factors that the police and practitioners themselves have tended to draw upon as indicators of the changing nature of populations which, in turn, are presumed to impact policing.

The variables under examination are divided into categories, including:

- Population
- Immigration²⁹
- Marital Status

²⁵ National Operational Resources Model (NORM) analysis: regression models of policing resources and crime rates. © perivale + taylor consulting Inc. 1996

²⁶ Police Resources in Canada (2007), Catalogue No. 85-225-XIE.

²⁷ <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/profiles/community/Index.cfm?Lang=E>; some variables from <http://www.bcstats.gov.bc.ca/data/dd/handout/lfsmetro.pdf>

²⁸ Census data for 2009 is not expected to be available until sometime in 2011. If available prior to the completion of the *Review* in June 2011, the new data set will be examined in terms of this analysis.

²⁹ This variable refers to the proportion of the total population who are immigrants, that is from out of country.

- Education
- Earnings and Employment
- Population Density, and
- Policing issues (such as crime rate, costs *per capita*, police per 100 000 population, clearance rate)

These variables were described previously (3.1 above).

3.2.1 Analysis and Summary of Findings

Of interest to policing agencies and policy makers is determining which factors influence costs of policing and crime rates. Criminologists consider a number of elements that they believe impact policing costs or crime rates, and some of these factors have been tested in a series of statistical models. What is trying to be determined, essentially, is whether changes in a particular level of a predictive factor result in changes in either costs or crime rate. The models suggest that there are certain factors that make a difference and appear to have an impact on both policing costs and crime rates. After looking at these factors separately, larger statistical models were made of the factors that appear to impact on costs or crime rates. These larger models are considered in terms of how much they “explain” or predict either costs or the crime rate. The higher the percentage explained, the more useful the model potentially is. (See Appendix 3A for details of the analysis.)

Importantly, these types of statistical models never completely explain any social phenomena. There are factors that impact on costs and crime rates that are not measurable, and the measures we do have are often imperfect. What the models can tell us, however, is that some factors are more important than others in the determination of costs per capita and crime rate. For purposes of the *Review*, the analysis suggests that costs per capita and crime rates are impacted by factors that are well outside the control of the police. It is noted that demographic factors, for example, such as median age and proportion of men between the ages of 15-34, impact on crime rates, but this is clearly not something that police can address. A broader approach to community safety and security would incorporate strategies that address risk factors that may be related to these types of demographic factors and are outside the control of the police. The analysis also points in directions that may impact the planning of communities.

4 Crime rates in growing communities

The *Review* examined a number of potential definitions to measurably describe *strong economic growth* and determined that population growth, unlike definitions which include value added or a region's gross product, is an objective measurement. For municipalities, an increase in population normally results in increased property tax income and a demand for increased levels of services and infrastructure which can be characterized as economic growth.

The *Review* identified a number of comparator communities of reasonably similar populations: four in Alberta, eleven from across Canada, and three from each of the US, UK, and Australia. The comparators include a variety of population increases and the analyses of the actual crime rate relative to population complements the academic research on this issue:

- In Alberta, the four comparators experienced population increases from 15 to 27% between 2004 and 2009. The Crime Severity Index (CSI) increased in one community and decreased in three.
 - Red Deer's population increased 23% and the CSI decreased.
- The national comparators experienced growth over 5% in four sites, less than 5% in three, no growth (less than plus or minus one percent) in one site, and a decline in population in two sites. There was no pattern which linked population growth numbers to the CSI.³⁰
- The international comparators demonstrate some connection between economics and crime and demographics and crime.

4.1 Economy and Crime

The link between economic conditions and crime rates is unclear and subject to much debate. To further complicate the issue, it is equally unclear how government policies impact the relationship. In explaining the recent decline in crime in England and Wales following a decade of growth and prosperity, one commentator succinctly noted.

*"Regardless of what policies are adopted if the economy is buoyant, crime will fall."*³¹

The idea that crime may be related to macro-economic factors has been explored, especially in research from the United Kingdom.³² A number of studies suggest that crime rates, and property crime rates in particular, are closely aligned with the strength of the economy, although the direction of this relationship is the subject of debate.

One argument is that during economic recessions, property crime tends to grow rapidly, whereas during

³⁰ It should be noted that this observation is based only on the comparator group in the *Review*

³¹ Travis, 2008. In, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jul/18/ukcrime.police>

³² In, http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2002/rr02_7/toc-tdm.htm

more economically favourable periods, it is apt to fall. This argument tends to accommodate the two neutralizing impact of increased drug use to escape in times of hardship and increased use of drugs due to more expendable income in times of wealth. It is hypothesized that during economically robust times, more people are employed and/or earn better wages and, as such, are less likely to be attracted to participate in criminality. In contrast, economic recessions result in greater unemployment and poverty, which, in turn, drives more people toward criminal behaviour. The antithetical argument is that booming economies produce increased wealth, which, in turn, bolsters conspicuous spending on consumer commodities. The increase in the number of commodities in society increases opportunities for theft, thereby pushing up instances of property crime. In addition, increased expendable income may permit expanded access to drugs and other antisocial activities which require the expenditure of money.

Field (1990; 1998)³³ concludes that macro-economic factors correlate most strongly with crime trends. In particular, he argues that the escalation of the property crime rate in the United Kingdom is closely tied to economic growth and, more specifically, to consumer spending. When the economy is strong and consumption of consumer goods and services is growing, property crime growth tends to slow down or reverse. The opposite is true during periods of economic recession. Following an analysis of data on crime and macro-economic cycles in England and Wales between 1946 and 1991, Pyle and Deadman (1994) found that the number of recorded burglaries, robberies, and thefts rose. This increase coincided with the ever-expanding economy and the rise in consumer spending.

The historical correlation between the economy and crime rates may also help to explain why the crime rate began to significantly increase during the 1960s and 1970s. This explanation hinges on how the increased wealth of developed countries was spent and the implications that these changing spending patterns afforded opportunities for crime. Field (1990) hypothesizes that prior to and immediately following the Second World War, increases in national income were heavily invested in improvements in the basic necessities of life, such as food and housing, heating, lighting, public transport, and social welfare programs. Increased expenditure in these areas did little to affect the opportunities for crime. It was during the 1950s that accumulating wealth was increasingly devoted to more consumer commodities vulnerable to theft, such as cars and electronic goods.³⁴ This resulted in more 'acquisitive crimes', crimes which result in acquiring usable items.

A survey of related literature³⁵ suggests absolute economic deprivation is associated with high levels of psychological distress, some forms of psychoses, and interpersonal violence, although not with relatively

³³ Field, S. (1998). *Trends in crime revisited*. Home Office Research Study 195 London, England: Home Office.
<<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/hors195.pdf>>. See also http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/2002/rr02_7/toc-tdm.htm

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ The Economy and Social Pathology, Allan V. Horwitz, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 10, (1984), pp. 95-119

minor forms of crime and neurosis. The mechanisms through which these disorders arise have not been isolated, however. Economic loss, particularly as a result of unemployment, is related to high rates of psychological distress and suicide but not to elevated amounts of psychoses or crime. Some research associates long-term rates of economic growth with rising levels of alcohol consumption, increased utilization of mental health facilities, and higher crime and imprisonment rates, but the reasons for these associations have not been established. Finally, there is no reliable correlation, or implication of causation, between absolute rates of economic change and the incidence of any form of pathology. Studies suggest that the relationship between the economy and social pathology is mediated by a number of factors including the stage of the life cycle, gender, social class, levels of social support, and personality. Several promising directions for further research are indicated.

Rosenfeld and Messner³⁶ propose that recent American crime reductions maintain that the crime drop was confined to the United States. Yet other research has revealed comparable crime decreases in Europe. They suggest that the US and European crime declines occurred in tandem because they were both brought about by upturns in the economy. In light of US research showing crime reductions resulting from growth in imprisonment, they also examine the possibility that rising imprisonment rates reduced European crime rates. They tested these hypotheses in a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of burglary rates in the US and nine European nations between 1993 and 2006. The results indicate that burglary declines in the US and Europe were associated with rising consumer confidence. This finding is supported by the research conducted for this *Review* in Manchester UK (see below).

Another comprehensive review of the crime literature³⁷ indicates varying and often opposing hypotheses of relationships between property crime and socioeconomic conditions such as poverty, business cycle conditions, demographics, criminal justice system actions, and family structure. Employing measures of each of the hypothesized factors, time-series models³⁸ for robbery, burglary, and vehicle theft are estimated from yearly and national Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data for the period 1959 through 1992 and are used to test these hypotheses' current empirical relevance. The empirical findings selectively confirm the importance of macroeconomic stability and criminal justice system actions in reducing property crime activity. In contrast, decreases in absolute poverty and general income inequality are associated with increased criminal activity; and age demographics and family/community structure apparently have little impact on any of the analyzed property-crime trends. A reduction in inflation apparently decreases property crimes.

³⁶ The crime drop in comparative perspective: the impact of the economy and imprisonment on American and European burglary rates. Richard Rosenfeld^{1,*}, Steven F. Messner

³⁷ Ralph C. Allen. *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. Volume 55, Issue 3, pages 293–308, July 1996.

³⁸ A time series is a sequence of data points, measured typically at successive times spaced at uniform time intervals.

In Canada,³⁹ in general, research results indicate that throughout the 1990s the greatest gains in reducing crime rates were made in property crimes, especially among young offenders. Significant declines were also noted for robberies and homicides involving firearms as well as homicides overall.

Research results indicate that, at the macro-level, different types of crime are influenced by different social and economic factors. Specifically, shifts in inflation were found to be associated with changes in the level of all financially motivated crimes examined (robbery, break and enter, motor vehicle theft). As noted in the NORM analysis in Red Deer (Chapter 3 and Appendix 1-3A), shifts in the age composition of the population, on the other hand, were found to be correlated with shifts in rates of break and enter and were not statistically significant for the other types of crimes studied. Finally, shifts in alcohol consumption and unemployment rates were found to be correlated with shifts in homicide rates.

Bunge *et al*⁴⁰ note there are relationships between crime rates and trends in other major socio-economic indicators, including inflation rates, population shifts, unemployment rates and per capita rates of alcohol consumption. Such analyses can only be achieved using time series analysis to examine these relationships. The results can be interpreted to mean that years in which certain social problems occur with greater frequency also tend to have higher rates of crime. In this study, years with higher rates of inflation tended to have higher rates of financially motivated crimes (robbery, break and enter, motor vehicle theft).

Cantor and Land (1985) have argued that economic distress prompts an "*upward shift in the density distribution of the population along the criminal-motivation continuum*". In other words, in times of high inflation when there is a significant differential between the price of goods and wages and uncertainty about one's economic future is high, as noted in Travis, above, those located at or near the motivational margin of legality may be more likely to cross the threshold into criminality. Furthermore, as Devine *et al* (1988) point out, inflation rewards property criminals due to the rising demand of goods and subsequent real profits in the illegal goods market.

Finally, the results in Bunge's study appear to support the contention that shifts in the age composition of the population is only one of many factors contributing to the overall crime drop (Steffensmeier & Harer, 1999; Levitt, 1999). Keeping in mind that only four crime types were examined in this study, shifts in the relative proportion of at-risk age groups in the population 15 to 24 years of age were found to be associated with shifts in rates of break and enter and were not significant for the other types of crimes studied. Furthermore, the effects of the 25 to 34 year-old population were neutralized when the effects of unemployment, inflation and *per capita* alcohol consumption were controlled. This finding suggests that

³⁹ Exploring Crime Patterns in Canada, Valerie Pottie Bunge and Holly Johnson (Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics) and Thierno A. Baldé (Time Series Research and Analysis Centre), Statistics Canada

⁴⁰ Ibid.

age can have a significant association depending on the type of crime being examined, however it also suggests that other factors may offset the effects of a change in the age composition (or profile) of the population.

4.2 Crime and economic conditions, the United Kingdom Perspective

To provide an international perspective, as directed in the *Review* RFP requirements, the Consultant conducted statistical and documentary analyses in Manchester, United Kingdom (UK). The purpose of this perspective is to provide the *Review* with a UK⁴¹ comparison of the impact a declining economy has on crime rates.

The UK national perspective is briefly considered and also the potential impact of an economic recession on crime rates within a number of localities, where the policing service is provided by the Greater Manchester Police (GMP), is examined. This discussion, presented in Appendix 4, addresses the UK national perspective, crime rates, and provides examples with respect to the impact of economic decline on crime rates at a local level in selected geographical location: Rochdale, Oldham and Manchester (emphasis on Harpurhey and the City Centre neighbourhoods).

4.3 General Observations Regarding the United Kingdom Perspective

It is accepted that many of the forthcoming conclusions from the UK perspective have been based on examining a particular type of crime, namely burglary of dwellings. However, the same principles referred to in this report are transferrable to other crimes, often referred to as acquisitive crimes, such as shoplifting, fraud, theft or drug trafficking, in other words, crimes committed to gain money or possessions.

For example, as more individuals find themselves unemployed⁴² they may turn to opportunist crime (theft of unattended items) and in previous recessions (1992) rises in domestic violence were experienced due to increases in family tensions. Similarly, hate crime rises were attributed to hostility towards migrants.

Consequently, the following conclusions should be read with that context in mind:

- Based on the UK Audit Commission's 'three waves of a recession' model, rising crime is recognized as a feature of economic downturn in the UK.
- In line with the UK Audit Commission's model the latter wave of a recession does include unequal

⁴¹ For the purposes of this document – England and Wales

⁴² UK Unemployment rates are expected to reach 2+ million in 2011

growth with long term problems in some areas, as highlighted by Harpurhey an area that has suffered as a result of economic downturn for over a decade.

- UK level crime rates do not always reflect the impact of economic downturn; a greater understanding can be achieved by examining local crime rates particularly with regards to acquisitive crime.
- Economic downturn can impact on crime rates in localities where it is least expected, as highlighted in the Manchester City Centre burglary crime rates.
- Effective partnership working both with the public sector and private sector (e.g. tenancy management improvements) is critical to achieving reductions in crime rates influenced by economic downturn.
- Partnership working and resources need to be focused in the 'neediest places'.
- 'Neediest places' should be identified by analysis of repeat crime locations and correlation with deprivation data (e.g. Vulnerable Localities Index (VLI) scores).

4.4 Summary regarding economic factors and crime in Red Deer

Without conducting detailed time series analyses⁴³, it could be concluded that economic factors which exist in Red Deer or its environs may affect the incidence of crime. It is likely that property or acquisitive crimes are more likely to be affected. Disorder crimes such as drunkenness and assaults may also be impacted. Some of the factors which may influence the commission of acts of crime or disorder are macro- in nature and have their origin in national or international arenas. They are beyond the control of City authorities. However, the City of Red Deer administration and stakeholders can assess and identify:

- which contributing factors are within its control
- crime and disorder incidents which require intervention
- strategies designed to prevent or reduce incidents of crime.

⁴³ Such analysis may involve examining the relationship between pairs of variables (bi-variate analysis) or analysing more than one variable at a time (multi-variate analysis)

5 Crime Data and Policing Services Analyses – Red Deer and Other Communities

5.1 Red Deer

5.1.1 Current and Previous Trend Comparisons

This section examines the trends and changes in crime rates and total violations for Red Deer.⁴⁴ It also compares the Red Deer data with other Alberta, national, and international communities. The comparator communities were selected based on population and also to provide a variety of population changes to examine the effect, if any, on crime rates. The varying populations are examined given Red Deer's recognition that the population of the city may expand and the associated concern that this may have an impact on crime rates.

The data used for analysis are from the City of Red Deer census, *Statistics Canada Census* and *Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)*, *Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Police Resources in Canada (PRC)*, *Vital Signs Reports*, and Red Deer RCMP PROS generated UCR submissions. The base years for the majority of comparisons are 2004 and 2009.⁴⁵

Data from the various sources are not always consistent, one with the other. This is problematic in terms of analysis and evaluation of overall trends and issues. For example, the City of Red Deer census lists the 2008 population as 87,816 whereas the Police Resources in Canada 2009 report provides a 2008 population figure of 105,130, which may include a portion of the Red Deer County population. Maclean's Magazine⁴⁶ in the discussion of the Crime Severity Index (CSI)⁴⁷ provides a population figure of 97,038 which differs from the City of Red Deer 2009 census, indicating a population of 89,891.

Further, it is noted that the *Police Resources in Canada 2010 Report* uses the 2009 population figures with the 2010 staffing levels to establish *police officer per one hundred thousand population* and *population per officer* ratios. To facilitate a consistent examination of these ratios, the Consultant used 2009 staffing levels, (obtained from the 2009 PRC report), and 2009 populations from the 2010 report.

⁴⁴ Crime rate refers to the numbers of total violations per 100,000 population. Total violations refers to the tabulation of all violent, property and other Criminal Code incidents reported for a given year.

⁴⁵ Finding contained in Maclean's magazine "Canada's Most Dangerous Cities" October 2010 are also discussed.


⁴⁶ Ibid. In, <http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/10/14/national-crime-rankings-2010/>

⁴⁷ CSI is defined later in the Report

Consequently, in an attempt to neutralize these difficulties in comparability, or the preference for one model, four measures or data sources are used within this *Review*.⁴⁸


Graph 1-1 illustrates the trend of Red Deer total crime rates through the six-year period from 2004 to 2009. There is an overall decrease of just under 20% from 2004 to 2009, although there is an increase in 2009 over 2008, but not equivalent to the 2005 spike in overall crime rate.

Graph 1-1 Red Deer Total Crime Rate 2004 to 2009 ⁴⁹



Graph 1-2 below, illustrates the trend of Red Deer *Violent Crime* rates through the six-year period from 2004 to 2009. There is an overall decrease of just under 5% during this period. However, the violent crime rate peaks in 2005 and increased in 2009 over 2008, although still lower than the 2005 level.

Graph 1-2 Red Deer Violent Crime Rate 2004 to 2009



Graph 1-3 below illustrates the trend of Red Deer *Property Crime* rates through the six-year period from 2004 to 2009. There is an overall decrease of just under 30% during this period, however the property crime rate increases in 2009 over 2008.

⁴⁸ Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, *Police Resources in Canada* (PRC), RCMP PROS generated UCR submissions

⁴⁹ Source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics

Graph 1-3 Red Deer Property Crime Rates 2004 to 2009




Table 1-1 below, uses the Red Deer census and RCMP-supplied Red Deer PROS generated UCR data to identify an additional measurement of annual comparisons. These data are for the period 2006 to 2009 inclusive.⁵⁰ The figures are the total numbers of all reportable (UCR) incidents and violations generated from PROS data for UCR submission to Statistics Canada and prior to reformatting for national publication. The UCR provides a slightly biased view of rates of crime. Where multiple offences occur in one incident, only the most serious of these is recorded for UCR purposes.⁵¹ Consequently, there may be slight variations in PROS and UCR figures.

The total figures include enforcement of other federal and provincial legislation such as the *Mental Health Act*, *Liquor Act*, *Trespass Act*, and *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, and, therefore, are higher than the crime figures. The figures for *incidents per 100,000 population percent change* are calculated from these figures and the Red Deer census. This methodology is different from the Statistics Canada crime rate figures in that it uses consistent comparators and, therefore, provides an additional perspective on the total incidents and crime trends.

Table 1-1 Red Deer 2006 – 2009 Total RCMP PROS Generated UCR Figures

	Red Deer Census ⁵² Population	% change	Red Deer Total Incidents	% change	Incidents per 100,000 pop	% change	Notes
2004	75,923	+4.5					Crime Prevention & Policing Review 1
2005	79,082	+4.2					
2006	82,971	+4.9	21,768		26,236		
2007	85,646	+3.2	23,701	+8.9	27,673	+5.5	
2008	87,816	+2.5	22,029	-7.1	25,085	-9.4	
2009	89,891	+2.4	20,197	-8.3	22,468	-10.4	18.4% increase in pop. from 2004

⁵⁰ 2004-2005 data was not available as there was a change in RCMP record management systems in 2006 from the previous years.

⁵¹ For further discussion of UCR data compilation please see Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Police Services Program, "Uniform Crime Reporting Incident-based Survey."

⁵² Red Deer 2010 census: www.reddeer.ca

Table 1-2, below, uses Statistics Canada census and Statistics Canada Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data to provide a comparison between the years 2004 (the time period when the previous *Crime Prevention and Policing Study* was conducted) and 2009, the base year for this *Review*. The Crime Rate is the number of violations per 100,000 population. The figures illustrate population growth of slightly over 25% accompanied by a 19% decrease in the crime rate and a marginal increase (0.9%) in the actual numbers of total violations.

Table 1-2 Red Deer 2004 & 2009 Comparison

	Population Police Resources in Canada	Pop % change	StatsCan Crime Rate	Crime Rate % change	StatsCan Total Violations	Total Violations % change
2004	73,698		17,827		13,199	
2009	92,415	+25.4%	14,410	-19.17%	13,317	+0.9

Table 1-3, below, uses Statistics Canada *Police Resources in Canada* (PRC) data and the *Red Deer census* to provide the nine-year trend for Red Deer from 2001 to 2009.

Table 1-3 Red Deer 2001 to 2009 Trend – Crime rates & Crime Severity

	PRC Population	Pop % change	Red Deer Census Population	Pop % change	Crime Rate ⁵³ & Severity ⁵⁴	Crime Rate /Severity % change
2001	65,455		68,308		13,565	
2002	65,795	+5.2%	70,593	+3.4	16,462	+20%
2003	72,176	+9.7%	72,691	+3.0	19,831	+30%
2004	73,698	+2.1%	75,923	+4.5	17,014	-14%
2005	78,352	+6.3%	79,082	+4.2	17,996	+3%
2006	79,391	+1.3%	82,971	+4.9	13,206	-23%
2007	97,038 ⁵⁵		85,646	+3.2	10,920	-20%
2008	105,130		87,816	+2.5	113.2	-1.6%
2009	92,415		89,891	+2.4	133.9	+18.3

The Red Deer census indicates a median growth rate of 3.3% during the period 2001-2009.⁵⁶ During the period of greatest population growth (2004-2006 inclusive) the crime rate had only a small increase (3%)

⁵³ Crime rate = total criminal code per 100,000 population

⁵⁴ Police Resources in Canada Reports changed from Crime Rate to Crime Severity in 2008

⁵⁵ Population numbers reported in Police Resources in Canada differ from the Red Deer census and so the population change rates are not included for the years 2007-2009

⁵⁶ Average population increase for the 2001 to 2009 period is 3.5%

between 2004 and 2005, but then dropped considerably (23%) between 2005 and 2006. The lowest year of population growth (2009) indicates a growth in the crime severity rate. Years of modest population growth coincide with crime rate decreases other than 2009 which combined a modest population increase with an 18% crime rate increase over 2008.

The publication *Vital Signs* provides profiles of Canadian municipalities and lists crime rates for Red Deer. Table 1-4, below, uses *Vital Signs Reports* to illustrate trends from 2007 to 2009.

Table 1-4 Red Deer 2007 to 2009 – Vital Signs

	Population	Pop % change	Property crime Rate per 100,000 pop	Rate % change	Violent crime Rate per 100,000 pop	Rate % change
2007	85,705	+3.3	4758	-13	1292	-21
2008	87,816	+2.5	4396	-4.8	1179	-9
2009	89,891	+2.4	7875	+22.7	2349	+28.9
2010	90,084	+0.2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

It should be noted that the 2008 data referring to property crime rate per 100,000 and rate changes were documented in the 2009 *Vital Signs* report. However, the 2010 *Vital Signs* report provides a different property crime rate (6420) and violent crime rate (1822) than the 2009 report for the year 2008.

In October 2010, Maclean’s magazine published “*Canada’s Most Dangerous Cities*”⁵⁷ which rank ordered 100 Canadian communities in terms of the Crime Severity Index (CSI). Maclean’s ranked Red Deer as 11th most dangerous city in Canada with an overall crime score as a percentage difference of 53.57% from the national crime rate.

