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FINAL REPORT

Future of Policing: Tiered Policing Study in Saskatchewan
(PWGSC File No. 013SS.0D160-7-4489)

Plural Policing in Saskatchewan First Nations

Report submitted to the Aboriginal Policing Directorate of
Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada

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The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors and not necessarily
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1.0 Executive Summary

1.1 Background

In the past thirty years, the configuration of policing provision has been significantly altered by the re-emergence of alternative forms of policing in most industrial and post-industrial nations (de Waard 1999; Johnston 1992). In Canada, this shift has seen the rapid rise of private security (Sanders 2003; Swol 1999), the increasing use of aggressive parapolicing (Rigakos 2002), and the problematic blurring of boundaries between public and private policing in public areas (Mopas 2005; Murphy and Clarke 2005). These developments have occurred alongside the apparent consolidation of policing provision in First Nations communities across Canada.

The First Nations Policing Policy (FNPP) created two policing models in 1991: Self-administered (SA) and Community Tripartite Agreements (CTA) where policing services were contracted, generally from the RCMP or provincial services. The direct goal of the FNPP, which has been generally realized (Jamieson, Beals, Lalonde and Associates 1995), has been the successive replacement of ad hoc First Nations policing arrangements that had no standardized training or coordination systems with rationalized, professional policing that is also culturally appropriate. An indirect effect, however, has been the creation of a tertiary policing void not unlike those experienced in non-First Nations communities across the country. As a result of this apparent local demand, and in the wake of more First Nations casinos (both assertions of self-reliance) far more policing in First Nations communities is being conducted outside the auspices of the FNPP. In some instances there has been a resuscitation of alternative policing in

First Nations communities.

1.2 This Study

This report seeks to understand the role and potential implications of Peacekeepers and casino security on policing provision in Saskatchewan under the FNPP. This report is a three-site study of alternative policing in Saskatchewan First Nations communities. It is based on observational research including ride-alongs and interviews in Onion Lake Cree Nation, Ahtahkakoop Cree Nation, and the Gold Eagle Casino in North Battleford. For the purposes of this study, we define policing as “any individual or organization acting legally on behalf of public or private organizations or person(s) to maintain security and/or social order while empowered by either public or private contract, regulations or policies, whether written or verbal” (LCC, 2002).

1.3 Key Findings

This research project yielded the following seven key findings based on 52.5 hours of observation and 37 contact-interviews with key respondents employed as Peacekeepers, casino security, band leaders and RCMP officers:

- 1) Peacekeepers are an essential service in both Ahtahkakoop and Onion Lake.**
RCMP accounts of the routine operational reliance they have for Peacekeepers is supported by observational and other interview data which reveals their vital role in a wide range of fire, emergency, and civic policing and diversion activity as well as acting as first responders including intervening in high risk law enforcement activity and suicide interventions.
- 2) Casino security is an integral part of aboriginal alternative policing.** Casino security are charged with ensuring the flow of populations and monies to the

Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) venues that have become a dominant economic engine of First Nations attempts at self-sufficiency and self-determination in Saskatchewan. Indeed, band-funded Peacekeepers are partly subsidized by casino revenues. In this way, casino security guards through their policing labour are actually helping finance Peacekeeper programs in Saskatchewan First Nations communities.

- 3) **Alternative forms of policing have quantitatively eclipsed the presence of FNPP financed policing.** In the three sites under consideration for this study we analyzed the wide array of security provision in current use. First Nations policing providers include: casino security personnel, casino surveillance personnel, contracted armed guards licensed by the province, private convenience store watchmen, band store security guards, Bingo security guards, static school Peacekeepers, patrolling Peacekeepers and dispatchers, arena guards, First Nations Commissionaires guarding RCMP detachments and finally, RCMP constables. We arrive at the surprising calculation that only two of 35, or less than 6 per cent, of the available on-duty community security personnel at the time of our ride-alongs could be counted as part of the FNPP program.
- 4) **Peacekeeper-RCMP relations are dyadic** in that both agencies rely on one another and generally work well together yet hold considerable reservations about each other's mission, deployment and efficacy. In one case, this led to heightened tensions over a suicide intervention. The Peacekeepers implemented risk reduction on the basis of core cultural values associated with restoration and harm reduction while the RCMP based their response on risk reduction gleaned from empirically-based intervention protocols. These risk calculations are vetted through two very different social and institutional lenses that can produce

significantly divergent outcomes, not only at odds with one another but when used in tandem ironically producing even more risk and heightened danger.

- 5) **Peacekeepers can be seen as a form of protest** to address the predominant concerns voiced by band council members and Peacekeepers about the RCMP. These centre around (1) staffing and visibility; (2) response time; (3) attitude and community relations; and finally (4) the lack of reciprocity in flows of information between the RCMP and both Peacekeepers (and casino security).
- 6) **RCMP officers hold significant reservations about Peacekeepers.** While the RCMP officers who dealt with Peacekeepers told us that “they do an excellent job” they were also concerned about: (1) their level of training and standards of recruiting; (2) their conduct at high-risk incidents; (3) their temptation to be biased given their community contacts; and finally (4) their lack of reliability in situations that require back-up for the RCMP.
- 7) **Alternative policing, if left unchecked, will continue to grow in size and scope.** Increasingly, First Nations communities have by virtue of their creation of tertiary services resuscitated the notion of local policing and patrol according to customary values that are communal and restorative. These are practices that divert youth from the criminal justice system and attempt to reintegrate offenders using ceremonies such as healing circles. Moreover, these policing organizations, in particular Peacekeepers and casino security, are a fundamental reassertion of First Nations sovereignty and self-reliance. There is no reason to believe that the compulsion for self-reliance and self-correction among First Nations peoples who have an entire generation’s worth of mistrust for “white” justice will wane in the next decade. It is expected that as the RCMP’s role in policing First Nations communities becomes more reactive (based on demands for service) and that as

First Nations communities continue to insist on greater control over their policing, alternative forms of policing will continue to emerge.

1.4 Policy Implications

Despite their considerable importance as an alternate form of policing in First Nations communities, casino security is self-contained, more narrowly mandated, and less likely to come into contact with FNPP police constables.

This study demonstrates that that the lion's share of everyday policing and patrol in Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop is administered by Peacekeepers and that their withdrawal would result in a significant impact on the effectiveness of the RCMP who heavily rely on their assistance and guidance. The vast majority of respondents do not wish to see the Peacekeepers become a police service under the "self-administered" option of the FNPP. Without exception, however, Peacekeepers, administrators, and RCMP officers believe the Peacekeepers need funding for standardized training, better equipment, and uniforms as well as more formalized information sharing with the RCMP. Under the current parameters of the FNPP, however, no such remedy is available. Without a change in the FNPP, the Peacekeepers will continue to act as underpaid, overworked and minimally trained first responders and role models upon whom the RCMP is, by their own admission, heavily dependent but unable to support.

Given this state of affairs, **it is recommended that the FNPP be revisited to allow for the possibility of plural forms of policing outside the First Nations Self-Administered (FNSA) and RCMP Community Tripartite Agreements (RCMP CTA).** Peacekeepers are inexpensive and very effective. It would take very little to expand and improve their service provision and thereby free up the RCMP to also engage in more proactive and culturally appropriate mentorship and community involvement.

2.0 Introduction

In the past thirty years, the configuration of policing provision has been significantly altered by the re-emergence of alternative forms of policing in most industrial and post-industrial nations (de Waard 1999; Johnston 1992). In Canada, this shift has seen the rise of private security (Sanders 2003; Swol 1999), the increasing use of parapolicing organizations such as, certain contract private security firms that use aggressive tactics and make routine arrests (Rigakos 2002), and the problematic blurring of boundaries between public and private policing in public areas (Mopas 2005; Murphy and Clarke 2005). These developments have occurred alongside the apparent consolidation of policing provision in First Nations communities across Canada. The First Nations Policing Policy (FNPP) created two policing models in 1991: Self-administered (SA) and Community Tripartite Agreements (CTA) where policing services were contracted, generally from the RCMP. The direct effect of the FNPP, which has been generally regarded as a success (Jamieson, Beals, Lalonde and Associates 1995), has been the successive replacement of ad hoc tribal policing arrangements that had no standardized training or coordination systems with rationalized, professional policing. The indirect effect has been the creation of a tertiary policing void not unlike those experienced in non-First Nations communities across the country. As a result of this apparent local demand, and in the wake of more First Nations casinos (both assertions of self-reliance) far more policing in First Nations communities is being conducted outside the auspices of the FNPP.

This report seeks to understand the role and potential implications of Peacekeepers and casino security on policing provision in Saskatchewan under the

FNPP. This report is a three-site study of alternative policing in Saskatchewan First Nations communities. It is based on observational research and interviews in Onion Lake Cree Nation, Ahtahkakoop Cree Nation, and the Gold Eagle Casino in North Battleford. The Report is organized into multiple sections dealing with methodology, a review of the literature, site selection criteria, and findings relating to the relationship, function and duties of Peacekeepers, casino security and the RCMP in all three communities.

3.0 Methods

This project employs multiple methods in an attempt at *triangulation*. The concept of triangulation (Denzin 1978) is a methodological notion that seeks to analyze as many sources of data about the same object of analysis as is possible. If one source of data is deficient or is able to capture only a particular “angle” or part of the lived experiences and setting of those it seeks to understand then data gleaned from other sources can help round out, indeed amend, our understanding. This research is based on three methodological approaches: (1) an ethnographic analysis of three policing organizations: Peacekeepers, RCMP, and casino security totalling 52.5 hours of observation; (2) contact-interviews with 37 key respondents; and (3) a comprehensive literature review to help theorize and contextualize the data.

3.1 Handling of Data

All data collected in this project has been obtained with the informed consent of both individual respondents and their organizations (see Appendix). Respondents were notified of the nature of the research, the funding agency sponsoring the research, our objectives and their right to withdraw at any time. All data identifiers are kept confidential

to the researchers. None of the data presented in this report are traceable to any individual respondent. Data was transcribed and coded shortly after collection. In keeping with generally accepted social science guidelines tape recordings and notes that include identifiers are destroyed or expurgated. Transcribed interviews and ethnographic notes with all identifiers removed will be kept on file for a period of 5 years.

3.2 Interviews

Interviews were conducted in all three locales with police, Peacekeepers and casino security depending on the nature of the site and the type of security employees. Table 4.2 reports the number of “contact-interviews” conducted with each organization. These are interviews that were sometimes conducted during the ethnographic research or that may have included two or more respondents at the same time. For example, at our initial meeting with representatives from Onion Lake Cree Nation and Ahtahkakoop Cree Nation we had the opportunity to discuss issues concerning Peacekeepers and the RCMP with a number of band council members, Chiefs, elders, Peacekeepers and even an RCMP officer. We were able to query everyone because in customary fashion, each speaker took turns to voice their opinion on specific issues and questions. We recorded all such data. Later, however, some interviews were conducted at detachment offices with one or more officers present and others interviews were folded into ride-alongs with Peacekeepers, RCMP and casino security personnel. In a few cases, officers met up with one another so we had an opportunity to conduct at least partial interviews with both of them in the field. In other cases interviews were scattered over the duration of a shift or interrupted by the interjection of another respondent. We have thus called these “contact-interviews” to signify their embeddedness in the research process and their intentional conflation with our ethnography.

We asked respondents questions based on a semi-structured interview schedule and allowed them to elaborate wherever they felt it necessary. Our questions related to six general themes: (1) background training and preparation for duty; (2) relationships with other policing organizations; (3) illustrative incidents of cooperation and/or competition with other policing services; (4) the effect of being/not being aboriginal on the nature of police work; (5) community relations; (6) the future needs of Peacekeepers or casino security (see Appendix). In total we conducted 38 contact-interviews, nine of Peacekeepers, 11 of RCMP officers and managers, 10 of casino security personnel and managers, and another eight of elders and/or band council members. We relied largely on 'snowball' and self-selection sampling wherein key respondents were asked to

	Onion Lake	Ahtahkakoop	North Battleford	Total
Peacekeepers	5	4	n/a	9
RCMP and managers	5	5	1	11
Casino security and managers	n/a	n/a	10	10
Elder and/or band council member	4	3	1	8
Total	14	12	12	38

Note that there are no Peacekeepers employed in North Battleford and no SIGA-Casino security officers are employed in Onion Lake or Ahtahkakoop.

identify others who were knowledgeable about community security concerns or who were directly involved in policing, security or peacekeeping. On the basis of this selection method, not a single participant whom we identified as a potential respondent denied us interview access. Table 3.2 summarizes the number of recorded contact-interviews by participant category.

3.3 Ethnography

Ethnographic study is perhaps the most basic, unfettered, yet nuanced form of data collection (Lofland 1974). I utilize a critical ethnographic approach that centres power and its associated dialectics of social control (Thomas 1993) as a focal point from which to understand social relations. While interviews are helpful and revealing in their own right, actually observing policing in action allows a type of insight that is otherwise

	Onion Lake	Ahtahkakoop	North Battleford	Total
Peacekeepers	14.5	10	n/a	24.5
RCMP	12	8	1	21
Casino security	n/a	n/a	8	8
Total	26.5	18	9	53.5

Note that there are no Peacekeepers employed in North Battleford and no SIGA-Casino security officers are employed in Onion Lake or Ahtahkakoop.

unavailable from quantitative analysis and interviews. We spent a total of 53.5 hours in ride-alongs and general observations of Peacekeepers, RCMP, and casino security at work (see Table 4.3).

3.4 Literature Review

Numerous databases were perused, including EBSCO Academic Search Primer, PsycInfo, Sage Full Text Collection, Sage Journals Online, and Sociological Abstracts. Key words in the search included First Nations, Aboriginal, Native, casino, gaming, gambling, security, surveillance, private policing, and socioeconomic. Secondary bibliographic directed searches (Ferentzy et al. 2006; Stevens 2006; Dartmouth Medical School 2006; Hayward and Colman 2004; McGowan, et al. 2000; Van Brunschot 2000) as well as government publications were also included (Public Safety Canada, Statistics Canada, Solicitor General, Alberta Justice Minister and Attorney General) as search tools.

4.0 Review of Literature

The main goal of this review is to examine the size and nature of the scholarly literatures concerning the complex interaction among gambling, policing and Aboriginal peoples. Several subheadings were created to organize the findings. First, positive and negative socio-economic impacts of gambling are discussed. Second, the impacts of gambling specific to First Nations Peoples and communities are outlined. Third, a historical outline of First Nations policing is provided. Fourth, the rise of alternative First Nations policing programs and initiatives is reviewed. Fifth, the growth in private policing services is

discussed with an eye towards seeing how they may benefit First Nations forms of policing. Sixth, the challenges of public policing services in many Aboriginal communities are presented as a background to the deployment of private policing on First Nations territories. Finally, the growth of “mass private properties”, such as casinos, on First Nations territories is examined in the context of public and private gambling security.

Despite the significance of each subheading, there is unevenness in the findings. For example, a large amount of literature was found on the socio-economic impacts of gambling in general and First Nations communities in particular. The increased participation and revenues associated with gambling, as well as the spread of problem gambling have piqued the interest of researchers, clinicians and governments alike and produced a wealth of research materials. On the other hand, there were difficulties in finding materials on private policing in First Nations communities. Although several analyses were available on the public policing of First Nations territories, very little has been published on private policing in these same communities. Furthermore, the interdependence of public and private policing in regard to Aboriginal property, particularly gambling establishments, has not been studied resulting in a paucity of reliable research.

4.1 The Socio-economic Impacts of Gambling

The social and economic impacts of gambling have been studied extensively. Gaming, whether in Canada (Belanger 2006), or other nations, such as America (Grinols 2004), New Zealand (Wendon Abbott and Volberg 1999) or Australia (KPMG Consulting 1999) has benefits and costs. Economic development, government revenues, tax relief and leisure benefits are frequently noted as positives while net job loss, marital break-up,

crime, debt, and health problems are noted as negatives (Azmier, Kelley, and Todosichuk 2001). As a result, gambling is not clear-cut as to its value or harm. In addition, there are methodological problems associated with studying the socio-economic impacts of gambling including problems in isolating the effects of gambling, in measuring the impacts, in defining the time frames of research, in using comparative data, and in specifying impacts by type of gambling activity (Stevens and Williams 2004). For example, a study conducted by Grinols and Mustard (2006) found that the introduction of a casino into a community increased crime. However, Walker (2007) noted several problems with their analysis (i.e. sample selection bias) and their interpretation of the results (i.e. conclusions not justified by empirical results). He reminded researchers and policy makers to strive for validity when taking the impacts of gambling into consideration, including the effects on government, employment, criminal justice, health care, pathological gamblers, and attitudes toward gambling.

Given that the primary interest for gambling regulators and operators is financial success, it is not unusual to find that most scholarly analysis and governmental reports concentrate on the economic impacts of gambling. Typically the beneficiaries include charities, religious organizations, citizens, communities, private businesses, the equine industry and especially provincial governments in the Canadian context (Azmier, Kelly, and Todosichuk 2001; Smith and Azmier 1997; Wynne, Smith and Volberg 1994). Indeed, in Canada, provincial gambling revenues have grown from \$1.687 billion in 1992/1993 to \$6.329 billion in 2003/2004 – a 275% increase. In fact, gambling remains the single dominant sin tax (Azmier 2005). The gross revenue from gambling is now \$15.3 billion with \$8.6 billion (57%) going directly to provincial governments (Canadian Gaming Association 2007). This sizeable revenue has allowed governments to increase economic development, fund social programs, and reduce taxes. This positive return

from gambling, in turn, has decreased concerns about the regressive nature of this form of taxation, neutralized the religious objections to gambling, and lessened the moral objections of raising funds from problem gamblers because at least it results in a public good (Azmi 2005).

The economic impacts of employment generated from the gambling industry, whether directly or indirectly, have been debated by many. The Canadian Gaming Association (2007) boasts that there are more than \$2 billion in direct salaried jobs for Canadians working in the gaming industry. Garrett (2003), who studied employment changes in four American states before and after the introduction of casino gambling found that three of four rural counties that adopted casino gambling experienced increased household and payroll employment. On the other hand, Banks (2002) discovered that gambling does not create many *new* jobs: jobs created in the gambling industry, he says, have a counterpart in jobs destroyed in other parts of the economy, and the new jobs created are of lower value than those displaced. Indeed, Statistics Canada (2003) discovered that those in gambling jobs were paid less (\$15 hourly versus \$18) compared with workers in non-gambling industries. According to Grinols (2004, p. 67), gambling promoters have relied heavily on the argument that they create jobs to counterbalance the perception that they create social costs. However, counting jobs is not enough to calibrate a true cost-benefit analysis. For example, there is no benefit to a community from an increase in jobs if they are only created to deal with the negative impacts of gambling. Employment for social and health workers may be created because of the increase in problem gamblers associated with permitted gambling (i.e. divorce, abuse, bankruptcy, mental health issues). In such a case, new jobs come at increased costs to communities.

The social impacts of gambling, such as crime, health care, pathological

gambling, marital failure, and dissention among community members are more difficult to measure than pecuniary ones, as they do not translate into financial terms without considerable manipulation. However, “costs that are hard to calculate are still costs” (Azmier, et al. 2001, p. 6) and in most studies, these are reported upon, but not valued in monetary terms.

