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CISC
Criminal Intelligence Service Canada

Integrated Threat Assessment Methodology

Version 1.0

Note: Concepts and ideas within this document, the CISC Integrated Threat Assessment Methodology, are gathered from a wide variety of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, academic publications and open source research, both domestic and international as well as CISC Central and Provincial Bureau best practices. These techniques and ideas are intended as a resource for the broader intelligence community as well as individuals involved in the integrated threat assessment process. For more information on the sources of information within this document, see the selected bibliography.

This document is a work in process which will be updated as the CISC integrated threat assessment process evolves.

Foreword

The integrated threat assessment process has its origins in the production of the first *National Threat Assessment on Organized and Serious Crime in Canada* produced by CISC Central Bureau in 2003. In 2004, the process became truly integrated, resulting in a national collection plan process and national-level working group meetings dedicated to establishing analytical standards for the assessments.

Continuing to build upon the foundation of previous threat assessments, both provincial and national, in 2005 Central Bureau focused on the overall threat to Canada posed by each criminal market in terms of its scope and magnitude and, in particular, the dynamics of organized crime groups' involvement within these markets. In 2007, Central Bureau will contribute further to the decision-making of senior law enforcement by identifying significant criminal threats as part of the coordinated enforcement targeting process to determine organized crime priorities. This process, part of the Canadian Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Organized Crime, was developed by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in cooperation with CISC.

As the threat assessment process has evolved over five years, there emerged a need to formalize the processes and protocols that make up its foundation as an integral part of the Canadian Criminal Intelligence Model. The methodology presented in this paper is the first step in gathering together key techniques, tools and common practices currently used or of emerging interest in the integrated threat assessment process. The integrated threat assessment process continues to be a work in progress and will continue to evolve through practice.

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About Criminal Intelligence Service Canada

CISC is the voice of the Canadian criminal intelligence community. As such, it is in a unique position to provide strategic intelligence on organized and serious crime in Canada to senior law enforcement management and designated government departments.

Structure

Established in 1970, CISC unites the Canadian criminal intelligence community by providing leadership and expertise to CISC member agencies. CISC consists of a Central Bureau in Ottawa and ten Provincial Bureaus across Canada. The Central Bureau liaises with and collects information and intelligence from the Provincial Bureaus which operate independently while maintaining common service delivery standards.

Membership and Governance

CISC has three categories of membership. Category 1 is restricted to police agencies that have full police authority provided under a Canadian federal or provincial police act. Category 2 membership may be granted to those agencies that have a limited law enforcement responsibility that grants them an authority under a specific federal and/or provincial legislation (e.g. *Customs Act, Provincial Wildlife Act*). Category 3 membership may be granted to an agency that does not have a direct law enforcement authority but provides assistance to law enforcement agencies.

The CISC National Executive Committee is the governing body for CISC. It is chaired by the Commissioner of the RCMP and is comprised of 24 leaders from Canada's law enforcement community.

Central Bureau Products and Services

ACIIS

ACIIS, the Automated Criminal Intelligence Information System, is the Canadian law enforcement community's national online database for criminal intelligence and information on organized and serious crime and is only accessible to law enforcement.

Criminal Intelligence Training

CISC sponsors criminal intelligence courses every year, which are held in several locations across the country. These courses offer training to CISC member agency personnel in various criminal intelligence functions.

National Criminal Intelligence Requirements, Collection and Liaison Program & Strategic Analytical Services

The Central Bureau's National Criminal Intelligence Requirements and Collection Program collects and monitors information and intelligence on the organized crime groups and their involvement within criminal markets. CISC Central Bureau's Strategic Analytical Services is responsible for the production of various strategic intelligence

products. Strategic Analytical Services also designed, developed and implemented a 'strategic early warning' methodology and system to enhance current law enforcement practices with a proactive approach to crime control and prevention.

Strategic Intelligence Analytical Products

CISC Central Bureau produces the following strategic intelligence analytical products:

National Threat Assessment on Organized and Serious Crime in Canada: The annual CISC *National Threat Assessment* assists informed decision making by senior law enforcement leaders as well as providing an overarching evaluation of organized criminality nationally for the Canadian criminal intelligence community. In 2007, Central Bureau will also identify significant criminal threats as an integral component of the coordinated enforcement targeting process to determine organized crime priorities. This process, part of the Canadian Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Organized Crime, was developed by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police in cooperation with CISC.

National Criminal Intelligence Estimate on Organized and Serious Crime in Canada: The primary aim of this report is to provide an overview of organized and serious crime threats in Canada to enable informed decision making for senior government officials.

Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada: This report, the only national public report on organized crime by law enforcement, is published to inform and educate the public on the effects of organized crime as it affects every community and region in Canada. This report is available at www.cisc.gc.ca.

Strategic Intelligence Threat Assessments: CISC periodically produces in-depth threat assessments on specific law enforcement issues and/or threats.

Strategic Intelligence Briefs: These reports are intended to provide CISC member agencies with shorter strategic analytical intelligence products on organized crime issues affecting Canada. Unclassified versions of these reports will be posted on the internet as available.

Strategic Intelligence Précis: This product line provides an executive summary of key findings, judgements and forecasts from products such as the *National Threat Assessment* or *National Criminal Intelligence Estimate*.

Sentinel Watch List and Strategic Early Warning Assessments (Sentinel): The *Sentinel Watch List*, produced quarterly, highlights a selection of future threat scenarios that could have repercussions for the Canadian law enforcement community in the coming months and years. The *Sentinel* is a product line that provides strategic early warning assessments of criminal threats and developments from within Canada and internationally.

