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# Ottawa Police Service Review of Cellblock Operations

## **Final Report**

*Safety. Security. Dignity.*

June 22, 2011

**Presented by:**

Chief Vern White

Ottawa Police Service

**Presented to:**

Ottawa Police Services Board



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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This report is the result of concerns surrounding the care and handling of people who go through the Central Cellblock of the Ottawa Police Service (OPS). These concerns stem from two cellblock incidents that came to light in November 2010, one from 2008 involving Stacy Bonds and the other from 2009 involving Terry Delay.

You will find, in this report, the Ottawa Police Service's responses, reviews and changes undertaken with regard to its care and control of prisoners. Addressing such concerns thoroughly, transparently, and without delay is critical. Failing to do so jeopardizes the confidence that the public places in the Ottawa Police Service. As well, maintaining the confidence of OPS members requires those same actions and values, including respect for due process and dealing fairly with resulting consequences. This report clearly illustrates the presence of these values in guiding the responses of the Ottawa Police Service.

OPS members interact with the public over one million times and handle about 400,000 calls for service annually. Not every person who is arrested goes to the cellblock; thousands are released at the scene or dealt with in other ways. However, over the course of each year more than 10,000 people are arrested and subsequently processed through the cellblock.

There are six relevant cases, and all six cases identified for investigation have been returned to OPS by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), and the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). When the SIU had completed its investigation into the Stacy Bonds case, it was returned to OPS in mid-March 2011. As a result, Sgt. Steven Desjourdy was charged with one count of Sexual Assault contrary to section 271 of the *Criminal Code of Canada*.

As with all the other files, it was referred to the OPP for investigation, in relation to conduct that was outside the scope of the SIU investigation. With respect to the outcomes of the OPP investigation, the OPS cannot offer any comments on those that overlap with the subject officer of the SIU investigation. The OPP have concluded that with respect to all other members that were the focus of this particular investigation, no criminal charges and no misconduct were identified.

No misconduct was found in four of the five remaining cases. In one case, the OPP identified misconduct by two civilian OPS members. Those members have been disciplined internally, but privacy rights (under the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act*) prevent OPS from disclosing the names of those members or details of the discipline they received.

What these cases did for the Ottawa Police Service was immediately set into motion a full review on all procedures related to the care and control of prisoners. This needed to be done with care, diligence and urgency. In order to dispel any potential claims of conflict of interest, OPS enlisted outside help. This included conduct investigations performed by the OPP, support from the Office for the Independent Police Review Director and the independent review by Presidia

Consulting of policies related to the cellblock incidents. Presidia found the policies it studied to be compliant; however, areas for improvement in training were identified, and the OPS have already taken steps to address identified gaps, where appropriate.

Improvements already instituted include the addition of audio recording to the cellblock video system, 16 hours of job-specific training for cellblock personnel and the Cellblock Review Project, which is an in-depth analysis of the work undertaken by OPS cellblock members.

One of the most important improvements has been reinforcing the supervisory role of the Officer in Charge of the cellblock. Strong leadership, in the form of the sergeant and the new position of the staff sergeant, is critical. They are responsible for the management of all prisoners within the cellblock. The officer escorting the prisoner must present him or her to the sergeant and brief them on the grounds for the arrest. That sergeant ensures policies and standard operating procedures are followed. A new staff sergeant position in the cellblock has given an additional layer of leadership and supervision.

A goal of the OPS is to ensure that every person who passes through its cellblocks is safe and secure, and treated with dignity. A Senior Officer review team has been identified to examine the outcomes, actions and impacts from the various reviews that have taken place in relation to the care and control of prisoners, including both internal and external reviews. This Senior Officer review team will be tasked with preparing a Management Response to include final recommendations and outcomes. It is expected that this Management Response will be delivered in Q4 of 2011.

## **BACKGROUND**

In September 2008, Stacy Bonds was arrested by the Ottawa Police Service for being intoxicated in a public place. She was subsequently charged with assaulting a peace officer. Her court date was October 26 and 27, 2010, before Justice Lajoie.

As the trial unfolded, a video of Bonds in the OPS central cellblock was shown as part of the evidence.

Justice Lajoie subsequently stayed the charges against Bonds and made some very strong statements about her treatment while in custody.

The Ottawa Police Service Legal Section was notified of the judge's views by the assistant Crown in the matter, who sent a summary of the decision to the OPS on October 29, 2010. The OPS executive was subsequently made aware and Chief White approved a formal complaint that was officially registered on November 1, 2010, to be investigated by the OPS Professional Standards Section (PSS).

On November 17, 2010, media stories began to appear on the Bonds matter. A case conference on the PSS file was held and a Critical Incident – Critical Situation (CI-CS) Team was activated to ensure appropriate and timely information about the situation and investigations were shared with the public ([see Communications](#)).

Two days later, Ontario's Special Investigations Unit (SIU) asked for and received materials from the Ottawa Police Service in relation to Bonds, and subsequently took jurisdiction of the incident, invoking their mandate.

Also on November 19, an OPS working group was established to examine policy and check for any gaps in the care and control of prisoners. Certain areas of policy were felt to be worthy of this examination, namely those dealing with public intoxication, strip searches, and cellblock processes.

With respect to investigations involving the SIU, the Chief of Police has a legal obligation under the *Police Services Act* to, "review the policies of, or services provided by, the police force, and the conduct of its police officers."

In this case and the five others that form the impetus for this report, the OPS decided that the "conduct" portion of the review should be conducted by outside agencies, to avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest. Meanwhile, OPS undertook an extensive review of its policies and services. This report outlines the trajectory of all the investigations, reviews and actions that were set into motion as a direct, or indirect, result of the Bonds incident.

## **INVESTIGATIONS**

### **MANDATE AND AUTHORITY**

The OPS decided that any portion of a review having to do with conduct would be handled by the SIU and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), supported by the OPS Professional Standards Section. Although this is not the usual approach, the OPS determined this process would help ensure public trust through an objective, thorough and professional review by outside and independent agencies reviewing the situation and providing recommendations.

For any investigation that involves the Ontario Special Investigations Unit (SIU), the chief of police is obligated by section 11 of Ontario Regulation 267/10 made under the *Police Services Act* to, “review the policies of, or services provided by, the police force, and the conduct of its police officers.”

*After the SIU has reported the results of their investigation, the chief of police must “report the findings and any action taken or recommended to be taken to the board within 30 days after the SIU director advises the chief of police that he or she has reported the results of the SIU’s investigation to the Attorney General.” This report fulfills that obligation.*

Concerning the policies and services to be reviewed, OPS Chief White quickly struck a team to begin work immediately. This team was charged with reviewing policies concerning arrest, search of person, release of person, prisoner care and control, intoxicated persons and liquor.

Members of the public and of the OPS were advised of these decisions and kept up-to-date through timely internal and external messaging, including meetings held with stakeholders and community groups such as the Community-Police Action Committee (COMPAC), Make Ottawa Safer Together (MOST), the RCMP Diversity Network, Ottawa Neighbourhood Watch Executive Committee (ONWEC) and Community Police Centres. The OPS also communicated with the public through mainstream media (news releases and forums such as the ottawapolice.ca website).