Maclean’s report ranking is problematic for the City of Red Deer. On the one hand, the CSI is a statistical compilation and represents the City of Red Deer’s ranking against other municipal centres. On the other hand, the total context (site and situation) for why Red Deer is ranked 11th is not fully explored in the MacLean’s article. This gives rise to anecdotal comments arising during the course of the *Review*, such as ‘statistics can say whatever you want them to.’ Interestingly, a similar observation was made during the 2004 *Crime Prevention and Policing Study*.

In comparing the city of Red Deer to other municipalities, both inside and outside of Alberta, as well as in review of best practices across North America, no one community, no one model of policing, stands alone

⁵⁷ MacLean’s Magazine. In, <http://www2.macleans.ca/2010/10/14/national-crime-rankings-2010/>

as better than the rest. Each model or program must be considered *in situ*. Factors such as the demographics, climate and location *vis-a-vis* other cities and location *vis-a-vis* surrounding development or industry will all impact crime and a Crime Severity Index as used in MacLean's. It should be noted that crime rates and the pattern of these rates over time, including underlying trends in Red Deer, are for the most part, in keeping with crime rates and patterns in other communities. Further, these rates become more aligned as the similarity of demographics in comparison communities to that of Red Deer increases.⁵⁸

Criticism of the Maclean's report primarily focuses on the article not taking into consideration size differences between cities. Further, that the report is based only on crimes reported. This was raised by cities such as Belleville, Ontario,⁵⁹ Winnipeg and Regina, where in the latter instance the Mayor commented,

"We don't compare ourselves to other cities. We compare ourselves with ourselves; we base our estimates of progress on whether we're reducing crime from year to year."⁶⁰

The Crime Severity Index (used in the Maclean's ranking) is a measure introduced by Statistics Canada, in 2006, to provide directly comparable data to reflect the degree of severity of crimes rather than, simply, a total tally of all crimes. This permits the consideration of the relative differences between crimes and its impact upon sense of security within a jurisdiction, the differences in time taken to address crime issues, and the impact upon victims.⁶¹ One disadvantage of the Crime Severity Index is that the number is useful only in comparing with other communities and doesn't provide an easily-understood indication in isolation of crime levels within a community.

Within Alberta comparators included in the Maclean's ranking (Table 1-5 and 1-6 below), Red Deer is ranked third of the five cities in overall crime, fourth in homicides, *sexual assault*, and *robbery*, second highest in *break & enter (B&E)*, and fourth in *motor vehicle theft*.

⁵⁸ Converge Consulting Group.

⁵⁹ Officials say report on crime overblown", The Intelligencer.

⁶⁰ Calgary Herald. "Regina is Canada's third-most 'crime-ridden' city: Maclean's crime survey." October 13, 2010.

⁶¹ Statistics Canada

**Table 1-5 Maclean's National 2010 Crime Rankings
– Selected Alberta Comparators**

Crime	Red Deer		Lethbridge		Medicine Hat		Fort McMurray	
	Overall crime score ⁶²	Rank in 100	Overall crime score	Rank in 100	Overall crime score	Rank in 100	Overall crime score	Rank in 100
Overall	53.57	11	31.95	19	-5.02	47	68.08	5
Homicide	21.68	27	-39.16	49	159.96	3	-5.97	38
Sexual Assault	8.16	30	34.60	14	-0.86	40	12.68	29
Robbery	9.89	32	11.88	29	-52.17	67	-18.16	42
B&E	26.19	31	13.01	45	-8.22	60	1.58	53
Motor Vehicle Theft	83.59	15	-10.08	46	-39.52	72	208.95	1

**Table 1-6 Maclean's National 2010 Crime Rankings
– Selected Alberta Comparators continued**

Crime	Red Deer		Grand Prairie		Calgary		Edmonton	
	Overall crime score*	Rank in 100	Overall crime score	Rank in 100	Overall crime score	Rank in 100	Overall crime score	Rank in 100
Overall	53.57	11	63.50	7	-8.50	55	48.00	13
Homicide	21.68	27	110.18	9	16.15	31	77.00	11
Sexual Assault	8.16	30	17.67	25	-25.69	69	-4.89	44
Robbery	9.89	32	-17.53	41	28.41	18	112.03	7
B&E	26.19	31	8.40	47	-17.78	69	30.82	29
Motor Vehicle Theft	83.59	15	117.53	7	33.81	30	122.05	6

The years from 2004 to 2009 – the years of the two *Crime Prevention and Policing Reviews* – are compared and summarized in Table 1-7 below. The figures were obtained through *Statistics Canada Uniform Crime Reporting* and include the total number of violations. Detailed analyses of specific categories of crimes and violations in each of the total categories are found in Appendix 1-5, (Tables A5-7a to A5-7j.)

⁶² As a percentage difference from the national rate

Table 1-7 Red Deer Crime Rate Trends 2004 to 2009 – Totals and Homicide

Red Deer	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Crime rate % 2004-2009 change
Population ⁶³	75,923					89,891	Pop +18%
Total All Violations	13,199	14,275	11,609	11,946	12,064	13,317	
Rate per 100,000 pop	17,827	18,684	13,452	11,593	11,491	14,410	-19.17%
All Criminal Code Violations including. traffic	12,846	13,727	11,240	11,532	11,661	12,881	
Rate per 100,000 pop	17,350	17,967	13,024	11,191	11,107	13,938	-19.67%
All Criminal Code Violations excluding. traffic	12,541	13,013	10,749	10,986	11,000	12,185	
Rate per 100,000 pop	16,938	17,032	12,455	10,661	10,477	13,185	-22.16%
Total Violent Criminal Code	1825	1972	1975	1861	1913	2171	+18.95%
Rate per 100,000 pop	2465	2581	2289	1806	1822	2349	-4.71%
Total Property Crime	8177	7748	6445	6846	6740	7278	-10.9%
Rate per 100,000 pop	11,044	10,141	7468	6644	6420	7875	-18.7%
Homicide	2	4	0	0	3	2	
Rate per 100,000 pop	2	5	0	0	3	2	
Attempted Murder	1	2	0	2	1	1	
Rate per 100,000 pop	1	3	0	2	1	1	

The total reported violation trend has remained relatively constant when compared between 2004 and 2009. However, there have been fluctuations within this time, for example an 8% rise in 2005, followed by an almost 19% drop in 2006 (from the previous year) and then a gradual increase during 2007 and 2008 to a level in 2009 just under 1% higher than that of 2004.

Correspondingly, during this same period, there has been an almost 20% decrease in the overall crime rate, associated with all reported violations. The number of reported total property crime violations in 2004 (8177) decreased almost 11% during this period to 7278 violations in 2009. When viewed as a rate per 100,000 population, property crime decreased by almost 19% during this period. However, it should be noted that total reported violent crime has been trending upward since 2004, with the number of reported crimes increasing by almost 19% from 2004 (1825) to 2009 (2171), although the rate per 100,000 population for total violent crime has decreased by just under 5% during this same time period. As a percentage of all reported criminal code violations (excepting traffic), violent crime has increased by 3.2% from 2004 to 2009. Conversely, property crime, as a percentage of all reported criminal code

⁶³ Red Deer City Census

violations, excepting traffic, has decreased by 5.5% during this same period. Simply stated, there are more incidents of violent crimes being reported between 2004 and 2009, than property crimes.


5.1.2 Similar size communities in Alberta and Canada

Considering all the comparators, the figures do not indicate a clear correlation between population growth and changes in the crime/severity rate. All communities experienced significant growth in populations but the crime rate changes showed, generally, a converse effect, decreases, and only one comparator showing a modest increase.

The four Alberta comparators were selected as comparators as they provide two contracted police services (RCMP Grand Prairie and Wood Buffalo/Fort McMurray) and two municipal police forces (Lethbridge and Medicine Hat) operating under the *Alberta Police Act* and having populations reasonably comparable.^{64,65} In addition, the communities have differences in population growth varying from under one percent to forty percent during different periods through the decade.

Graphs 1-4 and 1-5 illustrate the Crime Rate⁶⁶ based on the total reported *Criminal Code* violations, including traffic, for the comparator jurisdictions during the six-year period 2004 to 2009.

Graph 1-4 Alberta Comparators



⁶⁴ Census Canada

⁶⁵ The 2004 Review included the Alberta communities of Grande Prairie, Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, Calgary, and Edmonton

⁶⁶ Statistics Canada UCR. Crime Rate is the number of violations per 100,000 population. Exact numbers are included in the following Tables, 1-8, 1-9, 1-10

Graph 1-5 below, examines the specific crime rate comparison for the national comparators.

Graph 1-5




Table 1-8 below illustrates the specific Crime Rates⁶⁷ based on the total reported *Criminal Code* violations, including traffic, for all the comparator jurisdictions during the six-year period 2004 to 2009.

Table 1-8 Comparator Communities – Crime Rates – 2004 to 2009⁶⁸

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Change % 2004 - 2009
Red Deer City	17,827	18,684	13,452	11,593	11,491	14,410	-19.17
Red Deer Rural *	8888	10,893	9349	31,616	33,692	8664	-2.52
Grande Prairie	27,681	23,001	19,490	16,685	16,402	16,187	-41.5
Lethbridge	11,225	11,137	10,886	11,365	10,915	10,645	-5.17
Lethbridge Rural *	11,819	9238	7658	6097	5459	5426	-54.01
Medicine Hat	9,318	8,104	7,970	8,445	7,942	8,192	-12.08
Wood Buffalo	16,439	19,784	18,298	19,547	23,910	17,743	+7.93
Brantford	9380	9913	10,120	10,024	9396	9440	+0.64
Cape Breton	7768	7924	7980	8523	7973	8455	+8.84
Codiac	12,153	11,121	9514	8291	7307	7219	-40.59
Chatham-Kent	6689	7241	7521	7915	7772	7153	+6.93
Delta	7397	7726	7649	7320	7239	7202	-2.64
Kamloops	17,938	17,995	17,004	16,703	13,219	13,297	-25.87
Langley Township	12,482	11,051	10,926	10,906	8985	8480	-32.06
Nanaimo	18,579	18,129	18,050	16,202	12,956	14,075	-24.24
North Vancouver	6888	6685	6014	5671	4945	5277	-23.39
Wellington Co	3853	3720	3445	3399	3352	3350	-13.05

⁶⁷ Statistics Canada UCR. Crime Rate is the number of violations per 100,000 population

⁶⁸ Source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics

* It should be noted that Red Deer and Lethbridge Rural Detachments are not comparator communities due to their smaller populations. They are added in this instance as any significant changes in the contiguous jurisdictions may affect the cities.

Table 1-8 above and 1-9 and 1-10 below detail the crime rates (illustrated in the graphs above) from 2004 to 2009 for the four Alberta comparator communities and the ten national comparators. The figures are arranged in categories of total violations, violent crime, and property crime as it will be seen the different category rates within one community may not change uniformly.

The overall crime rate for Red Deer has decreased by just under 20% over the six years.

Table 1-9, below, illustrates the Violent Crime Rates⁶⁹ based on the total reported *Criminal Code* violations for the comparator jurisdictions during the six-year period 2004 to 2009.

Table 1-9 Comparator Communities – Violent Crime Rates – 2004 to 2009⁷⁰

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Change % 2004 - 2009
Red Deer City	2465	2581	2289	1806	1822	2349	-4.70
Red Deer Rural *	1417	1454	1262	4298	5533	1101	-22.30
Grande Prairie	3338	2601	2606	2454	2409	2536	-24.02
Lethbridge	1500	1381	1415	1504	1574	1690	+12.66
Lethbridge Rural *	2703	2207	2180	2045	963	766	-71.66
Medicine Hat	1039	1078	1095	1144	1106	1256	+20.88
Wood Buffalo	2974	2959	2752	2,594	2900	2550	-14.26
Brantford	1639	1772	1988	1925	1841	1934	+17.99
Cape Breton	1892	1744	1631	1653	1800	1865	-1.43
Codiac	1862	1614	1331	1377	1434	1455	-21.85
Chatham-Kent	862	994	1010	1235	1253	1022	+18.56
Delta	995	970	1135	913	993	986	-0.90
Kamloops	2733	2857	2992	2745	2419	2429	-11.12
Langley Township	1150	1115	1183	1153	986	994	-13.57
Nanaimo	2437	2624	2738	2107	1863	1853	-23.96
North Vancouver	885	826	764	683	576	588	-33.56
Wellington Co	476	543	519	497	531	386	-18.91

As previously noted, Red Deer and Lethbridge Rural Detachments are not comparator communities due to their smaller populations. However, they are added in this instance as any significant changes in the contiguous jurisdictions may affect the cities.

The violent crime rate for Red Deer has decreased by just under 5% between 2004 to 2009.

⁶⁹ Statistics Canada UCR. Crime Rate is the number of violations per 100,000 population

⁷⁰ Source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics

Table 1-10 illustrates the Property Crime Rates⁷¹ based on the total reported *Criminal Code* violations for the comparator jurisdictions during the six-year period 2004 to 2009.

Table 1-10 Comparator Communities – Property Crime Rates – 2004 to 2009⁷²

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Change % 2004 - 2009
Red Deer City	11,044	10,141	7468	6644	6420	7875	-28.69
Red Deer Rural *	5418	6631	6251	19,019	17,862	5114	-5.61
Grande Prairie	14,464	12,781	10,285	9393	8516	8295	-42.65
Lethbridge	6986	7099	6499	7050	6415	5965	-14.61
Lethbridge Rural *	5762	4219	3086	2268	2184	2273	-60.56
Medicine Hat	6152	4563	4807	4640	3947	3948	-35.83
Wood Buffalo	3314	4363	4368	4483	6038	4520	+36.39
Brantford	6299	6543	6291	6260	5846	5879	-6.67
Cape Breton	4839	5022	5062	4963	4595	4677	-3.35
Codiac	6968	6298	6030	4935	3950	4097	-41.20
Chatham-Kent	4582	4651	4880	4984	4642	4384	-4.32
Delta	4466	4563	4887	4559	4232	3951	-11.53
Kamloops	10,306	10,219	9731	9747	6775	5385	-47.75
Langley Township	8787	7747	7289	7229	5891	5649	-35.71
Nanaimo	11,839	10,257	9874	9604	7394	7545	-36.27
North Vancouver	4930	4381	3853	3523	2908	2975	-39.66
Wellington Co	2577	2423	2180	2127	2111	2324	-9.82

Red Deer and Lethbridge Rural Detachments are not comparator communities due to their smaller populations. They are added in this instance as any significant changes in the contiguous jurisdictions may affect the cities.

The property crime rate for Red Deer decreased by just over 28% during the period 2004-2009.

⁷¹ Statistics Canada UCR. Crime Rate is the number of violations per 100,000 population


⁷² Source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics

Table 1-11 Police-reported crime severity indexes by province and territory ⁷³

	2009	2008 to 2009	2009	2008 to 2009
	Total Crime Severity Index		Violent Crime Severity Index	
	index	% change	index	% change
Canada	87.2	-4	93.7	-1
Newfoundland and Labrador	72.1	0	60.9	-9
Prince Edward Island	65.5	-4	44.0	0
Nova Scotia	83.9	0	89.6	1
New Brunswick	70.7	-1	72.0	6
Quebec	82.0	-1	81.0	-2
Ontario	68.9	-3	81.5	0
Manitoba	131.1	2	175.4	10
Saskatchewan	149.4	-2	155.2	1
Alberta	104.7	-7	105.0	-6
British Columbia	110.3	-9	109.8	-5
Yukon	179.9	-1	198.8	2
Northwest Territories	323.3	-5	326.4	-4
Nunavut	336.9	2	485.5	1

Graph 1-6 below illustrates and compares the Red Deer population growth and Crime Severity Index for the years 2004 and 2009. Exact figures are included below in Tables 1-12 and 1-13.

Graph 1-6 Red Deer Property Crime Severity Index 2004 to 2009



⁷³ Statistics Canada

Table 1-12 below compares and contrasts the year of the first *Crime Prevention and Policing Study 2004* and the year 2009 for the current Review. All the comparator communities experienced population growth, varying from 15 to 27%. Four communities experienced a decline in the crime severity rate and one experienced an increase.

Table 1-12 Alberta Comparators – Population and Crime Severity Index 2004 & 2009 ⁷⁴

Community	Prov	2004 pop ⁷⁵	2009 pop	Pop % change	2004 crime severity	2009 crime severity	Crime % change
Red Deer	AB	73,698	92,415	+23.39	181.69	133.9	-26.31%
Grande Prairie	AB	41,786	52,053	+24.57	232.48	142.6	-38.66%
Lethbridge	AB	77,439	89,835	+16	128.04	115.1	-10.11%
Medicine Hat	AB	54,898	63,443	+15.56	102.87	82.8	-19.52%
Wood Buffalo / Fort McMurray	AB	47,783	60,069	+25.71	133.94	146.6	+9.45%

Table 5-13 below provides greater detail of the crime severity for the two *Review* study years, including violent and property crime severity. The rankings are national: 2004 from 1025 police services and 2009 from a 208 policing communities. The differences in numbers of participating police services are owing to a different approach by Stats Canada.

Table 1-13 Alberta Comparators – Crime Severity Index 2004 & 2009 ^{76 77}

Community	Prov	Overall Crime Severity Index 2004		Overall Crime Severity Index 2009		Violent Crime Severity Index 2009		Non-violent Crime Severity Index 2009	
		value	rank	value	rank	value	rank	value	rank
Alberta	AB	124.08	312						
Red Deer	AB	181.69	181	133.9	34	121.6	39	138.6	33
Grande Prairie	AB	232.48	114	142.6	28	130.5	33	147.2	25
Lethbridge	AB	128.04	297	115.1	54	107.8	55	117.8	60
Medicine Hat	AB	102.87	422	82.8	107	75.6	107	85.6	111
Fort McMurray / Wood Buffalo ⁷⁸	AB	133.94	272	146.6	22	127.5	36	153.9	18

⁷⁴ Statistics Canada

⁷⁵ 2004 and 2009 populations Police Resources in Canada Reports 2005 & 2010

⁷⁶ Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11292/tbl/csivalue-igcvaleurs-eng.htm>

⁷⁷ 2004 Values for 1025 Police Services Policing Communities; 2009 Values for 208 Police Services Policing Communities of over 10,000 Population

⁷⁸ The reports list 2004 as Fort McMurray and 2009 as Wood Buffalo. In 1995 the Improvement District No. 143 and the City of Fort McMurray were amalgamated to form the Municipality of Wood Buffalo; in 1996 the name was changed to Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo. Alberta Municipal Affairs website

Tables 5-14 and 5-15 use Statistics Canada Police Resources in Canada data to provide the six-year trend from 2001 to 2007 comparing crime rates/severity to population changes. Police Resources in Canada Reports changed from Crime Rate to Crime Severity in 2008. Consequently, data cannot be compared in this form between 2004 and 2009.

Table 1-14 Alberta Comparators – Crime Rates 2001 – 2007⁷⁹

	Population 2001	Population 2007	Pop % change	Crime rate 2001*	Crime rate 2007	Crime rate % change
Red Deer	65,455	97,038 ⁸⁰	+48.25%	13,565	10,920	-19.5%
Grande Prairie	35,836	49,900	+39.25%	17,223	14,898	-13.5%
Lethbridge	69,804	82,146	+17.68%	11,319	10,772	-4.83%
Medicine Hat	53,427	60,246	+12.76%	7,114	7,536	+5.93%
Fort McMurray	39,116	54,813	+40.13%	17,106	16,064	-6.09%

Table 1-15 Alberta Comparators – Crime Severity Rates 2008 – 2009

	Population 2008	Population 2009	Pop % change	Crime severity 2008	Crime severity 2009	Crime severity % change
Red Deer	105,130 a	92,415	⁸¹	113.2	133.9	+18.29%
Grande Prairie	51,578	52,053	+0.92%	150.5	142.6	-5.25%
Lethbridge	88,020	89,835	+2.06%	118.4	115.1	-2.79%
Medicine Hat	62,136	63,443	+2.1%	74.2	82.8	+11.59
Fort McMurray	54,064	60,069	+11.1%	206.5	146.6	-28.67%

The figures show that whereas there is a constant decrease in Red Deer from 2001 to 2008, there was an increase in 2009, contrasting with three of the comparators. Wood Buffalo shows a significant decrease in 2009 but remains at a higher crime rate and higher crime severity index compared to Red Deer throughout the period. Factors that are likely to influence the crime rate/severity index are described in Chapter 3.

⁷⁹ Crime rate = total criminal code per 100,000 population

⁸⁰ 2007 population as reported in Police Resources in Canada 2008 Report ; the Red Deer census reports a population of 85,646

⁸¹ The Red Deer 2008 population figure reported in Police Resources in Canada may include a portion of the Red Deer County and consequently the change rate is not calculated.

Tables 1-16 and 1-17 include communities with populations between 85,000 and 95,000.

Table 1-16 Canadian Comparators 1 – Population and Crime Severity/Rate Changes ⁸²

Community	Prov	2004 pop	2009 pop	Pop % change	2004 crime Severity / rate	2009 crime Severity / rate	Crime % change
Red Deer	AB	73,698	92,415	+23.39	181.69	133.9	-16.31%
Brantford	ON	91,584	95,285	+4.04	118.7	114.2	-3.8%
Wellington County ⁸³	ON	86,502	91290	+5.54	43.7	36.8	-15.79
Kamloops	BC	81,699	86,451	+5.81	174.88	114.8	-34.35
Nanaimo	BC	78,533	88,731	+12.98	179.85	129.3	-28.11%
North Vancouver District	BC	87,694	89,976	+2.6	CSI n/a Crime rate 6888	53.8 Crime rate 5277	n/a -23.24%

Tables 1-16 and 1-17 indicate all communities experienced increases in population (between 2% and 23%) accompanied by decreases in the Crime Severity Index (between 3% and 28%).

Table 1-17 Canadian Comparators 1 – Crime Severity Index 2004 & 2009 ^{84,85}

Community	Prov	Overall Crime Severity Index 2004		Overall Crime Severity Index 2009		Violent Crime Severity Index 2009		Non-violent Crime Severity Index 2009	
		value	rank	value	rank	value	value	value	rank
Red Deer	AB	181.69	181	133.9	34	121.6	39	138.6	33
Brantford	ON	118.7	342	114.2	58	102.8	61	118.5	57
Wellington County	ON	43.7	917	36.8	200	17.5	206	44.2	197
Kamloops	BC	174.88	193	114.8	55	116.4	47	114.1	64
Nanaimo	BC	179.85	185	129.3	37	99.3	65	140.9	28
North Vancouver	BC	n/a ⁸⁶	n/a	53.8	177	52.2	154	54.4	186

⁸² 2004 and 2009 populations and Crime Severity Rates source Police Resources in Canada. Crime rates source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada

⁸³ Name later changed to Wellington Centre

⁸⁴ Statistics Canada www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11292/tbl/csivalue-igcvaleurs-eng.htm

⁸⁵ 2004 Values for 1025 Police Services Policing Communities. 2009 Values for 208 Police Services Policing Communities of over 10,000 Population

⁸⁶ The 2004 figures appear to include both the City and District of North Vancouver and so are not consistent

Table 1-18 includes communities with populations between 100,000 and 110,000.

Table 1-18 Canadian Comparators 2 – Population and Crime Severity Index Changes

Community	Prov	2004 pop	2009 pop	Pop % change	2004 crime	2009 crime	Crime % change
Red Deer	AB	73,698	92,415	+23.39	181.69	133.9	-16.31
Chatham-Kent	ON	109,708	109,858	+0.13	82.84	90.1	+8.76%
Delta	BC	101,848	106,394	+4.46	76.82	77.1	+0.3%
Victoria ⁸⁷	BC	94,576	102,455	+8.33	226.82	157.5	-30.57%
Langley Township	BC	95,073	102,898	+8.22	140.99	108.1	-23.4%
Codiac Regional	NB	109,429	106,710	-3.74	121.26	82.8	-31.72%
Cape Breton	NS	105,860	102,056	-3.6	87.56	82.5	-5.78%

Table 1-19 Canadian Comparators 2 – Crime Severity Index 2004 & 2009 ^{88 89}

Community	Prov	Overall Crime Severity Index 2004		Overall Crime Severity Index 2009		Violent Crime Severity Index 2009		Non-violent Crime Severity Index 2009	
		value	rank	value	rank	value	value	value	rank
Red Deer	AB	181.69	181	133.9	34	121.6	39	138.6	33
Chatham-Kent	ON	82.84	568	90.1	94	64.1	128	100.1	80
Delta	BC	76.82	621	77.1	127	71.4	114	79.3	127
Victoria	BC	226.82	126	157.5	15	169.6	11	152.9	20
Langley Township	BC	140.99	257	108.1	67	84.3	88	117.3	63
Codiac Regional	NB	121.26	325	82.8	106	86.6	86	81.4	122
Cape Breton	NS	87.56	535	82.5	109	77.8	104	84.3	114

Tables 1-18 and 1-19, above, indicate that two communities experienced a slight loss of population, one had almost no change, and three had modest increase between 4% and 8%. One community had an increase of 8 % in CSI, one almost no change, one experienced a 5% decrease, and three reported decreases from 20% to over 30 percent.