Reports of criminal justice system impacts are extensive in the gambling literature. Smith, Wynne and Hartnagel (2003) argue that gambling-related crime, such as bookmaking, cheating, loan sharking, money laundering, counterfeiting, fraud, theft, prostitution, and family violence are part of the social and economic costs of doing business in casinos and racetracks. Addicted gamblers commit crime, and major gambling venues attract opportunistic criminals (p. 96). In fact, Grinols and Mustard (2006) concluded that the introduction of casinos into communities increased all crimes except murder. Ironically, legalization can give rise to white-collar crime because the structure of publicly owned gambling encourages theft and fraud among its retailers. For example, in the wake of the Edmonds affair where a retailer stole a customer's ticket worth half a million dollars, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (2001) found that the Ontario Lottery Corporation (OLC) did not “fulfill its duty to act as a reasonably prudent payor” and “acted in a negligent manner” (p. 5). In his independent investigation of OLG the Ombudsman found that the OLG's supervision of retailers was non-existent, and complaints of crime had been ignored or covered up for many years (Marin 2007). Conversely, other reviews found that legalization reduced the organized crime connection in gambling and that the opening of casinos did not increase crime, and in some cases public safety actually improved (McMillen 1998; KPMG 1995). Stitt, Nichols, and Giacomassi (2003) explain this finding in terms of the connection between a casino's success and a community's economic well-being. That is, private casino security and

public law enforcement agencies provide greater community protection from criminal activities in order to secure and maintain entertainment and tourism capital.

With the expansion of gambling worldwide, the impacts on health care services have been studied (Griffiths 2001; Volberg 2000; Griffiths 1999). By employing the short South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS)¹ in their study, Room, Turner and Ialomiteanu (1999) found that gambling related problems rose significantly among Niagara Falls residents after the Niagara Casino opened. Their findings also suggested that the increase in problem gambling was isolated to that city and not found elsewhere in the province. These researchers concluded that “gambling problems do not manifest themselves in the public arena but rather in the arena of private life” (p. 1449). In contrast, Jacques and Ladouceur (2006) performed a longitudinal study to evaluate the impact of a casino in Quebec. One year after the opening of the casino they found an increase in participating in casino games and in the amount of money lost in one day’s gambling; however, this trend was not maintained over their 2 and 4 year follow-ups. The rate of at-risk and probable pathological gamblers and the number of criteria on the SOGS did not increase. Similarly, a study of Casino Windsor revealed no significant changes in the rates of problem and pathological gambling among men, women or the general population one year after the opening of the casino (Govoni, Frisch, Rupcich, and Getty 1998).

Of particular interest to researchers has been the personal impact of gambling on problem gamblers and their social networks, including financial loss, emotional and

¹ The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) is a commonly used questionnaire to identify people with serious gambling problems. Five items from the SOGS were used in this study: Was there ever a time when you gambled more than you intended to? Have people criticized your gambling? Have money arguments centred on your gambling? Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what happens when you gamble? Have you claimed to be winning money gambling when you were not?

physical disorders, separation and divorce, child neglect, spousal abuse, declining work productivity, job loss, illegal activities, and substance abuse (Griffiths 2001; Azmier, Kelley, and Todosichuk 2001; Volberg 2000; McMullan et al. 1998/99; Smith and Azmier 1997). In particular, concerns regarding the inter-generational nature of gambling have been widely researched (see Darbyshire, Oster, and Carrig 2000). Wickwire, Whelan, Meyers, and Murray (2007) found that adolescents who reported that at least one parent gambles were more likely to self-identify as having gambling problems compared to adolescents who reported no parent gambling. Felsher, Derevensky, and Gupta (2003) discovered that parental involvement with the lottery played an important role in the initiation and maintenance of lottery participation for youth. Legalized gambling has also been linked to elevated suicide levels, although the research findings are mixed. Marshall and Wynne (2003) found that 18% of problem gamblers in Canada contemplated suicide in the previous year. In an American study, visitors to, and residents of Atlantic City experienced significantly elevated suicide rates which appeared only after gambling casinos were opened (Phillips, Welty, and Smith 1997). Feigelman, Gorman and Lesieur (2006) also found that young female gamblers reported significantly higher suicide thoughts and attempts, but young males were no more likely than non-gamblers to have suicide thoughts or prior suicide attempts. On the other hand, in their study of eight communities that adopted casino gambling compared with a matched set of control communities, Nichols, Stitt, and Giacomassi (2004) found that suicide rates were not statistically different between the communities. Ironically, the dual role of provincial governments as both regulator and promoter of gambling has created a conflict between increasing revenues and protecting at-risk and problem gamblers (Auditor General of British Columbia 1997, p. 42). In any event, Griffiths (2001) argues that state endorsed gambling is here to stay and, governments should prioritize funding

to organizations and health practitioners who provide treatment for people with severe gambling problems.

Even the opinion of community members over gambling can have a lasting impact on individuals and communities. Studies have shown that some people perceive gambling as simply another form of recreational, leisure activity (Banks 2002; Smith and Abt 1984), and may even provide diversions from daily/family pressures (McMullan, Perrier and MacDonald 1998-1999). Collins and Lapsley (2003), for example, argue that for the majority of people gambling is harmless pleasure that produces enjoyment, such as the anticipation of winning, (however unlikely) following the purchase of a lottery ticket (p. 143). In contrast, other citizens see gambling as a form of moral failure. In Missouri the attempt to introduce riverboat casino gaming was challenged on moral grounds, at the election polls, and in the courts. These challenges, in turn, created a divide in the community that lasted for several years (Louishomme 2003). Eadington (1995) contends that this division in attitude regarding the approval or rejection of gambling must be taken seriously. He insists that to introduce a casino into a community that is opposed to gambling is itself a “real gamble”: if the economic benefits dissipate, the community still has to cope with the perceived and real problems associated with the casino (p. 52-54).

4.2 First Nations and the Impact of Gambling

First Nations people and communities are important with regard to the socio-economic impacts of gambling. Historically, games of chance were a common cultural activity for tribal societies throughout North America prior to European contact. During the colonial occupation of Canada, First Nations games and wagering were seen as pagan and outlawed; however, these games continued to be played away from “the eyes of prying federal Indian agents” (Belanger 2006, p. 40). Indeed Little (2002) contends that this

cultural practice is deeply embedded in First Nations communities and helps explain why modern economic development agencies in conjunction with tribal groups consider gaming a “legitimate and traditional mode of fund-raising” (p. 70).

Aside from its perceived legitimacy, Aboriginal peoples often view gambling as a path to sovereignty, self-determination and economic self-sufficiency. Depressed economies on reserves, reliance on government programs, and political instability have been the motivation to promote a self-government agenda in Canada, which is ultimately predicated on financial autonomy (Belanger 2006). During the 1990s, American success stories regarding reservation casinos made this vision of economic independence seem feasible. For example, the Mashantucket Pequot Indian tribe of Connecticut opened Foxwoods Casino, which was one of the largest and most successful casino in the world with annual revenues of over \$1 billion (Nykiel 2004). Not surprisingly, this “New Buffalo”, as gambling is sometimes called, has had unique socio-economic impacts for First Nations Tribes. In the United States the National Indian Gaming Association (2006) claims that First Nations gaming creates new jobs, new funds essential to government services, and rebuilds demoralized communities. Much anecdotal evidence suggests a marked improvement in the standard of living after gambling products have been introduced on reserve territories: “The advantage of Indian gaming are becoming self-sufficient, picking ourselves up by the bootstraps”; “We’re getting back to the pride for the tribe and being able to be good citizens”; “Gaming revenue has taken some Native people out of ‘survival mode’ and brought back the significance of balance and connection to family and the land” (cited in Light and Rand 2005, p. 99). So, gambling may generate revenues to improve community infrastructure, schools, education, health care services and employment for First Nations peoples (Anders 1998). Indeed, the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s casino in the State of Washington created jobs for all of its 1490

members (Goldin 1999).

In Canada, hundreds of million of dollars in gambling revenue in Canada have been captured via casinos, VLT operations, and Internet gaming sites, and these funds have been used to “bolster faltering economies”, “fund social programming”, and support “economic development initiatives” (Belanger 2006, p, 167). For example, the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA) celebrated its tenth year with record profits: they made \$48.8 million in the 2006-07 fiscal years, a 21 percent increase from the previous year (Saskatoon 2007). This financial success allowed SIGA to provide financial support to more than 400 community groups and initiatives. Additionally, the Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation (2006/2007) reports that 47.4% of the 1,010 employees at Casinos Regina and Moose Jaw are of Aboriginal heritage. The economic benefit of gaming has also been felt in Ontario. After the opening of Casino Rama, for instance, unemployment on the Mnjikaning First Nation dropped from 70 percent to 8 percent, and band staff jumped from 50 to 230 (Belanger 2006, p. 97). Indeed, the economic benefits of gambling extend off the reservation as well. Janes and Collison (2004) studied the impact of a Native American casino on a local, non-First Nations community. They found that the community experienced significant economic gain over five years; \$28 million went into the local economy which helped fund essential services, infrastructure, recreation and social programs. Evans and Topoleski (2002) also discovered that counties with or near Native casinos experienced an increase in employment and a decline in mortality rates.

Several studies have noted that problem gambling is a major problem in First Nations communities as well. Personal testimonials have conveyed the distress that problem gambling has had on families, children, and community (Oakes,2005; Janes and Collison 2004). As one community member noted: “People get hooked on the

games and they get addicted to gambling and start to neglect their families by sitting at a slot machine all night. I've seen children neglected; I have been one of those left babysitting while others were out at bingo" (cited in Little 2002, p. 72). Quantitative research in the form of prevalence studies, most of which were conducted during the 1990s, indicates that First Nations populations have problem gambling behaviour rates 2.2 to 15.6 times higher than the non-Aboriginal population (see Wardman et al. 2001). In 2003, Marshall and Wynne discovered that Aboriginals in Canada were "those most at risk". Their statistical analysis demonstrated that Aboriginal gamblers were significantly more likely to be at risk (18%) than non-Aboriginal gamblers (6%). Hewitt (1994) interviewed 156 First Nations people from Alberta, where gambling "was cause for concern" and found that 149 (95 percent), were experiencing at least one significant problem with gambling (p. i). A year later, Hewitt and Auger (1995) conducted a second study of 961 First Nations students and found that 28 percent of Albertan Aboriginal youth scored as problem gamblers, while another 21 percent were at risk of developing a gambling problem. Interestingly, the respondents in both studies experienced economic and social problems such as poverty and significant losses through deaths, failed relationships, or addictions. Kelly (2001) put it as follows: "First Nations communities in Canada likely will be at greater risk, as many of these communities experience high rates of substance abuse and lower than average income and education" (p. 6).

The social costs of gambling on First Nations territory has led to community resistance and divisions. Some people feel that gaming may undermine the traditional cultural values of First Nations communities and produce intra-tribal conflicts (Light and Rand 2005; Little 2002; Wetzel 2005). The results from a North Dakota case study on compulsive gambling are telling. Cozzetto and Larocque (1996, p. 83) found that the long-term externalities associated with untreated pathological gambling behaviour could

“destroy what remains of tribal culture” and undermine the collectivity, the family and the role of elders in regard to community customs and traditions. Anders (1998, pp. 103-104) discovered that gambling on reserves was a contradictory force of great cultural concern. The economic clout of gambling brought tribal members together in order to mobilize them as a political force, but at the same time, it undercut the cultural integrity of the community as a whole. So, although gambling allowed some First Nations communities to be less dependent upon government programs and gave them a greater choice in their own economic direction, gambling profits also generated conflicts and increased inequalities between “have” and “have-not” tribal communities.

Enormous gambling profits have also triggered inter and intra tribal disputes in Canada. For instance, in 1993 the White Bear First Nation in Saskatchewan opened a casino without provincial government approval citing an inherent right to engage in gambling enterprises as they saw fit. This experiment ended with a massive RCMP raid on the casino, followed by arrests and prosecutions. The First Nations community of Akwesasne has also been divided over gambling. While the Mohawk Warrior Society supported gambling as an avenue to further sovereignty, members of the anti-gambling elected council were highly critical of it and called on the New York State Police to enforce the law. This led to community arrests and blockades, verbal abuse, fist fights, physical assault and, eventually, the death of two Mohawks (Cummins and Steckley 2003, p. 106). In 2000 SIGA was investigated for financial irregularities. This resulted in external audits and the subsequent dismissal of the SIGA chief executive officer and chairman. Similarly, the leadership of the Dakota Tipi Nation was investigated for the misuse of Bingo revenues; so intense were the feelings in the community that they led to violence and shootings (Belanger 2006). Additionally, gambling profits have raised questions over claims to tribal membership. For example, the Mystic Lake Casino on the

Prior Lake Skakopee Mdewakanton Dakota reservation in Minnesota has made many members of the tribe millionaires. This success has led to dozens of people “clamoring for tribal membership”, which has led to disputes over who is entitled to control the tribe’s gambling operation (Anders 1998, p. 104). In the end, public faith in both gambling authorities and First Nations were temporarily eroded and lobbying, negotiations, and bilateral and multilateral agreements along with new regulatory initiatives and power sharing were pursued as long-term solutions.

4.3 First Nations Policing

Prior to European settlement, First Nations peoples had their own form of justice and social order sometimes referred to as “customary law” which was spiritual and consensual in nature. This form of justice was based on the principle of maintaining social harmony and order through conflict resolution, reconciliation and restitution, although offenders were sometimes banished from their communities, or even executed in the name of fairness to the victim’s family (First Nations Chiefs of Police Association 2001, pp. 3-4). Since most communities were small and closely integrated during this time policing was often “shaped and directed by the interest of the wider community” (Depew 1992, p. 463). As a result, First Nations people had differing notions of policing than those of European descent who favored an individualistic crime control model. When contact between the British Crown and Aboriginal nations was relatively co-operative during the period between 1500 and Confederation (1867), Aboriginal nations were recognized as autonomous political entities, and were able to retain their inherent jurisdiction over justice matters. But, at the end of the 18th century, the Crown began to disregard the sovereignty of Aboriginal peoples, changing their justice systems dramatically. With the influx of white settler communities, the authority of First Nations to

continue to practice self-administered policing began to be destroyed (First Nations Chiefs of Police Association 2001).

In 1803, the British Crown extended their jurisdiction into the majority of First Nations territories and ignored previous treaties signed between two distinct nations. Statutes were enacted to assure the supremacy of the colonial government's criminal jurisdiction over crimes and offences and law enforcement. Consequently, previously unpunished crimes committed in First Nations territories were treated as if they had been committed within the provinces of Lower or Upper Canada. Courts in Upper Canada were given jurisdiction over First Nations territories, and justices of the peace were empowered to imprison anyone residing within a First Nations territory that refused to comply with a court order (First Nations Chiefs of Police Association 2001). Notably, 1826 was a turning point in Canadian First Nations legal history: under the authority of British law, an Indian was executed for murdering another Indian (Jefferson 1994). The warrant for and execution of Shawanakiskie effectively supplanted the First Nations justice system with a colonial one. Henceforth, Indians, like new arrivals, were subjected to British and Canadian law. With the implementation of the Indian Act in 1876, which "solidified the position of Aboriginals as wards of the state", the administration of policing was placed under the authority of the federal government of Canada (Cummins and Steckley 2003, p. 11). In 1892, the government of Canada extended the Criminal Code to all Aboriginal peoples and this remained in place for all policing administration until the 1960s and 1970s when new changes in the policing of Aboriginal communities were eventually considered and implemented (Clairmont 2006).

In the 1960s, The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) initiated a Program that allowed band councils to hire "band constables" to administer bylaws, such as traffic regulation infractions and prevention of disorderly

conduct. This program was expanded in 1971 when DIAND allocated band councils the authority to create unarmed “special constables” who could supplement senior police (i.e. RCMP, Ontario Provincial Police, Sûreté du Québec) to ensure that the enforced law reflected the wishes of the community (Clairmont 2006; Cummins and Steckley 2003; First Nations Chiefs of Police Association 2001). Then, in 1973, DIAND published its Task Force Report, *Policing on Reserves*, which outlined three policing options for Aboriginal communities:

1. Band Council policing where band constables would be charged with enforcing statutes relating to minor offences;
2. Municipal policing where the reserve would be considered a municipality for policing purposes and would be granted the approval to form its own police service or, alternatively, purchase the services of an adjacent police service or
3. Provincial policing where the reserves would be policed by the provincial police. This third option was further divided into:
 - a) The creation of separate First Nations police agencies that would have the status of the provincial police service for the purpose of providing policing on the reserve.
 - b) The creation of a contingent of First Nations officers acting under the direction of the provincial police force with the responsibility to police reserves (First Nations Chiefs of Police Association 2001, p. 89).

The Task Force recommended the adoption of option 3b, and Treasury Board approval established an experimental Indian Special Constable Program (ISCP), where constables were distinct but integrated into the RCMP service. From 1975 to 1990, these special limited authority constable programs continued to be developed despite more than twenty government reports calling for greater Aboriginal autonomy (Clairmont and Linden 1998). It was not until 1991 that Special Constables became full members of the RCMP and the program evolved into the Aboriginal Community Constable Program (ACCP). Although not promoted by DIAND, First Nations communities who lobbied for autonomy began experimenting with culturally sensitive and community effective police services during this period. For instance, in 1977, the Dakota Ojibway Tribal Council

Police Department (DOTCPD) became the first self-administered, Aboriginal police service in Canada (Public Safety Canada 2007), and in 1978 the James Bay Agreement authorized the development of autonomous police services for the James Bay Cree and the Naskapis (Clairmont 2006). These early community policing services eventually advanced the progress of autonomous Aboriginal policing.

After reviewing Aboriginal policing initiatives in 1991 the federal government introduced the First Nations Policing Policy (FNPP), which was administered by the Department of the Solicitor General. This national program was, and remains, unique to Canada. That is, its tripartite nature has not been duplicated in other countries with similar colonial histories, laws, and political structures such as the United States, Australia, and New Zealand (Lithopoulos 2007). This initiative was intended to assure First Nations peoples that they would have access to police services that were “professional, effective, culturally appropriate and accountable” to the communities they serve (Canada 1996, p. 1). The FNPP has three broad objectives: strengthen public security and personal safety; increase responsibility and accountability; and build a sense of partnership between First Nations and non-First Nations agencies (Cummins and Steckley 2003). This policy created two policing models: Self-administered (SA) and Community Tripartite Agreements (CTA) where policing services were contracted, generally from the RCMP. While the Louis Bull Reserve established the first self-administered First Nation police service in 1987 with policing powers equivalent to a municipal police department, most SAs began after the FNPP was adopted in 1991 (Clairmont 2006). Indeed, Saskatchewan recently established its first self-administered First Nations police agency, The File Hills First Nation Police Service, which serves five First Nations communities (Saskatchewan 2007). Similarly, the first tripartite policing agreement, involving the federal and Ontario governments and First Nation leaders, was

signed in 1981; however, most agreements were established in the 1990s. Community Tripartite Agreements are partnerships between governments, police and communities designed to increase the level and quality of policing in their own communities, and to enhance bilateral policing by deploying RCMP officers in existing detachments to meet these new policing requirements (Alberta Justice and Attorney General 2006). As of July 24, 2008, there are 163 FNPP agreements covering a total of 399 First Nations communities affecting an on-reserve population of 317,331 people. Additionally, there are 85 communities being policed by ACCP officers (56 detachments) and only 53 communities being policed by 103 band constables (APD internal records: as of June 24, 2008). Although an independent evaluation of the FNPP found the policy to be “relevant, sound and on-track” (Jamieson, Beals, Lalonde and Associates 1995), there is an overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples within the correctional system² and many First Nations peoples have expressed dissatisfaction with the size, poor response times, and overall efforts of local police (EKOS 2005).