Three-Module Structure

In 2003, at the beginning of the integrated threat assessment process, the Central & Provincial Bureaus started to establish consistent format & processes for the annual integrated provincial threat assessments (PTAs). In December 2004, the Provincial Bureaus agreed to adopt the three-module structure for their PTAs. This template ensures a consistent approach nationally to assessing organized crime and also facilitates comparisons between provinces.

Module I – Strategic Threat Assessment

- This module is completed by both the Provincial and Central Bureaus.
- Components of this module can include:
  - Environmental scan or drivers
  - Linkages – legitimate or criminal
  - Organized crime groups (threats, capabilities, vulnerabilities & trends)
  - Criminal markets (scope, magnitude, dynamics & trends)
  - Criminal harms
  - Forecasts
  - Recommendations

Module II – Organized Crime Group Inventory

- Provincial Bureaus complete group inventories on all or a specific number of significant criminal groups operating within their respective province.
- A group inventory template has been shared with all Provincial Bureaus to be used as a common framework.
- Central Bureau completes a national, strategic group inventory in order to determine significant, inter-provincial, national and international-level criminal threats.
- Components of this module can include:
  - Group name and size
  - Group associations
  - Business associations
  - Recent law enforcement efforts
  - Criminal activities (known/suspected)
  - Group structure
  - Sleipnir matrix
  - Money laundering
  - Sources of support
  - Ports of entry

Module III – Tactical Profiles of Organized Crime Groups or Individuals

- This module links the integrated threat assessments to the coordinated enforcement targeting process that determines intelligence and enforcement targets.
- The tactical profiles contain target-specific intelligence on groups or individuals engaged in organized and serious crime.
- Components of this module can include:
  - Personal data
  - Position and influence (reputation)
  - Capabilities (expertise and skills)
  - Criminal history and roles
  - Finances
  - Vulnerabilities and opportunities

National Threat Assessment Structure

The format of CISC Central Bureau's *National Threat Assessment* is complementary with the three-module approach of the integrated provincial threat assessments. Module I provides strategic assessments of criminal markets and significant criminal groups. In 2006, Central Bureau adopted Modules II and III to determine and classify significant criminal threats within an organized crime group inventory.

Module I: Strategic Criminal Market Assessment

A: **Key Findings**
B: **Drivers: International Environment and Criminality in Canada**
C: **Harms and Criminal Markets** (Economic, Social & Political)
D: **Criminal Markets**
Elements of each criminal sub-market is assessed with a focus on common themes that could include scope, magnitude, legitimate and criminal linkages as well as trends occurring on a national or international scale.

Illicit Drugs
• cocaine (crack cocaine)
• ecstasy
• heroin
• marihuana
• methamphetamine

Financial Crime
• mass marketing fraud
• payment card fraud
• mortgage fraud
• securities fraud
• money laundering

Contraband
• firearms
• tobacco
• intellectual property rights
• humans as commodity
• vehicle theft

Module II: Strategic Criminal Group Assessment

E: **Analysis**
Each criminal group identified in the integrated provincial threat assessments is classified into threat categories based on the group's criminal scope (international, international (cross-border), inter-provincial, intra-provincial or local) as well as the relative magnitude of the group's criminal roles or activities.

Module III: Profiles of Organized Crime Groups (Inter-provincial, National and International-level Threats)

F: **Analysis**
CISC Central Bureau assesses key criminal groups that pose higher-level threats with criminal scopes at the inter-provincial, national and international levels.

H: **Appendices**
a) Definitions
b) Methodology

G: **Assessment Evaluation Form**

(as to be used by CISC Central Bureau in the *National Threat Assessment*)

Group Name	Category	Province or territory (Base of operations)	City	Market – general	Market – subcategory	Criminal roles	Money laundering	Criminal scope	Sleipnir score
SMITH et al.	Independent (IND)	B.C.	Vancouver	Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Financial crime	Cocaine Cocaine Marihuana Marihuana Marihuana Precursors Mortgage fraud	Importer Financier Manufacturer Transporter Transporter Importer Operative	Laundering through stock market, real estate & money service businesses	International International Intra-provincial Inter-provincial Cross-border International Intra-provincial	576
LEE et al.	Asian organized crime (AOC)	Ontario	Toronto	Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Illegal gaming Intellectual property rights crime	Ecstasy Ecstasy Cocaine Illegal gaming Counterfeit goods	Manufacturer Wholesale distribution Wholesale distribution Operative Wholesale distribution	Laundering through commercial real estate in Canada & U.S., alternative remittance systems	Intra-provincial Cross-border Intra-provincial Intra-provincial Intra-provincial	524
DRAGON KIDZ	Street gang (SG)	Alberta	Calgary	Illicit drugs Illicit drugs Financial crime	Crack cocaine Marihuana Payment cards	Retail-level distribution Retail-level distribution Retail-level distribution	No laundering detected.	Local Local Local	369
MORTON et al.	Independent (IND)	Quebec	Quebec City	Financial Crime Financial Crime	Securities fraud Mass marketing fraud	Service provider Facilitator / broker	Laundering through stock market	International International	528

Unclassified – Information is fictional and is for presentation use only

Measuring Levels of Knowledge

(as to be used by CISC Central Bureau)