Table 1-20, below, illustrates the national comparator crime rates (violations per 100,000 populations) from 2004 to 2009. Of the twelve communities, one experienced a very slight increase of less than 1%; two have increases less than 10%; two have decreases less than 10%; two (including Red Deer) show decreases between 10% and 20%; and five have decreases of more than 20%.

⁸⁷ Victoria includes the municipality of Esquimalt

⁸⁸ Statistics Canada

⁸⁹ 2004 Values for 1025 Police Services Policing Communities 2009 Values for 208 Police Services Policing Communities of over 10,000 Population

Table 1-20 Canadian Comparators – Population & Crime Rate 2004 & 2009⁹⁰

Community	Pop 2004	Pop 2009	Pop % change	All Violations per 100,000 pop 2004	All Violations per 100,000 pop 2009	Violations % change
Red Deer AB	73,698	92,415	+23.39	17,827	14,410	-19.17%
Cape Breton Region NS	105,860	102,056	-3.6	7768	8455	+8.84%
Codiac Regional NB	109,429	106,710	-3.74	12,153	7219	-40.6%
Chatham-Kent ON	109,708	109,858	+0.13	6689	7153	+6.93%
Brantford ON	91,584	95,285	+4.04	9380	9440	+0.64%
Wellington County ON	86,502	91290	+5.54	3853	3350	-13.06%
Lethbridge AB	77,439	89,835	+16	11,225	10,645	-5.17%
Delta BC	101,848	106,394	+4.46	7397	7202	-2.64%
North Vancouver District	87,694	89,976	+2.6	6888	5277	-23.39%
Langley Township BC	95,073	102,898	+8.22	12,482	8480	-32.07%
Kamloops BC	81,699	86,451	+5.81	17,938	13,297	-25.88%
Nanaimo BC	78,533	88,731	+12.98	18,579	14,075	-24.25%

5.1.3 Similar sized communities outside of Canada

The *Review* compared Red Deer with nine communities of reasonably similar populations in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.⁹¹ The comparisons were based on 2006 and 2009 populations and crime rates. Complete details are found in Appendix 1-5. In summary, the three US communities with comparable populations show a consistent trend: all have modest population increases accompanied by crime reductions of between 10 and 16% where Red Deer experienced a slight increase in crime rate.

In the United Kingdom, between 2006 and 2009 overall crime rates fell from 11,109 (thousands) to 9587 (thousands) with a 9% reduction during 2008-2009.⁹²

The Australian comparators show different changes in the crime rates compared to increases in populations: two have significant increases in population (approx. 14%) but one has a crime rate decrease of 17% while the other has an increase of 19%. The third comparator has a modest increase in population (approx. 5%) and a slight decrease in the crime rate.

⁹⁰ Source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada

⁹¹ Caveat: the comparator figures are an approximate guide; the classification of offences and reporting policies may vary from country to country – however, the statistics within each table are from the same source and consequently the trend rate over the years is valid

⁹² <http://www.justice.gov.uk/criminal-statistics-annual-2009.pdf>

5.1.4 Criminal Code Offences vs. Other Offences Including Enforcement of Local bylaws

The following table illustrates the numbers of incidents/offences occurring in Red Deer during 2009 where the enforcement of federal and provincial legislation, in addition to the Criminal Code was undertaken.⁹³

Table 1-21 Criminal Code and Other Enforcement

Legislation	Number of Offences 2009
Total Criminal Code Violations	12,881
Total Criminal Code Violations – excluding traffic	12,185
Total Federal Statute Offences	
	436 ⁹⁴
Canadian Environmental Protection Act	17
Corrections & Conditional Release Act (including Parole Violations)	3
Customs Act	1
Excise Act - Tobacco Products Possession & Sales	2
Explosives Act	1
Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act	2
Family Relations Act	3
Firearms Act	3
Fire Prevention Act	5
Liquor Act	395
Litter Act	11
Lotteries/games of chance offences	1
Mental Health Act - Offences Only	18
National Sex Offender Registry - Fail to comply with order to register	1
Off-Road Vehicle Act	109
Provincial/Territorial Environmental Legislation	25
Tobacco Act	43
Tobacco Tax Act - Provincial/Territorial	4
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act - Provincial/Territorial	1
Trespass Act - Provincial/Territorial	128
Weights and Measures Act	2
Other Provincial/Territorial Statutes	402
Total	1613

⁹³ The figures were obtained from the Red Deer RCMP PROS generated UCR data for 2009.

⁹⁴ The Federal Statute Offences do not include the other categories listed below in this table. They comprise mainly drug-related offences with only 68 being non-drug related.

It is of interest to note that 25% of all other enforcement was directly related to the Alberta *Liquor Act*. As indicated, Federal Statute offences (drugs) accounted for an additional 23% of other enforcement. In sum, alcohol and drug related enforcement comprised nearly half (48%) of other enforcement.

Table 1-22 provides a summary of the legislation used by the Red Deer RCMP to address the range of community disorder and crime issues.

Table 1-22 Red Deer Crime 2009 – Violations/Incidents

Red Deer	Number of Violations / Incidents	Ratios
All Criminal Code Violations including. traffic ⁹⁵	12,881	74.7%
Non-Criminal Code Enforcement ⁹⁶	1177	6.8%
Bylaw Incidents ⁹⁷	1786	10.4%
Provincial Traffic Offences ⁹⁸	1402	8.1%
Total	17246	100%

5.2 Clearance rates

Clearance rates are one of the measures used to gauge the effectiveness of the police investigational abilities. Although providing a foundation for a certain level of assessment, clearance rates are not a comprehensive measure and should be considered with other available quantitative and qualitative data. Clearance rates may be affected by many factors such as the total number and severity of offences – more serious crimes are more complex and consume more resources and will, therefore, detract from the investigation of other crimes. Additionally, the numbers and experience of personnel who are deployed to investigations and even the degree of support for the police within the community served; the transiency of the population will influence the accessibility of intelligence and accessibility of suspects and will also impact clearance rates.

There are various types of “clearance”. These types are reflected in Statistics Canada data. When a police investigation leads to the identification of a suspect against whom a charge could be laid, then that incident can be *cleared*. Criminal incidents can either be *cleared by charge* or *cleared otherwise*. When an information is laid against the suspect (i.e., the person is formally charged), then from a statistical point the related actual incident can be *cleared by charge*. In cases where the police do not lay an

⁹⁵ Statistics Canada Uniform Crime Reporting

⁹⁶ RCMP UCR 2009 submission to Statistics Canada – see Table 5-24 above not including other Federal Statutes

⁹⁷ Review Analysis of Calls for Service – Jan 2009-June 2010 with numbers adjusted

⁹⁸ RCMP UCR 2009 submission to Statistics Canada

information⁹⁹, even though they have identified a suspect and have enough evidence to support the laying of such, the incident is *cleared otherwise*. Examples include instances where extrajudicial sanctions or alternative measures are recommended by the police, where police issue a warning or caution, where the complainant requests charges not be laid or cases where the alleged offender dies before he or she can be formally charged.¹⁰⁰

The *weighted clearance rate* is based on the same principle used to create the Crime Severity Index, (see above) whereby more serious offences are assigned a higher weight than less serious offences.

Applying this concept to clearance rates means that, for example, the clearance of a homicide, robbery or break and enter receives a higher weight than the clearance of less serious offences such as minor theft, mischief, or disturbing the peace.

Since the process of solving crime is often time-consuming, a criminal incident may be solved months or even years after it was reported to police and recorded by the UCR Survey. Therefore, it is possible for the number of incidents cleared in a year to be greater than the total number of "actual" incidents that year, and thus for the weighted clearance rate to exceed 100%.

The following Tables 1-23, 1-24, and 1-25 illustrate Red Deer's clearance rate compared to Alberta and national comparators. Red Deer (35.7) is almost a third below the Alberta comparator's (population 50K to 99K) average of 51.9; slightly above the 5 national comparators (pop. 84K to 95K) average of 32.8; and above the 5 national comparators (pop. 100K to 110K) average of 30.2.

Table 1-23 Alberta Comparators – Clearance Rates 2009

Community		Police	Officers per 100K pop (Actual) ¹⁰¹	Crime Severity Index	Weighted clearance rate
Red Deer	AB	RCMP	140	133.9	35.7
Grande Prairie	AB	RCMP	144	142.6	47.2
Lethbridge	AB	LRPS	174	115.1	52.3
Medicine Hat	AB	MHPS	178	82.8	53.6
Wood Buffalo	AB	RCMP	190	146.6	54.6
Average clearance rate of 4 comparators					51.9

⁹⁹ A laying of information must be carried out before the issue of either a warrant of arrest or a summons. Any information, submitted to a Justice of the Peace (JP) or the Clerk to the Justices, leading to the issue of an arrest warrant or summons, must be in writing and must include information on the statute infringed and the nature of the charge.

¹⁰⁰ For a complete discussion on the concepts and definitions relating to clearance rates and weighted clearance rates, please see Uniform Crime Reporting Survey – Concepts and Definitions. Statistics Canada. In, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/document/3302_D2_T9_V3-eng.pdf

¹⁰¹ Police Resources in Canada

Table 1-24 Canadian Comparators 1 – Clearance Rates 2009

Community	Prov	Police	Police officers per 100K pop (actual)	Crime Severity Index	Weighted clearance rate
Red Deer	AB	RCMP	140	133.9	35.7
Brantford	ON	BPS	161	114.2	39.6
Wellington County	ON	OPP	114	36.8	35.6
Kamloops	BC	RCMP	139	114.8	31.5
Nanaimo	BC	RCMP	139	129.3	37.5
North Vancouver	BC	RCMP	88	53.8	19.8
Average clearance rate					32.8

Table 1-25 Canadian Comparators 2 – Clearance Rates 2009

Community	Prov	Police	Police officers per 100K pop (actual)	Crime Severity Index	Weighted clearance rate
Red Deer	AB	RCMP	140	133.9	35.7
Chatham-Kent	ON	CKPS	154	90.1	37.1
Delta	BC	DPD	162	77.1	24.5
Victoria	BC	VPD	236	157.5	19.4
Langley Township	BC	RCMP	120	108.1	18.1
Codiac Regional	NB	RCMP	136	82.8	42.3
Cape Breton	NS	CBRP	202	82.5	39.9
Average clearance rate					30.2

5.3 Police Reported Youth Crime

A view of youth crime most often cited in the media is the law and order perspective: a view that sees youth crime as out of control and far more serious than it was in the past. The opposing perspective, that of youth advocates, suggests that youth crime is probably no better or worse than in other time periods. However, youth who are marginalised and the social problems affecting youth are the important issues, not youth crime.¹⁰²

In examining the issue of police reported youth crime, it is important, at the outset, to have an understanding of the current legislation which provides the framework for how the criminal justice system deals with young persons aged 12¹⁰³ to 17¹⁰⁴ who contravene federal laws or regulations. The youth

¹⁰² Sandra J. Bell. *Young Offenders and Youth Justice: a century after the fact*. Thomson/Nelson Third Edition 2007.p.31.

¹⁰³ Under the age of 12, a person is considered to be a child and is dealt with under provincial child welfare statutes. In Alberta, the provincial statute is the *Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act*, which replaced the *Child Welfare Act* in November 2004.

justice system today is substantially and structurally different from that of the 2 previous systems founded on the *Young Offenders Act* and its predecessor, the *Juvenile Delinquent Act*. Over the past 100 years Canadian society has moved from talking about youth as “delinquent” to “young offenders” to “youth criminals”.¹⁰⁵

The *Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA)*, which officially replaced the *Young Offenders Act (YOA)* on April 1, 2003, contains both a preamble and a declaration of principles to clarify the principles and objectives of the current youth justice system. The *Act* also specifies police action when dealing with young persons in conflict with the law.

*A police officer shall¹⁰⁶, before starting judicial proceedings or taking any other measures under this Act against a young person alleged to have committed an offence, consider whether it would be sufficient, having regard to the principles set out in section 4, to take no further action, warn the young person, administer a caution, if a program has been established under section 7, or, with the consent of the young person, refer the young person to a program or agency in the community that may assist the young person not to commit offences.*¹⁰⁷

Police do not always have to charge a young person even though they have sufficient evidence to do so. As stated in the legislation, the police have the power to use discretion and not formally charge a youth.

Extrajudicial sanctions may also be employed when a young person, alleged to have committed an offence, cannot be adequately dealt with by a warning, caution or referral because of the seriousness of the offence, the nature and number of previous offences committed by the young person, or any other aggravating circumstances.¹⁰⁸

Conditions also apply to the use of extrajudicial sanction which may only be used if:

- (a) it is part of a program of sanctions that may be authorized by the Attorney General or authorized by a person, or a member of a class of persons, designated by the lieutenant governor in council of the province;
- (b) the person who is considering whether to use the extrajudicial sanction is satisfied that it would be appropriate, having regard to the needs of the young person and the interests of society;
- (c) the young person, having been informed of the extrajudicial sanction, fully and freely consents to be subject to it;
- (d) the young person has, before consenting to be subject to the extrajudicial sanction, been advised of his or her right to be represented by counsel and been given a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel;

¹⁰⁴ When a person reaches their 18th birthday, they are considered an adult. However, it must be remembered that it is not the age of the person at the time of arrest that is important, rather it is the age at the time of the offence which dictates whether or not the person falls under the direction of the YCJA.

¹⁰⁵ Bell, 2007 op cit. p. 32.

¹⁰⁶ Emphasis added

¹⁰⁷ YCJA section 6(1) RSC. As noted in section 6(2), the failure of a police officer to consider the options set out in subsection (1) does not invalidate any subsequent charges against the young person for the offence

¹⁰⁸ YCJA section 10(1) RSC.

- (e) the young person accepts responsibility for the act or omission that forms the basis of the offence that he or she is alleged to have committed;
- (f) there is, in the opinion of the Attorney General, sufficient evidence to proceed with the prosecution of the offence; and
- (g) the prosecution of the offence is not in any way barred at law.¹⁰⁹

Restrictions on the use of extrajudicial sanctions do apply when a young person:

- (a) denies participation or involvement in the commission of the offence; or
- (b) expresses the wish to have the charge dealt with by a youth justice court.¹¹⁰

There are many benefits to using extrajudicial measures.

When youth are kept out of the court system by using extrajudicial measures, this allows the court to focus on more serious youth crimes. The Youth Criminal Justice Act requires police officers and crown prosecutors to use discretion, and make non-court measures the normal and expected result when the offence is less serious.¹¹¹

In the Red Deer context, the use of extrajudicial measures, by police, with respect to young persons in conflict with the law is illustrated in Table 1-26 below. Of the total 5128 incidents involving young persons between 2006 and 2009 inclusive, almost 66% were handled by police through the use of extrajudicial measures. Stated differently, 3270 incidents were dealt with other than through the courts, and as noted previously, the *Youth Criminal Justice Act* requires police officers and crown prosecutors to use discretion, and make non-court measures the normal and expected result when the offence is less serious.

Table 1-26 Use of Extrajudicial Sanctions 2006-2009¹¹²

	Young person Chg./ Male	Young Person Chg./Female	Young Person No Chg.	Total Incidents
2006	253	117	1034 – 74%	1404
2007	373	154	894 – 63%	1421
2008	389	139	726 – 51%	1254
2009	306	127	706 – 70%	1139
Total	1321	537	3360 – 66%	5128

The following tables illustrate the ratios young persons and adults charged in Red Deer during 2004 and 2009.

¹⁰⁹ YCJA section 10(2) RSC.

¹¹⁰ YCJA section 10(3) RSC.

¹¹¹ John Howard Society. "YCJA Handbook." p.10. In, <http://www.johnhoward.ab.ca/pub/youthcrim/youth.pdf>

¹¹² From RCMP PROS generated UCR data 2006-2009.

Table 1-27 compares the characteristics of persons (youths and adults) charged and not charged for offences during 2004 and 2009.

Table 1-27 Comparators 2004 & 2009 – Crime Perpetrators ¹¹³

Community	2004			2009		
	Incidents per 100K pop	Youth rate charged per 100K pop	Adult rate charged per 100K pop	Incidents per 100K pop	Youth rate charged per 100K pop	Adult rate charged per 100K pop
Red Deer	17,827	3304	3347	14,410	4639	3272
Lethbridge	11,225	6622	4948	10,645	6602	5709
Chatham-Kent	6689	3226	1895	7153	3744	2520
Delta	7397	1471	1040	7202	1463	1488
Langley Township	12,482	1021	1246	8480	1194	1543
Codiac Regional	12,153	4587	1959	7219	4907	2204
Cape Breton	7768	4036	2087	8455	5339	3523
Brantford	9380	7843	2313	9440	6952	2695
Wellington County	3853	2157	1051	3350	1934	935
Kamloops	17,938	1985	2367	13,297	2919	2478
Nanaimo	18,579	4384	3413	14,075	3921	3654
North Vancouver	6888	680	699	5277	945	778

During 2004 Red Deer was above the comparator average adult rate of 2197 at 3347 and below the average youth rate of 3443 at 3304. In eight of the comparators the rate of youth involvement is greater than that of adults; in two cases (including Red Deer) the ratio is almost equal; and in two the adult rate is higher.

In 2009 Red Deer is above the comparator average adult rate of 2567 at 3272 and above the average youth rate of 3713 at 4639. In ten of the comparators the rate of youth involvement is greater than that of adults; in one case the ratio is almost equal; and in one the adult rate is higher.

Table 1-28 illustrates that the *adult charge* rate has dropped slightly; the numbers of adults *charged* increased by more than 24% from 1913 to 2389. There is a significant increase in the rate (40% from 3304 to 4639) youth were *charged* as well as the number (30% from 164 to 214 for males and almost 90% from 48 to 91 for females).

¹¹³ UCR2, Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada

Table 1-28 Red Deer 2004 – Crime Perpetrators ¹¹⁴

	2004	2009	% change
Population	73,698	92,415	+23.39
Incidents per 100K pop	17,827	14,410	-19.16%
Adult rate charged per 100K pop	3347	3272	-2.24%
Total Adults charged	1913	2,389	+24.88%
Adult males charged	1569	1948	+24.15%
Adult females charged	344	441	+28.19%
Rate, youth charged per 100,000 population aged 12 to 17 years	3304	4639	+40.4%
Total Youth incidents	1065	891	-16.3%
Total Youth Charged	212	305	+43.9%
Youth males charged	164	214	+30.48%
Youth females charged	48	91	+89.58%
Total youth not charged	853	586	-31.3%
Rate, youth not charged per 100,000 population aged 12 to 17 years	13,292	8912	-32.95%

The total youth incidents have decreased by approximately 16% from 1065 incidents in 2004 to 891 in 2009. However the numbers of youth *not charged* have also decreased by over 30%. In 2009 police continued to employ extrajudicial measures in 65.8% of youth incidents, however this is approximately a 15% decrease from 2004 which saw 80% of incidents handled by extrajudicial measures.

One possible explanation for the decrease in the application of extrajudicial measures may be nature of the criminal acts perpetrated by the young persons. As Table 1-29 indicates, the number of reported violent offences for Red Deer in 2009 was almost 19% higher than reported offences in 2004, even though the total actual number of incidents in 2009 was less than 1% higher than 2004. Property crimes conversely were almost 11% lower in 2009 than in 2004.

¹¹⁴ UCR2, Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada

Correspondingly, the number of youth charged for violent offences increased by 80% from 2004 to 2009. Similarly, the rate of youth charged for violent offences increased by 76% from 2004 (639) to 2009 (1125). Of significance is the increase in the number of female youth charged. Youth involved in violent offences and dealt with by extrajudicial measures decreased 40% during this same time period. The number of youth charged for property related crimes increased almost by 52% between 2004 and 2009. The rate of youth charged also increased by 48% during this period. There was also a 40% decrease in the number of youth dealt with by extrajudicial measures during this time.

Table 1-29 Youth Charged and Not Charged 2004 and 2009

	Red Deer Actual incidents	Youth male Chg.	Youth Female Chg.	Youth Not Chg.
2004	13,199	164	48	853
Total Criminal , excluding traffic	12,541	138	41	819
Total Violent	1825	33	8	140
Total Property	8177	85	19	537
2009	13,317	214	91	586
Total Criminal , excluding traffic	12,185	175	85	554
Total Violent	2,171	48	26	100
Total Property	7,278	107	51	322

5.4 Red Deer – Street Gangs and Organized Crime

During the past few years there has been extensive media coverage relating to the issue of gangs. The increase in this coverage may be the result of a combination of factors including: higher-level organized crime groups being identified as street gangs, cells from larger gangs being identified as new entities, street gangs splintering into smaller criminal groups, or gangs changing names or a combination of increased gang activity along with increased media coverage.¹¹⁵

News stories that focus on gangs have influenced attitudes and opinions by providing vivid public images of gang crime and criminals. Gang news not only presents information, it also articulates ideological messages concerning the meaning and definition of gangs. Moreover, news stories influence community responses to gang activities, which in turn become part of the story to be reported.¹¹⁶

A youth's motivation to join a gang may vary depending upon his or her geographic location and socioeconomic, cultural or ethnic, age, and/or family factors. The majority of gang members are male youths aged 16 to 19, and almost half (48%) are under the age of 18.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family. "Youth Gangs in Canada."

¹¹⁶ C.Y. Thomson et al. "Representing Gangs in the News: Media Constructions of Criminal Gangs." *Sociological Spectrum*, Volume 20, Number 4, 1 October 2000 , pp. 409-432(24)

¹¹⁷ Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family. "Youth Gangs in Canada."

A review of literature indicates that there is no single theory to explain gang involvement. However, there is general agreement that the following factors are inextricably linked to gangs. These factors include:

- Cultural Discord
- Educational Deficiencies
- Lack of Responsibility
- Economic factors
- Parental Guidance
- Racism
- Traditional
- Gang Culture
- Ego Fulfillment

There are also other underlying factors such as: dissatisfaction with the existing social structure; lack of guidance and encouragement; lack of education or opportunity for advancement; attainment of status, respect, identity or recognition; sense of belonging, family; means to overcome language, cultural barriers; and criminal activity for profit.

The more causes or risk factors present, the stronger is the potential for gang involvement. Clearly then, differences in social, individual, and offending characteristics exist among youth with varying levels of involvement with the law, and these factors all combine to affect a youth's ability to resist criminal involvement.

Five discrete group/gang categories have been identified that demonstrate an increasing level of criminal activity, organizational structure, and recruitment strategies.¹¹⁸ They are:

- *Group of Friends* groups tend to be interest-based and usually do not involve criminal activity, thus pose no threat to a community's well-being and, in many situations, should be promoted.
- *Spontaneous Criminal Activity Group/Gangs* are social in nature and derive their power and status from the size of their group. Criminal activity is situationally motivated and much of this type of gang/group activity can be categorized as gratuitous violence and bullying by misdirected and unsupervised youth. Many of the members have other options in life and are less committed to the gang or its culture than more serious type gangs.
- *Purposive Group/gangs* come together for a specific purpose. Whether stealing cars, engaging in vigilante-type violence or spontaneous mob activity, these groups/gangs can emerge from within existing larger groups/gangs or may come about for a specific purpose and are disbanded once the activity or plan has been carried out.
- *Youth Street gangs* are highly visible hard core groups that come together primarily for profit-driven criminal activity. These street gangs identify themselves as such through the adoption of a gang name, common brands, styles, colours of clothing and/or jewelry, and tattoos to openly display gang membership to other gangs. These gangs do not seem to be part of a larger criminal organization and often have a definite territory or "turf" that they claim and defend as their

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

own. Street gangs appear to be stand-alone organizations that have little connection to other gangs.

