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Towards a Crime Reduction Strategy In British Columbia

Major Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
Criminal Justice

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Gary Bass, 2007

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Abstract

This paper will examine the development of Crime Reduction in British Columbia as a new approach to addressing crime. One of the key goals of this paper is to provide support for the notion that the type of crime reduction program currently being implemented in British Columbia represents a significant change not only for policing, but the broader Criminal Justice System (CJS). One of the critical foundational components of this strategy is the recognition that substantial progress in the reduction of crime is possible through the better integration of the agencies with roles in the prevention and reduction of crime. This shift represents a fundamentally different approach in terms of the manner in which the various components of the CJS view their own respective roles and, more importantly, how these components work cooperatively in an integrated fashion.

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Dedication

This paper is dedicated to the men and women of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in the Pacific Region who are translating the vision of the crime reduction strategy into reality. Without their hard work and dedication, this vision would be nothing more than that.

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
Introduction

In Canada, policing is an increasingly expensive enterprise which, in many cases, represents the largest part of municipal budgets (Brantingham and Easton, 1998). In 2005, expenditures on policing in Canada totaled \$9.3 billion; a 4% increase over 2004 after adjusting for inflation. In effect, policing costs \$288 per Canadian a year (Statistics Canada, 2006). Still, by way of comparison, the United Kingdom spends about \$400 per person a year (Home Office, 2006).¹ For every dollar spent in all justice sectors in Canada, 62 cents is allocated to policing. In fact, 2006 marked the ninth year in a row that constant dollar spending had increased with municipal policing accounting for approximately 57% of policing expenditures, provincial policing accounting for 23%, and approximately 20% allocated for federal policing (Statistics Canada, 2006).

In addition to the financial costs of policing and the continuing growth of police organizations and programs directed at the control of crime, little progress has been made in reducing the incidence of crime over the past 30 years (Malm et al., 2005). While there have been modest drops in property crimes during the past three years, violent crime has either increased slightly or remained stable during that period. However, it may be argued that little significance can be drawn from these types of statistics over the short term (Malm et al., 2005). Figure 1 below represents the criminal code caseload in British Columbia over the 30 year period between 1962 and 2002. There was a decrease between 1997 and 2001, and thereafter, a continuing climb. Most notably, the reported incidence of criminal code offences has increased by a magnitude of seven over this extended time period (Malm et al., 2005).

¹ Taken from the Home Office website at http://press.homeoffice.gov/United_Kingdom/press-releases/Significant_Boost_To_Police_Serv?version=1.

Figure 1: Growth in Reported Criminal Code Cases in British Columbia



The importance of this figure is that it demonstrates the magnitude of the increase of reported criminal code cases over the same period of time when several major police programs were introduced specifically to reduce crime, such as community policing which was first introduced in the early 1970s. Another important issue is that during this same period the clearance rates for crimes steadily declined (Malm et al., 2005).

Although more dollars are being allocated to policing in terms of ‘real dollars’ for personnel, equipment, and other resources, police leaders in many jurisdictions struggle with the requirement to be more effective with fewer resources. Simply put, British Columbia has 13% of Canada’s population, however, it accounts for 20% of all of Canada’s Criminal Code offences and receives only 10% of Canada’s spending on policing (Malm et al., 2005). Moreover,

Canada's overall police to population ratio is considerably lower than other developed nations; 19% lower than Australia's, 22% lower than in the United States, and 26% lower than in England and Wales (Malm et al., 2005). Adding to the challenge, police work has become more complex, more time consuming, and more taxing on resources through such factors as disclosure rules, case law, and the deployment of technology. These factors, in addition to many other issues, have contributed to widening the gap between the incidence of crime and the capacity of police to solve crime. As a result, there has been a significant reduction in the capacity of police organizations to address crime or to make any meaningful progress in reducing crime (Malm et al., 2005).

In practical terms, police have to make choices about allocating their finite resources. This typically results in less attention being paid to less serious crime; the result of which can be seen from the significant and continuing drop in clearance rates in B.C.² The unintended consequences of these choices may be more nuisance offences, the development and initiation of new criminals, and a potential increase in the number of minor offenders who graduate to more serious offending. Exacerbating the problem is the absence of effective integration within the Criminal Justice System (CJS). For example, adding police resources without addressing capacity downstream from the police, such as prosecution, courts, or corrections, can make the situation worse. One potential implication of the lack of justice integration may be that it reinforces for offenders the notion that there is little or no risk associated with engaging in criminal behaviour or that they are unlikely to be held accountable for their criminal behaviour.

Based on this cursory overview, it would appear that change is required to improve Canada's criminal justice system to the point where the public has an increased level of confidence in the system to both keep it safe from crime and to sufficiently punish and rehabilitate those who engage in criminal behaviour. It also appears that there is a growing

² B.C. Crime Statistics 2005-2006 reported a decrease in the numbers of crimes solved with respect to both violent crime and property related crime. Although the clearance rates for the latter had been falling for several years, more recently, between 1999 and 2005, the clearance rates for violent crimes dropped steadily at a rate of 5% per year from 75% to 52%.

consensus among municipal, provincial, and federal levels of government, law enforcement agencies, and the general public that Canadians must consider additional approaches or solutions to reducing the incidences of crime and address crime's underlying causes.

Recently, British Columbia has adopted the "crime reduction" strategy to achieve these broad objectives. The uniqueness of a comprehensive crime reduction strategy is that it is based on the integration and the functioning of real partnerships between police, community, and other criminal justice system partners, as well as the integration of government agencies to provide a vision and leadership for the reduction of crime and strategies to address its underlying causes. In both practical and theoretical terms, the crime reduction strategy builds upon community-based policing and intelligence-led models of policing. However, its key distinguishing features are its focus on developing long-term solutions to crime through more effective integration on a broader scale and placing a greater emphasis and focus on the offender, rather than the criminal event.

In order to provide a detailed accounting of the development of the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia, this paper will focus on three specific and key components of the crime reduction strategy, namely a prolific and priority offender scheme, the evidence-based approach, and integrated justice. In brief, a prolific and priority offender scheme is a multi-faceted approach involving the three complimentary elements of prevention, enforcement, and rehabilitation. The evidence-based approach relates to integration and the use of empirical research, information management systems, and strong, appropriate measures to assess and evaluate systems and programs. As indicated by its name, integrated justice targets the effective integration of all of the players in and associated with the CJS.

As will be demonstrated throughout this major paper, these three approaches represent key departures from the strategies recently employed in the CJS. Moreover, it is through these lenses that the effectiveness of the police and other components of the CJS to control and reduce crime in Canada will be considered. Specifically, these approaches will be used to provide an

argument for the premise that, notwithstanding the challenges currently faced by the CJS, meaningful improvements and progress can be achieved through the crime reduction strategy.

This major paper will be divided into four chapters. Chapter One will examine crime reduction in greater detail by taking a critical view of historical and current policing strategies and programs, such as community policing, problem-oriented policing, and others. These programs have been selected because they are the main approaches introduced in recent years to reduce and respond to crime in British Columbia. In this chapter, the need for an evidence-based approach to an effective crime reduction strategy (CRS) will also be examined. This chapter will also include a discussion on intelligence-led policing and how it relates to the evidence-based approach.

Chapter Two will include a more detailed examination of the crime reduction experience in the United Kingdom with a particular emphasis placed on the Prolific and Priority Offender Scheme. This Chapter will also examine issues concerning the proper evaluation of programs, particularly the evaluation of the crime reduction strategy in the United Kingdom. Chapter Three will examine the evolution of the Crime Reduction Program in British Columbia with comparisons to the model in the United Kingdom. This chapter will highlight some of the important similarities and differences between the models in the United Kingdom and the British Columbia and will conclude with a discussion of the significance of integrated justice. The final chapter will detail the lessons learned and the remaining challenges for the implementation of the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia.

Chapter One: Literature Review

The crime reduction strategy being implemented in British Columbia is a new model for policing in Canada. Over the years, many models for policing, individual programs, and various policing strategies have been developed, implemented, and studied in an ongoing effort to become more effective in controlling or reducing crime and being more accountable to the public. These initiatives ranged from very small and relatively simple strategies to extremely complex models. The underlying goal of these efforts was to either prevent, reduce, or eliminate specific types of crimes or to achieve a broad-based reduction in the overall level of crime in Canada. For example, some programs or strategies sought to remove or reduce the opportunities for crimes to occur, while others sought ways to prevent individuals from committing crimes. Some were conducted by the police alone, while others were designed to engage the broader community in finding solutions to the causes of crime or implementing ways to prevent criminal behaviour. The literature review conducted for this major paper is, therefore, broad-based and examines the material on Community-Based Policing (CP), Problem-Oriented Policing (POP), Reassurance Policing, Broken Windows Theory, and other related material.

Crime reduction strategies involving robust supporting programs and the horizontal integration of services have been implemented primarily in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. While there is reference made to crime reduction in the United States and other jurisdictions in the research literature, this reference usually refers to a very specific, singular initiative directed at specific crime issues and not the system-wide integration characterizing a crime reduction strategy. Therefore, in this chapter, some of the programs or initiatives which preceded the introduction of a crime reduction strategy will be examined in an effort to demonstrate how police in British Columbia are attempting to develop a new model of policing.

Community Based Policing

Community-based policing began in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1980s (Kelling et al., 1974; Loftin and McDowall, 1982; Tien, Simon, & Larson 1978; Spelman and Brown, 1981; Kelling and Moore, 1988; Rosenbaum, 1998). Community-based policing was both a philosophy and an organizational strategy (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Its development was based on the theoretical perspective that police needed to engage the community directly and seek its support in order to effectively respond to crime and criminals. This strategy was part of a sociological shift that began in the early 1970s as part of the move away from the penal-welfare state and towards a more neo-liberal approach to the governance of social issues.

According to Garland (2001), the prevalence of high crime rates and disorder led to the recognition that the criminal justice system had a limited ability to control crime and ensure public security. This conclusion was accompanied by a change in how society generally viewed offenders. In other words, during this time, society had less confidence in models of rehabilitation and demanded the imposition of harsher sentences. Rather than blaming criminal conduct on what Garland described as “defective or poorly adapted individuals” (2001:148), society believed that individuals were responsible for their actions and, therefore, should be held accountable. Crime was seen as normal and commonplace in contemporary society and committed by “normal” individuals. In response to this evolving environment, agents within the criminal justice system developed new strategies that appealed to the political, popular, and professional sectors and made members of the public and community organizations increasingly more responsible for crime control (Garland, 1996).

Kelling (1988) suggested that the move to community policing was also due to growing citizen disenchantment with police services and an increased frustration with the traditional role of the police officer. He claimed that there was widespread disenchantment, especially among minorities, with the use of police methods that resulted in police officers becoming increasingly

remote and distant from the citizens they served. Research on certain policing strategies, such as rapid response, preventive patrols, and investigation, indicated that these approaches had little or no effect on reducing crime, reducing citizen levels of fear of victimization, or increasing the public's satisfaction with their police (Edwards, 1999). Given this, it was believed that community policing could reduce levels of crime and disorder and improve the quality of life of citizens by including them in the policing process. In other words, the model of community policing saw the police and the community as partners in fighting crime (Sparrow, 1988). Trojanowicz and Carter (1988) defined community policing as a proactive and decentralized approach designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime by assigning the same officer in a specific geographic area on a long-term basis. In effect, the overarching strategy was that the police would know the community and the community would know its police.

Riechers and Roberg (1990) also described the goals of community policing as fear reduction, increased citizen satisfaction with police, and the development of techniques that addressed the specific problems or needs of the community. At its core, community policing was designed to promote mutual trust and cooperation between the community and the police, and challenge people to work together to make their communities safer. However, achieving this goal would require a substantial shift in the roles and responsibilities of the police and the community. While community police officers would provide the impetus in confronting crime, fear of crime, and decay and disorder in neighborhoods, community members would be more active in shaping police objectives, providing information to the police, and playing a critical role in the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1992).

Community policing was, therefore, associated with decentralized, geographically-based policing that advocated closer community relationships. Community policing required that the police and the community worked together to promote mutual trust and cooperation, and empowered neighborhoods to fight crime, drugs, and the public effects of apathy, despair, and social unrest (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1992). As implemented in several police

departments throughout the United States, community policing was, and continues to be, primarily concerned with quality of life issues, such as fear of crime and victimization (Moore and Trojanowicz, 1988), and improving citizen perceptions of the police with an emphasis on effective working partnerships (Peak, Bradshaw, & Glensor, 1992; Peak and Glensor, 1999).

With the development of this model of policing, the public learned how to protect themselves, how to avoid risky situations, and, in many cases, to lower their expectations of the criminal justice system. These were what Garland (2001) described as “responsibilization strategies”, or attempts by the state to extend its reach through state agencies to actors in the community and private sectors. The goal was to produce “an enhanced network of more or less directed, more or less informal crime control, complementing and extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state” (Garland, 2001:124). Although described in various ways, such as the emergence of situational crime prevention and reducing opportunities for crime, in effect, the onus to prevent and to avoid crime shifted to the victim or potential victim. This shift also involved a change from the understanding that crime could be managed and controlled to recognition that crime was normative; something to be both aware of and to accept personal responsibility for avoiding.