### **SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT (SIU)**

On November 19, 2010, the SIU invoked their mandate in the Stacy Bonds incident. On January 19, 2011, the SIU designated one Subject Officer and five Witness Officers.

A second case, concerning the treatment of Terry Delay, was sent to the SIU because it was referenced in the Bonds court case and judgement. These comments were reported in media coverage of the Bonds incident, and some of the cellblock personnel were involved in the Bonds case as well.

Two other cases came to the attention of OPS in early December. OPS referred one of these cases to the SIU for consultation. On December 10, 2010, the SIU advised OPS that they were discharging any jurisdiction with this file. Both of these cases were forwarded to the OPP for investigation.

On January 21, 2011, the SIU notified OPS that it no longer had a jurisdictional interest in the Delay case, which was then sent by the OPS to the OPP.

On March 15, 2011, the SIU advised OPS that it had completed its investigation. As a result, Sgt. Steven Desjourdy was charged with one count of Sexual Assault contrary to section 271 of the *Criminal Code of Canada*, and the officer was subsequently assigned to administrative duties.

The Ottawa Police then referred the Bonds file to the Ontario Provincial Police for investigation under the *Police Services Act* in relation to the role of sworn members involved in the cellblock incident. OPP also undertook the investigation into the conduct of the involved civilian members.

The Ottawa Police cannot make any further public comments on the Bonds case because the matter is now before the court, and is under the jurisdiction of the SIU. For information about the Ontario Special Investigations Unit investigation, please contact them directly.

#### **ONTARIO PROVINCIAL POLICE (OPP)**

In order to ensure transparency, openness and accountability, at a meeting on November 25, 2010, the OPS asked the OPP to investigate any matters returned from the SIU for what would typically be an internal investigation conducted by the OPS Professional Standards Section. These matters would be related to the previously-mentioned conduct review of the Chief's Section 11 obligations.

On December 5, 2010, a formal request was sent by A/Chief Gilles Larochelle to the OPP and two days later they agreed to that request. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIRPD) was consulted about this approach and agreed in principle to its intent and format.

Through the comprehensive review that had been put in place by Chief White, two cases that came to light on December 3 and 6, 2010, were sent to the OPP for investigation.

In mid-January 2011, two more cases surfaced after the conclusion of the comprehensive review of all public complaints on file involving the cellblock since September 2008. The Office of the Independent Police Review Director has previously referred these cases to the OPS for investigation, and subsequently, as a result of the comprehensive review, they were both sent to the OPP to complete the investigations.

On January 21, 2011, the SIU notified OPS that it no longer had a jurisdictional interest in the Delay case, at which the file was forwarded to the OPP.

On March 22, 2011, the OPP returned five files to the Ottawa Police Service. Of these, they found no misconduct in four and misconduct in one. With respect to the file where misconduct was identified, the matter was dealt with internally, as the two persons involved are not sworn members and therefore not covered by the *Police Services Act*. These two civilian members will

not be identified nor will the details of their discipline be disclosed, in order to comply with the *Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act* (MFIPPA).

This result was communicated to the members immediately, via internal messaging and a Chief's video. A news release was also issued.

At the end of May, the OPP reported the findings of their investigation into the Bonds incident. With respect to the outcomes, the OPS cannot offer any comments on those that overlap with the subject officer of the SIU investigation. The OPP have concluded that with respect to all other members that were the focus of their investigation, no criminal charges and no misconduct was identified.

The OPP undertook and completed the investigations dealing with matters of conduct under a Memorandum of Understanding. The Ottawa Police Service is extremely appreciative to the OPP for their timely and thorough investigations.

### **COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW**

As part of the Ottawa Police Service response to these matters, a staff sergeant was assigned to assist the working group on the cellblock very early in the process (November 27, 2010). The assigned staff sergeant not only had extensive experience with the Professional Standards Section (PSS), but had also served as a cellblock Sergeant.

It was decided to conduct a comprehensive review of files that might be similar in nature, giving priority to those cases already before the courts, complaints about police conduct already made, internal investigations, civil litigation, and any new complaints that might come in as a result of the media coverage.

This review further identified two additional files. These two files were public complaints lodged through the OIPRD in July and August of 2010 in relation to the cellblock. Both complaints were sent by the OIPRD to the OPS for investigation by the Professional Standards Section. As with the other cases, these two additional cases were sent to the OPP to complete the investigations.

The OPS decided to contact Ontario's Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to act in a consultative capacity with this comprehensive review. They agreed to assist. The involvement of OIPRD added legitimacy to this review process, as well as another layer of unprejudiced, external oversight.

*It is worth noting that the OIPRD commented on their involvement, saying the "collaboration and cooperation is a clear indication of Ottawa Police Service's commitment to transparency and accountability and meets with OIPRD's goals and mandate." The director added his congratulations to OPS "on the process undertaken to address issues in a very transparent and efficient manner."*

## POLICY IMPACT

Following the comments made in the Bonds matter by the judiciary, the media and the public, Chief White made it a top priority to review any policies that might have a bearing on the circumstances, looking for any gaps and opportunities for improvement. On November 19, 2010, he established a high-level working group to lead this policy review.

The group worked with the Policy Committee, a standing committee of the Ottawa Police Service that is devoted to addressing policy. It meets regularly and is composed of members from various sections of the Ottawa Police Service.

Policy is based on long-standing best practices, laws such as the *Criminal Code of Canada* and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, and is updated regularly in accordance with adequacy standards. Changes in policy come from a variety of sources, such as new legislation, judicial rulings and member input. The Ottawa Police Service takes pride in staying up-to-date on recent issues and findings, as it works to steadily improve and learn from the past.

As a matter of course, the Arrest – Search – Release Policy itself was already under review (prior to the Bonds matter). A smaller committee of officers in Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) had already laid the groundwork for separating the Arrest – Search – Release Policy into three separate policies.

Upon being advised of Justice Lajoie's decision and reasons, a Chief's Complaint was initiated. New directives on strip searches and arrests for public intoxication were authorized. A third directive was issued in relation to operating procedures in the Central Cellblock (*see Interim Directives Issued November 19, 2010*). Also note that these directives were later incorporated into the new policies that were reviewed and finalized in early and mid-December 2010 (*see Post-Review Policies*).

As part of the extensive review of related policies, the Ottawa Police Service engaged the services of Presidia, a local consulting company with expertise in the field of policing and, in particular, policy and training. Their initial efforts focused on a gap analysis of existing policies and procedures relating to these same areas, and provided recommendations for any changes required (*see Presidia's Findings*). They also compared Ottawa Police Service policies to existing legislated and regulatory requirements, and compared them to current best practices, using several other Canadian police services as comparators. Existing training related to these areas was also reviewed (*see Training*).