- *Structured Criminal Organization* gangs are highly structured criminal networks that tend to be led by criminally experienced adults for the purpose of economic or financial gain. The criminal activities of these types of gangs tend to be serious in nature and are generally premeditated. Youth are used for specific purposes to further the gang's activities.

Other typologies for criminal gangs include both organized crime (enterprise crime) gangs and street gangs. Organized crime gangs are defined within the context of the Criminal Code of Canada:

*“Criminal organization” means a group, however organized, that a) is composed of three or more persons in or outside of Canada; and b) has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group. It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate commission of a single offence.*¹¹⁹

The hallmark of the organized crime gang:

- well organized with strong leadership
- membership is based on the worth of the individual and his/her contribution to the organisation
- discipline is highly structured and ruthlessly enforced
- criminal activity is motivated solely for profit
- leadership attempts to develop some semblance of legitimacy
- illegal gain is channeled into legitimate business enterprise
- political leverage is sought.

Street gang is a term that law enforcement traditionally uses to categorize crime groups that consisted predominantly of young males from similar ethnic backgrounds that were usually engaged in a low level of criminality, often based within a specific geographical area. While this profile continues to have some validity, increasingly there are street gangs that have evolved and now operate beyond their initial communities.¹²⁰

Characteristics of a Street Gang include:

- higher levels of organizational and criminal sophistication
- engaging in criminality that may equal or even surpass the levels of more established organized crime groups
- an increasingly older membership within some street gangs, many of whom are often in their twenties and thirties
- greater fluidity and diversity within some street gangs with their membership increasingly including individuals from various ethnic backgrounds
- territory need not be a fixed geographic location, it can be interprovincial, intra-provincial or 'product' based

¹¹⁹ Criminal code of Canada Section 467.1

¹²⁰ Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC) Annual Report 2004.

The Red Deer 2008 Vital Signs report stated:

*Approximately 350 to 400 youth (11 to 24 years old) are currently involved in gang activity in Red Deer - the majority of these are between 12 and 15 years old, and about 30 per cent are female. It is estimated by the RCMP that about 80 of them are involved in serious crimes, for example, those involving violence and weapons.*¹²¹

Current information, obtained from documents and interviews in the course of the *Review*, confirms the continued presence of youth gangs in Red Deer; however, the number of youth actually involved is somewhat elusive. Criminal activity among youth gangs appears centered on property offences, assaults, and drug trafficking. Of significant interest is the presence of a gang originating in Winnipeg which has now become entrenched in Red Deer. Information also indicates that this gang has branched off and another gang, principally comprised of persons from the diverse community, may have formed. Criminal activity of these street level gangs again focuses on drug trafficking and some firearm offences.

A 12 to 20 member chapter of an outlaw motorcycle gang is also resident in Red Deer. Criminal activities associated with this gang include drug trafficking, firearm offences, assaults, and prostitution.

The presence of street gang members from British Columbia and cities such as Calgary and Edmonton has further raised the ante with respect to the potential for, and actual presence of, violent criminal activity within Red Deer. The gang-related homicide in April 2009, on a residential street in Red Deer, illustrates how violent street gangs can impact the city. It was reported that police believed the murder was gang-related and alleged that the gang had participated in several violent acts against rival gangs in Calgary and other Alberta communities. This shooting was also believed to have been a direct result of conflicts between rival Southern Alberta gangs.

In responding to the issue of gangs in the community, the literature indicates that an effective strategy must have four key components:

- Education Prevention
- Early Intervention
- Disruption
- Investigation

It is noted that Red Deer has formed a High Risk Youth Committee to address the issue of serious habitual offenders in the community. Additionally, the provincially sponsored Alberta Gang Reduction Strategy, was announced in December 2010. Both the Red Deer committee and the Gang Reduction

¹²¹ Red Deer Advocate, "Early intervention may slow gangs" October 11, 2008. In, http://www.albertalocalnews.com/reddeeradvocate/opinion/Early_intervention_may_slow_gangs.html

Strategy, with its intended approach being a balance between awareness, prevention, intervention, and enforcement, are in keeping with an effective strategic approach to gangs.

5.5 Social Media

Social media is the norm in today's youth culture. This integrated technology allows users to generate their own content and then share that content through various connections. While social media has benefits for families, individuals and the community, there is also a darker side to social media often associated with youth, such as, cyber-bullying – threats on line, bullying in chat rooms, distributing harmful attachments or pictures of a sexual nature.

Law enforcement officials and agencies are also using social media to communicate with their communities. This enables police to keep the public informed of up-to-the-minute safety information and disseminate information that could help capture perpetrators of crime.¹²²

¹²² "Police embrace Twitter but lack strategy." Bizreport September 2010. In, <http://www.bizreport.com/2010/09/police-embrace-twitter-but-lack-strategy.html>

6.0 Levels of policing

For many years the ratio of police to population was the foundation for inter-agency comparisons. Advocates of the use of this ratio, more popularly known as the “cop to pop”, proposed the ratio as the barometer of policing. It was suggested that the more officers per 1000 population the better the policing. Inter-force comparisons were frequently made in an attempt to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of policing by comparing staffing ratios.

The discussion concerning the ratio of police to population is not new:

The ratio of one policeman to a population of about 1,000 became the rule of thumb for officialdom in Victorian England though, in reality, the ratio broadly averaged out to one to roughly one officer for 700 inhabitants in the boroughs and one to 1,500 in rural areas.¹²³

Although this issue will be addressed in greater detail in the subsequent report of Part 3, the current debate in the UK regarding the wholesale government cutbacks has raised the matter again in the UK media. With a 20% reduction in overall government¹²⁴ police funding for England and Wales over the next four years, starting with a 6% cut in the national funding grant this year, Civitas, a UK think-tank, compared crime rates and officers in European countries per 100k population. It concluded that countries with fewer police were likely to have a higher crime rate than those with larger numbers of officers. The anticipated cutbacks in the UK would, it was suggested, lower the chance of criminals being caught and sanctioned, making crime less risky and more attractive for potential offenders and pushing up crime rates. The report concluded,

‘While police numbers and resources are far from the only contributor to police effectiveness, it seems highly unlikely that the [sweeping]cuts now being enacted will be made without significantly decreasing detection rates... It is possible that recent falls in crime will be halted or even reversed. Members of the public are at greater risk of crime in the coming year.’

Although there is continuing debate, the police to population ratio may be viewed as a less than adequate comparison for several reasons.

- The type of policing and numbers of police personnel required are determined, in part, by the demographics of the community being served.
- The type of policing and numbers of police personnel are determined, in part, by the types of facilities such as crime or crime attractors/generators¹²⁵ located in the jurisdiction.
- Police agencies have adopted various levels of civilianization.¹²⁶ Civilian personnel are not reflected in police personnel numbers.

¹²³ Emsley, C. *The Great British Bobbie: A History of British Policing from the 18th Century to the Present*. Quercus, London, 2009

¹²⁴ 51% of police funding in the UK is received from the central/federal government.

¹²⁵ Brantingham P and P, *Criminality of Place: Crime Generators and Crime Attractors*, European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research Volume:3 Issue:3 Dated:(1995) Pages:1-26. “Crime generators, providing many opportunities for crime, while others are crime attractors, in which offenders seek out victims in a planned and deliberate way.”

- In contracted police services, such as the RCMP or OPP the responsibility for some policing or administrative tasks is assumed by the divisions' personnel.
- The numbers of police or civilian employed by the police agency are influenced by the degree to which some tasks, such as Crime Prevention or Finance or Human Resources is assumed by the employing municipality versus the police agency.
- In some jurisdictions, specialized services such as transit or airport security have been assumed by other forms of police agency or by private security companies.
- The amount of work assumed by the police is partly determined by the degree to which other community agencies, such as Women's Shelters or Immigrant Societies, and private security become involved in community support activities.
- Many jurisdictions are subject to daily in-flow or out-flow of citizens from contiguous jurisdictions for work or entertainment purposes creating the *downtown effect* where *crime attractors* and *crime generators* are more likely present. These daily migrations impact the level of policing required however, they would not be reflected in the population figures.

The United Kingdom provides an extreme example of such migration. The City of London Police, which is deployed to police just over a square kilometre within metropolitan London, has 850 sworn personnel and 406 civilian staff. The resident population of the City of London is 7185. This equates to a ratio of 11,830 police per 100,000 population. However, the daily migration into work in this major financial centre in the UK is 300,000, which represents a ratio of 276 officers per 100,000 population during business hours.

Much the same concern is voiced by large city administrations (or Police Chiefs) in Canada. Cities such as Vancouver provide services to urban populations who move into the city from outlying municipalities such as Abbotsford, Delta, New Westminster or North Vancouver for work and entertainment. Similarly, Edmonton, for example, receives daily commuters from places such as St. Albert and Spruce Grove. None of the municipal taxes paid by these commuters, at place of residence, contribute towards the cost of policing services at place of employment or leisure activity. In a similar manner to the City of London example (above), the ratio of police to population in major Canadian urban centres is affected. In Red Deer, the day time in-migration of persons for work, school, shopping, and leisure activities alters the police to population ratio.

The example noted in Table 1-33 below, the Quesnel and Qualicum Detachments of the RCMP, provides another instance of the limitations in considering police to population in the absence of other comparative data.

It is clear that while the police to population ratio is used as a convenient measure in the absence of other suitable comparators, it should be viewed within the context of the totality of community safety and security strategies and costs.

¹²⁶ Civilianization: a commonly used term to describe replacing sworn police officers with "civilian" – that is non-sworn – staff to reduce costs or introduce specialized skills.

6.1 Comparison to other communities in Alberta and Canada

As described above, the daily influx of people to work and take advantage of services offered in Red Deer increases the population beyond the census numbers.¹²⁷ Some of the comparators share this characteristic while others are bedroom communities where there is a net loss of daily population. The comparators below are identified as regional centre (RC) indicating an increase in daily population, commuter belt (CB) with a loss of daily population or a community where there appears to be no or minor changes in daily populations (NK).

The following tables present staffing levels and police-population ratios for Alberta and national comparators. In Table 1-30 Red Deer's ratio of 140 (actual) officers per one hundred thousand population is below the Alberta comparators' average of 165 and the contracted policing (RCMP) average of 158. The two municipal police services compared have an average of 176 officers per one hundred thousand population. It should be noted that where the staffing levels reflect local staffing, the contracted police services' figures of the provincial police (RCMP) will not include divisional administration, training, and specialized regional services which are included in municipal police service figures. The higher figure for Wood Buffalo may reflect the unusual characteristics of the municipality.¹²⁸

Table 1-30 Alberta Comparators – Levels of Policing 2009¹²⁹

Community	Pop 2009	Police service	Police Officers (Actual)	Officers per 100K pop Actual	Police Officers Authorized	Officers per 100K pop Authorized	Crime Rate
Red Deer (RC)	92,415	RCMP	129 ¹³⁰	140	147	150	14,410
Grande Prairie (RC)	52,053	RCMP	75	144	80	154	16,187
Lethbridge (RC)	89,835	LRPS	156	174	153	170	10,645
Medicine Hat (RC)	63,443	MHPS	113	178	114	180	8,192
Fort McMurray (NK)	60,069	RCMP	114	190	130	216	16,439

In Table 1-31 below, Red Deer's ratio of 140 officers per one hundred thousand population is below the comparators' average of 149; but compared to the contracted policing (RCMP and OPP) Red Deer is above the average of 125. The municipal police service average is 183 which include personnel

¹²⁷ City of Red Deer website: 'Red Deer's central location, growing economy and competitive advantage are fast making the Red Deer Corridor 'Canada's Economic Capital'

¹²⁸ The Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo is a specialized municipality formed from the amalgamation of the City of Fort McMurray and Improvement District Number 143 in 1995. The area of the municipality is over 60,000km²

¹²⁹ Police Resources in Canada Report 2009 staffing levels and 2010 Report for populations

¹³⁰ The actual figure may differ from the year-end funding figure (The *Review* was advised that the 2009 Red Deer final figure was 122.5 officer-years) which takes into account absences over 30 days which are not billed to the City.

assigned to those services which would form part of the divisionally-provided services in contracted agencies.

Table 1-31 Canadian Comparators 1 – Levels of Policing 2009 ¹³¹

Community	Prov	Pop 2009	Police	Police Officers actual	Officers per 100K pop Actual	Crime Rate
Red Deer (RC)	AB	92,415	RCMP	129	140	14,410
Brantford (RC)	ON	95,285	BPS	153	161	9440
Kamloops (RC)	BC	86,451	RCMP	120	139	13,297
Nanaimo (CR)	BC	88,731	RCMP	123	139	14,075
North Vancouver District (CB)	BC	89,976	RCMP	79	88	5277
Wellington County (NK)	ON	91,290	OPP	104	114	3350

Table 1-32 Canadian Comparators 2 – Levels of Policing 2009

Community	Prov	Pop 2009	Police	Police Officers actual	Officers per 100K pop Actual	Crime Rate
Red Deer (RC)	AB	92,415	RCMP	129	140	14,410
Cape Breton (NK)	NS	102,056	CBRP	206	202	8455
Chatham-Kent (NK)	ON	109,858	CKPS	169	154	7153
Codiac Regional (RC)	NB	106,710	RCMP	145	136	7219
Delta (CB)	BC	106,394	DPD	172	162	7202
Langley Township (CB)	BC	102,898	RCMP	123	120	8480
Victoria (RC)	BC	102,455	VPD	242	236	¹³²

Although the previous figures provide some perspective on how Red Deer compares, the following example in Table 1-33 below illustrates how caution should be exercised when viewing the statistics in isolation.

Table 1-33 Population-based comparators ¹³³

Community	Prov	Police	Pop 2009	Police Officers 2009	Pop per officer	Crime Rate	Cost per capita	Severity Index 2004 ¹³⁴	Severity Index 2009 ¹³⁵	CSI % change
Qualicum Beach (NK)	BC	RCMP	8766	7	1,252	466	\$ 92	98.93	67.9	-31.37%
Quesnel (CB)	BC	RCMP	9710	21	462	2387	\$ 327	276.09	262.7	-4.85%

¹³¹ Police Resources in Canada Report 2009 staffing levels and 2010 Report for populations

¹³² The Review is presently waiting for this data and it will be input upon receipt.

¹³³ Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Police Resources in BC 2009

¹³⁴ Statistics Canada

¹³⁵ <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/article/11292/tbl/csivalue-igcvaleurs-eng.htm>

The figures above are provided as an illustration that police staffing levels, crime rates, and policing costs are determined by a variety of factors beyond simply population figures, typically including population density, age, single-parent families, and education. What also appears to be significant is the large decrease in CSI in one community with a modest decrease in the other. The *Review* did not examine the context of these figures. This issue is also discussed in Chapter 3 with respect to criminogenic factors.

Case load is a commonly used term for the number of Criminal Code violations – ‘cases’ – per officer per year.¹³⁶ Table 1-34 illustrates the ‘case load’ of the policing comparators. The case load figures are calculated from the figures in the table, rather than taken from national averages, to provide comparisons calculated from the *Review’s* figures and comparators.

Table 1-34 Comparator Communities – Case Load – 2009

	Total Criminal Code Violations ¹³⁷	Authorized police staffing ¹³⁸	Officers per 100K pop (Authorized) ¹³⁹	Case load	Clearance rate ¹⁴⁰
Red Deer	13,317	147	150	91	35.7
Grande Prairie	8,426	80	154	105	47.2
Lethbridge	9,563	153	170	63	52.3
Medicine Hat	5,197	114	180	29	53.6
Wood Buffalo	10,658	130	216	82	54.6
Brantford	8,995	156	165	58	39.6
Cape Breton	8,629	206	200	49	39.9
Codiac	7,703	144	137	53	42.3
Chatham-Kent	7,858	170	153	46	37.1
Delta	7,662	165	158	46	24.5
Kamloops	11,495	123	144	93	31.5
Langley Township	8,726	128	127	68	18.1
Nanaimo	12,489	123	141	101	37.5
North Vancouver	4,748	91	103	52	19.8
Wellington Co	3,058	104	115	29	35.6

The case load for the fourteen comparator communities averages 62. The Red Deer case load of 91 is 47% above the average. However, high case load is not solely a factor of high workload. Case load can be influenced by the range (type and severity) of cases that are taken on for investigation (versus alternative methods of addressing)

¹³⁶ The issue of case load will be further discussed and elaborated upon in Part 3 of the *Review*.

¹³⁷ Source: UCR2 Aggregate Survey, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada

¹³⁸ Police Resources in Canada 2009

¹³⁹ Police Resources in Canada 2009

¹⁴⁰ Police Resources in Canada 2009

6.2 Services provided by the Divisional RCMP

The services provided under Divisional Administration are both operational support services and administrative support services and include but are not restricted to:

- Air Support
- Computer/Informatics/Technological support
- Corporate services (budgeting, pay forecasting, strategic planning, communications)
- Emergency Response Team
- Forensic Artist
- Forensic Services
- Human Resources (staffing, compensation, pensions, recruiting, mediation, adjudications, pay negotiation, staff relation representatives, etc)
- Integrated Child Exploitation (ICE)
- Legal
- Major Crimes (to complement Detachment level services)
- Polygraph
- Tactical Troop
- Training (both developmental and mandatory recertification)
- Underwater Recovery Team
- Violent Crime Linkage System (ViCLAS) analysis¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ Police officers investigating a serious crime that qualifies as a ViCLAS reportable case are responsible to complete the questionnaire/booklet at the detachment. This is then forwarded to the ViCLAS centre in Edmonton. .

7.0 Police ability to respond to crime and social disorder issues

7.1 Policing Models

A great deal of research has been conducted into the effectiveness of various policing strategies. Most of the literature focuses on the United States and the United Kingdom.

In 1972, in examining a more scientific, rational and analytical approach to policing, the *Kansas City Patrol Experiment*¹⁴² showed that untargeted, random police patrols are not effective in preventing crime.

In contrast, targeted police tactics based on problem analysis have been shown to reduce crime. In summary, and as suggested by Bayley, the following are the ideas that have generated significant changes in policing.¹⁴³ These are the ideas that are considered to be important as well as controversial changes from past practice. These principles explain the foundation for determining the best approach to policing in Red Deer.

- *Community-oriented policing*, referring to the recognition that the police must act to encourage the public to share responsibility for public safety, specifically by consulting with them, adapting their operations to local conditions, mobilizing volunteer resources, and problem-solving. (Bayley 1994, Goldstein 1990, Skolnick and Bayley 1986, 1988, Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). Community-oriented policing can mobilize and coordinate the community resources and assist the police to identify community priorities. Through ongoing meaningful community liaison, the use of volunteers, and effective communication, the public police can ensure the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. (also *community policing* and *community-based policing*)
- *Problem-oriented policing*. (POP) Developed by Herman Goldstein, POP involves developing police programs that ameliorate or eliminate conditions that generate problems of insecurity and disorder that police are repeatedly called upon to prevent. (Goldstein 1979, 1990). POP can be built on the foundation of community-orientated policing. The community, community agencies, and municipal / provincial service providers can often identify underlying issues where crime and disorder are effects, allowing a coordinated response to address both causes and effects.
- *Signs-of-crime policing*, where police, drawing on the logic of "broken windows" (Wilson and Kelling 1982), prosecute minor offences that contribute to the creation of milieu of incivility. Signs-of-crime policing is an early intervention strategy to prevent conditions from deteriorating to the point where crime flourishes.
- *Hot-spots policing*, meaning the short-lived or episodic concentration of police resources on areas or situations of repeated criminal activity (Sherman et al. 1989) and requires a flexible

¹⁴² The results indicated that police deployment strategies could be based on targeted crime prevention and service goals rather than on routine preventive patrol.

¹⁴³ Bayley, David H. Distinguished Professor, State University of New York at Albany, 2006

organisation able to respond quickly to identified crime patterns to disrupt and suppress criminal or disorderly activity

- *Compstat*, for computer-driven crime statistics, is the signature innovation in the development of evidence-based policing (McDonald 2002). Evidence-based policing means evaluating police activity by systematically collecting information about police operations and their effects. It is also a process that holds police managers accountable to action appropriate interventions. This process facilitates the intervention of the police in a timely and coordinated manner can make a significant impact on crime and public disorder levels. It is also a process that holds police managers accountable to action-appropriate interventions. (also *Strategic policing* and *Intelligence-led policing*)

In addition, commonly-used approaches in Canada include:¹⁴⁴

- *Crime Control* or *Professional Response* – also referred to as the *Traditional approach*
 - Reduced crime through rapid response and follow-up investigation.
- *Order Maintenance*
 - Limiting signs of public disorder and urban decay to allow community ownership often combined with CPTED and other infrastructure initiatives.
- *Social Justice*
 - Extra vigilance in protecting those most vulnerable in society and understanding root causes.

The philosophical approaches are not discrete and organisations usually comprise elements of all philosophies but tend to be weighted in a certain culture of approach to their mandate which influences the manner in which practitioners view their activities.

For the first time, technology and computerization have enabled timely analyses of crime and policing activities. Many police forces have daily, weekly, and monthly reviews of events and trends and adapt deployment and priorities as required. The process allows for operationally effective and cost effective use of resources.

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is a policing model that employs an analysis-driven approach to crime control. As a business model and managerial philosophy, crime intelligence and data analysis are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework for crime reduction and prevention through strategic management and effective strategies that target prolific and serious offenders.¹⁴⁵ Although there is no universally accepted definition of ILP,

“it is a model of policing in which [criminal] intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁴ Hovbrenner, A. Evaluating the New Paradigm of Policing, Master's Thesis, Royal Roads University, 2003

¹⁴⁵ Ratcliffe, JH. "Intelligence-Led Policing." Willan Publishing: Cullompton, Devon. 2008.

¹⁴⁶ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "Intelligence-led policing: A Definition." RCMP Criminal Intelligence Program, June 2007.

The model applies crime analysis and other criminal intelligence to help the police to work more effectively. ILP was seen as a policing framework that built on earlier paradigms, including community policing and problem-oriented policing. ILP represents a

*“rejection of the reactive, crime focus of community policing with calls for police to spend more time employing informants and surveillance to combat recidivist offenders”.*¹⁴⁷

The *Strategic* or *Intelligence-led* model incorporates the other models strategically and tactically as required. Based on *Crime and Incident Analyses*, decisions on deployment, response, and intervention strategies can be determined, for example

- *Social Justice* working with social agencies
- *Community-based* combined with *Order maintenance* in the downtown area
- *Professional response* for largely crime free areas
- *Geographic and temporal deployment* for uniform primary investigation

Tactically, timely *Crime and Incident Analysis* allows the most suitable response to be applied immediately. Supporting this, an intelligence gathering process is required to augment the more objective data-based analyses.

Many police agencies now view intelligence-led policing as a core business practice incorporating a structured analysis and response comprising:¹⁴⁸

- Scanning: problem identification
- Analysis: nature and causes of problems
- Response: formulation of tailor-made strategies
- Assessment: evaluation of effectiveness.

In addition to the Intelligence-led model, it is necessary to deliver services in the most appropriate manner. The *Review* examined options which include service delivery through: police officers; peace officers; by-law enforcement; non-sworn specialists such as scenes-of-crime staff; private security personnel under contract to police agencies or municipalities; police community service officers; special constables; citizens' crime patrol; victim services; police partnerships with business improvement associations and street security patrols; partnerships with private security in stores, hotels, malls, and a variety of public spaces; partnerships with loss prevention officers (private security) working undercover in public places; and volunteers working in a number of support functions.