The importance of the emergence of community-based policing was that it contributed philosophically and practically to one of the foundational components of the CRS; namely that not only is rehabilitation possible, but that it is the only way that long-term progress to reduce crime can be achieved. Moreover, responsibilization strategies recognized that effectively dealing with crime was beyond the capacity and capability of the police alone. In other words, the general public had to be part of crime reduction solutions. The CRS takes this understanding beyond community involvement to the idea of integrated justice in that the solution to many of the underlying causes of crime lie beyond the control of police and, in some cases, beyond the control of community groups. For example, the provision of effective drug treatment programs

requires support from various levels of government due to the fact that program and legislative responsibility is shared.

Still, community policing in the Canadian context has not been able to achieve all of its stated objectives. One of the main reasons for this is that it is difficult to determine what is meant by community (Griffiths et al., 2001). As a result of communities becoming more diverse with community members more mobile and less interested in community affairs, it is difficult to get people who live in the same geographic area to agree that they represent or are part of a community. Moreover, people are less likely to know their neighbours or to identify themselves as part of a “community”, particularly in large urban centers (Griffiths et al., 2001). Skolnick and Bayley made similar comments with respect to “community” noting that “sociologically, the concept of community implies a group of people with a common history, common beliefs and understandings, sense of themselves as ‘us’ and outsiders as ‘them’ and often, but not always, a shared territory” (1986:116). In other words, a common geography may have more to do with the concept of a neighbourhood than a community. Moreover, “genuine communities are probably very rare in modern cities and wherever they do exist, have little interest in cultivating a relationship of any kind with police” (1986:136). If so, one’s community may have much more to do with the people that an individual feels emotionally, socially, or psychologically connected to rather than a shared geographic space.

Another important issue that comes out of the community-based policing model is that, as a general rule, the type of crime which causes the most observable frustration and concern to the community is typically what is visible to those living in the community³. This would include property crimes, frauds, drug possession offences, drug trafficking offences, and public rowdiness; those crimes most commonly experienced by citizens. As crime rates rise, police organizations adjust their priorities accordingly (Malm et al., 2005). As a result, more serious

³ According to B.C. Crime Statistics 2005 – 2006, violent crime comprised only 10% of total reported crimes in B.C. with property crimes accounting for over 50% of the total figure. In terms of setting policing priorities, however, these type crimes are often considered the least serious.

criminality increasingly receives less attention in terms of police response because these kinds of offences are not the primary focus of the public. Community policing programs, therefore, often deal with relatively less serious crimes, particularly those which directly involve community members taking some sort of action.⁴ As a consequence, community policing may result in programs designed to deal with or prevent more serious crimes either being cancelled or significantly altered in ways which make them less successful or useful. Based on these theoretical and practical issues, an alternative approach which builds on the successes of community policing and attempts to alleviate some of its challenges is Problem-Oriented Policing.

Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)

Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) is considered by some as an attempt to re-work the standard operating procedures of policing. It is designed to deal with the underlying conditions which cause crime and disorder by requiring officers to recognize those factors and respond to them. The methodology became known as SARA; scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (Goldstein, 1979). This process required the police to analyze their work and identify issues that could be successfully addressed by employing problem solving techniques (Goldstein, 1990). Removing the opportunity for crime, such as by implementing anti-theft strategies or devices, is just one basic example of problem solving techniques. Another strategy is altering personal travel patterns to avoid high crime locales in order to reduce the risk of victimization. Moore (1992) suggested that thought and analyses were fundamental to problem-oriented policing as these elements were necessary to respond effectively to the causes of crime and the ability to utilize alternatives other than arrest when crime did occur. Spelman and Eck (1987b) suggested that problem-oriented policing converged on three main themes: (1) increased effectiveness; (2)

⁴ Some of the more common programs associated with Community Policing include Block Watch programs, Citizens on Patrol, graffiti reduction, and “lookout” programs targeting, for example, marihuana grow operations or clandestine drug production labs.

reliance on the expertise and creativity of line officers; and (3) closer involvement with the public. For them, these objectives could be realized by attacking the underlying causes of behaviours that utilized patrol and investigative time, such as responding to false alarms or to complaints where there is little likelihood of finding the subject of the complaint or solving the crime. Carrying over from the community policing model, the POP approach encourages officers to study problems and develop innovative solutions to ensure that they addressed the needs of the community.

Compared to community-based policing, POP further defined the relationship between police and the community by adding a more sophisticated approach to problem solving and efforts to address the underlying causes of crime. Comparing the two approaches, problem-solving and community policing are both strategic concepts that seek to redefine the ends and means of policing. However, POP focuses police attention on the problems that contribute to criminal incidents, rather than on the incidents exclusively. Conversely, community policing more commonly emphasizes the establishment of working partnerships between police and communities to reduce crime and enhance security. Still, absent from both approaches are effective processes to facilitate integration of services and the critical component of government involvement and leadership. The addition of integration represents the step forward achieved by the crime reduction strategy.

For some, the theories grounding community policing and problem-oriented policing overlap (Moore, 1992). According to Moore's assessment, if both strategies occur routinely, community policing becomes indistinguishable from problem-oriented policing. For Moore, a solid POP philosophy should: (1) allow officers to gather information about all the circumstances contributing to problems so that their underlying causes may be better understood; (2) the design of police operations should be oriented to deal with these identified problems; (3) evaluation measures should be developed to determine whether the design of the police operation has been successful; and (4) police must recognize the important role of the community in selecting the

problems to be addressed by the police and in designing and implementing solutions. While all of these elements are seen as critical, it is the fourth element that is considered paramount. For Moore, the goals of crime fighting are best achieved by establishing trusting relations with the community. There is also a need to recognize that police have broader opportunities to prevent and control crime. However, the current model of policing in Canada is not exclusively influenced by community policing models or POP. Rather, policing has been influenced by a number of other approaches.

Table 1 presented below attempts to capture the key components of the three major approaches to policing strategies employed over the past 30 years; beginning with Community Based Policing, progressing through Problem Oriented Policing, and ending with the Crime Reduction Strategy.

Table 1: Overview of Policing Strategies

Community Policing	Problem Oriented Policing	Crime Reduction
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce fear • Promote trust • Decentralize police • Empower neighborhoods • Rehabilitate offenders • Engage community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Problem analysis • Problem solving • Increased effectiveness • Focus on causes of crime • Better design of police structures • Closer involvement with community 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence-based approach • Broad-based and effective partnerships • Shared vision and shared crime reduction targets • Strong accountability structures • Rigorous evaluation of programs • Recognition that solutions to crime go well beyond policing • Integrated justice structures across community and government • Integration of community concerns and their direct involvement in solutions

There is a gradual progression throughout these strategies to develop stronger partnerships and increasingly more sophisticated problem solving techniques. It is the extent of this progression, together with the fundamental changes which result from a truly integrated justice system, which distinguishes crime reduction from the previous two strategies.

Other Approaches to Policing

Models of policing or policing strategies have also been affected over the years by criminological or sociological theories. One such theory is broken windows theory. This theory holds that “crime was encouraged by allowing activities that created the impression in particular places that standards of civility were such that no one cared, that anything goes. The primary indicators of such ‘free-fire’ places were signs of physical deterioration (broken windows) and disorderly behavior (panhandling)” (Wilson and Kelling, 1982: 136). Broken windows theory posited that certain neighbourhood characteristics, such as litter on the street or open drug trafficking, send signals about the health of the community in terms of crime, and that visible evidence of decay, such as broken windows or the visible deterioration of buildings, encouraged crime and caused residents to feel vulnerable, unsafe, and less willing to intervene to maintain public order. This theory suggested that paying attention to these issues, for example by repairing broken windows or keeping the neighbourhood clean, could help prevent and reduce neighbourhood levels of crime. In effect, the main contention raised by this theoretical approach was that neighbourhoods that did not tolerate minor forms of delinquency, deviancy, or criminality or signs of social disorder prevented the establishment of more major forms of disorder. Evidence in support of this theory is somewhat difficult to find, to the extent that it can actually achieve a significant reduction in a broad range of crimes. While there is some evidence to support the notion that vandalism and littering may be reduced, there is little empirical evidence to support the claim that the reduction of petty crime or anti-social behavior necessarily leads to the prevention of major crimes (Lott, 2000). Moreover, any relationship between disorder and

serious crime was found to be modest at best (Thacher, 2004). Critics pointed to the fact that during the 1990's, major crimes dropped significantly in many large cities in the U.S., including those that had not adopted broken windows strategies. Others noted that alternative explanations needed to be considered, including changing demographics and even the legalization of abortion in the late 1980s (Levitt and Dubner, 2005) as having a more direct role in the reduction of crime.

Within a relatively short period of time, “reassurance policing” (Fielding and Innes, 2006; Herrington and Millie, 2006) developed in the United Kingdom as a variation of “broken windows”. The Home Office, the Department of Communities, and local governments rolled this strategy out under the livability agenda with a major focus of swiftly responding to graffiti and vandalism. The Government claimed to be committed to the principle of community engagement in policing and to delivering 'neighborhood policing' stating that the interface between these two concepts was crucial. In the United Kingdom, 'citizen focus' was the broad philosophy for policing whereas neighborhood policing was focused specifically on crime, disorder, feelings of safety, and service delivery in local areas.⁵ Accountability of police services to their communities was one of the main objectives of the initiative. In this way, citizen-focused policing and neighbourhood policing are comparable and similar to community policing in the United States.

Neighbourhood policing holds that community engagement must ensure community participation at all levels of policing. However, it also recognized that a program of neighbourhood policing will not automatically deliver community engagement (Herrington and Millie, 2006). Reassurance policing was included as part of the 2002 Police Reform Act, successive National Policing Plans, and the 2004 Police Reform White Paper. This strategy evolved from concern that, while the crime rate was falling, there was a public perception that it

⁵ <http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/police-reform/reform-programme/citizen-focus/neighbourhood-policing>

had continued to rise. This disparity was called the “reassurance gap” with reassurance policing seen as a way of closing the gap by providing better information to the public.

The importance of examining these other programs is to understand what has worked historically in local and national efforts to control or reduce crime, and how successful innovations might be adapted to the Canadian context. This is necessary because, notwithstanding the goals of community policing, problem-oriented policing, and other programs, initiatives, and theories, crime in Canada has generally increased over the years with a corresponding drop in the level of efficiency of various components of the CJS, including the police. It can be argued, therefore, that there is room for significant improvement across the entire CJS, particularly in British Columbia because one of the reasons for the increase in crime may be the lack of effective integration between agencies and the absence of a focused approach to seeking solutions to crime related issues.

Rather than a complete rejection of previous policing models, the current RCMP decision to adopt crime reduction strategies in British Columbia should be seen as the next step in the process of evolving police work from the community policing model. The link between the two approaches is the demand by the public to have greater involvement and say in matters which affect them, such as policing. A key distinction, however, lies in the fact that, whereas community policing was primarily police driven, the CRS is a much more complex process involving a significant number of partner agencies in a structured fashion. Ideally, this strategy should be a government-led process which would set the vision for the strategy and provide leadership to facilitate strong integration across government agencies.

Given the realities of crime and criminals in the contemporary period, police organizations need to create at least two distinct pathways for dealing with the broad range of criminality today; one to respond to the type of criminality that community involvement can contribute to reducing and another which seeks to address more sophisticated crime and criminals. Community policing models are too simplistic to address crime issues in the 21st

century due to the increasing complexity of the issues underlying crime, as well as the need for more effective horizontal and vertical integration of the criminal justice system, other agencies responsible for social order, and the public.

An Evidence-Based Approach to Crime Reduction

One of the key considerations for the implementation of the CRS was to develop a partnership between the RCMP and academia. The topic of academic and police partnerships has been the subject of discussion at various levels in recent years (Laycock, 2001). However, it was not until recently that meaningful progress has been made on the issue in Canada. Although it is possible to point to a number of short-term initiatives that have examined a specific crime-related issue, there are no examples of formal, long-term relationships between the police and academia directed at the broad issue of significantly reducing crime in society and finding ways to make these reductions sustainable.⁶

This type of partnership has substantial benefits for both parties. For academia, a key benefit of this developing partnership is the ability to gain access to police data, rather than publicly available data. For police, it means access to evidence-based research with which to develop programs, as well as the ability to conduct effective, detailed, and timely crime analysis.

In a 2001 paper, *Research for Police: Who Needs It?*, written for the Australian Institute of Criminology, Gloria Laycock argued that the time was right for a ‘more intimate’ relationship between researchers and practitioners given the growing emphasis on crime reduction and the new focus on outcomes. She argued that this new imperative highlighted the need for an evidence-based approach to crime reduction practices. The traditional relationship between academia and policing was described this way:

⁶ The Memorandum of Understanding between Simon Fraser University, the University College of the Fraser Valley, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Province of British Columbia, which assigned three University research Chairs to the RCMP for a period of five years, is the first partnership of its kind in Canada.