Please note that it is not the practice of the Ottawa Police Service to make public its policies and procedures, for safety and security reasons. However, given the importance of policy in this review and OPS desire for transparency and accountability, they will be discussed here in limited detail.

## **POLICY PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 19, 2010**

The policies of the Ottawa Police Service are grounded in law and best practices, and are frequently reviewed. What follows is a description of the policies relevant to this review as they existed prior to November 19, 2010.

Prior to November 19, 2010, the arrest, search and release of persons were handled under a single policy, namely Policy No. 6.01, Arrest – Search – Release. This policy had been updated as recently as January 2010. Under the section on Searches were included directions on strip searches.

Care and control of prisoners was addressed by Policy No. 6.05, Prisoner Care and Control. This policy included the processes to be followed upon arrival at the cellblock.

The arrest of a person who was drunk in a public place was handled by the Policy No. 10.05, Intoxicated Persons.

Incidents relating to liquor and related offences were covered by Policy No. 10.06, Liquor.

## **INTERIM DIRECTIVES ISSUED NOVEMBER 19, 2010**

Chief White issued three directives to OPS members on November 19, 2010, two days after the Bonds incident became public. All three directives were to be read and understood by all affected members.

The first directive dealt with arresting persons for public intoxication and officers' responsibilities under the *Liquor License Act*. The directive laid out in detail the criteria that must be present in order for an arrest to be made: that the person is in an intoxicated condition (showing behavioural and physical indications); that the person is in a public place; and that an arrest is necessary for the safety of that or any other person. The directive also mentioned alternative strategies for dealing with people who are intoxicated, such as placing the person in someone else's care. Proper articulation and documentation of the arrest was stressed.

The second directive dealt with strip searches, giving an outline of the most often cited legal case on this topic, *R. v. Golden* (2001) 3 SCR 679. The officers' responsibilities are outlined in light of the *Charter* and the manner and circumstances under which a strip search is conducted.

Finally, the third directive issued on November 19, 2010, related to revised operating procedures for the Central Cellblock. The focus and intent of this directive was to control the flow, safety and care of prisoners entering the Central Cellblock, and reinforced the roles and responsibilities of the Officer in Charge at the cellblock.

## **POST-REVIEW POLICIES**

The Arrest – Search – Release Policy (as previously stated, already under review), was broken into the following three distinct policies:

Arrest of Person, Policy No. 6.01

Search of Person, Policy No. 6.10

### Release of Person, Policy No. 6.11

Arrest of Person now includes additional sections to clarify roles, responsibilities and supervision. Already under review by an OPS working group, OPS Legal Services and the Crown's Office, it was reviewed by the Policy Committee on December 3, 2010 and given final approval by the executive on December 13, 2010.

Search of Person was updated to include the tenets of *R. v. Golden* giving greater consideration to reasons for and justification of a strip search, and the manner in which one is conducted. The responsibility to ensure that arrest and search provisions have been abided by falls to the Officer in Charge. Various types of searches are defined (consent search, frisk search, strip search, combination search, body cavity search). This was reviewed by the Policy Committee on December 3, 2010 and given final approval by the executive on December 13, 2010.

Release of Person, in addition to being a separate policy, has a new section that deals with prisoners who refuse to sign their release documents. This was reviewed by the Policy Committee on December 3, 2010 and given final approval by the executive on December 6, 2010.

Care and handling of prisoners is detailed in Prisoner Care and Control, Policy No. 6.05. The changes centered on providing clarity to officers bringing prisoners into Central Cellblock, while providing reinforcement of existing procedures. Additional positive changes include officers:

- bringing prisoners into the cellblock are to contact the Officer in Charge prior to entry, and complete the Accused Information Sheet;
- entering and presenting the prisoner and their paperwork to the Officer in Charge and outline the reasons for the arrest; and,
- staying with their prisoner until formally relieved by cellblock staff.

The Officer in Charge, amongst many other duties, shall only process one prisoner at a time. This was reviewed by the Policy Committee on December 3, 2010 and given final approval by the executive on December 6, 2010.

Dealing with people who are found drunk in a public place and who pose a safety concern, is detailed in Intoxicated Persons, Policy No. 10.05. The new changes give officers clearer guidelines when dealing with possible intoxicated persons, and alternatives to taking the person into custody are given. A section has been added that outlines four criteria for arrest, namely that: the person is intoxicated; the person is in a public place; there is a safety concern; and less intrusive means of ensuring their safety are not available. Behavioural and physical indicators are listed and defined, to assist officers in assessing these cases. This was reviewed by the Policy Committee on December 3, 2010 and given final approval by the executive on December 13, 2010.

Liquor remains as Liquor Policy 10.06. Minor changes were made Liquor Policy 10.06, to linking this policy to Intoxicated Persons. This policy was reviewed by the Policy Committee on December 3, 2010 and given final approval by the executive on December 6, 2010.

The amended policies were formally distributed to OPS members on December 24, 2010, in the form of General Order EX/ORD/2010-553, Intoxicated Persons and Prisoner Care and Control; and General Order EX/ORD/2010-569. Members were also directed to the “What’s New” section of Policy-Net (OPS’s on-line, electronic policy repository) for a brief synopsis of the changes.

#### POLICY REVIEW BY PRESIDIA CONSULTING

Presidia Consulting is a local company with expertise in the field of policing, particularly with regard to policy and training. Presidia was hired to undertake an objective analysis that included:

- a comparison of OPS policy and training materials to the Ontario adequacy standards,
- a review of the Ontario *Police Services Act* and associated regulations,
- interviews of OPS members as directed by the OPS project supervisory team, and
- a comparison against the best practices of other Canadian police agencies.

The policies were found to meet and sometimes exceed best practices of the comparison Canadian agencies. Some deficiencies were identified with regard to training and training materials, and have already been addressed by OPS (*see Training*), where deemed appropriate.

Presidia made 10 observations (*below*) resulting in nine recommendations ([see Summary of Immediate Actions / Recommendations](#)).

#### PRESIDIA'S OBSERVATIONS

One: The “Intoxicated Persons” policy that was in place prior to November 19, 2010, had last been updated in July 2002 and the material on the “options” available for “dealing with an intoxicated person” were narrow in scope.

Two: The new updated “Intoxicated Persons” policy, as of December 13, 2010, is consistent with, and in some cases exceeds, the comparison Canadian police agencies.

Three: The OPS “Strip Search” policy is consistent with the comparison Canadian police agency practices. Further, on December 13, 2010, the OPS Policy Glossary was amended and provided an increased definition for “strip search,” which is consistent with the definition from *R. v. Golden*.

Four: The revised OPS policy on “Prisoner Care and Control” is in accordance with legislative and legal requirements.

Five: The current selection process for cellblock supervisors lacks specific criteria focusing on traits and skills conducive to this environment.

Six: The OPS policy on “Care and Control of Prisoners” meets the comparison with Canadian police agency practices as it relates to the supervisory functions of the OPS Staff employed in the central cellblock facility.