Effective communication with and from the community is essential for any service to be successful. Traditionally, police forces have relied on personal contact and reporting directly to a police officer. While this is often the highest form of service to the public it is resource intense and often unnecessary. The

¹⁴⁷ Page 4, Ratcliff, Jerry H. (2008). *Intelligence Led Policing*. Portland: Willan Publishing. ISBN: 978-1-84392-340-4

¹⁴⁸ SARA and a variety of similar acronyms. *Police Chief Magazine*, December 2010

Review identified a number of options which may be successful in the Red Deer context including: police officer telephone investigation; telephone report taking; internet reporting; initial telephone report and appointments for officer follow up; non-sworn staff initial report taking and investigation; and walk-in reporting at a police office.

An example of a broad communication approach is found with the West Vancouver Police Department¹⁴⁹

West Vancouver is the first community in Canada to bring ePolicing technology to its citizens. This powerful web technology puts current and relevant information on current crime trends directly into the hands of the police department's most important stakeholders, its citizens. This tool has been used successfully by large US police departments, such as the Los Angeles Police Department, and now has been adapted and prepared to meet the needs of West Vancouver.

From the West Vancouver Police Department website, you can sign up to receive up to date bulletins in the areas that interest you. Our interactive crime maps will provide you with current information on what is happening in your community, letting you see both what is happening in your area as well as what we're doing to proactively reduce crime based on current trends.

The Calgary Police Service also uses the Internet to communicate with the community.¹⁵⁰ For example: Citizen Online Police Report System

*Welcome to the Calgary Police Service Citizen Online Police Report System.
FOR EMERGENCIES OR CRIMES IN PROGRESS – CALL 9-1-1
This system allows you to submit and print a police report if one of the following has happened to you within the City of Calgary and you do not know who did it:*

- *You have lost or have had stolen something that is worth less than \$5,000 (not including firearms, licence plates or government-issued funds or identification).
(Lost Property or Theft under \$5,000)*
- *Your property or vehicle has been vandalized.
(Damage/Mischief to Property or Vehicle under \$5,000)*
- *Your vehicle has been broken into.
(Theft from Vehicle under \$5,000)*

The London Police Service, Ontario, also use Internet reporting:¹⁵¹

Online Reporting

Welcome to the London Police Service Citizens Online Police Reporting System. If this is an Emergency please call 911.

- *It is the policy of London Police Service to only accept reports that occurred within the London city limits.*
- *Click here for City of London map.*
- *If you were involved in a motor vehicle collision, please call Police. Click here for more information.*
- *If someone has broken into your house or business, please call Police. Click here for more information.*

¹⁴⁹ West Vancouver Police Department website December 8th 2010

¹⁵⁰ Calgary Police Service website December 8th 2010

¹⁵¹ London Police Service website December 8th 2010

- *If you have lost your wallet, [click here](#) for more information on how to protect yourself.*
- *If you believe that you are a victim of identity theft, [click here](#) for more information on how deal with this situation.*
- *If you wish to report a theft or attempted theft of a vehicle, please call Police.*
- *If this is a theft or loss of a Canadian or foreign passport and /or Federal Canadian documents, please call Police.*
- *If you have a suspect, please call Police.*
- *If you have questions about the Citizen Online Reporting System please refer to our [Frequently Asked Questions](#) page.*

The Vancouver Police Department offers Internet and telephone reporting¹⁵²

Report a Crime

Online Crime Reporting

Some crimes can be reported online via the web, particularly if there is no suspect. See [Online Citizen Reporting](#) to view reporting guidelines.

Non-Emergency? Call (604) 717-3321

Many reports to police do not require a police officer to attend in person. If there is no suspect or there is no potential evidence for officers to collect, your call can usually be handled over the telephone. Examples of crimes that should be reported via the non-emergency line:

- *thefts under \$5,000*
- *stolen vehicles*
- *lost property*
- *stolen or lost licence plates and validation tags*

In addition there are a variety of other services:

A-Z List of Services

The Vancouver Police Department's A-Z List of Services is currently being built as the redeveloped website is indexed by search engines. Please try a [Search](#) for the information you are looking for, consult the [Site Map](#), or see [Contact the VPD](#) for a list of contacts.

Some commonly requested services:

- *Compliments & Complaints*
- *Crime Maps*
- *Crime Statistics*
- *Destruction of Fingerprints*
- *Fingerprinting Service*
- *Freedom of Information Requests*
- *Police Records Check*
- *Report a Crime*
- *Request a Copy of a Police Report*
- *Start a Block Watch*
- *Victim Services*
- *Volunteer Opportunities*

¹⁵² Vancouver Police Department website December 8th 2010

The key component for a policing and public safety system to be able to sustain a suitable level of service is to continually assess the workload, resources available, and community needs – and structure the organisation’s resources and policies to provide the most effective service as required.

7.2 Public perceptions

Public perceptions of crime are used as a gauge of public sentiment regarding a sense of security and as a determinant of public policy. However, there appears to be a general disconnect between actual incidence of crime and the public perception of crime. Research in the United Kingdom¹⁵³ demonstrates that the proportion of people who perceive an increase in crime nationally (75 per cent) is far higher than that which perceives an increase in crime locally (36 per cent). This finding occurs although the volume of crime such as murders, manslaughters, and child killings has dropped by 17 per cent to a 20-year low with violent crime and gun crime down by six and 17 per cent respectively; although domestic burglaries and thefts are up marginally, overall crime is down by 5 per cent. The British Crime Survey (BCS) suggests that the public generally believe crime is much more widespread and out of control than it really is. Further, this disconnect appears to be more acute when applied to distant rather than the local crime as evidenced in the proportion of people who perceive an increase in crime nationally being far higher than that which perceives an increase in crime locally. This seems to suggest that the public experience a general anxiety about the volume of crime rather than drawing a conclusion from personal experience.

Similar findings have been experienced in the United States. Gallup¹⁵⁴ asked respondents to rate the seriousness of crime in their local areas as well as nationally. Relatively few Americans call the nation’s crime problem “extremely serious,” but combined with those who call it “very serious,” a majority hold negative views of the national crime problem. By contrast, only 15% of Americans consider crime in the areas where they live to be ‘extremely or very serious’, while 51% do not view it as ‘serious’. Current perceptions of local crime in the US are similar to what Gallup found the previous two years. Since 2005, roughly half of Americans have said they believe there is “more crime in their areas compared to a year ago,” while close to three in ten have said there is less crime. This is contrary to data released by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Department of Justice in the US which report that crime is declining or remaining the same as the previous year.

A 2007 IPSOS report in the United Kingdom stated that a large part of the explanation (in the UK) is to be found in media coverage, “... media portrayals of crime and justice do seem particularly perverse.”

¹⁵³ The Big Question: Why are public perceptions of crime so at odds with the official statistics? Amol Rajan, The Independent, July 2009

¹⁵⁴ Gallup, Jeffrey Jones, October 2009

Local news captures large audiences.¹⁵⁵ News is available 24 hours and the drive for audiences pushes local news organisations to favour an action-oriented format, which is driven by crime and police-oriented content.¹⁵⁶

*If there is a choice between a sensational news item, however fleeting, and a less sensational one that may affect more members of the public or address a bigger problem, the former will generally secure front page in the newspaper or the lead story on the evening television news.*¹⁵⁷

Many researchers of crime and the media suggest crime news has long been and continues to be an information priority for the media and constitutes a large percentage of news stories. The concentration on crime news not only influences public attitudes and opinions toward crime and criminals, it also helps to maintain crime as a salient political issue.¹⁵⁸

In the US, the subjective reality of crime was influenced significantly more by network TV crime coverage than it was by either (a) the crime coverage of four influential national print media or (b) actual real-world crimes.¹⁵⁹

In the 1997 election campaign in the UK, the Labour government ran on a platform which emphasised the need to take control of crime. In the ensuing years of Labour rule it has been suggested that 3000 pieces of legislation were introduced to address criminal issues.¹⁶⁰ Principal among these was legislation which addressed 'lower-level' anti-social behaviors, those behaviors which create a sense of disquiet and threat within local communities. The *Crime and Disorder Act* 1998 introduced the controversial anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOS) and parenting orders. The *Anti-Social Behaviour Act* 2003 gave police powers to disperse large groups of people, and equipped landlords with similar powers over unruly tenants. The *Criminal Justice and Immigration Act* 2008 allows police to close premises used by drug dealers or those suspected of being involved in organized crime.

In Red Deer, the course of the *Review*, participants in interviews and focus groups frequently mentioned an 'increase in crime' and 'the unsafe nature of the downtown area'. When clarification was sought regarding the nature of "unsafe", only isolated examples or hearsay anecdotes were provided. Those references alluded to panhandling and the presence of homeless people in the downtown core. Others mentioned, but without specific examples, an "increase in crime" given that Red Deer has become a city.

¹⁵⁵ Roper-Starch, 1994; Papper and Gerhard, 1999; Hess 1991

¹⁵⁶ Gilliam, F., and Iyengar, S. Prime Suspects: The influence of Local television News on the Viewing Public, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 44, no. 3, 2000

¹⁵⁷ Media Analysis, prepared by Linda Slobodian for Winnipeg Auto Theft Suppression Strategy, Final Evaluation 2009.

¹⁵⁸ C.Y. Thompson *et al.* "Representing Gangs in the News: Media Constructions of Criminal Gangs." *Sociological Spectrum*, 20 p.409-432. Taylor and Francis 2000. In,

http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Representing_Gangs_in_The_News__Media_Constructions_of_Criminal_Gangs.pdf

¹⁵⁹ The Social Construction and Subjective Reality of Crime: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media Crime Reporting, Public Perceptions of Crime and FBI Crime Statistics Dennis T. Lowry*, Tarn Ching Josephine Nio**, Kwangok Kim*, Daekyung Kim*, Yanjun Zhao*, and Dennis W. Leitner* * Southern Illinois University Carbondale ** Southern Taiwan University of Technology Presented to the Mass Communication Division of the International Communication Association at the annual conference, New Orleans, May 28, 2004.

¹⁶⁰ Gallup, Jeffrey Jones, October 2009

Also mentioned in interviews was the feeling of apprehension that was engendered by the implementation of Neighborhood Watch, in that if such a crime prevention program is warranted, then crime must be rife. The preventive aspects of Neighbourhood Watch were not fully appreciated.

An important aspect of perceptions of crime is the distinction between the fear of being a victim of crime and the probability of being a victim of crime. Individuals or communities that feel vulnerable to victimization are influenced by the feeling that they will be targeted by criminals or that they are unable to control their circumstances to prevent victimization. An important issue in this discussion which relates to the downtown is the need for residential, retail and entertainment facilities in the downtown. This would encourage the presence of people in the downtown core. This issue will be addressed in subsequent phases of the *Review*, however, it was frequently mentioned in interviews and focus groups that currently the downtown is largely void of citizens who interviewees considered to be mainstream or any purpose for a family to visit or spend time there. Given the current location of social support agencies and in the absence of residential, entertainment or other commercial establishments, on those occasions that mainstream citizens visit downtown the perception is that they may be outnumbered by those residents who display characteristics which are not considered, by them, to be fully desirable. The reported crime data (previously discussed) and the calls for service discussed below indicate that the perception of downtown being unsafe is predicated more on the unsupported belief that crime is rampant rather than on the reality. As noted in the call analysis, much of the crime “downtown” occurs in the vicinity of the detachment office and, further, many of these “incidents” are administrative in nature rather than actual crimes which may cause direct harm to citizens or their property.

7.3 Calls for Service

‘Calls for service’ originate from different sources and are classified as either emergency or non-emergency. An emergency call for police service generally enters the reporting system via the Red Deer Regional 911 Communication Centre, located in the Red Deer Fire Hall. As the Primary Service Answer Point (PSAP), operators will route police related calls to the Secondary Service Answer Point, which in the case of Red Deer is the RCMP Southern Alberta Operational Control Center (OCC). Here, staff members designated to receive calls for service for the City of Red Deer municipal RCMP will create files using the Computer Integrated Information and Dispatch System (CIIDS) and then route (dispatch) the file for police attention and response.¹⁶¹

Non-emergency calls for service may also enter the reporting system via the OCC. Staff at the OCC has no discretion to either filter a call or deal with the call for service in any other manner than dispatching the call to a police unit. The OCC is fully funded by the Province of Alberta and, consequently, the City has

¹⁶¹ Part 3 of the Report will include further examination of this issue

limited ability to affect the policies and procedures of the OCC with respect to the dispatch of officers assigned to the Red Deer detachment.¹⁶²

Calls for service may also be generated from the Detachment Operational Center or the Watch Office (or as it is colloquially known, the Bubble Room) which is located within the detachment and staffed 23 hours each day by two municipal employees and the additional 24th hour by one employee. The Watch Office staff monitor calls which are dispatched by the OCC to Red Deer units via CIIDS and provides administrative support in the form of, for example, the conduct of CPIC or vehicle ownership checks. The staff also dispatches units based upon calls for service that may be generated by citizens who attend the front counter at the detachment. Watch Office personnel also “convert” CIIDS files to PROS files, both of which are RCMP systems. CIIDS must be transferred to PROS format for report preparation and submission. The Watch office is funded by The City of Red Deer.¹⁶³

Each category of call for service can be subject to different level of accuracy and specificity. Calls for service to the detachment, for example, rarely refer to an actual dispatch of a mobile unit. Many can result from the attendance of a member of the public to report a minor incident, to request information or to obtain, say, a security clearance form for volunteer work or to acquire a damage sticker to enable repair of motor vehicle damage.¹⁶⁴

Calls for service may be generated in many ways, for example:

- By a 911 call from a citizen to the OCC
- By a non-emergency call from a citizen to OCC
- By a call or visit by a citizen to the front counter at the detachment
- By police patrol activity, for example, officer /violator contacts, such as the issuance of speeding ticket, or the arrest of an impaired driver.
- A patrol unit being hailed by a citizen on the street
- By a request for assistance from another police agency such as a request for a ‘notification of death’ or an administrative query.
- By a request from a unit which is at the detachment for assistance from another unit to conduct a breathalyser test.


¹⁶² Griffiths, C., and Fenning, T., Dispatch for the City of Red Deer RCMP: Current practice, outcomes and options, 2008.

¹⁶³ Ibid. See note (page viii) “*The fiscal cost of the current dispatch is nil, as the city does not contribute to the operation of the Southern Alberta OCC.*”

¹⁶⁴ In the course of the research, there was varying opinion as to whether “call-ins” generated a ‘call for service’ although some “call-ins” were addressed by counter staff, on other occasions; a unit was called via OCC. At times, even the detachment administrative office initiated a call to a unit. Such calls for service would not be logged the same as a call directed via OCC and would not be recorded under the CIIDS file process.

7.3.1 Calls for Service – Geographic

Graph 1-7A Zones and Atoms in Red Deer



As illustrated in Graph 1-7A (above)¹⁶⁵ the area policed by Red Deer Municipal RCMP includes the urban core ('Downtown'), peripheral neighbourhoods and rural areas within the city boundaries. The jurisdiction is divided into 18 zones. Zones are also subdivided into smaller units of measure, called atoms. The bulk of policing activity occurs in zones considered more urban. Not only do the calls for service vary within each zone, but the types of calls that occur within each of these zones also vary. Depending upon the zone under consideration, the types of calls for service occurring within the atoms comprising a particular zone also differ.¹⁶⁶

In the following distribution of calls for service by zone¹⁶⁷ most calls for service come from Zone 3 (22.4%), the downtown core. In rank order, Zones 1, 6 and 2 generate the next highest calls for service ranging from approximately 15 – 16% of all calls for service. Specific details of calls for service are provided in Appendix 7A.

Table 1-35 Calls for Service by Zone

Zone	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
1	9,425	15.6	15.6
2	8,677	14.4	30.0
3	13,083	21.7	51.7
4	489	.8	52.5
5	7,145	11.8	64.3
6	10,666	17.7	82.0
7	7,077	11.7	93.7
8	3,670	6.1	99.8
9	32	.0	99.8
10	2	.0	99.8
11	29	.0	99.9
13	2	.0	99.9
15	4	.0	99.9
16	6	.0	99.9
19	16	.0	99.9
	60,323	100.0	100.0

¹⁶⁵ New electronic versions of maps have been requested from City of Red Deer and upon receipt will be substituted for the current Graphs in order to more clearly denote community boundary and name.

¹⁶⁶ Zones outside of the city boundaries have been established in anticipation of future annexation and growth.

¹⁶⁷ Data is inclusive January 2009 to June 2010


7.3.2 Atom Analysis by Zone

As noted previously, zones contain smaller units of measure: atoms. The number of atoms per zone ranges from 2 (zone 3) to 18 (zone 6). In an examination of the seven zones having the most calls for service, (zones 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8), the charts below suggest that, calls for service are not distributed evenly within the zones, just as they are not distributed equally, as noted above, between zones. The uneven distribution of calls for service within zones at the atom level suggests that policing resources cannot be evenly deployed within zones. Similarly, from a call for service perspective, police resources cannot be evenly deployed between zones.

It is noted that Zone 4, call for service accounts for less than 1% of total calls for service. As with other zones (9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, and 19) accounting for less than 1% of calls for service, Zone 4 is not included in the following analysis.



Zone 1

The images presented here depict the geographic space that is Zone 1, along with a pie chart that depicts how calls are distributed within the zone. The bulk of the calls for service in Zone 1 come from Atom 1G, one of the largest geographic atoms in this zone.





Zone 2

Nearly half of all calls in Zone 2 come from Atom 2F (41%). Atom 2H is the next most prolific generator of calls, accounting for nearly 29% of calls for service.





Zone 3

Unlike all other zones which have multiple atoms, there are two atoms in Zone 3, only one of which is evident from the map. Atom 3X, which includes the Downtown core, accounts for over 90% of the calls for service in the zone. As detailed in Appendix 1-7, the top 10 calls for service in rank order and accounting for almost 50% of calls are: Disturbing the peace (11.7%), Assistance to Canadian Province (6.3%), Traffic Collision- Property (6.1%), Theft under or equal to \$5000 (4.6%), Assistance to Canadian Police (4.2%), Assault 266 CC (FIP) (3.9%), Items Lost/Found (3.4%), Municipal Bylaws – Other (3.1%), False Alarms (3%), and Other theft under \$5000 (3%).





Zone 5

Although Atom 5X is geographically smaller than Atom 5W, Atom 5X accounts for 60% of the calls for service, and Atom 5W for 20%.



Zone 6



Unlike the zones considered earlier, Zone 6 has multiple atoms with a relatively more even distribution, especially once physical size of the atoms is taken into account.¹⁶⁸ Although Atom 6M has the most calls for service, it is also the largest atom in this zone. Many of the remaining atoms in this zone have about 5-8% of the calls for service.



¹⁶⁸ For clarity, atom call for service distribution is presented in bar graph format, rather than pie chart.

Zone 7



In Zone 7, Atom 7E accounts for nearly 26% of the calls for service.¹⁶⁹ Like Atom 6M, described above, Atom 7E is comparatively larger than the other atoms in this zone. Atom 7DE accounts for 14% of the calls for service and is half the geographic size of Atom 7E.



¹⁶⁹ Again, for clarity, atom call for service distribution is presented in bar graph format, rather than pie chart.

Zone 8

There are four atoms in Zone 8. Atom 8X accounts for over 51% of the calls for service, with Atoms 8P and 8Y make up 45% of the calls for service. Atom 8WP



7.3.3 Calls for Service, by Type

The examination that follows highlights how calls for service are distributed, prioritising zones as the focus of interest, along the following dimensions:

- types of calls for service,
- the distribution of calls for service over time (including month, day and hour),
- distribution of calls for service by call method,
- the distribution of calls for service by priority ranking, and
- the distribution of calls for service in terms of clearance type status.

The data for this analysis includes calls for service for all of 2009 and for January to July, 2010. Where appropriate, the calls for service from the first half of 2009 are compared to the first half of 2010.

The types of calls that come to the attention of the police are many and varied. In Table 1-36 below, the 15 most frequent calls for service overall for the duration of the period under examination (January 2009 – June 2010) are considered.¹⁷⁰ As can be seen from Table 1-36, the most frequent calls for service are those involving traffic collisions (7.4% of all calls), disturbing the peace (6.5%), false alarms (5.7%), theft under \$5000 (5.5%) and violation of municipal bylaws (5.0%). The ten most frequent types of calls for service make up nearly half of all calls for service while the most frequent fifteen calls for service takes up nearly 60% of officers' time.

¹⁷⁰ The complete table of all 232 types of calls is provided in Appendix 7

Table 1-36 Overall Calls for Service (January 2009 – June 2010)

	Type of Call	Frequency	Percent of Total Calls	Cumulative Percent
1	Traffic Collision(s) – Prop. Damage	4489	7.4%	7.4%
2	Disturbing the peace [175(1) CC]	3984	6.5%	13.9%
3	False Alarms	3477	5.7%	19.6%
4	Theft under or equal to \$5000	3360	5.5%	25.1%
5	Municipal Bylaws - Other	3027	5.0%	30.1%
6	Mischief - Damage to, or Obstruct	2290	3.8%	33.9%
7	Assault (266 CC)	2166	3.5%	37.4%
8	Other theft under \$5000 [334(b) CC]	2039	3.3%	40.7%
9	Mischief equal to or under \$5000	1998	3.3%	44.0%
10	Impaired Operation (by Alcohol)	1801	3.0%	47.0%
11	Assistance to General Public	1750	2.9%	49.9%
12	Person Reported Missing	1591	2.6%	52.5%
13	Fail to Stop or Remain at Accident	1528	2.5%	55.0%
14	Other Moving Traffic Violation	1528	2.5%	57.5%
15	Suspicious Person/ Vehicle/ Prop.	1461	2.4%	59.9%
	Totals	61023	59.9%	

The calls for service vary by zone: not all zones have the same distribution of calls, with the implication that officers will be spending their time differently depending upon which zone is being policed. As can be seen from Table 1-37 below, *traffic collisions* are not equally proportionate across the zones: Zone 5 has over 11% of *traffic collisions* as calls for service, while Zone 2 has less than half that proportion at 4.5%. Similarly, *disturbing the peace* is nearly 12% of the calls for service Zone 3, while Zone 7 has fewer than 4% of the same calls.

While the overall proportion of these calls was nearly 60%, regardless of zone, this particular selection of calls makes up different proportions of calls for service depending upon the zone being considered. In Zone 3, for example, these calls make up nearly 53% of calls for service, while in Zone 8 these types of calls constitute nearly 67% of calls for service. The implications for the types of units scheduled for any particular shift would necessarily have to reflect the nature of the calls generated by a particular zone.¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ As noted in the Introduction, no recommendations for changes to strategies are made within Part 1 of the Review. Such recommendations and discussion will be included in Parts 2 and 3.

Although, as demonstrated, the 'call for service' data indicates the types of calls in each geographical area, the time taken on types of calls is sometimes inaccurate as officers either fail to notify arrival at the scene of an incident; fail to register their departure from the scene or continue an investigation off site and do not notify despatch that the call is complete. The last case is particularly difficult to capture as an investigation may last several days or weeks or even months, given the nature of the crime, and, consequently the dispatch data would be distorted. With these caveats, time taken at calls is addressed below, in Table 1-44.