Practitioners and researchers have operated in different universes for a long time. Researchers study police practices and criticize what they find, because that is what researchers are trained to do. They publish their work in journals and worry about tenure, their next grant, the number of citations they have amassed and the purity of their methodology. Contributing to the development of policing is not always top of the list. The police complain and ignore the research: their perspective is that they do not need the hassle it causes and they can carry out the tasks required of them without any help from researchers (Laycock, 2001:1).

According to Laycock, fundamental changes to the “deep structure” of both the research community and to policing are underway based on the increased demands for “outcomes” to keep crime levels down. Furthermore, in those cases where crime has been reduced, there was little research to explain why that happened. As important as it is to actually make progress in the reduction of crime, it is perhaps equally important to understand why that progress had occurred so that successful efforts can be replicated, where appropriate, in other jurisdictions. As stated by Laycock, “while there are lots of books published each year on policing, there is no published knowledge base on what works and what does not work in the profession. The only way to establish a real body of knowledge is through systematic and prolonged investment in research” (2001:2).

Laycock’s position was that increasing citizen involvement in policing, with strengthened accountability structures, were important strategies for building trust and confidence in policing. Communication was seen as a key component in this process and she suggested that poor communication contributed to the community feeling unsafe which subsequently undermined the effectiveness of policing strategies (Laycock, 2001). It was these same issues which led to the introduction of neighbourhood policing in the United Kingdom.

Esserman and Pesare (2004) described the collaborative relationship between police in Providence, Rhode Island and the School of Justice Studies at Roger Williams University as recognizing the utility of having resources from outside the police department help extend severely strained police resources. As part of that specific partnership, the police department shared police data with the university in hopes that the data would be studied from an academic

perspective. Esserman and Pesare noted that the most immediate benefit to their collaboration was the practical application of research on police strategies.

Cosner and Loftus (2005) focused on the general attitude of the law enforcement culture towards research and noted that police, generally speaking, were practical and wanted concepts they could put to work immediately as opposed to theories which tended to broadly explain events. They concluded that action research was the best model for a police-researcher alliance because the participatory nature of the model produced better results for the police.⁷ According to Cosner and Loftus (2005), better results were defined by the police as evidence-based recommendations arising from research findings.

In summing up the need for partnering in research, Cosner and Loftus argued that:

Effective partnerships between leaders and academic researchers are critical to discovering and implementing best policing practices. Robust research projects performed within law enforcement agencies with the direct involvement of law enforcement leaders lead to sound and substantive policy. These partnerships are mutually satisfactory: researchers are intensely interested in pursuing such projects, while law enforcement leaders are just as interested in turning the results into enhanced policing practices (2005:3).

Developing this partnership, however, required a level of trust. Where undertaken, these experiments have demonstrated to the police that their involvement in research partnerships provided them with a critical role in defining issues of interest to them for research. The traditional obstacle to achieving this goal was the academic emphasis on publications in the absence of practical accountability. The solution was the development of a research model that included the needs of the police.

Jensen (2006) noted that evidence-based policing is a policing philosophy that applied equally to every aspect of policing. In other words, it is about having a sound basis for the techniques employed and the decisions made, all informed by reliable and relevant research.

Evidence-based policing is the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units, and officers. Put

⁷ Fraenkel and Wallen (1999) defined action research as research conducted by one or more individuals or groups for the purposes of solving a problem or obtaining information in order to inform local practice.

more simply, evidence-based policing uses research to guide practice and evaluate practitioners. It uses the best evidence to shape the best practice. It is a systematic effort to parse out and codify unsystematic “experience” as the basis for police work, refining it by ongoing systematic testing of hypotheses (Sherman 1998:8).

Sherman suggested that evidence-based policing “contains the principles of its own implementation” (1998: 10), in that the positive results will promote further implementation.

No institution is likely to increase voluntarily its accountability except under strong external pressure. It is unlikely that evidence-based policing could be adopted by a police executive simply because it appears to be a good idea. The history of evidence-based medicine and education strongly suggests that professionals will only make such changes under external coercion (Sherman, 1998:10).

Sherman contended that performance measures would force cooperation. While this may be true in other jurisdictions, the evidence-based approach in British Columbia was initiated by the police and without external pressure. The importance of this is that the RCMP may, therefore, be more ‘open’ to evidence-based research findings and more willing to partner with academics.

The role of evidence-based policing continues to gain prominence among the RCMP in British Columbia because most police organizations, in an effort to meet and address the complexities of policing, continually implement a wide range of programs and initiatives as they seek out new ways to be more effective and accountable. Most police organizations, however, are not particularly adept at doing the research required to develop and validate these initiatives.⁸ The proliferation of community policing initiatives over the past 30 years, in many respects, suffered from this lack of research. These efforts are another example of very popular and widespread programs which have had little peer-reviewed, empirically-based evaluations over the years. In fact, the same can be said of most programs in policing.⁹

Tilley and Laycock (2002) focused on several key components required in the evidence-based approach with respect to the need for a strong strategic planning capacity.

⁸ The D.A.R.E. program (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) is a good example of the extent to which some programs have been implemented and embraced by police organizations without the benefit of sound research.

⁹ As a senior manager within the RCMP, a member of the British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Canadian Chiefs of Police, the author has direct knowledge of the fact that there is little substantive research done within policing either before or after a program has been implemented.

If police and partnerships are to adopt this approach as a matter of routine, there needs to be capacity for strategic thinking at the appropriate level. In the United Kingdom, the currently most relevant policing level would be the basic command unit, to which, in many forces, resources are now delegated. For partnerships it is the district level local authority area at which statutory responsibility is pitched. In a small US police agency it might be at Chief Officer level whilst in the larger agencies it might be at precinct or district level (Tilley and Laycock, 2002:46).

In discussing the type of leaders needed, Tilley and Laycock stated:

The individual or group carrying out this function needs to be ‘research-literate’ – they need to know what the research literature has to say about problem specification and tactics, mechanisms and contexts. They also need to be sufficiently senior - carry enough clout - to be able to direct the use of police and other resources and, when relevant, to relate to other potential contributors to any strategic plan (2002:46).

The key points with respect to both of these comments are that careful consideration must be given to the distribution of resources which support and facilitate strategic thinking and evidence-based processes within an organization, and that those responsible for implementation and oversight need to be at a very senior level in the organization. The authors also commented on the requirement for good data about crime and criminals and stressed the importance of properly trained crime analysts. Finally, they stressed the importance of leverage in terms of partnerships.

It is now generally acknowledged that the police alone can have only a very partial effect on crime levels. They have limited detection and arrest capabilities. Moreover, enforcement is a relatively inefficient means of crime prevention. Pre-emptive tactics against crime generally call for actions beyond the direct control of the police. For this reason, partnership has been emphasized increasingly over the past two decades, and has become ubiquitous in Britain where it has been put on a statutory footing. This growth in partnership working should increase the likelihood that others will accept their crime reduction responsibilities. However, not all of those who can act belong to partnerships and of those who do belong; some may still be reluctant to incur the costs of prevention. Under these circumstances leverage may be necessary. As with prevention itself, the police may sometimes provide leverage directly on their own, and they may sometimes apply it with the help of collaborating partners. *Police and partnerships need to get better at exercising their considerable leverage to persuade hesitant agencies, institutions and individuals to play their part* (Laycock, 1996). There are several well-documented examples (see, for example, Laycock and Tilley, 1995) where leverage has led ‘reluctant’ partners to take action, when they may not have been keen to do so for financial or other reasons. Successful problem-solving requires familiarity with and skills in leverage. It is not enough to explain failure by referring to others’ failures to act. Effective

problem-solving includes finding ways to persuade them to do so (*Emphasis added*) (Tilley and Laycock, 2002:47).

The notion of leverage is important in the current context of British Columbia given that program implementation, at least to this point, has not resulted in the imposition of legislative requirements on agencies, nor have there been financial incentives for agencies to become involved in crime reduction strategies.

Intelligence-led Policing

The evidence-based approach has been closely linked to “intelligence-led” policing. However, according to Ratcliffe (2003), there is a degree of confusion in the literature over the meaning of intelligence-led policing. The term first came into use in the early 1990s, however, there remains no commonly accepted definition. The Criminal Intelligence Directorate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) used the following definition:

Intelligence-led policing is a term that has only begun to gain currency in the last few years. For this reason, it lacks a single, overarching definition. Most would agree, however, that at its most fundamental definition, intelligence-led policing involves the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels. It is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse. It is innovative and, by some standards, even radical, but it is predicated on the notion that a principal task of the police is to prevent and detect crime rather than simply to react to it (Smith, 1998).

It should be noted that this description pre-dates the introduction of the CRS in British Columbia and, therefore, should be expanded to recognize the contribution of an evidence-based approach through partnerships with academia.

Beginning in 1993, several reports and papers in the United Kingdom and Australia examined the concepts that would eventually be recognized as intelligence-led policing. The Audit Commission Report into police effectiveness was one of the first to examine the relationship between economic accountability and effective policing (Audit Commission, 1993). This report identified three specific areas of focus with respect to becoming more effective at reducing and preventing crime: (1) the existing roles and the level of accountability lacked

integration and efficiency; (2) police were failing to make the best use of resources; and (3) a greater emphasis on criminals would be more effective than focusing on crimes.

In 1997, a publication by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), *Policing With Intelligence*, provided a clear vision for intelligence-led policing. The general theme was the recognition of the strong link between the concept of intelligence-led policing and the implementation of crime reduction strategies. The aim of the process, according to Ratcliffe (2003), could be interpreted from the tactical tasking priorities of the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Model (NIM) which concentrated on four key elements: (1) targeting offenders (especially the targeting of active criminals through overt and covert means); (2) the management of crime and disorder hotspots; (3) the investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents; and (4) the application of preventative measures, including working with local partnerships to reduce crime and disorder (NCIS 2000).

One of the key principles identified through the development of NIM were theories about prolific offenders and the recognition that a relatively small percentage of criminal offenders were responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. More important was the decision to concentrate on offenders as opposed to crime.¹⁰ The research also informed a number of policy issues, such as the Drug Intervention Program and issues around offender management. One of the key reasons for the implementation of NIM was the need for a more systematic use of intelligence across operational units and the use of research to better inform the hierarchy of strategic priorities. Based on these developments, Ratcliffe defined intelligence-led policing as

¹⁰ This represents an interesting parallel to the approach taken by the RCMP in the late-1990s to shift from "commodity-based enforcement" to targeting offenders or offending organizations. The essence of this approach was captured in the RCMP Operations Model in place since 1998 and can be described as an offender-based model designed to target the most significant criminals in a given jurisdiction.

“the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evidential base” (Ratcliff 2003:3). Given that there was a limited ability for the police to significantly affect the level of crime in society, Ratcliffe acknowledged the power of effective partnerships in addressing the causal factors underlying crime and the ability to reduce crime. Indeed, it could be said that partnerships, such as those developed under the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) agreements in use in the United Kingdom, are the cornerstone of effective crime reduction strategies and the key component in an intelligence-led strategy.

In addressing another key element of intelligence-led policing, Cope (2004) argued that there was an inadequate understanding amongst police officers of the value of crime analysis. This lack of awareness resulted in an ineffective use of crime-analyst products and skills. Cope suggested that a “clash of cultures” was one of the principle barriers to the integration of analysis into policing. This clash was primarily a result of a police culture that did not accept the “civilian” view of how certain investigative work should be undertaken. However, this is one of the key barriers to overcome if an agency is to achieve true intelligence-led status.¹¹ The importance of police organizations addressing this problem cannot be overstated as an analytical capacity and capability is a key foundational piece of establishing effective intelligence-led practices and strategies. It is for these reasons that crime analysis received significant attention in the crime reduction strategy implementation process in British Columbia.

It may be that the gap between evidence-based policing and intelligence-led policing has narrowed to a point where they have become indistinguishable. At its inception, intelligence-led policing seemed to have a strong operational focus on the effective targeting of criminals and

¹¹ It is worthy of note that the Criminal Intelligence Program within the Royal Canadian Police in British Columbia , since 2001, has been headed by a civilian member of the Force.

criminal organizations, as opposed to a more broad, policy-based approach to examining both operational and administrative issues in policing.

In sum, several key concepts arise from an analysis of community-based policing, evidence-based approaches, and intelligence-led policing. All three models support the rationale for change on the basis that the capacity for police to respond to crime has been greatly diminished and that it is imperative to become more effective with available resources. Another key issue is that the complexity of policing and the nature of crime have forced police to reconsider and to reevaluate basic assumptions about what current policing strategies can achieve. For example, at the local level in British Columbia, despite efforts to improve the effectiveness of the CJS, a number of complexities, such as judicial disclosure and new and evolving criminal case law, continue to contribute to an ever-expanding capacity gap in the CJS.

Beyond a lack of effectiveness in reducing crime, the increasing costs associated with policing, and other pressures on policing, there are other good reasons for changing the current approach to policing and to examine and evaluate how policing interrelates with other parts of the CJS and the Canadian public. It is time to move on from the community policing model to a model which brings greater inclusion and integration of all of the parties with a stake in crime issues. However, this does not mean that there is a need to discard programs like community policing or problem-oriented policing. Perhaps too much is expected of programs that have not been adequately adjusted over the past three decades to respond to the changes in both the policing environment and in society.¹²

Community policing was a necessary step in the evolution of policing; a key step in building community involvement and community awareness about the complexities of policing. Properly adapting the next phase of community policing will be an important element in educating and building consensus at the community level on the next step in the evolution of

¹² The increases in the reporting of criminal code cases with the corresponding decline of police clearances rates mentioned earlier support the contention that these programs have not met their goals with respect to the reduction of crime.

policing strategies. It is useful to note that many of the problems identified in this chapter have been addressed in the CRS implemented in the United Kingdom. The next chapter, therefore, will explore the United Kingdom's crime reduction strategy experience in greater detail with an emphasis on the evaluation of this approach.