Seven: Currently, the training material provided by the Professional Development Centre (PDC) is focused on the provincial legislation and does not provide any training material specific to the OPS policies and procedures.

Eight: The PDC provides limited training for individuals who are assigned to supervisory duties within the cellblock.

Nine: There is an orientation process for individuals who are assigned to supervisory duties within the cellblock.

Ten: Not every special constable assigned to the Central Cellblock has undergone the “Special Constable Training Course.”

A Senior Officer review team has been tasked with considering these observations, and any actions that might flow from them.

# **CELLBLOCK**

## **OVERVIEW OF CELLBLOCK OPERATIONS**

Cellblock operations are vital and complex aspects of a modern Canadian municipal police service.

The basic function of the OPS Central Cellblock is to provide temporary custody for people under arrest. The custody is temporary because arrested persons must, by law, either be released from the cellblock or held for court. Generally, these processes must all take place within a 24-hour period or as soon as practicable. The cellblock is designed to provide a safe, escape-proof custody facility where arrested persons can be processed, then released or transported to court for a bail hearing. During this time, the person must be housed, fed and cared for. Arrested persons, often intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, can be violent or combative. Many persons arrive at the cellblock with pre-existing medical conditions or injuries. They all must be treated with dignity.

A police officer who arrests someone and elects not to release them at the scene must transport the arrested person to the Central Cellblock. Upon arrival, the arrested person undergoes a series of practical and legal processes.

The Central Cellblock is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. It processes, on average, between 10,000 and 11,000 prisoners per year. In a given year, about half are sent to bail hearings. These persons have to be transported daily from the Central Cellblock to the Ottawa Courthouse. The other half are released by other means, such as an appearance notice, summons, promise to appear, recognizance with an undertaking or recognizance without an undertaking.

The following is a brief description of the Ottawa Police cellblock operations.

### **General physical description**

The Ottawa Police maintains three cellblock facilities. One is located within the Courthouse located on Elgin Street, designed for the custody of persons attending court, and is governed by the provincial Ministry of the Attorney General. People are kept in the Courthouse Cellblock facility only long enough to attend court and are never held there overnight.

There is also a cellblock facility located at the OPS detachment at the Ottawa Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, which is used for prisoners being transported by air, or for persons arrested at the airport. In the latter case, individuals in custody are immediately transported to the Central Cellblock.

The vast majority of OPS custody operations are conducted at the Central Cellblock facility located at the OPS Headquarters Building at 474 Elgin Street. The Central Cellblock currently has 63 individual cells, divided as follows:

- 10 young offender cells
- 12 female cells
- 41 male cells (which includes three isolation cells)

The Central Cellblock has a sally-port (an area where a police vehicle can be secured by gates to ensure there is no possibility of escape or injury), three official holding rooms, one private room, a booking area, three interview rooms, four telephone rooms, an identification area, three Breath Technician / Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) rooms, and the Sergeant's desk.

The cellblock was renovated in 2005, the first major upgrade since the building had been opened in 1983.

### Personnel

There are 26 employees assigned to the Central Cellblock, as follows:

- 1 staff sergeant
- 1 administrative sergeant
- 5 platoon sergeants
- 1 relief sergeant
- 18 special constables

The superintendent in charge of Support Services has the overall responsibility for the Central Cellblock.

### Processes

An arrested person passes through a series of legal and practical processes strictly governed by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* or specific sections of the *Criminal Code of Canada*. These processes include the following:

Arrest: individual officers who make an arrest and elect not to release the person at the scene must transport the person to the Central Cellblock. The arresting officer is responsible to ensure the provisions of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* are complied with at the scene.

Transportation to the Central Cellblock: arrested persons are usually transported in the back of marked police vehicles. There is video surveillance coverage from the time the vehicle enters the sally-port.

Other processes followed in the cellblock include:

- search of the person;
- booking (various information and details of the prisoner are recorded);
- *Charter* rights (access to legal counsel, usually by telephone);
- identification (fingerprints and photograph, if warranted);
- investigation (such as an interview by a detective);
- provision of necessities (such as food, clothing, medicine, medical care);
- release or show cause is decided upon;
- transportation arranged, if warranted;
- liaison with other law-enforcement agencies, if necessary.

## TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

### Camera surveillance system

A surveillance camera system was installed as part of the 2005 renovation. Comprised of 89 separate cameras, the system was designed to provide video coverage of the cellblock, from the sallyport to the individual cells. The cellblock is video-recorded 24 / 7, except for the individual cells, which are recorded manually if deemed necessary by the Cellblock sergeant.

The video recordings are maintained and secured in a separate high-security area. OPS employs a video storage clerk to oversee the video equipment and prepare videotapes for court or review purposes.

Cellblock videos can be used in court or for other investigations, but seeing a video without the accompanying audio can lead to perceptions that are out of context.

A review of the cellblock video system, including an exploration of the usefulness and feasibility off adding audio, had already started in September 2010 (before the Bonds matter had become public). This review recommended that priority be given to adding audio to certain areas of the cellblock, such as the breath-test rooms. Chief White approved adding audio to the existing system. The audio components were ordered and the work started the week of January 10, 2011. Audio recording was operational by the week of February 21, 2011.

In order to respect the privacy rights of employees, the audio recording is turned on manually by the Officer in Charge when the prisoner enters the Central Cellblock and only remains on until the prisoner is placed in the cell. This enables simultaneous audio and video recording of all prisoners entering the cellblock and being presented to the sergeant, as well as the searching and processing of the prisoner at the special constable intake area.

A training video was produced and added to the Intranet, and a message was sent to all personnel on February 23, 2011, advising Supervisors to ensure all officers view the video.

Audio recording began on February 24, 2011.

Several green lights were mounted in the cellblock area to alert everyone to the fact that the audio recording was on. This modification was announced to all members on April 5, 2011. These green lights are located at the cellblock sergeant's desk, the special constable's desk, inside the 0-level cellblock hallway entrance, and inside the sally-port.

Prisoners are advised upon their arrival that they are being audio- and video-recorded.

Standard operating procedure is to record audio from the time the person in custody enters the cellblock to the time that person is put in a cell.

In reviewing the surveillance system, it became clear that video image quality has improved dramatically in the few years since the cameras were installed, specifically the prevalence and

affordability of high definition image quality. Understanding the importance of this technology in providing evidence and monitoring, OPS approved the installation of a new surveillance system that will provide high-definition image quality which is now being installed.

### **SUPERVISION**

To improve the supervisory span of control, and to put it more in line with other Directorates, a new layer of supervision was added to the Central Cellblock. As an interim measure, the Court Security / Temporary Custody Staff Sergeant, who was responsible for both the Courthouse and Central Cellblock, was physically moved from the Courthouse to the Central Cellblock.

Funding for a staff sergeant position intended to be deployed into CIS as part of the Strategic Growth Initiative, was re-directed to create a new staff sergeant position, Staff Sergeant Temporary Custody – Central Cellblock. This competition was posted December 21, 2010, and closed January 7, 2011, and the position filled (the Court Security / Temporary Custody Staff Sergeant has since returned to the Courthouse).