Criminal market	Statement of knowledge *Assess components of market subcategory, ex importation / exportation, manufacturing & distribution of illicit commodities, & criminal groups capabilities*	Level of knowledge *(excellent, good, fair or poor)*	Focus areas for collection *Specific intelligence gaps within each market subcategory with a focus on criminal roles, scope and capabilities.*
Mortgage fraud	• Identified some key criminal groups involved in mortgage fraud with concentrations in B.C., Alberta & Ontario. • Less knowledge about the scope, magnitude & harm of this fraud.	Good Fair	Focus on establishing key areas/regions for mortgage fraud & criminal groups using mortgage fraud to further other activities like marihuana grow operations.
Payment card fraud	• Knowledge of some groups involved in the distribution & use of smaller quantities of counterfeit cards. • Less knowledge about the manufacture of counterfeit cards.	Fair Poor	Focus on groups involved in large-scale manufacture & distribution of counterfeit cards, particularly with distribution internationally.
Illicit drugs – ecstasy	• Identified key criminal groups are involved in importing chemical precursors & manufacturing ecstasy in multi-kilogram quantities on a regular basis. • There are numerous criminal groups involved in distributing ecstasy at mid-level & street-level distribution quantities throughout the country. • Varying levels of knowledge are present regarding their criminal capabilities, sources of ecstasy, magnitude of operations, & inter-linkages.	Good Good Fair	Focus on identifying all groups involved in manufacturing ecstasy at the higher levels of magnitude (multi-kilogram quantities). Focus on establishing the precursors' source (countries, groups) & amount of precursors entering Canada.
Illicit drugs – methamphetamine	• Knowledge of criminal groups involved in mid- and retail-level distribution of methamphetamine. • Less information about the magnitude of manufacture and the domestic usage patterns & levels.	Good Fair	Focus on targeting the groups involved in large-scale manufacture & wholesale distribution of methamphetamine in Pacific/Prairie regions. Focus on determining rate/extent of drug's increase.
Human trafficking	• Some groups identified but difficult to determine scope & magnitude of operations with Canada as a destination or transit country. • Some knowledge of source & transit countries & border entry points.	Poor Fair	Focus on identifying the magnitude of trafficking operations within & through Canada, as well as key groups involved in the sexual/labour exploitation of the trafficked individuals.
Mass marketing fraud	• Identification of some groups in B.C., Ontario & Quebec. • Difficult to determine scope & magnitude of operations within Canada or extending internationally.	Fair Poor	Focus on scope/magnitude of key groups with large-scale operations operating internationally, & the extent of domestic operations.

Unclassified – Information is fictional and is for presentation use only

Harms from Organized and Serious Crime

In terms of measuring threat, "harm" refers to the adverse consequences of criminal activities. These consequences may be direct and tangible, such as fraud or thefts, with effects that can be quantified in terms of monetary loss. Harms also encompass a range of intangible effects more difficult to quantify. For example, the loss of quality of life is difficult to measure or to compare objectively against a merchant's loss of business due to counterfeit goods. Following the work undertaken by the London Metropolitan Police Service in the United Kingdom, harms can be conceived of in terms of social, economic, political or indirect consequences from organized criminality, as seen below:

Harm Type	Harm Definition	Examples
Social	Negative physical, psychological or emotional consequences; cannot be readily expressed in cash terms.	Homicide, intimidation & assaults.
Economic	Negative effects on an individual, community, business, institution, government or country; can be readily expressed in cash terms. Two sub-components: economic losses to the victims of organized crime and economic gains to the criminal group.	Theft, loss of business because of counterfeit goods & fraud schemes. Complicity of associated businesses, unfair competition.
Political	Negative effects on the political stability of a community, institution, region or country.	Corruption, loss of confidence in government, or diminished view of effectiveness of law enforcement or government.
Indirect	Secondary adverse consequences of criminal activities.	Environmental damage from clandestine drug laboratory or marihuana grow operation waste.

Harm analysis can distinguish between crimes that may have a high volume/low harm factor (ex. break-and-enters) versus crimes that a low volume/high harm factor (ex. counterfeit pharmaceuticals). Distinguishing between the relative negative effects of harms contributes to determining the harm magnitude of different types of crime types within the total volume of all criminal activity. Harm analysis on a specific criminal subcategory would enable decision makers to prioritize specific criminal offences because of the significant harms caused.

Within the Canadian criminal intelligence community, work on harm analysis is being undertaken through the RCMP-led Harm Prioritization Scale which is currently in the research and development phase. This project, with participation from the broad criminal intelligence community through the CISC network, has the aim of ranking the relative harms caused by specific criminal groups that will be an additional layer of analysis to complement Sleipnir threat assessment matrices.

Business Rules

Business rules are standards or operating rules for analysts that are intended to provide consistency and reliability between analytical products, regardless of product line or agency. These rules also provide a level of rigour to ensure that each analytical product is timely, relevant and logical. At Central Bureau, as the integrated threat assessment process evolved, so did the need for common practices.

The following are mandatory business rules for use by all strategic criminal intelligence analysts at Central Bureau.

- Footnote each separate piece of information, both unclassified and classified. Statements without footnotes will be assumed to be analytical judgements. Each footnote must include all applicable information: the information source, date of information and the security classification of the information.

- Each sentence should have a security classification in brackets following each sentence: Unclassified or 'UC', or Protected "A" or 'PA', or Protected "B" or 'PB.'

- All analysts will follow the agreed upon working terminology in order to ensure consistent use of terms within analytical products.

- Each analyst will maintain official files (electronic or hard copy) on assigned topics that contain official correspondence, draft submissions, and source documents. This information must be easily retrievable for addition to the official project file at the completion of the production as well as to answer any questions raised during the intelligence review processes.

- For all intelligence products, analysts will focus on intelligence judgements, implications and forecasts (ie. what *will* happen? *why* is this important?), not on current or background intelligence. Judgements and forecasts should be clear, concise and supported by valid and reliable information.

- There is a three-year time limit on information to be included in the *National Threat Assessment*. Any information over this limit will not be included in products, unless there are extenuating circumstances.