As First Nations increasingly entered CTAs, the RCMP increased its policing duties in Aboriginal communities, which were sometimes delivered to Aboriginal peoples through the First Nations Community Policing Service (FNCPS). In other parts of the province, however, RCMP service was still delivered until provincial or municipal contract notwithstanding FNCPS agreements. The RCMP-FNCPS arrangements reflected the principles and objectives of the FNPP (RCMP 2007). As such, the RCMP provided linkages between First Nation leaders and operational police, facilitated recruitment, advanced cultural awareness, and maintained Aboriginal advisory councils (Clairmont 2006). For example, in 2002 *The Aboriginal Police Studies Program* was implemented. It

² Aboriginal people comprise 3% of Canada's population, yet they account for approximately 20% of people serving a sentence in custody (Statistics Canada, 2005).

was designed to enhance the skill levels of recruits to enter policing as a career (RCMP 2007). But, a lack of contract commitments from the RCMP to the CTA policing units has also been noted. A recent review of RCMP police service indicated that staffing resources and training programs required better formulation and development, and that the RCMP were not keeping pace with the changing nature and needs of Aboriginal communities (Auditor General of Canada 2005).

However, it must be remembered that mainstream policing and law enforcement are generally “culturally foreign” to Aboriginal peoples. Not surprisingly, the former’s police services have evolved into unique institutions, rather than simple add-ons or hybrids (Linden 2007). The Blood Inquiry, for example, emphasized that native people rejected the response to complaint-based style of the RCMP and wanted a genuine community-based policing model more consistent with tribal culture (Murphy and Clairmont 1996, p. 10). Indeed, similar objections and preferences raised by individual citizens, First Nations groups and governments, have facilitated a gradual progression toward autonomous and alternative policing styles for First Nations people. Over a decade ago, Griffith (1994, p. 133) argued that this evolution would raise a myriad of questions including:

- What are the standards (and who should set them) that are to be used in recruiting and training Aboriginal police officers?
- What is the jurisdictional authority of Aboriginal police officers?
- What are the most appropriate models of police-service delivery to First Nations communities by First Nations and non-First Nations police forces?
- How are structures to ensure the accountability of First Nations police officers to be established?
- What system of checks and balances can be put into place to ensure that First Nations police forces remain as free as possible from political interference?
- What are the potential implications of First Nations officers policing their home communities, particularly when these communities are small and close-knit?
- What provisions, if any, can be established to provide an interface between the First Nations police force and the federal, provincial, and municipal police force?
- What is the potential for developing First Nations-controlled police forces in off-reserve communities and in urban centres?

Although First Nation communities have attempted to mobilize an effective and sustainable model of policing suitable to them, it must be noted that many of these questions are as relevant now as they were a decade ago.

4.4 Alternative forms of First Nations Policing

First Nations organizations claim that they carry a “collective responsibility to take care of the health and well-being of their communities and land” (Union of BC Indian Chiefs 2007, p. 1). As a result, their policing services differ from those operating in non-First Nations communities. A survey of First Nations police chiefs found that First Nations policing was distinctive; it was in intimate contact with the community, and responded to more diverse requests for help than other police services. Officers emphasized that policing was about “local resolutions” and they put great weight on “peacekeeping” rather than “enforcement and compliance” (Clairmont and Murphy 2000, p. 43). Not surprisingly, several alternative justice practices have developed to accommodate policing services on reserves. Community-based models are particularly salient. They encourage active community involvement, expand the definition and scope of police roles, and maintain both reactive and proactive delivery services, making this type of policing “more likely than the crime control approach to reflect the social, political, economic, and cultural conditions of a wide range of native communities” (Depew 1992, p. 475). As one Commission report put it: “long lasting solutions to policing programs are grounded in the people and the communities themselves” (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996).

One development of community policing involves ‘indigenizing’ or ‘indianizing’ the ‘white’ system of crime control. Indigenization is premised on the notion that justice for

First Nations peoples can be realized by replacing non-First Nations justice system personnel with First Nations personnel (Dickson-Gilmore and LaPrairie 2005, p. 68). Indeed, 7% of the 18,000 RCMP members now report some Aboriginal ancestry (Clairmont 2006, p. 16). In fact, shortly after the establishment of the Dakota Ojibway Tribal Council Police (DOTCP) in 1978, an evaluation of the service concluded that the presence of First Nations officers in the DOTCP resulted in fewer First Nations people being subjected to Canadian criminal justice procedures (First Nations Chiefs of Police Association 2001). Additionally, an assessment of the band constable program in 2005 found that band constables provided a calming effect in the community and that crime and disorder was deterred because of their presence and visibility (APD 2007, p. 13). Expecting First Nations police officers to “break the psyche of colleagues and justice administration, and thereby somehow alter the cycle of Aboriginal over-representation” is unfair and unrealistic (Dickson-Gilmore and LaPrairie 2005, p. 68). It places an onerous burden of responsibility on First Nations people, especially the police. Being policed by people from one’s own community may have benefits, but it may also negatively affect tribal policing and local justice programs. According to Cummins and Steckley (2003), “It is difficult for police forces to be neutral”. Police officers may come from disputing families who are not in power positions and band councils may try to influence or ignore them. The latter, it should be remembered, “have the power to close down a policing service and return to policing by outsiders” (p. 20). This Band council power was exercised in Manitoba in 1993 when members of the Dakota-Ojibway Tribal Police were evicted by the band council at Roseau River after members of the tribal police force assisted the RCMP in a raid on the reserve where gambling equipment was seized (Griffiths 1994, p. 132). Similar issues of local politics have arisen for First Nations women facing intimate violence. In one case, a known abuser was appointed band

constable by chief and council to ensure that he avoided charges of domestic assault. In a second case, a Manitoba court acquitted a man charged with assaulting his wife and daughter, and stated that it would not stand in the way of his appointment as band constable (McGillivray and Comaskey 1999, p. 93).

Based on a combination of local tribal culture politics and modern justice arrangements, each reserve has tried to determine the best way to ensure community justice for its people. In British Columbia, First Nations peoples have begun to develop their own peacekeeping system, which takes into consideration the Criminal Code of Canada as well as their own cultural justice values. In Alberta, the Blood Tribe Police Service, under a CTA, has full policing responsibility for the Blood Tribe reserve. They have incorporated their Elders Program into their police service to “provide education to the community about the role of the police, improve relations between the community and the police, and advise the police in the development and delivery of crime prevention initiatives” (Alberta Justice and Attorney General 2006, p. 18). They offer services “to victims of crime through respect, dignity, and through acknowledging cultural traditions and values”, and the victim services unit assists “individuals who suffered violent crime, trauma and tragedy, and misfortune” (Blood Tribe Police Service 2007).

In Saskatchewan, the Saskatoon Tribal Council was established to “assist the individual and collective governments of the First Nations in the Saskatoon area” including the Cree, Saulteaux, and Dakota cultures (Saskatoon Tribal Council 2002/2003). To this end, a relationship with the Saskatoon Municipal Police Service was fostered and has been ongoing for years. The Saskatoon Tribal Council (2002/2003) claims that such community-based partnerships progressively decrease the number of First Nations people involved with the criminal justice system. Indeed, many at-risk youth sent from the Tribal Council’s “Youth Circles” diversion program have participated in

programs with police officers. For example, *Project Firewood/Rocks* mobilized First Nations youth and Saskatoon police officers to travel to northern Saskatchewan to collect firewood and rocks to be taken to Band Elders for sweat lodge ceremonies (Cummins and Steckley 2003).

The Six Nations Police Service (SNPS) in Ontario is thought to be a “model for self-administered policing” (Clairmont 2002, p. 52). This police organization is composed of and managed by band members who deliver a service oriented approach to response, enforcement and crime control. Rather than emphasizing proactive crime prevention and community policing (including policing band bylaws) as some First Nations police do, this police service has concentrated on meeting the conventional standards for policing, as well as maintaining freedom from political interference that can lead to community factionalism. During one reserve-based conflict the SNPS was pressured to take sides. They responded professionally and refused to act unless and until an offense took place, and when the infraction occurred, they responded according to the letter of the law (Clairmont 2002, pp. 49-56). So community justice on this reserve comes in the form of highly visible patrols, competent investigations, carefully laid charges, and police neutrality. In Atlantic Canada, there are other interesting First Nations justice initiatives with policing consequences. The Mi’kmaq people in Elsipogtog, New Brunswick have a far-reaching alternative justice program. It engages the RCMP as an “advocate” to obtain referrals at the post-charge levels of the criminal justice system, and with Children and Family Services (CFS) it utilizes restorative justice processes for youth under twelve years of age. Elsipogtog has also developed an offender reintegration program which entails not only “parole release agreements” generated by justice circles (discussions among the inmate, community people, support service personnel, and others) but also treatment programs and healing circles for offenders, victims and families (Clairmont and

McMillan 2006, p. 19). Mi'kmaq conflict/dispute resolution initiatives have also developed in the Atlantic Provinces. In sum, although policing arrangements on First Nations territories have been progressing, they remain diverse and a work in progress. Their unique history, desire for self-determination, and distinct socioeconomic conditions enter into defining policing organizations for First Nations communities. But, policing cannot be considered independent of health care, transportation, social services and crisis intervention (Landau 1996, p. 397). For many First Nations communities effective crime intervention requires the "development of collaborative initiatives involving the community and other criminal-justice and social-service agencies and a focus on the etiology of crime and trouble, rather than merely formatting responses to it" (Griffiths 1994, p. 129). For them reducing the over-representation of First Nations peoples in prisons requires moving beyond restorative justice programs to include social justice programs that entails meaningful employment, positive lived environments, and the support of families, social services, and educational institutions. As Dickson-Gilmore and La Prairie (2006) put it: "we must work with Aboriginal people to develop communities before developing community justice projects" (p. 231).

4.5 The Rise of Private Policing

The rapid growth of private policing in North America and Europe has been well documented (Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police 2000; Gordon 2006; Jones and Newburn 1998 1999; Murphy and Clarke 2005; Opolot 1999; Rigakos 2002; Stenning, Briggs, and Crouch 1996). Twenty-five years ago, Shearing and Stenning (1983) argued that private security in urban environments was "ubiquitous and likely to be encountered by city dwellers at home, at work, when shopping or banking, when using public transit, or when going to a sports stadium, university, or hospital" (p. 493). More recent research

has demonstrated that this trend is true and expanding. According to the Canadian 2001 census there were more people working in private security than there were public police officers. Nationally, there were 10,465 private investigators and 73,535 security guards compared to 62,860 police officers (Taylor-Butts 2001). It took centuries for public policing to establish dominance over paid private security agents and less than two decades for the trend to reverse itself (Forst and Manning 1999, p. 16). Bayley and Shearing (2001) characterize recent policing transformation as follows:

1. In most countries, certainly in the democratic world, private policing outnumber public police;
2. In these same countries, people spend more time in their daily lives in places where visible crime prevention and control are provided by nongovernmental groups rather than by governmental police agencies;
3. The reconstruction of policing is occurring worldwide despite differences in wealth and economic systems (p. 1).

A central explanation for this growth in private security is the connection between private security and shifts in property relations. This “mass private property” thesis underlies Shearing and Stenning’s (1983) argument that the expansion of privately owned facilities, such as shopping centres, residential estates, manufacturing complexes, and university campuses, have resulted in more and more public life taking place on private property. In their words, “the protection of property – which lies at the heart of private security’s function – has increasingly come to include the maintenance of public order” (p. 497). As a result, private corporations now control areas of public life that were once under the control of the state. The immense cost of public policing also contributes to the increased demands for private policing. Canadian policing expenditures in 2005 totalled 9.3 billion dollars, marking the ninth year in a row that spending had increased (Reitano 2006). Although the public is demanding more police and security services, they are less willing to support tax-based expansion of public

policing (Murphy 2000, p. 36). Notably, in 2001 public police officers earned an average of about \$59,000 per year, which was more than one and a half times the average income for private investigators and more than double the average income of security guards (Taylor-Butts 2001). So, when governments try to reduce the cost of policing by increasing the fiscal accountability of police services, private policing is advanced. In Murphy's (2000) words, fiscal constraint means that police officers are less able to satisfy either "broad demands or very specialized demands for security, order and protection services outside of crises" (p.36). Although some roles and duties performed by public police officers have been reduced, fiscal challenges have increased their workload so much so that full-service policing is no longer possible and private policing must fill this void (Griffiths 2008, p. 98).

Despite these explanations for the increase in private policing and security, defining its boundaries is still ongoing. While public police are "the executive arm of the government" in enforcing laws, private security personnel are "engaged by companies or individuals to act on their behalf and in their private interests" (Murray and McKim 2000, p. 6). Private security personnel do not have the legal power (search, arrest and detention) or weaponry to enforce their power as police do, nor are they deployed as broadly in the community or have the same training requirements or credentials (Gordon 2006). The mentality of private policing also differs from public police services. Private policing is more concerned with preventing than punishing crime. That is, private policing does not rely on arrest and punishment as a deterrent, but rather on the regulation of behaviour to diminish the possibility that crime will occur (Johnston and Shearing 2003, p.16).

The private security sector is also defined by its involvement in both the "contract security industry" and the "in-house security" business (Law Commission of Canada

2006, p. 22). On one hand there is a private security industry comprised of companies that sell various security and policing services to clients under contract, and another that provides policing services on behalf of their direct employers. These private security functions are considerable in scope and include such activities as mobile foot patrols, property protection, calls for service, arrest (citizen's arrest powers), criminal investigations, crime prevention consulting, security surveillance, personal protection, public order policing, traffic policing, law enforcement (by-law, Criminal Code of Canada), court and case preparation and armed force services (armoured car security) (Murphy and Clarke 2005, p.224).

Indeed, it is becoming more difficult to define private policing due to a range of "hybrid" policing institutions that signify the narrowing distinction between public and private policing (Law Commission of Canada 2006, p. 26). Hybrid police services, which are done in collaboration with or as substitutes for the public police, include the military police, the Commissionaires, special constables, and 'extra duty' public police. Special constables in Nova Scotia, for example, perform a "variety of restricted policing functions" including the enforcement of municipal bylaws such as "parking, noise, alarms, pesticides, animal control, traffic, smoking, housing standards and so on" (Murphy and Clarke 2005, p. 222). So, although these officers are "private", they exhibit some public accountability and drawing clear lines between private and public policing is simply unconvincing. In Stenning's (2000) judgment, it is "almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in democratic societies" (p. 327).

Despite the large amount of research concerning the growth, explanation, and definition of private policing it is not always supported by either the public police or the

general public. Canadian police chiefs and police associations think that private security should defer to the higher authority and expertise of the public police (Murray and McKim, p. 11). Kinnear (2000, p. 108) claims that the Canadian Police Association has several concerns about the privatization of policing services: lack of accountability, regulation and liability, overlaps in police duties, and similarities in uniforms and equipment which confuse the public about their policing role and powers. He claims that private security poses a “threat to the public police and the public good” (p. 108). However, Gordon (2006) does not see the rise of private policing as a threat to either the state or the public police. He argues that private security guards complement police officers by removing “some of the grunt work for officers” (p. 26). Their interconnecting and overlapping roles are a foundation for cooperation. In Vancouver, private security personnel assist the public police by collecting and sharing information regarding crime or other social problems (Mopas 2005). Indeed, the cooperation between the public and private police is often facilitated by “the migration of retiring police officers to the private security sector”. For example, the private security firm contracted by the RCMP at Pearson International Airport is owned and operated by a former RCMP officer (Rigakos 2002, p. 39).

In general, multi-tiered policing is a decisive trend in Canada. The president of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police acknowledges that the authority, resources, and roles of all police services must be clarified in order to limit overlapping agendas and connect mandate gaps that result in waste, risk, and confusion in regard to safety and security (Ewatski 2007, p. 2). Hughson and Connolly (2000) note that this multi-tiered concept of policing overcomes the public and private divide by including “individual citizens, neighbourhood associations, community, volunteer and/or non-profit associations and other government agencies” (p.99). So in this model, community

members and organizations are seen as active agents in policing and social control, and the provision of security is increasingly being regarded as “everybody’s business” (Johnston and Shearing 2003, p. 16).

4.6 Private Policing and First Nations Policing

While the expansion of private policing in Canada is well documented no systematic information has been collected about private policing and the particular policing needs and priorities of First Nations communities (Stenning 2003). Instead as noted earlier, First Nations policing studies have focused almost exclusively on the various versions of public policing that have evolved under the management and control of government bodies. These studies have consistently revealed the unique challenges of providing policing services to many First Nations communities, including enormous financial costs, rural isolation, and self-governance all of which makes a discussion on private policing in these communities both relevant and timely.

Given the financial costs involved in policing First Nations, private policing may play a major role in these communities. First Nations policing costs are significantly higher than their non-First Nations counterparts due to “location, community size, high general demand for police services, and culturally distinctive police services” (Murphy 2007, p. 13). In 2005-06, the allocated budget for the Aboriginal Policing Directorate totalled approximately \$97,000,000 with the majority of funds distributed to SA policing services (61%) and CTA services (24%) (APD 2007, p 9). The known costs of First Nations policing gives cause for concern. In Saskatchewan where Aboriginal participation in the justice system is growing and costly, Findlay and Weir (2004) project that annual First Nations policing costs will rise from \$153,114,990 in 2004 to \$209,965,660 by the year 2021. This growth is telling when it is considered that the

projected police cost for the entire province for 2021 is \$332,529,517. Such government funding may be unrealistic, making alternatives to current First Nations policing services urgent and necessary. Private policing functions in First Nations communities will likely range from “security guard property functions, to surveillance and patrol and even band bylaw enforcement” because neglected police tasks such as “community patrol, information-gathering, communications, community interaction, surveillance and even some forms of law enforcement” do not require fully trained police officers (Murphy 2007, pp. 32-35).

The complexity of providing policing services to rural areas also highlights the relevance of private policing initiatives. Indeed, Aboriginals are well represented in private policing organizations, but their presence is concentrated in urban areas (Stenning 2003; Taylor-Butts 2001). Unfortunately conventional police services are consistent with an “urban” criminal justice system approach which is generally designed to prosecute, punish, and deter offenders, and which financially rewards city work over rural work (Depew 1992, p. 462). For example, when the Calgary police toured northern Saskatchewan reserves looking to recruit Aboriginals, they offered pay that was 10 percent higher than that provided by the Saskatoon Police Service (as cited in Cummins and Steckley 2003, p.69). This type of service is counter productive for First Nations communities who are dispersed across Canada in approximately 600 bands with an average band size of 800 members. Compared to other small towns and rural areas, First Nations policing has required and acquired more resources but it is still insufficient given its high per capita costs, low population to officer ratio, and modest level of criminal code incidents per officer (Clairmont and Murphy 2000, p. 73). The problems in recruiting and training officers and the costs associated with this for First Nations police officers in geographically remote areas intensifies the call for more private policing

initiatives (Clairmont and Murphy 2000, p. 36).

The desire for self-governance, based on economic sustainability, will no doubt contribute to increased private policing initiatives. The continued expansion of privately owned facilities on First Nations territories has increased the need for cost-effective, ancillary policing. First Nations gambling establishments in Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have become important institutions that have expanded public life onto private property. These operations have come with other private service providers, such as hotels, restaurants, and entertainment venues. Such establishments need multi-tiered, integrated policing and the role of alternative private policing is on the agenda for the future development of First Nations policing models. But this may be controversial. On the one hand, private policing may be more likely than public policing to act according to the principles of restorative justice (Braithwaite 1989). Private police may rely on prevention, and act in a restitutive manner more in keeping with First Nations policing policies. On the other hand, private policing can also profile. It can take premonitory action on the basis of social criteria, such as dress (bare feet) or behaviour (obscene language), that do not have to be justified in legal terms, and unlike the public police, private officers are not hampered by probable cause requirements (Bayley and Shearing 2001, p. 18). In Harding's (1992) words:

Private police are part of the social control system which separates most Aboriginal (and other poor strata) from the dominant, corporate society. Aboriginal youth are already in greater conflict with private police, as seen in some urban shopping malls. This, in part, is because their high unemployment and relative impoverishment makes them less attractive for profitable consumerism. As urbanization and demographics converge, this could prove to be a source of systemic discrimination that is more invisible

than are the public police which are presently being scrutinized by various judicial inquiries. From this perspective, private policing shouldn't be confused with community based policing alternatives" (p. 627).