As part of our accountability improvement process, a daily report to the superintendent in charge of Support Services has been initiated, reporting on cellblock staffing, the number of prisoners, charges, warrants, injuries, illnesses, altercations, use of force, strip searches, release numbers and types, and any other significant issues. This adds a layer of supervisory oversight at the senior command level.

### **TRAINING**

As part of the review of cellblock operations, a need for job-specific training for cellblock sergeants and special constables was recognized and addressed.

In consultation with our teaching and training staff at the Professional Development Centre (PDC), a training syllabus for cellblock staff was developed. This 16 hours of additional training covered such areas as the concept of “duty of care;” cellblock procedure and policies, including the recent changes; legal topics; handcuffing and searching, including strip searches; suicidal persons; equipment; use of force; medical considerations; note-taking and report writing.

Supervisor training took place on the use of the Conducted Energy Weapon (CEW, or “Taser”).

Finally, there was a physical component, involving scenarios which were, again, job-specific. The cellblock officers participated in real-life scenarios and were then critiqued by our PDC use-of-force experts.

The training was delivered to all cellblock staff, starting the weekend of January 8, 2011 and was completed the weekend of February 5, 2011. This training will now be delivered to cellblock staff annually and is in addition to the legislated use-of-force training that all OPS members are required to attend every 11 months.

### **CELLBLOCK REVIEW PROJECT**

Resulting from the OPS review of cellblock procedures, including the report prepared by Presidia, is an awareness of the unique challenges these officers face in undertaking the care and handling of people who go through the OPS cellblocks. The Cellblock Review Project began on March 20, 2011, and will undertake an in-depth study of all aspects—for the last five years—of the responsibilities that OPS members have in the cellblock, looking for opportunities to improve processes.

The project team is interviewing employees, analyzing statistics, looking at workload, and reviewing all procedures and practices for sergeants and special constables.

The plan resulting from the Cellblock Review Project is to enhance safety and security, and identify inefficiencies. Other recommendations will address the process of arrest, the electronic tracking of prisoners, hiring and training practices for special constables, as well as transfer policies for special constables between the Courthouse and Central cellblock facilities. Evaluation mechanisms—ways to know how OPS is improving—in the cellblock and courthouse will be commented upon. Finally, recommendations will be made on the OPS Court Operations reporting structure.

At the time of the writing of this report, the project has not yet concluded.

## **COMMUNICATION**

The Ottawa Police Service believes in accountability and transparency. Maintaining the trust of the public and our members is very important to us. As soon as these issues arose, Chief White began openly communicating with our members, citizens and key stakeholders to the extend that he could.

### **INTERNAL COMMUNICATION**

The OPS made good use of technology, sending frequent and timely messages to the members. This was reinforced with countless personal e-mails, conversations and visits to various worksites.

Members of Executive Command and Senior Officers met face-to-face with the vast majority of front-line officers to hear their concerns and to reassure them that confidence in their abilities has never been in question.

Internal communication included:

- Numerous e-mails to members and updates to the Ottawa Police Intranet communicated police updates regarding Intoxicated Persons and Prisoner Care and Control;
- Information Sessions were held for various ranks;
- Video updates from the Chief and A/Chief for the members;
- Attendance at many Parades and worksites by Executive Command and Senior Officers.

### **EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION**

The Chief notified the Police Services Board Chair and the Mayor very early in these matters, and began a series of reports, both formal and informal. The media were regularly communicated with, and their questions were answered and their concerns were addressed.

External communication included:

- Media Releases
- Chief's Verbal Reports to the PBS
- Updates to ottawapolice.ca and extranets
- Video message (posted to ottawapolice.ca)
- Meetings with community members and partners
- PSB Reports
- Fact Sheet
- Demonstrations on Use of Force and Central Cellblock procedures

Various media outlets requested and were granted access to the cellblock area. In January 2011, guided tours were given to media members who expressed interest. Requests were accommodated in order to present the current cellblock setup. This also included providing interviews with special constables, briefings on protocols (including the search and processing of prisoners within the cellblock), how the new audio system will operate, as well as the role of the special constable. In one instance, a reporter was embedded with cellblock personnel during an eight hour evening shift.

As a result of media interest, we opened our doors further. A half-hour training demonstration for Special Constables was hosted by Use of Force Instructors at the Professional Development Centre for members of the media on February 3 and 5, 2011. Following the demos, a guided tour of cellblock was again provided to interested media.

Police Services Board members, including the Mayor of the City of Ottawa, expressed interest in viewing the cellblock area and were granted tours early in 2011.

At the time of this report, there have been several detailed reports (written and verbal) to the Board which of course are available to the public [online](#). The public have also attended the PSB meetings to hear of our efforts.

### **CONSULTATION**

As stated above, maintaining the public's trust in the Ottawa Police Service in all its endeavors is a top priority for us all. Much of this trust is built and maintained through open, face-to-face dialogue.

A CI-CS (Critical Incident – Critical Situation) Team was activated in November 2010 to work and communicate with the community, and remains engaged. A robust workplan was developed by the CI-CS Team with the following objectives:

- To prevent the escalation of a Critical Incident into a Critical Situation
- To increase community responsibility during a Critical Incident
- To ensure regular on-going communication between the police and the community
- To diffuse tension caused by the published allegations of misconduct by Ottawa Police Service members on Stacy Bonds, a visible minority female

The Police Services Board hosted a meeting on racial profiling on November 30, 2010. Although its purpose was not to address the issues that are the subject of this review, many citizens used the opportunity to offer their views, and OPS was there to listen.

As mentioned earlier, another way that the Ottawa Police Service reached out to the public was through the media, with reporters being invited to attend the cellblock to see it in operation. This led to several related media stories.

Finally, monthly community meetings were held with the Community-Police Action Committee (COMPAC) and discussions included the potential role of COMPAC in community consultations. Meetings also took place with Make Ottawa Safer Together (MOST), and the RCMP Diversity Network, all in efforts to reach out to the public and listen to what they had to say.

## **PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH**

*On January 8, 2011, a Leger Marketing poll commissioned by the Ottawa Sun revealed three out of four respondents “have confidence” in the police service- another strong endorsement of our commitment to the community during this difficult period.*

The Planning, Performance and Analytics (PPA) Section of the Service anticipates rolling out the Ottawa Police Service Environmental Scan in the fall of this year. The scan is a broad account of the environment in which policing services are delivered in the City of Ottawa. The scan aims to document crime and disorder trends, as well as relevant factors in the environment, such as demographic and legislative trends, which may have the potential to impact the future delivery of policing services in Ottawa. In addition, the environmental scan is an account of various consultations including the public, OPS members and key community stakeholders.

This year, we are planning to build in some new questions in the environmental scan that go beyond public perceptions of quality, competency, and performance contained in past scans to include questions on topics such as ethics, accountability and integrity. The PPA Section also continues to conduct research on best practices and OPS is working closely with the community to continue to enhance public confidence in our policing.