Chapter Two: The Crime Reduction Experience in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the implementation of the Crime Reduction Program (CRP) was driven from the top down in a government-led process involving significant funding, new legislation, and a broad infrastructure to facilitate implementation (Home Office, 2006).¹³ The Home Office is responsible for public safety and security in England and Wales, including policing, corrections, and criminological research. The Home Office is the lead department for the government-wide policy commitment to reducing the volume of crime. This policy mandate was supported by the *Crime and Disorder Act* (1998) which required active participation in crime reduction programs by all local governments and agencies and by all departments and agencies of the central government. At the local level, crime reduction is pursued through Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships or legislatively mandated multi-agency entities with specific crime reduction responsibilities. The Crime Reduction Program enjoyed a high degree of political support from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet (Homel et al, 2004).

The overarching goals for the approach were set out in the *National Community Safety Plan 2006-2009*. The plan was best described by the following three statements from Hazel Blears:¹⁴

If we are to make our communities still safer, everyone, from the heart of national government, through regional and local partners, right through to neighborhoods and the people who live in them must play their part. We need to create a new relationship between public services and the communities they serve which will encourage accountability, trust, and cooperation a mutual respect. And we need to

¹³ During the course of this research, Crime Reduction Programs and initiatives in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand were reviewed. In April, 2006, a delegation from Canada comprised of Dr. Paul Brantingham, Dr. Patricia Brantingham, Dr. Darryl Plecas, Dr. Allan Castle, Assistant Commissioner Al Macintyre, Chief Supt. Fraser MacAuley, and Assistant Commissioner Gary Bass, led by Fiona Young of the United Kingdom, traveled to the United Kingdom and held extensive meetings with Government, police, and other officials. There was little evidence of similar programs in existence elsewhere in the world. Although there are programs identified as “crime reduction” in the United States, for the most part, they are targeted initiatives directed at a specific crime type and do not involve a comprehensive set of initiatives such as those set out in the United Kingdom.

¹⁴ Minister of State for the Home Office.

work together to tackle extremism and racism in all its forms.” (Emphasis added) (National Community Safety Plan, p. 2).

The reference to a “new” relationship between public services and communities is a key aspect of a strategic change mentioned above. This new relationship points to the need to move beyond a general relationship between the police and communities to one which includes government in the description of public services. This point is emphasized further as:

The National Community Safety Plan is not limited to the work of the police. Crucial as their role is, they alone cannot provide for all our safety and security. That is why, shortly after taking office, we legislated to introduce Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships across England and Wales. We brought together for the first time ever, all the chief players at the local level the police, police authorities, local government, primary care trusts, children’s trusts, fire services and other public sector bodies to prevent and reduce crime and anti-social behavior.... But, it is communities themselves which lie at the heart of the plan. We need them to identify the community safety priorities for their neighbourhoods, work with the key agencies at the local level to make sure they are tackled responsibly and effectively and then hold them to account for what they have promised to do. We must remember that the public will only feel safe if they have confidence that the agencies on whom they rely are responsive to their concerns and are providing high quality services to them (National Community Safety Plan 2006-2009:3).

In short, the national government in the United Kingdom has taken a very pro-active and serious role in ensuring that crime reduction strategies in England and Wales are a reality. The plan ensures that everyone understands their roles in community safety. Legislation and performance agreements for all partner agencies brought local governments and other social agencies into active participation in the program.

The current National Community Safety Plan began with a list of crime reduction accomplishments resulting from government initiatives.¹⁵ It then set out the national government’s key community safety priorities for the next three years. It also set out its expectations for key public partners in improving community safety. As the plan contained the Home Secretary’s priorities for the police, it also served as the National Policing Plan. The five community safety themes of the government, as set out in the plan, were: (1) making

¹⁵ Briefing by Steve Trimmins of the Home Office.

communities stronger and more effective; (2) further reducing crime and anti-social behavior; (3) creating safer environments; (4) protecting the public and building confidence; and (5) improving people's lives so they are less likely to commit offences or re-offend (Home Office 2005). Each of these themes was broken down into key strategic deliverables or goals to be accomplished by 2008.

The Home Office took the lead in building a safe, just, and tolerant society in England and Wales.¹⁶ To do so, it set a number of key goals which included reducing the fear of crime, focusing on prolific offenders, and ensuring that citizens, communities, and the private sector became more engaged in seeking solutions to crime problems. The Home Office clearly understood that community safety was the product of partnership and that the police were only one of many partners in this endeavor.

Recognizing that informal arrangements prior to 1998 had not worked in a wholly satisfactory way, as they had no consistent mandate and evaluation, legislation was enacted to formalize crime reduction partnerships in the United Kingdom. The *Crime and Disorder Act* (CDA) mandated the creation of new community partnerships with statutory responsibilities. In essence, the CDA was an enabler, a catalyst for action that drew attention to five key areas in reducing crime and promoting communities: (1) targeting prolific offenders; (2) developing effective drug intervention programs; (3) developing a comprehensive drug strategy; (4) reducing re-offending; and (5) engaging communities. The first two involved the implementation of specific programs, while the others were more broadly based policies. The CDA imposed on local communities, and on the various public agencies that contributed to the safety and healthiness of the community, a statutory requirement to take action to reduce crime and disorder

¹⁶ Briefing by David Truscott, United Kingdom Home Office, April 18th, 2006.

(Home Office, 2006). In other words, improving community well-being was the central aim of the legislation.

The CDA also called for performance management and effectiveness evaluation. In pursuit of these objectives, public funds were being expended and the Home Office and the government wanted to know that these funds were being used in an appropriate and value-added fashion. To achieve these objectives, the inclusion and definitions of performance management measurement occurred through a series of agreements and frameworks which included: (1) local area agreements with local strategic partnerships; (2) performance agreements with Drug Action Teams and CDRPs; (3) local Criminal Justice Board performance frameworks; (4) best value performance indicators regime (applied to police, local authorities, and CDRPs); and (5) a police performance assessment framework (Home Office 2001). Taken together, these elements provide a strong framework for effective partnerships with mechanisms to ensure that it is possible to have all of the partners helping each other achieve their goals. At the local level, there were generally five agencies which formed the core of the scheme: (1) the police; (2) the fire department; (3) health; (4) education; (5) and, where applicable, the police board which was identified as a responsible body under the Act.

Preliminary results indicated that success was contingent on the participation by the top management level in every respective agency.¹⁷ Moreover, effective performance required collaborative work by decision-makers. In other words, effective participation could not be delegated down. In fact, participants were pushed for solutions.¹⁸ Timely data and information sharing between participating agencies were critical for successful crime reduction programs. The integration and coordination of criminal justice system activities that often operated independently and sometimes operated in an adversarial nature formed an important part of the overall crime reduction initiative. This conclusion was based on the belief that it made little

¹⁷ Briefing By David Truscott, Home Office, April 18th, 2006.

¹⁸ Briefing by Chief Constable, Northumbria Police, April 21st, 2006.

sense to improve the effectiveness of one part of the criminal justice system if other parts of the system lacked the capacity to handle changed case volumes or could not themselves increase their operating effectiveness.

Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal trial process through the better trials unit, for example, was a major justice reform initiative within the overall crime reduction programme. The Better Trials Unit is responsible for policy on the laws governing procedures in the magistrates' courts, the Crown Court, and the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), including policy on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings, and implementing the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This provides a good example of how achieving efficiencies in one part of the CJS can have a positive impact on other parts of the CJS. Reducing the number of court appearances an accused makes prior to trial and shortening the length of criminal trials not only saves time, money, and resources in the court system, but also reduces policing costs, costs to the accused and his family, as well as saving costs to victims.

National coordination and leadership provided under the National Community Safety Plan was quite remarkable and was probably one of the key elements to the strategy's overall success (National Community Safety Plan, 2006 - 2009). The government took a pro-active and focused role in ensuring the crime reduction strategy in the U.K. was not just a strategy, but a reality. Through this plan, the government ensured that everyone understood that they had a role to play in community safety and that they needed to work together in order to achieve success. The clear vision of the government was well articulated and was supported by excellent communication tools on the web and in print. This carried through to the local offices around the country.

The high degree of integration and the strength of partnerships were impressive. Regardless of government will, money, resources, or any other factor, a program of this nature could not work without strong and trusting partnerships. The tools of the trade, with respect to this ambitious program, were the Prolific and Priority Offender Program¹⁹, the targeting of crime hot spots, the targeting of the most victimized, and a strong drug intervention program supported by wrap-around services and solid oversight from the courts. The CDA also introduced a range of youth justice provisions which led to the establishment of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs). The mandate of the YOTs was framed in Section 38 of the 1998 CDA. The goals of this program included preventing young people from offending in the first instance, carrying out standardized assessments of young people entering the CJS, and delivering intervention programs for young people. There was also a Street Crime initiative²⁰ and the Liveability and Respect Agenda²¹. Finally, it should be noted that ongoing program evaluation was considered important and was carried out with considerable rigor in efforts to follow an evidence-based approach to initiatives.

The Prolific and Priority Offender Strategy

The crime reduction approach in the United Kingdom is both simple and complex. At its heart is a focused approach on a relatively small proportion of the offender population, the prolific and priority offenders (PPO), who are responsible for a disproportional amount of crime. The theory underlying this approach is that by dealing effectively with this group of offenders, a substantial reduction in raw numbers of criminal offences will occur over time (Home Office,

¹⁹ The Newcastle PPO field observation was hosted by Detective Constable John Snowdon and Probation Officer Laura Seebohm.

²⁰ The Street Crime Initiative began in March 2002 with the aim of reducing street crime (robbery and snatch theft) in the 10 worst affected areas in England. These 10 areas accounted for over 80% of all robberies in England and Wales. A joint inspection of the agencies involved in the initiative found many examples of good practice and found it to be effective in reducing street crime. However, the inspection found room for improvement, particularly in the rehabilitation of offenders.

²¹ Described by the Home Office as a coherent policy package delivered through governance changes and service improvement to empower people so that they can shape the public services they use and influence decisions about the things that matter to them.

2001). The goal of the PPO strategy was to reduce the number of overall crimes through the selective targeting of a relatively small percentage of criminals. The target population of persistent offenders was identified from the volume and nature of the crimes they committed and the damage they inflicted on local communities. The strategy was, however, more complex than simply police targeting of offenders. The PPO strategy was designed to deal with both prolific offending and its root causes by: (1) preventing and deterring potentially prolific offenders; (2) catching and convicting those who were already prolific offenders; and (3) rehabilitating and resettling offenders back into the community (Home Office, 2001). These components were referred to as the three strands of the strategy in the United Kingdom's model.

The "Prevent and Deter" part of the strategy aimed to stop people, overwhelmingly young people, from entering the prolific offender group (Home Office, 2001). Essentially, it involved targeting youth at risk of becoming prolific offenders, seeking to address issues leading to criminality, and preventing any further involvement in crime. The second component of the strategy, "Catch and Convict", aimed to arrest and prosecute those who were already prolific offenders (Home Office, 2001). It was this part of the strategy that the police had the most influence over and was, therefore, the logical starting point of a CRS. The third component, "Rehabilitate and Resettle", worked to enable the identified PPO group to stop offending by offering offenders a range of supportive interventions. This aspect proved to be the most critical in terms of reducing recidivism and crime because without dealing with the underlying causes of a criminal's lifestyle, such as drug dependence which leads to acquisitive crimes, the offender was more likely to continue with their offending. Any benefit gained as a result of temporarily intervening in their ability to commit crimes, for example through incarceration, was typically lost upon their release back into society without community supports and services. Nowhere in the strategy was the power of effective partnerships more important because it required the coordinated application of resources from many agencies to effectively deal with all of the issues which contribute to offending.