In fact, the Ontario Human Rights Commission Inquiry (2003) found that private security companies have a practice of racial profiling and recommended that security firms provide ongoing effective training initiatives on racism, race relations and racial profiling.

4.7 First Nations Gambling Security

In 1985, the federal government amended the Criminal Code to allow the provincial governments to be the sole legal providers and regulators of gambling in Canada (Kelley 2001). As such, each province has established its own regulatory environment through which First Nations must receive approval before establishing on-reserve gambling. To date, no national First Nations gambling regulatory body has been created, although some individual First Nations have acquired limited regulatory powers over licensed charitable gaming and electronic gaming machines (Canadian Partnership for Responsible Gambling 2004). But in a move toward self-governance, a First Nations agency, Indigenous Gaming Regulators (IGR), has now taken over responsibility for licensing and regulating bingos, break-open tickets, Texas hold'em poker, and Monte Carlo events, as well as table games at casinos run by the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority (SLGA). However, the SLGA for its part still retains control over security and surveillance in the casinos (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2007).

The policing and security of First Nations gaming sites was triggered by the insistence that First Nations peoples have a constitutionally protected right to conduct reserve gaming. According to the *Indian Act*, the Canadian government accepted First

Nations' rights "to control public games". Citing this law, the Shawanaga First Nation in Ontario challenged the Canadian government by operating high-stakes bingos, and passing local gaming by-laws that disregarded Canadian laws and any consequent provincial law enforcement. The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) investigated this matter, and in 1993 the Chiefs involved were convicted of running an unlawful gaming house. Similarly, the Eagle Lake First Nation in Ontario established their own self-regulated high-stakes bingo operation, which ended in 1990 when the OPP charged the chief and band members with running a bingo operation without a provincial gaming license (Belanger 2006, p. 84). Such incidents seemingly solidified the role of public police jurisdictions over First Nations gaming establishments. However, the Kahnawake Mohawks in Quebec have proved to be an exception. Based on the claim that they are a sovereign nation within Canada, they established a massive internet gaming operation under their own self-regulatory system in 1996, The Kahnawake Gaming Commission (KGC), defined its purpose is as follows:

"to provide a lawful basis for the regulation and control of interactive gaming based in or offered from within the Territory as a means of promoting and preserving economic development, self-sufficiency and peace, order and good government within the Territory (Kahnawake Gaming Commission 2007, p.1)".

To secure this type of interactive gaming operation, the KGC regulations outlined various ways to ensure player protection and safeguard against crime, which if not followed, could result in the suspension or revocation of a gaming license and/or the imposition of fines. For example, to prevent money laundering, authorized client providers are required to file a currency transaction report for all transactions exceeding ten thousand

dollars with the KGC and to protect consumers the authorized client provider has to establish effective systems to ensure players under the full age of eighteen years do not participate in interactive gaming (Kahnawake Gaming Commission 2007). As one of the world's largest hosts of on-line gambling sites, the KGC has issued close to 500 licenses to various Internet gambling websites at a price of \$25,000.00 (USD) each (Heydary 2007). Since internet gaming is in violation of Quebec's provincial gaming provisions, the Kahnawake have been investigated by provincial and federal governments. No legal action; however, has been taken to halt these gambling activities, probably because of tensions resulting from the Oka crisis in 1990 and its aftermath (Belanger 2006, p. 165). More recently, the Alexander Cree band located near Edmonton, Alberta has indicated that they too have Internet gambling plans, and they have been mentored by the Kahnawake Mohawks as to how to accomplish this agenda. However, the Solicitor General of Alberta has stated that he will not allow the Cree band to copy the Mohawks, and since the Cree have stated their intent to defy the Criminal Code of Canada, an investigation of their activities is now underway (Globe and Mail, March 2007).

As with other "mass private properties", First Nations gaming establishments rely on cooperation between public and private policing agencies. For example, the recent opening of a new casino on the Whitecap Dakota First Nation reserve in Saskatchewan has triggered plans to increase policing efforts due to the influx of new visitors. The band is attempting to acquire government funding for three full-time RCMP officers who will be stationed in a new post on the reserve (French 2007). Policing within the gaming establishments themselves also requires a unique form of tiered policing. In Alberta, for example, if illegal activity in a casino is suspected, the dealer contacts the manager of security, who then alerts the security guards, after which an investigator is requested through a special phone number to the Alberta Gaming and Liquor Commission (AGLC).

If they are not available, the local law enforcement agency is contacted (AGLC 2007). Areas of security outside of conventional illegal activity, including the integrity of games, the backgrounds of employees, and the honesty and reliability of gambling supplies and technologies are for the most part regulated by provincial authorities but are fulfilled by private policing contracts. On-line gaming is no exception. Regulation 167 of the Kahnawake Gaming Commission (2007), for example, indicates that the commission must cooperate with and, when appropriate, provide “information concerning actual or potential money-laundering activities of which it becomes aware, to the Kahnawá:ke Peacekeepers and/or such other domestic or international agency or agencies that are appropriate” (p. 28).

The multi-tiered policing deployed at gambling establishments is not only complex, it is legally required. Due to provincial regulations, casino operators on First Nations territories have no choice but to approach security matters from a private policing framework. Regulations 22 and 25 of the Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation Casino Regulations, for example, set out the numerous rules and directives that compose a casino’s security arrangement. First and foremost, every casino must have a security department, as well as a surveillance department. The security department establishes the level of security clearance for all employees. This department must conduct background checks on people who provide non-gaming services to the casino, such as contracted facility maintenance and repair personnel. It also conducts security screenings on all gaming employees who performs cash transactions, who transport chips, tokens, decks, and money to and from the casino and who manages money in the cashiers cages and the count room. Security screenings must also be conducted on those employees who have the power to refuse customers access to the casino or have the authority to remove banned or disorderly persons from the casino. The

responsibilities of the surveillance department on the other hand revolve around monitoring and documenting. This department is required to observe and record, via video, all activities in the gaming area including bets made, chips, cashed, card values played and the outcomes of each game of chance. These personnel must also observe and record the movement of tokens, drop boxes, drop buckets, tip boxes and other gaming equipment such as slot machines. They watch over the entrance, exit and interior of the cashiers' cages (with enough clarity to identify the person making the transaction), the casino, the vault, and the count room (including audio monitoring). The surveillance department must also monitor and record any activity that the corporation suspects to be illegal, including cheating, theft and fraud (Saskatchewan 2002, p.14).

The emerging question is whether the transference of regulatory power will translate into practical policing on reserve territories where many of these gambling products are sold. What will be the mandate of the new police? What will be the division of labor between public and indigenous police? What will be the mix between private and public policing going forward?

In sum, Canadian society is witnessing an expansion and blurring of the borders between public and private policing: a strict dichotomy is no longer appropriate, cost-efficient or effective. Conservative measurements from the *Canadian Labour Force Survey* report 210 public police officers 100,000 Canadians versus 321 private security guards per 100,000 Canadians in 2004 (Statistics Canada, 2006). Other estimates place the current ratio of private to public policing at approximately 2:1 (Rigakos, 2002). Social control is now in the hands of various actors, and has become characterized by interdependence and cooperation. Flexibility is the new benchmark for policing services and functions. This is particularly true for rural First Nations communities where full-service public policing is unaffordable or unattainable. In First Nations gambling

establishments, as with mass private property elsewhere, several types of policing have emerged to secure such distinct environments. However, lingering issues such as the claims for First Nations sovereignty, the expansion of provincial government agendas in gambling, the Federal government involvement in First Nations matters, and the social benefits and social costs associated with permitted gambling suggest that the policing of gambling on reservations will be a complex, complicated and controversial for all parties involved. No doubt, the dynamics of private and public policing will change the economic and social organizations on First Nations reservations and transform the regulatory system of investigation, compliance, and law enforcement.

5.0 Site Selection

The three sites chosen for this project were selected based on feasibility, access, and the variety of alternative policing arrangements provided in each First Nations community. The three sites that expressed interest in participation are within a day's driving distance in North-West Saskatchewan. Each has developed alternative policing organizations. The three sites chosen are: Ahtahkakoop, Onion Lake and North Battleford. Onion Lake has the largest and most developed Peacekeeper service in Saskatchewan that provided an assortment of services including fire, security and other civic services. Ahtahkakoop has a smaller service devoted exclusively to security. North Battleford is home to the Gold Eagle Casino, one of six SIGA-operated casinos in the province with a full compliment of security and surveillance personnel, almost 70% of whom are aboriginal.

5.1 Ahtahkakoop

Ahtahkakoop First Nation, comprising 17,347 hectares is located 72 kilometres northwest of Prince Albert in what was formerly considered the 'heart' of buffalo country. It is situated along the shores of Sandy Lake and surrounded by meadows, hills, and parkland. The Band is a member of the Fort Carlton Agency Council, Treaty #6 Territory. The name of the Ahtahkakoop Cree Nation originated from the first chief, Ahtahkakoop, meaning 'star blanket' in Cree. The official language spoken is Cree. Chief Ahtahkakoop and his cousin, Chief Mistawasis, were two leading chiefs to sign Treaty #6 in 1876 at Fort Carlton. Ahtahkakoop is reported to have been a strong and highly respected strategic leader. He died at the age of 81, on December 4, 1896.

The 2003 registered population of Ahtahkakoop was 2,642 with 1,412 members residing in the First Nation community. The landscape is comprised of lakes and forests and related natural and wildlife resources ideal for tourism opportunities. The Ahtahkakoop territory also encompasses highly fertile land, well suited to farming and ranching. The Ahtahkakoop Cree Nation School, located in Shell Lake, schools students from kindergarten to grade 12. Amenities in the First Nation community include: store, Band office, health clinic, ACFS building, NADAP centre, two churches, community hall, arena, sports grounds, daycare, and adult education centre. The Ahtahkakoop High School, opened September 15, 1994, accommodating grades 6 to 12 and houses a gymnasium, science lab, home economic room, computer lab, main office, library, lobby, and storage rooms. An elementary school is also attached to the high school. Ahtahkakoop Publishing, a division of Ahtahkakoop Cree Nation Education, was established in 2000 following the identification of a void in Aboriginal literature and history in the educational system.

The Ahtahkakoop Peacekeepers are a small service of four employees who are exclusively responsible for security and other associated services in the community. The

local RCMP detachment is operated as a two-year rotational satellite site of the larger Shellbrook detachment. Currently, there are two officers who are assigned and reside in Ahtahkakoop First Nation.

5.2 Onion Lake

Onion Lake First Nation is situated 50 kilometres north of Lloydminster at the junction of Highway #17 and Highway #797. Located along the Saskatchewan-Alberta border, Onion Lake is the only Cree Nation to straddle a provincial border. The community landmass of 21,254.6 hectares is divided in two sections: Makaoo and Seekaskootch. Onion Lake First Nation is an independent band, Treaty #6 Territory. The Cree band joined Treaty #6 on September 9, 1876 at Fort Pitt, Saskatchewan. At the time of signing, the band did not have a chief and band counselor so Makaoo was appointed to sign. Makaoo and his people settled near a lake that came to be known as Onion Lake. Many legends exist in relation to the naming of the lake. One story relates the name to wild onions growing in abundance around the lake. Following the signing of Treaty #6 in 1876, Seekaskootch became chief. He participated in the surveying of Seekaskootch Reserve, which was established in 1889 northwest of Fort Pitt. Seekaskootch was killed in the 1885 rebellion at Steele Narrows while attempting to make peace. He was unarmed at his death. Seekaskootch and Weemisticooseahwis (Makaoo) bands amalgamated on January 16, 1914 and formed Onion Lake Band. Historically, band members made their living at ranching, hunting, trapping, and fishing. Onion Lake is the largest Treaty Land Entitlement Reserve in Saskatchewan and the first reserve created under the *Saskatchewan Claims and Implementation Act: Bill C-37*.

Onion Lake First Nation has a growing membership. Currently, the band has 4,000 members and more than half live in the Onion Lake community. As a step toward

self-sufficiency, Onion Lake First Nation purchased real estate in Lloydminster, and 30 acres of property along the Bi-Provincial Up-grader. With a goal of total self-reliance, a sincere desire to succeed and a strategic network of international business contacts, the band envisions total independence within 10 years. Community and economic development play an important role in the community. Band owned and privately owned businesses provide the community with essential services. The small businesses and growing industries of Onion Lake will eventually provide employment solely to band members. Officers and Directors of Onion Lake First Nation have restructured the executive directives of Onion Lake in an effort to facilitate and motivate the development of strategic business initiatives. Seeking corporate partnerships and alliances, the Onion Lake Executive has actively pursued strategic acquisitions and property development. The Makao Mall, constructed in 1990, houses a number of storefront businesses including grocery store, cafe, laundromat, and gas station. Other community businesses include automobile repair, two taxi services, and Triple O Ranch, a 400-head cattle ranch.

In 2003 residential construction increased 20% over the previous year. Currently there are 514 homes and 25 under construction. Band owned North Sask Cree Construction provides housing and road construction. Onion Lake Gas supplies natural gas.

The Onion Lake Cree Nation Peacekeepers were founded in 1990 and are responsible for fire, ambulatory and security services for the entire community. They are the largest and most comprehensive Peacekeeping agency in the province, operating two fire trucks, two security vehicles and an ambulance service 24 hours a day on a three-shift rotation. Up until 1998, the service was originally a security outfit of three

guards responsible for patrolling band-owned buildings but became formally recognized as “Peacekeepers” in 1998. The Onion Lake Cree Nation Council reports that the current service costs of maintaining 15 full and part-time Peacekeepers is \$230,000 per year. Onion Lake houses a full-fledged RCMP detachment with housing. There are currently eight constables, one corporal and one sergeant assigned to Onion Lake but the detachment services an area that extends far outside the reserve’s boundaries.

5.3 North Battleford (Gold Eagle Casino)

North Battleford is located on the TransCanada Yellowhead Highway and serves as the hub for five major highways: 16, 4, 26, 29, and 40. The City is 240 miles/386 kilometres (kms) from both Edmonton, Alberta and Regina, Saskatchewan. The 85-mile/139 kms drive to Saskatoon takes slightly more than one hour on the newly twinned Yellowhead Inter-Provincial Highway. North Battleford is a 'special place' where fertile farmlands meet the beauty of this province's 100,000 lakes, vast forests and the spectacular panorama of the North Saskatchewan River Valley. Recorded history reveals that the first fur trading post was established in the Town of Battleford in 1785, a telegraph line in 1874, a North West Mounted Police (NWMP) headquarters in 1876, the Capital of the North West Territories in 1877, and the first newspaper west of Winnipeg in 1878. In 1905, North Battleford came into being when the CNR built a railroad on the north side of the North Saskatchewan River. This was the fastest growing centre in the west, incorporated as a Village in 1906, a Town in 1907, and a City in 1913. The population of North Battleford is 13,690. The rationalization of the grain industry has changed traditional business practices on the Prairies. As such, North Battleford's role as a service centre to the northwest has been dramatically expanded and new and diverse opportunities have been created for the future. Industry officials believe North Battleford

will become one of the most important agricultural communities on the Prairies.

Situated on Highway 16 in North Battleford, the Gold Eagle Casino provides a wide array of entertainment options. Operating under the auspices of the Saskatchewan Indian Gaming Authority (SIGA), the casino drew over 468 thousand guests last year. The casino employs over 300 staff, and is spread over 39,000 sq. ft., including a large gaming floor, restaurant and multi-function facility. Gold Eagle operates 295 slot machines and eight live table games, the Kihiw Restaurant (Cree for "Eagle") and the Gold Ridge Centre multifunction facility. At the time of our research, a new Gold Eagle Luxury Hotel was being completed next door to the casino. Unlike the rural communities of Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop, North Battleford has no First Nations Peacekeepers. Instead, the SIGA-operated Gold Eagle Casino maintains an in-house security staff, three-quarters of whom are aboriginal, of about 20 employees.

6.0 Connections between Peacekeepers and Casino Security

At first blush it may appear as if there are minimal connections between Peacekeepers and SIGA-operated casino security personnel in Saskatchewan. Peacekeepers are "on reserve" policing agents while casino guards only deal with matters inside the casino. Peacekeepers are routinely working alongside the RCMP, conducting patrols and responding to calls for service from band members while casino guards safeguard money, keep order inside a segregated space and rarely deal with the RCMP. Casino security is employed by the provincial regulator while Peacekeepers are employed by the local band. Further inspection, however, reveals a much greater degree of practical and theoretical overlap between Peacekeepers and casino guards in at least five important ways.

First, as we have already mentioned, both Peacekeepers and casino guards are

part of the burgeoning corps of alternative policing arrangements in an increasingly pluralized system of security, both in a general globalized sense and specifically to First Nations communities. In this sense, both Peacekeepers and casino security are part of a larger trend toward the diversification of policing provision beyond the traditional public police officer to which we have grown accustomed. Thus, for both First Nations and non-First Nations, their most likely contact with policing agents will take the shape of “tertiary” or specialized policing and security bodies such as Peacekeepers and casino security. In both cases, however, Peacekeepers and casino security are nonetheless dependent on the RCMP as a final policing arbiter with their associated potential use of force and arrest powers. Both Peacekeepers and casino security routinely pass information to the RCMP in order to safeguard the populations they are charged with protecting and both constitute alternative forms of policing in support or even in lieu of the RCMP.

Second, it must not be overlooked that both Peacekeepers and casino security are assertions of First Nations sovereignty. Peacekeepers do so by metaphorically and literally flying the local flag of their nation by maintaining peace and security and enforcing band by-laws while casino security are charged with ensuring the flow of populations and monies to SIGA venues that have become a dominant economic engine of First Nations attempts at self-sufficiency and self-determination and both financed independently of non-First Nations government sources.

The third connection between Peacekeepers and casino security is thus through the indirect transfer of revenues. In the case of SIGA security and surveillance personnel, they are paid directly by the proceeds of gambling collected through the six casinos. Casino profits, however, are split three ways between the province (37.5%), the First Nations trust (37.5%) and the community development corporation (25%). The First Nations trust disburses collected proceeds on the basis of population size for First

Nations programs aimed at economic, recreational, educational and justice initiatives. The band-funded Peacekeepers, therefore, are partly subsidized by casino revenues. In this way, casino security guards through their policing labour are actually helping finance Peacekeeper programs in Saskatchewan First Nations communities.

Fourth, in the context of capacity development, both Peacekeeping and casino security are considered employment opportunities that foster life skills, security training, education and a good salary relative to a lack of opportunities on reserve. Indeed, SIGA casinos employ over 1,600 personnel, of whom 74.5% of security staff is aboriginal. All of the Peacekeepers we interviewed are from the local band and so far are exclusively aboriginal. Respondents at SIGA, and official SIGA reports, extol their role in providing employment opportunities and creating a positive First Nations identity around entrepreneurship in the province. Many RCMP officers believed that some Peacekeepers could potentially become excellent police officers given their experience and training.