Table 1-37 Overall Calls for Service (January 2009 – June 2010 – 18 Month Duration) by Selected Zones

	Type of Call	1	2	3	5	6	7	8
1	Traffic Collision(s) – Prop. Damage	621 (6.6%)	388 (4.5%)	796 (6.1%)	811 (11.4%)	750 (8.3%)	386 (5.5%)	359 (9.8%)
2	Disturbing the peace [175(1) CC]	440 (4.7%)	511 (5.9%)	1525 (11.7%)	518 (7.3%)	338 (4.0%)	257 (3.7%)	243 (6.6%)
3	False Alarms	671 (7.1%)	349 (4.0%)	396 (3.0%)	353 (4.7%)	725 (8.0%)	446 (6.4%)	343 (9.4%)
4	Theft under or equal to \$5000	502 (5.3%)	337 (3.9%)	596 (4.6%)	387 (5.4%)	575 (6.4%)	422 (6.0%)	344 (9.4%)
5	Municipal Bylaws - Other	513 (5.5%)	633 (7.3%)	407 (3.1%)	56 (0.8%)	506 (5.6%)	468 (6.7%)	98 (2.7%)
6	Mischief - Damage/Obstruct	392 (4.2%)	375 (4.3%)	328 (2.5%)	361 (3.7%)	447 (4.9%)	325 (4.6%)	91 (2.5%)
7	Assault (266 CC)	376 (4.0%)	393 (4.6%)	513 (3.9%)	249 (3.5%)	237 (2.6%)	244 (3.5%)	89 (2.4%)
8	Other theft under \$5000 [334(b)CC]	321 (3.4%)	304 (3.5%)	391 (3.0%)	263 (3.7%)	273 (3.0%)	260 (3.7%)	153 (4.2%)
9	Mischief equal to or under \$5000	322 (3.4%)	361 (4.2%)	312 (3.4%)	208 (2.9%)	330 (3.6%)	278 (4.0%)	88 (2.4%)
10	Impaired Operation (Alc.)	281 (3.0%)	287 (3.3%)	318 (2.4%)	260 (3.6%)	307 (3.4%)	137 (2.0%)	128 (3.5%)
11	Assistance to General Public	322 (3.4%)	299 (3.5%)	320 (2.4%)	200 (2.8%)	241 (2.7%)	211 (3.0%)	75 (2.0%)
12	Person Report Missing	367 (3.9%)	396 (4.6%)	110 (0.8%)	124 (1.7%)	123 (1.4%)	348 (5.0%)	28 (0.8%)
13	Fail Stop/Remain at Accident	183 (1.9%)	126 (1.5%)	268 (2.1%)	295 (4.1%)	208 (2.3%)	104 (1.5%)	194 (5.3%)
14	Other Moving Traffic Violation	253 (2.7%)	214 (2.5%)	209 (1.6%)	208 (2.9%)	254 (2.8%)	175 (2.5%)	115 (3.2%)
15	Suspicious Pers./ Veh./ Prop.	218 (2.3%)	212 (2.5%)	275 (2.1%)	150 (2.1%)	254 (2.8%)	185 (2.6%)	91 (2.5%)
	Total (Percent of calls)	9400 (61.4%)	8627 (60.1%)	13,068 (52.7%)	7136 (60.6%)	9045 (61.8%)	7021 (60.7%)	3664 (66.7%)


7.3.4 Calls for Service Temporal

7.3.4.1 Month

The distribution of calls for service varies over the course of months and seasons – each of which has particular opportunities for social interaction, as well as climatic implications for the types of activities taking place. Graph 7B indicates the monthly variation of calls for service for all zones.

Graph 7B illustrates how the volume of calls for service has or has not changed over two time periods. In the first six months of 2009, from January to June, we note the following proportions of calls: 5.1%, 4.6%, 5.1%, 5.5%, 5.8%, and 6.1%, respectively. For the same months (January to June) of 2010, the proportions are: 4.8%, 4.4%, 5.2%, 5.7%, 6.9% and 6.9%, respectively. While January, February and March remain relatively consistent in both 2009 and 2010, the proportionate volume of calls during the months of April to June is somewhat higher in 2010 than in 2009.


Graph 1-8 Calls for Service by Month - Jan 2009 to June 2010



7.3.4.2 Day of Week

As noted in Graph 7C, the distribution of calls for service is greatest on Fridays, while both Thursday and Saturday remain proportionately higher than the other days of the week. Sundays are marked by a substantial decrease in volume. This pattern remained consistent across all zones.


Graph 1-9 Distribution of calls for service by day of the week (2009)



7.3.4.3 Hour of Day

An observation by policing and other emergency responders is that the volume of calls varies by the time of day. These observations are largely substantiated in the analyses of the calls for service for Red Deer RCMP. Graph 7D displays the percentage volume of cases occurring over a 24-hour period. Notably, 29.5% of the calls in any given day are received between 1 and 6 pm on average: a five hour period (approximately 21% of the day) is associated with 30% of the calls for service.

Graph 1-10 Percent of Calls over a 24 Hour Period



7.4 Distribution of Calls by Call Method

An issue that substantially impacts on workload and the way in which calls for service are dealt with is the method by which calls come to the attention of police. As noted above, the term “calls for service” is somewhat nebulous – it may include a variety of methods by which service requests come to the attention of police, such as, 911 calls, telephone calls on non-emergency lines, walk-ins, and officer-generated requests.

The majority of calls, 80%, come to the attention of police via phone. The next largest proportion, though substantially less, are walk-ins at 8.5%. Unspecified calls are exactly that – unspecified – while “other” calls consist of methods such as CPIC, email, fax, internal emails and mail.

Table 1:38: Calls for Service (January 2009 – June 2010) by Reporting Method

Origin of call.	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Phone	48,856	80.1	80.1
Officer	3410	5.6	85.7
Walk-In	5208	8.5	94.2
Unspecified	2725	4.5	97.7
Other	823	1.3	100.0
	61,022	100.0	

Unfortunately, the data for this portion of the analysis are somewhat unclear as the categories do not provide much detail. While certain reporting methods have been collapsed into larger categories, the specifics of the categories that have been collapsed are not self-evident. For example, the category “phone” includes what is referred to in the data provided as “phone totals”, cell-phone and pay-phone totals – these latter categories making up only a small number (approximately 15%) of the total phone calls. It is difficult to determine the proportion of these phone calls which are 9-1-1 calls versus the proportion of calls that may be a result of a non-emergency response line. These are important data which impacts the types of strategic responses to *calls for service*.


Table 1-39 Calls for Service (January 2009 – June 2010) by Reporting Method by Selected Zones

	Phone	Officer	Walk-In	Unspecified	Other	Total
1	8159	326	622	229	64	9400
% in zone	86.8%	3.5%	6.6%	2.4%	.7%	100.0%
2	7416	413	430	284	84	8627
% in zone	86.0%	4.8%	5.0%	3.3%	1.0%	100.0%
3	8603	1368	1418	1248	431	13068
% in zone	65.8%	10.5%	10.9%	9.6%	3.3%	100.0%
5	5747	297	797	249	46	7136
% in zone	80.5%	4.2%	11.2%	3.5%	.6%	100.0%
6	7513	383	734	345	70	9045
% in zone	83.1%	4.2%	8.1%	3.8%	.8%	100.0%
7	6095	284	416	164	62	7021
% in zone	86.8%	4.0%	5.9%	2.3%	.9%	100.0%
8	3023	140	386	96	19	3664
% in zone	82.5%	3.8%	10.5%	2.6%	.5%	100.0%
	(46799)	(3219)	(4815)	(2620)	(779)	(58232)
	80.4%	5.5%	8.3%	4.5%	1.3%	100.0%

Table 1-39 provides further detail on the method of calls received by the zones. What is notable is that the proportions of calls for service received by phone vary. In Zones 1 and 7, for example, nearly 87% of the calls for service come in via phone. For Zone 3, on the other hand, only 66% of calls come in via phone with a much larger proportion coming from officer generated, walk-in calls for service and “unspecified” service requests. The differing nature of these service requests for Zone 3 make sense given the fact that the area is relatively small, densely populated and includes police facilities open to the public. The occasional presence of a downtown foot patrol may also influence the rate at which officers are summoned to incidents. However, given the high percentage of calls which emanate via ‘phone, (see below) the impact of face to face reporting and its impact on reported crime rates is relatively low.

Graph 7D provides a visual representation of the data presented in Table 7-5, above.

Graph 1-11: Reporting Methods by Selected Zones



7.5 Distribution of Calls by Priority

The urgency of calls, like the nature of the calls themselves, can vary dramatically impacting on response times. The calls for service considered here were coded into four categories: “urgent”, “routine”, “information” and “unspecified”.

RCMP standard operating procedures for “K” Division Operational Communications Centres state there are four priority codes.¹⁷²

- Priority 1 – Very Urgent – Immediate Dispatch. A major incident or incident in progress that requires immediate police presence, assistance or service. Involves the report of a loss of life or a need for police to prevent a loss of life.
- Priority 2 – Urgent – Dispatch as soon as possible. There is an urgent need for the police presence, assistance, or service. While there is no loss of life involved, the potential for escalation of violence exists.
- Priority 3 – Routine – Dispatch as soon as reasonably possible. Reports that do not require immediate police presence, assistance or service.
- Priority 4 – No immediate Action. Reports that do not require police assistance and are for information purposes only.

It is apparent that, given the priority codes, response times will differ. What is known is that the bulk of the calls for service, 85%, are considered routine, as depicted in Graph 1-12.

¹⁷² “K” Division OCC Program Rev: 0001 July 8, 2010.

Graph 1-12 Calls for Service by Priority (2009 to June 2010)




Table 1-40, below, provides further information with respect to the relationship between priority and reporting method. The data suggest that of those calls that are considered “urgent”, nearly 99% of these calls were reported by phone. Of those calls that were considered “routine”, nearly 85% were reported by phone; for “information” 76% were reported by phone and for “unspecified”, 1.3% was reported by phone.

Table 1-40 Reporting Method by Priority (January 2009 – June 2010)

Method	Priority				Total
	Urgent	Routine	Information	Unspecified	
Phone	4754	43,687	364	51	48,856
% within method	9.7%	89.4%	.7%	.1%	100.0%
% within priority	98.9%	84.6%	76.3%	1.3%	80.1%
Officer	18	2861	48	483	3410
% within method	.5%	83.9%	1.4%	14.2%	100.0%
% within priority	.4%	5.5%	10.1%	11.9%	5.6%
Walk-In	19	4301	40	848	5208
% within method	.4%	82.6%	.8%	16.3%	100.0%
% within priority	.4%	8.3%	8.4%	20.8%	8.5%
Unspecified	3	494	11	2217	2725
% within method	.1%	18.1%	.4%	81.4%	100.0%
% within priority	.1%	1.0%	2.3%	54.5%	4.5%
Other	13	325	14	471	823
% within method	1.6%	39.5%	1.7%	57.2%	100.0%
% within priority	.3%	.6%	2.9%	11.6%	1.3%
Total	4807	51668	477	4070	61022
% within method	7.9%	84.7%	.8%	6.7%	100.0%
% within priority	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

7.6 Distribution of Calls by Clearance Status

Considered here (Table 1-41) are the data from 2009. It is noted that most calls for service are considered *completed*, although *unsolved*, at nearly 37% of calls for service. This refers to calls for service where all investigative efforts have been completed and an offender has not been identified or there is not sufficient evidence to proceed with a charge or clear the call otherwise. The next largest proportion of calls is those considered *completed*, though solved, at nearly 31%. This refers to an occurrence (call for service) that is non-criminal (not an offence). In comparison to these *completed* calls, significantly less are cleared by charge – nearly 14%, while less than half that amount about 7% are considered *unfounded*, that is the police investigation has determined there is no violation of the law or attempted violation.

Table 1-41 Calls by Clearance Status 2009

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Cleared by charge	5534	13.7	13.7
Cleared other - beyond control of dept	90	.2	13.9
Cleared other - CO declines to lay charge	603	1.5	15.4
Cleared other	152	.4	15.8
Cleared other - dept discretion	3869	9.6	25.4
Not cleared - continuing	160	.4	25.8
Complete - unsolved	14807	36.7	62.5
Complete - solved	12409	30.7	93.2
Unfounded	2734	6.8	100.0
Total	40358	100.0	

Clearance status may be interpreted in a number of ways and is impacted by a number of factors. For example, the reporting method may have an impact on the ways in which calls are ultimately cleared. What is noted is that of those calls reported by phone, less than 9% are cleared by charge. This is substantially different than most of the other methods. If an officer reports the call, nearly 60% are cleared by charge, compared to about 25% cleared by charge if reported via walk-in or unspecified. For calls that are phoned in, over 40% are considered as ‘complete-unsolved’, compared with 6% of officer reported calls, and 28% of walk-ins. A further discussion of interpretation of incident clearance status is contained in Appendix 6.

Table 1-42A Clearance Status by Reporting Method

Clearance Status	Reporting Method					Total
	Phone	Officer	Walk-In	Unspecified	Other	
Cleared by charge	2844	1274	885	477	54	5534
% within clearance status	51.4%	23.0%	16.0%	8.6%	1.0%	100.0%
% within reporting method	8.8%	59.9%	24.4%	27.2%	9.9%	13.7%
Cleared other - beyond control of dept	39	19	17	13	2	90
% within clearance status	43.3%	21.1%	18.9%	14.4%	2.2%	100.0%
% within reporting method	.1%	.9%	.5%	.7%	.4%	.2%
Cleared other - CO declines to lay charge	554	9	28	9	3	603
% within clearance status	91.9%	1.5%	4.6%	1.5%	.5%	100.0%
% within reporting method	1.7%	.4%	.8%	.5%	.6%	1.5%
Cleared other	122	13	5	6	6	152
% within clearance status	80.3%	8.6%	3.3%	3.9%	3.9%	100.0%
% within reporting method	.4%	.6%	.1%	.3%	1.1%	.4%
Cleared other - dept discretion	3605	83	92	74	15	3869
% within clearance status	93.2%	2.1%	2.4%	1.9%	.4%	100.0%
% within reporting method	11.2%	3.9%	2.5%	4.2%	2.8%	9.6%
Not cleared - continuing	99	3	24	29	5	160
% within clearance status	61.9%	1.9%	15.0%	18.1%	3.1%	100.0%
% within reporting method	.3%	.1%	.7%	1.7%	.9%	.4%
Complete - unsolved	13270	127	1029	308	73	14807
% within clearance status	89.6%	.9%	6.9%	2.1%	.5%	100.0%
% within reporting method	41.1%	6.0%	28.3%	17.6%	13.4%	36.7%

Continued Table 1-42B

Table 1-42B Clearance Status by Reporting Method

<u>Clearance Status</u>	<u>Phone</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Walk-In</u>	<u>Unspecified</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
Complete - solved	9456	456	1503	617	377	12409
% within clearance status	76.2%	3.7%	12.1%	5.0%	3.0%	100.0%
% within reporting method	29.3%	21.4%	41.4%	35.2%	69.2%	30.7%
Unfounded	2309	144	51	220	10	2734
% within clearance status	84.5%	5.3%	1.9%	8.0%	.4%	100.0%
% within reporting method	7.1%	6.8%	1.4%	12.5%	1.8%	6.8%
Total	32298	2128	3634	1753	545	40358
% within clearance status	80.0%	5.3%	9.0%	4.3%	1.4%	100.0%
% within reporting method	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

7.7 Responding to Calls

7.7.1 Report, Dispatch, and Arrival Times

The following analysis uses data for which there was a recorded Computerized Integrated Information and Dispatch System (CIIDS) event.¹⁷³ Reported events are not independent. Several calls for service may refer to the same event. Also, more than one unit may be dispatched to the same event. This may occur on purpose to provide additional cover for an attending unit or inadvertently when two events are not linked and initially considered as separate events.

Table 1-43 Summary of CIIDS Events Analyzed

	2009 (January – December) # of events	2010 (January – June) # of events
Reported time	40,153	19,883
First digital dispatch time	34,532	17,674
First at scene time	16,097	7,789

There are various categorizations of calls for service.

¹⁷³ Further discussion regarding the difference between CIIDS reported events and PROS reported events can be found above in the report.

- 'Reported time' is generally the time at which the incoming call is recorded by OCC following a call by a citizen or a police officer (or some other source).
- Dispatched time is the time at which the call is dispatched to a unit by the staff at OCC (or in limited cases the Watch office at the detachment):
- Time on scene is the time at which the unit records having arrived at the scene of the incident:
- Time completed is the time at which the unit records that the call is complete.

There are caveats which must be considered when viewing call for service data.

- In particularly busy periods, such as Friday or Saturday evenings, there may be a back log of cases awaiting dispatch. On those, infrequent, occasions there would be a more protracted delay between call receipt and dispatch.
- Unless the recording of the time is computer generated, as at OCC, any time record is dependent upon the officer being able or having the inclination to record the time. Given the urgent nature of some events, the officer may simply and with urgency attend to the incident without notifying the dispatch of his/her arrival. In addition, being human, the officer may forget.
- In the case of 'call completed', incidents which require a protracted investigation and extensive report writing may not "be completed" for days or even months and, in some cases, years. The 'call completed' time tends, although not exclusively, to be entered for those incidents which are relatively quick and easy to handle.

Below, the data regarding calls for service are configured in such a way that all events (in 2009, 40,153, and for the first half of 2010, 19,883) have a "reported" date and time. Events are eliminated, however, when dispatch date and time are considered, as not all events have recorded dispatches. There may be no dispatch date/time as a result of no unit ever having been dispatched – should an event be resolved prior to dispatch, it may no longer require a dispatched unit and there would be no associated dispatch date/time. There are even fewer events that have arrival dates/times. In some instances, this may be due to human error, with officers failing to record their time of arrival, or again, it may mean that an event was resolved after dispatch and prior to units arriving on-scene. The accuracy of this data has an impact upon effective management of resources.

Finally, it is important to note that the times used for this analysis are calculated in terms of "minutes", or fractions of whole minutes.

7.8 Times by Zone and Priority

Tables 1-44A and 1-440B summarise the average time (in minutes) of three priority levels of events for each of the eight zones under consideration. As could be expected, the duration from "report to arrival" varies both by priority level, as well as by zone.

For priority 1 events, the zones that have the fastest "report to arrival" times are Zones 1, 2 and 3, ranging from 4.00 to 6.75 minutes. It is important to note that there are very few events that are priority 1 in any

of the zones considered. During 2009 or in the six months of data supplied for 2010, Zone 7 had 19 priority 1 events, the largest number of priority 1 events of any of the zones, with the average “report to arrival” time at under 14 minutes. This longer travel time is not surprising, given that Zone 7 covers a substantially larger area than Zones 1, 2 or 3, for example.

Considerably more priority 2 and 3 events occur than do priority 1. Given that priority 2 and 3 are characterized by less overall urgency, response times are longer as well. Zones 2, 3 and 5 average the fastest response times (“report to arrival” time) at the 8-10 minute range. All of the other zones have priority 2 averaging at about 11 minutes. Priority 3 events tend to be 2-3 times longer, on average, than priority 1 events, ranging from a low of under 11 minutes (Zone 3) to over an hour and 15 minutes (Zone 8).

Table 1-44A Report to Arrival Times (January 2009 to June 2010)

Zone 1			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	2.21	4.41	5.90
Dispatch to Arrival	5.63	7.05	10.30
Report to Arrival [N]	6.75 [8]	10.50 [606]	14.72 [2742]
Zone 2			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	4.50	4.32	5.93
Dispatch to Arrival	2.40	5.84	8.77
Report to Arrival [N]	5.40 [5]	9.07 [628]	13.03 [2741]
Zone 3			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	2.46	3.79	6.92
Dispatch to Arrival	2.14	5.09	6.96
Report to Arrival [N]	4.00 [7]	7.96 [596]	10.79 [3169]
Zone 4			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	--	5.63	6.32
Dispatch to Arrival	--	6.89	8.54
Report to Arrival [N]	--	10.07 [44]	13.17 [186]
Zone 5			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	0.85	4.31	5.99
Dispatch to Arrival	TBA	6.26	9.50
Report to Arrival [N]	50.23 [13] ¹⁷⁴	9.54 [366]	13.75 [1839]


¹⁷⁴ There is no apparent reason for this anomaly. Zone 5 does not contain any identifiable reason such as facility, geographical feature which might account for this. It is assumed to be a reporting error..

Continued Table 1-44B Report to Arrival Times (January 2009 to June 2010)

Zone 6			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	5.90	4.29	6.20
Dispatch to Arrival	8.09	8.20	10.84
Report to Arrival [N]	15.18 [11]	11.70 [597]	15.41 [2785]
Zone 7			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	3.57	4.11	17.80
Dispatch to Arrival	8.95	8.05	10.76
Report to Arrival [N]	13.47 [19]	11.42 [463]	15.35 [2124]
Zone 8			
	Priority 1	Priority 2	Priority 3
Report to Dispatch	--	5.05	28.33
Dispatch to Arrival	--	7.21	9.86
Report to Arrival [N]	--	11.36 [208]	75.12 [1107]

Another way of looking at times is to consider the average proportion of the time spent between reporting and dispatch, and the average time between dispatch and arrival. Graph 1-13 depicts the average times (report to dispatch and dispatch to arrival) for priority 2 events across the eight zones. Note that this figure should be considered representative only, as the two measures employ different denominators. What is suggested, however, is that there may be some delay in particular zones in terms of report to dispatch. For example, it appears that in zone 4, over 40% of the average time taken to arrive at an event is the duration between report to dispatch. This differs from zones 6 and 7, who appear to use about 32% of the entire time to arrival.

Graph 1-13 Average Times for Priority 2 Calls by Zone



7.9 Times by Zone and Selected Offenses

It is clear that response times depend on a combination of geographic proximity to events, as well as the nature of the reported event. The nature of events is examined with a more detailed consideration of five specific event types (see Table 1-45). Frequencies of event types were generated and a selection of five of the most frequently occurring event types (suspicious persons/vehicles/etc., disturbing the peace, assault (level one), other theft under \$5000, and property damage less than \$5000) was chosen for consideration in this analysis. The “report to arrival” times are compared across each of the eight zones.

The first type of event, suspicious persons/vehicles/property reflects variation in response to arrival times from just over 10 minutes (zone 3) to about 16.5 minutes (zone 6). The variation in response times is less for disturbing the peace, ranging from just under 7 minutes (zone 3) to nearly 11 minutes (zone 4). For assault, there is a range of nearly 7.5 minutes (zone 4) to over 13 minutes (zone 6). Other theft under, suggests a range of about 14.5 minutes (zone 3) to 21 minutes (zone 8). Property damage less than \$5000 varies from just over 15.5 minutes, to nearly 23.5 minutes – a difference of approximately 8 minutes.

These times are difficult to compare between jurisdictions as travel times depend upon many factors including workload; traffic density; size, geography and configuration of the jurisdiction; number of staff assigned to patrol; tipping point for incident to a specialist unit, and others.


Table 1-45 Report to Arrival Time - Averages for Selected Offenses by Zone

Zones	Suspicious persons/ vehicles/ property	Disturbing the peace	Assault level one	Other theft under \$5000	Property Damage Less than \$5000
1	13.90 [328] ¹⁷⁵	10.34 [632]	11.58 [185]	16.6 [51]	18.6 [59]
2	12.29 [383]	9.18 [737]	10.63 [235]	16.61 [44]	16.33 [57]
3	10.04 [558]	6.95 [575]	8.43 [249]	14.48 [95]	15.61 [64]
4	15.11 [9]	10.97 [32]	7.37 [16]	--	12.67 [3]
5	16.46 [235]	9.02 [370]	11.23 [128]	18.90 [42]	23.35 [42]
6	16.40 [302]	10.85 [493]	13.19 [154]	17.44 [55]	18.82 [72]
7	14.19 [268]	10.67 [500]	11.10 [131]	17.18 [43]	19.78 [59]
8	13.98 [157]	9.75 [134]	8.23 [56]	21.00 [40]	16.61 [13]
Total	13.31 [2240]	9.49 [3473]	10.61 [1154]	16.99 [370]	18.39 [369]

¹⁷⁵ Brackets numeral is number of incidents to show sample size.

Graph 1-14 provides a visual representation of average “report to arrival times” for selected offenses by zone.

Graph 1-14 Report to Arrival Time - Averages for Selected Offenses by Zone



Beyond event type and geographic proximity, other factors impact response times such as deployment strategies.

8 Legislative change

Since the *2004 Crime Prevention and Policing Study* was conducted, there have been a number of legislative changes and initiatives that impact law enforcement and crime prevention. The following examples are provided.

Safer Communities and Neighbourhoods (SCAN) Act¹⁷⁶

SCAN, was a key recommendation from the Safer Communities and Crime Reduction Task Force, and promotes community safety by targeting/investigating properties that: negatively affect the health, safety or security of one or more persons in a neighbourhood; and/or interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of one or more properties in a community or neighbourhood.

SCAN is intended to improve community safety by targeting properties used for ongoing illegal activities such as:

- producing, selling or using illegal drugs
- solvent abuse
- unlawful sale and/or consumption of alcohol
- prostitution
- child sexual abuse; and/or
- gang & criminal organization activity.