Part of the environmental scan will include an OPS employee survey. This has proven to be a valuable consultation tool for measuring employee satisfaction and morale that can be used to improve human resource functions, policy, procedure, accountability and service to clients, including the public.

## **FINANCIAL IMPACT**

Four Ottawa Police Service staff members were assigned temporary full-time project roles to ensure that this review was carried out in an orderly, timely and comprehensive way. They adopted a formal project management framework to ensure this work plan and its related activities were developed and implemented in a structured and robust way. They worked under the direction of an executive level steering committee and were able to access expertise and knowledge across OPS when needed. The team was composed of:

- a superintendent who carried the responsibility for leading the team and managing the work plan,
- an inspector who synthesized the range of material being prepared by project contributors, prepared reports to update stakeholders on the project's progress and documented the results of project activities,
- a staff sergeant who was responsible for analyzing and reviewing case material to determine if it warrants review by the project team and
- an administrative assistant to support project activities.

Staff also engaged the services of a small number of professionals in 2010 Q4 to provide subject-matter expertise on specific aspects of the project work plan. These contracts were established in accordance with the Police Services Board's procurement and delegated authority guidelines, and are in conformity with the Board's Financial Accountability and Procedures Manual.

Presidia Security Services reviewed policy and training programs. Face Value Communications provided strategic communication and issue management advice. Together these contracts were less than \$40,000 and can be absorbed within the existing budget for 2010.

In December 2010, OPS awarded two further contracts, in accordance with the Chief's delegated authority under the Board's FAP Manual. One was an extension of the Face Value Communications contract for an amount of approximately \$15,000, the other was to the firm of Thornley Fallis, who provided enhanced monitoring and analysis of both traditional and social media. This firm is on the City of Ottawa's standing offer list, and the contract is for an amount of roughly \$40,000. Funding for these contracts has been identified in the Corporate Accounts.

An information technology project was also launched to introduce an audio feed to the cellblock video monitoring system (as outlined above). The final cost for this enhancement was approximately \$11,000. This was funded from the unspent balance of the capital project for the upgrading of the audio and video monitoring of interview rooms across the OPS that was completed this year (Project 904133).

The contract to install the high-definition video system in Central Cellblock was awarded to Sunotech Canada Inc. of Ottawa, Ontario. They are in the process of supplying and installing a March Networks VideoSphere™ Intelligent Video Surveillance system for \$285,831, exclusive of all applicable taxes.

Finally, there were some costs associated with the new cellblock-specific training. These costs will be absorbed by the 2011 overtime budget provisions. It was deemed necessary, given the importance of delivering this training in a timely fashion, to conduct it on weekends, when members were on overtime.

## **EXTERNAL RESOURCES**

### **PRESIDIA SECURITY CONSULTING**

Presidia is a private consulting company with expertise in the field of policing and in particular, policy and training. They were engaged on December 6, 2010 to conduct a detailed review of policies, procedures and training with a view to ensuring validity and compliance during arrests for public intoxication, and post-arrest custody processes including strip searching. Compliance of the Ottawa Police Service with legislation, case law and adequacy standards, and comparison to other Canadian police services, was examined for any gaps. They will work with the OPS Policy Review Committee.

### **FACE VALUE COMMUNICATIONS**

Face Value is a full-service agency specializing in strategic analysis and advice, issue management, crisis communications counsel, facilitation, executive development, and project management. Company founder, Derek Johnston, has worked extensively throughout the Canadian law enforcement community for more than 15 years, providing consulting and training services to hundreds of senior police executives and police board officials. Face Value provided issue management and crisis communications counsel in relation to the series of cellblock incidents that generated extensive public and media interest starting in November 2010.

### **THORNLEY FALLIS**

Thornley Fallis is a full-service, communications, public relations and marketing firm that is based in Ottawa and is one of the leaders in using, analysing and making sense of social media for their clients. This firm provided enhanced monitoring and analysis of both traditional and social media channels from late December 2010 to February 2011.

### **OFFICE OF THE INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW DIRECTOR (OIPRD)**

Maintaining the public trust is a critical part of modern-day policing. OPS felt it was important to have an independent body assist the OPS in our comprehensive review of files. OIPRD provided support in the OPS search to uncover any other cellblock files that bore similarities to those sent for investigation. OIPRD assessed and approved the methods used to ascertain which files OPS should bring forward to external agencies for closer review

## **SUMMARY OF IMMEDIATE ACTIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **Initial Actions**

**1. Action / Recommendation:** Following the comments made in the Bonds matter by the judiciary, the media and the public, the Chief of Police made it a top priority to review any policies related to the care and control of prisoners, to identify any gaps and opportunities for improvement.

**Status:** Complete

**2. Action / Recommendation:** The Chief of Police made three directives in relation to policy to OPS members just days after the Bonds incident became public. These dealt with arresting persons for public intoxication, strip searches and operating procedures for the Central Cellblock.

**Status:** Complete

**3. Action / Recommendation:** A comprehensive review of files similar in nature was conducted, giving priority to cases already before the courts, complaints already made about police conduct, internal investigations, civil litigation and any new complaints with the possibility of resulting in media coverage. A staff sergeant was assigned to assist the OPS working group very early in the review process initiated by Chief White (November 27, 2010). This staff sergeant not only had extensive experience with the Professional Standards Section (PSS), but had also served as a cellblock Sergeant.

**Status:** Complete. Files identified to OPP for investigation.

**4. Action / Recommendation:** The OPS asked the Ontario's Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to assist with this case review in a consultative capacity. The involvement of OIPRD added legitimacy to the review process, as well as another layer of unprejudiced, external oversight.

**Status:** Complete

### **Cellblock Training**

**1. Action / Recommendation:** OPS should ensure that all special constables assigned to Central Cellblock have received the appropriate training.

**Status:** Complete (*see Training #2*)

**2. Action / Recommendation:** A training syllabus specifically for cellblock staff was developed and delivered. This 16 hours of additional training covers such areas as the concept of duty of care; cellblock procedure and policies, including the recent changes;

legal topics; handcuffing and searching, including strip searches; suicidal persons; equipment; use of force; medical considerations; note-taking and report writing. Additional training for Taser use was added. Real-life scenarios were conducted and then critiqued by use-of-force experts. Training to recur annually.

**Status:** Complete

**3. Action / Recommendation:** The OPS training material for recruits and lateral transfer police officers should be reviewed to ensure that it provides updated material on OPS-specific policies and procedures relating to the care and control of prisoners.

**Status:** Complete. Training provided to all officers is constantly reviewed. This ensures uniformity with the Ontario Police College, changing case law and new or changing OPS policies and procedures.

**4. Action / Recommendation:** The OPS should consider making the Professional Development Centre the “Centre of Excellence” for all OPS training. This would mean that the PDC would be required to conduct all training; however, it would ensure that training being provided to OPS members is approved by the PDC to ensure a standard is being maintained.