The United Kingdom determined that it was not wise to impose a single definition for a PPO across the country, but rather to set general guidelines and allow local authorities to define a prolific offender within the context of their own jurisdiction (Home Office 2001). This was due to the different range of subjective values that various cities and communities placed on the various types of criminal behavior. For example, a certain crime considered serious in a small community may not pose much concern in a larger city. It was decided, therefore, that communities should be left some discretion in deciding their key priorities. Nonetheless, there were guidelines established to assist in the selection of PPOs outlined in the National Intelligence Model. These guidelines suggested that the definition of prolific offenders should consider: (1) the nature and volume of the crimes an offender committed; (2) the nature and volume of other harms the offender caused; and (3) other local criteria based on the impact of the offender on their local communities (Home office 2001). British Columbia has developed these criteria into three specific areas: (1) offenders who committed a high volume of relatively less serious offences, such as thefts to support drug addictions; (2) offenders who committed more serious crimes, such as sex crimes or armed robberies; and (3) appropriately called priority offenders, individuals who were members of organized crime groups, for example, even if they had no prior convictions.²²

The manner in which PPOs were confronted and dealt with was a key aspect of the success achieved in various parts of the United Kingdom. The approach was a mixture of empathy and tough actions. There was recognition that these offenders, in particular, were often characterized by a range of social problems needing attention. There was also the recognition that offenders must clearly understand that they were facing a united approach from the CJS with the goal of helping them rehabilitate (Home Office, 2007). Part of this process involved police and probation jointly at the time when offenders were first told that they were designated PPOs

²² Discussions within the senior management team of the RCMP, "E" Division November. 2006.

and that there would be a concentrated focus on them. Offenders were clearly told that while the ultimate goal was rehabilitation, they would be monitored closely and expected to stay out of crime and to obey court imposed conditions. They were also made to understand that violations of conditions would result in a swift return to court. On the other hand, offenders understood that they would receive assistance in dealing with any underlying issues that contributed to their offending (Home Office, 2007). As this type of assistance frequently involved drug treatment, a close working relationship between several agencies was necessary.

The PPO strategy was led by Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). The emphasis was a multi-agency approach to deal with both the crime issue and the individual offender. These partnerships included a broad range of agencies, such as police, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), prisons and probation, health, education, housing, and others, working together with the local criminal justice board (LCJB) to catch, convict, monitor, and manage and rehabilitate offenders in the community or custody (Home Office, 2001). The LCJBs have CPS and court services as members and the PPO schemes have a joint focus on the complimentary targets of each partnership.

This specific approach is one of the key differences with community policing practices as, theoretically, it places much more rigor on the way partnerships are established and managed. Each CDRP is responsible for identifying its own target group of PPOs by using the National Intelligence Model and CDRP strategic priorities. This process enabled practitioners to identify the most prolific offenders, the most persistently anti-social in their behaviors, and those who posed the greatest threat to the safety and confidence of their local communities. Individuals could be identified as a PPO at any point in their offending cycle; before arrest, while in custody, or post-sentence. Joint partnerships between the police, probation, Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), and prisons remain critical to the success of the scheme.

Critical success factors that have been documented in the United Kingdom include: (1) ensuring that there are clear established protocols set up between agencies to exchange

information and establish effective communication from the outset; (2) adopting a strong multi-agency approach with active involvement from all agencies, including the police, probation, community drugs teams, alcohol services, employment and training services, housing, CPS, and the courts; (3) holding regular joint meetings to discuss the targeting of PPOs, the progress of offenders, or any operational issues; (4) the development of clear criteria for inclusion on the scheme and a clear referral process; and (5) developing good communication channels to ensure that offenders and potential offenders are diverted away from crime and anti-social behaviors and, where this does not occur, that swift police action is taken to arrest the offender and bring him or her before the courts.²³

This entire approach was designed to reduce the amount of criminal offending by extremely active offenders through apprehension, rendering these offenders unable to re-offend. An example of this type of offender might be a drug-dependent person who commits numerous property offences per day in order to sustain their drug habit. Moreover, this approach also attempts to get individuals out of crime altogether or, at a minimum, to reduce the number of crimes they commit. In effect, this is the long-term and key objective of the crime reduction strategy and is instrumental to achieving a sustainable reduction in crime.

Effective treatment programs are critical in lowering recidivism among the Prolific Offender cohort.²⁴ Often, this means drug treatment programs, but may also include treating a variety of other issues which contribute to offending, such as the presence of mental disorders, gainful employment problems, housing or mobility issues, and familial dysfunction. In other words, offender management teams must be fully integrated into seamless “wrap around” services providing offenders with opportunities to succeed.

This chapter has summarized the experiences to date with the CRP in the United Kingdom. The messages received through the broad range of interviews and presentations in

²³ Briefing on April 20th, 2006 in Newcastle, UK by Nicola Reasbeck, Crown Prosecution Service, who is on the Northumbria LCJB and Sheila Proudlock, Newcastle Area Director of HM Courts Service.

²⁴ Briefings by Drug Treatment Centre staff in Newcastle, UK on April 21st, 2006

London and in Newcastle had several consistent themes: (1) that strong and effective partnerships are critical and do work; (2) that a majority of prolific offenders can be at least partially rehabilitated; (3) that effective drug treatment is critical and works; and (4) that a significant reduction in crime is both achievable and sustainable.²⁵ However, Canada's federal system of government does present some challenges in terms of setting a national vision and framework similar to that of the United Kingdom. For example, Canada does not have a framework mechanism like that described in the NIM. Another challenge in British Columbia will be the provision of adequate drug treatment programs. Some communities or cities will be in a better position to offer the full range of services and programs necessary to reduce recidivism over the long term. This has potential to raise allegations of unfair treatment in areas not able to respond as well. This said, any progress in the reduction of crime is a positive event, therefore, it may be argued that crime may be reduced to the relative degree of success of the initiative.

Evaluation of the Crime Reduction Program

In 2004, a comprehensive review of the Crime Reduction Program in the United Kingdom was completed by Homel et al.²⁶ The evaluation addressed three key questions: (1) If the CRP was about the further development of a crime reduction evidence base, to what extent has this evidence base been applied and extended?; (2) If the CRP was supposed to stimulate innovation, has it done so and how?; and (3) If the CRP was about increasing crime reduction activity, has this occurred and to what degree? In terms of methodology, the process of evaluation was managed through the Home Office's Research Development and Statistics

²⁵ The April, 2006 visit of the B.C. delegation to London and Newcastle involved presentations and discussions with over 60 U.K. officials representing the Home Office, municipal governments, police, probation workers, drug treatment workers, prosecutors, health care workers, youth workers, CDRP partners, and prolific offenders. These meetings provided a comprehensive understanding of how the initiative was working there and the degree of implementation.

²⁶ This should not be confused with the evaluations on the Prolific and Priority Offender Schemes which I shall discuss later.

Directorate (RDS), but the individual evaluation tasks, for the most part, were contracted out to independent research groups, mostly based in universities (Homel et al., 2004).

The evaluation concluded that, in general terms, the program did make extensive use of the available evidence (Homel et al., 2004). It found, however, that projects with less direct involvement with the Home Office tended to be less evidence-based. The evaluation program was considered to be of generally high quality resulting in extending the evidence base overall. Innovation was not achieved during the CRP's implementation process because of a struggle within the program between the original research/learning agenda and the subsequent mainstream program objectives of reducing volume crime (Homel et al., 2004).²⁷

The effective promotion and adoption of innovation required significant support and nurturing, however, the focus on innovation all but disappeared from the programme within 12 months of its inception. While it is not clear from the research why this occurred, it would appear that a stronger focus on issues related to funding received greater attention. Finally, the level of crime reduction activity produced was well below the original expectations and projections for the CRP.²⁸ While crime reduction activity increased substantially, and there were some promising signs that levels of activity would be sustained, the CRP demonstrated that programme delivery required more input than just money and good plans.

Maguire (2004) was critical of the Crime Reduction Program. He noted that the urgency of government priorities was used to replace proper research:

It suffered from major practical problems caused by unfeasible timescales, slow-moving bureaucratic procedures, and shortages of 'capacity'. Low commitment to project integrity, cultural resistance among practitioners, and insufficient attention to differences between academics' and policy makers' understandings of research, also contributed to its problems. While some useful outcomes can be claimed, the results of the Crime Reduction Programme as a whole were unquestionably disappointing (Maguire, 2004: 214).

²⁷ The term "volume crime" in the U.K. related generally to what we in Canada refer to as property crime.

²⁸ This was highlighted by the struggle within the programme between the original research/learning agenda and the subsequent mainstream programme objectives of reducing volume crime.

While the article was indeed generally critical of the program overall, Maguire did state:

Finally, despite the inevitably negative tone of much of this article, it is important to end by emphasizing that the CRP has by no means sunk without trace, and that some of its elements have not only produced useful research results but spawned new thinking and new practice initiatives. This is visible particularly in areas where investment in projects continued into a 'second phase', where there has been evidence of major improvement in project design and implementation as those involved have learned from previous mistakes (2004: 232).

Perhaps the key observation by Maguire was that:

As has been pointed out elsewhere in this volume, evaluating the 'effectiveness' of interventions is one of the most difficult of all research tasks, and it takes a long time and many studies before any faith can justifiably be placed in statements about how, when and why a particular response to crime or offenders is likely to produce an impact. *Given this, and given all the problems described earlier, it is tempting to conclude that the ideal of 'evidence-based policy' may be more effectively pursued as a series of quiet iterative processes in individual corners of the criminal justice arena, than through one large-scale and high profile 'programme'.* (Emphasis added) (2004: 233).

Tilley (2004) argued that social programs, such as Crime Reduction, were only as good as the theories upon which they were grounded. Therefore, as programs changed, theories had to adapt. It was important, he argued, that one be able to accurately identify and track the range of theories in order to effectively evaluate a program.

These two authors provided a useful perspective and context for examining the evaluation mechanisms for the CRP. The actual program being evaluated was the funded pilot programs beginning in April, 1999 and ending in March, 2002. Tilley (2004) detailed the key problems with the program and it is important that these reasons be well understood as other jurisdictions, such as British Columbia, move forward. According to Tilley (2004), the evidence-based rationale for the allocation of funding was compromised at the start with the distribution of more than £150 million additional money specifically for closed circuit television. While there were some promising research findings about the crime prevention effectiveness of CCTV in specific settings, notably car parks, findings in other settings were mixed and, on the whole, rather disappointing, notwithstanding public and political support (Poyner, 1991; Tilley, 1993; Ditton and Short, 1999; Phillips, 1999; Welsh and Farrington, 2003; Homel et al., forthcoming).

Additionally, local bids for funding were rarely rooted in local evidence and the measures proposed were not selected on the basis of the strength of evidence regarding their efficacy. A review of bids by an independent reviewer for the targeted policing stream determined that only 2% were well targeted in the light of evidence (Bullock et al., 2002). In addition, few bids involved innovative responses to problems. Rather, standard approaches tended to be proposed, for burglary reduction initiatives (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). Moreover, there was widespread implementation failure. In a few cases, little was done (Bullock and Tilley, 2003). In many cases, what was planned was not implemented, resulting in a 25% to 50% implementation failure rate. It would appear that this resulted from inadequate oversight (Bullock and Tilley, 2003; Hanmer, 2003). Homel et al. (forthcoming) reported a 25% to 50% project implementation failure rate. There were also substantial delays in implementation, specifically in the first year where only 13% of the budget was spent (Homel et al., forthcoming).

Because of the aforementioned weaknesses, few potentially informative projects emerged from the competitive bidding (Homel et al., forthcoming). Though some feedback was made available on the basis of early work (Tilley et al., 1999; Maguire et al., 2001), formal evaluation findings could not be produced within the original three-year timetable for the program. This resulted in lesson learning related to the effectiveness of preventive measures not being fed back into the program (Homel et al., forthcoming). There was also a strong sense among those responsible for organizing evaluations within the CRP that there was an inadequate supply of competent researchers capable of conducting the complex evaluations required (Homel et al., forthcoming). Finally, the implementation patterns meant that there was little detailed transferable theory testing (Polder, 1992; Ekblom et al., 1996; Bowers et al., 2004). Much of the criticism directed at the program, therefore, related to the manner in which funding was allocated and tracked and the poor quality of the evaluation research.

The Home Office (2005) initiated its own evaluation as a response to these criticisms. Early findings generally revealed a 10% drop in re-offending by persons in the PPO scheme

(Home Office, 2005). The final report on the PPO evaluation was released in 2007 (Home Office, 2007). The five key aims of the evaluation were to: (1) identify which offenders had been selected as PPOs; (2) explore how schemes had been implemented; (3) identify what interventions PPOs received; (4) understand the experiences and perceptions of those engaged by the PPO scheme; and (5) explore the affect that the PPO programme may have had on offending.

Research on the impact of the PPO program used a statistical technique called Propensity Score Matching (PSM).²⁹ There were also sixty interviews conducted with PPOs taken from across ten different Government Office regions, as well as fifty-two interviews with key PPO staff which included police, probation, and Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership representatives from ten Government Office regions (Home Office, 2007). One of the criticisms of the review was that the PSM methodology did not provide a definitive measure with respect to the impact of the PPO scheme on criminal offending and found it likely that the influence of unobserved variables had weakened the control group (Home Office, 2007). Notwithstanding possible problems with the establishment of a proper control group, the report found reason for optimism. One of the ways the evaluation measured success was by comparing the total number of convictions in the 17 months before and following the PPO program. This analysis revealed that there was a 43% reduction in the offending of the entire PPO cohort (Home Office, 2007).

There was also a substantial reduction in offending following entry into the program; a 62% reduction in overall convictions in the first 17 months. The rate of offending fell 24% from 0.51 convictions per month per PPO to 0.39 convictions per month per PPO over the first 12 months of entry into the program. The number of days between the commission of offences by members of the cohort and being sentenced for those offences was reduced by 13 days. Although

²⁹ A number of complementary research methods were used which, when taken together, aimed to provide a reasonable indication of the impact of the PPO programme. The methods used were a combination of offender interviews, PPO staff interviews, an analysis of the offending of PPOs prior to and following their entry into the PPO programme, and an attempt to draw comparisons between any changes in PPO offending with an appropriate control group identified using a statistical technique called Propensity Score Matching (PSM).

further analysis of the data was needed, the preliminary results were described as encouraging (Home Office, 2007).