Finally, both Peacekeeping and casino security share a risk perspective that privileges restoration and harm reduction over law enforcement. Indeed, most corporate entities such as casinos value loss prevention and the minimization of embarrassment over any need for retribution. We witnessed how casino surveillance implored one patron to return money that was counted incorrectly in his favour. But, in the end, casino security let him go because it would be too embarrassing to attempt to have police lay charges for an incident that was the casino's own making - even though casino surveillance had the entire erroneous transaction on tape. Casino security also monitors players at their request who self-identify as problem gamblers and even ban them when their betting gets out of hand. Indeed, registered gamblers set maximum loss thresholds on their tracking cards and ask the casino management to cut them off when their losses

get too high. Peacekeepers too take on a significant caretaker function in their own communities with the aim of minimizing further harm and preventing band members from coming into contact with the criminal justice system. This continuous diversion has much in common with the type of risk thinking in casino security and can be effectively juxtaposed to a law enforcement approach with formal sanctions.

Thus, casino security and Peacekeeping in Saskatchewan First Nations are closely associated, economically through employment opportunities and revenue shifting for justice initiatives; symbolically as acts of First Nations self-reliance; and conceptually as examples of the broadening of pluralistic policing provision outside the FNPP both on and off reserve.

7.0 Peacekeepers and the RCMP as a Dyadic Relation

Dyadic relations are complimentary, competitive, and antipodal in that while they may be absolutely essential to each party, their opposition in both rhetoric and reality produce relations that end up governing communications between them. Sociologists have observed such relations in everyday interactions between siblings, and management specialists have applied similar theory in business and institutional analyses. Thus, in the case of RCMP-Peacekeeper relations, the subject of this section, we would do well to remember that behind all the rhetoric about opposition and differences in philosophy, focus, and institutional posturing, there is the empirically substantiated truism that interactions are usually productive and complimentary. Indeed, we have observed as much in our ethnographic observations (and interviews) and these incidents are recounted where applicable in this section. At the same time, the theoretical emphasis herein is on difference because of the natural disposition of uniformed members of co-

servicing organizations to regard the other as culturally and occupationally alien. This produces an almost antiphonal rhetorical relation where despite enormous similarities in function, practical cooperation, work content and territorial overlap, difference is emphasized as the primary motif of the dyad.

Even in name, the term "Peacekeeper" has a strong oppositional connotation to white justice in First Nations communities. The term is even used to describe the sometimes schizophrenic existence of First Nations Police Chiefs who are responsible for law enforcement and diversion as well as community restoration and development. The Canadian Police College creates a stark contrast in perception to distinguish each role's mission and mandate: "The peace officer and Peacekeeper roles represent two very different approaches to ensuring community well-being. The peace officer role flows from the western sense of justice as symbolized by balanced scales. Justice from this perspective implies an impartial, and indeed in some representations, a blind weighing of wrongdoing and punishment. It is an eye for an eye balancing act governed by objective and neutral rules. It is personal in the sense that, for each wrongdoer, the scale must be balanced and typically this means diminishing the wrongdoer through punishment." On the other hand, "the Peacekeeper role focuses less on the individual wrongdoer and more on the community" where "its goal is to ensure the health of the community by raising up both the injured and the wrongdoer to the shared common healthy state that existed prior to the wrongdoing." In sum "the Peacekeeper reconciles and restores where the peace officer enforces. *There is a clear expectation that the police officers working for First Nations services remain respectful of both the peace officer and Peacekeeper traditions and this is their dilemma*" (Sunahara 2006: 2). This is undoubtedly true, of course, unless perhaps the Peacekeeper title and identity is hived off from the policing service (in our case represented by members of the RCMP) and

then institutionalized as a separate organization.

Figure 7 summarizes the contrasting qualities of the Peacekeeper-RCMP dyad based on our field research and the beliefs of respondents. These oppositions are isolated in the form of nine dyadic aspects. Each of the nine dyadic aspects represents the exaggerated oppositional rhetoric of the two policing agencies. As in the case of the

Figure 7: Contrasting qualities of the Peacekeeper – RCMP dyad

Peacekeepers	Dyadic Aspect	RCMP
Harm reduction and restoration	Criminal Justice System Focus	Law enforcement
Legitimate local authority	Presentation	Senior expert partner
Attached and popular insider	Community Relations	Detached and unpopular outsider
Amateur	Skills	Professional
Community diversion	Mission Focus	Individual sanction
Low profile: symbolic of FN sovereignty	Uniform	Authoritative: symbolic of Canadian federalism
Security	Training	Paramilitary
Local and communal	Structure	Centralized and hierarchical
Segregated to band members	Membership	Ostensibly open to all Canadians

Canadian Police College's rendition of Peacekeeper versus peace officer, the overall criminal justice focus, our first dyadic aspect, takes the representational form of harm reduction versus law enforcement. "We want to build on restorative justice models and Peacekeepers are part of that" argued one band leader. The RCMP concede: "We can't pull in every youth for breaking curfew, but they do. They drive youth home. They play a big role in pre-empting later problems from starting." Indeed, we witnessed numerous occasions where the Peacekeepers acted as a taxi service for youth, intoxicated band members, and even impaired drivers, taking the drivers and their cars to their homes. These differences are, of course, overstated. Peacekeepers do hold suspects for the RCMP to arrest or track and corner wanted persons in order to help the RCMP issue warrants. Moreover, we also witnessed RCMP officers give rides to youth who turned up at the detachment office and they emphasized their desire to keep band members out of the criminal justice system.

The second aspect of our dyad is presentational style. The Peacekeepers assert themselves as a legitimate local authority while the RCMP is perceptually elevated as the senior expert partner. "People feel safer in the community with Peacekeepers present. A lot of time people would rather call the Peacekeepers as opposed to the RCMP" a band leader noted. A Peacekeeper added: "we talk to them in their own language and we take out a pen and paper, that's all the equipment we should need" presumably in lieu of a gun and badge. For their part of the dyad, the RCMP often views Peacekeepers as junior partners: "We view the Peacekeepers as extra manpower" noted one officer. Echoing a similar senior partner disposition, another officer added: "the Peacekeepers are an extra set of eyes – they don't have the tools or training that they need...I wonder if we could provide that extra training."

As far as community relations, the third dyadic aspect, Peacekeepers profess

themselves to be attached and popular insiders while critiquing the RCMP for being detached and unpopular outsiders. A band leader offered: "Peacekeepers are more aware of the community, know people on a personal level and have role model status. They are more 'hands on' with reference to critiquing lifestyles and morals." A Peacekeeper echoed this assertion: "we are role models and a reflection of the community." Given that "the RCMP have left a very large policing void", according to a Peacekeeper in Onion Lake, this has resulted in closer contacts between Peacekeepers and the community. The RCMP concede that "some people feel more comfortable calling the Peacekeepers" even though "a lot of this work they're doing they shouldn't be doing". On the contrary, one RCMP constable believed that RCMP-community relations are better as it is the Peacekeepers that are dealing with giving rides to community members. Another Peacekeeper noted: "people can relate to the Peacekeepers better because we are members of the same band."

Our fourth dyadic aspect is skills and the RCMP is seen as well-trained professionals while the Peacekeepers are relegated to amateur status. The Peacekeepers concede as much in their division of labour: "anything that has to do with arrests, we call the RCMP" but added that, in his opinion, "the RCMP are professional but not as effective as us because of poor response times." For their part, all RCMP officers were of the opinion that Peacekeepers were inadequately trained and equipped and were heavily reliant on the RCMP to resolve calls for service.

The fifth dyadic aspect is mission focus, which is community diversion for Peacekeepers and individual sanction for the RCMP. "We're always putting our people in jail. If they're selling drugs, then banish them from the reserve but don't jail them and then tell them to come back" complained one band leader. "Our Peacekeepers are looking to be more preventative" added a Peacekeeper from Ahtahkakoop. A band

leader in Onion Lake wanted to make clear that the mandate of Peacekeeping was in keeping with broader First Nations practices: "Peacekeepers are just doing what's part of our aboriginal seven natural laws. We want to work with restorative justice and traditional law." An RCMP officer conceded "they divert people from us, from encounters with the RCMP. That's a good thing." As a critique of RCMP deployment practices, one band leader complained: "they're [the RCMP] working with the computers all the time, with paper. They're taking time away from the people. It's a waste of money." By way of providing an example of the mission autonomy of the Peacekeepers, one respondent offered: "teachers approach us all the time about missing children running away from school. We track them down and bring them back. We contact the RCMP only as a courtesy." On the other hand an RCMP officer reminded us that "the Peacekeepers don't arrest. They don't do that. They only did that once I think. They just detain so they need us all the time." Even at the casino, the RCMP was not called because of their propensity to resort to formal sanctions. "We'll call them when it concerns them. Stuff outside the casino. We handle most of our own staff issues internally" noted one casino security official.

The sixth dyadic aspect, uniforms, is a highly symbolic but meaningful one in the world of law enforcement and particularly for First Nations communities. The uniform of the Peacekeeper is low profile but representative of First Nations sovereignty while the scarlet tunic of the RCMP is clearly identified as an authoritative uniform of Canadian federalism. "When you are wearing a uniform versus no uniform, the band members prefer the Peacekeepers. I think the offender relates better" said one band leader.

The seventh dyadic aspect concerns training. For the Peacekeepers, training revolves around general security provision while for the RCMP; Depot training in Regina is still highly paramilitary. The eighth dyadic aspect is structure. The RCMP is a

centralized and hierarchical organization while the Peacekeepers are local and communal. This often means that command and impartiality are institutionally valued, including the policy to transfer officers lest they become too ensconced in a community. “Two years is too long. You become less effective and you should be transferred out” noted one RCMP officer.

Finally, the ninth dyadic aspect concerns membership. Peacekeeping positions are only open to band members while the RCMP is ostensibly open to all. On the positive end, Peacekeepers argue “Our success is that we are our community.” We asked what would happen if Peacekeepers also included outsiders who were white. “A white Peacekeeper would get piled on as an outsider” replied one Peacekeeper. “I think a white Peacekeeper would get more respect” answered another. Both responses are indicative of the racially segregated nature of band security. One final note about membership: There were no female Peacekeepers in either of the two communities we studied.

As we already noted, it is tempting to overlay these rhetorical differences but we would do well to remember that the vast majority of Peacekeeper-RCMP interactions are friendly, complimentary and suffused with tremendous cooperation. In fact, our supposed dyad of difference actually works in favour of Peacekeepers employing diversion methods when they warn suspects: “you can deal with me or you can deal with the RCMP” or who tell them “if the situation doesn’t improve we may need to call in the RCMP.” Thus, the presumably paramilitary and alien involvement of the RCMP is actually introduced as a potentiality by the Peacekeepers to coerce compliance. Even when the RCMP is not there in body, it seems they may be invoked in spirit. For their part, the RCMP officers do get involved in community development and participate actively as role models. One was a broom-ball coach, the other a hockey coach and

another volunteered in the community. In the end, RCMP officers were quite pleased to see the presence of the Peacekeepers: “When they see us racing to a call at three in the morning, sometimes when we come out of the house we can see them sitting there. It feels good to know they can help”.

7.1 The Suicide Intervention Exemplar

The dyadic relationship between RCMP and Peacekeepers in some Saskatchewan First Nations communities is best understood by way of empirically-based example. On our initial visit to collect data on RCMP and Peacekeeper relations and cooperation we were told a story about a suicide intervention that witnessed considerable friction between responding Peacekeepers and RCMP. In fact, the narrative about this suicide intervention had become so generalized, so diffuse throughout the two agencies that the effects relayed seem to have made their way into the general cultural understandings of self-identification for both organizations in the dyad. So much so, that reference to the actual specifics of the incident had become lost in a general re-affirmation of the problems each organization viewed as endemic to the other.

As far as we can piece together from interviews and conversational references, a suicidal band member was under the influence of alcohol and off of his anti-depressant medication one frosty early Saskatchewan morning. He had threatened himself and others earlier that night and was holding a large knife to his own throat when two Peacekeepers, as is common in that community, were the first to arrive on the scene. The Peacekeepers immediately tried to calm the subject down as he was known to them. They spoke to him in Cree. They tried to remind him of where he was, who they were and what they were trying to accomplish. The man occasionally waved the knife at the unarmed Peacekeepers but they remained with him and continued to extol him to put

the weapon down. They felt that they were making progress when two RCMP officers arrived. Responding to an armed suspect who was off of his prescribed medications, armed with a knife and who had threatened himself and others, the constables entered with their guns drawn. The subject, upon seeing the officers immediately became enraged, he felt the Peacekeepers had betrayed him and once again swung his knife at the Peacekeepers and now the police. The Peacekeepers tried to de-escalate the situation by telling the police to “relax” and back down. The police were alarmed to have both an unstable armed subject and two uniformed Peacekeepers demanding they put away their guns, which, much to the chagrin of the Peacekeepers, the responding RCMP officers were clearly not about to do. Luckily, the chaos of those few moments passed and the incident was eventually defused when the subject was convinced that no one at the scene was going to harm him. However, both the Peacekeepers and the RCMP, normally on excellent working relations, left the scene with bitter lessons and reaffirmations about the limitations of each others’ organizational approaches. Curiously, for both the Peacekeepers and RCMP, responding to the suicide was an issue of risk reduction according to generally accepted practices – the aggregate effect of which ironically was to create even more risk, uncertainty and danger.

The Peacekeepers felt the RCMP jeopardized their safety and rather than assist in calming down the subject only added fuel to the fire with their actions. For the Peacekeepers, the RCMP officers were too confrontational, too willing to use violence and show force and were inconsiderate of the progress that the Peacekeepers had made with the despondent man up to that point. They felt the RCMP officers undid their hard work which was based on their community knowledge of the subject and their ability to relate to him as fellow band members. The incident reaffirmed their belief that the Mounties were too “gung-ho”, too prone to follow protocol rather than use their discretion

and were unsympathetic to local custom.

For their part, the RCMP officers were disappointed at the lack of professionalism displayed by the Peacekeepers and the fact that they placed themselves between the police and subject. Rather than assist in disarming him, the Peacekeepers seemed to further complicate the situation by apparently siding with the subject. The Peacekeepers placed themselves, the subject, and the Mounties in further jeopardy because of their lack of training in dealing with armed suspects and by trying to reason with a mentally ill subject off of his medications. The Peacekeepers seemed to amateurishly complicate an already complicated intervention.

Here, the Peacekeepers' fundamental role was to act as first responders and as a liaison to the RCMP while the RCMP's fundamental role was to disarm the subject and put him into care as soon as possible. All responding parties acted in the spirit of their mandate and mission. All parties wanted a peaceful and safe resolution. All parties based their response on the central goal of risk reduction and the minimization of harm. On the one hand, the Peacekeepers implemented risk reduction on the basis of core cultural values associated with restoration and harm reduction. On the other hand, the RCMP based their response on risk reduction gleaned from empirically-based intervention protocols.

Of course, both agencies must invoke discretionary practice in such situations but this is always coloured and conditioned by accepted institutional practices. These risk calculations are vetted through two very different social and institutional lenses that can produce significantly divergent outcomes, not only at odds with one another but when used in tandem ironically producing even more risk and heightened danger.

8.0 Plural Policing in Three Saskatchewan First Nations Communities

8.1 Policing Re-conceptualized

In our literature review, and again in section 7, we discussed the growing significance of alternative forms of policing provision – both public and private – in Canadian society. We have also seen that these general trends are not always entirely applicable to First Nations communities given their historic subjugation; their desire for self-reliance; and the long-standing issue of sovereignty. Nonetheless, plural policing forms such as tribal constables, self-administered police services, and even contract policing provision by provincial or federal police have long been part of the aboriginal policing experience. Today, these public police options have been largely replaced by the FNPP which, in the case of Saskatchewan, allows for the creation of self-administered policing (of which there is only one example in the province) or contracted policing with the RCMP. With the emergence of Peacekeepers and casino security, however, plural policing in First Nations communities has taken on a new character.

It is important here to remember that “policing” as an activity should not be confused with “police” as a legal designation. The former is wide-ranging and inclusive of a number of agencies and personnel while the latter refers to peace officers within the definition of the criminal code. Academic awareness that the vast majority of contemporary security provision is done by private and quasi-public bodies has prompted a re-definitions of policing (see Rigakos 2002), adopted by the Law Commission of Canada in its exhaustive international review and far-reaching consultations with the Canadian public, police and security executives:

“Any individual or organization acting legally on behalf of public or private organizations or person(s) to maintain security and/or social order while empowered by

either public or private contract, regulations or policies, whether written or verbal.”

8.2 A Composite Tour

As a way of demonstrating these pluralistic policing practices at play in First Nations communities, we ask the reader indulge us in a composite tour of a First Nations community. Of course, this tour never actually took place in the precise chronological manner in which we describe it but it is based on interview and ethnographic data fragments from the three sites under investigation in a narrative format wedded together to make our case. It is important, however, that the reader understand that this illustrative tour is not an exceptional description outside the norm but rather is simply exceptionally illustrative of the actually existing, mundane, and everyday security arrangements already operating in the communities we researched.

We begin our tour at a SIGA-operated casino where a Peacekeeper from a nearby First Nations community is scheduled to pick us up. As we wait, we are immersed within the buzz and beeping of slot machines and the clatter of dropping coins. We wince at the sting of tobacco smoke stirred up by overhead fans. We sit uneasily under the soft, panoptic, electronic whirl of dozens of CCTV cameras and we wave in return to a cheerful nod by a patrolling First Nations security officer – one of about a half-dozen on the casino floor this evening. Our image is being piped into a surveillance office where a line of monitors display our visage along with a plethora of casino staff and patrons, one of whom is an approaching Peacekeeper as he pulls his decade-old truck into the casino parking lot. The surveillance officer zooms in on the uniformed Peacekeeper, watching him make his way past the security guard manning the entranceway and over to where we are seated. The surveillance staff is particularly cautious right now as two armed Brinks guards make their way across the casino and

directly to three cashiers awaiting their arrival inside a caged area with money satchels. Their progress is monitored every step of the way as we hustle out of the casino and into the chilly night air. As the night's bounty is transferred for transport to the Brinks guards we would do well to remember that this scene is only a microcosm of the tremendous economic engine and aspiring self reliance that SIGA-run casinos signify for many First Nations people in Saskatchewan.

After a few minutes of driving along the provincial route we enter the nearby Cree Nation community to begin our ride-along. Our Peacekeeper guide turns onto an unpaved road and our tires churn up dust and pepper the wheel wells of our pick-up truck with ricocheting gravel. All seems clear when down the road we receive a garbled call on the radio from dispatch. The Peacekeeper leans forward to turn down a Shania Twain song being broadcast by the local community radio station. We pass a privately-run convenience store and the Peacekeeper slows to train the vehicle's spotlight on the front window. The night watchman has called complaining about a half-dozen or so mischievous youth throwing rocks and making threats. The apparently intoxicated youth have left some time ago, also passing the band-owned local market where they were spotted by the store's after-hours security guard. The store is an essential life-blood of the community and is routinely patrolled by the Peacekeepers.

We turn into a community centre lot where the uniformed Peacekeeper assigned to school security nods and waves to us as we approach. His evening has been surprisingly uneventful and he has not seen the youth we are looking for. In the adjacent lot, band members are congregating outside the community centre as it is bingo night and the doors are about to open. Like the SIGA-run casino we left moments ago, this gathering constitutes a significant community economic activity and (as in many church basements across the country) is also a central social forum for community interaction.