- Each analytical product at Central Bureau will be assigned one lead analyst for short analytical products and two lead analysts for each national assessment. Lead analysts are responsible for coordinating the production of the strategic assessment at each stage in the process up to and including its translation, review of translation, graphic design, printing and distribution. The leads function as assistant editors and provide feedback on each draft and direction for subsequent drafts.

a. The lead analysts report on the progress of the assessment to the team supervisor, who in turn advises the Manager, Strategic Analytical Services who functions as the chief editor and is the final authority on its contents and the final arbitrator, if necessary, to achieve a consensus on contentious issues.

- Each Central Bureau analytical product will follow the *Criminal Code* definition of a criminal group. Any so-called 'white-collar' criminal groups that meet this definition will be determined to be part of organized crime.

- The purpose of the Intelligence Review Board (IRB) is to conduct a constructive review of an intelligence assessment. Any proposed changes must be based on written documentation with accompanying substantiating evidence that is sent to CISC prior to the IRB or brought to and discussed at the IRB.

b. Analysts involved in producing the intelligence product are required to bring all relevant background material to the IRB in order to answer any questions.

c. Any significant changes to the intelligence product that result from discussions within the IRB will result in the product being re-disseminated to the IRB participants for final comments.

Flowchart of Integrated Threat Assessment Process

This chart depicts the outcomes from the cyclical ITA process, namely the integrated provincial & national threat assessments, the presentation to the coordinated enforcement targeting process, & the subsequent Central Bureau analytical products. The national planning meetings, steering committee & Central Bureau national intelligence requirements assist in guiding the evolution of the ITA process.

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                    ┌─────────────────────────┐
                    │ 2007                    │
                    │ Integrated              │
                    │ Collection Plan Process │
                    └─────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Integrated       │   │ National Threat  │───────▶│ Integrated Threat Assessment Planning │
│ Provincial       │   │ Assessment (NTA) │◀───────│ Meetings (National) & Steering        │
│ Threat           │   │                  │        │ Committee                             │
│ Assessments      │   └──────────────────┘        └──────────────────────────────────────┘
│ (PTAs)           │
└──────────────────┘                                ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
                                                    │ National Working Groups on            │
                                                    │ Criminal Harms, Analytical Tools &    │
                                                    │ Categorization of Organized Crime     │
┌──────────────────────────────────┐               └──────────────────────────────────────┘
│ Information from the PTAs and NTA │
│ are presented to the Provincial   │              ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐
│ and National Executive Committees.│              │ CISC Central Bureau National Criminal │
│ In a coordinated enforcement      │              │ Intelligence Requirements (levels     │
│ targeting process, representatives│              │ of knowledge & intelligence gaps)     │
│ of municipal, provincial and      │              └──────────────────────────────────────┘
│ federal law enforcement agencies  │
│ choose local, provincial and      │              ┌──────────────────────┐
│ national targets.                 │              │ 2008 Integrated      │
└──────────────────────────────────┘              │ National Collection  │
                                                   │ Plan Process         │
                    ┌─────────────────────┐        └──────────────────────┘
                    │ Intelligence in the │
                    │ NTA can lead to     │
                    │ other analytical    │
                    │ products for CISC   │
                    │ Central Bureau      │
                    └─────────────────────┘
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| Sentinels (Strategic Early Warning) | Strategic Intelligence Briefs | National Criminal Intelligence Estimate (for government) | Annual Report on Organized Crime (for public) |

Words of Estimative Probability

The following table assigns percentage values to certain qualifying phrases. The percentages are from Sherman Kent's "Words of Estimative Probability" from the Centre for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1964.

State of Probability		Phrases of Probability
	100% - certainty	
Almost certain	93% (Give or take about 6%)	Will Virtually certain Highly likely
Probable	75% (Give or take about 12%)	Likely Probable
Chances about even	50% (Give or take about 10%)	
Probably not	30% (Give or take about 10%)	Unlikely Low probability
Almost certainly not	7% (Give or take about 5%)	Virtually impossible Almost impossible Slight chance Highly doubtful Very unlikely Highly unlikely Extremely unlikely Little prospect
	0% - impossibility	

This table does not contain an exhaustive list of terminology that can be used to express probability. However, some standards in regards to the phrases used will ensure greater consistency in the language of judgements and forecasts (as well as how the analysis is interpreted by decision makers) within the criminal intelligence community.

Canadian Criminal Intelligence Model

The Canadian Criminal Intelligence Model (CCIM) is an end-to-end business process for effectively managing and integrating intelligence-led policing activity at all levels of law enforcement across Canada: municipal, provincial, federal and international. CISC Central Bureau is leading the coordination and implementation of CCIM with broad consultation from the criminal intelligence and wider law enforcement community. Its basic objective is to better inform strategic and tactical decision-making with sound intelligence products and services. The framework for the development of the CCIM is centred on four key pillars:

1. **Delivery of intelligence products and services.** The CCIM establishes nationally accepted standards through principal intelligence products such as the integrated provincial and national threat assessments, strategic and tactical assessments, and strategic early warning assessments (*Sentinels* and *Watch List*).

2. **Information/intelligence storage, retrieval and exchange**. The CCIM will establish processes and protocols to identify and prioritize critical intelligence gaps, collection strategies and communication procedures. These processes will assist law enforcement to address critical knowledge gaps and mitigate threats/risks while ensuring the delivery of timely information/intelligence between all CISC member agencies across Canada.

3. **Tasking, coordination and application**. The CCIM demands that strategic and operational decision-making processes are intelligence-led and that the analytical products both inform and drive tasking. This will provide both the framework and information to align resources to priorities and to revise the latter in the light of emerging threats or trends. An important component of this pillar is a quality assurance or audit mechanism to measure the value and effectiveness of the intelligence process and related products.