Given the disproportionately large numbers of crimes committed by PPOs, a 43% reduction in re-offending is highly significant in terms of the larger numbers of crimes being avoided. Criticism of the CRP, as detailed above, does not mean that the theories underlying the PPO scheme are not valid.

The constitutional structure of Canada makes it difficult to implement a program in the same manner as in the United Kingdom as more than one level of government has responsibility for law enforcement. However, that fact may not necessarily act as an impediment to a “bottom up” approach in Canada. Much of the criticism of the United Kingdom program related to implementation failures (Bullock and Tilley, 2002). A more effective method might be to break the CRP into smaller, more manageable pieces. Furthermore, a more collaborative approach in the development of the program would work better here in British Columbia. In other words, a consultative process with Mayors and Councils and with communities providing input into the planning process could be organized. This is important because one of the key steps towards more effective integration is to build integration at the ground level where services are provided. Finally, there is the unique opportunity to learn from the United Kingdom’s experience, to take what has worked well, and to avoid that which has not. To this end, the next chapter of this paper will examine the progress of the implementation of the CRS in British Columbia and note the key distinctions in the British Columbia approach from the United Kingdom model.

Chapter Three: The Evolution of Crime Reduction in British Columbia

This chapter will provide an account of how the RCMP, as one criminal justice stakeholder, attempted to set the stage for the implementation of crime reduction in British Columbia.³⁰ As mentioned in Chapter Two, there were a number of valuable lessons to be learned from the implementation process in the United Kingdom. One important lesson was highlighted by Maguire's (2004) suggestion that some of the implementation problems encountered in large scale programs might be more effectively dealt with through a series of smaller iterative processes conducted in different areas of the criminal justice system. To this end, the implementation process and strategy in British Columbia and Canada has involved small steps with extensive partnerships with other departments and agencies.³¹

On the basis of the United Kingdom experience, change towards a CRS required careful planning and implementation strategies with clarity about the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the process. A sound communication strategy was also critical. In order to accomplish this, the process was started with a number of key briefings to large numbers of RCMP management staff followed by extensive written briefings to the RCMP membership at large.³² As noted throughout this major paper, the move to a crime reduction strategy in British Columbia involved a change in terms of both the scope of the initiative and the relative parts to be played by everyone. The key role of municipal and provincial governments represented a fundamental shift away from the concept of police working only with the community and other local partners. It added the critical component of government leadership and horizontal integration of government agencies.

³⁰ Comments regarding the implementation of crime reduction are based on the author's direct involvement in the planning and implementation process through my roles as the Criminal Operations Officer and Commanding Officer of the RCMP in British Columbia.

³¹ Internal RCMP documents between January and May, 2005.


³² Memoranda and quarterly newsletters were circulated to all RCMP employees in British Columbia beginning in May, 2005 and remain ongoing.

Throughout the evolution of the strategy, there have been unforeseen, yet welcome, developments which could be best characterized in two general phases. The first was the very rapid and positive degree of “buy-in”, both internally from the RCMP and externally with partners in the CJS and other parts of municipal, provincial, and the Federal governments. The second phase involved the discovery that several partner agencies were already involved in similar and complimentary initiatives and that a lack of communication hid this fact from all involved.³³ For example, work was underway within the Ministry of the Attorney General, B.C. to improve upon internal process. In a similar fashion, the Chief Provincial Court Judge had begun an in-depth examination of processes within the court system in an effort to make improvements. This was similar, in many ways, to work being done by the Better Trials Unit in the United Kingdom. As well, B.C. Corrections had developed several innovative treatment programs which, to some extent, mirrored the wrap around services in the United Kingdom.

Figure 2 illustrates the key milestones in the timeline of implementation of the CRS. The timeline begins in October, 2005, when the Memorandum of Understanding between the RCMP, the Province of British Columbia, the University College of the Fraser Valley, and Simon Fraser University was signed naming three University Research Chairs to work with the RCMP on developing the evidence-based research to support the crime reduction strategy. From there, Figure 2 details the significant milestones in the development of the CRS in British Columbia.

³³ Comments and observations gathered in meetings conducted by Dr. Allan Castle with Provincial Government agencies between November, 2006 and February, 2007.

Figure 2: Crime Reduction Strategy Implementation Timeline.



Based on my observations, there were specific implementation timelines and processes to consider. Given the differences noted earlier between the United Kingdom implementation and British Columbia, not the least of which was the fact that the United Kingdom initiative was government led, funded, and legislated, there was considerable uncertainty in British Columbia with respect to not only what could be achieved within policing, and more specifically within the RCMP, but what the interest would be in such a strategy with the rest of the CJS.³⁴

³⁴ Ongoing discussions in the management team of the RCMP and with the University Chairs between September 2005 and December, 2006.

For that reason, the initial focus was on a small part of a PPO initiative which the police had direct influence on, namely, an enforcement focus on prolific offenders. Although the entire crime reduction strategy in British Columbia does not only include the PPO initiative, to date, this initiative has received the most attention and energy from the RCMP. When the pilot sites to concentrate on prolific offenders were selected in the Fall of 2005, only six RCMP detachments were chosen, representing large and small detachments and urban and rural ones.³⁵ This initiative proved to be very popular with the police membership and, as a consequence, ad hoc initiatives started up around the Province outside the formal pilot sites with virtually all of them showing positive results within relatively short periods of time.³⁶ Although the choice to use a “series of quiet iterative processes in individual corners of the justice system” (Maguire, 2004: 244) was the only one available to the RCMP at the time, in light of the United Kingdom experience, this may not have been a particularly bad option.

Presentations on the crime reduction strategy started in late 2005 with briefings to all senior officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) across the Province. This was followed by a communications plan including newsletters to the entire membership of the Division. As support within the RCMP grew, and there was greater discussion and integration with Crown Counsel, acceptance grew culminating in direction from the Assistant Deputy Minister to Regional Crown Counsel to work with police on the PPO strategy. One of the main limitations of this approach was that nothing was being done to address the causal factors of crime so that the positive impact, in terms of reducing the incidence of crime, lasted only as long as the prolific offenders were incarcerated. A key component of the strategy implementation were the briefings of nearly all Mayors and Councils of the Municipalities of British Columbia who provided a

³⁵ Pilot projects began in January, 2006 in Courtenay/Comox, Coquitlam, Penticton, Fraser Lake, and Port McNeil. These locations were chosen to represent large municipal, medium municipal, and small rural policing areas, as well as a mixture of RCMP and municipal police agencies.

³⁶ Within relatively short periods of time after arresting prolific offenders, pilot project Detachments began to see drops in the incidence of a variety of property crimes.

strong degree of support and made that support known to Provincial and Federal politicians.³⁷ Municipal governments recognized the strategy as a vehicle to provide valuable input on issues related to crime at the community level.

While the Provincial Government was supportive throughout the development and implementation phase of this strategy, significant momentum developed through the Fall of 2006 and into the winter of 2007 with the establishment of the Crime Reduction and Criminal Justice Reform Office, which was linked to the Ministries of the Solicitor General and Attorney General. One of the key goals of this office was making progress on the Integrated Justice model.³⁸ Included in this office, on secondment, was the head of Court Services for British Columbia, the Deputy head of British Columbia Corrections, an RCMP Inspector, and others. The establishment of this office and the partnerships developed was a critical component of developing this initiative beyond a police initiative against prolific offenders, into a successful and fully integrated partnership. It was also important in terms of making the reduction of crime sustainable through achieving effective strategies to address crime causation.

Within weeks of the establishment of this office, observable signs of progress, in terms of the development of positive working relationships between different Ministries of Government, were evident. All parties shared the same enthusiasm and vision for the initiative. As meetings were quickly established with new partners, such as Health, Children and Families, and Housing, it was evident that they shared the vision of the RCMP. In summary, based on my direct observations, there was broad-based support within the RCMP, at all levels, for this initiative, broad-based support within the Municipal and Provincial Governments of the Province of British Columbia, and growing support within the Federal Government.

As noted above, the key partners for the strategy included the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the Ministry of the Attorney General, Ministries of Health, Education, and Housing, the

³⁷ In October, 2006, at Victoria, B.C., the Union of British Columbia Municipalities passed a resolution to adopt the Crime Reduction Strategy as proposed by the RCMP.


³⁸ This approach will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter.

Judiciary, Contract Policing partners at the Municipal and Provincial levels, and Federal partners.

The schematic represented in Figure 3 (Castle, 2006) defined the three critical aspects which needed to be in place for an effective CRS, namely the underlying support, implementation processes, and governance.

Figure 3: Crime Reduction Governance and Support

Crime Reduction Initiative: Implementation, Governance and Support



This schematic is a visual representation for the proposition that the strategic goals of the CRS, primarily dealing effectively with PPOs, required an integrated, multi-agency approach with appropriate support in terms of being evidence-based and developed upon efficient CJS structures through coordinated CJS services. It also addressed the underlying support structures, implementation processes, and governance of the strategy.

More specifically, the top of the schematic depicts the strategic goals of the partners being actioned and addressed through a multi-agency targeting process across the CJS. This required a reliable evidence base, efficient CJS structures, and coordinated CJS services. The evidence-based approach, shown in the left hand column, was drawn from the academic partnership as well as the analytical services section of the RCMP, and was linked to the integrated partners in the CJS. In the centre column, coordinated CJS services were identified as being central to both the local CJS partners and to RCMP frontline operations, as well as being connected directly to the evidence base, other integrated CJS partners, and to efficient CJS structures. Governance, captured in the right hand column, incorporated RCMP management, the integrated CJS stakeholders, and the Provincial and Regional Criminal Justice Boards. There were also a number of other elements critical to the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia.

To this point in time, the schematic is representative of the vision for crime reduction in British Columbia. There will be challenges to overcome in progressing from the vision to an operating model. That said, the actual goals sought are relatively easy to describe. The strategy aims to bring all of the appropriate partners together to solve the problems which prevent the reduction of crime. That will require a reliable evidence base upon which to make sound decisions, efficient and coordinated CJS systems and structures which all work towards shared goals, and a series of processes for ongoing review and analysis. At its core, however, the importance of strong, effective, and trusting partnerships cannot be overstated.

Other Considerations

RCMP/University Chair Partnership Model

The RCMP/University Partnership model developed in September, 2005 involved the assignment of three University Research Chairs designed to link intelligence-led and evidence-based policing. The model was developed in such a way as to provide unprecedented access by

the Chairs and researchers to police data in a variety of formats. To date, this partnership has resulted in a close and collaborative working relationship between the RCMP and academia, while ensuring that academic independence was respected.³⁹ In order to facilitate the access of police data to the University Research Chairs, secure Crime Labs were established at both Simon Fraser University (SFU) and the University College of the Fraser Valley (UCFV) which provides researchers with access to all relevant RCMP crime data. This partnership directly addresses the issues discussed by Laycock (2001) and others. The Research Chairs have a direct relationship with the Division Criminal Intelligence Analysis Section and the Operations Strategy Branch of the RCMP. The Research Chairs were linked to specific pilot sites when they began in January, 2006 and they oversaw the crime reduction work being done there. They traveled throughout British Columbia and to other parts of Canada working on and speaking to a broad range of interested parties on the CRS.

The extensive interaction between the Research Chairs and large numbers of students, as well as visiting professors, police managers, and frontline officers, continues to foster mutually beneficial and trusting relationships as evidenced by the fact that the Research Chairs are in high demand by Detachment Commanders around the province and RCMP managers in other provinces.⁴⁰ Participation in conferences is seen as another key role in developing and promoting an evidence-based approach to the crime reduction strategy. During 2006, the RCMP, in cooperation with University partners, sponsored two international conferences, the International Police Executive Symposium (IPES) and the Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis (ECCA).⁴¹ Both were deemed unqualified successes by the agencies involved and resulted in

³⁹ Memorandum of Understanding signed September, 2005 between Simon Fraser University, the University College of the Fraser Valley, the Province of B.C. and the RCMP.

⁴⁰ Each of the University Research Chairs is assigned to a specific pilot site at an RCMP Detachment.

⁴¹ Four members of the RCMP, together with the University Research Chairs, will present papers at the Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis Conference (ECCA) in London, July, 2007, detailing the work done at one of the pilot sites. Another paper will be delivered comparing Crime Reduction in the United Kingdom to the ongoing initiative in British Columbia.