**Status:** Recommendation will not be implemented. OPS does not believe this is a feasible course of action. All directorates already share a training partnership with the PDC. Also, the PDC does not have the capacity required for all essential training (e.g. canine and tactical).

## Cellblock Operations

**1. Action / Recommendation:** Audio recording capabilities has been added to compliment the video recording in Central Cellblock. It is mandatory that a person in custody is recorded from their entry into cellblock until they are placed in a cell.

**Status:** Complete

**2. Action / Recommendation:** To improve the supervisory span of control, a new layer of supervision was added to the Central Cellblock. The Court Security / Temporary Custody Staff Sergeant (who was originally responsible for both the Courthouse and Central cellblock) was physically moved from the Courthouse to the Central cellblock until a permanent Staff Sergeant position could be placed at the cellblock. Once this position was filled, the Court Security / Temporary Custody Staff Sergeant was returned to the Courthouse.

**Status:** Complete

**3. Action / Recommendation:** Given the high degree of liability and supervisory challenges associated with employment in the cellblock, OPS should identify traits and skills conducive to this environment and include them in their selection process for cellblock supervisors.

**Status:** Recommendation will not be implemented. OPS feels that the *supervisory* needs of the cell block do not require specific, specialized training. A person promoted to be a supervisor should have the necessary skills. The addition of the staff sergeant provides valuable experience and oversight to the Central Cellblock (*see Cellblock Operations 2*).

**4. Action / Recommendation:** Institute a daily report from the staff sergeant to the superintendent in charge of Support Services, reporting on cellblock staffing, the number of prisoners, charges, Warrants, injuries or illnesses, serious altercations or use of force, strip searches, release numbers and types, and any other significant issues.

**Status: Completed:** Implemented December 2010

**5. Action / Recommendation:** Undertake an in-depth study of all aspects—for the last five years—of the responsibilities that OPS officers have in the cellblock, looking for opportunities to improve processes.

**Status:** In progress

**6. Action / Recommendation:** Installation of high-definition video system in Central Cellblock.

**Status:** In progress. Installation June 2011.

## Communications

**1. Action / Recommendation:** Members of the public and stakeholder groups were made aware of matters related to the cellblock through PSB meetings, and meetings held with the Community-Police Action Committee (COMPAC), Make Ottawa Safer Together (MOST), the RCMP Diversity Network, Ottawa Neighbourhood Watch Executive Committee (ONWEC) and Community Police Centres. The OPS also communicated with the public through mainstream media (news releases and ottawapolice.ca).

**Status:** Complete

**2. Action / Recommendation:** A Critical Incident – Critical Situation Team was activated to work and communicate with the community.

**Status:** Ongoing

**3. Action / Recommendation:** OPS opened its cellblock doors to media, local politicians and the Police Services Board so they could see the facility in operation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the situations faced by cellblock personnel

**Status:** Completed and ongoing

### **Policy and Procedures**

**1. Action / Recommendation:** Generally, a policy is recognized as being a broad statement of an objective, intended to assist in guiding a member's thinking process, while a procedure is a specific rule or guideline which sets out explicit steps to follow in order to fulfill a policy objective. Consideration should be given to reviewing the current policy documents and further delineating the procedure material from them. This will assist in expediting the amendment of procedure documents in order to align training and procedures with innovations in policing or amendments to legislation.

**Status:** Complete. Standard operating procedures have been incorporated into existing policy relating to the care and handling of prisoners and temporary custody.

**2. Action / Recommendation:** The Ottawa Police Service should consider implementing more stringent requirements as it pertains to arresting an individual for being intoxicated in a public place. These requirements should include such measures as ensuring that the arresting officer provides a detailed written account including a rationale of why they believe the individual being arrested was a danger to themselves or others. Further, it should require supervisors to review the officer's reasons for the arrest.

**Status:** Complete. Now found in the Intoxicated Persons policy.

**3. Action / Recommendation:** The Ottawa Police Service should establish a process to track repeat offenders who have been arrested for being intoxicated in a public place. This process would allow the OPS to determine if specific persons are being arrested for intoxication on a continual basis. It may assist in identifying chronic alcoholics who require referral to a treatment program.

**Status:** Ongoing. This recommendation has been given to Central District to study further, in consultation with a variety of social agencies. Further, all persons detained in the Central Cellblock are entered into the Records Management System (RMS) database. These records, including number of temporary detentions in the cellblock, are available to the cellblock NCO.

**4. Action / Recommendation:** The Ottawa Police Service should consider conducting a statistical review of all occurrences pertaining to the matter of arrest for public intoxication, to identify specific trends.

**Status:** Complete. An audit of intoxicated persons was completed in the fall of 2010 and will be done annually. The results are shared with OPS members and the community (with respect to business practices).

**5. Action / Recommendation:** The Ottawa Police Service should consider instituting a compulsory “check box” on their records management system (RMS) each and every time a strip search is conducted. This will allow the OPS leadership to quickly track the frequency and trends as they pertain to strip searches.

**Status:** Complete. This tracking system was put in place in December 2010, as part of the daily report sent to the superintendent. In February 2011, a template for strip searches was added to the RMS.

## **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The Ottawa Police Service has a long and proud history of serving the community. This has been demonstrated over time, and validated by countless positive experiences with, and feedback from, the public we serve.

The Ottawa Police Service handles about 400,000 calls for service every year and 10,000 people are processed through our cellblock annually. The vast majority of these contacts are handled with competence and professionalism.

When the decision of Justice Lajoie came to light, OPS quickly recognized that there was a need to take the necessary steps to ensure and maintain public confidence in our police service. OPS has acted with determination and transparency. Through training, technical enhancements, policy reviews, and other means, we have worked to address the concerns regarding the cellblock operations and are continuing to strive to fulfill our ultimate goal, which is the safety, security and dignity of every person in our care.

As previously stated, a Senior Officer review team has been identified to examine the outcomes, actions and impacts from the various reviews that have taken place in relation to the care and control of prisoners, including both internal and external reviews. The Senior Officer review team will be tasked with preparing a Management Response to include final recommendations and outcomes. It is expected that this Management Response will be delivered in Q4 of 2011.