4. **Professionalization of the intelligence function**. The CCIM's focus on supporting intelligence-led policing places a renewed emphasis on the requirement for greater professionalism, ongoing training and development of intelligence specialists. This will involve the development and delivery of new training courses, career path development for intelligence personnel, as well as intelligence tradecraft doctrine development.

Key tenets of CCIM are to incorporate best practices and tools that are already in place, such as the Sleipnir threat assessment technique, Harm Prioritization Scale and integrated provincial and national threat assessments. CCIM also focuses on identifying and incorporating innovative processes, domestically and internationally from multiple disciplines. The integrated threat assessment methodology, contained within this document as a work in process, is also an important component of CCIM.

Terminology

These terms are to be considered working definitions for CISC Central Bureau for the integrated threat assessment process. They are gathered from a variety of law enforcement and intelligence agencies, academic publications and open source research, both domestic and international as well as from the CISC Central and Provincial Bureaus. This terminology will evolve as the integrated threat assessment process evolves.

Division of Canada into Regions

- Northern (Yukon, Northwest Territories & Nunavut),
- Pacific (British Columbia),
- Prairies (Alberta, Saskatchewan & Manitoba),
- Ontario
- Quebec
- Atlantic (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, PEI, Newfoundland & Labrador).

Criminal Scope

International Scope: A criminal group that has illicit activities that extend beyond Canada to another country (other than bordering U.S. states – see international cross-border scope), or that has criminal linkages/presence extending to another country that is the source or transit country for illicit commodities destined for Canada. Or, a foreign organized crime group that criminally operates in Canada or influences the Canadian criminal marketplace (ex. using Canada to launder money illicitly earned in another country).

International (Cross-border): Criminal groups evaluated as having an international cross-border scope are those that have criminal activities/linkages extending to U.S. northern border states or the French islands of St. Pierre and/or Miquelon off the Canadian east coast. (The U.S. states or French islands should have a geographic proximity to the Canadian province/territory in which the criminal group operates).

National Scope: Criminal groups evaluated as having a scope that encompasses at least two primary criminal hubs (ie. B.C. Lower Mainland, southern Ontario & greater Montreal region). (*See Criminal Hubs*).

Inter-provincial Scope: Criminal groups evaluated as having an inter-provincial scope within Canada are those that have criminal activities/linkages extending to two or more provinces or territories.

Intra-provincial Scope: Criminal groups evaluated as having an intra-provincial scope are those that have criminal activities/linkages that are localized within a single province but encompass more than one area (city, town, or rural area) within the province.

Localized Scope: Criminal groups evaluated as having a localized scope are those that have criminal activities/linkages that are localized within a single area (city, town, or rural area).

Unknown Scope: Criminal scope is unknown.

Level of International Criminal Scope: Limited (2 countries), Medium (3 to 4 countries), and Extensive (five and more countries).

Structure of Criminal Organizations

The following three definitions of criminal structure are derived from the United Nations' "Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries", 2002.

Criminal Network: Criminal networks are defined by the activities of key individuals who engage in illicit activity in often shifting alliances. Such individuals may not regard themselves as members of a criminal group, and may not be regarded as a criminal group by outsiders. Nevertheless, they coalesce around a series of criminal projects.

Hierarchy: This type of criminal group has a relatively defined hierarchy and systems of internal coordination or discipline. While social or ethnic identities can be present, this is not always the case. There may be a relatively clear allocation of tasks and some form of internal code of conduct.

Core Criminal Group: A core criminal group generally consists of a limited number of individuals who form a relatively tight and structured group. Around this core group there may be a large number of associate members or a network that are used from time to time. There may be an internal division of activities among members.

Nature of Criminal Bonds

The following definitions of criminal structure are derived from the London (United Kingdom) Metropolitan Police Service's definitions of networks. CISC Central Bureau added the "specialized network" to capture another dimension of criminal interactions.

Family Network: Some members or associates have familial bonds. These bonds may be cross-generational.

Cultural Network: The network shares bonds due to a shared culture, language, religion, ideology, country of origin and/or sense of identity. Some of these networks may shift over time from being culturally based to the proximal model.

Proximity Network: The network shares bonds due to certain geographical ties of its members (ex. past bonding in correctional or other institutions, or living within specific regions or neighbourhoods). Members may also form a network with proximity to an area strategic to their criminal interests (ex. a neighbourhood or key border entry point). There may be a dominant ethnicity within the group, but they are primarily together for other reasons.

Virtual Network: A criminal network that may never physically meet but work together through the Internet (ex. networks involved in online fraud, theft or money laundering).

Specialized Network: Individuals in this network come together to undertake criminal activities primarily based on the skills, expertise or particular capabilities they offer.

Levels of Criminal Threats

Higher-Level Criminal Threats
- Regularly conduct multiple criminal operations that involve specialized expertise or a higher level of sophistication, particularly importing illicit commodities directly from source location and/or exporting internationally, wholesale and/or mid-level distribution of illicit commodities and manufacturing (and/or directing/financing the manufacture) of illicit commodities at the wholesale level.
- Generally operates inter-provincially or internationally and has multiple criminal linkages to other crime groups in Canada and internationally.
- Regularly launders large sums and maintains multiple links to legitimate businesses for money laundering and to further legitimate and/or criminal activities.

Mid-level Criminal Threats
- Conduct some criminal operations with expertise such as involvement in the mid-level distribution of illicit commodities at the intra/inter-provincial, and to a lesser extent, international (cross-border) scope with some retail-level distribution. Involvement in international importation/exportation is rare.
- Criminal scope and linkages to other groups range from localized to international (cross-border) but infrequently extend internationally.
- Laundering of illicit proceeds occurs on a smaller and less frequent scale than higher-level groups. Maintain links to legitimate businesses for money laundering and to further legitimate and/or criminal activities.