Three band-appointed security guards oversee the energized crowd as patrons collect their bingo cards and make their way into the hall to take their seats. A few nights earlier two Peacekeepers and two bingo security guards had to restrain and hold a violent and belligerent band member for the RCMP. Tonight there is no sign of trouble. Finally, dispatch notifies us that the youths in question have been spotted by another band member play-fighting behind the arena and community centre and that the local site security guard has also called the RCMP. We turn on the vehicle's emergency light bars and our tires spit up gravel as we circle to the rear of the building. The Peacekeeper turns to me and informs me that the RCMP are short-staffed tonight and that they have called in a community band Commissionaire to staff the detachment until they return at shift's end. This is a common practice to make up for staff shortages and demands for service.

As we speed into the rear parking lot our spotlight catches five teenagers who all turn toward the vehicle. They have either decided not to flee or are frozen in surprise. We are joined by two more Peacekeepers as they pull in behind us. The youth are quickly reprimanded for drinking; their shared bottle is confiscated and emptied onto the gravel lot; and they are questioned about their recent whereabouts and destination. The Peacekeeper tells them that they must get home soon or risk missing curfew. They are not arrested or detained but after a short discussion the youth are loaded into the vehicles and driven home immediately. Just then, a mud-caked RCMP truck slowly rumbles around the corner toward the rear of the building with its piercing blue and red emergency lights spinning. The two attending constables are just in time to witness the remaining youth clambering aboard the trucks and squeeze for sitting space. Our Peacekeeper guide exits the truck after pausing to admonish the youth to "stop talking stupid" and "show respect" before he meets with the RCMP. Only a few seconds later

the friendly Mounties turn off their vehicle emergency light bar and wave to us as they exit the lot on their way to their next call. We once again pull onto the dark dirt road, this time toward the youths' homes.

In this rather uneventful ride-along, we have navigated past a series of policing bodies, passive or active, static or mobile. What is so important about these security agencies and the relative role of the RCMP in this plural arrangement? We can make three important observations. First, we may observe that arguably the most important economic engine of First Nations' self-reliance in Saskatchewan, the series of SIGA-run casinos that crisscross the province, are secured by hundreds of First Nations security and surveillance officers with very little involvement of the local police or RCMP. Second, other crucial economic and social institutions in First Nations communities such as schools, convenience stores, arenas, community centres, bingo halls, and even RCMP detachments themselves are patrolled and safeguarded by private or band security personnel such as Peacekeepers. Finally, our tour has illustrated one last attribute considered commonplace in the security of First Nations communities that we examined: the often fleeting and temporary appearance of the RCMP compared to the permanent and familiar presence of a wide range of public and private policing personnel including especially Peacekeepers and casino security. Indeed, if we were to total the number of policing and security agents to which we were exposed on this hypothetical ride-along, we would have to count 10 casino security personnel, 10 casino surveillance personnel, two contracted Brinks guards, one private convenience store watchman, one band store security guard, three Bingo security guards, one static school Peacekeeper, five patrolling Peacekeepers (including the dispatcher), one arena guard, one First Nations Commissionaire guarding the RCMP detachment and finally, two RCMP constables. We arrive at the surprising calculation that only two of 35, or less

than 6 per cent, of the available on-duty community security personnel at the time of our ride-along could be counted as part of the FNPP program.

9.0 Preparation for Duty

It is a well-worn cliché among police researchers that “more training is necessary.”

Indeed, police practitioners and security personnel have made similar arguments about the dearth of qualifications for private security personnel and this call has become louder as alternative forms of policing provision have become more prevalent in the last three decades. But as public policing has become more complicated; as skill acquisition, minimum educational requirements and physical and psychological testing have become more stringent, it is nonetheless less trained private and quasi-public forms of policing that most Canadians are likely to come into contact with. It is therefore important for analysts to keep in mind that while more training is ostensibly always better, it may not always be necessary or cost efficient.

9.1 Training

There are no set training standards for Peacekeepers in the communities we analyzed. While it is common for Peacekeepers to have received minimum provincial security guard training, First Aid and CPR training, some Peacekeepers also have fire rescue, fire prevention, using the “jaws of life”, paramedic, handcuff and use of force training depending on the individual’s length of service and job assignment. Indeed, since Peacekeepers are not considered contract security personnel under existing provincial regulations, even their minimum security guard training is technically not required. There are no existing statutory or regulatory requirements for the recruitment or training of Peacekeepers and the name appears nowhere as an official title except in band

contracts and regulations.

Casino security is considered “in-house” security and its personnel are not required to take provincial security guard training. Nonetheless, casino security guards receive in-house training with SIGA. This classroom training is dependent on their assigned duties. Casino surveillance personnel are given a course on surveillance including techniques of surveillance, the use of equipment, report writing skills, observational skills, etc. while floor security typically are trained “on the job.” Some casino security personnel have received handcuff training and this is currently being explored as a required course for all staff. Some casino security personnel benefit from previous security training such as Commissionaires training or even police training as they are former RCMP officers.

9.2 Equipment

Neither casino security nor Peacekeepers are armed. One Peacekeeper carried handcuffs as he had the required training and we were shown handcuffs at the Gold Eagle Casino but it appears that the use of handcuffs by both organizations is very rare as arrests are discouraged and most staff is not trained in the use of handcuffs or use of force. Casino security personnel are uniformed in low profile concierge-style blue blazers and white collared shirts. Peacekeepers wear baseball caps embroidered with “Peacekeeper” and/or nylon jackets with arm flashes bearing the First Nation’s logo with the word Peacekeeper embroidered on them. Their jackets also have the word “Peacekeeper” across the back.

Peacekeepers are equipped with motorized vehicles, including 4-wheel drive Ford F150 trucks, two fire trucks and ambulance support. The state of these vehicles

depends on the community. In Ahtahkakoop the patrol vehicle, a former RCMP member's personal vehicle, was out of service because of a faulty fuel line, while in Onion Lake one of the vehicle's horns did not function. In cases where vehicles were out of commission, Peacekeepers used their own personal vehicles and were expected to pay gas and maintenance costs from their salary.

Onion Lake had a dispatch centre that fielded calls for service from band members. In addition, in both Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop, Peacekeepers had cell phones – in the former case as an addition to the dispatch system and in the latter in lieu of one. Both Peacekeeper organizations also monitored RCMP frequencies with scanners. In Onion Lake, Peacekeepers also monitored Medcom.

9.3 Pay

The pay for Peacekeepers ranged from \$8.00 - \$10.00 per hour. Supervisors were paid more, two of whom were salaried employees. Casino security personnel are paid about \$12.00 per hour, less than surveillance personnel who are paid between \$14.00 to \$17.73 per hour. The entire cost of the Peacekeeping program was reportedly \$230,000 in Onion Lake in 2006.

10.0 Duties

The duties of Peacekeepers in the Onion Lake Cree Nation are expansive. The Onion Lake Peacekeeper service, moreover, does more than provide security patrols. It houses a self-financed fire station and a subsidized ambulance service. The community reportedly spends close to a quarter of a million dollars annually on security, fire, and ambulance services. In Ahtahkakoop, Peacekeepers are mandated to provide security but in both jurisdictions they provide general maintenance, educational, and wide range

of civic duties. We either observed or were informed that Peacekeepers have engaged in the following activities in their respective communities:

- Provide dispatch services and fielding cell phone calls for service;
- Monitor RCMP frequencies;
- First Aid and ambulance services;
- Taxi home band members and youth who are inebriated, lost, out past curfew, reported missing, ill, in need of medical attention, or who have been in an accident;
- Deliver medical prescriptions to elders;
- Conduct fire inspections at schools and band buildings;
- Secure band building by checking locks and windows and conducting internal patrols;
- Put out brush fires with portable water packs;
- Provide translator services for the RCMP;
- Conduct evictions and enforcing overcrowding bylaws;
- Enforce alcohol bans on reserve including setting up roadside inspections and confiscating alcohol;
- Conduct crowd control when band cheques are issued;
- Locate missing or truant children and return them to school;
- Conduct school visits and provide safety demonstrations and emergency contact numbers;
- Shut down wild parties;
- Euthanize stray dogs and collect dead animals;
- Respond to calls for service involving attempted suicides, domestic violence, threats and an assortment of alcohol-related violent crime;

- Remove panhandlers from band property.

This list is not exhaustive but illustrative of the assortment of responsibilities that Peacekeepers are tasked with in the communities we studied. As one Peacekeeper noted: “The Chief has given us a mandate but our mandate is blurry and getting blurrier.” Indeed, “mission creep” has created a situation where, according to a band leader in Onion Lake, Peacekeepers “are doing far more than they’re supposed to be doing.” Indeed, as Peacekeepers continue to monitor RCMP frequencies, they are not only attending to their own calls for service dispatched by their own office or made directly to their cell phone, but are most often on site before the Mounties have a chance to respond to calls for service issued from RCMP dispatch in Regina. In this way, they are likely to respond to more calls for service per night than the RCMP.

Casino security and surveillance personnel at the Gold Eagle Casino in North Battleford have a narrower mandate and far less frequently make contact with the local RCMP. Their duties are relegated to the patrol and surveillance of the casino, the monitoring and removal of problem patrons and the ongoing inspection of staff who routinely come into contact with cash, casino chips and credit. Indeed, the majority of surveillance is aimed internally at the casino’s own employees rather than the less frequent possibility of dealing with drunk or irate patrons. In this sense, casino security is far more traditionally “private security” in terms of its mission, mandate and lack of territorial overlap with public spaces patrolled by the police.

The best method of illustrating Casino security, Peacekeeper and RCMP patrol activity is to offer a description of the “ride-alongs” we conducted with each of these three organizations. The next three sections, therefore, offer short “snap-shots” of our field observations while on patrol with Peacekeepers, the RCMP and casino security. We have used pseudonyms and refrain from using physical descriptors to safeguard to

privacy of our respondents and community members who come into contact with them.

10.1 On Patrol with Peacekeepers

It's 12 degrees this cool October evening. **Darryl** is a long standing member of the community, familiar with the location of most residents. Like other Peacekeepers, he has been given basic security training in **Lloydminster**. His call sign tonight is Sierra 4.

Comment [T1]: Name changed

Comment [T2]: This is ok as all peacekeepers (past & present) receive their training in Lloydminster. Can't

7:18pm: We start our patrol and are advised there are no calls received that need to be investigated to alleviate a backlog. We check windows and doors on band property. Darryl says that this is the number one priority for preventative peacekeeping patrols in Onion Lake. We pass by one private business, a convenience store that has its own private security at night, and look in as an ongoing courtesy provided by the Peacekeepers. Darryl explains that calls are recovered from two different lines. First, the after-hours maintenance line that community members call is answered by the Peacekeepers and second, the main Peacekeeper line that connects directly to dispatch. The fire Chief will often work dispatch on his own time to fill the gap between the time that the security head leaves for the day, at 5:00pm, to 10:00pm when the designated dispatcher begins his shift.

7:45pm: Darryl is checking doors at the band office. As we walk around the building, he explains how the EMS station was acquired by the reserve. Essentially, the band was told that if they built the structure, then the government would staff it: "It was too much for our people when an ambulance has to come from Lloyd...People were sick and needed help right away. People shouldn't die because they were waiting 40 minutes for an ambulance to come, it's kind of like the Peacekeepers... Who wants to wait 40 minutes for the RCMP

either?”

- 7:49pm: The sun has set in Onion Lake, and five youths can be seen using a swing-set at the Chief Taylor School. The Peacekeeper on duty tells them that they should make their way home because it is late and they may miss curfew. The youth are compliant and move away from the band building. Darryl adds: “You want to keep people away from band buildings especially at night because we want people to know that we are keeping buildings safe for the community.”
- 8:12pm: We approach a gentleman who is a known drug dealer who has provided very helpful information about crime in the area to Peacekeepers. The man is known to get particularly violent when he is intoxicated. “Hop in and I’ll give you a ride home,” says Darryl: “But I just got here,” the man answers: “You can come back tomorrow,” smiles Darryl: The man jumps into the truck wedging himself between us and is given a ride back to his residence. “I think I just saved us from having trouble with this guy later,” notes Darryl.
- 8:35pm: We receive a call from the maintenance line. A community member is requesting a ride for a child at his residence. Darryl adds: “Rides are very common, they happen maybe 3-4 times a week and it’s the officer’s discretion whether or not to drive the person home...Sometimes we are just too busy and other times we do it to prevent that kid from causing any problems later on in the night.” Darryl tells the caller that he will be there when he finishes his first round of patrols. When asked if he knows whether the RCMP provides these escorts as well, Darryl strangely responds, “we have been decreasing our response to some alcohol related crimes to keep the RCMP busy.” He complains that the RCMP, according to the CTA

agreement, has to be on reserve 80% of the time but never is.

8:50pm: Darryl drives us to a location by the community gas. Our vehicle is hidden from view, but in a manner where we can still observe the pumps. He explains that Peacekeepers will conduct surveillance to catch people stealing gas.

9:07pm: We again patrol by the East Central Store, which has its own private security. This security officer monitors the Peacekeeper frequency and starts after the store closes for the night.

9:19pm: There are shoes seen hanging over one of the power lines. When asked for their significance, Darryl indicates that the shoes are usually a sign of kids just playing around. We patrol the Health and Wellness Center and check on the vehicles parked outside the building. The patrol then takes us by a local radio station running radio bingo, a form of bingo that takes place over the airwaves. Tickets can be purchased days in advance. People are then able to play bingo from the comfort of their own home.

9:29pm: A call comes in over the main Peacekeeper cell phone line informing us of a "hit and run" that has just occurred. Darryl places a call to Code 9 (RCMP), and turns on the "cherry lights" on the Peacekeeper vehicle while providing the location to the RCMP. We are pushing the vehicle to its limits as we dangerously speed around corners in an attempt to be the first responder.

9:35pm: As we approach the scene of the accident, I noticed a pair of shoes on the road just outside a vehicle bearing a large scrape on its left side. Four people are standing outside the vehicle, one woman is particularly upset. As Darryl approaches to investigate, he spots a smaller vehicle that was evidently attempting to pass the first vehicle at the side of the road. The driver failed to

yield after the collision and no description of the vehicle was obtained because it was too dark for the passengers of the first vehicle to get a real description for Peacekeepers. During his initial assessment of the scene, Darryl finds that there are no serious injuries, and only two subjects of the first vehicle were "shaken up". A call comes over the radio from Peacekeeper dispatch inquiring whether EMS is required for this call. Darryl responds "10-10" which is a negative.

9:42pm: The RCMP arrive on the scene after making the short five minute drive from their detachment and begin interviewing the parties involved. This time it took approximately 13 minutes for the RCMP to respond. Darryl is thanked by the RCMP for responding and climbs back into the Peacekeeper vehicle to join me. As he begins to drive away, he tries to honk the horn (which is not functioning), looks over me and says: "Sideswiped by drunks. It looks like nobody is hurt but too bad those guys couldn't give a better description of the car that did this so we could find them and make sure they stay off the road."

9:50pm: Darryl resumes normal patrol when he receives a call from the junkyard/pool hall operator near the band office who has information but doesn't want to provide it over the radio.

10:06pm: Almost an hour and a half after receiving the initial request from the parent who needed the escort for a child at his house, the boy is picked up and taken home: "This is a low priority call, parents asking us to drive their kids from A to B...We're not a Taxi service, but if someone is cold or if its dark, some parents don't have a way to drive their kids around, that's where we come in to fill the gap."

10:22pm: A call comes through on the maintenance line from an elder who was

reporting that doors were open at her residence and that she couldn't turn the heat down in her unit. Darryl explains, "Even though the doors on this building aren't supposed to be locked until 11:00pm, when an elder calls, we have to respond... All calls from elders are responded to."

10:29pm: We arrive on scene to deal with the elder's heating problems. The residence looks to be a retirement home. The maintenance worker who is normally in the building has left his post. "He just got his money today, he's probably out spending it...Its payday and he's gone and they're not doing their job" Darryl decides: "We will make a note that this maintenance worker wasn't there and we always like to report times where we have to deal with calls that take our time away from patrols."

10:41pm: One full patrol has just been completed and Tango meets up with the static guard at the section one Chief Taylor School and begins to conduct routine window and door checks. Darryl tells me an interesting story about a group of stranded hunters who required help from the Peacekeepers in order to be rescued. After a day of hunting without proper supplies or knowledge of the area, a group of three men went hunting deep in the north of the reserve. A call was received from family after the first day reporting the men missing. The Onion Lake Peacekeepers got a couple of vehicles together (including some personal vehicles) and began the search for the men. After a few hours, the men were found and given the much needed supplies and directional support. "Without us in these types of emergency RCMP would be looking for these people for days."

11:06pm: We continue our patrol in an area called "Sesame Street". We smell smoke in the vicinity. Since there is a fire ban in Onion Lake ever since the drought,

fires on the reserve are taken very seriously by the Peacekeepers. Darryl starts to search for the source of the fire.

11:13pm: A call comes in over the radio from dispatch reporting a youth in a red “bunny hug” and jeans that didn’t come home from school. “When kids don’t come home, maybe they’re with a friend, but its always good for them to tell us if they miss their kid because we pick up so many and drive them around that there’s a good chance we’ll find them,” remarks Darryl.

11:16pm: The source of the previously detected smoke has now been discovered. Eight to twelve youths are sitting and relaxing by a small, controlled bonfire in their backyard. Darryl says, “Hey kids, keep that fire low and make sure that you put it out when you’re done.” He then turns to me and adds: “You see it’s a tough choice, because they’re not supposed to have a fire going, but they only have a small fire and they’re not drinking...I’ll come back and check on them later but everything seems peaceful right now.” Despite the fire ban, it would appear that the officer still has discretion.

11:24pm: A call comes in from dispatch concerning an apparently abandoned vehicle that may or may not have an occupant passed out inside. Darryl turns on the emergency lights.

11:29pm: We arrive at the call to find a woman passed out in the driver’s seat. Code 9 (RCMP) have been called and Darryl has not attempted to wake the driver. When asked why he doesn’t try to wake her up, Darryl responds, “she’s a female and I’m by myself, the RCMP will take care of it. She’s slumped over and the keys are in between her legs.” EMS has not been called in this situation either. Dispatch calls Darryl to update him on the RCMP response. The RCMP is transporting a prisoner to Lloyd and they will be another 20

minutes. "They've got 4 trucks and it's the busiest day of the month, why can't they put more people in their trucks? Where are their vehicles?" asks Darryl. While we wait, I ask Darryl whether it would be helpful if they knew who they were dealing with or at least the risk they pose before the response. Darryl answers, "Knowing people by face and name is the most effective way to defuse problems. People don't want us to ask for I.D. or treat them like criminals or people under investigation. That's what the police are for."

12:04am: Another Peacekeeper vehicle (Sierra 3) is sent to respond to grass fire in the same area as the bonfire detected earlier by Darryl. This new fire was only the same small controlled campfire we identified earlier.

12:11am: With their emergency lights flashing, the RCMP responds to the accident being tended to by Darryl and attempts to wake the driver. The woman wakes up abruptly and begins resisting as she is pulled out of her car. The RCMP finally gets her out of the vehicle and instructs Darryl to call a tow truck to remove the vehicle. The RCMP conducts a brief vehicle search and then return to their idling police car.

2:15am: I have transferred to Sierra 3 as Darryl has ended his shift. An MVA (Motor Vehicle Accident) is reported over the radio, Sierra 3's face loses a slight bit of colour, he looks over at me and says, "I've got to put on my turtle gear" (this is the full firefighter uniform). The MVA was picked up on the RCMP scanner by dispatch and the Peacekeepers are already getting ready to attend as they eagerly await a call to respond from one of the residents driving by. When the phone rings it is not a band member, but rather the RCMP requesting Peacekeeper assistance. They want them to send a vehicle because a vehicle has rolled over into the ditch. Sierra 3 suits up and

calls the fire chief at home to let him know that there was an MVA and starts toward the scene. We turn on our emergency lights and sirens and set off to the location of the MVA.