The SCAN legislation holds property owners accountable for illegal activities regularly taking place on their property.

Two SCAN Units, with Alberta Sheriffs, operating out of northern and southern Alberta, are intended to improve community safety by investigating tips from the community about problem properties in your neighborhood.

Gunshot and Stab Wound Mandatory Disclosure Act¹⁷⁷

Gunshot and stab wound legislation provides clear direction on when and how much information health care workers need to disclose to police when a gunshot or stab wound victim shows up at a health care facility. The *Act* makes it mandatory for health practitioners to report such wounds and enables police to investigate and take immediate steps to prevent further violence, injury or death.

The *Act* deals with individuals who are dropped off or show up at emergency rooms or health centres seeking treatment for gunshot or stab wounds. The legislation ensures police are only provided with

¹⁷⁶ RSA. In, https://www.solgps.alberta.ca/safe_communities/scan/Pages/SCAN.aspx

¹⁷⁷ RSA. In, <http://alberta.ca/home/NewsFrame.cfm?ReleaseID=/acn/201004/28077B5FFC51E-9D57-597D-C4C9B52C55A1FA9B.htm>

limited information, such as the patient's name, location of health facility and type of wound and not the individual's health details.

Previously, healthcare practitioners had to use their discretion when reporting these types of wounds.

Disclosure under the enactment requires the following health information to be disclosed to the police:

- The injured person's name, if known;
- Whether the injury was a gunshot or stab wound;
- In the case of a health care facility, the name and location of the healthcare facility;
- In the case of an emergency medical technician, the location intended to treat the injured person; and
- Any other information that may be required by the regulations.

Mental Health Act (MHA)¹⁷⁸

Individuals with serious and persistent mental disorders may be caught in a cycle of being admitted to hospital when they meet the criteria for involuntary admission, are discharged after stabilization, but deteriorate in the community, only to be readmitted. This is given as a reason for the January 2010 implementation of the Community Treatment Order, under the *Mental Health Act*. A Community Treatment Order (CTO) is a tool intended to assist patients in maintaining compliance with treatment while in the community, thereby breaking this cycle. There are criteria set out in the *Mental Health Act* that describe the conditions under which a CTO can be written.

It is noted that for the period 2009 until half way through 2010, in Red Deer, there were 1102 separate calls for service with respect to the *Mental Health Act*. This accounts for slightly less than 2% of total calls for service during this time period. When police detain individuals under Form 10 *MHA* and escort them to a facility, there may be long waits at the hospital while the patient is assessed by medical staff. This impacts availability of officers for other investigational duties.

In Calgary, police and Alberta Health Services have introduced a three year pilot project to provide treatment instead of jail for people with mental health and addiction issues who have been accused of petty crimes.

The Police And Crisis Teams (PACT), comprised of police and mental health workers, is called out to assist when street officers have determined a person could benefit from their assistance.

The Executive Director of mental health and addictions for Alberta Health Services stated:

¹⁷⁸ RSA. See also Community Treatment Orders section in the *Act*.

"Research indicates that by reaching out to this vulnerable population, we can reduce the incarceration and recidivism of people with mental illness by linking them to mental health services and support. By providing early intervention for these individuals, we are more likely to see successful health outcomes."¹⁷⁹

Protection for Persons in Care Act¹⁸⁰

Revisions to this *Act* provide for the investigation of abuse, defined as:

- Serious emotional harm
- Serious bodily harm
- Withholding or prescribing medication for an inappropriate purpose, resulting in serious bodily harm
- Subjecting an individual to non- consensual sexual contact, activity , or behaviour
- Involves misappropriating, or improperly ,or illegally converting a significant amount of money or other valuable possessions
- Results in failing to provide adequate nutrition, adequate medical attention or another necessity of life without a valid consent, resulting in serious bodily harm.

Investigation may involve allegation of abuse at any of the following conditions: publically funded nursing homes; an approved hospital; lodge accommodation; a facility designed under the *Mental Health Act*; a social care facility; a supportive living accommodation; person that provides care support for individuals with developmental disabilities; and a person who provides day programs or residential and care services or residential and support services.

Health Information Act¹⁸¹

Custodians need to consider all applicable provisions under the *Act* when deciding whether or not to disclose health information to police including any expressed wishes that the individual may have.

Disclosure to police may be classified in three ways:

- with consent;
- without consent; and
- mandatory.

Disclosure to Police with Consent

Custodians are allowed to disclose health information to a person other than the individual, when the individual or an individual with the authority to exercise rights on behalf of the individual, has consented to the disclosure.

¹⁷⁹ In, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgary/story/2010/05/18/calgary-mental-health-police-addiction-initiative.html#ixzz16hox5q9q>

¹⁸⁰ RSA.

¹⁸¹ RSA. In, http://www.oipc.ab.ca/Content_Files/Files/Publications/HIA_Guide_August_2010.pdf

Disclosure to Police without Consent

Disclosure may be made to the police in the following circumstances:

- **Family Members:** For contacting family members where an individual is injured, ill or deceased.
- **Subpoenas, Warrants and Court Orders:** For purposes of complying with a subpoena, warrant or order issued by a court or other persons or bodies having jurisdiction in Alberta to compel the information.
- **Imminent Danger:** To avert or minimize an imminent danger to the health or safety of any person.
- **Best Interests:** When the individual lacks capacity to provide consent, if in the opinion of the custodian, the disclosure is in the best interests of the individual.
- **Enactments:** When the disclosure is authorized or required by an enactment of Alberta or Canada.
- **Prevent or Limit Fraud or Abuse of Health Services:** If the information relates to the possible commission of an offence under a statute or regulation of Alberta or Canada and the disclosure will detect or prevent fraud or limit abuse in the use of health services.

Mandatory Disclosure

Although the *HIA* does not contain a mandatory disclosure to police provision, it is important to be aware of the *Gunshot and Stab Wound Mandatory Disclosure Act*. This *Act* requires health care facilities and emergency medical technicians who treat gunshot or stab wounds to disclose health information, without consent, to the police. Therefore, this is an example of disclosure without consent that is authorized or required by an enactment of Alberta.

Protection of Children Abusing Drugs (PChAD)¹⁸²

The *PChAD Act*, which came into force July 2006, provides parents/guardians the ability to apply to the court to authorize an apprehension and confinement order for a child whose use of alcohol and/or other drugs has or may cause significant psychological or social harm to the child, or physical harm to the child or others. There is a PChAD house in Red Deer and currently work is being done to develop a purpose built facility for the service. Police involvement is related to the apprehension of the child based on a court order initiated by the parents.

Traffic Safety Act¹⁸³

The province changed the *Traffic Safety Act* in 2006 to allow police to take vehicles in prostitution-related offences. Impounded vehicles stay in police custody until the prostitution cases go through court.

¹⁸² <http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/ProvincialCourt/FamilyCourt/ProtectionofChildrenAbusingDrugsAct/tabid/240/Default.aspx>
¹⁸³ RSA.

Missing Persons Act¹⁸⁴

The *Missing Persons Act* allows a police agency to obtain the personal information needed to help find missing persons in cases where the police have no reason to suspect that a crime has been committed. The legislation balances fundamental privacy rights with access to important information such as cell phone and financial records.

Previously, information that could be vital to solving a missing persons case was only available to investigators if they believed a crime has been committed. Police can now obtain this information in any missing persons case.

Police must apply to the Courts to obtain this information and fundamental privacy rights have to be balanced through the course of the investigation. In emergency situations, when the police believe a missing person may be at risk of harm or death, police can issue a demand for a specified list of records that are urgently needed to locate a missing person. Information collected under this *Act* will be confidential and can only be used in situations cited in the legislation. Records and information collected must be kept separate from other police agency records.

In the spring of 2010 the Alberta Association of Chiefs of Police passed a resolution asking the Government of Alberta to develop missing persons legislation. Alberta is the first jurisdiction in Canada to introduce legislation dedicated to assisting police with missing persons investigations.

8.1 Police Time

Policy requirements applicable to both public police in Alberta and also some specific requirements within the RCMP impact the demand on police time.¹⁸⁵ Some areas of concern include:

- *Judicial Interim Release*: Judicial release packages must be completed and forwarded to the Hearing Officer to substantiate conditions and incarceration requests.
- *Subject Behaviour Observation Reports (SB/OR)*: Must be completed by each member on scene.
- *Victim Service Referral Form*: To be completed for property and persons crimes.
- *Impaired Driving Investigations*: 3-4 hours for investigation.
- *Domestic Violence Investigation*: Completion of the Family Violence Investigation Report, Family Violence Check sheet form and possible acquisition of Protection orders etc.

¹⁸⁴ Government of Alberta News Release, February 28, 2011. In <http://alberta.ca/home/NewsFrame.cfm?ReleaseID=/acn/201102/299776E10A583-DFE7-BC52-FC0B3EAAAC708D577.html>

¹⁸⁵ Part 2,3 of the report of the *Review* will further address the issue of 'police time'

9 Crime Prevention

9.1 Introduction

The literature review conducted in support of the *Review* examines multiple stakeholder roles and responsibilities with respect to leading crime prevention programs and policing practices in provincial, national and international communities. This review is performed in consideration of the most relevant crime prevention strategies to Red Deer, and is consistent with the definitions and principles of the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC).

The literature indicates that crime and social disorder is now viewed from a wider perspective, that the origins are multifaceted and that the resolution of crime issues is not the sole responsibility of the police. Crime prevention and policing practices (in their broadest sense), relevant to the Red Deer situation, should incorporate a comprehensive and strategic approach to crime prevention inclusive of social, situational, and community approaches which involve community partnerships at the local level. These local approaches, however, should, whenever possible incorporate provincial and federal expertise and resources in both the identification and the resolution of crime issues.

9.2 Perspectives on Crime Prevention and Community Safety

The responsibility for social and crime control, and community safety was traditionally that of partners within the criminal justice system. This law and order approach did little to focus on crime prevention in any other than a generalized, *ad hoc* manner. The development of crime prevention as a policy and practice alternative was due to;

- the perceived failing of the criminal justice system's capacity to address the underlying causes of crime and the identification of potential offenders;
- growth in the quantity of crime;
- the costs of criminal justice responses and its inability, in many cases, to bring about justice;
- and finally, its focus on incarceration, over rehabilitation, which in some instances, was proven to promote rather than deter crime.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ PowerPoint Presentation to the John Howard Society: Less law, more order: shifting debate from tough/too tough to stop victimization and save taxes. Available at: <http://www.johnhoward.ca-media-LessLawMoreOrder-07.ppt>, and PowerPoint presentation to Safer Cities Mississauga, Convincing governments to invest in prevention: reducing crime, protecting rights. Available at http://www.safecitymississauga.on.ca/conference/u_of_w.ppt. Based on the book by Irvin Waller Less law, more order, 2006; Great Britain. (2010). Cutting crime: The case for justice reinvestment: first report of session 2009-10. London: Stationery Office.

In response, approaches to crime prevention developed to address crime at all levels:

- primary (reducing opportunities for social disorder and crime),
- secondary (focusing on at-risk individuals, groups, or communities),
- and tertiary (preventing offenders from re-offending).

It is noted that the “National Crime Prevention Strategy”, which aims to reduce crime and victimization by tackling crime before it happens, is based on the principle that the surest way to reduce crime is to focus on the factors that put an individual at risk, for example, family violence, school problems and drug abuse.¹⁸⁷

Social developmental approaches to crime prevention and reduction, commonly referred to as "crime prevention through social development," or CPSD, assert that crime can be reduced or prevented by effectively eliminating criminal tendencies, or risk factors, that increase the likelihood of an individual committing a crime. Responses are designed to target “at risk” individuals, groups and communities addressing both the causes of crime and the protective factors which manage them. A number of challenges of this approach relate to the scale and costs of implementation, and the length of time before outcomes, if any, can be assessed.¹⁸⁸ Most governments, at some, if not all levels, have demonstrated support for this approach in official policy statements and in the provision of funding for social developmental crime prevention practices.¹⁸⁹

The situational approach, developed initially by Britain’s Home Office, is a rational approach to address recurrent crime focusing on how geography and physical features of a particular community relate to the prevention and reduction of crime and social disorder. This approach operates through public and private organizations, qangos, (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations), community agencies, and businesses, whose products, services and operations generate the conditions for effective crime prevention. In this approach, a specific response is customized to a specific situation. This specificity encourages rigorous evaluation resulting in much stronger empirical support for this approach than any other.¹⁹⁰ After reviewing evidence from both Moore and Tonry (1998), and Painter and Farrington (1997) Linden argues that situational prevention strategies play a critical role in the social development of communities and can be catalysts that lead to changes that would be categorized as social developmental.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁷ Whitelaw, Brian and Richard Parent. *Community-Based Strategic Policing in Canada*. Third Edition, Nelson Education 2010. p. 85.

¹⁸⁸ Linden, Rick. (2007) Situational crime prevention: its role in comprehensive prevention initiatives. *IPC Review*, 1: 139-159.

¹⁸⁹ National Working Group on Crime Prevention. (2007) *Building a safer Canada: First Report of the National Working Group on Crime Prevention*. Ottawa: Institute for the Prevention of Crime, University of Ottawa; Youth Justice Board for England and Wales. (2005) *Risk and protective factors; Australia - ; United States - ;*

¹⁹⁰ Weisburd, David. (2008) Place-based policing. *Ideas in American Policing*, 9:1-16; Clarke, Ronald V. (2005) Seven misconceptions of situational crime prevention. In Nick Tilley ed, *Handbook of Crime Prevention and Public Safety*. Portland: Willan Publishing.

¹⁹¹ Linden, Rick. (2007) Situational crime prevention: its role in comprehensive prevention initiatives. *IPC Review*, 1: 139-159.

Situational and social crime prevention approaches introduced the idea of coordinated, multi-agency problem-solving to develop, implement and evaluate a crime problem, while recognizing that information rests with a number of different entities each having resources to aid in the response.¹⁹² Linden (2007) argues:

*the most sensible strategy to pursue is one that recognizes that all crime prevention strategies have their strengths and weaknesses. A comprehensive strategy should include prevention programs that involve cooperation among different levels of government and other agencies and groups that can contribute to the solution; that are targeted to areas where they are most needed; that use a broad range of prevention approaches tailored to the specific needs of the communities; that draw upon programs that have been shown to be effective in other places; and, that give the community a meaningful role in prevention.*¹⁹³

The development from reactive criminal justice response to proactive crime preventative response meant problem-solving methodology became central in policing approaches. Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), introduced by Herman Goldstein in 1979, offered a four-step methodology known as SARA (scan, analyze, respond, assess) which addressed real recurrent crime problems. In Canada, the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) adopted a similar problem-solving methodology in PARE (Problem Identification, Analysis, Response and Evaluation). The RCMP have developed a problem-solving model called CAPRA (Clients, Acquire/Analyze information, Partnerships, Response, and Assessment), which is applied throughout the RCMP to a number of internal and external community problems.

The benefit of such problem-orientated approaches is the customization, and ultimately, optimization, of specific intervention strategies for specific individuals, groups and communities. Problem-oriented policing is advanced today by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the problem-oriented policing approach was recently conducted by a Campbell systematic review.¹⁹⁴ After an exhaustive search strategy that identified more than 5,500 articles and reports on the POP approach, the authors found only *ten* methodologically rigorous evaluations that met their inclusion criteria for meta-analysis. Findings suggest an overall modest but statistically significant impact of problem-oriented policing on crime and social disorder, but only one in ten studies reported full implementation without any implementation problems. As they concluded,

POP has been adopted widely across police agencies and has been identified as effective by many policing scholars. Our study supports the overall commitment of police to POP but suggests that we should not necessarily expect large crime and disorder control benefits from this approach. Moreover, funders and the police need to invest much greater effort and resources to identify the

¹⁹² Gilling, D (1997) *Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics*. UCL Press, London; Linden, Rick. (2007) Situational crime prevention: its role in comprehensive prevention initiatives.

¹⁹³ Linden, Rick. (2007) Situational crime prevention: its role in comprehensive prevention initiatives. *IPC Review*, 1: 139-159.

¹⁹⁴ A systematic review uses transparent procedures to find, evaluate and synthesize the results of relevant research. Procedures are explicitly defined in advance, in order to ensure that the exercise is transparent and can be replicated. This practice is also designed to minimize bias. Campbell reviews must include a systematic search for unpublished reports (to avoid publication bias), are usually international in scope, with a protocol (project plan) for the review developed in advance and undergoing peer review. Study inclusion and coding decisions are accomplished by at least two reviewers who work independently and compare results. In, http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/what_is_a_systematic_review/index.php

*specific approaches and tactics that work best in combating specific types of crime problems. We conclude that the evidence base in this area is deficient given the strong investment in POP being made by the government and police agencies.*¹⁹⁵

Community-Oriented Policing (COP) has been described as “policing *for* and *with* communities rather than policing *of* communities.”¹⁹⁶ Communities were seen to possess the knowledge and resources required in the development of crime prevention strategies. In communities using this approach, citizens are empowered to become actively involved in the crime prevention planning process and response through the creation of police-community partnerships resulting in better problem-solving and development of successful strategies to effectively combat crime. Perhaps the best known and oldest community-oriented strategy is Neighbourhood Watch. This early crime prevention strategy capitalized on citizens’ motivation to make their communities safer and engaged them to work together with the assistance of law enforcement to increase community safety and improve their quality of life.

Community-oriented policing is advanced by the Community Policing Consortium (CPC) in the United States, a partnership of five of the leading police organizations in the United States, representing the leadership of law enforcement:

- International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP),
- National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE),
- National Sheriffs' Association (NSA),
- Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and
- Police Foundation.

Today, the community policing philosophy is the standard model of service delivery for most policing agencies across Canada. The Edmonton Police Service was a pioneer in the field in adopting community policing in 1984 and the RCMP officially implemented this philosophy in 1990.¹⁹⁷ Since that time, other police agencies and police associations, including the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACCP) and the Canadian Association of Police Boards (CAPB), have expressed strong support for the community policing philosophy. The 1997 federal Speech from the Throne confirmed that community policing was the policing service delivery of choice by stating:

*safe communities -- a hallmark of Canada -- depend on strong crime prevention efforts. There is a growing commitment and belief that effective policing can be achieved only when there is ongoing co-operation and partnership between police and the community.*¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵Weisburd, David, et al. *Is problem-oriented policing effective in reducing crime and disorder? Findings from a Campbell systematic review.* Criminology & Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 139-172.

¹⁹⁶Tilley, N. (2008). *Modern Approaches to Policing: Community, Problem-orientated and Intelligence-led.* In T. Newburn (ed.), *Handbook of Policing.* Cullompton: Willan.

¹⁹⁷ Policing in Canada Today, Prepared by Erica McKim, Public Affairs and Information Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, McKim, .

Historically the problem-oriented and community-oriented approaches were seen to exist as separate and distinct philosophical and practical models of crime prevention. Today they operate simultaneously as complementary, mutually beneficial approaches and most policing agencies have incorporated both approaches in their crime prevention and social disorder responses. Problem-solving methodology is evident in all of these approaches to crime prevention and social disorder in that they share a similar structure:

- beginning with the identification and diagnosis of the problem in the local context;
- the setting of priorities and selection of appropriate resources to combat the crime problem;
- the creation of strategies and targets for response; and finally,
- an evaluation of the outcome.

In the past decade, literature suggests another philosophical shift from community-oriented to intelligence-led policing (ILP) has emerged. Built on earlier problem and community-based approaches, it incorporates business principles of risk management and risk assessment. ILP embodies a vision of policing premised upon the leverage of knowledge, or intelligence. Intelligence directs action and communities become the source of knowledge rather than just partners in crime prevention. In December 2000, the RCMP's commissioner announced the operational adoption of intelligence-led policing.¹⁹⁹ The RCMP problem-solving model, CAPRA, was redesigned as intelligence-led policing. Since 2001, police departments across Canada, including the RCMP, OPP, regional, and municipal police services have begun adopting the intelligence-led approach and philosophy. In the United States the adoption of this policing approach has hastened because of the war on terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) modified the RCMP's CAPRA model with the inclusion of 'information' as a key component in the structure. The new acronym CIAPRA represents a second-generation intelligence-led problem solving model.

The importance of arguing for a specific philosophical approach to crime prevention lessened with social science academics' and practitioners' recognition that a comprehensive approach was needed and focused changed to "what worked best" in a specific crime prevention practice. Best practice was inherently problematic because it was subjectively defined. Given the strong investment of resources in approaches by law enforcement agencies, communities and governments the requirement for an evidence-base of rigorous, scientific, research practice gained importance.

Numerous evidence-based information resources evolved online in many sectors of society, including policing. Notable evaluative crime prevention programming information includes, but is not limited to:

- Australian Institute of Criminology
- Blueprints for Violence Prevention, Colorado
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC), USA

¹⁹⁹Ibid, McKim

- Center for Evidence-Based Crime Practice (CEBP), for adults and juveniles, for community corrections,
- Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy (“Top- Tier”),
- Crime and Justice Coordinating Group (CCJG) of the Campbell Collaboration (C2)
- Home Office in the United Kingdom
- National Crime Prevention Centre, *Promising and Model Crime Prevention Programs*, Canada
- Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP)
- Promising Practices Network
- International Campbell Collaboration
- National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services (SAMHSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- United Nations Office, *Compilation of Evidence-Based Family Skills Training Programmes*,
- *Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Evidence-Based Juvenile Offender Programs*

Evidence-based crime prevention was defined by Welsh (2007) as programs and practices that are proven to be effective through sound research methodology and have produced consistently positive patterns of results.²⁰⁰ Evaluation is considered to be of high quality if the evaluation methodology is either of the experimental (randomized and non-randomized) or quasi-experimental evaluative research design, both of which possess a high degree validity - internal, construct and statistical conclusion validity.

Recent literature identifies a need remaining to place evidence into practice, especially into local context and conditions. A recent evidence-based policing matrix, developed by Lum, Koper, and Telep is described as a

*...research-to-practice translation tool that categorizes and visualizes all experimental and quasi-experimental research on police and crime reduction according to three common dimensions of crime prevention – the nature of the target, the extent to which the strategy is proactive or reactive, and the specificity or generality of the strategy. This categorization and visualization of policing evaluation studies reveals three-dimensional clusters of effective studies, which we refer to as “realms of effectiveness”.*²⁰¹

These realms of effectiveness provide insights into the nature and commonalities of effective police strategies and can be used by police agencies to guide various aspects of their operations. Their mapping of 97 police evaluation studies using this tool found that proactive, place-based, and specific policing approaches are more effective at reducing crime than individual-based, reactive and general ones.²⁰²

²⁰⁰ Welsh, Brandon C. (2007) Evidence-Based Crime Prevention: The Scientific Basis, Trends, and Results, with Implications for Canada, Final Report, Prepared for the National Crime Prevention Centre, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada.

²⁰¹ Cynthia Lum, Christopher Koper, Cody Telep. Evidence-Based Policing Matrix. Center for Evidence-based Crime Policy, Journal of Experimental Criminology (13 September 2010), pp. 1-24-24. Available at: <http://gunston.gmu.edu/cebcp/Matrix/index.html>.

²⁰² Lum, Cynthia, and Christopher s. Koeper and Cody W. Telep. 2010 The Evidence-Based Policing Matrix. September 2010. Journal of Experimental Criminology, Available online at <http://www.springerlink.com/content/q766n155018r4455/>

9.3 Roles and Responsibilities of Various Stakeholders

There exists significant variation between jurisdictions, governmental administrations, governmental and non-governmental departments and agencies, police, communities, and practitioners with respect to crime prevention and how it should be implemented.

9.3.1 Government

Political, social, economic, and environmental influences, more often than not, determine which crime prevention programs are selected, implemented, expanded, or dismissed. Crime prevention should be adopted as a policy principle to complement traditional law and order policy, however, shifting priorities, scarcity of resources, changes in administrations and the influence of public opinion make it difficult to implement and sustain long term policy and practice.²⁰³ Instead, more government focus has been placed on increasing the penalties for crime than on its prevention, despite evidence that this doesn't work, and may even increase crime.²⁰⁴ Further, evidence for certain practices or target populations may be overlooked because of pressure to deliver rapid responses to crime problems resulting in solutions that are not relevant to specific problems, or favour crime prevention strategies that are politically fashionable, but have no evidence-base.