Lower-Level Criminal Threats
- Tend to have specific and/or fixed levels of criminal activity that are lower level with little or no capability to expand the sophistication or scope of their criminal activities. Focus on retail-level distribution of illicit commodities with limited, if any, involvement in the importation or manufacture of illicit commodities.
- Limited number of criminal linkages within a restricted geographic location.
- Few, if any, links to legitimate businesses for money laundering, or to further legitimate and/or criminal activities. Laundering of illicit proceeds is unsophisticated with the majority of any proceeds are directed toward property investment and/or lifestyle maintenance.

Criminal Marketplace Roles – Illicit Commodities

Importer/Exporter: This refers to a criminal group involved in the importing/exporting of illicit commodities to another country. Typically, the criminal group has international or international (cross-border) scope or linkages.

Manufacturer: This refers to a criminal group involved in the manufacture, production or cultivation of illicit commodities (ex. marihuana, methamphetamine or counterfeit goods). Production quantities range among wholesale, mid-level or retail distribution levels.

Wholesale Distributor: This refers to a criminal group involved in the distribution of illicit commodities that are purchased directly from a source of supply or manufacture and are typically sold to mid-level distributors.

Mid-level Distributor: This refers to a criminal group in the distribution of illicit commodities that are purchased directly from wholesalers and are sold in smaller quantities to other mid-level distributors or to retail distributors.

Retail distributor (street-level)
This refers to a criminal group involved in the distribution of illicit commodities that are sold directly to end users in small amounts.

Criminal Marketplace Roles – Illicit Services

Transporter: This refers to a criminal group that transports illicit commodities either for its own benefit or on behalf of other criminal organizations.

Financier: This refers to a criminal group that is involved in funding criminal activity whether in a controlling manner or as an arms-length investor.

Facilitator/Broker: This refers to a criminal group that acts as a facilitator or provides necessary expertise, services, materials, or other assistance to another crime group or network. This group also has demonstrated ability to broker or orchestrate high-value criminal activity amongst various groups. This group can include corrupted professional intermediaries such as accountants, lawyers, real estate agents, mortgage brokers or commercial truck/helicopter pilots, amongst others.

Operative: This refers to a criminal group that commits core criminal functions (substantive offences), for example, drug offences, fraud, or proceeds of crime either for its own benefit or on behalf of other criminal groups.

General Terminology

Base of Operations: The location from which a criminal group's activities originate.

Basic (Background) Intelligence: Background intelligence, usually encyclopedic in nature, provides a broad range of baseline information and intelligence.

Canadian Criminal Intelligence Model (CCIM): The CCIM is an end-to-end process, led by CISC Central Bureau, for effectively managing and integrating intelligence-led policing at all levels of law enforcement across Canada. It is based upon four pillars:
- Delivery of intelligence products and services following accepted national standards
- Processes and protocols for information/intelligence storage, retrieval and exchange

- Intelligence-led tasking, coordination and application
- Professionalization of the intelligence function

Canadian Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Organized Crime: This strategy, devised and fully supported by the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) in cooperation with CISC, describes the process by which law enforcement will determine organized and serious crime priorities. Individuals representing municipal, provincial and federal law enforcement agencies will bring municipal and provincial enforcement priorities, established from the integrated provincial threat assessments, to the Provincial Enforcement Coordinating Committee. Inter-provincial, national and international-level threats identified in the *National Threat Assessment*, along with priorities identified at the Provincial Enforcement Coordinating Committee will be presented to the National Enforcement Coordinating Committee.

Capability: Capability is the function of the resources and knowledge available to a criminal group or subject. Each element can be assigned a value, either quantitative or qualitative.

Confidence: The confidence held by a threat that it will achieve its aim.

Categorization of Organized Crime Working Group: The cultural-geographic typology for categorizing criminal groups has limitations, given multiple multi-ethnic groups and groups with fluid networks or dynamic structures. In Canada, law enforcement is working to develop a framework that more accurately and effectively assesses the state of organized crime based on the level of threat posed by the groups.

Collection Requests: Collection requests are questions generated by analysts for intelligence officers on intelligence gaps in order to update and further assessments of particular criminal groups, issues or markets.

Criminal Hubs: The B.C. Lower Mainland, southern Ontario and the greater Montreal region are the primary criminal hubs in Canada with spokes of distribution and criminal influence extending from each hub to secondary criminal hubs. These secondary criminal hubs act as key mid-level distribution centres for the surrounding regions, following established networks extending outward to the smaller, tertiary hubs. The hubs are naturally formed around criminal markets in urban areas and are proportional in size to the urban centres in which they are located. There is interaction between hubs in Canada and other criminal hubs internationally.

Criminal Group of Interest: A criminal group of interest is one that, assessed in the criminal group inventory matrix, has some attributes indicating that it may be a higher-level criminal threat with inter-provincial or international/cross-border scope, or may present a significant criminal harm. However, significant information gaps prevent a determination of its capabilities, scope or harms. These types of groups are prioritized and become collection requests.

Criminal Group Inventory Matrix: This matrix is a comprehensive chart of all criminal groups identified in the integrated threat assessment process. It contains each group's name, cultural-geographic category, location of operations, involvement in each criminal market, methods of money laundering, criminal scope and Sleipnir score. Criminal groups can then be ranked as being higher-, mid- or lower-level threats. Analysis of the criminal harms these groups pose will complement evaluations of their capabilities.

Criminal Group or Organization: Defined in the *Criminal Code of Canada*, as a group, however organized, that is composed of three or more persons in or outside of Canada, and has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group.