⁴¹ ECCA or Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis held its 14th International conference in Chilliwack, British Columbia, hosted by the RCMP in 2005.

ongoing collaboration. In the summer of 2007, RCMP personnel, recognized for outstanding contributions to the Crime Reduction Strategy, are traveling to London, England to present a paper at the ECCA conference.⁴² The goal of this initiative is to further strengthen the relationship internationally between police and academics. The RCMP holds a number of conferences and less formal meetings each year that the Research Chairs participate in. In addition, and in keeping with the spirit of evidence-based information, there are significant numbers of research projects currently underway under the auspices of the Memorandum just described.⁴³

Integrated Justice

The concept of developing an integrated CJS is one of the most important goals in working towards an effective Crime Reduction Program and criminal justice reform. This is a key component of the RCMP crime reduction strategy; a feature that distinguishes CRS from community-based policing and problem-oriented policing. These other programs have essentially involved issues within the sphere of influence of either the police alone or the police working with community partners. The CRS recognized the critical role played by an effective and integrated CJS and the need for broader integration into other areas, such as housing, health, and

⁴² ECCA or Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis held its 14th International conference in Chilliwack, British Columbia, hosted by the RCMP in 2005.

⁴³ A partial list of completed or ongoing projects include: An Analysis of Calls for Service and Dispatched Response; An Analysis of the Feasibility of Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) for British Columbia; An Analysis of the Criminal Justice Response to Impaired Driving in British Columbia; An Analysis of Police Pursuits; Public Safety, Victimization, and Perceptions of the Police; An Analysis of the Nature and Extent of Illegal Hydro Consumption in Marijuana Grow Operations in British Columbia; An Analysis of Auto Thieves and Auto Theft Routing in Surrey; A Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Auto Fires in British Columbia; A Criminal History Analysis of Prolific Offenders: Robbery as a Case in Point; An Analysis of the Relationship Between Criminals and Crimes; Crime Reduction Evaluation Design Plan; Summaries of Crime Reduction Activities in Pilot Sites; Baseline Crime Trend Data; British Columbia Version of Iquanta; Pilot Location Trends and Hotspots; Crime Seriousness Index; Estimates of Prolific Offenders by Detachment; Case Studies of Highly Prolific Offenders; Crime Analysis Toolkit; Support for Local Area Agreements and General Knowledge Transfer; Integrated Justice System Research; Prototype Creation of Integrated Criminal Justice Policy Simulation Model; An Evaluation of DARE; Integrated Dog Squad Study; Offender Target Choice; Security Modeling; Design of Research Crime Data Warehouse; Design of Interim Policy/Research Databases; Developing and Testing of Crime/Offender Analysis Techniques.

education. The term integrated justice, therefore, contemplates a larger group which is far more inclusive than what would normally be considered CJS partners.

One of the challenges to this scope of integration comes as a result of the constitutional structure of our country, the federal system, and the relationship that it creates between the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Governments with respect to law enforcement and justice. Under the unitary system in the United Kingdom, the national government was able to set a vision for the reduction of crime and to provide a legislative framework upon which it was based (Home office, 2001). In my role with the RCMP, I have personally observed integrated justice with Police, Crown, and Corrections who have targeted high risk prolific offenders. In this case, the benefits of an integrated approach were that it eliminated several undesirable outcomes, including significant overlap and duplication of effort, wasting of scarce resources, and a general lack of efficiency.

In my view, successful integration in Canada will involve a shifting of resources in some cases. A key step on the way to success in this regard is the establishment of a Provincial Community Safety Steering Committee. A core function of this Committee is to improve the safety and livability of B.C. communities by implementing strategies that reduce and prevent crime. While this initiative is still in the implementation phase, there will be four core functions for the board:


- Develop a common vision, goals and objectives;
- Set priorities and targets for crime prevention and crime reduction;
- Agree on strategies to target resources; and
- Monitoring and report on activities.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Memo dated June 1st, 2007 outlining the role of the committee and setting the first meeting July 27th, 2007

As currently proposed, the Committee would be comprised of a broad range of senior government officials, police representatives, and First Nations leaders. It will include the Deputy Ministers of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Children and Family Development, Health, Education, Employment and Income Assistance, Housing, the First Nations Leadership Council, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Criminal Justice Branch, the Executive Lead of the Criminal Justice Reform Secretariat, an academic representative, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities, the Deputy Commissioner Correctional Services Canada, the Deputy Commissioner Pacific Region RCMP, and the Chief of the Vancouver Police Department.

The model set out in Figure 4 situates one possible structure of the Committee in terms of the current government structure and the front-line service delivery at the community level.

Figure 4: Integrated Justice Model



The mandate of the Committee is described as follows:

The Provincial Criminal Justice Board leads the process of criminal justice reform in British Columbia, facilitating co-ordination, collaboration, and application of evidence based practices toward the goals of improved public safety, increased confidence in the justice system, greater system efficiencies, and better responsiveness to First Nations. The Board establishes reform objectives, co-ordinates the planning to achieve them, and sets targets for improved results (RCMP Internal Briefing Note, 2007).


The fragmentation of the CJS is not only ineffective in terms of dealing with offenders, reducing recidivism, and reducing crime, but is also responsible for wasting the limited resources available to address these complex issues.

For example, the PPOs, more often than not, access or are linked to numerous agencies within and closely related to the CJS. They are in frequent contact with the police, the courts, corrections, social services, health systems, and others. It is, therefore, critically important that these agencies work together to avoid any duplication of effort and ensure that the action taken by any one agency does not work against those of another in a “wrap around” approach. The offender management team must bring to bear the specific skills and actions uniquely required for each offender recognizing that each offender has different needs.

As illustrated by Figure 5 (Castle, 2006),⁴⁵ one can observe how the PPO scheme fits with the concept of Integrated Justice and how Integrated Justice is dependent on a wide variety of partners within and outside the CJS.

⁴⁵ Dr. Allan Castle is the Officer in Charge of the Criminal Analysis Section, RCMP, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Figure 5: Integrated Justice Partners



This diagram captures and describes the critical components of the CRS, including the manner in which all of the stakeholders have to work together with shared goals and performance targets within an integrated justice framework to assist and respond to offenders in a holistic manner which balances the needs of the offender with the protection of society.

In summary, the strategy implemented in British Columbia has been guided by the process and success of the United Kingdom. However, given the constitutional framework of

Canada's federal system, there have been unique challenges. Furthermore, the RCMP has worked with partners in the CJS to develop the crime reduction program through a process of consensus-building techniques and strategies. By way of summarizing the key elements of progress to date with respect to implementation of the crime reduction strategy in B.C., it could be described in terms of two main phases.

Phase One involved the examination and analysis of crime reduction programs in other jurisdictions, outside of Canada, and a review of the current state of affairs with respect to crime in British Columbia and Canada. This analysis led to an increasingly stronger focus on the CRP in the United Kingdom and eventually to a realization that, although an exact replica of that CRP was not feasible or suitable in British Columbia, many of the key principles and much of the underlying theory could be adopted to work in British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada. This phase also involved the development of an evidence-based approach, primarily achieved through the Memorandum of Understanding described above.

Phase Two involved a strong internal and external communication plan. Internally, it was designed to provide information to personnel and to gain support for implementation. External communication shared these common goals, but added another important one. In the end, the potential of the program, in terms of the breadth of effective partnerships, would be wholly dependent on partners voluntarily joining. As a result, at the beginning, it was not possible to know with certainty how many partners would join and, therefore, how successful the initiative would be. At the same time, pilot projects were started in RCMP jurisdictions across various parts of B.C. Internal interest and support for the initiative exceeded expectations, both in terms of the results achieved at the pilot sites and in the number of initiatives being started in other RCMP jurisdictions outside of the designated pilot sites. External partnerships and support were also highly successful. These involved municipal and provincial elected officials and ministry employees. Efforts to build new partnerships as well as to strengthen existing ones will be ongoing as these partnerships and the CRS evolve and mature.

Chapter Four: Conclusions and Recommendations

Much has been learned since the implementation of the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia. This chapter will detail the important lessons learned and will make several recommendations with respect to critical aspects of the initiative which will not only assist with the ongoing implementation in British Columbia, but will also provide a framework document for other provinces as they move forward with their programs.

Notwithstanding many innovative programs in policing over the past thirty years and the “professionalisation” of policing, crime continues to flourish, officer caseloads grow, and there is a corresponding decline in police clearance rates (Malm et al., 2005). In recent years, police have recognized that many of the underlying causes of crime are beyond the sphere of influence of policing. There has also been a corresponding growing involvement on the part of community members and leaders with respect to issues around crime. This has allowed for the formation of broad-based partnerships focused on crime and crime causation.

Even with the high degree of support and enthusiasm, there are significant challenges in the process of implementing a broad-based, cross-government crime reduction strategy. These challenges relate to matters of governance, measurement, legal issues, information systems, and organizational culture. The fact that Canada has a federal system complicates the issue of integration as the federal government cannot simply mandate this strategy. Moreover, implementing broad-based changes to any large organization is difficult. The challenges increase substantially when this change is simultaneously required of multiple agencies. It is for this reason that one of the most significant challenges to the CRS is changing organizational cultures. Although it has been noted above that implementation of the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia has not encountered some of the usual problems associated with organizational changes

of this magnitude, the topic is worthy of mention with respect to both internal and external relationships.

Change Management

Changes of the magnitude required by the CRS necessitate careful planning and ongoing monitoring and adjustment. It is important that careful consideration be given to the skill sets of the key individuals leading the change and program implementation. According to *Enterprise-Wide Change*, these skills include: (1) a deep understanding of the change process and the main concepts of systems thinking; (2) discipline and courage to ensure consistency, integrity, and focus of the entire enterprise to its strategic positioning in the marketplace, year after year; and (3) persistence and energy over the long term to ensure superior results through a focus on both the economic alignment of delivery and the cultural attunement with people's hearts and minds (Anderson et al., 2006). One of the key issues in managing change of this magnitude is to ensure effective communication. Not only is it important to communicate effectively, there is a need to measure how well this is being done.⁴⁶

In addition, Tilley and Laycock commented specifically on the attributes of team leaders for the implementation of this particular type of strategy:

The individual or group carrying out this function needs to be 'research-literate' – they need to know what the research literature has to say about problem specification and tactics, mechanisms and contexts. They also need to be sufficiently senior - carry enough clout - to be able to direct the use of police and other resources and, when relevant, to relate to other potential contributors to any strategic plan (2002:46).

Over the past year, there have been ongoing personal briefings and discussions regarding the initiative within the RCMP. As well, the best published research papers have been

⁴⁶ The RCMP conducts regular surveys within their membership which asks several questions about communications when new strategies are being implemented.

made available to the RCMP to ensure that the team is as “research literate” as possible. Ultimately, one of the key measures of success with respect to making the team “research literate” will be through the observable reduction of crime.

In British Columbia, the plan to get “buy-in” has been underway for some time and continues to evolve as the RCMP understands and identifies the positions of the various CJS partners.⁴⁷ This is important because there are several key issues that must be considered or addressed when implementing and evaluating large scale changes across programs in organizations (Tilley, 2004). One of these elements involves assessing what is being done in other jurisdictions and emulating success. While this may suggest a lack of program innovation when another jurisdiction is considering implementation, it is always beneficial to examine the lessons learned from others to avoid making similar mistakes or wasting time and resources.

Another key element is prematurely abandoning policies or projects based on an unsupported assumption that they are about to fail or because they currently have not completed an evaluation (Tilley, 2004). This is closely related to the use of agenda setting messaging about programs. In other words, in situations where early success is not evident, there may be efforts to blame others for the apparent failure. There is both the risk of individuals claiming early success without supporting evidence or not taking responsibility for failing initiatives.

Resource appropriation can also lead to problems specifically with respect to the legitimacy of bids in grant allocation processes (Tilley, 2004). Non-recipients of grants

⁴⁷ One of the measures with respect to “buy-in” is to encourage feedback and criticism of the initiative and to actively seek out input from employees. This is done through employee surveys, town hall meetings, and one-on-one meetings with those individual commanders implementing the strategy.

may engage in activities harmful to programs as a result of their efforts to remain competitive. There is also the potential for personnel to provide unsupported positive feedback to managers about the progress of projects so that they can maintain a positive relationship with them. In either of the cases of those who receive funding or those who do not, there is the potential for individuals to simply tell managers what they want to hear. It is anticipated that it would be relatively easy to determine whether this is occurring in the current initiative through active monitoring of the degree of partnership building. Failing to develop strong partnerships would be difficult, if not impossible, to hide in a policing organization.

Finally, there is a risk of subversion of efforts by personnel who, for a variety of reasons, do not support the project (Rogers, 2002). This is an important issue to address when implementing changes of this magnitude in an organization as diverse as the RCMP.⁴⁸ Laycock and Webb (2003) pointed to similar concerns with respect to the ability for programs, such as crime reduction, to succeed. More directly, they commented on cultural issues within police organizations that had to be dealt with effectively in order for these initiatives to work. An example of this potential problem can be seen in the partnership issue mentioned above. Individuals in policing who believe that the role of police ends with the arrest and processing of suspects may exhibit reluctance to developing partnerships, which again, would be readily apparent. In part, this criticism refers back to Goldstein (2003) and his work in POP.⁴⁹ Both Laycock and Webb (2003)

⁴⁸ The RCMP polices 130 towns and cities in B.C. and over 700 across Canada from coast to coast and throughout the Yukon, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut.