2:36am: When we arrive on scene, the RCMP is present, and two subjects are walking on the roadside near the flipped truck. A badly damaged 4x4 truck is visible in the ditch, but the occupants seem to be unscathed as they speak with RCMP and Peacekeepers. The RCMP has asked for Peacekeeper assistance because the RCMP has two subjects detained on another matter in the back of their police vehicle and would prefer that the Peacekeepers deal with the incident. The head of security arrives on scene. Another subject who is very intoxicated is urinating on the side of the road, while another younger subject is speaking to a Peacekeeper and one of the attending RCMP officers.

2:48am: It is decided that no charges should be laid, and the RCMP request that the Peacekeepers remain at the scene and wait for the tow truck.

2:52am: When the tow truck arrives on the scene, everyone (including myself) is asked to help erect the truck by righting it over onto its wheels. We learn that two other subjects have fled the scene of the accident before the RCMP arrived. The Peacekeepers were able to obtain this information, including the two subjects' names and whereabouts, one of whom was the driver. One of the Peacekeepers believes that, "They never would have told the RCMP anything about the guys who did this. They trust us, but now we have to provide that information to the RCMP." Sierra 3 drives one of the subjects home and EMS is called and told their response to the scene is unnecessary as nobody is in need of treatment.

3:19am: At shift's end I ask the dispatcher what is on the go. He glances down at his clipboard and replies: "The RCMP are tied up on booking and paperwork and we know that they will probably not be out there again unless something serious is called in. There are four guys fighting on a lady's lawn with baseball bats. One guy has passed out on someone else's lawn. Another guy is about to commit suicide. We have another guy who wants the Peacekeepers to attend his girlfriend's residence to pick-up his truck, and finally an assaulted female is refusing EMS and they need someone to respond to convince her to take treatment." Sierra 3 looks over to me and says, "We've got our hands full" and I concede that they most certainly do.

10.2 On Patrol with the RCMP

I ask the constable assigned to my ride-along about the communication system works. He tells me that Regina will receive the 911 call, contact the local detachment, and then a call log will be automatically generated inside the PROS system in the RCMP database. An officer then has to enter the required details for the call and is cued to do so in case they didn't have adequate time to make notes at each call.

7:00pm: My ride-along with Ray begins with a complaint of "drunks drinking at a house." When we finally arrive, no one is home but the call was put in about 30 minutes before the start of the shift. The next complaint for "uttering threats" is coming through from Regina via cell phone. Ray responds with another constable who follows in another truck. Ray comments on accidents: "We just don't have time to stay at the scene." Ray complains that for threats and drinking calls, "We respond and usually the subject will have left once the

call was made.”

7:19pm: Both constables arrive at the uttering threats complaint. The female complainant is calm and wants the officer to speak to her boyfriend who is intoxicated and becoming increasingly violent. The boyfriend had allegedly threatened to get a bunch of girls after her. When we arrive, nobody is home. Another call comes through on the cell phone from Regina. A female complainant fears her brother who is becoming increasingly violent and beginning to black out. One constable goes around back and one constable goes around front. They both enter the residence and bring out one male and load him into the vehicle. “Most of our responses are violence or alcohol related and most assaults are due to the consumption of alcohol,” notes the constable. “We have mandatory charging guidelines that we follow, but with no written statements, no evidence of assault and the nature of our paperless policing on reserve, we usually just hold them for the night and release them to family the next day.” He continues, “We give them our info and phone number, for at the end of the day, as long as the client is happy, that’s what we care about.” The very intoxicated male begins talking frantically to me while the constables are deciding what they want to do, “They roughed me up and pepper sprayed me last night, I was trying to cooperate, they’re gonna charge me again!” The subject’s mother and sister did not want him to remain at the residence, and the subject is read his rights for a breach of undertaking. The subject claims he only drank one beer, which does not seem to be the case according to his disposition. The man then reinforces the RCMP’s decision to separate him from his family. “It’s not over, when I get out of here, I need to fight. Racist cops!” On the allegation of racism:

“They are always throwing problems like what happened with the police in Saskatoon, they claim to be related to that victim and try to say that we are excessive or violent,” says Ray shaking his head. The subject is then brought back to the detachment and booked for a breach of undertaking.

8:15pm: Ray arrives back at the detachment to find two youth asking for a ride home. He agrees to drive and on the way, one of the passengers decides to change the destination location. The constable obliges and drops the two youths off at the requested location. A complaint comes in over the radio from Regina of a female who is recovering from a skull fracture facing threats of violence. There was no call back number and apparently the complainant has locked herself in a bathroom. As we pull into the community, Ray explains how the residence we are responding to usually contains one or two of the main bullies on the reserve. Both the complainant and the accused have an alcohol problem according to the constable, “The victims at this residence never seem to want to file a complaint or provide witness statements and twice a month we get a call of this nature to this residence.”

8:34pm: We arrive at the address. Ray jumps out of the vehicle. “I’ll be right back. She probably just doesn’t want the guy inside her house while she’s drunk.” The complainant indicated that she was punched and the male is placed under arrest for being intoxicated on a reserve and for assault. The subject is loaded into our RCMP truck and is given his charter rights.

8:51pm: We arrive back at the detachment with the combative male and the subject offers to write up a statement explaining what happened at the house. Ray explains how on the previous night, the RCMP had to call the Peacekeepers for assistance with a MVA. I informed him that I was actually in the

Peacekeeper's vehicle during that call. I asked why by the RCMP called the Peacekeepers. He answers: "We already had two inside our truck ready for booking, and we didn't want to call in a member who had to work the next morning...Basically we view the Peacekeepers as an extra set of hands." And then he adds: "With 5000 plus people [in our patrol area] we can use all the help we can get."

9:15pm: Back at the detachment I am surprised to see a private security guard and begin a conversation with him. He is from the community and contracted by the RCMP through the corps of Commissionaires to provide security in the detachment when there are prisoners in cells and the RCMP patrols are out responding to calls. I find out that there are four security officers that rotate at that detachment. They are paid out of the RCMP budget and are only called in when required. Whenever the cells are occupied, a guard will be present. The Commissionaire notes: "I am here to log activity, prisoner movement, housekeeping and to provide meals to prisoners." He goes on to explain, "In [this community] it is hard to get anyone reliable to do anything. I am the eyes and ears here when the [RCMP] are gone. Being Aboriginal is irrelevant and [the prisoners] resent [us] even more because they are Aboriginal."

9:30pm: An off duty RCMP member enters the detachment to catch up on paperwork. "There is always a 5-10 hour backlog of paperwork for us to do at any given time," he says. "Whether or not we lay charges is very discretionary, but the report has to be clear." I ask a constable if they provide as many escorts as the Peacekeepers do. He responds: "Unless we're busy, rides home are very common, but if there is a party going on we tell them, 'you're not going

there'."

- 10:15pm: A call comes in from Regina about a woman who has been hit on the head with a shovel. The constables respond to the residence within five minutes to get more details. They find that the woman has driven away to an undisclosed location in order to hide from males in a purple vehicle.
- 10:52pm: We run into a Peacekeeper on patrol and wave to him.
- 11:00pm: Ray remains back at the detachment to do paperwork, while we drive to Lloydminster to serve a warrant on a subject. The previous night he was charged with assault with a weapon, outstanding warrants, care and control while impaired and escaping lawful custody. The reason this subject is being held in Lloydminster is because he required attention at a hospital. He was originally transported by the Onion Lake EMS to Lloydminster.
- 1:30pm: We are joined by a Peacekeeper at the residence of the youth whom we transported earlier that evening. We are looking for a missing teen. The RCMP was told by the people at the door that the youth fled into the bush. After a brief search, the Peacekeepers find the girl. Ray did not have his flashlight and so he was unable to search without the Peacekeepers. The Peacekeepers agree to drive the youth back to the arena.
- 3:10am: Ray receives a call from Regina that was placed by the local Peacekeepers. A vehicle is doing "donuts" in a parking lot near the community center. The constable complains: "They [Peacekeepers] need to be told to get more information on these vehicles so we can follow-up properly with the drivers. Its frustrating getting these calls and only being told that a vehicle is doing donuts."
- 3:15am: Another call comes in from Regina. This time there is a fight at a residence

where a girl has again locked herself in a bathroom. We respond and arrive to find an upset woman who was allegedly assaulted by people inside the residence. We remove the female from the residence and she is placed in the back of the RCMP vehicle. The female is worried about getting harassed. When the constable returns to the vehicle, he gives her the option of charging the other occupants with assault or going to the “drunk tank”. For their part, the group inside the house is saying that the complainant was actually causing the disturbance and that they wanted her removed from the residence. The female says that she doesn’t want to press charges and doesn’t have anywhere else to go. We drive her home and she is admonished: “no more dealings with the police!”

3:38am: We begin pulling over vehicles and conducting random alcohol and sobriety spot checks.

3:50am: Camouflaged in a ditch at a popular crossroad the constable turns on his police lights and begins to pursue a large green van containing five occupants. As he approaches the vehicle and begins speaking to the driver, the constable discovers and removes a case of beer. He tells me that the driver had no idea that this was a dry reserve. The constable takes him at his word, confiscates the alcohol and allows the vehicle to proceed.

4:00am: Another vehicle is pulled over, however, there is no alcohol on board

4:23am: We respond to a call where a man has assaulted a woman.

4:32am: We arrive on scene to find a woman bleeding profusely from the head. The RCMP immediately calls EMS and begins transporting the woman to a rendezvous point to make the ambulance response a quicker one. We learn

that the woman was hit on the head with a baseball bat by another woman, and that the male in the home was actually assisting her. The man is loaded into the back of one of the RCMP trucks and both RCMP vehicles head off to rendezvous with the ambulance. The man in the vehicle is very belligerent toward the police, "Hey white cowboy cop, what am I being charged with." He begins to repeatedly bang his own head on the Plexiglas divider and screams profanities.

5:00am: We spot a purple minivan parked at a residence beside the RCMP detachment and, on hunch, go to investigate as the woman who was assaulted earlier in the evening also had a purple vehicle as well. We learn that the female who drives the purple vehicle assaulted the female with a bat after that female had attacked her at 10:15pm (the earlier call). The constable checks his watch: "We're going to follow-up on this one tomorrow, the shift's almost done. All of the violence has ended, the parties have

10.3 On Patrol with Casino Security

There are approximately 190 patrons inside the Gold Eagle Casino this evening. The smell of smoke and chatter fill the air. There is a constant ringing and the sound of coins can be heard clacking out of a slot machine. Security officers are wearing a standard concierge style private security guard uniforms with blue blazer and a white collared shirts. They carry no weapons and are not wearing utility belts, common to more high profile law enforcement duties. Six security officers are currently on duty. Four officers are normally walking the floor, one officer is by the front door checking ID and monitoring door procedures and the last officer is usually stationed at the live gaming tables. According to Dave – who has worked at the Casino for 6 years: "We look for conflicts,

silver mining [people looking for money at machines or on the floor] and cheating.” He continues to elaborate on house procedures during incidents. Security is required to first contact a security supervisor, who then will contact surveillance to capture the exchange on videotape, at which point one of the managers will be called in to review the tape and decide on the next course of action. Thomas has received general security training from SIGA, but has not received “take down”, handcuffing or baton training. “All we need to do is make our rounds and talk to people and if there’s a problem, we check the cage, the bar, the games, take down training isn’t really necessary.” As our conversation continues, Thomas complains, “Security is getting paid less than all other departments...I believe in equal pay for equal value and security pay never increases, we’re getting paid like maintenance.” I begin my field observations...

6:38pm: There are a number of cameras affixed to the ceiling creating an intimidating and ubiquitous feeling of surveillance when one begins to take stock of them. I notice several dark black tile patches on the ceiling. I surmise that aside from the visible 360 degree cameras mounted on the ceiling, there are also several cameras concealed beneath the ceiling tiles, however, this could not be confirmed by the staff. Another security officer is interacting with a player on a slot machine. They are smiling, laughing and chatting about something. It would appear that security at this casino builds relationships with the customers and has detailed knowledge of the regulars and their habits. Andrew confirms my suspicions: “See that guy, he comes in every afternoon at 4:00pm and leaves at about 8:00pm, he never looks like he’s havin’ a good time but he’s got an itchy trigger finger on those slots.” He explains that it’s better to get to know the people who use the casino often, because it makes busier nights easier if you already know who may cause trouble.

7:10pm: Samantha, another security officer, was just seen escorting a slot technician and his cart full of coins to the back cage. She explains that she was conducting a 10-59 where security is required to escort cash. She indicates that she conducts anywhere from 5-10 escorts per shift. Miranda is stationed at the front door of the Casino and she tells me that her duties at this post require her to “keep an eye on the machine lights [those flashing lights on top of the machine that signal a maintenance problem make sure people check their bags at the door, looking for pocket knives, drinks being brought in or out.”

7:20pm: Over the radio security can be heard contacting surveillance personnel regarding a tape that needs to be reviewed. The operations manager is now on the floor and approaches me to explain that a patron was overpaid by the bank and is now being approached by security to convince him to re-pay the money. The subject is not surprisingly unreceptive to the security officer's request and is now being approached by the operations manager. After several minutes, the gentleman being asked to pay back money to the casino is becoming very agitated. The operations manager walks back toward me and says, “I told him that I would be referring him to legal affairs but you know its tough, because in the end it was the cage's fault.”

8:00pm: Samantha can be observed overseeing the live gaming tables. Thomas who is from the Onion Lake Cree Nation indicates that “nothing out of the blue is happening right now, the people who come here are usually pretty good just here to enjoy their time at the casino.” He also explains how there is a private security contract firm that is based out of Saskatoon called Black Eagle Security. They are Aboriginal and will provide security for a variety of

events such as, the Summer Games in Prince Albert and 7 eleven convenience store security.

8:15pm: I enter the surveillance room and begin to observe the surveillance operators performing their duties. The Supervisor explains how every call made to '93' (surveillance) is documented on shift reports: "A cashier will call us and we can find the tape and also record the interaction between the staff member and the patron while they talk about what to do." A key surveillance document utilized by surveillance to track patrons not only throughout the casino, but to learn when they last played at the casino, their photo, age, description, etc. is called the "Players Club Card." Most patrons will purchase this card which can be loaded with money and helps the patron win points. In exchange for the casino allowing players to accumulate points, patrons provide the Casino with a detailed description of habits, physical attributes, financial habits (how often do they refill the card and with how much money, etc.

9:50pm: A gentleman who is believed to be on the Red Status list (that is, previously banned) for causing a disturbance is spotted by a security guard who wants to confirm his status. The surveillance operators access the database and print off a copy of his photo with the banning notice attached. When the suspected photo is showed to security, it comes back as a negative match, and the patron is allowed to continue to move throughout the Casino. The shift supervisor continues to explain how helpful the cameras are in tracking the movement of each patron from the moment they enter the facility to the moment they leave. On average, Tanya indicates that 25-40% of patrons can be recognized by surveillance at any given time. The cameras act as a

deterrent to theft, drinking in the parking lot and as Marcel one of the surveillance operators says, "Without surveillance and without cameras there would be chaos out there."

11.0 Peacekeeping as Protest

It should come as little surprise to analysts of policing in First Nations communities that the predominant concerns voiced by band council members and Peacekeepers about the RCMP centre around (1) staffing and visibility; (2) response time; (3) attitude and community relations; and finally (4) the lack of reciprocity in flows of information between the RCMP and both Peacekeepers and casino security. Some of these community concerns have been previously reported elsewhere (Murphy and Clairmont 2006) for other First Nations locales under FNPP contracts.

Even in First Nations communities that have entire RCMP detachments on reserve or designated satellite RCMP offices with housing for assigned police officers, as in Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop, a common complaint by band councilors and Peacekeepers is the lack of devoted RCMP patrol in the community. Band councilors complained that officers were too often "off reserve and deployed very poor visibility". Even though a corporal's house was being built and housing for two RCMP officers already existed in Ahtahkakoop, the belief was that "the RCMP is short-staffed". Indeed, in Ahtahkakoop, two constables are assigned to be on reserve but their responsibilities extend to highway duties and responses far away from their base of operations. In Onion Lake, RCMP officers concede that they are understaffed: "We have insufficient manpower in the community. We conduct too much reactive policing." One RCMP member continued: "We need one more constable in Onion Lake. That would fix the problem." He recommends one corporal, one sergeant and nine constables, ensuring

that three constables would be available at all times. As one Onion Lake band leader noted: “Even though they are supposed to be fully staffed, we never see them.”

Associated with concerns about staffing and visibility is response time. Indeed, in both Ahtahkakoop and Onion Lake, poor RCMP response times were cited as one of the primary reasons that Peacekeepers were made necessary in the first instance. One Peacekeeper in Onion Lake reported that staffing issues had affected RCMP responses so significantly that “we had a girl commit suicide this summer and we were the only ones to respond. The RCMP never came!” Demands for Peacekeeping services are predicated on the band members’ belief that “we are the people who show up first before the RCMP, but sometimes they won’t even show up”. Another Onion Lake Peacekeeper affirmed “some band members will call the Peacekeepers because RCMP response times are too slow”. While another said “with poor response times for the RCMP, people appreciate us being there”. Similar sentiments were expressed in Ahtahkakoop where the belief was “the Peacekeepers are always there first”. Given that band members are diverted to a centralized Regina call centre when requesting service from the RCMP, Peacekeepers assert “they’d rather call us first”. Indeed, because the RCMP would take so long to arrive Peacekeepers report having to “double up because of the violence”.

Casino security also expressed occasional dismay that the RCMP in North Battleford would not arrive in a timely manner. “The RCMP response time from time to time takes too long”. This casino surveillance operator recounted an episode where staff monitored a parking lot fight that continued for over 10 minutes before the RCMP arrived. Another aboriginal casino surveillance officer believed that response time from the RCMP depended upon whether the suspect was white or not: “If the subject is aboriginal, they will come right away.” Other security staff at the casino recounted an incident where staff monitored suspects drinking and “smoking pot” in the casino parking

lot. Surveillance staff called the police three times and even took down their plates and kept the tapes. The RCMP never responded and never requested the tapes. Indeed, the problem of lack of RCMP response to calls for service concerning illegal activities in the parking lot was repeated by other casino security staff. In one case, a surveillance operator, was frustrated by the RCMP. She had witnessed two men attempting to break into three vehicles and captured their activities on tape. When the RCMP finally responded, they were seen talking to the two men and releasing them. The suspects were sent on their way even though the operator claims she had captured them breaking into a truck and attempting to “hot wire” it.

When the RCMP does respond to calls for service, some band representatives and Peacekeepers complain that they have a poor attitude. This complaint was especially aimed at younger or less experienced RCMP officers who rotate through Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop. Band representatives were occasionally worried about new “gung ho” officers and instead wanted “family men who would do more than make arrests”. Part of the reason why relations were sometimes poor, according to one band leader, related back to their staffing problems: “They are so rushed...just a quick warning [but] no sit down or circle to find out what the issues are”. When RCMP officers did not meet with community leaders or elders and made few contacts with youth other than to enforce the law, band representatives would be disappointed. In this sense, a general attitude toward over-zealous policing is reflected in the response by one Ahtahkakoop Peacekeeper who remarked “RCMP officers that are laid back got the better results.” Being too laid back, however, brought its own critique: “Our vehicles are running 24 hours a day and when you look at the RCMP parking lot, their cars are always parking there...They know the Peacekeepers are going to be responding.” Gold Eagle casino security, like Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop band leaders and

Peacekeepers had generally good relations with the RCMP. However, a few casino surveillance personnel believed that the North Battleford RCMP dispatchers “had a major attitude” and “treated [them] like criminals” when they called. These complaints were levied in the context of the RCMP’s lack of response to calls for service when illegal activity was recorded in the parking lot.