Criminal Market: The criminal market is a network in which buyers and sellers interact to exchange goods and services for money. Within broad markets like illicit drugs, there are market subcategories with specific geographic locations and individual components (ex. heroin, cocaine). Each market subcategory can be analyzed in terms of suppliers, distributors, retailers, purchasers, the networks of interaction between goods and people, market scope, the types of goods, supply and demand for those goods, their price and their fluctuations, the distribution of those goods to different market segments, the size and length of the distribution chain and so on.

Criminal Scope: Criminal scope is the area in which a crime group operates, encompassing importation/exportation, manufacturing and distribution activities. It is assessed to range from international, international (cross-border), national, inter-provincial to intra-provincial, localized and unknown.

Cultural-geographic Groupings: Historically, law enforcement used broad-based groupings (i.e., Asian-based, Eastern European-based, Italian-based) to categorize organized criminal groups. For some criminal groups, these broad-based cultural-geographical groupings continue to be valid; others are more multi-ethnic in their membership and/or criminal associations. References to these groupings do not suggest that all members of that specific ethnic group are involved in organized crime or that the government of the country of origin or its authorized agencies permits or participates in any illegal activities. (*See Categorization of Organized Crime Working Group*).

Current Intelligence: Current intelligence is related to the status of an ongoing operational threat, event, environmental condition or indication of illicit activity.

Current Threats: Current threats are those that are actively occurring.

Drivers: Drivers (usually social, economic, political, institutional, technological or cultural in nature) are a collection of facts, trends and forecasts used for making judgements and recommendations regarding a particular issue or phenomenon. The drivers' underlying

causes can typically be subdivided into enabling conditions (risk factors) or constraining conditions (protective factors).

Estimative Intelligence: Estimative intelligence is that which provides forward looking assessment and predictive judgments, and attempts to project probable future developments in the law enforcement environment and analyses their implications.

Ethnographic Intelligence: This form of intelligence refers to information about indigenous, traditional or local forms of association, organization and methods of mobilization (ex. *hawala*). This information focuses on personal interactions, issues of cultural significance and how groups of people react to certain events.

Extent: Extent is the range across which the impact of the activity occurs. The extent of an activity should be assessed in relation to its possible occurrence.

Future Threats: Future threats are those that are not actively occurring, but have some probability of occurring in the future.

Harm: Harm refers to the magnitude and type of negative consequences that would occur should a threat be realized. Harm encompasses the adverse effects on the social, economic and political interests of all levels of society and refers not only to actual data but also to the perceive likelihood and impact of consequences.

Harm Analysis: This type of analysis involves analytical assessments using techniques to identify and assess harm levels. It will contribute to informing the deliberations of law enforcement management setting intelligence and enforcement priorities at the municipal, provincial and federal levels.

Harm Prioritization Scale (HPS): The RCMP-led HPS is designed to identify and objectively assess the harms caused by organized criminal activities in the social, environmental and economic realms. This technique, currently in the research and development phase, will rank the relative harms caused by specific criminal groups and will add an additional layer of analysis to complement Sleipnir matrices.

Impact: Impact is the degree, either directly or indirectly, to which the threat issue and/or criminal groups affects a specific area.

Impact Potential Key (from CISC Central Bureau, Strategic Early Warning)

Severe	Severe implications for the organized crime situation in Canada. Major impact will be felt across provincial and national borders.
High	Significant impact on organized criminal activity in Canada in multiple regions.
Medium	Moderate impact on organized criminal activity in Canada. Impact will be primarily in a single region, but effects there may be significant.
Low	Minor or highly localized impact on organized criminal activity in Canada.
Nil	Negligible impact on organized criminal activity in Canada. No warning necessary.

Indicator: An event or action which assists in the prediction of threat.

Intelligence: Intelligence is information that has been subjected to the process of planning direction, collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, dissemination and re-evaluation.

Intelligence Gaps: Information the intelligence community does not know about a criminal group, individual or topic of interest. Intelligence gaps should be turned into collection requests (collection plans).

Intelligence-led Policing: Intelligence-led policing involves the collection, analysis and sharing of information to produce an intelligence product designed to inform law enforcement decision-making at both the tactical and strategic levels.

Intent: Intent refers to the likely desire of a group (or subject) to engage in activities and the level of confidence of success. Intention is typically difficult to determine.

Levels of Knowledge: Levels of knowledge are formed through broad-based statements of knowledge about specific criminal markets or groups that reflect the criminal intelligence community's collective available information. The completeness of that knowledge is then evaluated as excellent, good, fair or poor. (*See National Criminal Intelligence Requirements*).

Likelihood: The potential for the occurrence of an event. Used as a qualitative description of probability and frequency.

Market Profiles: A market profile assesses the criminal market around a particular illicit commodity (ex. stolen vehicles) or service (ex. prostitution). It evaluates market activity, trends in availability, price, the key individuals, networks, criminal assets and associated trends in related criminality.

National Criminal Intelligence Requirements: This system provides an over-arching framework that coordinates the collection of information or the production of intelligence for any subject, general or specific. Within this system, there is a standardized, rigourous process by which all information is rated for reliability and validity, key intelligence gaps for focused collection efforts are identified, and levels of knowledge on specific issues are ranked. Priorities are then assigned to specific collection targets. (*See Intelligence Gaps and Levels of Knowledge*).

National Criminal Intelligence Requirements-based Collection vs. Traditional Collection (The following chart is from Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, by David L. Carter, PhD, 2004.)

Requirements Based	Collection Based
Analysis driven	Data driven
Contemplative	Exploratory
Emphasizes analysis of data	Emphasizes amassing data
Targeting/specificity on information	Aggregate approach to collection
Selective collection based on priorities	Generalized collection (dragnet)
Develops intelligence files for contingency needs (just in case information is needed)	Develops intelligence files in support of ongoing strategic products or needs
Statistics for decision making	Statistics for descriptive purposes

Operational Intelligence: Operational intelligence is the creation of an intelligence product which supports law enforcement management in planning crime reduction activity and deploying resources to achieve operational objectives.