## APPENDIX A: TIMELINE

September 6, 2008	Stacy Bonds is arrested by OPS for Public Intoxication and subsequently charged with assaulting a police officer
July 9, 2009	Arrest of Terry Delay for Public Intoxication and subsequently Assault Peace Officer.
October 26–27, 2010	Court dates for Stacy Bonds. Justice Lajoie stays the charges.
October 29, 2010	OPS Legal Section is notified of Justice Lajoie's views by Assistant Crown via written summary of the decision
November 1, 2011	Chief White makes a formal complaint about the Bonds incident, to be investigated by the OPS Professional Standards Section (PSS)
November 17, 2010	News stories about the Bonds case begin to appear
November 19, 2010	OPS working group is established to examine policies related to prisoner care and control, including public intoxication, strip searches and cellblock processes
November 19, 2010	Chief White issues three directives related to policy, (public intoxication, strip searches and cellblock operations) to be read and understood by all affected members.
November 19, 2010	Ontario's Special Investigations Unit asks for and receives materials from OPS about the Bonds case, citing jurisdiction interest
November 25, 2010	The Court releases the video of Bonds in the OPS cellblock to the media, gaining national attention
December 1, 2010	Chief White notifies public that the case involving the treatment of Terry Delay is also with the SIU. It was considered as evidence in the Bonds court case and judgement.
December 3 and 6, 2010	Two more cellblock cases (3 and 4) come to light and are sent to the OPP for investigation on December 7
December 24, 2010	Updated and new policies, approved by the executive on December 6 and 13, are distributed to OPS members
January 2011	New supervisory role (staff sergeant) is permanently added to the Central Cellblock
January 8 to February 6, 2011	Sixteen additional hours of training are delivered for each cellblock staff—to occur annually.
Week of January 10, 2011	Cases 5 and 6 are discovered after a comprehensive review of all public complaints on file involving the cellblock since September 2008. They are sent to the OPP for investigation, bringing the total now resting with the OPP to five.
January 19, 2011	SIU designates one officer as a subject officer and five as witness officers in the Bonds case.
January 21, 2011	SIU informs OPS that it no longer has jurisdictional interest in the Delay case. OPS sends the case to the OPP.
February 24, 2011	Audio recording is added to the existing cellblock camera system
March 15, 2011	SIU completes investigation on Bonds case. Sgt. Steven Desjourdy is charged with sexual assault and reassigned to administrative duties. OPS sends the file immediately to the OPP for a review of conduct To date, his case has not been heard in court.
March 22, 2011	OPP returns five files (all but Bonds) to OPS. No misconduct in four and misconduct in one. File dealt with internally as the two persons involved are civilians
May 25, 2011	OPP report findings of Bonds investigation. All five witness officers cleared of misconduct. The OPS is not offering any comments on outcomes that overlap with the subject officer of the SIU investigation.

## APPENDIX B: INTERNAL COMMUNICATION TIMELINE

<b>Internal Product</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Issue Date</b>
Office of the Chief email	Message from the Chief regarding incident involving Stacy Bonds	November 26, 2010; 3:24 p.m.
Office of the Chief email/video	Video Update #51	November 29, 2010; 10:39 a.m.
Office of the Chief email	Internal & Community Concerns – Platoon Briefings	November 29, 2010; 4:13 p.m.
Information Session	For Inspectors and Staff Sergeants	November 30, 2010; 9:00 a.m.
Office of the Chief email	Chief White Releases Public Statement Today	December 2, 2010; 12:24 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	Handling of Persons in Custody	December 7, 2010; 1:59 p.m.
Office of the Chief email/video	Acting Chief's Video Message and Internal email (Video Update #52)	December 7, 2010; 5:18 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	Internal & Community Concerns – Platoon Briefings	December 8, 2010; 12:37 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	In response to issues raised by OPA President	December 9, 2010; 8:29 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	Platoon Visits by Chief	December 23, 2010; 3:54 p.m.
General Order 2010-553	Amended policies	December 24, 2010; 1:03 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	Ottawa Police review identifies two cellblock incidents for investigation	January 14, 2011; 10:33 a.m.
Office of the Chief email	Training Video for Central Cellblock Procedures: Audio to be turned on this week	February 23, 2011; 10:47 a.m.
Office of the Chief email	SIU Charges Ottawa Police Officer	March 15, 2011; 2:06 p.m.
Fact Sheet (issued to members and media)	OPS Enhancements to Cellblock Operations	March 15, 2011; 2:06 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	Cellblock Review Project	March 18, 2011; 10:57 a.m.
Office of the Chief email/Chief's video	OPP concludes investigation into several Ottawa Police cellblock incidents (Video Update #53)	March 25, 2011; 12:36 p.m.
Cellblock S/Sgt email	Green Light Now Activated to Indicate Recording in Cellblock	April 5, 2011; 7:20 a.m.
Chief's Verbal Report to PSB	Cellblock Update	May 2, 2011; 5:00 p.m.
Office of the Chief email	OPP outcomes re: Stacy Bonds investigation	May 27, 2011; 2:30 p.m.
Chief's Verbal Report to PSB	Update on OPP outcomes re: Stacy Bonds Case	May 30, 2011; 5:00 p.m.

## APPENDIX C: EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION TIMELINE

<b>External Product</b>	<b>Subject</b>	<b>Issue Date</b>
Media Release and Video	Public Statement Issued by Ottawa Police Chief Vern White (Stacy Bonds video released by courts – SIU invokes)	November 19, 2010; 8:10 p.m.
Chief's Verbal Report to PSB	Ruling on Stacy Bond's case	November 22, 2010; 5:00 p.m.
Media Release	Public Statement released by Ottawa Police Chief Vern White (Terry Delay video released by courts – part of SIU)	November 25, 2010; 3:30 p.m.
Media Release/video	Ottawa Police Chief Vern White posts Video Update (update on files & transition to A/Chief)	December 2, 2010; 12:45 p.m. (news conference 9 a.m.)
Chief & Mayor meeting	Media scrum Chief and Mayor at 3pm at City Hall (i.e. Mayor supports Chief)	December 2, 2010 3:00 p.m. scrum
Media Release	Public Statement by Ottawa Police Acting Chief Gilles Laroche (OPP called in with 2 new incidents)	December 7, 2010; 4:40 p.m. (news conference at 4 p.m.)
Meeting with police and community members, workplan and interview questions	CICS Team; S/Sgt. John Medeiros	December 7, 2010; 3:30 p.m.
PSB Report	Status Report on the Review of Cellblock Operations	December 20, 2010; 5:00 p.m.
Chief's Verbal Report to PSB	Status Report on the Review of Cellblock Operations	December 20, 2010; 5:00 p.m.
Media Release	Ottawa Police review identifies two cellblock incidents for investigation	January 14, 2011; 11:00 a.m.
PSB Report	Review of Cellblock Operations	January 24, 2011; 5:00 p.m.
Media Release	Demonstration of Ottawa Police Service Special Constable training procedures	February 2, 2011; 1:04 p.m.
Chief's Verbal Report to PSB	Review of Cellblock Operations	February 28, 2011; 5:00 p.m.
Media Release	SIU charges Ottawa Police Officer following cellblock incident investigation	March 15, 2011; 2:15 p.m.
Fact Sheet (issued to members and media)	OPS Enhancements to Cellblock Operations	March 15, 2011; 2:06 p.m.
Media Release	OPP concludes several investigations into Cellblock incidents	March 25, 2011; 12:50 p.m.
Chief's Verbal Report to PSB	Review of Cellblock Operations	March 28, 2011; 5:00 p.m.
Media Release	OPP outcomes re: Stacy Bonds investigation	May 27, 2011; 2:45 p.m.