Casino security personnel also felt that information exchange with the RCMP was unidirectional. Surveillance staff reported that they rarely received advance knowledge of RCMP investigations that included the casino. Although casino management reported that “relations with the RCMP in North Battleford are excellent”, more junior members did not believe the Mounties took their complaints seriously or gave them adequate notice of illegal activities that might affect them. Despite this claim, the RCMP and casino surveillance had recently completed a joint investigation of a drug dealer’s money laundering activities that resulted in charges being laid. Indeed, the local detachment sergeant pointed to the success of this operation as indication of the good working relations of the organizations.

Finally, RCMP officers were sometimes criticized for their lack of language proficiency in Cree, or more generally, for not being Aboriginal. “Our people can’t communicate with Regina, they’d prefer to speak to us” said one Peacekeeper, “what they really need is an aboriginal who speaks the language in Regina”. Thus Peacekeepers are viewed as translators and essential intermediaries whenever the RCMP is called: “The Peacekeepers give the people who don’t speak English the chance to be heard, and people feel comfortable dealing with their own communities.” One Peacekeeper added “I don’t think any of [the RCMP officers] can speak Cree.” These beliefs led to the entreaty, espoused by some band leaders, that the RCMP need to staff their detachments in Onion Lake and Shellbrook – Ahtahkakoop with more

aboriginal officers. For their part, the RCMP report that six Onion Lake constables and two Ahtahkakoop constables were actually aboriginal and the community was likely unaware of this. Indeed, one aboriginal officer said “I’m aboriginal but I don’t broadcast it”, and another noted “speaking Cree has helped me a lot in this community”.

While many limitations about RCMP deployments in Ahtahkakoop and Onion Lake are in circulation, it bears attention that band leaders and Peacekeepers nonetheless argue for *more* RCMP presence and community integration, not less. In this way, we are best served by regarding Peacekeepers as a form of protest against a perceived policing void in RCMP visibility, response time, community relations, information sharing and communication. By implication, therefore, the unlikely remedying of these outstanding policing issues would make Peacekeeping services redundant in First Nations communities.

12.0 RCMP officer Concerns about Peacekeepers

For all the complaints heard about RCMP visibility, response times and community relations by band members and supporters of Onion Lake’s and Ahtahkakoop’s Peacekeepers programs, the RCMP officers we spoke to also had reservations about Peacekeeping. While the RCMP officers who dealt with Peacekeepers told us that “they do an excellent job” and that “they’re essential for us to doing our work” they were also concerned about: (1) their level of training and standards of recruiting; (2) their conduct at high-risk incidents; (3) their temptation to be biased given their community contacts; and finally (4) their lack of reliability in situations that require back-up for the RCMP. We shall deal with each of these concerns in turn.

First, without exception, RCMP officers reported that Peacekeepers “need more training” and that the cursory security instruction they receive is “inadequate.” Moreover

their “level of education” and preparation to deal with even more risky responses such as “suicide interventions requires [they] receive more [specialized] training”. Indeed, as we saw in our analysis of a suicide intervention above (see section 8.1), divergent RCMP and Peacekeeper conduct and training for such incidents can be the source of considerable friction between organizations. Most RCMP officers felt that Peacekeepers, at minimum, should possess First-Aid, CPR, self-defense, suicide intervention, and hand-cuff training. Opinions varied, however, on the use of pepper spray or batons, although there seemed to be more support for the latter rather than the former. “A baton can be taken away and can be deadly” noted one RCMP officer. Another added “pepper spray only pisses people off” if the person using it is inadequately trained. Given their lack of training, in the eyes of one RCMP respondent, the Peacekeepers often become a burden because they detect many offences but are unable to resolve them adequately: “I appreciate the large amount of information they bring to our attention like kids smashing windows and petty theft stuff but it would be great if they could start resolving those before we get there”. Despite this complaint, however, this same RCMP officer was quick to remind us: “Last winter there was a spousal assault call. We were away and the Peacekeepers were able to defuse the situation”. He added “we like to joke with the Peacekeepers, but when dealing with complaints, the communication is good”.

The other concern expressed by some RCMP officers was the associated feeling that Peacekeepers, by virtue of their lack of training, equipment and general preparation are unable to deal with particularly risky incidents, even though, on occasion they may do just that. In one incident, a Peacekeeper intercepted a man heading to a school armed with a shotgun. The incident was resolved quickly, and the man was disarmed and driven home. When the incident was relayed to us during a meeting that included

an RCMP officer it was clear that the actions of the Peacekeepers, while ending well on this occasion, set an unnerving precedent for the police. Another officer, on the topic of high risk responses echoed earlier concerns about preparation: “Some guys can’t be trusted with responsibility due to lack of training”. When asked to elaborate, he added “Peacekeepers are afraid”. The lack of trust for Peacekeepers at such incidents is decided on an individual basis. One RCMP officer noted that the “biggest problem” is staff turnover as some Peacekeepers only “stay on for a couple weeks”.

The temptation for Peacekeepers to exhibit bias because of their connection to the band is actually a generalized problem of policing small communities – a problem that the RCMP structurally and culturally seeks to overcome. Thus, it should not be surprising to hear comments from RCMP members –who are required to rotate out of communities after two or three years – that the closeness of Peacekeepers to band members creates occasional problems. Indeed, we witnessed an incident in which Peacekeepers waved off the RCMP who had responded to an overturned vehicle one night at the side of the local highway in one community. The RCMP reluctantly moved on but it later became clear that the motorist was closely related to one of the responding Peacekeepers. This type of reaction clearly undermines the trust the RCMP has for Peacekeepers. As one Peacekeeper himself remarked “it’s very difficult to deal with immediate family”. This troubled him so much that he confessed “sometimes I wish I wasn’t working”.

The final critique that RCMP members level against Peacekeepers is their lack of reliability in situations that require backup. RCMP officers, like other police services, highly value the camaraderie and solidarity that emanates from the occupational credo that “someone has their back”. Indeed, failure to respond in this manner can result in accusations of cowardice – the worst of all critiques of one’s fellow officers. RCMP

officers are concerned when they cannot rely on Peacekeepers for reason of training, preparation for high risk work, the temptation to be biased or lack of support. As one RCMP officer reported: "They assist us but never back us up". Another officer offered an example: "One [RCMP officer] went to a call involving a male passed out, just a guy in the ditch. When [the officer] woke him up, the guy became violent and began to fight with [the officer]. The Peacekeeper just stood around there watching and didn't do anything to back him up".

We run the risk, in this section, of overstating the significance of RCMP complaints of Peacekeeper conduct (and vice versa). This is because we were specifically fishing for such incidents and attitudes in our research. It is incumbent on us to remind the reader that for the most part RCMP-Peacekeeper relations are excellent indeed and that, without exception, RCMP officers urged the improvement and expansion of Peacekeepers rather their elimination or curtailment. RCMP officers repeatedly stated that they could not track down suspects, issue warrants or even navigate certain calls for service without Peacekeeper assistance.

13.0 The Future of Plural Policing in First Nations Communities

Prognostications about social phenomenon are always subject to miscalculation when current trends are exaggerated beyond their contemporary scope. For quite some time, however, policing experts (Bayley and Shearing; Johnston; Jones and Newburn; Murphy) have made just such predictions with remarkable success. This is largely due to the fact that the pluralization, privatization and commodification (Rigakos 2002) of policing has continued unabated in advanced Western democracies. Private and alternative forms of policing began to crowd out the public police since the mid-sixties (Rigakos 2003). To continue to expect the ongoing proliferation of private security and

tertiary policy, especially after 9/11 would not be much of a theoretical risk.

We have seen, however, that the spread of alternative forms of policing has also made its way into First Nations communities. Not only are these plural forms more prevalent, much as they are generally in industrialized nations, but such services are likewise taking on more responsibilities that, at least in the last century, have largely been the purview of the public police. In First Nations communities, the recent rise of Peacekeepers may be seen as a necessary policing innovation filling the void of scarcer RCMP patrols. It is tempting to draw analogies, here, to the type of resistance to centralized, professionalized policing experienced in the London boroughs in the years following the expansion of the first modern police: The Metropolitan police of London. In the 1860s rate payers were dismayed to see their local watchman being replaced by the London “bobbies” who, while efficient and professional were rarely seen and far more expensive. Slowly, through parliamentary tax incentives and perseverance, the old watchman system was eventually dismissed as archaic and amateurish. Today, however, CCTV cameras, community wardens and second-tier “community safety officers” (CSOS) have re-emerged in London alongside a burgeoning private security sector. Policing is plural once more in the cradle of modern, professional public policing.

While First Nations communities have inherited a very different system of policing than nineteenth century London rate-payers, and while First Nations communities cannot be understood within the context of “mass private property” there are nonetheless connections to wider social phenomenon. Increasingly, First Nations communities have by virtue of their creation of tertiary services resuscitated the notion of local policing and patrol according to customary values that are communal and restorative. Moreover, these policing organizations, in particular Peacekeepers and casino security, are a fundamental reassertion of First Nations sovereignty and self-reliance. In Onion Lake,

Peacekeepers field an average of 30 calls per night not including the dozens of proactive stops, taxi lifts, admonitions and criminal justice diversions they actively engage in. Casino security guards police segregated spaces far more like general private policing and social surveillance. They secure a sector that means millions of dollars in revenue for First Nations communities across the province. Together, Peacekeepers, casino security guards and other band watchmen and Commissionaires safeguard the most crucial social and economic institutions in First Nations communities: schools, band buildings, arenas, recreation centres, bingo halls, casinos, convenience stores and even RCMP detachments. While they provide essential assistance to the RCMP every day, it also makes sense to begin saying that by virtue of their mandate and duties, the RCMP increasingly provide assistance to the Peacekeepers and security who are largely the first responders, exercising judgment at interventions, asserting discretion and gauging whether to involve the RCMP at each incident.

As a social force in the community, RCMP officers have historically been well-regarded by the First Nations communities. They have played a fundamental social service function and are role models for aboriginal youth. Increasingly, Peacekeepers are filling this role as staffing shortfalls and demands for service put strains on RCMP officers' ability to fulfill such proactive mandates. Today, it is the Peacekeeper who enforces band by-laws forbidding drinking, drives inebriated band members home, lectures schoolchildren, enforces curfews and de-escalates potentially lethal situations. In the same way, casino surveillance personnel place aboriginal problem-gamblers on watch lists, electronically monitoring their activities, offer warnings and even ban patrons from doing themselves even more financial harm. There is no reason to believe that the compulsion for self-reliance and self-correction among First Nations peoples who have an entire generation's worth of mistrust for "white" justice will wane in the next decade. It

is expected that as the RCMP's role in policing First Nations communities becomes more reactive (based on demands for service) and that as First Nations communities continue to insist on greater control over their policing, alternative forms of policing will continue to emerge. What remains to be seen is how these services will be incorporated within existing policing frameworks.

While the future of SIGA-casino security remains secure and will continue to play a prominent role in Aboriginal employment, especially entry-level training for security work and policing, it is peacekeeping which leaves much in doubt and most directly challenges FNPP arrangements. Throughout our research time in the field elders, band councilors, Peacekeepers and RCMP officers made suggestions for the improvement of service provision at Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop. Suggestions ranged from modest improvements in training, providing uniforms and equipment to calls for transforming the Peacekeepers into full-fledged peace officers with side-arms. Invariably, however, these discussions came back to the issue of funding.

Given the nature of the section to follow on implications for FNPP policy, it bears reminding that funders will, whether directly or indirectly, demand some control over the program they are assisting. Requests for the funding of Peacekeepers have been made to the RCMP, the Aboriginal Policing Directorate of Public Safety Canada, the RCMP's Community Crime Prevention Initiative and the provincial Department of Justice without success so far. While previous Peacekeeping services, such as Mistawasis, have received external funding, Peacekeeping services in the two jurisdictions we studied were entirely self-financed by the bands. When tensions between RCMP and Peacekeepers occasionally arise, there is always an available rhetorical stance which dictates Peacekeepers are acting under a separate authority and have as their mandate "diversion, restoration and welfare". If they were to be funded by the federal

government, how could they legitimize their desire to act differently than the RCMP or fail to assist them in the face of a criminal offence? Would this jeopardize their funding? What will demands for interoperability, standardized report writing, and information-sharing produce and how will this potentially undermine the mission of the Peacekeepers? Peacekeepers insist that they do not want to be “lackies” for the RCMP but by accepting funding from government sources, they risk placing themselves in an awkward position of financial dependence. Whatever assistance Peacekeepers receive would require a certain degree of operational autonomy from the RCMP, even though on a practical level most security in Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop is heavily dependent on the dyadic policing relationship between the RCMP and Peacekeepers.

14.0 Implications for FNPP policy

We have learned that the lion’s share of everyday policing and patrol in Onion Lake and Ahtahkakoop is administered by Peacekeepers and that their withdrawal would result in a significant impact on the effectiveness of the RCMP who heavily rely on their assistance and guidance. In the Cree community of Mistawasis, where Peacekeepers were disbanded, the RCMP reported that their withdrawal immediately resulted in \$30,000 worth of damage including a subsequent rise in mischief calls, vandalism, theft of gas and school damage. The local RCMP sergeant remarked “we really missed their presence and the community suffered”. While a renewed attempt to reestablish Peacekeepers in Mistawasis is underway, their absence significantly affected RCMP responses. The same sergeant noted “we wish we had more time to conduct more proactive policing, proactive patrols and act as role models but we can’t provide that now”. Throughout this report, we have noted that in the two communities where Peacekeepers are operating the RCMP view the contribution of Peacekeepers as

invaluable. Despite their considerable importance as an alternate form of policing in First Nations communities, we find that casino security is self-contained, more narrowly mandated, and less likely to come into contact with FNPP police constables or policy. It is for this reason that the discussion to follow is aimed at considering the implication of Peacekeepers on FNPP.

If part of the overall agenda of the FNPP was the elimination of unprofessional, ineffective and unaccountable policing best exemplified in the poor training, nepotism, and biased policing found in some band constable services, then by all accounts the program has been an unqualified success (APD 2007). If, however, the goal of the FNPP program was to make redundant any other form of self-financed alternatives to tripartite policing arrangements then the emergence of Peacekeepers and the persistence of some band constable services is a challenge to the FNPP.

Peacekeepers, it would seem, are currently outside the mandate of the FNPP as they do not qualify as either an SA or a CTA police service. But this state of affairs may be more a function of implementation rather than in keeping with the spirit and purpose of the FNPP. Indeed, while the FNPP makes no provision for alternative designations outside the formally recognized status of “police officer” or “constable” the policy also does not expressly exclude that possibility. A core policy principle of the FNPP under the rubric of “Selection of a Police Service Model” allows for plural forms of policing provision by stating that “[t]he selection of a particular model of police service should be balanced by the need for cost-effectiveness and the particular policing needs of First Nations communities” (Solicitor General 1996, p.4).

In more detailed guidelines issued in 1995 the government made it clear that given the “cultural distinctiveness” of First Nations communities and their legally identified “role in criminal justice either through participation in the existing Canadian

system or through initiatives that provide for more culturally sensitive policing” federal negotiators should “ensure that tripartite agreements provide for culturally sensitive policing” (APD, internal communiqué, 1995, p.4). Indeed, federal negotiation guidelines focused not only on “the need for community input into the type of policing service that is provided” but repeatedly emphasized “cost-effectiveness” (p.4), “the need for fiscal responsibility” and “that the proposed police service model should make sense from a practical point of view” (p.7). The needs of the community, cultural sensitivity and fiscal prudence, therefore, should presumably outweigh any existing bias toward either SA or CTA policing options as already evinced by the use of Peacekeepers in Saskatchewan. Peacekeepers, by virtue of their existence as an alternative agency deployed to fill a policing void created by the transition to RCMP CTAs demonstrate the limits of a “constable-only” interpretation of the FNPP. This state of affairs was already becoming clear to the APD only a few years after the Policy’s implementation. A 1997 internal APD progress report noted that the rapid replacement of band constables with “fully-functional, professional police” was creating a problem for local policing in remote or smaller communities where it was not feasible or cost-effective to locate a detachment. The report foreshadowed a conclusion of this study when the author noted “if the BCP [Band Constable Program] funding is terminated, these communities lose the only on-site policing presence they have enjoyed.” The author went on to observe: “it is beginning to appear that community-based Peacekeepers may represent a desirable supplement to the FNPP” raising “questions relating to service standards, protocols, training, liability and funding” (APD Report 1997, p.3).

By 2005, there was an acknowledgement of this new reality. The recommendation of an evaluation of the BCP called for a new policy position in a revised FNPP policy framework to deal with the possible retention of band constables “or an

alternative program.” This policy re-positioning was based on the evaluation of the BCP which found that band constables were “providing services attuned to First Nation needs and local culture, and [were] accommodating local and regional variations in the need for policing services – two objectives of the FNPP” (Prairie Research Associates 2005, p.ii). There is therefore renewed interest in incorporating surviving BCP services in Manitoba, New Brunswick, Alberta, and Prince Edward Island (now woefully under-funded) within a more flexible FNPP. The report’s authors recommend that “the BCP could be revised and incorporated in the FNPP as a supplementary component” (p.iv). There is no reason why similar changes in FNPP policy could not be extended to Peacekeepers within a more encompassing *plurality* of policing choices.

One possible explanation for the creation of Peacekeepers is the fact that implementation of the FNPP in a First Nations community currently requires the withdrawal of the BCP. In the communities we visited, the majority of respondents do not wish to see the Peacekeepers become a police service under the “self-administered” option of the FNPP. Without exception, however, Peacekeepers, administrators, and RCMP officers believe the Peacekeepers need funding for standardized training, better equipment, and uniforms as well as more formalized information sharing with the RCMP. Under the current parameters of the FNPP, however, no such remedy is available. Without a change in the application of the FNPP, the Peacekeepers will continue to act as underpaid, overworked and minimally trained first responders and role models upon whom the RCMP is, by their own admission, heavily dependent but unable to support.³ This is a finding that echoes previous research on the continued use of band constables (Prairie Research Associates 2005).

³ Except through informal donations. One RCMP officer transferred his vehicle for \$1.00 to Peacekeepers in Onion Lake.

If the FNPP was expanded to include the possibility of Peacekeepers within a plurality of policing options including band constables, then it would be incumbent on policymakers to encourage:

- 1) Interoperability and information sharing between services;
- 2) Operationally autonomy from the RCMP in both recruiting and policy;
- 3) Training in baton, use of force, and handcuffing to assist RCMP and/or hold suspects until their arrival in certain circumstances;
- 4) Special arrest powers to enforce band by-laws or provincial infractions;
- 5) Funding for uniforms that include bullet-proof vests, slash-proof gloves and other utilities and equipment necessary for the job.

Indeed, RCMP officers kept requesting that the researchers send the message to the APD that the Peacekeepers are an essential service in need of support. Given this state of affairs, **it is recommended that the FNPP be revisited to allow for the possibility of plural forms of policing outside the self and tripartite administered options.**

Peacekeepers are inexpensive and very effective. It would take very little to expand and improve their service provision and thereby free up the RCMP to also engage in more proactive and culturally appropriate mentorship and community involvement. By extension, the Peacekeeper services could act as a recruiting source for the RCMP, increasing aboriginal representation in the federal service. But this need not be considered the primary benefit of a federally-funded Peacekeeper program.

Peacekeepers could be further elevated into mentorship and role model positions in the community because of better pay, equipment, training and organizational pride.

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