Past Threats: Past threats are those that have occurred in the past, but are no longer active, although their effects may still persist.

Permanence: Permanence is the length of time needed for the affected community, area or market to recover from the criminal activity in question. Recovery is defined as the restoration of the structures, functions or processes to levels that existed prior to the activity's occurrence or existence as a threat. The degree of permanence, which could also be called resilience, will depend on such factors as the type of damage and the ability to restore the resources.

Probability: Probability is the likelihood of a specific outcome occurring in the future. Factors to consider include the degree and pervasiveness of this activity in the past, risk and protective factors.

Probability Coding Key (from CISC Central Bureau, Strategic Early Warning)

Certain	Threat scenario already occurring or its eventual occurrence is "almost certain". Probability at or above 85%
High	The occurrence of the threat scenario is "probable" to "highly likely". Probability at or above 70% but below 85%
Medium	There is a "better than even" to "likely" chance that the threat scenario will occur. Probability above 55% but below 70%
Low	Scenario occurrence is possible but "improbable"; "little chance" to "about even" chance of occurrence. Probability above 20% but at or below 55%
Nil	Probability of event occurrence is negligible or "highly unlikely". Probability at or below 20%

Resource: The material and experience the source of risk has at its disposal to take an action or achieve an aim.

Risk: Risk refers to the uncertainty that surrounds future events and outcomes. It is measured in terms of likelihood and harm (consequences) of an event with the potential to influence the achievement of an important objective. Often expressed as: Threat + Vulnerability = Risk.

Risk Analysis: In a law enforcement context, risk analysis assesses the scale of risks posed by individual offenders or criminal groups to potential victims, the public at large, and to law enforcement agencies.

Risk Assessment: A risk assessment is the process to determine risk management priorities by evaluating and comparing the level of risk against predetermined standards and other criteria. It describes and analyses the context within which the problem is located, identifies gaps in knowledge and measures likelihood and impact.

Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM): RAM provides a consistent framework within which possible sources of threat can be compared, the likelihood of threat is evaluated and harmful impacts assessed.

Risk Attributes: The factors that constitute a specific risk.

Sleipnir: Sleipnir is an RCMP-created analytical threat measurement technique that uses a rank-ordered set of criminal attributes (capabilities, limitations and vulnerabilities) to assess the relative threat posed by organized criminal groups. Values are then assigned to each attribute: high, medium, low, nil or unknown.

Social Network Analysis: Social network analysis is an analytical technique mapping relationships between individuals, organization or resources. It examines such issues as the prominence of particular individuals; the concept of centrality, i.e., the individual in the network with the most—or most important—ties to other actors; and the notions of closeness and distance based on communication paths among the actors in the network.

Statement of Knowledge: These statements form the basis for levels of knowledge about specific criminal markets or groups. Knowledge on the components of each market (ex. importation/exportation, manufacturing, distribution) or each group (ex. capabilities, intentions, threats, vulnerabilities) form broad-based statements of knowledge. (*See National Criminal Intelligence Requirements)*.

Strategic Analysis: Strategic intelligence provides a strategic context for understanding emerging threats, gives a foresight capacity to allow the development of targeted strategies, narrows the range of uncertainty and ensures that this analysis is provided in an appropriate form to the appropriate policy makers at the right time.

Strategic Assessments: These assessments give a high-level, long-term evaluation of a particular issue, relevant patterns and trends and forecast likely future developments to assist planning and policy making.

Strategic Early Warning: This type of intelligence aims to provide timely warnings to decision and policy makers of potential or likely threats and issues by assessing the impact of observed threats, events and trends on the criminal justice environment. CISC Central Bureau designed, developed and implemented a 'strategic early warning' methodology and system.

Strategic Intelligence: Strategic intelligence provides a comprehensive and current picture of the scope and direction of criminal activity in order to assist management decision-making and the determination of future action.

Subject of Interest: A person actively involved in criminal activities that are far-reaching geographically and have significant harm. The subject typically operates in multiple locations, multiple criminal commodities and is a facilitator of more than one criminal organization.

Target Profile: A target profile is person(s) specific and contains sufficient detail to initiate a target operation or support an ongoing operation against an individual or networked group of individuals. The target profile includes a best course of action and proposals to fill the gaps in the intelligence picture.

Threat: Threat is based on a group's (or subject's) intent and capability and is a measure of how likely the success in carrying out some activity that may cause harm.

Threat Assessment: Threat assessments are strategic intelligence products that provide analysis of the capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities and limitations of groups posing an organized crime or national security threat. Their outlook is generally long term and future-oriented.

Threat Magnitude: Threat magnitude is a combination of criminal scope and severity of impact.

Uncertainty: Uncertainty is a broad term to refer to things that are unknown or incompletely understood. It is the degree to which the lack of knowledge is responsible for hesitancy in accepting results and observations without caution.

Vulnerability: Vulnerability is defined as the probability of a successful attack. Vulnerability of each element at risk can be measured along a continuum from total resilience at one end to total susceptibility at the other.

Vulnerability Analysis: Vulnerability analysis is the process of calculating the vulnerability of essential components or communities (critical nodes), understanding the linkages and relationships among critical nodes (network analysis), and focusing on what is critical and what is desirable to protect.

Warning Intelligence: Warning intelligence bridges the current and estimative intelligence gap by focusing on agreed warning problems as part of a decision support mechanism that requires rapid alert and some form of policy, intelligence or operational response.

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