⁴⁹ Goldstein identified five reasons for the challenges posed by traditional police culture. These were: (1) the absence of long-term commitment from police leaders to strengthen policing and the police as an institution; (2) the lack of analytic skills within a police agency needed to analyze problems and evaluate

and Knutsson (2003) made the argument that, while there was convincing evidence that the concept of evidence-based problem solving was a valid goal for implementation into the CJS, the task of introducing these processes into a police environment was underestimated. Based on my experiences, however, these types of challenges have largely been overcome in British Columbia.⁵⁰

Funding will present challenges at more than one stage of the implementation process. There will be a need to work in concert with other agencies to secure funding for drug treatment, rehabilitation, and the types of “wrap around” services necessary to provide PPOs with the best chances of success. The provision of services is a critical feature of an effective PPO program and requires the RCMP to convince all three levels of government to make appropriate contributions. Accomplishing this will not be easy and will require considerable effort as the strategy moves forward. In fact, these challenges represent another of the key goals of integrated justice and effective integration of government services, namely the need for each partner to understand the importance of effectively sharing available resources and funding for the greatest possible benefit of the whole.

A challenge which has developed from the success of the implementation process to date is the rapid expansion and the desire by many RCMP detachments to get involved

strategies for dealing with the problems; (3) the lack of a clear academic connection; (4) the absence of informed outside pressure; and (5) the lack of financial support.

⁵⁰ Prior to the signing of the M.O.U. with the University Research Chairs and the RCMP in September, 2005, a high level of trust and respect already existed between the RCMP and numerous university researchers in B.C. This is evidenced by a large number of collaborative projects involving many researchers and RCMP members, such as two extensive studies on marijuana growing operations. This relationship has been enhanced with the signing of the MOU through more structured and intensive interaction on a variety of studies, joint conferences, and frequent meetings.

and to move forward with initiatives.⁵¹ This has created substantial pressures on implementation staff as well as analytical staff needed to provide the solid evidence-based foundation for the strategy. The expansion of the crime reduction strategy to other parts of Canada further exacerbates this challenge and underscores the requirement for effective communication processes. In addition, information systems and data collection issues continue to present critical challenges to implementation and are a key focus of efforts to find solutions in the early stages.

A new records management system is currently being implemented in British Columbia; Police Record Information Management (PRIME). This system will begin to address one of the key components necessary for the success of a crime reduction initiative and will be one of the primary data sources used for both program development and analysis/evaluation. Given that the implementation of PRIME is ongoing, it is too early to determine whether there will be limitations to the system with respect to the CRS.

Finally, the involvement and participation of the federal government will continue to be a key challenge. As noted throughout this major paper, the federal system in Canada recognizes clear and distinct roles between provincial and federal governments in the administration of justice.⁵² While there are several benefits to this arrangement, it fragments the administration of justice and provides impediments to setting a national vision with respect to issues related to crime. Notwithstanding that there are significant

⁵¹ Several Detachments not included in the pilot studies, such as Kamloops and Surrey, have implemented extensive crime reduction strategies.

⁵² Criminal law is created at the Federal level, however, for the most part; the administration of justice is carried out by the Provinces and Territories.

challenges to the implementation of the CRS, there is considerable optimism that they can be overcome.⁵³

Program Evaluation

Program evaluation will be yet another challenge. Effective program evaluation begins with the identification of key baseline data prior to implementation. The collection and analysis of baseline data has been done in the five pilot sites in British Columbia with additional data being collected from other jurisdictions. Furthermore, the implementation team must work to address the lack of CJS measures in Canada and will develop appropriate tools to fill this void.

In addition to the collection of baseline data, as is the case in all program evaluation, it is necessary to clearly identify what the program being evaluated was intended to do. In the Canadian context, the stated goals of the CJS remain somewhat vague. For example, there is reference to such objectives as maintaining public confidence in the CJS, but there are no explicit goals associated with the reduction of crime and re-offending. An evaluation of the RCMP proposed CRS must involve several distinct and independent evaluations, conducted on different parts of the CJS, and focusing on different elements of the crime reduction strategy. In other words, evaluations will examine the broad questions of the degree to which the crime reduction strategy is achieving its overarching goals, but these findings will be complementary to evaluations of specific programs and strategies throughout the province which fall under the crime reduction framework. An evaluation framework will be developed the Office for Crime Reduction and Criminal Justice Reform during the summer of 2007.

⁵³ Throughout ongoing meetings with Municipal, Provincial, and Federal officials since November, 2005, optimism has been expressed by Deputy Ministers in several Provinces and Territories that they will work towards solutions.

Lessons Learned

Although the crime reduction strategy in British Columbia remains in its infancy, perhaps the most important lesson learned to date is that significant system-wide change can be achieved through a “bottom-up” approach. Furthermore, it may, in fact, be a more effective mode of implementation than that employed in the United Kingdom. The program in the United Kingdom was supported by legislation and significant funding. The initiative had the full weight of the Prime Minister’s office and there was considerable pressure on public officials to ensure success. “Top down” changes of this magnitude always run the risk of developing obstacles to implementation, such as a lack of buy-in by lower level managers (Rogers, 2002). The approach taken in British Columbia to begin within the policing sphere of influence and to gradually work outwards has resulted in a broad degree of acceptance of the strategy from within the RCMP. Indeed, there has been no observable reluctance or disagreement with the program from the RCMP.

Another important lesson learned at this early stage was that there was ongoing work in other components of the CJS which complimented efforts being made by the police. What was missing was a coordinating effort to bring together all of the initiatives already in operation in all the various agencies. This discovery alone provides additional impetus for an integrated approach within the CJS. Given the critical role played by effective partnerships (Home Office, 2006), and the fact that, to this point, it does not appear that this strategy will be a legislated, government-led initiative, the coordination of efforts occurring in different parts of the CJS is important.

Implications for the Future

There are significant implications for the CJS here in British Columbia and in Canada as a result of the crime reduction strategy. In January, 2007, the RCMP made a

decision to implement crime reduction throughout those jurisdictions of Canada where it provided policing services.⁵⁴ In February, 2007, a national workshop was held in Vancouver hosting policing representatives with representation from the Government of Canada. It is now apparent that programs similar to the one in British Columbia will begin in other parts of Canada in 2007.⁵⁵ While it is too early in the process to be certain, a desirable outcome would be the development and implementation of a National Integrated Justice Strategy which would compliment and coordinate those in the Provinces and Territories. An Office of Crime Reduction has been established within the National Headquarters of the RCMP in Ottawa and its role will be to implement crime reduction across Canada within the RCMP. The involvement of all levels of government is the desirable end result.

In British Columbia, the provincial government has made crime reduction a priority for all policing agencies. As this initiative grows at the national level, it will likely extend beyond the RCMP to include other police agencies in Canada. However, this process will take place province by province or territory by territory as the federal government has no authority to instruct the entire country to implement the CRS. However, it appears that the federal government will indeed encourage implementation across the country to the extent that it is able to provide funding grants for initiatives supportive of the strategy.⁵⁶ The federal government's involvement in the CRS is crucial in many ways, such as drug treatment issues, and it is now apparent that there is a general recognition of this fact.

⁵⁴ Decision by the Senior Executive Committee of the RCMP on December 15th, 2006.

⁵⁵ The Territorial Government of the Yukon, working with the RCMP, implemented its Crime Reduction Strategy in April, 2007, announcing it in the throne speech on April 4th. The governments of Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland received presentations on the BC initiative in May, 2006 at St. Andrews, N.B. and Halifax, N.S. Following these meetings, representatives expressed interest and asked for further presentations.

⁵⁶ Meetings between January and May, 2006 between the Commissioner of the RCMP and Deputy Ministers in the Federal government.

Recommendations

Based on the implementation process to this point in British Columbia, there are several key recommendations which can be made to people in other jurisdictions attempting similar programs. The first recommendation is that considerable time should be spent providing briefings on the proposed strategy to all levels of government, to all those within the police organization, to all stakeholders or partners who will be involved in the program, and with the media to assist in explaining the strategy to the public. The benefits derived in the British Columbia experience was a strong degree of support from municipal politicians which led to the same support from the province.⁵⁷

The concept of integrated justice is an important component in the development of a crime reduction strategy and parallel discussions and plans between police and government should complement those being implemented within the police organization. Similarly, all initiatives and processes need to be intelligence-led and evidence-based. This requires effective data management processes, strong and effective analytical capabilities, and strong police/academic partnerships. There also needs to be a solid commitment to the process by police leaders responsible for program implementation. The critical role of strong and effective partnerships cannot be overstated. The key challenge to achieving this is getting to a position where each of the partners shares the overall vision and understands their own and each others contributions to the whole.

Within the partnerships, there needs to be a general recognition that the overall success of crime reduction is dependent on the sharing of goals, targets, and the resources required to achieve the overall aims of the partnership. Moreover, an effective PPO strategy is the most critical component of a crime reduction strategy in terms of the degree of impact possible directly from police organizations. Based on the United

⁵⁷ As noted earlier, such consultations led to a motion being passed at the Union of British Columbia Municipalities meeting at Victoria, B.C. in October, 2006, to adopt crime reduction across the province.

Kingdom and British Columbia experiences, the development and implementation of an effective PPO strategy within policing will probably assist in building the larger crime reduction strategy within the CJS.

The Current Status

The RCMP's journey in the implementation of crime reduction in British Columbia over the past two years has been enlightening. What started as an attempt to derive greater efficiency within one police force in one province in one part of the CJS has spread to multiple agencies within and outside policing across Canada. The RCMP has observed significant reductions in a range of crimes in a number of jurisdictions in British Columbia, both at formal pilot sites and in other locations where some components of the crime reduction strategy have been introduced. For example, in Kelowna, comparing the first quarter of 2007 against the first quarter of 2006, the incidence of reported Break and Entry offences was down 20%, Theft of Motor Vehicle was down 7%, and Possession of Stolen Property was down 16%. While formal evaluations have not been able to attribute these reductions to the work being done under crime reduction initiatives, there are strong indicators that this is the case. Similar results are being observed in the Surrey statistics which, when comparing data over the same periods, indicates that Commercial Break and Entry was down 27%, Residential Break and Entry was down 12%, Theft of Motor Vehicle was down 21%, and Theft Under \$5,000.00 was down 8%.

There have also been structural changes within the provincial government to facilitate crime reduction and integrated justice suggesting a genuine interest to support this initiative and to make important changes and advances in the criminal justice system in British Columbia. In addition, there is a strong level of buy-in from agencies not

typically considered part of the CJS, such as the provincial ministries of health, housing, and education.

Nonetheless, there will likely be opposition to the crime reduction strategy which, to some, may appear to be “soft on crime”. The current federal government has indicated a desire to impose tougher sentencing guidelines on offenders, including minimum sentences.⁵⁸ I would argue, however, that the proposed methods for dealing with PPOs under the crime reduction strategy should not be characterized as either tough or soft on crime, but as being “intelligent on crime”. The crime reduction method argues for intelligence-led sentencing practices, evidence-based sentencing practices, and, ultimately, sentencing which addresses the offender rather than the offence. In other words, based on this strategy, the type and length of sentence imposed on offenders should be uniquely designed and crafted for the specific offender. The obvious benefits to this approach include the fact that “wrap-around” services will attempt to address the specific underlying problems with individuals in efforts to make them less likely to re-offend, thereby reducing the numbers of crimes being committed. Achieving success with even a small number of highly prolific offenders has the potential to significantly reduce overall crime in a given jurisdiction.

Partners in the CJS have to look beyond their own agencies to the CJS as a whole and must critically assess all of the partners’ needs in terms of fiscal and human resources. At the provincial level, this involves the recognition that another agency’s needs may supersede theirs if the CJS is to be made more effective. That has been done to some extent in British Columbia where policing has given up part of its budget to support more crown prosecutors and agreed that the current resource needs of correctional

⁵⁸ Taken from the Progressive Conservative website at <http://www.conservative.ca/EN/2888>. “This Government will tackle crime. It will propose changes to the Criminal Code to provide tougher sentences for violent and repeat offenders, particularly those involved in weapons-related crimes. It will help prevent crime by putting more police on the street and improving the security of our borders.”

agencies should take precedence over policing needs.⁵⁹ That is the essence of the CRS shift, namely that each agency must look beyond its own needs to those of the CJS as a whole having understood and more fully accepted that the integrated approach will be significantly more effective for all partners. Integration in terms of budget, goals, and the individual case management of offenders is the ultimate goal and presents one of the greatest challenges to successful implementation of a crime reduction strategy.

The CRS being implemented in British Columbia, and soon across Canada, although similar to that of the United Kingdom is uniquely designed for Canada. It continues to change daily in terms of the expansion of the program. In fact, it might be said that this recognition of continual change is one of its strengths. The CRS will continue to evolve. It should be viewed as a continuum into the future with its elements and descriptors being fluid and adaptable as opposed to a rigid design typical of criminal justice organizations of the past. The crime reduction strategy represents a significant enhancement of the criminal justice system in British Columbia and one which will lead to wider justice reforms in Canada.

⁵⁹ In 2002, the RCMP made a permanent transfer of \$1,000,000.00 from its operating budget in B.C. to the Ministry of the Attorney General for the purpose of establishing the Organized Crime Prosecution Team. The rationale for this decision was that it made little sense for the police to commit to significant investigations against organized crime if there were to be a lack of prosecution resources at the conclusion of investigations.

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