Many stakeholders have identified the need to use permanent responsibility structures to sustain crime prevention initiatives over the long term. A fundamental requirement for success and sustainability of crime prevention and community safety initiatives is the establishment of a governance structure that will sustain crime reduction efforts through political and environmental change. This means:

- establishing a locus of responsibility with strong political leadership
- establishing multi-agency and multi-disciplinary partnerships in order to harness the combined expertise of different government departments, nongovernmental organizations, the corporate sector and local citizens
- mobilizing local political and administrative authorities
- emphasizing the need for greater integration of safety as a cross-cutting element of municipal planning.²⁰⁵

Recognition of the role of local government began with international conferences of municipal associations and led to the integration of recommendations into policies and guidelines in many international, federal and local governments and public and private agencies.²⁰⁶ Local governments have

²⁰³ Tonry and Farrington, 1995; Gest, 2001; Waller, 2006;

²⁰⁴ Waller, 2006.

²⁰⁵ Johnson and Fraser. (2007) Making Cities Safer: International Strategies and Practices.

²⁰⁶ In Canada, various parliamentary committees and national organizations have recognized the need for a coordinated multi-agency approach. The Canadian Council on Social development, the two standing Committees on Justice and the Solicitor General

a role to play in mobilizing key stakeholders, developing local actions plans, and implementing short and long term solutions accomplished through collaboration with, and support from, other orders of government. While local governments often profess to have the lead role in crime prevention, they often lack authority to demand accountability from agencies and organizations that have a key role in crime reduction.²⁰⁷ The involvement of municipal governments in local crime prevention and community safety initiatives is important because this governmental level is best able to identify local crime problems and the conditions that contribute to them. This is accompanied by municipal governments being able to identify and orchestrate local stakeholders. There is a need for communication between provincial and local government about transferring authority and decision-making powers to local government, securing resources, considering the non-recurrent nature of most funding, and agreements about expectations and outcomes.²⁰⁸

9.3.2 Criminal justice system

Police, courts, and corrections have always had a central role in crime prevention. Traditionally, the criminal justice systems' role was in enforcement, apprehension and punishment, but this approach had little deterrent effect, and partners had limited capacity to deal with the factors affecting crime and community safety including situational, social, political, and economic conditions. Policing approaches are adopted in response to community perceptions of crime, social disorder, and community safety, as well as, community expectations for the role of police. Increasing confidence in policing will bring about reductions in the concern about crime from the community.²⁰⁹ Law enforcement policing practices in crime prevention typically involve increasing police visibility to deter or displace potential offenders. Increasing the number of police officers to address problems of crime and social disorder does not produce significant, nor sustainable, reductions in rates of crime or victimization.²¹⁰ In fact, as some social science evidence suggests, it has the reverse affect.^{211,212} Yet, local and provincial governments in many countries continue to add more officers despite this evidence,²¹³ and the opinions of many policing agencies that this is an ineffective and inefficient response to crime. Through a survey of police Caputo and Vallee found that crime prevention was seen as a core policing function by Canadian police service

(The Horner Report and the Cohen Report), the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities are some.

²⁰⁷ Cherney, Adrian. (2006) The role of local government in crime prevention: an overview. *Local Government Reporter*, 5(3-4): 25-28. See also addition discussion regarding oversight and accountability.

²⁰⁸ Cherney, Adrian. (2006) The role of local government in crime prevention: an overview. *Local Government Reporter*, 5(3-4): 25-28.

²⁰⁹ Skogan

²¹⁰ (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 1998, 2000; US National Research Council, 2004 obtain complete citation).

²¹¹ Skolnick, Jermome, and Bayley, Davide. 1985; Cameron, Samuel. 1988. Levitt, Steven D. 2004 Understanding why crime fell in the 1990s" four factors that explain the decline and six that do not. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1): 163-190.

²¹² See discussion in Levels of Policing, above.

²¹³ "Ford's plan to hire more police, only cops don't want them", December 6, 2010, thestar.com. Available at <http://www.thestar.com/article/902070>; "Nick Herbert: more police does not mean less crime, says minister", December 19, 2010, The Telegraph. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8149923/Nick-Herbert-more-police-does-not-mean-less-crime-says-minister.html>.

members. Despite this, it was also the first core policing function to be suspended in times of budgetary constraints.²¹⁴ The availability of resources for proactive policing and social development approaches to crime prevention are of less of a priority than those of situational, or traditional policing approaches. Caputo and Vallee argue that police are in a unique position with respect to social development approaches since they are well positioned to facilitate an integrated, multi-agency response to social problems. This idea is supported by Jamieson, Beals, Lalonde & Associates in finding that police are indeed major participants and sponsors of crime prevention in Canada.²¹⁵ Policing partnerships provide an alternative to traditional law and order policing and facilitate the consolidation of their law enforcement and crime prevention roles.²¹⁶

Police partnerships with community developers in situational crime prevention initiatives have a significant impact on a community by converting crime “hot spots” into community assets that promote safety and quality of life.²¹⁷ A common situational strategy is “crime prevention through environmental design”, or CPTED which operates through a number of public and private organizations, agencies, businesses, whose products, services and operations generate conditions for crime. CPTED is a widely adopted crime prevention strategy worldwide. In January, 2008, Red Deer City Council approved \$50,000 in funding for a crime prevention incentive program for downtown business owners. The pilot program provided funding assistance for CPTED related upgrades to downtown property or business in the areas of Natural Surveillance, Territorial Reinforcement, and Access Control.²¹⁸ The results of the pilot are not yet available.

There is a need to provide alternatives to traditional criminal justice court response. Alternative courts are needed to address specific conditions within a community as they may relate, for example, to domestic violence, drug abuse, or mental health issues. The Domestic Violence Treatment Option (DVTO) is an innovative specialized court and treatment option targeting First Nations population with high rates of domestic violence. Located in Whitehorse, Yukon, the DVTO court sought to engage multiple stakeholders, including police, probation officers, a specialized Crown attorney, victim services, and women's groups in addressing domestic violence in this community. For cases of spousal or partner abuse, this treatment option presented a comprehensive intervention system, Spousal Abuse Program (SAP), directed away from a traditional criminal justice sentencing response. Vancouver’s Downtown Community Court is another example of an innovative alternate court option. This court is designed to

²¹⁴ Caputo, Tullio and Michel Vallee. 2010, *Creating Safer Communities for Children and Youth: The Role of the Police in Crime Prevention*.

²¹⁵ Jamieson, Beals, Lalonde & Associates. 2000. *Crime prevention practice in Canada*. Ottawa: Justice Canada.

²¹⁶ Caputo, Tullio and Michel Vallee. 2010 *Creating Safer Communities for Children and Youth: The Role of the Police in Crime Prevention*. *International Journal of Child, Youth and Family Studies*, 1(1).

²¹⁷ Geller, Bill and Lisa Belsky. 2009. *Policy-makers guide to building our way out of crime: the transformative power of police-community developer partnerships*. US Dept of Justice.

²¹⁸ The City of Red Deer. CPTED Incentive Funding Pilot. Accessed December 10, 2010. Available at <http://www.reddeer.ca/Residents/Crime+Prevention/Crime+Prevention+Through+Environmental+Design/CPTED+Incentive+Funding+Pilot.htm>.

manage the number of offenders in downtown Vancouver have health and social problems, including alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, homelessness and poverty.

The immediate pressures that have led to the development of the mental health court strategy include crises in community mental health care, the drug epidemic of the 1980's and 1990's, the major increase in homelessness over the last 2 decades, and widespread jail overcrowding.²¹⁹ There are over 100 mental health courts in the United States, according to the 2006 Survey of Mental Health Courts by The National Alliance on Mental Illness.²²⁰

One recent initiative proposed by the Calgary Police Service (CPS) is a so-called "safe jail" to handle people with mental health issues separately and let the justice system focus on "real criminals" instead. The CPS is working on several projects designed to steer people with mental health and addiction problems into treatment rather than send them to prison.

"We want to develop a community diversion court – we're talking about that with our partners in the justice system – where the justice system is geared less to punishment and more to treatment for those who are suffering from drug addictions alcoholism and mental illness," "Because if we don't do it, those numbers are going to increase astronomically on the street."²²¹

A similar program already exists in the City of New York which has an integrated approach to dealing with mentally ill people and addicted people that streams them away from the punitive nature of the justice system and into treatment programs.

The criminal justice system, policing agencies and communities across many jurisdictions share a similar problem - having a significant number of people returning from prisons and jails into their communities and that many of these returning offenders will likely re-offend or violate the terms of their supervision. In response, an increasing number of law enforcement leaders are looking to correctional-based re-entry programs as part of a comprehensive effort to prevent reoffending and victimizations, reduce crime, and successfully re-integrate released prisoners to lead productive and law-abiding lives. Listwan, Cullen and Latessa (2006) suggest factors in preventing recidivism point to three principles: risks, needs, and responsivity.

The risk principle refers to the identification of personal attributes or circumstances that predict reoffending. This principle suggests that the most intensive correctional treatment services should target the highest risk population. The principle of classification according to needs refers to targeting the needs that underlie the specific criminal behaviours of the individual. These needs may include changing antisocial attitudes, reforming feelings and values, and addressing skill and

²¹⁹ Souweine, Daniel. (2008) Mental Health Courts: a Primer for Policymakers and Practitioners. Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance. Available at: <http://www.nicic.gov/Library/023518>.

²²⁰ Government of Canada. Government of United States.

²²¹ CBC News March 5, 2010. "Mentally Ill need treatment." In, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgary/story/2010/03/05/calgary-mental-illness-jail-prison-hanson.html>

behavioural management deficiencies. Programs should be designed to address these various needs. Responsivity is the third core principle. It refers to the delivery of an intervention that matches the abilities and styles of the client.

Additionally, they suggest that ideal models of crime prevention for offenders should have three phases:

- The first phase would begin in the institution with the delivery of services that target the inmate's needs.
- The second phase would begin as the inmate is released from the institution. The inmate's risks and needs may change significantly as he/she enters the community. Ideally, the individual would continue with treatment services and case plans that would be updated and modified as needed.
- The final phase of the re-entry model is an aftercare or relapse prevention phase in which clients receive ongoing support and services that address their needs. The role police can play in the implementation of re-entry strategies include: coordinating community policing partnerships for re-entry; participating in pre-release re-entry planning, joining parole pursuit of successful prisoner integration.

9.3.3 Community

Community involvement in crime prevention partnerships with police have largely been within the community-policing approach. Lately, there has been a move beyond community-oriented policing to community governance. Community governance is a philosophical approach to local governance in which municipal agencies, city leaders, and the community view themselves as partners in crime prevention and community safety initiatives and collaborate to address community problems and improve the overall quality of life.

Community-governance concept is embraced for its ability to bring together municipal agencies, community organizations, businesses and individuals. Such governance requires organizational change at the local government level. Local governments can organize to implement the four elements that compose the community governance philosophy:

- partnerships among municipal agencies
- partnerships with the community
- collaborative problem-solving efforts
- organizational change²²²

Much of this mobilization can be credited to Canada's National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) which provided community-oriented project funding aimed at mobilizing communities and increasing their capacity for crime prevention. Community mobilization for crime prevention is of three inter-related types:

²²² Diamond, Drew and Deirdre mead Weiss. *Advancing community policing through community governance: a framework document*. 2009. United States. Department of Justice, Office of Community Policing Services (COPS). See also, The Asset-based Community Development Institute in <http://www.abcdinstitute.org/>

- *Community in support of law enforcement* – began with the emergence of community policing as a policing initiative designed to increase local knowledge, improve police-community relations, and engage citizens as active participants in service delivery. Increasing responsibilities on community residents was seen as a good strategy for reducing the opportunities for crime and increasing community solidarity, while minimizing pressure on policing resources.²²³ Community mobilization has become more strategic concentrating on mobilizing residents in troubled neighbourhoods and crime “hot spots”.
- *Community Mobilization to advance change within the criminal justice sector* – activists and advocates have become increasingly involved in collaborative attempts with the criminal justice system to change policies and practices so that institutional structures and processes are more responsive to the needs of diverse populations. For example, the Missing Women Task Force, which organized on behalf of missing and murdered aboriginal women in BC.
- *Community Mobilization to advance community safety and well-being* - community mobilization was integrated into social developmental approach of addressing the root causes of crime. It linked a wider range of community participants focused more broadly on community safety and well-being. An example is the TAMARACK Institute’s Vibrant Communities initiative.²²⁴

9.3.4 Private – Public security partnerships

Red Deer has implemented an important element in the *continuum of public safety, law enforcement, and policing* through the understanding of “policing” as more than purely a public police function. The use of Peace Officers, Bylaw Officers, and Street Ambassadors demonstrate a commitment to allocating the appropriate resources to address public safety issues.

*Many urban areas are witnessing not simply two-tiered policing but a continuum of agencies that are responsible for policing.*²²⁵

In addition, the SAFE²²⁶ Downtown Initiatives Task Force has been established to respond to challenges and to work towards a more vibrant and (SAFE) downtown, and the City has a full-time Crime Prevention Coordinator.

The Law Commission of Canada makes the following recommendation:

*Public Security Boards or analogous institutions should have the ability to allocate their budget to providers of policing, whether public or private, according to their demonstrated capacity and suitability for contributing to the best overall policing of communities.*²²⁷

As the concept develops, the *private security* component of the *continuum* is often unorganized and, when cooperation exists, it is usually based on the initiative of individuals. However, there are Canadian examples of municipal involvement and funding of private-public safety partnerships.

²²³ Jamieson 2008

²²⁴ TAMARACK. An Institute for Community Engagement. Vibrant Communities. Available at: <http://tamarackcommunity.ca/g2.php>.

²²⁵ *In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada* Law Commission of Canada 2006

²²⁶ Sustainable Active Friendly Economically viable

²²⁷ *In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada* Law Commission of Canada 2006, 135

In 1994, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) established *Operation Cooperation* in Vancouver with one of the key principals being the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Association (DVBIA). The Association helped *Operation Co-Operation*²²⁸, as it now exists²²⁹, to obtain an agreement with the VPD under the *Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* allowing and governing the protection and use of information supplied by the VPD.

The introduction of the *Personal Information Privacy Act* in 2004, which covers the Operation Cooperation members (the Downtown Vancouver Business Improvement Area, (DVBIA) private security companies, and retail security functions), facilitated this relationship with the public police where personal information must be protected. This arrangement enables the private security function to receive information on chronic offenders where police have an active investigation ongoing and require assistance to apprehend or notify the police when they encounter serial offenders or persons wanted on warrants.

*Today, it is more accurate to suggest that policing is carried out by a complex mix of public police and private security. In many cases these networks of policing are overlapping, complimentary, and mutually supportive. Within this context, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between public and private responsibilities.*²³⁰

The Downtown Ambassadors Program²³¹ is comprised of 32 full-time Ambassadors who are trained to provide hospitality assistance and crime prevention services to the DVBIA area and four other business neighbourhoods. The Ambassadors patrol both on foot and by bike up to 16 hours every day. The goal of the program is to address "quality of life" issues such as panhandling, litter, illegal vending, and graffiti with the understanding that these issues not only affect the general quality of life in the downtown but also the overall crime rates.

In addition, maps are forwarded to the VPD with the locations of various incidents and occurrences involving the civilian Downtown Ambassadors and Loss Prevention Team (LPT) at downtown stores: drug use, arrests, panhandling, litter, illegal vending and graffiti with the understanding that these issues not only affect the general quality of life in the downtown but also the overall crime rates. This information complements the police analyses of incidents in the area. This information provides measureable criteria to determine the effects of city or police initiatives; for example, when homeless shelters open, the amount of aggressive panhandling decreased although the overall level remained constant, that is, the level of passive panhandling increased.²³²

²²⁸ *Operation Cooperation* is a term coined by the US Department of Justice which supports public-private partnerships in the field of policing

²²⁹ Vancouver *Operation Cooperation* is led by a board of business, police, and community representation. The members pay a \$25 fee to cover the minor administrative expenses. DVBIA

²³⁰ In Search of Security: The Future of Policing in Canada Law Commission of Canada 2006

²³¹ Vancouver Downtown Ambassadors® Program was established by the Vancouver Downtown Business Improvement Association . All Ambassadors and LPT members are licensed under the BC Security Services Act 2007 as security personnel

²³² TBA

The LPT works closely with the DVBI, businesses, *Operation Cooperation*, and the Vancouver Police Department which has direct web access to Ambassador data that is updated daily. Police can see at a glance what is happening either through a Google Map display or by scanning incident types and notes. During 2010 the LPT made over 600 apprehensions: 118 of these were through *Operation Cooperation* projects. In addition, there were over 30 arrests facilitated by the LPT accessing the VPD warrants photographs on the VPD web site. *Operation Cooperation* has expanded to include the Transit Police.²³³

The *Surrey (BC) Retail Theft Prevention Project*²³⁴ is another example of *Operation Cooperation*.

*The Surrey Crime Reduction Strategy is a complete paradigm shift from what is currently done in Canadian municipalities to combat crime. It seeks to implement new and innovative programs with practical applications that will result in a concrete, measurable reduction in crime. The Mayor's Task Force along with the R.C.M.P. and key stakeholders has investigated crime reduction strategies that are implemented in the United Kingdom. Crime rate reduction in the U.K. has varied to as high as 44% in some jurisdictions.*²³⁵

The website for the *Retail Theft Prevention Project* program contains information regarding warrants issued for persons likely to come into contact with loss prevention staff and police photographs of wanted persons. The program has the effect of coordinating the resources of retail business security and the public police.

Considering the cost of providing public safety and policing services, it is essential that the issues in the community are analyzed and the appropriate allocation of resources with the suitable mandate and authority are made. The development of such a continuum of public safety and policing allows the most cost effective use of community resources both public and private.

9.4 Summary of Crime Prevention approaches

In the last quarter of the 20th century, two very significant disorder related changes have occurred within communities. First, the idea has gained prominence in policing that the prevention of crime is not an adjunct to policing, rather, it is a crucial aspect of its success. Second, the police have engaged civilian personnel to participate in and, in many instances, to manage crime prevention initiatives. These two developments have further resulted in a wholesale shift in what is understood as “policing”. Policing is now viewed as a task encompassing the entire community rather than a function of the specialized police organisation. A corollary of this is that there has been an associated change in the breadth of community

²³³ South Coast BC Transportation Authority Police

²³⁴ Crime Prevention Strategy: It is a collaborative strategy that has involved more than 100 individuals representing over 50 community groups and organizations as well as all 3 levels of government. City of Surrey website January 8th 2011

²³⁵ City of Surrey website January 8th 2011

and community agency involvement in safety and security and the adoption of a more strategic, orchestrated approach to community wellbeing.

Approaches to crime prevention now view the origins of crime as being multifaceted. Prevention is now based upon more evidence-driven approaches with an attendant requirement to assess the value of strategies. Crime prevention and policing have moved from being intuitive based to a more rational and measured foundation.

Consequently, the police are now generally considered to be only one of several agencies on a continuum of law enforcement services. As indicated in the Figure 1-1, below, the responsibility to address crime is a hierarchically and laterally shared response with participation by local agencies and various levels of government. With this approach, a community is afforded a range of options to prevent, intervene or to enforce standards, as appropriate, which buttress general community safety and security.

Figure 1-1 Continuum of crime prevention and policing

Citizen	Community Agencies & Organizations	Business/ Private Enterprise	City Departments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leadership ▪ Coordination ▪ Bylaws 	Bylaw Officers/ Community Peace Officers	Public Police <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Municipal ▪ Provincial ▪ Federal
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Awareness ▪ Support ▪ Reporting 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Neighbourhood associations ▪ Social agencies ▪ Community organizations ▪ Schools ▪ Library 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local businesses ▪ Industry ▪ Security companies ▪ Media 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Social Planning ▪ Recreation Parks and Culture ▪ Inspections and Licensing ▪ Transit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Bylaw enforcement ▪ Traffic Enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Local police ▪ Sheriffs ▪ RCMP

In summary, the literature asserts that it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive community based model with intervention strategies aimed at each level of crime prevention: primary (reducing opportunities for crime or social disorder), secondary (focus on at-risk individuals, groups, or communities), and tertiary (prevent offenders from re-offending).

The synopsis of the literature review, with respect to crime prevention, conducted for Part1 of the *Review* is found in Appendix 1- 8.

9.5 Implications for Red Deer

In looking towards a comprehensive crime prevention strategy for the City of Red Deer, this broad approach can be summarized as follows:

- A senior, council level, leadership that is committed to a strategic approach to crime prevention.
- The development of an evidence-based strategy which addresses the prevention of crime and disorder in Red Deer and encompasses those City departments which have mandates that impact on such issues.
- The implementation of constituent programs in the strategic approach which are based upon promising or successful programs.
- The identification of relevant community stakeholders which are consulted and incorporated into a partnership arrangement to actively support, and become actively involved in, the crime prevention strategy.
- The underscoring of the importance of a partner based strategic approach through documented mutual understandings of responsibilities.
- Periodic evaluation of the success against objectives and continued viability of the programs which form elements of the strategic approach.
- Periodic consultation with stakeholders and with the community regarding expectations, status of programs and the overall crime prevention approach and its impact upon quality of life in Red Deer.

9.6 Community Resource Inventory

An inventory detailing agencies and organisations that provide services which impact public safety: i.e. protect the client directly or assist the client with behaviour which may affect the community is provided in Appendix 9.²³⁶ The inventory is grouped by service sectors, for example health, social services, corrections, public police or by client base, such as youth and seniors. Additionally, the agency or organisation stated mandate, if provided to the review and a general description of client service is outlined in the inventory.

²³⁶ This inventory is currently a work in progress and will be completed for inclusion in the *Final report of the Review*.

10 Strategic Framework

A deliverable for Part 1 of the *Review* is the conduct of,

'a workshop with City Council members to provide a foundation for the development of guiding principles²³⁷ for crime prevention and policing in Red Deer for now and into the future, in keeping with The City of Red Deer Strategic Plan, Vision and Direction.'

The workshop was held at the outset of the *Review* and, through an active highly participative process, the members of Council provided input to the vision for crime prevention and policing strategies.²³⁸ As mentioned previously in this report, the sources for information in this *Review* have been broad. Following the workshop, additional information was received from interviewees and focus groups which added value to the foundation ideas of Council. Throughout the Part 1 data collection process the Strategic Framework evolved. Given the cumulative nature of the data used in the *Review* and the subsequent public telephone survey and additional data collection activities associated with Parts 2 and 3 of the *Review*, the Strategic Framework evolved further, culminating in its final form, as presented in the Part 3 report of the *Review and the Review Summation, Recommendation and Strategic Framework* document.

The Strategic Framework is synthesised from available perspectives and, equally importantly, constructed against a backdrop in Red Deer which exhibits important elements that influence the nature and feasibility of such a framework. These conditions in the city, noted below, create an environment which is conducive to the adoption of an inclusive crime prevention and law enforcement strategy:

- Council in Red Deer is progressive and practices a comprehensive perspective on oversight and the operation of City functions.
- Members of the City administration mirror this perspective in thinking strategically.
- A strong foundation has been established in City administration which values the inclusion of all stakeholders in identifying issues which are problematic, in developing prospective resolutions to such problems, and in following through on actions designed to improve the quality of life in the City.
- The police, the social support agencies, local businesses and members of the community are informed and active supporters of the principles of crime prevention and willing to participate in processes which enhance the quality of life in Red Deer.
- The Government of Alberta is progressive and supportive of local initiatives which encourage crime prevention and improved policing.

²³⁷ In discussion with the *Review* project manager and project coordinator, and accepted by the Steering Committee, the term 'Strategic Framework' was substituted for 'Guiding principles'. In discussion, it became apparent that the term 'Guiding Principles' was too limiting for the broad philosophy and practice which was being proposed.

²³⁸ Following the October 2010 Civic election, the three new council members were also individually interviewed and their input sought with respect to the general questions posed to [then] sitting Council in August, 2011.